# THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY:

CONTAINING

The Lives, Opinions, Actions and Diſcourſes

OF THE

# PHILOSOPHERS

Of every SECT.

Illuſtrated with the EFFIGIES of divers of Them.

BY

THOMAS STANLEY, Eſq;

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To my Honoured Uncle

# JOHN MARSHAM, Esq;

*SIR,*

I SEND this Book to you, becauſe you firſt directed me to this deſign; The Learned *Gaſſendus* was my precedent; whom nevertheleſs I have not followed in his partiality: For he, though limited to a ſingle perſon, yet giveth himſelf liberty of enlargement, and taketh occaſion from this ſubject to make the World acquainted with many excellent Diſquiſitions of his own. Our ſcope being of a greater latitude, affords leſs opportunity to favour any particular; whilſt there is due to every one the commendation of their own deſerts. This benefit I hope to have received from the variety of the ſubject; but far more are thoſe I owe to your encouragement, which if I could wiſh leſs, I ſhould upon this occaſion, that there might ſeem to have been expreſſed ſomething of choice and inclination in this action, which is now but an inconſiderable effect of the gratitude of,

*Dear Uncle,*

Nephew of John Marsham Esq^r

*Your moſt affectionate Nephew, and*

*humble Servant,*

THOMAS STANLEY.

A PREFACE.

# PREFACE.

*History (which by expounding actions past teacheth to regulate the future, and furnisheth us with wisdom at the cost of other Mens experience) is not unlike Painting: their scope is the same; and as in the latter it argues want of skill to look upon the whole Draught with an indifferent eye, but to select and insist upon some chief particular is proper to an Artist; so he who rests satisfied with the general relation of affairs, (not fixing upon some eminent Actor in that Story) loseth its greatest benefit; since what is most particular, by its nearer affinity with us, hath greatest influence upon us.*

*Hence it is that there are two kinds of History; One represents general affairs of State; The other gives account of particular persons, whose lives have rendred them eminent.* Homer *hath given an essay of each; of the first in his* Iliads, *a relation of a War betwixt different Nations; of the second in his* Odysses, *confined to the person of* Ulysses.

*Now the life of Man being either* practick, *busied in civil affairs of Peace and War, or* Contemplative, *retir'd from publick business to speculation and study of wisdom, Divine or Humane, it follows that this personal History be twofold likewise, describing either the actions of such persons as are wholly interested in affairs of State (properly compar'd to the persons of a drammatical design, whose single Characters and Parts, serve one only to make up one joint plot. Such are most of those whose lives are related by* Plutarch, *and the twelve* Cæsars *of* Suetonius) *or the lives of such as have been excellent in some kind of learning; thus* Antipho *writ of Poets;* Eudemus *of Astrologers;* Cicero *and* Plutarch *of Orators,* Suetonius *of Grammarians. They who writ of Philosophers exceeded the rest far in number, of whom to give a particular account will be unnecessary, because their Works are not extant, and therefore we shall only name them,* Aetius, Anaxilides, Antigonus, Antisthenes, Aristocles Aristoxenus, Callimachus, Clitomachus, Diocles, Diogenes, Laertius, Eunapius, Heraclides, Hermippus, Hesychius, Hippobotus, Son, Idomeneus, Nicander, Nicias, Panætius, Porrius, Plutarch, Sotion *and* Theodorus.

*Of almost all these (which is much to be deplored) there remain not any footsteps; the only Author in this kind for the more ancient Philosophers is* Diogenes Laertius, *for the later* Eunapius. *And to make the misfortune the greater, that which* Laertius *gives us is so far short of what he might have done, that there is much more to be found of the same persons dispersed amongst other Authors, which I have here collected and digested, with what diligence I could.*

*Nor is it unseasonable at this time to examine the tenents of old Philosophers, when so great variety of opinions daily spring up; some of which are but raked out of the ruines of antiquity, which ought to be restored to their first owners; others being of late invention will receive addition, when advanced to such height we look down to the bottom from which Philosophy took her first rise, and see how great a progress she hath made, whose beginnings are almost inscrutable.*

*Although some* Grecians *have challenged to their Nation the Original of Philosophy, yet the more learned of them have acknowledged it derived from the* East. *To omit the dark traditions of the* Athenians *concerning* Musæus, *of the* Thebanes *concerning* Linus, *and of the* Thracians *about* Orpheus, *it is manifest that the original of the* Greek *Philosophy is to be deriv'd from* Thales, *who travelling into the* East, *first brought Natural learning,* Geometry, *and* Astrology, *thence into* Greece, *for which reason the Attribute of* Wise *was conferred upon him, and at the same time upon six others for their eminence in morality and politicks. Thus learning in the ancienteſt*

*cienteſt times was by the* Greeks *called* Sophia (wiſdom) *and the profeſſor thereof, who raiſed his Soul to an eminent degree of knowledge,* Sophos (wiſe) Pythagoras *firſt named it* Philoſophy (love of wiſdom) *and himſelf a* Philoſopher, *affirming that no Man is wiſe, but only God.*

* *Laert. vit. Thalet.*

* *As concerning thoſe who were honoured with this Attribute of* Wiſe, Damon *the* Cyrenean *undervalues them all, eſpecially the ſeven.* Anaximenes *ſaith, They were all addicted to Poetry;* Dicæarchus, *that they were neither wiſe Men, nor Philoſophers, but upright Men and Lawgivers:* Archetimus *the* Syracuſian *wrote concerning their meeting with* Cypſelus (*Father to* Periander) *whereat he ſaith himſelf was preſent.* Ephorus *affirms they all met with* Crœſus, Thales *only excepted. Some ſay they met alſo at the* Panionian *Feaſt, and at* Corinth *with* Periander *at* Delphi.

*There is ſome controverſie concerning their Sentences, of which ſome are aſcribed to ſeveral perſons, as that,*

*Lacedæmonian Chilon* this profeſt,
Nothing too much; a mean in all is beſt.

† Not *Leophantum Gorſiadem* as the Interpreters render.

* So *Suidas* Ἀχυσίλαος Κάδα υἱὸς Ἀργεῖος, by which *Laertius* is explain'd contrary to the Interpreters.

*There is no leſs diſſent concerning their number.* Leandrius *for* Cleobulus *and* Myſon, *inſerts* Leophantus *Son of* † Gorſiades *a* Lebedion, *or* Epheſian, *and* Epimenides *the* Cretan. Plato (*in his* Protagoras) *ſubſtitutes* Myſon *for* Periander: Ephorus, Anacharſis *for* Myſon. *Some add* Pythagoras. Dicæarchus *alledgeth four, acknowledg'd by all,* Thales, Bias, Pittacus *and* Solon: *then names ſix more, out of which are to be ſelected three,* Ariſtodemus, Pamphilus, Chilon *the* Lacedæmonian, Cleobulus, Anacharſis, Periander; *ſome add* * Acuſilaus *Son of* Caba *or* Scabra *an* Argive. Hermippus *in his Treatiſe of the ſeven wiſe Men ſaith, they were in all ſeventeen, of which ſeven were variouſly named, which were* Solon, Thales, Pittacus, Bias, Chilon, Cleobulus, Periander, Anacharſis, Acuſilaus, Epimenides, Leophantus, Pherecydes, Ariſtodemus, Pythagoras, Laſus *of* Hermionea, *Son of* Charmantides, *or (according to* Ariſtoxenus) *of* Simbrinus, Anaxagoras. Hippobotus *in his commentary of Philoſophers reckons* Linus, Orpheus, Solon, Periander, Anacharſis, Cleobulus, Myſon, Thales, Bias, Pittacus, Epicharmus, Pythagoras.

Laertius *reckons them thus,* Thales, Solon, Chilon, Pittacus, Bias, Cleobulus, Periander; *whereto he adds* Anacharſis, Myſon, Epimenides, *and* Pherecydes. *Theſe, ſaith he, were called* the wiſe Men, *to whom ſome annex* Piſiſtratus *the Tyrant.*

*Amongſt the* Romans *alſo three had the ſirname of* Sapiens, M. Cato, C. Lælius, *and* L. Acilius.

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*Diogenes Laertius*, frequently in the *Greek* Philoſophy.
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*Iamblichus*, frequently in the Life and Doctrine of *Pythagoras*.

*Marmora Arundeliana*, Chilon. ch. 1. Xenoph. ch. 2.

*Nicomachus*, frequently, Pyth. doctr.

*Pliny*, Pyth. ch. 20.
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*Sextus Empiricus*, his Pyrrhonian Hypotypoſes, in the Scepticiſm.
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*Engubinus*, Pla. ch. 4.

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*Kircher*, Chald. ſect. 1. ch. 2. and frequently in the *Chaldaick* Doctrine.

*Leo Allatius*, Socrat. ch. 1. 12. Epiſt. 1. 6. Xenoph. Epiſt. 5. 8. Simon. Ariſtip. ch. 8.
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*FINIS.*

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

## The First Part,

Containing thoſe on whom the Attribute of WISE was conferred.

## THALES.

### CHAP. I.

*The Country and Parents of* Thales.

GReat wits, which have been happy in benefiting Poſterity by their excellent inventions, have not always had the fortune to enjoy the juſt reward, their glory being intercepted oftentimes by ſome later diſguiſe of alteration or addition. It were therefore grati-

tude in us, who find our ſelves inſtructed by the Ancients, to vindicate the memory of our Maſters, by enquiring diligently the Authors of thoſe Labors whereof we reap the Harveſt. This kind of injury hath happened very conſiderably to *THALES* the wiſe Man of *Miletus*, who firſt introduc'd Natural and Mathematical Learning into *Greece*, from whence it is derived to us; but the honour of ſo noble a deſign, the ambitious oppoſition of ſome, the induſtry of others hath ſo obſcur'd, that there is little of the reputation left to the deſerving Author. I have therefore eſteemed it worth my pains, to digeſt what I could collect or obſerve of a perſon, to whom all lovers of Learning are ſo much oblig'd.

The Original of *Thales* is very obſcurely delivered. Some conceive he was a *Phœnician* by birth, whoſe opinion ſeeming to be ſtrongly founded upon *Laertius*, and the Authorities by him alledged, it is neceſſary that we begin with a diſquiſition upon his words, which are, as commonly rendred, theſe:

*Now* Thales *was born, as* Herodotus, Duris *and* Democritus *affirm, his Father being* Examius, *his Mother* Cleobulina, *of the* Thelidæ, *who were* Phœnicians, *the moſt illuſtrious of all from* Cadmus *and* Agenor, *as* Plato *alſo ſaith.* ] The Teſtimony of *Herodotus*, though * *Higynus* and * *Suidas* ſeem to underſtand it according to the common error, as if he were born in *Phœnicia*, expreſly confirms the contrary, being thus: *Thales* a *Mileſian*, afar off by deſcent a *Phœnician*; whence we may gather, that the other two Authorities of *Duris* and *Democritus* imported little more, or at leaſt nothing to a contrary ſenſe. So likewiſe that of *Leander*, which is by * *Clemens Alexandrinus* cited jointly with *Herodotus*, to prove him of a *Phœnician* extract.

*He was made free of* Miletus *when he went with* Neleus *who was baniſh'd out of* Phœnicia. ] The learned (a) *Caſaubon* to reconcile this Story with that of *Neleus*, who was not baniſh'd out of *Phœnicia*, when he built *Miletus*, for ὅτε ἦλθε σὺν Νειλεῖ ἐκπεσὼν φοινίκης, *reads*, ἐκπεσὼν ἀ φοινίκης, as if *Thales* being baniſh'd out of *Phœnicia* had gone with *Neleus* to *Miletus*; which alteration begetteth a very great Anachroniſm, for this *Thales* was above four hundred years later than that *Neleus*. Therefore if *Laertius* meant the ſame *Neleus*, either he was ſtrangely miſtaken, or his Text is corrupt, and ought to be underſtood of the Anceſtors of *Thales*, to which ſenſe it may be reduc'd with little alteration, thus, ἐπολιτογραφήθη ἢ ἐν Μιλήτῳ ὅτε ἦλθεν σὺν Νειλεῖ ἐκπεσόντι φοίνικες, *i. e.* if they being *Phœnicians*, went into *Caria*, and became Citizens of *Miletus*, at what time *Neleus* Son of *Codrus*, being put beſide the Kingdom of *Athens* by his younger Brother *Medon*, led thither the *Ionian* Colonies, whereof *Miletus* (which he built) was the chief City. Of this Colony ſee *Herodotus*, *Strabo*, and *Ælian*.

*But as moſt ſay he was born there, at* Miletus, *and of a noble Race:* ] So they render Θαλῆν, but in oppoſition to the firſt opinion, which only mentions his Family, not Country, it may perhaps be underſtood here in the ſame relation: Some (ſaith he) think he was of a *Phœnician* extract, of thoſe who were incorporated at *Miletus*; others that he was of a *Grecian* Family, and that noble. Of this latter opinion is (b) *Plutarch*, who reproves *Herodotus* for making *Thales* deſcended afar off from a *Barbarian* ſtock, and (c) *Hermippus*, who aſcribes that ſaying to him, that he thanked the Gods he was a *Grecian*, not a *Barbarian*.

(b) *De Herod. malign.*

(c) *Laert. vit. Thal.*

## CHAP. II.

### *Of the time of his Birth.*

APollodorus *ſaith, that* Thales *was born the firſt year of the thirty fifth Olympiad*; * Demetrius Phalereus *ſaith, that he was honored with the title of Wiſe, when* Damaſias *was* Archon. Damaſias *was* Archon *according to* (a) Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus *the ſecond year of the thirty fifth Olympiad, when* Ancus Martius *the fourth King of* Rome *began his Reign.*

* *Laert.*

* *Laert.*

(a) *Liv. 3.*

Hereupon an Anachroniſm of one year is ſuppoſed by very learned Men, who would have *Thales* to be born the ſame year that *Damaſias* was Archon. Whence (b) *Sigonius*, (c) *Voſſius*, and others bring down the Birth of *Thales* to the ſecond year of this Olympiad; (d) *Scaliger*, (e) *Meurſius*. (f) *Petavius* and others raiſe *Damaſias* to the firſt year, that they may make his Magiſtracy agree with *Thales*'s Birth; neither rightly; for the office of *Damaſias* relateth not to the Birth of *Thales*. For the clearing whereof we muſt take notice, that *Damaſias* in the *Athenian Faſti* is twice ſaid to be Archon, firſt in the ſecond year of the thirty fifth Olympiad, the next year after the Birth of *Thales*, and again the fourth year of the forty eighth Olympiad, when he obtained the title of *Wiſe*; the latter we cannot mention without acknowledgment of the great light Chronology hath received by Mr. *Selden*'s *Marmora Arundeliana*.

(b) *De Athenis. tempor.*

(c) *De ſcient. mathemat.* 32. 8.

(d) *In Euſeb.*

(e) *Archont. l.* 11.

(f) *Rationar. temp.* 2. 12.

It will be alſo worth obſervance, that there was another of this name, whom *Euſebius* placeth at the eighth Olympiad, and *Laertius* and (g) *Plutarch* make contemporary with *Homer*, *Heſiod* and *Lycurgus*. (h) *Scaliger*, who perceived the inconſiſtency of this account, perceived not the reaſon of it; for (i) *Lycurgus* and *Iphitus* inſtituted the Olympick Games twenty ſeven Olympiads before *Coræbus* was Victor, who according to *Euſebius* is the firſt. Theſe two *Thales* are by ſome confounded; *Euſebius* calls the firſt a Natural Philoſopher, whereas it is certain that kind of Learning was firſt introduc'd into *Greece* by the ſecond. (k) *Suidas* cites *Phlegon*, that the latter *Thales* flouriſh'd in the ſeventh Olympiad, which *Phlegon* doubtleſs meant of the firſt. (l) They who place *Thales* about the ſeventh Olympiad, and make him contemporary with *Romulus*, confound the latter *Thales* with the firſt, and the true Epocha of the Olympiads with the vulgar. For the firſt *Thales* lived in the ſeventh Olympiad from the firſt of *Iphitus*; *Romulus* liv'd about the ſame diſtance from the Olympiad of *Coræbus*.

(g) *Vita Lycurg.*

(h) *In Euſeb.*

(i) *Phlegon. fragm.*

(k) *In voce Thales.*

(l) *See St. Auguſtin. de civit. Dei, lib.* 18. *cap.* 24, *&* 27.

This time is miſtaken by that learned Father *Clemens Alexandrinus*, to prove *Thales* younger than the later Prophets. (m) *Thus* (ſaith he) *it is demonſtrated that they who propheſied in the time of* Darius Hyſtaſpes *in the ſecond year of his Reign*,

(m) *Stromat. I.*

* *Aſtronom. Natione fuit Phœnix, ut Herodotus Mileſius dicit.* Which doubtleſs is corrupt (for what *Herodotus is* that?) and to be reſtored to this effect, *Natione fuit Phœnix ut Herodotus, Mileſius ut alii dicunt.*

(a) *In voce Thales.*

*Reign, that is to ſay,* Aggæus, Zacharias, *and* Malachy, *who was one of the twelve, ſeeing that they propheſied in the firſt year of the forty eighth Olympiad, were more ancient than* Pythagoras, *who is ſaid to have been in the ſixty ſecond Olympiad*; *and then* Thales *eldeſt of the* Greek *Sages, who was about the fiftieth Olympiad*; as if this were not rather an argument to prove theſe Prophets contemporary with *Thales*, which *Euſebius* allows. * *About the time* (ſaith he) *of* Cyrus *King of* Perſia, *the ſeven wiſe Men flouriſhed*; *this was the time in which the laſt of the* Hebrew *Prophets propheſied, ſince* Troy, *above ſix hundred years, after* Moſes, *no leſs than fifteen hundred years.* But if with *Clemens Alexandrinus* we account theſe Prophets coætaneous with *Darius Hyſtaſpes*, they will appear much younger than *Thales*, for *Darius* began his Reign in the laſt year of the ſixty fourth Olympiad.

* *Præpar. Evangel.* 10 4.

## CHAP. III.

### *His Travels.*

HE employ'd the firſt and greateſt part of his time in Travel; he went to *Creet*, to inform himſelf of the Myſteries of their Religion (for that Iſland was famous for the Birth of *Jupiter*) as is acknowledg'd by himſelf in an (*a*) Epiſtle to *Pherecydes*.

(*a*) *Laert.*

That he travell'd alſo into *Aſia* is affirmed in the ſame Epiſtles; ſome ſay into *Phœnicia*, arguing from his Aſtrology which he is thought to have learned of the *Phœnicians*, Maſters of that Science; and particularly becauſe he is ſaid to have firſt obſerved the conſtellation of the *Leſſer Bear* by which the *Phœnicians* ſailed. (*b*) *Voſſius* eſſays to prove the word *Cynoſura* to be *Phœnician*, not as deriv'd from κυνὸς, οὐρὰ but from כנם and אור as being a *Collection of light*; or בונש אורא *Umbilicus igneus*.

(*b*) *De Scient. Mathemat. cap.* 32.

His laſt journey (being (*c*) in years) was into *Ægypt*, to confer (as he acknowledgeth in his Epiſtle to *Pherecydes*) with Prieſts and Aſtronomers. There he was inſtructed by the Prieſts at *Memphis*, particularly (ſaith * *Jamblicus*) by thoſe of *Jupiter*. *Laertius* affirms he learnt Geometry of them; * *Plutarch* implies as much of his Philoſophy.

(*c*) *Plut. de plac. phil.* 1.

* *Vit. Pythag.* 1, 2.

He was there in the Reign of (*d*) *Amaſis, by whom much favour'd and admir'd for many things, eſpecially for meaſuring the height of the Pyramids by the ſhadow*; *until at laſt accuſed to him of diſ-affection to Monarchs and that kind of Government, to which effect many bitter ſayings of his were alledged concerning Tyrants. As when* Molpagoras *an eminent Perſon of* Ionia *demanded what was the ſtrangeſt ſight he ever ſaw, he anſwered, A Tyrant old. Another time being at a Feaſt where a queſtion aroſe, what Beaſts were moſt dangerous*; *of wild, ſaith he, a Tyrant, of tame, a Flatterer*; *and Princes* (ſaith *Plutarch*) *however they profeſs themſelves far different from Tyrants, yet take no pleaſure in ſuch Apothegms:* hereupon he loſt the favour of *Amaſis*. Thus having ſtudied Philoſophy in *Ægypt*, he returned to *Miletus*, and (*e*) tranſported that vaſt ſtock of Learning which he had there collected, into his own Country.

(*d*) *Plutarch. Symp. ſept. ſap. conviv.*

(*e*) *Cyril.*

## CHAP. IV.

### *How he lived at* Miletus.

HIS life at *Miletus* (as (*a*) *Heraclides* affirms) was retir'd and private; ſome report he married and had a Son named *Cybiſſus*, but the truer opinion is of thoſe who ſay he lived unmarried, and made his (*b*) Siſters Son (whom (*c*) *Plutarch* calls *Cybiſthus*) his Heir (*d*). He put off his Mother when ſhe firſt moved him to Marry, by telling her it was not yet time; and when he was more in years, being again ſollicited by her, he anſwered, Nor is it now time, meaning it was then too late. Being demanded why he took not ſome courſe to have iſſue, he anſwer'd, διὰ φιλοτικνίαν, which is the ſame in pronouncing with δι' ἀφλοτικνίαν, and may be taken either *becauſe he loved Children*, or *did not love them*, as (*e*) *Caſaubon* conjectures; but perhaps his meaning may better be gather'd out of another anſwer of his to the ſame queſtion, (*f*) *that he did not mean to draw voluntary cares upon his life, and diſturb the quiet thereof*; or from this ſtory related by (*g*) *Plutarch*.

(*a*) *Laert.*

(*b*) *Laert. Suid. in Θαλ.*

(*c*) *Vitâ Solon.*

(*d*) *Laert. Plut. Symposiac.* 3. 6. *Stob. Serm.* 66.

(*e*) *In Laertium.*

(*f*) *Stob. ſerm.* 66.

(*g*) *Vita Solon.*

Solon *coming to* Miletus *to viſit him, told him that he wondred he wholly neglected Marriage and iſſue.* Thales *at that time anſwered nothing, but ſome few days after ſuborned a ſtranger to pretend that he came within ten days from* Athens; Solon *demanded what news from thence*; *nothing* (*anſwered the other as he was inſtructed*) *but the burial of a young Man attended by the whole City, being as was ſaid Son of the moſt eminent Perſon of the City, who at the ſame time was abroad in travel. Unhappy Man* (*crys* Solon) *what was his name? I heard it, anſwered the other, but have forgot, only I remember he was very famous for Wiſdom and Juſtice.* Solon's *fear encreaſing upon every anſwer, he at laſt asked him, if the Fathers name were not* Solon? *which the other affirming, he beat his own Head, and did other actions accompanied with ſpeeches proper to ſuch as are tranſported with grief*; *wherenpon* Thales *ſmiling, and interrupting him*; *Theſe things,* Solon, *ſaid he, deterr'd me from marriage, which thus diſorder even thee a moſt conſtant perſon, but be not troubl'd at this news, it is counterfeit.*

In this privacy of life he was ſolicited and ſent unto by many Princes, whoſe invitations and amities, (*Plutarch* (*h*) ſaith) he refuſed; viſited by many eminent perſons.

(*h*) *Sept. ſap. conviv.*

(*i*) He is ſaid to have cohabited ſome time with *Thraſibulus* (a Man of excellent Wit and Judgment) who was King, or (according to the Greek word) Tyrant of *Miletus*, (*k*) though his Reign continued but eleven months; (*l*) about the time that the *Mileſians* enter'd into a League with *Alyates* the ſecond then King of *Lydia*.

(*i*) *Laert.*

(*k*) *Ariſt. pol.* 5. *ultim.*

(*l*) *Herodot.* 1.

## CHAP. V.

### *The attribute of* Wiſe *conferred on him.*

THE attribute of *Wiſe*, as (*a*) *Plutarch* and Saint *Auguſtine* † obſerve, was conferr'd upon the reſt in reſpect of their moral rules and practice, but upon *Thales* particularly for his

(*a*) *Vit. Solon.* † *De civit. Dei*, 8. 2.

ſpeculative Learning. It was firſt beſtow'd on *Thales*, at what time *Damaſias* was Archon, *under whom* (according to (*b*) *Demetrius Phalareus*) *all the ſeven were called* Wiſe. The ſecond *Damaſias* was Archon in the third year of the 49th Olympiad, which (*c*) *Salmaſius* knew not, when to make the words of *Laertius* agree with the firſt *Damaſias*, he miſ-interpreted *Euſebius* and *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and ſubverted all other accounts of the Birth and Death of *Thales*, whereas this fortunately complies with the times of all the ſeven.

(*b*) *Laert.*

(*c*) *Exercitat. Plinian. pag.* 843.

The firſt was *Thales*, juſtly prefer'd before the reſt in reſpect of his great Learning, which he owed not to any Maſter. The time when this honour was conferred on him, falls upon the fifty ninth year of his age.

The ſecond, *Pittacus* of *Mitylene* who flouriſhed in the forty ſecond Olympiad, and died in the third year of the fifty ſecond.

The third, *Bias* of *Priene*, contemporary with *Pittacus*, living under *Alyattes* and *Cræſus*.

The fourth, *Solon*, who was Archon at *Athens* the third year of the forty ſixth Olympiad. He died Olymp. 55.

The fifth, *Cleobulus* of *Lindus*, coetaneous with *Solon*.

The ſixth, *Myſon* of *Chene*.

The ſeventh, *Chilon* of *Lacedæmon*, who was *Ephorus*, Olymp. 56.

*The credit and glory of theſe ſeven, was much encreaſed* (ſaith *Plutarch*) *by a Tripod ſent round from one to another, by a mutual, noble and modeſt conceſſion: the occaſion related thus, by* Laertius *and* Valerius Maximus.

(*d*) *Laert.*

(*e*) *Valer. Maxim.* 4. 1.

(*f*) *Laert.*

(*g*) *Val. Max.*

(*d*) *Some young Men of* Ionia *having bought a Draught of the* Mileſian *Fiſhermen, when the Net was drawn up, there was found in it a Tripod,* [(*e*) a golden Delphick Table of great weight.] (*f*) *Hereupon aroſe a diſpute,* [(*g*) thoſe affirming they had bargain'd only for the Fiſh; the others, that they bought the Draught at a venture: by reaſon of the ſtrangeneſs of the caſe, and the value of the Tripod, it was delivered to the City *Miletus*.] (*h*) *The* Mileſians *ſent to the Oracle at* Delphi *about it, and received this anſwer:*

(*h*) *Laert.*

Com'ſt thou *Mileſian* to conſult my Shrine?
The Tripod to the wiſeſt I aſſign.

*Hereupon the* Mileſians, *by agreement, preſented it to* Thales, *he ſent it to* Bias, Bias *to* Pittacus, *he to another, till it paſt through all the ſeven, coming at laſt to* Solon, *who affirming God to be the wiſeſt, ſent it back to* Delphi, [(*i*) giving him at once the title and reward of greateſt Wiſdom.]

(*i*) *Val. Max.*

*But* Callimachus *in his* Iambicks, (*continueth* Laertius) *relates it otherwiſe; that* Bathycles *an* Arcadian *left a Cup, with order that it ſhould be given to the wiſeſt, whereupon it was preſented to* Thales, *and paſt about in courſe till it came to him again, who then dedicated it to* Apollo Didymæus, *with theſe Verſes, according to* Callimachus:

*Thales* to him that rules th' *Ionian* State
This twice obtained prize doth conſecrate.

*In Proſe thus,* Thales *the* Mileſian, *Son of* Examius, *to* Delphian Apollo *of the* Grecians *offers this twice received Prize of eminence. He that carried the Cup from one to another, was* Thyrion, *Son to* Bathycles,] whither allude theſe Verſes of (*k*) *Phœnix Colophonius.*

(*k*) *Athen. deipn.*

Thales, *whoſe Birth his Country bleſt,*
*Eſteemed of all Men the beſt:*
*Was of the golden Cup poſſeſt.*

Eudoxius *of* Gnidus, *and* Euanthes *of* Miletus, *report that a Friend of* Cræſus *having receiv'd from him a golden Cup to be given to the wiſeſt of the* Grecians, *deliver'd it to* Thales, *and that at laſt it came to* Solon, *who ſending to the* Pythian *Oracle to know who was the wiſeſt, was anſwer'd* Myſon; *whom* Eudoxius *ſubſtitutes for* Cleobulus, Plato *for* Periander; *the Oracle concerning* Myſon *was this:*

*Octaan Myſon* I declare
Wiſer than thoſe that wiſeſt are.

*He that was ſent upon the enquiry was* Anacharſis. Dædacus *the* Platoniſt, *and* Clearchus *affirm, that the Cup was ſent by* Cræſus *to* Pittacus, *and ſo carried about. Andron* in *Tripode,* (which ſeems to have been a diſcourſe wholly upon this ſubject, and is likewiſe cited by *Clemens Alexandrinus*, to prove that *Thales* and the other ſix flouriſh'd about the fiftieth Olympiad) *writes, that the* Argives *propoſed this Tripod as a Prize to the wiſeſt of the* Greeks, *and that it was adjudged to* Ariſtodemus *a* Spartan, *who reſigned it to* Chilon; Ariſtodemus *is mentioned by* Alchæus.

This Speech we owe to *Ariſtodemus*
Mony's the Man, none's poor and honeſt too.

*There are who report that a Ship richly laden, ſent by* Periander *to* Thraſibulus *Tyrant of* Miletus, *was caſt away in the* Coan *Sea, and the Tripod taken up by ſome Fiſhermen.* Phanodius *affirms it was loſt in the* Athenian *Sea, and afterwards brought to the City, and upon conſultation voted to be ſent to* Bias. *Others ſay this Tripod was made by* Vulcan, *who gave it to* Pelops *as his Wives Portion; from him it came to* Menelaus, *and afterwards being taken away with* Hellen *by* Paris, *was by the* Lacedæmonian [Hellen] *thrown into the Sea, calling to mind* [(*l*) an old Oracle] *that it would prove in time to come the ground of many contentions. After this ſome* Lebedians *fiſhing thereabouts drew it up, and quarrelling with the Fiſhermen about it, it was brought to* Coos, *but the controverſie not decided, the buſineſs was told to thoſe of* Miletus, *which is the chief City of that Country, they ſent a Meſſenger to demand it, and finding themſelves ſlighted, made War upon the* Coans; *in which many being ſlain on both ſides, the Oracle declared that the Tripod ſhould be given to the wiſeſt, whereupon both parties with joynt conſent preſented it to* Thales [(*m*) The *Coans* being willing to grant that to a private Perſon, for which they before conteſted with all the *Mileſians*] *who dedicated it to* Apollo Didymæus; *the effect of the Oracle to the* Coans *was this:*

(*l*) *Plut. vit. Sol.*

(*m*) *Plut. vit. Sol.*

This Conteſtation ſhall continue till
The golden Tripod into th' Ocean caſt
By *Vulcan*, you preſent to one whoſe skill
Extends to things to come, preſent and paſt.

To

*To the Milesians,*

Comest thou *Milesian* to consult my Shrine? *as before.* Thus *Laertius.* (n) *Plutarch* adds, that Thales *said,* Bias *was wiser than himself, whereupon it past to him, from him to another, as wiser; so passing in a circle from one to another, it came at last to* Thales *the second time. Finally it was sent from* Miletus *to* Thebes, *and dedicated to* Ismenian Apollo. Theophrastus *saith it was first sent to* Bias *at* Priene, *then by* Bias *to* Thales *at* Miletus, *so passing through all, it came again to* Bias; *and finally was sent to* Delphi. *This is most generally reported, saving instead of a Tripod, some say it was a Cup sent from* Croesus; *others, that it was left there by* Bathycles.

(a) *Vit. Sol.*

Thus was the Priority of *Thales* confirmed by the Oracle, for which reason he is by *Cicero* and *Strabo* stiled *Prince of the wise Men,* to whom the rest yielded the preheminence.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of his Philosophy.*

*Thales* (saith *Laertius*) *is by many affirm'd to be the first that made disquisitions upon Nature.* * *Cicero* (who taught the *Greek* Philosophy first to speak *Latin,*) acknowledges *Thales* to be the *first Author thereof.* † *Strabo* saith, that he *first of the* Grecians *made enquiry into natural Causes and the* Mathematicks. (a) *Plutarch* calls him, *Inventor of Philosophy;* Justine Martyr, (b) *The most ancient of Philosophers;* (c) Tertullian, *first of Natural Philosophers;* (d) Lactantius, *the first that made enquiry after Natural Causes.*

* *Apud Lactant. & de Natura Deor.* I.
† *Lib.* 14.
(a) *De plac. phil.* 1. 3.
(b) *Paraenes. ad Graec.*
(c) *Apologet.*
(d) *De falsa rel.* 1. 5.

### Sect. 1. *That* Water *is the Principle of all things.*

IN his disquisition of the natural Causes of things, he conceived *Water to be the first Principle of all natural Bodies, whereof they consist, and into which they resolve.* His reasons (as deliver'd by (e) *Plutarch*, and repeated by (f) *Stobaeus*) these:

(e) *Placit. philos.* 1. 3.
(f) *Eclog. phys.* 1. 13.

First, *Because natural Seed, the Principle of all living Creatures, is humid; whence it is probable that humidity is also the principle of all other things.*

Secondly, *Because all kinds of Plants are nourish'd by moisture; wanting which, they wither and decay.*

Thirdly, *Because Fire, even the Sun it self and the Stars are nourish'd and maintain'd by Vapours proceeding from Water, and consequently the whole World consists of the same. Whence* Homer *supposing all things to be engendred of Water, saith,*

Ὠκεανὸς ὅπερ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται.

The Ocean whence all things receive their Birth.

*In pursuit* ((g) as *Aristotle* saith) *of this opinion,* he assign'd Water the lowest place, *holding* (according to (h) *Seneca*) *that the whole Earth floats, and is carried above the Water, whether that we call the Ocean or great Sea, or any simple moisture of another nature, or a moist Element. By this Water* (saith he) *the Earth is sustained as a great Ship, which presseth upon the Water that bears it up, because the most weighty part of the World cannot be upheld by the Air, which is subtle and light.* Thus is, (i) *Aristotle* to be explain'd, who saith, *Thales held, that the Earth being capable of swimming, resteth as Wood or the like; now of such things, none swim upon Air, but upon Water.*

(g) *Metaph.* 1. 3.
(h) *Natur. quaest.* 6. 6.
(i) *Metaphys.* 1. 3.

Upon this ground it was that he held *Water* (as *Laertius* saith) *to be the cause of Earthquakes.* Thus (k) *Seneca, He holds that the Globe of the Earth is upheld by Water, and carried as a Bark, and floateth by the mobility thereof, at such time as it is said to quake.* One of his reasons alledged by (l) *Seneca,* is this, *because in all extraordinary motions thereof some new Fountains commonly issued, which if they incline to one side, and shew their Keel aside-long, gather Water; which, if it chance the burden they bear be overweighty, raiseth it self higher towards the right or left side.*

(k) *Nat. quaest.* 3. 13.
(l) *Nat. quaest.* 6. 6.

From the testimony of *Homer*, by which *Thales* (according to *Plutarch* and *Justin Martyr*) defended this Tenet (that Water is the principle of all things) it is manifest it was deliver'd, (though imperfectly) by other *Grecians* before *Thales*; *Plutarch* (m) elsewhere producing this Authority of (n) *Hesiod,*

(m) *Ignis an aquae utilior?*
(n) *Theogon.*

Πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ'——

*Of all things* Chaos *was the first*——

addeth, *the greater part of ancient Philosophers called Water* Chaos, ἀπὸ τῆς χύσεως *from diffusion.* The Scholiast of (o) *Apollonius* upon these words,

(o) *Argonaut.* 4.

——Ἐξ ἰλυὸς ἐπλάσσατο χθὼν ἅπασα.

*The Earth of slime was made.*

affirms (citing *Zeno*) that *the Chaos, whereof all things were made according to* Hesiod, *was Water, which setling became slime, the slime condens'd into solid Earth; to which add this testimony of* (p) Orpheus,

(p) Cited by *Athenagoras.*

Ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος ἰλὺς πήξις.

*Of Water slime was made.*

This opinion they borrow'd from the *Phœnicians*, with whom the *Grecians* had a very ancient correspondence. *Linus* came from thence; *Orpheus* had his learning from thence; as *Thales* is conceived to have done likewise, which appears clearly in (q) *Numenius*, an ancient Philosopher, who cites the very words of *Moses* for this opinion, *The Spirit of God moved on the face of the waters.* There is an eminent place in (r) *Eusebius* to prove this; *the divinity of the* Phœnicians *asserts the principle of this World to be a dark spiritual Air, or the spirit of dark Air, and Chaos troubled and involv'd in darkness; that this was infinite, and a long time had no bound; but (say they) the Spirit being moved with the love of his own principles, there was made a mixtion, which nexure was called love; this was the beginning of the production of all things; but the spirit it self had no generation, and from this connexion of the spirit was begotten* Μώτ, *which some call slime, others corruption of watery mistion, and of this was made the seed of all Creatures, and the generation of all things.*

(q) *Porphyr. de antro Nymph.*
(r) *Praepar. Evangel.* 1. 10.

Nor

Nor were the *Indians* ignorant of this, as (f) *Megaſthenes* delivers their opinion. (f) *They are of the ſame mind in many things with the* Grecians, *as that the World had beginning, and ſhall have end; that God its Maker and Governour goes quite through it; that all things had different beginnings, but that of which the World was made was Water.* (f) *Strab. lib.* 15.

The word ἀρχὴ, *Principle*, becauſe with Philoſophers it includes the efficient cauſe, and conſequently underſtood ſingly excludes the reſt, that being the moſt noble, hath given occaſion to ſome to miſtake *Thales*, as if by acknowledging no other Principle, he conſequently accounted *Water* to be *God*; but that *Thales* underſtands by *Principle* only the material Cauſe, we may eaſily gather from *Plutarch*, (t) who condemneth *Thales* for confounding a *Principle* with an Element, and for holding them to be both one; *Whereas* (*ſaith he*) *there is great difference; Elements are compounded, Principles are neither compounded, nor are any compleat ſubſtance, and truly Water, Air, Earth, Fire we term Elements, but principles we call other Natures, in this reſpect that there is nothing precedent to them, whereof they are engendred. For otherwiſe, if they were not the firſt, they would not be Principles, but that rather ſhould be ſo termed whereof they were made. Now certain things there are precedent, whereof Earth and Water are compounded,* viz. *The firſt inform matter, and the form it ſelf and privation.* Thales *therefore errs, affirming Water to be both Element and principle of all things.* Thus we ſee by *Plutarch*, that the objection can only be as to the name, not to reaſon of the name; for the diſtinction of Principle and Element being not uſed in that time, *Thales* by *Principle*, meant nothing of the efficient cauſe, which is moſt certain from *Ariſtotle*. *Thales*, ſaith he, *affirms Water to be the Principle: wherefore he held the Earth to be above the Water; perhaps he conceived ſo, becauſe he ſaw that the nutriment of all things, is humid, that heat it ſelf conſiſts thereof, and that every Creature lives thereby; He held that of which things are made to be the Principles of all things, for thoſe reaſons he was of this opinion, as alſo becauſe the Seeds of all things are of a humid Nature, and Water is the Principle of things humid.* (t) *De placit. Philoſ.* 1. 2.

## Sect. 2. *Of God.*

TErtullian ſaith, That *Thales* to *Cræſus* *enquiring concerning the Deity, gave no certain account, but deſired ſeveral times of deliberating to no effect.* He ſeems to reflect upon the ſame or a like Story to that which is reported of *Simonides* and *Hieron*. *Apologet. contra gent. Metaphyſ.* 1. 3.

But what the opinion of *Thales* was concerning *God*, may be gather'd from two Apothegms cited by *Laertius*, repeated with this gloſs by (a) *Clemens Alexandrinus*; *And what are not thoſe the ſayings of* Thales *that are derived from hence, That God is glorified for ever and ever, and he openly confeſſeth that he is called* κρυφογνώστης, *he who knoweth Hearts. For* Thales *being demanded what God was, that* (ſaith he) *which hath neither beginning nor end. Another asking if a Man might do ill and conceal it from God.* How, ſaid he, *when a Man that thinks it cannot? Men ought to think* (ſays (b) *Cicero* in his name) *that the Gods ſee all things.* (a) *Stromat.* 5. (b) *De legib.* 2.

He acknowledged the firſt of beings, and Author of the World, aſſerting (according to *Laertius*) that *the moſt ancient of all things is God, for he is not begotten*; that *the faireſt is the World, for it is his work.* This is confirmed by *Cicero*. Thales *the* Mileſian (ſaith he *) *who firſt enquired into theſe things, ſaid, That Water was the principle of things, but that God was that mind which formed all things of Water. If Gods may be without ſenſe and mind, why did he joyn the mind to Water? Why Water to the mind, if the mind can ſubſiſt without a Body?* Thus *Cicero* who underſtands *Thales* to intend the material principle to be co-eternal with the efficient; which *Thales* himſelf ſeems not to mean, when he declared God to be the firſt of Beings. But that the *Mens* of *Anaxagoras*, for the annexing of which to matter, he was ſo much famed, was no more than what he borrowed from *Thales*, the words of *Cicero* make good. * *De natur. deor.* 1.

He affirmed that God by the immutable decree of his providence governs the World. *Thales* (ſaith *Stobæus*) *being demanded what was moſt ſtrong, anſwered Neceſſity, for it rules all the World. Neceſſity is the firm judgment and immutable power of providence.* Hither we muſt likewiſe refer what is cited under his name by the ſame *Stobæus*, that *the firſt mover is immovable*, which (c) *Ariſtotle* hath borrow'd from him, not owning the Author. (c) *Phyſic.* 8.

Something imperfectly was before delivered by *Orpheus*, concerning God, alledged by (d) *Clemens Alexandrinus* and others; but as *Cicero* ſaith, Thales *was the firſt among the* Grecians, *who made any ſearch into theſe things*; and that he brought it out of *Ægypt*, the *Grecians* themſelves deny not, (e) for they acknowledge, that they received the names of their Gods from thence, and believed the *Ægyptians* to be the firſt, who looking up to the World above them, and admiring the nature of the Univerſe, reflected upon the Deity. (d) *Admonit. ad gent.* (e) *Herodot. lib.* 2.

## Sect. 3. *Of Dæmons.*

THales (*ſaith* (a) Plutarch) *with* Pythagoras, Plato, *and the* Stoicks *hold, that* Dæmons *are ſpiritual ſubſtances, and the Hero's Souls ſeparated from the Bodies, of which ſort, there are two, good, and bad; the good Hero's are the good Souls, the bad, the bad.* The ſame order (b) *Athenagoras* atteſts to be obſerved by *Thales*, ranking the three degrees thus: Firſt, that of the immortal Gods, next Dæmons, thirdly Hero's: This was followed by *Pythagoras*, that *the Gods were to be preferred in reverence before* Dæmons, Hero's *before* Men. (a) *Placit. Philoſ.* 1. 8. (b) *Apolog.*

*He affirm'd* (as *Stobæus* ſaith) *the World to be full of theſe* Dæmons. This is thought the meaning of that of (c) *Ariſtotle*, repeated by *Cicero*, * Thales *thought that all things were full of Gods.* The ſame aſſertion *Laertius* * aſcribes to *Pythagoras, that all the Air is full of Souls, which are* Hero's *and* Dæmons. (c) *De anim.* 1. 8. * *de legib.* 2. * *Vit. Pythag.*

This opinion was aſſerted by the *Greeks*, before the time of *Thales*, particularly by *Heſiod*; but

but whether that be argument enough, to deny, that *Thales* had it from the Ægyptians, I queſtion; that they held it in the ſame manner, we may learn by * *Jamblichus*. Beſides, *Pythagoras* and *Plato* (whom *Plutarch* joyns in this Tenet with *Thales*) drew their learning from the ſame fountain.

* *De myſter. Egypt. ſect. initio.*

## Sect. 4. *Of the Soul.*

PLutarch and *Stobæus* ſay, that *Thales firſt affirm'd the Soul to be* αὐτοκινητὸν, *a ſelf-moving nature.* (a) *Ariſtotle* that he calls it κινητικὸν in reſpect to the motion it gives to other things, in which are included both parts of the definition of the * *Platoniſts*, *a ſubſtance, having within it ſelf a power to move it ſelf and other things*: which * *Plato* argues to this effect: *The firſt of motions is that whereby a thing moves it ſelf; the ſecond, that whereby it moves another: every thing that moves it ſelf, lives; every living thing lives, becauſe it moves it ſelf, therefore the power of ſelf-motion is the eſſence of that ſubſtance which we call the Soul, which Soul is the cauſe of the firſt generation and motion of things which are, were, and ſhall be; and of all their contraries, as of all tranſmutation, the principal of motion, and therefore more antient than the Body, which it moves by a ſecond motion.* And afterwards declares theſe to be the names of the Souls motion, *to Will, to Conſider, to take Care, to Conſult, to judge Rightly, and not Rightly, to Joy, to Grieve, to Dare, to Fear, to Hate, to Love*, and the like. *Theſe which are the firſt motions, and ſuſcipient of the ſecond corporal, bring all things into augmentation, and decreaſe, converſion, or condemnation, and denſation, or rarefaction.* This opinion firſt raiſed by *Thales*, was entertained in the Schools with the aſſent of * *Pythagoras*, *Anaxagoras*, *Socrates*, and *Plato*, till exploded by *Ariſtotle*, whoſe chief arguments againſt it were theſe. 1. That nothing is moved but what is in place, nothing in place but what hath quantity, which becauſe the ſoul wants none of the four kinds of motion (*viz.* Lation, Alteration, Diminution, Accretion) are competible (*per ſe*) to her. Secondly, that ſelf-motion is not eſſential to the Soul, becauſe ſhe is moved accidentally, by external objects. The firſt, if underſtood of Circumſcription, not only denies the motion of all things, that are definitively in place, as Spirits, but of the higheſt ſphere, if compared with *Ariſtotle*'s definition of place; yet that ſome of theſe ſpecies of motion, though in a different extraordinary manner, are competent to the ſoul, and not accidentally, may be argued 1. From the further diffuſion of the Soul, according to the augmentation of the body. 2. From intellection, which is acknowledg'd a perfection, and conſequently a kind of alteration, which that *Thales* underſtood to be one of the Soul's motions, is clear from that Apothegm aſcribed to him by *Laertius*, *the ſwifteſt of things is the mind, for it over-runs all things*: Whence (b) *Cicero* (confeſſing almoſt in the very words of *Thales*, that *nothing is ſwifter than the mind*, that no *ſwiftneſs may compare with the ſwiftneſs of the mind*) would interpret the ἐντελέχεια of *Ariſtotle*, a *continued and perpetual motion.*

(a) *De plac. Phil.* 4 2.

* *De anima.* 1. 2.

* *Plato in Time.*

* *Stob. Ecl. phyſ. lib.* 1.
* *Ariſt. de anima. l.* 2.

(b) *Tuſcul. queſt.* 1.

The ſecond reaſon may be queſtioned by comparing the acts of the *memory*, and *reminiſcence*; the firſt occaſion'd by exterior things yet *objective* only, ſo that the motion is within her ſelf; but by the other ſhe moves her ſelf, from a privation to a habit, without the help of any exterior.

It is worth notice, that among theſe and other reaſons alledg'd by (c) *Ariſtotle* to deſtroy this aſſertion, one is the poſſibility of the reſurrection of the Body; but this ἐν παρέργῳ.

(c) *De anima.* 1. 3.

From the ſecond part of the difference in the definition (*viz.* from moving other things) *Thales* argued, that the *Load-ſtone*, and *Amber* had ſouls; the firſt becauſe it draws Iron, the ſecond Straw. *He further* (ſaith *Laertius*) *aſſerted thoſe things we count inanimate, to have ſouls, arguing it from the loadſtone and Amber*: the reaſon of which latter example, (d) *Aldobrandinus* falſely interprets its change of colour, and jarring as it were at poiſon: But (e) *Ariſtotle* more plainly, *for of thoſe whom we mentioned*, Thales *ſeems to have taken the Soul to be ſomething* κινητικὸν, *apt to move, ſince he affirmed a ſtone to have a Soul, becauſe it moved Iron.*

(d) *In Laert.*

(e) *De anima.* 1. 2.

He aſſerted likewiſe the Soul (of Man) to be immortal, and according to (f) *Cherilus*, was the firſt that held ſo. (g) *Cicero* aſcribes the original of this opinion to *Pherecydes*, but it rather ſeems to have been brought by *Thales* from the Egyptians; that they held ſo (h) *Herodotus* atteſts.

(f) *Laert.*

(g) *Tuſc. quæſt.* 1.

(h) *Lib.* 2.

## Sect. 5. *Of the World.*

THales held, (a) that *there was but one World*, and that (b) *made by God*; which truth was follow'd by all Philoſophers; as (c) *Ariſtotle* confeſſeth, untill he rejected it, to defend, by the contrary, an aſſertion equally falſe, that the World is everlaſting, *which could not be*, ſaith he, *if it had beginning.*

(a) *Plutarch de plac. phil.* 2. 1.
(b) *Laert.*
(c) *De Cœlo.* 1. 10. 12.

That (d) *the World being Gods work, is the faireſt of things, whatſoever diſpoſed in lively order, being a part thereof*, for which reaſon *Pythagoras* (according to (e) *Plutarch*) called it firſt κόσμον.

(d) *Laert.*

(e) *De plac. phil.* 2. 1.

That *Night is elder than Day.* This circumſtance of the Creation was held likewiſe by * *Orpheus*, and *Heſiod*, who had it from the *Phœnicians*: for this reaſon the * *Numidians*, * *Germans*, * and * *Gauls* reckoned by Nights.

* *Timoth.*
* *Damaſcen.*
* *Tacit. de mor. Germ.*
* *Cæſar. de bello Gall.* 6.

That *the* * *World is animated*, and *that* (g) *God is the Soul thereof, diffus'd through every part, whoſe divine moving vertue penetrates through the element of Water.* Thus explain'd by the *Hermetick* Philoſophers; the divine ſpirit who produc'd this World out of the firſt Water, being infus'd as it were, by a continual inſpiration into the works of nature, and diffus'd largely through, by a certain ſecret, and continual act, moving the whole, and every particular according to its kind, is the ſoul of the World.

(g) *Laert.*

That *the* (h) *World is contained in place.* This agrees with the definition of place by *ſpace*; but they who with *Ariſtotle* define place a *ſuperficies*, though they hold the parts of the World to be in place, are forced to deny the whole to be ſo.

(h) *Laert. Plaut. ſept. ſap. convers.*

That

Plut. de plac. phil. 1. 18.

That *in the World there is no vacuum*, in which (as *Plutarch* obſerves) all Philoſophers agree, who affirm the World to be animated, and govern'd by providence; the contrary defended, by thoſe who maintain that it conſiſteth of Atoms, is inanimate, not governed by providence.

(o) Plut. de plac. phil. 1. 9.

That (o) *matter is fluid and variable.*

(p) Plut. de pl. phil. 1. 16.

That (p) *Bodies are paſſible and diviſible, in infinitum, and continuous as are alſo a line, ſuperficies, place, and time.*

(q) Plut. de plac. phil. 2. 13. Achil. Tat. Isag in Arat.

That (q) *Miſtion is made by compoſition of the Elements.*

(r) De cœlo. 2. 7. Plut. de plac. phil. 2. 28.

That (r) *the Stars are earthly, yet fiery*; (ſ) *the Sun earthly. They who affirm the Stars to be fiery,* ſaith (t) *Ariſtotle, hold ſo, as conceiving the whole ſuperior Body to be Fire.*

(ſ) Plut. de plac. phil. 3. 9.

(t) Plut. de pla. phil 3. 10.

That *the Moon is of the ſame nature with the Sun, that ſhe is illuminated by him. Plutarch*, and *Stobæus* affirm this to be firſt held by *Thales*, though *Eudemus* cited by *Theon* aſcribe it to *Anaximander*.

That *the monthly occultations of the Moon are cauſed by the nearneſs of the Sun ſhining round her.*

(u) Plut. de plac. phil. 3. 11.

(w) Sept. ſap. conviv.

(x) Laert.

That *there is but* (u) *one earth*, (w) *round, in faſhion of a Globe*, (x) *ſeated in the midſt of the World*, to which relates that ſpeech aſcribed to him by *Cleodemus*, that, *if the earth were taken out of the World, there muſt of neceſſity follow a confuſion of all things.*

(y) Meteor. 2. 6.

(a) De plac. phil.

That *the overflowing of* Nilus *is cauſed by the Eteſian* (yearly) *winds*, which riſe with the Dog-ſtar, after the ſummer Solſtice, and beginning to blow from the North, ſpread (as (z) *Ariſtole* deſcribes them) into remote quarters. *Theſe* (ſaith (a) *Plutarch*) *blowing directly againſt* Ægyt, *cauſe the water ſo to ſwell, that the Sea driven by theſe winds, entereth within the mouth of that River, and hindereth it, that it cannot diſcharge it ſelf freely into the Sea, but is repulſed.*

(b) Lib. 1.

*Whereupon* (addes (b) *Diodorus Siculus*) *it overflowes* Ægypt, *which lieth low and level. But this reaſon, though it ſeem plauſible, is eaſily diſproved; for if this were true, all the Rivers which are diſcharged into the Sea, oppoſite to the Eteſian winds, ſhould have the ſame overflowing.* Thus *Diodorus* in his excellent Diſcourſe upon this Subject, which concludes with the opinion of *Agatharchides*, that it is occaſion'd by rain, coming from the mountains of *Ethiopia*.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of his Geometry.*

Fulvid. lib. 4. Laert. vit. Pythag.

*Puleius*, who calls *Thales the inventer of Geometry amongſt the Grecians*, is more juſt to his memory than *Anticlides* and others, who aſcribe the honour thereof to *Mœris*, or to *Pythagoras*, who by the acknowledgement of (a) *Jamblichus*, a Pythagorean, learnt Mathematicks of *Thales*. The original and progreſs of this ſcience, to the perfection it received from *Pythagoras* (which gave occaſion to that miſtake) is thus delivered by *Proclus*.

(a) De vita Pythag. 1. 2.

In Euclid. 2. 4.

*Geometry was invented by the Egyptians, taking its beginning from meaſuring fields; it being neceſſary for them, by reaſon of the inundation of* Nilus, *which waſhed away the bounds of their ſeverals. Nor is it to be wondered at, that as well this, as other ſciences, ſhould have their beginning from commodiouſneſs, and opportunity; ſince, as is ſaid in generation, it proceeds from imperfect to perfect; therefore not without reaſon is the tranſition from ſence to conſideration, and from conſideration to the mind. As therefore among the Phœncians, by reaſon of merchandiſe and traffick, the certain knowledge of numbers had its beginning; ſo likewiſe among the Ægyptians, Geometry was found out upon the foreſaid occaſion; and* Thales *going to* Egypt, *firſt brought over this ſcience into* Greece: *and many things he found out himſelf, and taught his followers the principles of many things, declaring ſome more generally, other things more plainly. Next him* Ameriſtus, *brother to* Steſichorus *the Poet, is remembred,* (c) *as having touched Geometry, of whom* Hippias *the* Elean *makes mention, as eminent in that knowledge: After theſe* Pythagoras *conſidering the principles thereof more highly, advanced it into a liberal ſcience.*

Supply the breach in the text, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν λογισμῶν εἰς τὸν νοῦν ἡ μετάβασις, ὅτι, ſo Barocius tranſlates.

(c) Read, ὡς ἐφαψάμενος τῆς περὶ γεωμετρίας καθ' ὑπεροχήν, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦτο.

### Sect. 1. *Propoſitions invented by him.*

THat he improved (as *Proclus* implies) the Geometry which he learnt of the Ægyptians with many propoſitions of his own, is confirmed by *Laertius*, who ſaith, that *he much advanced thoſe things, the invention whereof* Callimachus *in his Iambicks, aſcribes to* Euphorbus *the Phrygian, as ſcalenons triangles, and others.* Nor is it to be doubted, but that many of them are of thoſe, which *Euclid* hath reduced into his Elements; whoſe deſign it was to collect and digeſt thoſe that were invented by others, accurately demonſtrating ſuch as were more negligently proved, but of them only, theſe are known to be his.

(d) Lib. 1. def. 17.

[(d) 1. *Every Diameter divides its circle into two equal parts.*] This propoſition which *Euclid* makes part of the definition of a Diameter, * *Proclus* affirms to have been firſt demonſtrated by *Thales*.

* in Euclid lib. 2. com. 14.

(e) Euclid. lib. 1. prop. 5

2. [(e) *In all Iſoſceles triangles, the angles at the baſe are equal the one to the other, and thoſe right lines being produced, the angles under the baſe are equal.*] * *Proclus* ſaith, that *for the invention of this likewiſe, as of many other propoſitions, we are beholding to* Thales, *for he firſt obſerved and ſaid, that of every Iſoſceles, the angles at the baſe are equal, and according to the antients called equal like.* Theſe are three paſſages in the demonſtration, which infer nothing toward the concluſion, of which kind there are many in *Euclid*, and ſeem to confirm the antiquity thereof, and that it was leſs curiouſly reformed by him.

* lib. 3. com. 9.

3. [*If two lines cut one the other, the verticle angles ſhall equal the one the other.*] (b) *Eudemus* atteſts this Theorem to have been invented by *Thales*, but firſt demonſtrated by *Euclid*.

(b) Euclid lib. 1. prop. 15. Procl. lib. 3. com. 19.

4. [* *If two triangles have two angles equal to two angles the one to the other, and one ſide equal to one ſide, either that which is adjacent to the equal angles, or that which ſubtendeth one of the equal angles, they ſhall likewiſe have the other ſides, equal to the other ſides, both to both, and the remaining angle equal to the remaining angle*] (i) Eudemus *attributes this Theorem* (ſaith *Proclus*) *to* Thales, *for ſhowing the diſtance of ſhips upon the Sea, in that manner as he is ſaid to do, it is neceſſary that he perform it by this.*

* Euclid lib. 1. prop. 26.

(i) Procl. lib. 3. com. 31.

Pamphila

Pamphila (ſaith *Laertius*) *affirms, that he firſt deſcribed the rectangle triangle of a circle.* ](b) *Ramus* attributes to *Thales* (upon this authority of *Laertius*) the ſecond, third, fourth, and fifth propoſitions of the fourth book of *Euclid*, which are concerning the adſcription of a triangle and a circle, and conſequently takes καταγράψαι here to include both inſcription, and circumſcription; whereas in all thoſe propoſitions, there is nothing proper to a rectangle triangle; ſo that if the word ὀρθογώνιον be retain'd, it muſt relate to the 31 propoſition of the third book, whence may be deduced the deſcription of a rectangle triangle in a circle. But becauſe there is no ſuch propoſition in *Euclid*, and this hath but an obſcure reference to part of that Theorem; it is to be doubted that the Text of *Laertius* is corrupt, and the word (or mark) κύκλου inſerted by accident, without which theſe words καταγράψαι τὸ τριγωνὸν ὀρθογώνιον exactly correſpond with thoſe of (i) *Vitruvius*, *Pythagoricum trigonum orthogonium deſcribere*: by which he means (as he at large expreſſeth (k) elſewhere,) the forty fifth propoſition of the firſt book of *Euclid, that in rectangle triangles, the ſquare of the hypotenuſe, is equal to the ſquare of the ſides containing the right angle.* That *Vitruvius*, *Proclus*, and others, attribute this invention to *Pythagoras*, confirms it to be the ſame here meant by *Laertius*; who adds, that *Thales, for the invention hereof, ſacrificed an Ox, though others* (ſaith he) *among whom is* Apollodorus, *aſcribe it to* Pythagoras. And in the life of *Pythagoras*, he cites the ſame *Apollodorus*, that *Pythagoras ſacrificed a Hecatomb, having found out, that the hypotenuſe of a right angled triangle, is of equal power to the two ſides, including the right angle according to the Epigram.*

(b) *Geom.*

(i) *Lib.* 10. *cap.* 11.

(k) *Lib.* 9. *cap.* 2.

That noble ſcheme *Pythagoras* deviſ'd,
For which a Hecatomb he ſacrific'd.

*Cicero*, though he differ in the Author, agrees in the quantity of the offering with *Laertius*; affirming, that *Pythagoras upon any new invention, uſed to ſacrifice an Ox*: Which kind of gratitude begun by *Thales*, was imitated by others alſo, as by *Perſeus*.

(l) *Procl. in Euclid. lib.* 2. *def.* 4. *where the words perhaps are inverted, and for* τρεῖς γραμμὰς ὅτι πάντα τομαῖς ἰυξὶν πὶς σραιρικὰς ἰυξών.

*(l) Finding three ſpiral lines, in ſections five,*
Perſeus *an offering to the Gods did give.*

## Sect. 2. *Of his taking the height of the Pyramids.*

THE Pyramids of *Egypt* are ſuppoſed by (a) *Solinus*, (b) *Auſonius*, *Ammianus* (c) *Marcellinus*, and (d) *Caſſiodorus*, to caſt no ſhadow at all, which (as Maſter *Greaves* hath obſerved in his excellent diſcourſe upon this ſubject) muſt be meant either of the ſummer time, or, which is nearer the truth, that for three quarters of the year, they have none at mid-day.

(a) *Polyhiſt. cap.* 25.
(b) *Idyl.* 2.
(c) *Lib.* 22.
(d) *Var.* 7. *form.* 15.

For, that *Thales* by the ſhadow meaſured their height, is acknowledged. (e) *Hieronymus* ſaith, *he meaſured the Pyramids by the ſhadow, obſerving when they are of equal bigneſs.* (f) *Pliny* affirms, *he found out a way to take the height of them, and all ſuch like, by meaſuring the ſhadow, at what time it is equal to the body.* But *Plutarch* hath given a more regular and exact account of his manner of operation, *by erecting a ſtaff perpendicular upon the end of the ſhadow of the Pyramid, and by two triangles made by the beams of the Sun, he demonſtrated, that what proportion there was between the ſhadows, the ſame was betwixt the Pyramid and the ſtaff*; A demonſtration ſo rational, that it is the ordinary way of taking heights by ſhadows, founded upon this Theorem.

(e) *Laert.*

(f) *Lib.* 36. *cap.* 12.

(g) *Of equiangle triangles, the ſides that are about equal angles are proportional, and the ſides that ſubtend the equal angles are homologous.* (g) *Euclid. lib.* 6. *prop.* 4.

Which if *Proclus* had proceeded as far as the ſixth book of *Euclid*, we ſhould in all likelyhood have found aſcribed to *Thales*; for the ſame argument wherewith *Eudemus* proves him inventor of the fourth Theorem in the foregoing Section, whereby he took diſtances, is of equal, force in this, whereby he took altitudes.

The height of the great Pyramid (which *Thales* meaſured) is by its perpendicular (according to Mr. *Greaves*) 499 Feet, by its inclining aſcent, 693 Feet.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of his Aſtronomy.*

OMitting the fable of *Orpheus*'s Harp alluding to the ſeven Planets, and the obſervations of *Heſiod*, which were little more than of the riſing and ſetting of ſome principal Stars, (ſo imperfect, that *Plato* calls all thoſe who ſatisfie themſelves with ſuch ſuperficial knowledge, *Aſtronomers according to Heſiod*) we may with *Eudemus* and others affirm, that *Thales was the firſt of the Grecians that was skilful in Aſtronomy.* Which Science, (a) *Pliny* aſſerts to have been brought out of *Phœnicia*; (b) *Ariſtotle*, that the Grecians owe much of it to the Ægyptians, where it had been of a long time practiſed: Thither indeed (c) *Thales* acknowledgeth that he travelled to confer with Aſtronomers.

(a) *lib.* 5. *Cap.* 17.
(b) *de Cœlo.* 2. 12.
(c) *Epiſt. ad Pherecyd.*

## Sect. 1. *Of the Celeſtial Spheres.*

THales, *Pythagoras* (ſaith * *Plutarch*, repeated by * *Stobæus*) *with his followers affirm, that the Celeſtial ſphere is divided into five Circles* (*which they call* Zones) *whereof one is call'd Artick, and is always in view to us; one the ſummer Tropick, one the Equinoctial, one the winter Tropick, one the Antartick circle, never ſeen by us. The oblique Circle, called the Zodiack, lyeth under the three middle circles, it toucheth them all three as it paſſeth, and each of them is cut in right angles by the Meridian, which goeth from Pole to Pole. Unjuſtly therefore is the invention of the Zones aſcribed by* (e) Poſidonius to Parmenides; *and that of the obliquity of the Zodiack by* (f) *others to* Anaximander, Pythagoras, *or* Ænipodes.

* *De plac. phil.*

(e) *Strab. lib.* 1.
(f) *Plin.* 2. 8.

(g) *Eudemus* ſaith, that *he firſt obſerv'd the Tropicks*; *Laertius*, that *he firſt found out the acceſſion of the Sun from Tropick to Tropick.* The word τρόπαι ſignifies not only the Solſtices, but the Æquinoxes likewiſe: (h) *Sextus Empiricus. The Tropick ſigns are thoſe into which the Sun coming, changeth and maketh converſions of the air; ſuch a ſign is* Aries, *and the oppoſite to it* Libra; *ſo alſo* Capricorn *and* Cancer: *for in* Aries *is made the vernal converſion, in* Capricorn *the Winter, in* Cancer *the Summer, in* Libra

(g) *Laert.*

(h) *Adverſ. mathem.* 5. 2.

*the autumnal.* This expoſition *Laertius* confirms, when he ſaith that *Thales compoſed only two treatiſes, one of the Tropicks, the other of the Equinoctials,* and that *he diſtinguiſhed the ſeaſons of the year.*

### Sect. 2. *Of the Sun, Moon, and Stars.*

HE firſt obſerved the apparent diameter of the Sun, which is the angle made in the eye, to be the 720 part of his Orb: This doubtleſs is the meaning of *Laertius*, his words theſe, καὶ πρῶτος τὸ τῆς ἡλίου μέγεθος τῆς σελήνης ἑπτακοσιοστὸν καὶ εἰκοστὸν μέρος ἀπεφήνατο. Than which reading, which implies the Sun to be 720 times leſſer than the Moon, nothing is more ridiculous; for knowing (as is granted by all) the cauſe of Eclipſes, he muſt likewiſe know the Sun to be greater than the Moon: nor is it much mended by thoſe who read καὶ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἡλίου μέγεθος τὸ τῆς σελήνης, the text ſeems rather to require ζῳδιακὸν for σελήνης, or ſomething to that effect, of which, thus (*a*) *Archimedes, this we ſuppoſe when* Ariſtarchus *ſaith the Sun appeareth, as being the 720 part of the circle of the* Zodiack; *for he conſidered how he might by inſtruments take the angle made in the eye by the Suns apparent diameter: but to take any ſuch thing exactly is not eaſie; for neither the ſight, nor the hand, nor the inſtruments wherewith the obſervation is made, are of credit ſufficient to demonſtrate it exactly.* This correction *Apuleius* thus confirms, *In his declining Age he made an excellent demonſtration of the proportion of the Sun, which I have not only learned* (ſaith *Apuleius*) *but confirmed by practice, how many times the Suns magnitude is comprehended in the circle which his motion makes. This, as ſoon as he found out,* Thales *ſhew'd to* Mandraytus *of* Priene, *who being infinitely delighted with this new and unexpected knowledge, bad him ask what he would in recompence for ſuch an excellent invention: It will be reward enough for me, ſaid* Thales, *if what you have learned of me, whenſoever you communicate it to others, you profeſs me to be the Inventor.*

(*a*) *in Arenar.*

He firſt found out the conſtellation of the leſſer Bear, (*b*) *Callimachus*

(*b*) *Laert. & Achill. Tat. Iſag. in Arat.*

*He to* Miletus *ſail'd, invited*
*By* Thales *glory, who quick-ſighted*
*Is ſaid t'have mark'd the leſſer Bear,*
*The Star by which* Phœnicians *ſteer.*

*Higynus* affirms that he firſt called it Ἄρκτος, *the Bear.*

### Sect. 3. *Of Eclipſes.*

HE *was the firſt* (ſaith *Laertius*) *that foretold Eclipſes, as* Eudemus *affirms in his Aſtrologick Hiſtory; for which* Xenophanes *and* Herodotus *admire him; atteſted alſo by* Heraclitus *and* Democritus. *Theon, Smyrnæus,* and *Clemens Alexandrinus* cite the ſame place of *Eudemus*; the ſcope of whoſe Book was the Hiſtory of Aſtrologers, and what every one found out. Thus likewiſe *Pliny, amongſt the* Grecians, *the firſt that ſearch'd into Eclipſes, was* Thales *the* Mileſian.

(*a*) *Plutarch* affirms, that *he was the firſt that obſerved the Eclipſe of the Sun, and ſaid, that it was occaſion'd by the Moon, coming in a direct line underneath him, which may be ſeen in a Baſon of Water, or Looking-glaſs.* (*b*) *That the Eclipſe of the Moon is cauſed by the ſhadow of the Earth, which being placed betwixt theſe two Stars, darkens the leſſer.*

(*a*) *De placit. Phil.* 2. 2.

(*b*) *Plut. de plac. phil.* 2. 28.

The teſtimony of *Herodotus*, alledg'd by *Laertius* is this: (*c*) *A five years War was raiſed between the* Lydians *and the* Medes, *in which, ſometimes the* Medes *had the better of the* Lydians, *ſometimes the* Lydians *of the* Medes, *and one battle was fought by night: The War being thus equal on both ſides, in the ſixth year, the Armies being joyned, it hapned that as they were fighting, the day on a ſudden became night; which alteration of that day,* Thales a Mileſian *had foretold the* Ionians, *deſigning the year wherein it ſhould happen. The* Lydians *and* Medes *ſeeing the day turned to night, left off fighting, and laboured to conclude a mutual peace,* which by the mediation of *Syennenſes* King of *Cilicia*, and *Labnitus* King of *Babylon* (whom *Scaliger* conceives to be *Nebuchadnezzar*) was concluded, with the marriage of *Aryæna* Daughter of *Alyattes*, with *Aſtyages*, Son of *Cyaxares*, ratifi'd by drinking Blood.

(*c*) *Lib.* 1.

This is the Story of that memorable Eclipſe, the time whereof is uncertain: (*d*) *Pliny* placeth it in the fourth year of the forty eight Olympiad, before the building of *Rome* 170 years: (*e*) *Solinus* in the 49 Olympiad, the 604 year after the deſtruction of *Troy*; which falls upon the firſt year of that Olympiad. (*f*) *Clemens Alexandrinus* (citing *Endemus*) about the fiftieth Olympiad, at what time *Cyaxares* Father of *Aſtyages* Raigned in *Media*: *Alyattes* Father of *Cræſus* in *Lydia*. *Euſebius* in the ſecond year of the forty eight Olympiad, 1430 years after *Abraham*. *Cleomedes* ſaith, it was total in *Helleſpont*; in *Alexandrina*, but of ten digits. (*g*) *Johannes Antiochenus* ſaith, *It continued many hours*; but they could not exceed three.

(*d*) *Lib.* 2. *cap.* 12.

(*e*) *cap.* 20.

(*f*) *Strom.* 1.

(*g*) *Lib.* 6. ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ ὁ ἥλιος ἐξέλιπεν ἐπὶ πολλὰς ὥρας ἡμέρας, περὶ μεσημβρίαν, Θαλῆς τὸν φιλόσοφον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἦν τὸν ἥλιον.

Of latter Writers differing accounts thereof are delivered by theſe.

*Ricciolus* placeth it before the incarnation 585 years, *May* 28 about 6 a Clock in the afternoon, the digits Eclipſed 12. 56.

*Calviſius* before the incarnation 607 years. Olympiad 43. 4 differing from *Pliny* 18 years.

The learned Biſhop of *Armagh*, in the raign of *Cyaxares* Olympiad 44. 4 the 147 year of *Nabonaſſar*, the fourth day of the *Egyptian* Month *Pachon*, according to the *Julian* account *September* 20 *feria* 1. beginning after Sun-riſe 1 $3^{m.}$ $25^{s.}$ digits Eclipſed 9. continuing almoſt two hours.

*Petavius* Olympiad 45. 4. *Julian* period 4117. before the incarnation 597, after the building of *Rome* 157. *July* 9. *feria* 3. beginning after midnight $4^{h.}$ $45^{m.}$ digits eclipſed 9. $22^{m.}$ continuance full two hours.

*Kocca* confutes *Petavius*, becauſe that Eclipſe ſuits not with the circumſtances of the Story, as beginning too early in the morning, and being defective as to the quantity in *Pontus* and leſſer *Aſia*.

*The* MS. *prepared for the Preſs in the hands of my honoured Friend* Edward Byſhe, *Eſq;*

*Lansbergius,*

*Lansbergius*, Olympiad. 48. 3. the 163 year of *Nabonassar*, the 12 day of *Tybi*, which is *May* 28. digits Eclipsed 12. $20^{m.}$ in *Hellespont*: 10. $12^{m.}$ in *Alexandria*.

*Kepler*, *Scaliger*, *Buntingus*, and *Salianus*, follow *Pliny*: digits Eclipsed (according to *Buntingus*) 11. $30^{m.}$

Neither is it easie to determine whether this variety arise from the incertainty of the Astronomers, or of the Chronologers.

### Sect. 4. *Of the Year.*

LAertius saith, that *he distinguished the seasons of the year*, that *he first called the last day of every month* Φαῦλος the thirtieth day: that he *divided the year into three hundred sixty five days.*

This calculation of the year he seem'd to have learned in *Egypt*, where it was in use, thus explained and commended by * *Herodotus*, *the* Egyptians *were of all Men the first that found out the year, distinguishing it into twelve months; this they gathered from the Stars, and more judiciously (in my opinion) than the* Grecians, *for as much as the* Grecians *every third year, intercalate a month to make up the time; but the* Ægyptians *to the number of* 360 *daies, which twelve months make, add yearly five daies, whereby the account of the circle of time returning into it self is made good.*

* lib. 2.

This was called in latter times, *the* Æyptian *year* (perhaps becaus used by *Ptolomy*, who lived in *Egypt*) in distinction from the *Julian year*, which was then used in all the Western parts, and hath the addition of six hours: the most perfect is the *Gregorian*, consisting of three hundred sixty five days, five hours, forty nine minutes, twelve seconds.

### Sect. 5. *His Astrological Predictions.*

THales being earnestly addicted to Astrology, became obnoxious to the censure of some persons. *As he was led abroad one night by an old Woman,* his Maid (a (a) *Thracian*) *to look upon the Stars, he fell into a Ditch* (wherein she purposely led him) *to whom as he complained,* Thales, *said she, do you think, when you cannot see those things that are at your feet, that you can understand the Heavens.*

(a) *Plat.*

He was also, for preferring this study before wealth, reproved by some friends, not without reproach to the Science, as conferring no advantage on its professors; whereupon he thus vindicated himself and the Art from that aspersion. *When they upbraid him,* saith (b) Aristotle, *with his poverty, as if Philosophy were unprofitable, it is said, that he by Astrology, foreseeing the plenty of Olives that would be that year, before the Winter was gone* (antequam florere cœpissent, saith (c) Cicero) *gave earnest, and bought up all the places for Oyle at* Miletus, *and* Chios, *which he did with little Mony, there being no other chapman at that time to raise the price; and when the time came that many were sought for in haste, he setting what rates on them he pleas'd, by this means got together much Mony, and then shew'd, that it was easie for Philosophers to be rich, if they would themselves, but that wealth was not their aim.* To this *Plutarch* alludes, when he said, that *Thales is reported to have practised Merchandize.*

(b) *Pol.* 1. 7.

(c) *De divinat.* 1.

## CHAP. IX.

### *His Moral Sentences.*

OF his Moral Sentences those are first to be remembred which (a) *Plutarch* mentions upon this occasion.

(a) *Sept. sap. conviv.*

*Amasis* King of *Egypt* entring into contestation with the King of *Æthiopia* concerning wisedom, propounded these questions to be resolved by him; *what is oldest of all things, what fairest, what greatest, what wisest, what most common, what most profitable, what most hurtful, what most powerful, what most easie?*

The answers of the *Æthiopian* were these, the oldest of things is time, the wisest Truth, the fairest Light, the most common Death, the most profitable God, the most hurtful the Devil, the most powerful Fortune, the most easie that which pleaseth. *Thales* demanded of *Niloxenus*, whether *Amasis* approved these solutions? *Niloxenus*, who was sent by *Amasis* into *Greece* with these other questions to be resolved by the Sages, answered that with some he was satisfied, with others not; *and yet*, replyes Thales, *there is not one but is erroneous and betrays ignorance. As for the first, how can it be defended that Time is the oldest of things, when one part of it is past, the other present, the third yet to come, for that which is to come must in reason be esteemed younger than all Men or things? Next to affirm the truth is wisdom, is as much as if we should say, that the Light and seeing are all one. Again, if he esteem Light fair, why doth he forget the Sun? His answers concerning God and the Devil are bold and dangerous, but that of Fortune most improbable, for if she be so powerful, how comes it that she is so easily changed. Nor is Death the most common, for it is not common to the Living. The most ancient of things is God, for he never had beginning or birth, the greatest place of the World containeth all other things, place contains the World; the fairest the World, for whatsoever is orderly dispos'd is part thereof. The wisest is time, for it hath found out all things already devis'd, and will find out all that shall be; the most common, hope, for that remains with such as have nothing else; the most profitable, vertue, for it maketh all things useful and commodious; (b) the most hurtful, vice, for it destroyeth all good things; the most powerful, Necessity, for that only is invincible; the most easie, that which agreeth with nature, for even pleasures are many times given over and cloy us.*

(b) *Etiam apud Stob. serm.* 109 *Etiam apud Stob. s. m.* 46.

To which Apothegms these are added by *Laertius*, *The swiftest of things is the mind, for it over-runs all. He affirmed that there is no difference betwixt Life and Death; being thereupon asked why he did not die; because saith he, there is no difference; to one who asked which was eldest, night or day; he answered night by a day; another enquiring whether a Man might do ill and conceal it from the Gods; nor think it, said he. To an Adulterer questioning him if he might not clear himself by Oath.* * *Perjury, says he, is no worse than Adultery: Being demanded what was difficult, he answered, To know ones self; what easie, to be ruled by another; what sweet,*

* ὃ χεῖρον μοιχείας ἐπορκία: not as councelling the latter, but reproving the former. * *Plut. de dæm. Socr.*

*to follow ones own will; what divine, that which hath neither beginning nor end.* At his return from travel, being demanded *what was the ſtrangeſt thing* he had ſeen, he anſwered, *a Tyrant old. What will help to bear ill fortune? to behold our enemies in worſe. How ſhall a Man live juſtly? by avoiding what he blames in others. Who is happy? he who hath a ſound body, a rich fortune, and a docile nature.*

(c) *Sympoſ. ſept. ſap.* (c) *Plutarch* adds theſe; *We may well report probable news, but improbable ſhould not be related. We ought not to believe our enemies in credible things, nor to diſtruſt our friends in incredible.* Periander *being much troubled at a monſter which a youth brought him, born of a Mare with the head only of a horſe, the reſt reſembling a Man, he adviſed him not to take care for expiation of what the prodigy portended,* ἐγὼ δὲ σοὶ παραινῶν (ſaith he) ἡσυχίαν τὸ μὴ χεῖδαι νομεύσιν ἵππων, ἢ διδόναι γυναῖκας αὐτοῖς.

† *Serm* 61. † *Serm.* 104. Stobæus theſe; † *Being demanded how far falſhood was diſtant from truth, as far ſaith he as the eyes from the ears. It is hard but good to know our ſelves, for that is to live according to nature.*

† *Stob. ſerm.* 28. His moral precepts are thus delivered by *Demetrius Phalereus* †; *If thou art a ſurety, loſs is nigh; Be equally mindfull of friends preſent and abſent; ſtudy not to beautifie thy face but thy mind: enrich not thy ſelf by unjuſt means.* † *Let not any words fall from thee which may accuſe thee to him who hath committed any thing in truſt to thee. Cheriſh thy Parents. Entertain not evil. What thou beſtoweſt on thy Parents thou ſhalt receive from thy Children in thy old age. It is hard to underſtand well. The ſweeteſt thing is to enjoy our deſire. Idleneſs is troubleſome. Intemperance hurtful. Ignorance intolerable. Learn and teach better things. Be not idle though rich. Conceal thy domeſtick ills. To avoid envy be not pitiable. Uſe moderation. Believe not all. If a Governour, rule thy ſelf.* I follow thoſe copies of *Stobæus*, that aſcribe theſe to *Thales* rather than to *Pittacus*, becauſe the greater part are confirmed by *Laertius*.

† i. e. *be true to thy truſt.*

*Auſonius* hath reduced theſe into verſe under his name.

Fear ere thou ſin, thy ſelf though none elſe nigh,
Life fades, a glorious death can never die.
Let not thy tongue diſcover thy intent,
Tis miſery to dread, and not prevent.
He helps his foes that juſtly reprehends.
He that unjuſtly praiſeth, harms his friends
That's not enough that to exceſs extends.

(f) *Clem. Alex.* (g) *Fab.* 221. (h) *Laert.* His Motto was according to *Laertius*, *Know thy ſelf*; according to (f) *Didymus* and (g) *Higynus*, *if thou be a ſurety, loſs is nigh*; by (h) *Hermippus*, this is aſcribed to him, though by others to *Socrates*: *He gave thanks to fortune for three things: firſt, that he was born rational, not a beaſt; ſecondly, that a Man, not a Woman: thirdly, that a Grecian, not a Barbarian.*

There are beſides cited by *Laertius*, under the name of ἀδομένα, or *looſe verſes*, theſe ſentences,

*Not many words much wiſdom ſignifie,*
*Chooſe one thing excellent, to which apply*
*Thy mind, and ſtop the mouth of calumny.*

## CHAP. X.

*His judgment in Civil affairs.*

POliticks were, according to *Laertius*, his firſt ſtudy, in which his advice was of great Authority, though he were the only perſon (as *Cicero* obſerves) of the ſeven wiſe Men, that was not ruler of the City wherein he lived.

(i) *Lib.* 1. τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πόλεις οἰκημένας, μηδὲν ἧσσον νομίζειν θεοῦ κατάπερ εἰ δῆμοι εἶεν, which Valla renders thus; Cæteras autem civitates habitatas nihilo minus huic parituras, quam aliarum civitatum tribus legibus parerent. *Stephanus* thus: nihilo minus eodem loco haberi quo tribus: *both (I conceive) amiſs.*

Of his judgment herein we have two inſtances; the firſt from (i) *Herodotus*; *Good alſo, even before the deſtruction of* Ionia, *was the advice of* Thales, *a Mileſian, afar off by deſcent Phœnician, who commanded the Ionians to build one common Council Hall, and that in* Teos, *for that* Teos *is in the midſt of* Ionia, *and the reſt of the inhabited Cities, nevertheleſs, to be in repute, according as the Citizens were.*

The other cited by *Laertius* (with no leſs applauſe) is this. In the firſt year of the fifty eight Olympiad, *Cræſus* King of *Lydia*, fearing the greatneſs of *Cyrus*, and encourag'd thereunto, as he conceiv'd, by the Oracle, ſent Ambaſſadours and preſents to the moſt conſiderable of the Grecians, perſwading them to joyn with him in an expedition againſt *Cyrus*, which the Lacedæmonians with many others did: but *Thales* forbad the Mileſians to enter into league with him. *It appears* (adds *Laertius*) *that his advice in civil affairs was excellent; for this thing* (Cyrus *getting the better*) *preſerv'd the Citty.*

Yet did he afford *Cræſus* his particular aſſiſtance in paſſing his Army over *Halys*, as the Grecians affirm, though *Herodotus* be of a contrary opinion, who gives this account of both. *When* Cræſus *was come to the River* Halys, *then, I believe, by bridges that were there, he paſſed over his Army; but the common report of the Grecians is, that* Thales *the Mileſian was he who conveigh'd it over: For* Cræſus *being doubtful over what part of the River his Army ſhould paſs, there being in thoſe days no Bridges,* Thales, *who was in the field with him, is ſaid to have cauſed the River that did run on the left hand of the Army, to run alſo on the right, which he brought to paſs thus. Beginning above the trench, he digged a deep trench, and brought it in the faſhion of a half Moon, that the River being turned into the trench from the former channel at the back of the Army, and paſſing by the camp, came into the old channel again, ſo that aſſoon as the River was thus divided,* (which (k) Lucian *ſaith,* (k) *In Hippia.* *was done in one night*) *it became fordable on either ſide: Some ſay that the old channel was quite made up, but that I do not believe, for then, how could they in their return paſs over?* That this is the meaning of *Herodotus*, miſtaken by * *Valla*, will appear from the (m) Scholiaſt of *Ariſtophanes*, who relates it in the ſame manner, not without applauding *Thales*, for his excellency in Mechanicks.

* *Who renders* ταύτη κατὰ τὼ διόρυχα ἐκτραπόμενος τῶν ἀρχαίων ῥεέθρων ἐς τὰ ἀρχαῖα ἐσέβαλλε, *in quam cum introduxiſſet ex priſtino alveo fluvium, iterum cum ubi exercitus trajectus eſſet in ſuum alveum refunderet.* (m) *In Nubes.*

He

He was a great Enemy to Tyrants, and accounted all Monarchy little better, as appears by *Plutarch*, who makes him speak thus: *As for taking one for the other*, (viz. a Monarch for a Tyrant) *I am of the same mind with the young Man, who throwing a Stone at a Dog, hit his Step-Mother; it is no matter, said he, for even so, it lights not amiss, truly I always esteemed* Solon *very wise, for refusing to be King of his own Country: and* Pittacus, *if he had not taken upon him a Monarchy, would never have said, how hard it is to be a good Man: and* Periander *being seiz'd (as it were an hereditary disease derived from his Father) by the same Tyranny, did very well to endeavour as much as he could to disengage himself from it, by frequenting the conversation of the best Men, inviting Sages, and Philosophers, and being invited by them, not approving the dangerous Counsel of* Thrasibulus, *my Country-man, who perswaded him to take off the heads of the chiefest. For a Tyrant, who chooseth rather to command Slaves than Freemen, is like a Husband-man, who preferreth the gathering of Locusts, and catching of Fowl, before reaping of good Corn. These soveraign Authorities have only this good, in recompense of many evils, a kind of honour and glory, if Men be so happy, that in ruling good Men, they themselves prove better; as for such, who in their office aim at nothing but security, without respect of honour or honesty, they are fitter to be set over Beasts than Men.*

In the same Symposion, he gives this account of Monarchy, Democracy, and Oeconomicks.

Stob. serm. 147. Stob. serm. 141. Stob. serm. 43. *That Prince is happy, who lives till he is old, and dies a natural death. That Common-wealth is best ordered, where the Citezens are niether too rich, nor too poor. That House is best, wherein the Master may live most at ease.*

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of his Writings.*

*Some affirm* (saith *Laertius*) *that he left nothing behind him in writing.* Others that he writ,

(a) De civit. Dei. *Of natural Philosophy*: Saint (*a*) *Augustine*, saith, that *Thales, to propagate his doctrine to succession, searched into the secrets of Nature, and committing his opinions to Monuments and Letters, grew famous.*

(b) Laert. *Of Nautick Astrology* (mentioned by (*b*) *Simplicus*) which is by some ascribed to *Phocus*, a *Samian.*

*Of the Tropicks and Equinoctials:* which two Treatises *Laertius* saith, *he composed, as judging the rest easie to be understood.* These seem to be those Astrological writings which *Lobon*, an *Argive*, who writ concerning the Poets, affirmeth to have extended to two hundred Verses.

(c) Lib. 6. ταῦτα ἱστόρησαν οἱ στοιχειωταὶ Θάλης καὶ Κάστωρ καὶ Πολύβιος συγγεγραφέναι μετὰ Ἡσίοδον ὁ ἰσοδιγράφος. *Of Meteors*: a Treatise in Verse, mentioned by *Suidas.*

*The History of his own times:* if we may give credit to (*c*) *Johannes Antiochenus*, who saith, *These things* Thales, Castor, *and* Polybius *most wise Authors, committed to writing, and after them* Herodotus *the Historian:* but perhaps this may be no more probable, than that *Polybius* and *Castor* should precede *Herodotus.*

Ἀδμήνα, of which those that are cited by *Laertius*, we have inserted among his moral Sentences, for such they were, tending to the instruction of the common People, a kind of loose Verse, coming near Prose, whence *Demosthenes* makes two kinds of Poets, πρὸ ἐμμέτρους καὶ τοὺς ἀδμένους, (as *Casaubon* observes) those that write in *meeter*, and (if we may so term it) those that write in *blank-Verse.* Whatsoever *Laertius* in the lives of the seven wise men produceth in this kind, seemeth not to be taken out of any Poet, but to have been written by the wise Men themselves.

*Epistles*, of which two only are extant, preserved by *Laertius.*

### Thales *to* Pherecydes.

*I Hear, that you first of the* Ionians, *are about to publish a Discourse to the* Greeks *concerning Religion, and* * *justly you conceive that your work ought rather to be laid in a publick Library, than transmitted to uncertain persons: if therefore it may any way pleasure you, I will willingly confer with you about that which you have written, and if you desire, will visit you at* Syrus; *for neither my self, nor* Solon *the* Athenian *should deserve the titles of* wise Men, *if we, who sail'd to* Creet *to inform our selves of matters there, and into* Ægypt, *to confer with Priests and Astronomers, should not likewise make a journey to you:* Solon *also, if you think fit, will come. You who affect home seldom pass into* Ionia, *nor care to enjoy the society of strangers; we, who write nothing, spend our time in travelling through* Greece *and* Asia.

* But the interpreters render this to another effect.

### Thales *to* Solon.

*IF you leave* Athens, *you may, in my opinion, settle your self (with those you take along with you) at* Miletus, *for here is nothing to trouble you. If you dislike that we* Milesians *are governed by a Tyrant (for you are averse to all Monarchs, even elective) yet may you please your self in the society and conversation of me your friend.* Bias *likewise hath sent to invite you to* Priene; *if to abide at* Priene *please you better, we will also come and dwell there with you.*

## CHAP. XII.

### *His Auditors and Scholars.*

THE first eminent person of those who heard *Thales* and profess'd his Philosophy, was *Anaximander* Son of *Praxides* a *Milesian*, who flourished in the time of *Polycrates* Tyrant of *Samos.*

Next is *Anaximenes* a *Milesian* also, Son of *Eurystratus*, (who according to *Eusebius*) flourished in the second year of the 56th Olympiad. He was Scholar to *Anaximander* and *Parmenides*; but that he heard *Thales* also, he acknowledgeth in an (*a*) Epistle to *Pythagoras.*

(a) Laert. vit. Anax.

We may (as in that Epistle *Amaximenes* doth) amongst the disciples of *Thales* reckon *Pythagoras* the *Samian*, institutor of the Italick Sect, who being from his youth particularly addicted

addicted to inveſtigation of Religious myſteries, addreſt his firſt journey to *Thales* at *Miletus*, as to one that beſt could further his deſign, being (according to * *Jamblicus*) not fully 18 years old; which if we follow the account of *Euſebius* for his birth (the fourth year of the ſeventieth Olympiad) and that of *Soſicrates* for his Age, eighty years (for the reſt, the farther they exceed that time, are ſo much the more incapable of reconcilement) will fall about the ſecond year of the fifty fourth Olympaid,) which is the 82 of *Thales*. From *Thales* he received the Rudiments of that Excellence which he afterwards attained. This is acknowledged by † *Jamblicus*. *Thales*, ſaith he, *entertained him very kindly, admiring the difference between him and other youths, which exceeded the fame he had receiv'd of him. After that he had inſtructed him as well as he was able in the Mathematicks, alledging for excuſe his old Age and Infirmity, he advis'd him to go to* Ægypt, *and to converſe with the* Memphian *Prieſts, eſpecially thoſe of* Jupiter, *of whom he himſelf had in his Travels learned thoſe things, for which by many he was eſteem'd wiſe*; and * again, *among other things* Thales *chiefly advis'd him to husband his time well, in reſpect whereof he abſtain'd from Wine and Fleſh, only eating ſuch things as are light of digeſtion, by which means he procured ſhortneſs of ſleep, wakefulneſs, purity of mind, and conſtant health of Body.*

* *De vita Pythag.* 1. 2.

† *Vit. Pythag.* 2.

* *Vit. Pythag.* 1. 3.

## CHAP. XIII.

### *Of his Death.*

† *Laert.*

*Thales* having now liv'd to a great age, being full of honour and wiſdom, * died in the firſt year of the fifty eighth Olympiad (when according to *Pauſanias Erxyclides* was Archon) as he was beholding the Olympick games, oppreſt with heat, thirſt and the burden of his years which amounted to ninety two. *Laertius* under reckons him to have lived but eighty ſeven years, having before acknowledged his Birth to have been in the firſt of the 35 Olympiad. † *Petavius* over-reckons, who makes him live to the end of the 58. which could not be becauſe he died ſpectator of the Olympick Games. * *Lucian* and † *Sincellus* more, who ſay he lived 100 years. *Soſicrates* comes neareſt to the truth, who allows him to have lived 90 years, and to have died in the 58 Olympiad; for from the firſt of the 58. are 23 entire Olympiads.

† *Rationar. temp.* 1. 12.

* *De longævit.* † *Chronol.*

The manner of his death gave *Laertius* occaſion to favour him with this Epigram.

*Viewing th' Olympick Games Elean* Jove,
*Thou didſt wiſe* Thales *from that his race remove*
*Nigher thy ſelf; and 'twas well done, now old*
*He could not well from Earth the Stars behold.*

He was buried according to his own appointment in a poor obſcure part of the *Mileſian* field, where he preſag'd that in future times their *Forum* ſhould be; upon his Tomb this diſtich,

*Plut. vit. Solon.*

*Narrow the Tomb, the fame than Heaven more wide,*
*Of wiſeſt* Thales, *whom this earth doth hide.*

There was alſo a Statue erected in honour of him bearing this ſubſcription.

*Mileſian* Thales *this doth repreſent,*
*Who all in wiſe Aſtrology outwent.*

† There were five more of this name mentioned by *Demetrius* the Magneſian, an Orator of *Calates*, an affected imitator. A Painter of *Sicyonia*, of a great ſpirit. The third very antient, contemporary with *Heſiod*, *Homer* and *Lycurgus*; The fourth mentioned by *Duris*: the fifth of later times, by *Dionyſius* in *Criticis*. * *Laertius* names *Pherecydes* as a detractor from *Thales* the Philoſopher.

† *Laert.*

* *Vit. Socrat.*

SOLON.

Solon.

## CHAP. I.

### Solon *his Parents, Country, and Condition.*

*Plut.* PHilocles, cited by *Didymus*, affirms that *Solon*'s Father was named *Euphorion*, but by the unanimous conſent of all other Writers he was called *Execeſtides*, a perſon though of ſmall fortune and account among the Citizens, yet of the moſt noble Family in *Athens*, deſcended from *Codrus*, * *Solon* deriving himſelf from *Neleus*, Son of *Codrus*, and from *Neptune*: † His Mother near of kin to the Mother of *Piſiſtratus*; his Parents had another Son named *Dropides*, Archon, the year after *Solon*, from him was *Plato* deſcended.

* *Laert. Plut.*

† *Laert. vit. Proclus in Timæum.*

*Solon* was born (according to *Laertius*) at *Salamis*, for which reaſon he deſired at his death

death that his body might be carried thither; but from his Parents and the place of his Residence, he was Sirnamed *Athenian*.

* *Plut.* * His Father by munificence and liberality brought his Estate so low, as to want even necessaries: *Solon* (ashamed to receive from any, being of a House which used to maintain others) betook himself to Merchandize: others say, he travelled rather to improve his knowledge and experience, for he was a professed lover of wisdom, and even to his last used to say, *I grow old in Learning*; Riches he esteemed not much, but to grow rich like

*——him who abounds*
*In heaps of Gold, as in rank Corn his grounds*
*In Mules and Horses, whilst his numerous wealth*
*Made pleasing by uninterrupted health:*
*If to compleat these joys, he be possest*
*Of Wife and Children, he is truly blest.*

And elsewhere,

*Riches I wish, not Riches that are plac'd*
*In unjust means, for vengeance comes at last.*

That he was profuse and delicate, and more luxurious in his Verses than beseems a Philosopher, is attributed to his practising Merchandise, such persons requiring more than ordinary delicacies and freedoms in recompence of their many and great dangers. That he was rather in the number of the Poor than of the Rich, is apparent from these his Verses.

*Many unjust grow Rich, and pious Poor,*
*We would not change our virtue for their store.*
*For constant vertue is a solid base:*
*Riches from Man to Man uncertain pass.*

† *Polit.* 4. 11. † *Aristotle* ranks *Solon* amongst the inferior sort of Citizens, which (saith he) *is manifest from his Elegies*, meaning perhaps, some of these which *Plutarch* cites. * *Lucian* saith, he was extreamly poor: * *Paleologus*, that he neither had nor valued wealth.

* *In Scytha.*

* *Orat.* 1.

## CHAP. II.

*How by his means the* Athenians *took* Salamis, Cyrrha, *and the* Thracian Chersonesus.

* *Orat. de falsa legat.* MAny (saith * *Demosthenes*) *of obscure and contemptible have become illustrious by profession of wisdom.* Solon *both living and dead flourish'd in extraordinary glory, to whom the utmost honours were not denyed, for he left a monument of his valour, the Megarean Trophy, and of his wisdom, the recovery of* Salamis; the occasons these.

† *Pausan.* * *Plut.* † *The Island* Salamis *revolted from the* Athenians *to the* Megarenses; * *the Athenians* having had a long troublesome War with the *Megarenses* for its recovery, grew at length so weary, that giving it over, they made a Law, forbidding any upon pain of death to speak or write any thing to perswade the City to re-attempt it: *Solon* brooking with much reluctance this ignominy, and seeing many young Men in the City desirous to renew the War, (though not daring to move it, by reason of the Edict) counterfeited himself mad, which he caused to be given out through the City, and having privately composed some elegiack Verses and got them by heart, came skipping into the *Forum* with his Cap (or as *Laertius* saith, *a Garland*) on; the people flocking about him, he went up into the place of the Cryer, and sung his Elegy beginning thus:

*A Cryer I, from* Salamis *the fair,*
*Am come in Verse this Message to declare:*

* *Pausan.* * The lines wherewith they were most excited were these:

*Rather than* Athens *would, I own'd my birth*
*To* Pholegondrian, *or* Sicinian *earth:*
*For Men where ere I go will say this is*
*One of the* Athenians *that lost* Salamis.

And,

*Then let's to* Salamis, *renew our claim,*
*And with the Isle recover our lost fame.*

† *Plut.* † This Poem was intituled *Salamis*, it consisted of a hundred Verses, very elegant: when he had made an end of singing, it was much applauded by his Friends, particularly by *Pisistratus*, who excited the Citizens to follow his advice: By this means the Law was repealed, the War recommenced, wherein *Solon* was made General: the common report is, that taking *Pisistratus* along with him (*whence it is, that some ascribe the whole glory of the action to* Pisistratus, *of whom are* Frontinus, Æneas, *and* Justine) he sailed to *Colias*, where finding all the Women celebrating the festival of *Ceres*, he sent a trusty messenger to *Salamis*, who pretending to be a Runagate, told the *Megarenses*, that if they would surprise the principal Women of *Athens*, they should go immediately with him to *Colias*: The *Megarenses* believing what he said, manned a Ship, and sent it along with him; *Solon*, as soon as he saw the Ship come from the Island, commanded the Women to retire, and as many beardless young men to put on their Gowns, Head-tyre, and Shoes, hiding Daggers under their Garments, and so danced and play'd by the Sea-side, till the enemy were landed, and their Ship at Anchor: By this time the *Megarenses*, deceived by their outward appearance, landed in great hast, and came upon them, thinking to take them away by force, * *but they suddenly drawing their Swords, shew'd themselves to be Men, not Women*; † the *Megarenses* were all slain, not one escaping, the *Athenians* going immediately to the Island took it.

* *Polyæn. lib.* 1.

† *Plut.*

* *Plut.* * Others deny it was taken in this manner, but that first receiving this answer from the Delphian Oracle,

*Let Sacrifice be to those Hero's paid,*
*Who under the* Asopian *ground are laid,*
*And dead, are by the setting Sun survey'd.*

*Solon* by night sailed to the Island, and sacrificed burnt Offerings to the Heroes, *Periphemus*, and *Cichris*; then he received five hundred Men of the *Athenians*, with condition, that if they gained the Island, the Supreme Government

ment thereof ſhould be in them: Shipping his Men in Fiſher-boats, attended by one Ship of thirty Oars, they caſt Anchor by *Salamis*, near a point oppoſite to *Eubœa*: The *Megarenſes* who were in *Salamis* hearing an uncertain rumor hereof, betook themſelves confuſedly to Arms, ſending forth a Ship to bring them more certain intelligence from the Enemy, which *Solon*, as ſoon as it came near, took, and killing the *Megarenſes*, manned with choice *Athenians*, whom he commanded to make directly for the City, with all poſſible ſecrecy; in the mean time, he with the reſt of the *Athenians*, aſſaulted the *Megarenſes* by Land, and whilſt they were in ſight, they who were in the Ship, making haſte, poſſeſt themſelves of the Town. This relation is confirmed by their Solemnity, an *Athenian* Ship comes thither firſt in ſilence, then falling on with cries and ſhouts, an armed Man leaps forth, and runs directly towards the *Scirradian* Promontory, againſt thoſe that come from the Land: hard by is the Temple of *Mars* built by *Solon*; for he overcame the *Megarenſes*, and let go ranſomleſs all thoſe that eſcaped the miſery of the War: † Ælian ſaith, *he took two Ships of the* Megarenſes, *whereinto he put* Athenian *Officers, and Soldiers, bidding them put on the Armour of the Enemy, whereby deceiving the* Megarenſes, *he ſlew many of them unarmed.*

† *Var. Hiſt.* 7. 19.

† *Plut.*

† But the *Megarenſes* perſiſting in obſtinacy, to the loſs of many lives on both ſides, the buſineſs was referred to the *Lacedæmonians* to be decided; many affirm *Solon* alledg'd the Authority of *Homer*, inſerting a Verſe into his Catalogue of Ships, which he thus recited at the trial,

Ajax *twelve Veſſels brought to* Salamis,
*And where the* Athenian *Men had ſtood, rank'd his.*

(*By which ſecond Verſe of his own making and addition he evinc'd, that* Salamis *of old belonged to the* Athenians.) But the *Athenians* eſteem this relation fabulous, affirming, *Solon* demonſtrated to the Judges, that *Phylæus* and *Euriſaces*, Sons of *Ajax*, being made free Denizons by the *Athenians*, delivered this Iſland to them, and dwelt, one at *Branco*, in *Attica*, the other in *Melita*, whence there is a Tribe named *Philaidæ*, from *Philæus*, of which was *Piſiſtratus*. † *He overcame the* Megarenſes *in an Oration, getting the better of them, not with ſpecious words, but weight of argument*: * more clearly to convince them, he inſtanced in the burial of the dead, *and inſcription of the names of Towns*, uſed by thoſe of *Salamis*, † *as he ſhewed, by digging up ſome Graves*, after the manner of the *Athenians*, not of the *Megarenſes*; for in *Megara* they buried their dead with their Faces to the Eaſt, in *Athens*, to the Weſt. But *Hereas* of *Megara* denying this, affirms, the *Megarenſes* buried alſo with their Faces toward the Weſt; for further confirmation, *Solon* alledg'd, that the *Athenians* had for each Man a ſeveral Coffin, the *Megarenſes* buried three or four in the ſame. It is ſaid alſo, that *Solon* was much helped by certain Oracles of *Apollo*, wherein he calls *Salamis Ionia*. This cauſe was decided by five *Spartans*, *Critolaidas*, *Amomphoretus*, *Hypſechidas*, *Anaxilas*, and *Cleomenes*.

† *Elian. Var. Hiſt.* 7. 19.

* *Plut.*

† *Latrt.*

* *Plut.*

* By this action *Solon* grew into great eſteem and honour, but he became [*not long after*] much more admired and cried up by the *Greeks*, for ſpeaking concerning the Temple at *Delphi*. *The* Cyrrhæans *committed many impieties againſt* Apollo, *and cut off part of the Land belonging to him.* † *Solon* declared, that it behoved them to relieve it, and not to ſuffer the *Cyrrhæans* to prophane the Oracle, but that they ſhould vindicate the Gods cauſe. The *Amphictions* thus inſtigated by him, undertook the War with much eagerneſs, as *Ariſtotle* affirms, aſcribing to *Solon* the honour of that Enterpriſe. *Æſchines* ſaith, the motion made by *Solon* was confirmed by the Oracle. Some affirm he was made General; others *Alcmæon*: *But the whole Army of the* Greeks *was* (*according to* † Pauſanias) *led by* Cliſthenes, *Tyrant of* Sycionia, *along with whom they ſent* Solon *from* Athens *to be his Counſellor.* * Suidas *ſaith, he was choſen Counſellor by thoſe, who were pickt out for the ſervice of that War.* † *Whilſt* Cliſthenes *beſieged* Cirrha, * *they enquired concerning the Victory; and from the* Pythian *Oracle received this Anſwer,*

† *Plut.*

† *In Phoc.*

* *In voce* Solon.

† *Polyæn. lib.* 3.

* *Pauſan.*

This Cities Fort you ſhall not take before
Blew *Amphitrites* ſwelling Billows roar
Againſt my Wave-waſh't grove, and hallow'd ſhoar.

*Whereupon* Solon *advis'd to conſecrate the* Cyrrhæan *field to* Apollo, *by which means the Sea ſhould touch ſacred Land.* † *He uſed alſo another ſtratagem againſt the* Cirrhæans; *the River* Pliſtus *which ran through the City, he diverted another way, the Town holding out againſt the Beſiegers, ſome drunk Well-water; others Rain, which they ſaved in Ciſterns. He cauſed Roots of Hellebore to be thrown into* Pliſtus, *and when he found it was fully poiſon'd, turned the River again into its proper channel: The* Cyrrhæans *drinking greedily of that Water, were taken with a continual Flux, and forced thereby to give over the defence of their works: the* Amphictions *being poſſeſt of the City, puniſhed the* Cirrhæans, *and aveng'd the Gods.* Theſe two ſtratagems were aſcribed to *Cliſthenes*, the firſt by † *Polianus*, the ſecond by * *Frontinus*; but the reaſon is apparent, he doing them by the direction of *Solon*.

† *Pauſan. ibid.*

† *Lib.* 3.

* *Lib.* 3. *cap.* 7.

† *Solon* perſwaded alſo the *Athenians* to reduce into their power the *Thracian Cherſoneſus*.

† *Latrt.*

## CHAP. III.

*How he compoſed differences and ſeditions at home, and was made Archon.*

† THE *Cylonian* impiety had for a long time vexed the City, ever ſince the Complices of *Cylon*, having taken ſanctuary, were perſwaded by *Megacles* the Archon to put themſelves upon a Trial, they laying hold of a Thread which was tied to the Image of *Pallas*, when they came near the Images of the Furies, the Thread broke of it ſelf, whereupon *Megacles* with the other Archons fell upon them, as perſons diſown'd by the Goddeſs; thoſe that were without the Temple they ſtoned, thoſe who run to the Altars, they were murdered; they only eſcaped who ſued to their Wives, whence being called impious, they were accounted odious:

† *Plut.*

dious: those that remained of the *Cylonians* were grown very rich, and had perpetual enmity with the Family of *Megacles*; at what time this dissention was highest, and the People thereby divided into factions, *Solon* being of much Authority amongst them, taking with him the chiefest of the City, interposed betwixt them, and with intreaties and advice perswaded those who were called impious to submit to the judgment of three hundred of the chief Citizens: *Miro* was their accuser, they were condemned, the Living to be banished, the Bones of the dead to be digged up, and thrown beyond the confines of the Country.

During these Commotions, the *Megarenses* took *Nysea*, and recovered *Salamis* from the *Athenians*; the City was full of superstitious terrors and apparitions; the Priests declared, that the entrails of the sacrificed Beasts imported great crimes and impieties, which required expiation. † *There was also a great Plague*; * the Oracle advis'd them to lustrate the City; to this end they sent († *Nicias*, Son of *Niceratus* with a Ship) * to fetch *Epimenides* out of *Creet*, who coming to *Athens*, was entertained by *Solon* as a Guest, conversed with him as a Friend, instructed him in many things, and set him in the way of making Laws. *This lustration of the City*, Eusebius *under-reckons, placing it in the second year of the forty seventh Olympiad, whereas* Solon's *being Archon, which certainly happened after this, was in the third of the forty sixth.* Suidas *seems to over-reckon, ranking it in the forty fourth: the opinion of* † Laertius *agrees best with the circumstances of the story, that it was in the forty sixth.*

† Laert. * Plut. † Laert. * Plut. † In Epimenid.

* The Commotions of the *Cylonei*, being thus appeased, and the Offendors extirpated, the People fell into their old difference about the Government of the Common-wealth, whereby they were divided into as many factions, as the Province contained distinctions of People; the Citizens were Domocratical, the Countrymen affected Oligarchy, the Maritimes stood for a mixt kind of Government, and hindred both the other Parties from having the rule; at the same time the City was in a dangerous condition, by reason of a dissension betwixt the rich and the poor, arising from their inequality, the business seemed impossible to be composed, but by a Monarchy; the Commons were generally oppressed by the Mony which they had borrowed of the rich, and either had tilled their Land, paying to them the sixth part of the Crop, whence they were called *Hectemoru*, and *Thetes*, or ingaged their Bodies to their Creditors, whereof some served at home, others were sold abroad, many also (there being no Law to the contrary) were necessitated to sell their Children, and leave the City, through the cruelty of these Usurers, the greatest part (such as had most coarage amongst them) assembling together, mutually exhorted one another not to indure these things any longer, but chusing some trusty Man to be their Leader, to discharge those that paid not their Mony at the set day, to share the Land, and quite invert the State of the Common-wealth. The discreetest amongst the *Athenians* looking upon *Solon* as a Person free from any crime, (neither ingaged in the oppressions of the rich, nor involved in the necessities of the poor) intreated him to take charge of the Common-wealth, and to compose the differences of the People. *Phanias* the *Lesbian* affirmeth, that for preservation of the State, he deceived both Parties, promising under-hand to the poor, a division of the Land; the rich, to make good their contracts; but that he first made scruples of undertaking the business, deterred by the avarice of the one, and insolence of the other; he was chosen Archon, next after *Cleombrotus* († *in the third year of the forty sixth Olympiad*) at what time he made his Laws also, being at once a Peace-maker, and a Law-giver, acceptable to the rich, as rich, and to the poor, as good; the People had often in their Mouths this saying of his, *Equality breeds no strife*, which pleased alike both Parties; one side understanding it of Number and Measure, the other of worth and vertue; upon which hope, the most powerful of both Factions courted him much, and desired him to take upon him the Tyranny of that Common-wealth, which he had now in his power, offering themselves to his assistance: Many also of the moderate part, seeing how laborious and difficult it would be to reform the State by Reason and Law, were not unwilling to have a Prince created, such an one as were most prudent and just: some affirm he received this Oracle from *Apollo*,

† Laert.

*Sit at the Helm of State, their Pilot be,*
*The Common-wealth's glad to be Steer'd by thee.*

But he was most of all reproved by his familiar Friends, for being deterred by the name of a Tyranny, as if the virtue of a King were not diffus'd through the Kingdom, instancing in *Tynondas* long since Tyrant of *Eubœa*, and *Pittacus* at present of *Mytelene*: nothing they alledg'd could move him, he told them a Tyranny was a fair possession, but it had no passage out: to *Phocus*, writing thus in Verse,

*That I preserved free my Native soil,*
*Nor did with bloody Tyranny defile*
*My honour, I not blush at by this deed,*
*All that was done by others I exceed.*

Whereby it appears, he was of great Authority before he writ his Laws. The Contumelies of such as reproved him for declining the Government, he thus expreſt in Verse:

*Nor wise is* Solon, *nor good counsel knows,*
*For he resists the good that God bestows,*
*The prey within his power he did behold,*
*But would not draw the Net; thoughts meanly cold:*
*Had but his Soul with noble aims been fir'd,*
*The Kingdom for one day he had desir'd,*
*Then split, and all his Family expir'd.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. IV.

*What alterations he made during his Government, and first of the* Sisachthia.

* *Plut.* *THough he refused the Tyranny, yet he behaved not himself remisly in the Government, not complying with the powerful, nor making Laws to please those who had chosen him, where things were tolerable, he corrected nor altered nothing; fearing, lest, if he should change and confound the Common-wealth in every particular, he should want strength to settle it again, and to temper it with the best reason; but such things unto which he conceived he might perswade the obsequious, and compel the refractory, those he enacted; joyning (as he said) Force and Justice, whence, being afterwards demanded if he had had given the *Athenians* the best Laws, the best (saith he) they would receive.

† *Plut.* * *Laert.* † The first change he made in the Government was this, he (* *introduced the* Sisachthia, *which was a discharge of Bodies and Goods; or as* Hesychius *defines it, a Law for remission of private and publick Debts, so called from shaking off the oppression of usury:* † *for at that time they engaged their Bodies for payment, and many through want were constrained to serve their Creditors, he therefore*) ordained that for the time past, all Debts should be acquitted, and for the future, no security should be taken upon the Body of any; this by a moderate term he called *Sisachthia*; there want not (of whom is *Androtion*) who affirmed he contented the poor, not by an absolute discharge of the Debt, but by moderating the Interest, which he called *Sisachthia*; whereto he added the increase of Measures, and valuation of Mony; for the Mina which was before seventy three Drachms, he made a hundred: by this means the poorer sort paid a greater summ in less Coyn, which was a great ease to the Debtor, and no wrong to the Creditor: but the greater part hold it was an absolute discharge, which agreeth best with the Verses of *Solon*, wherein he boasteth he had *removed the bounds throughout the Land, freed such as were under oppression, called home those, who being forced to travel, had forgotten their native Language; and others that were at home under bondage, set at liberty.* The same

* *Lib.* 1. Law, * *Diodorus Siculus* observes to be among the *Egyptians*, conceiving *Solon* (though as yet he had not been there) derived it from them.

* *Plut.* *But in this design a great misfortune befel him, whilst he endeavoured to redress the oppression of Usury, and was studying how to begin an Oration suitable to the thing, he acquainted his intimate Friends in whom he reposed most confidence, *Conon*, *Clinias*, and *Hipponicus*, that he meant not to meddle with Land, but to cut off all Debts; they (preventing the Edict) borrowed of the rich great summs of Mony, wherewith they purchased much Land; the Edict being published, they enjoyed their purchase, without satisfying their Creditors: *Solon* was much blamed, as not defrauded with the rest, but as being a defrauder with those, and a partaker of their cozenage; but this imputation was immediately washed away with five Talents, so much he had forth at interest, which he first, according to the Law, blotted out, (*Laertius* saith six, perswading others to do the like) others, of whom is *Polyzelus* the *Rhodian*, fifteen; but his Friends were ever after called χρεωκοπίδαι.

* *Plut.* * This pleased neither parts; he discontented the rich by cancelling their Bonds, the poor more, not making good a parity of Estates, which they expected, as *Lycurgus* had done, he being the eleventh from *Hercules*, having reigned many years in *Lacedæmon*, great in Authority, Friends, and Wealth, whereby he was able to make good what he thought convenient for the State, rather by force than perswasion, even to the loss of his Eye, effected as a thing most expedient to the preservation and peace of the Common-wealth, that none of the Citizens were either rich or poor: but *Solon* attained not this in the Common-wealth, he was one of the People, and of a mean degree; yet he omitted nothing within his power, carried on by his own Judgment, and the Faith which the Citizens had in him; that he displeased many, who expected other things, is thus acknowledged by himself.

*Before they look'd upon me kindly, now*
*With eyes severe, and a contracted brow:*
*Had any else my power, he would exact*
*Their riches, and their fattest milk extract.*

But both Parties soon found how much this conduced to the general good, and laying aside their private differences, sacrificed together, calling the Sacrifice Σεισαχθεία.

## CHAP. V.

*How he divided the People into Classes, and erected Courts of Judicature.*

† *Plut.* †HEreupon they chose *Solon* reformer and Lawgiver of the Common wealth, not limiting him to any thing, but submitting all to his Power, Magistracies, Convocations, Judgments, Courts to take an accompt of them, to prescribe what number and times he pleased; to disannul or ratifie of the present Law what he thought good.

* *Plut.* * First, then he quite abolished all the Laws of *Draco*, except for murther, because of their rigidness and severity, for he punished almost all offences with death; as that they who were surprised in Idleness should be put to death; they who stole Herbs or Apples should undergo the same punishment with such as had committed Murther, or Sacriledge; whence *Demades* wittily said, *Draco* writ his Laws not in Ink, but Blood; he being asked why he punished all offences with Death, answered, *He conceived the least deserved so much, and he knew no more for the greatest*; Herodicus *alluding to his name, said his Laws were not of a Man, but of a Dragon, they were so rigid*; *And* † Aristotle saith, *there was nothing in them extraordinary and worthy of memory,* † *Arist. Rhet.* 2. 23. *but that severity and greatness of penalty* which was so excessive, that * *not by any edict or command, but by a silent unexpressed consent amongst the* Athe- * *A. Gell.* 11. 18.

nians *they were laid aside*; *afterwards they used the milder Laws made by* Solon, differing even in name, the first being called θεσμοὶ, the latter νόμοι. † Those of *Draco* were made in the 39th Olympiad, 47 years (as * *Ulpian* accounts) before these of *Solon*.

† *Tatian. Clem. Alex. Suid.* * *In Demost. Timocr.*

† Next, *Solon* (being desirous that all Offices might continue as they were, in the hands of the rich, but that other Priviledges of the Common-wealth, from which the People were excluded, might be promiscuously disposed) took an account and valuation of the People [† *and divided them into four orders*] those whose stock of dry and liquid Fruits amounted to 500 Measures he ranked in the first place, and called *Pentacosiomedimni*, [* *these paid a Talent to the publick Treasury.*] In the second Class were those who were able to maintain a Horse, or received 300 Measures, these he called [† *for that reason*] *Horsemen*; *they paid half a Talent.* The third Class were *Zengitæ* (* *so called because*) they had 200 Measures of both sorts, † *these paid* 10 *Mine*, the rest were all called *Thetes*, whom he suffered not to be capable of any Magistracy, neither did they pay any thing, but only had so far interest in the Common-wealth, as to have a suffrage in the publick Convocation, and at Judgments, which at first seemed nothing, but afterwards appeared to be of great consequence; for in whatsoever was brought before the Judges, he gave them leave (if they would) to appeal to the common *Forum*; moreover writing his Laws obscurely and perplexedly, he increased the power of the *Forum*, for not being able to determine Controversies by the Law, they were forced to have recourse to the Judges, as Masters of the Law; this equality he himself thus expresseth,

† *Pollux.* † *Pollux.* * *Pollux.* † *Pollux.*

*The Commons I sufficient power allow;*
*Honour from none I took, on none bestow;*
*Those who in Power or Wealth the rest outshin'd,*
*In bounds of moderation I confin'd;*
*To either part I was a firm defence,*
*And neither did allow preheminence.*

Hither † *Seneca* alluding saith, Solon *founded* Athens *upon equal right*; *and* * Justin, *he carried himself with such temper between the Commons and the Senate, that he attracted equal favour from both, he suffered no Man* (saith † Æneas Gazeus) *to have a peculiar Law, but made all Men subject to the same.*

† *Epist.* 90. * *Lib.* 2. † *In Theophrast.*

† He likewise (continues *Plutarch*) constituted the Court of the *Areopagus*, consisting of the yearly *Archons*, whereof himself (being the chief) was one; perceiving the People to be much exalted and emboldened by the remission of their Debts, he ordained a second Court of Judicature, selecting out of each Tribe (which were in all four) a hundred Persons, who should resolve upon all Decrees before they were reported to the People; nor should any thing be brought to them, until it had first past the Senate: the supreme Senate he appointed Judge and preserver of the Laws, conceiving the City would be less apt to float up and down, and the People become more setled, relying upon these two Courts, as on two Anchors; thus the greater part of Writers make *Solon* Institutor of the Court of *Areopagus*, (*of whom also is* † Cicero) which seems to be confirmed, in that *Draco* never mentions the *Areopagites*, but in criminal Causes always names the *Ephetæ*; but the eighth Law of the thirtieth Table of *Solon* hath these words, *Those who were branded with infamy before* Solon *was Archon, let them be restored to their fame, except such as were condemned by the* Areopagites, *or by the* Ephetæ, *&c.* And it is certain, That *the Court of* Areopagus *was long before* Solon's *time, until then consisting promiscuously of such Persons as were eminent for Nobility, Power, or Riches, but* Solon *reformed it, ordaining none should be thereof, but such as had first undergone the office of Archon.* See *Meursius, Areop. cap.* 3.

† *De offic. l.* 1.

† Pollux *saith, that* Solon *ordained a thousand Men to judge all Accusations*; * Demetrius Phalereus, *that he constituted the* Demarci, *first called* Nauclari.

† *Lib.* 8. *cap.* 6. * *Schol. Aristoph. in Nub.*

## CHAP. VI.

### *His Laws.*

HAving thus disposed the Common-wealth, and Courts of Judicature, he in the next place applied himself to making Laws, which he performed so excellently, that he is generally remembered under that notion, with *Minos* of *Creet*, and *Lycurgus* of *Lacedæmon*, whose Laws those of *Solon exceeded*, (as † *Tacitus* saith) *both in exquisiteness and number*: * *of how much greater esteem they were than all before them, may be computed from this, That they were the last, and continued always in the City: They, for whom they were made, thought them more Illustrious than their publick Ornaments, which transcended those of all other Cities, more impregnable than their Tower, which they accounted the strongest of all upon Earth, and far better than those things wherein they gloried most*: † nor were they of less esteem among Foreign Nations, insomuch that the *Romans agreeing concerning Laws in general, but differing about the Law-giver, sent Ambassadors to* Athens, Sp. Posthumius Albus, A. Manlius, P. Sulpitius Camerinus, *commanding them to transcribe the renowned Laws of* Solon: † which *transferred out of the Books of* Solon *the* Decemviri, *expounded in the twelve Tables.* Hence * Ammianus Marcellinus *saith, that* Solon *assisted by the Sentences of the* Ægyptian *Priests, having with just moderation framed Laws, added also to the* Roman *State the greatest Foundation.*

† *Annal.* 3. * *Man. Paleolog. in protrept. ad doctr.* † *Liv. lib.* 3. † *Aurel. Vict. de vir. illust. c.* 21. * *Lib.* 22.

Of his Laws, these have been preserved by *Plutarch*, and others.

† *If any Man were beaten, hurt, or violently treated, whosoever had the means and will, might sue the offender.* Thus (saith *Plutarch*) he wisely brought the Citizens to a mutual sense of one another hurts, as if done to a Limb of their own Body.

† *Plut.*

† *Of infamous Persons, let all such as were infamous before the Government of* Solon, *be restored to their fame, excepting whosoever were condemned by the* Ephetæ, *or in the* Prytanæum *by the Magistrates, banished for Murder, Theft, or aspiring to Tyranny.* This was the eighth Law of the thirteenth Table. There

† *Plut.*

There were two kinds of infamy, by the leſſer a Man was degraded and made uncapable of all honour or office in the Common-wealth; by the greater, he and his children were lyable to be killed by any man, and he not to be queſtioned for it.

(b) Plut. (b) Of his laws, thoſe ſeem moſt ſingular and paradoxal, which declare him infamous, who in a ſedition takes neither part: it is cited out of (i) Lib. 2. cap. 12. *Ariſtotle* by (i) *A. Gellius* in theſe words: *If through diſcord and diſſention, any ſedition and difference divided the people into two factions, whereupon with exaſperated minds both parties take up arms and fight; he, who at that time, and upon that occaſion of civil diſcord ſhall not engage himſelf on either ſide, but ſolitary and ſeparated from the common evil of the City withdraw himſelf, let him be deprived of houſe, Country and goods by baniſhment.* (k) He would not that any one ſaving himſelf harmleſs, ſhould be inſenſible of the common calamity, or boaſt himſelf to have no ſhare in the publick grief, but that inſtantly applying himſelf to the better and juſter ſide, he ſhould intereſt himſelf in the common danger, and aſſiſt, rather than out of all hazard, expect which ſide ſhould get the better. When we did read (ſaith *A. Gellius*) this law of *Solon*, a perſon indued with ſingular wiſdom, at firſt we remained in great ſuſpence and admiration, enquiring for what reaſon he judged thoſe worthy of puniſhment, who withdrew themſelves from ſedition and civil war; then one whoſe ſight pierced more deeply into the uſe and meaning of the law, affirmed, the intent thereof was not to encreaſe, but appeaſe ſedition; and ſo indeed it is: for if all good perſons, who in the beginning are too few to reſtrain a ſedition, ſhould not deter the diſtracted raging people, but dividing themſelves, adhere to either ſide, it would follow, that they being ſeparated as partakers of both factions, the parties might be temper'd and govern'd by them, as being perſons of greateſt authority; by which means they might reſtore them to peace, and reconcile them, governing and moderating that ſide whereof they are, and deſiring much rather the adverſe party ſhould be preſerved than deſtroyed. (l) *Cicero* citing this law, averreth the puniſhment to have been capital, perhaps underſtanding infamy here of the more ſevere kind.

(k) Plut.

(l) ad Attic. 10. 1.

Abſurd and ridiculous (ſaith *Plutarch*) ſeemeth that Law which alloweth *an inheritrix, if he who poſſeſſeth her by law as her Lord and Maſter be impotent, to admit any of her husbands neareſt kindred.* But ſome aver it is juſt, as to thoſe, who though they are impotent, yet will marry rich heirs for their mony, and by the priviledge of law wrong nature; for when they ſee it lawful for the heir to admit whom ſhe pleaſeth, either they will refrain from ſuch marriages, or undergo them with the reproach of avarice and diſhoneſty: It is well ordered alſo, that ſhe may not admit any one, but only whom ſhe will of her husbands kindred, whereby the iſſue may be of his family and race. (m) Hither likewiſe it tends, that *the Bride be ſhut up in a room with the Bridegroom, and eat a Quince with him.* (Intimating, according to (n) *Plutarch's* interpretation, that the firſt grace of her lips and voyce ſhould be agreeable and ſweet) and that *he who marrieth an heir, be obliged to viſit her thrice a month at the leaſt*: For though they have not children, this argues a reſpect due to a chaſt Wife, and prevents or reconciles unkindneſs and diſſention.

(m) Plut.

(n) In præcept. conjugal.

Thoſe words of the former law, *He who poſſeſſeth her by law as her Lord and Maſter*, have reference to another Law of his, mentioned by (o) *Diodorus Siculus*, that *the next of kin to an heir might by law require her in marriage, and ſhe likewiſe might require him that was next of kin who was obliged to marry her, though never ſo poor, or to pay 500 Drachms for her dowry.* Hereto (p) *Terence* alludes. (o) Lib. 12.

(p) Hec. Act. 3. Scen. 2.

*The Law commands an heir to marry with*
*Her Husbands next of kin, and him to take her.*

And to the putting her off without a dowry of 500 drachms, (that is five *minæ*) (q) elſewhere. (q) Phorm. Act. 2. ſcen. 3.

*Though I be injur'd thus, yet rather than*
*I'le be contentious, or bound ſtill to hear thee,*
*Since ſhe's my kinſwoman, take hence with her*
*The Dower the law enjoyns me, here's five pound.*

(r) In all other marriages he forbad Dowries, ordaining that *a Bride ſhould bring with her no more than three gowns, and ſome ſlight houſhold-ſtuff, of ſmall value*, the particulars whereof were expreſſed, as (ſ) *Pollux* ſeems to imply, *for he would not that marriage ſhould be mercenary or vendible, but that the Man and Woman ſhould co-habit for Iſſue, love, and friendſhip.* Hither (t) *Iſidor* alludes; amongſt the Athenians legal marriage was ſaid to be contracted, in reſpect of iſſue. (r) Plut. (ſ) 1. 12. 15. (t) Lib. 3. Epiſt. 243.

That Law of his alſo was commended, as (u) *Demoſthenes* and *Plutarch* atteſt, which forbad to revile the dead, *Let no man revile any dead perſon, though provoked by the revilings of his Children.* (w) To eſteem the deceaſed holy is pious, to ſpare the abſent juſt, to take away the eternity of hatred civil. (u) Orat. in Leptin. (w) Plut.

(x) He forbad *to revile any living perſon at ſacred ſolemnities, Courts of Judicature, and publick ſpectacles, upon penalty of three drachms to be paid to the reviled perſon, two more to the common treaſury.* To moderate anger no where he accounted rude and diſorderly, every where difficult, to ſome impoſſible. A law muſt he accommodated to what is poſſible, intending to puniſh ſome few, to advantage not many to no purpoſe. (x) Plut.

(y) His law concerning Teſtaments is much approved; for before, no man had power to make a Will, but his goods, and lands continued in the family of the deceaſed perſon. *Solon* made it *lawful for him that had no Children to give his eſtate to whom he pleaſed.* He preferred friendſhip before kindred, and favour before neceſſity, and ordered, that wealth ſhould be at the diſpoſal of him in whoſe hands it was: yet he permitted not this raſhly, or abſolutely, but conditionally, *If he were not wrought upon by ſickneſs, potions, bondage, or the blandiſhments of a Wife.* Juſtly he eſteemed it all one whether a Man be ſeduced by indirect means, or violently conſtrained, thus comparing deceit with force, and pleaſure with pain, as being of equal power to put (y) Plut.

put a Man out of his right mind. This Law is mentioned likewise by *g) Demosthenes.*

(g) *Orat. in Lept.*

He also limited the visits, mournings, and feasts of Women, by a law which curbed their former licentiousness. *Her who went abroad, he permitted not to carry with her above three Gowns, nor more meat and drink than might be bought with an obolus, nor a basket above a cubit in bigness, nor to travel by night, unless in a chariot, and with torch-light: He forbad them to tear their cheeks to procure mourning and lamentation, at the funerals of those, to whom they have no relation. He forbad to sacrifice an Ox at funerals, and to bury more than three garments with the dead body; not to approach the monuments of strangers unless at their Exequies.* Of which (saith *Plutarch*) our laws are full: (*h*) *Cicero* also affirms, that the laws of the twelve Tables for contracting the pomp of funerals, and concerning mourning, are transferred from those of *Solon*, who (as *Phalereus* writes) assoon as funerals began to be solemnised with pomp and lamentation, took them away: which Law the *Decemviri* put into the tenth table, almost in the very same words, for that of three neighbourhoods and most of the rest are *Solon's*, that of mourning in his express words, *Let no women tear their cheeks, nor make lamentation at a funeral.*

(h) *De leg. lib. 2.*

(i) Considering that the City grew very populous, many recurring thither from all parts of *Attica*, for liberty and security, that the Country was for the most part barren and bad, that such as trade by sea import nothing for those, that have not wherewith to barter or exchange with them, he addicted the Citizens to arts, and made a law, that *the Son should not be obliged to maintain his Father, if he had not brought him up to a trade* (mentioned also by (*k*) *Vitruvius, Galen,* (*l*) (*m*) *Theophylact*, and others) and commanded *the court of Areopagus to examine by what gain every Man maintained himself, and to punish idle persons whom he made liable to the action of every Man, and at the third conviction punished with infamy.* This law, (*n*) *Herodotus*, and (*o*) *Diodorus Siculus* affirm to have been in use amongst the Ægyptians, made by *Amasis*, and from them derived by *Solon* to the Athenians.

(i) *Plut.*

(k) *Præfat. lib. 6.*
(l) *Exhort. Vrat. ad artes.*
(m) *Epist 7.*
(n) *Lib. 7.*
(o) *Lib. 1.*

(p) Yet more severe was that mentioned by *Heraclides* of *Pontus*, which *disengaged the sons of concubines from maintaining their fathers.* He who transgresseth the bounds of marriage, professeth he doth it not out of desire of issue, but for pleasure, and therefore already hath his reward and can expect to have no further tye upon those he begets, whose birth is their shame.

(p) *Plut.*

(q) Most incongruous seem those laws of *Solon* which concern women, for he permitted that, whosoever surprised an adulterer (with the Wife or (*r*) Concubine of any) might kill him, (or exact mony of him) *he that ravished a free Woman was fined* 100. *Drachms, he that plaid the pandor*, 20 ((*s*) *Æschines* saith, to die) *except to such Women as were common.* He also forbad *any Man to give his Sister or daughter to that profession, unless himself first surprise her with a Man.* This (saith *Plutarch*) seems absurd, to punish the same offence sometimes severely with death, sometimes with a pecuniary mulct, unless, because at that time mony was very rare in *Athens*, the scarcity thereof aggravated the punishment.

(q) *Plut.*

(r) *Lysias in Orat. de cæde Eratosth.*
(s) *Orat. in Timarch.*

(t) He assigned *five hundred drachms to the Victor of the Isthmian games, a hundred to the Victor of the Olympick*: attested also by *Laertius*, who saith, he contracted the rewards of the Athleta's, judging them dangerous Victors, and that they were crowned rather against, than for their Country.

(t) *Plut.*

(u) *Whosoever brought a he-wolf was to receive five drachms, for a she-wolf one*; according to *Demetreus Phalereus*, this being the price of a sheep, that of an Ox. It is customary with the Athenians, that such as have grounds fitter for pasture than plowing, make War with the Wolves.

(u) *Plut.*

(w) Forasmuch as there is such scarcity of Rivers, Lakes and Springs in the Country, that they are constrained to dig wells, he made a Law, *where there was a common Well within a Hippicon, they should make use of it.* (A Hippicon is the distance of four furlongs) *they that lived further off should procure water of their own, and if when they have digged ten fathom deep, they find not any, they might be allowed to fill a pitcher of six gallons twice a day at their neighbours well.*

(w) *Plut.*

(x) These exact rules he prescribed for planting, *whosoever planted any young Tree in his ground, should set it five foot distant from his neighbours; who a Fig-tree or Olive-tree, nine:* Because the roots of these spread far, nor is their neighbourhood harmless to all, but sucks away the nourishment, and to some their blatt is prejudical.

(x) *Plut.*

(z) *Whosoever diggeth any hole or ditch must make it so far distant from his neighbours, as it is deep.* These are confirmed by (*a*) *Cajus*, adding; *whosoever makes a hedge to divide himself from his neighbour, must not exceed his own bounds; if a wall, he must leave the space of a foot, if a house, two feet, if a well, a fathom.*

(z) *Plut.*

(a) *Lib. 4. ad leg. 12. tab.*

*Whosoever placeth a hive of bees, should observe the distance of thirty feet, from those that were before placed by his neighbour.*

(b) He commanded *the Archons to curse him who exported any thing out of the Country, or that he should pay a hundred Drachms to the publick treasury*, whereby they are not to be rejected, who say, that of old the exportation of figgs was prohibited, and that he, who discover'd an exporter, was called a Sycophant.

(b) *Plut.*

(c) He made a law concerning such as should be hurt by a dog, wherein he ordained, *the dog that bit to be bound in a chain four cubits long.*

(c) *Plut.*

(d) This law concerning Denization is difficult, *That none should be made free of the City, except such as were banished for ever out of their own Country, or came to* Athens *with their whole families to exercise some trade*; this he did not to drive away foreigners, but to invite them to *Athens* by certainty of admittance into the City, conceiving such would be faithful, those out of necessity, these out of good-will.

(d) *Plut.*

(e) Likewise to be feasted in the publick hall was the peculiar institution of *Solon*, which he called ἀσιτίαν, not permitting the same person to eat there frequently: but if he who were invited, would not accept of it, he was punished,

(e) *Plut.*

punished, conceiving this a contempt of the publique honour, that an inordinate appetite.

Hitherto *Plutarch*: these following are recited by *Laertius*.

(a) Laert. (a) *If any one maintain not his Parents, let him be infamous, as likewise he that devours his patrimony.* Hitherto † *Æschines* alludes; in the fourth place with whom hath he to do? If any Man by prodigality hath consumed his patrimony or hereditary goods; for he conceived, he who had ordered his own family ill, would in the same manner take care of the common wealth; neither did the law-giver imagine it possible, that the same person should be privately wicked, and publickly good, or that it were fitting such a one should go up into the chair, who took more care to frame an oration, than to compose his life.

† Orat. in Timarch.

* Laert. † In Timarch. * He *forbad such as haunted common Women to plead*; confirmed by *Æschines* †. In the third place with whom hath he to do? If any Man (saith he) be a haunter of common Women, or procure mony by such means; for he conreived, such a one as sold his own fame for mony, would easily sell the business of the State. And (b) *Demosthenes*, it is worth inquiry and consideration, *Athenians*, how great care, *Solon*, the author of this law, had in the Comonwealth in all those which he made, and how particularly solicitous he was herein above all other things, which as it is evident by many other laws, so also by this, which forbids those *qui se prostituerunt*, either to plead or judge in publick.

(b) In Androt.

(c) Laert. * In Panathen. (c) He augmented the rewards of such as should die in War, whose sons he *ordered to be brought up and instructed at the publick charge.* * *Aristides*, thou alone of all Men didst ordain these three things by law, that such as died for their country should be annually praised publickly at their sepulchers, their Children, till grown Men, maintained at the publick charge, then sent back to their fathers house with compleat armes; likewise that infirm Citizens should be maintain'd at the publick charge. (d) *Plato* adds that the same indulgence was allowed to the parents; you know the care of the Common-wealth, which in the laws concerning the Children and parents of such as died in the War, *commands the supream Magistrate to take care, that the parents of those that died in the War, above all other Citizens should not receive any injury.* The State brings up the Children also: hereby, saith *Laertius*, they became eager of fame and honour in War, as *Polyzelus*, as *Cynegyrus*, as all those in the *Marathonian* fight: to whom may be aded *Harmodius*, *Aristogiton*, *Miltiades*.

(d) Menexen.

(e) Laert. * In Hermog. † In Hermog. (e) *Let not a guardian marry the Mother of his ward, nor let not any one be ward to him, who, if he die, shall inherit his estate*, confirm'd by * *Syrianus*, † *Marcellinus*, and others, who add that the same law forbad the ward to marry her guardians Son.

(f) Laert. (f) *Let not a graver keep the impression of any seal after he hath sold it.*

(g) Laert. (g) *If any man put out the eye of another, who had but one, he shall lose both his own.*

His law concerning theft, *Laertius* expresseth thus; *What thou laidst not down, take not up, otherwise the punishment death.* * *Æschines* adds, if they confessed themselves guilty: others affirm the punishment was only to pay double the value, of whom is (h) *A. Gellius* and † *Hermogenes*, who affirm, the law made that distinction betwixt sacriledge and theft, punishing the first with death, the latter with double restitution. * *Demosthenes* clears this, reciting this law exactly in these words, *If any Man steal in the day time above fifty drachms, he may be carried to the eleven officers, if he steal any thing by night, it shall be lawful for any to kill him, or in the pursuit to wound him, and to carry him to the eleven officers. Whosoever is convict of such offences, as are liable to chains, shall not be capable of giving bail for his theft, but his punishment shall be death, and if any one steal out of the Lyceum, or the Academy, or Cynosarges, a garment or a small vessel of Wine, or any other thing of little value, or some vessel out of the Gymnasia, or Havens, he shall be punished with death; but if any Man shall be convict privately of theft, it shall be lawful for him to pay a double value, and it shall be also at the pleasure of the convictor, besides payment of Mony, to put him in chains five days, and as many nights, so as all Men may see him bound.* (i) Even those who stole dung, were by *Solon*'s law liable to punishment.

(h) Lib. 11. c. 18. † Partit. sect. 4. * Orat. in Timocr.

(i) Schol. Aristoph. ad equites.

* That *if an Archon were taken drunk, he should be punisht with death.* * Laert.

To those recited by *Laertius*, add these collected from others.

He *allowed Brothers and Sisters by the same Father to marry, and prohibited only Brothers and Sisters of the same venter*; Whereas contrariwise (saith (k) *Philo*) the Lacedæmonian law-giver allowed these, and prohibited those. Hence (l) *Cornelius Nepos* affirms, *Cimon* married his Sister *Elpinice*, invited, not more by love, than the Athenian custom, which allows to marry a Sister by the same Father.

(k) De leg. spec. lib. 2. (l) In Proem. & in Cimonis vita

(m) He writ according to the manner of the antients, severally concerning the discipline of Matrons, for *a Woman taken in Adultery he permitted not to wear ornaments, nor to come into publick Temples, lest by her presence she should corrupt modest women; if she came into a temple, or adorned her self, he commanded every one to rend her garments, to tear off her ornaments, and to beat her, but not to kill, or maim her*; By this means depriving such a Woman of all honour, and giving her a life more bitter than death. This is also confirmed by * *Demosthenes*, who adds, *If any man surprize an Adulterer, it shall not be lawful for him who took them to have the Woman in marriage, if he continue to keep her as his Wife, let him be infamous.*

(m) Æschin. Orat in Timarch. * In Neæram.

(n) *Let the dead body be laid out within the house, according as he gave order, and the day following before Sun-rise carried forth; whilst the body is carrying to the grave, let the men go before, the Women follow; it shall not be lawful for any Woman to enter upon the goods of the dead, and follow the body to the grave, under threescore years of age, excepting those within the degree of cosens, nor shall any Woman enter upon the goods of the deceased after the body is carried forth, excepting those who are within the degree of Cosens.*

(n) Demosth. Orat. in Macartat.

* Concerning Sepulchers, he saith no more, than that *no man shall demolish them, or bring any new thing into them; and he shall be punished, whosoever violates, casts down, or breaks any tomb, monument, or column.*

* Cicer. de leg. 2.

(o) If

(p) Ælian. var. hist. 2. 42. & c. 5. 14.

(p) *If any one light upon the dead body of a man unburied, let him throw earth upon it.*

* Demost. in Lipton.

* *Whosoever shall dislike a received Law, let him first accuse it, then if it be abrogated, substitute another:* The manner whereof is largely expressed by *Demosthenes*.

(q) Declam. 18.

† Pyrrh. Hipp. 3. 24.

* Lib. 2.

He ordained according to (q) *Libanius*) that *Children should be obliged to perform all due offices to their parents.* † *Sextus* saith he made a Law of indemnity, whereby he allowed any Man to kill his Son; but * *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* affirms, he permitted them to turn their Children out of doors, and to disenherit them, but nothing more.

† Æschin. in Ctesiph.

† He ordained that *all such as declined to be engaged in War, or forsook the Army, or was a Coward, should have all one punishment, to be driven out of the bounds of the* Forum, *not permitted to wear a garland, or to enter into publick Temples.*

(r) Demost. Orat. in Timocr.

(r) *If any one be seized on, for having abused his Parents or forsaken his colours, or being forbidden by law, hath gone into places where he ought not, let the eleven officers take and bind him, and carry him into the Heliæa, it shall be lawful for any one that will to accuse him, and if he be cast, it shall be at the judgment of the Heliæa to impose what punishment or Fine they should think fit, if a Fine, let him be kept in fetters till it be paid.*

(s) Athenæus. deipn. lib. 15.

(s) He permitted *not a man to sell unguents,* as being an effeminate office.

(t) Æschin. in Ctesiph.

(t) As concerning Orators, he ordered, that *the Eldest of the Citizens should go up first into the pleaders chair modestly without tumult and perturbation to move, he out of experience should conceive best for the Common-Wealth; then that every Citizen according to his age should several by and in order declare his judgment.*

(u) Liban. declam. 13.

(u) He ordered that *a Citizen of* Athens *should be tried no where but at* Athens.

(w) Stob. 112.

(w) He commanded that *no young man should bear the office of a Magistrate, nor be admitted to council, though he were esteemed exceeding wise.*

(x) Demost. in Aristogit.

(x) For the common people he ordained slow punishments, for Magistrates and Rulers of the people sudain, conceiving those might be punished at any time, but that the correction of these would admit no delay.

(z) Maxim. Tyr. 39.

* Cicer. orat. pro S. Rosc.

(z) As for the Gods and their worship, he decreed nothing, * nor against Parricides, answering those who questioned him about it, *he did not think any could be so wicked.*

## CHAP. VII.

*Of the Axes and Cyrbes, Senators Oath, and other institutions of* Solon.

* Plut.

† A. Gell. 2. 12.

* Plut. Etymol.

† Pollux. 8. 10.

* *These Laws he ratified, for a hundred years;* They were † *carved* in different tables*. Those which concerned private actions, in oblong quadrangular tables of Wood, with cases, which reached from the ground and turned about upon a Pin like a Wheel, whence they were called Ἄξονες, † placed first in the Tower, then brought into the Prytanæum that all might see them, where there were some remains of them in *Plutarch's* time. Those which concerned (a) publick orders and sacrifices, in (b) triangular tables of stone called κύρβεις, either from (c) *Cyrbus* who took the accompt of every mans estate, or ἀπὸ τῶ ταύτα κυρωσῆναι τοῖς γεγιμμένοις, or ἀπὸ (d) τῶ κακοζυφᾶσθαι, or from the *Corybantes*, to whom the invention thereof is by some ascribed. These were placed in the *Porticus regia*; (e) Both the *Axes* and *Cyrbes* were written after the same manner as oxen to turn in ploughing (βουστροφηδὸν γράφειν.) whence *Demosthenes* calls that law the lowest which beginneth on the left side.

(a) Said.

(b) Amm. differ. voc.

(c) Said.

(d) Schol. Aristot. in Av.

(e) Didym. apud Harp. & Suid.

(f) *The Senate took one common oath to make good the laws of* Solon *for a hundred years, each of the Thesmothetæ sworn in the* Forum *at the Criers Stone; if he violated them, to dedicate a golden statue of equal weight with himself at* Delphi.

(f) Plut.

Some particulars of the oath imposed by *Solon* mentioned by several Authors (as, *not to abrogate his laws,* by *Plutarch*, to *admit no young man to be judge,* by (g) *Stobæus*; *to hear impartially both the Plaintiff and Defendant,* by (h) *Demosthenes*;) argue it to be the same which the same (i) Author delivers in these words.

(g) Serm. 11.

(h) Orat. de corona.

(i) Demost.

"I will declare my opinion according to the "laws of the *Athenians*, and five hundred Senators. By no assistance from me shall Tyranny or Oligarchy be admitted, I will never side with him who hath corrupted the people, "or intends, or indeavors it. I will never suffer "any new tables or any division of those already "received, or a parity of Lands or Goods. I "will never call home any banished or confined "person. I will consent that he be expelled the "City, who denies these laws, decreed by the "Senate, confirmed by the people; I will never "permit any to be injured, I will never constitute any Magistrate before he hath given account of his last Magistracy. I will never permit the same Man to be chosen twice in one "year, or at once to hold two Offices. I will "neither take, nor suffer any to take bribes or "rewards. I am thirty years old, I will hear impartially both Plaintiff and Defendant, and "condemn without excuse those that deserve "it. I swear by *Jove*, by *Neptune* and by *Ceres*, "may they destroy me, my house and Children, "if I observe not all these particulars. Hence "perhaps it is that (k) *Hesychius* affirms, *Solon* in his "laws to have ordained on oath by three "Gods.

(k) τρεῖς θεοί.

Considering the irregularity of Months, and the course of the Moon, which agreed not always with the rising and setting of the Sun, but some times overtook and went past him in one day, he called that day the ἕνη καὶ νέα, *last and first*, attributing that part which precedes the conjunction to the last month, the rest to the beginning of the next. Thus (l) *he taught the* Athenians *to accommodete the reckoning of their days to the motion of the Moon:* (m) and was (as it appears) the first who understood rightly that of *Homer*,

(l) Laert.

(m) Plut.

*When one Month ended and the next began,*

The day following he called Νουμηνία, *The new Moon:* from the twentieth day to the thirtieth he reckon'd not by addition but by substraction, in respect of the Moons decrease: of this see (n) *Aristophanes*.

(n) The clouds act. 4. scen. 1.

* He

* Laert. * He ordered the Verſes of *Homer* to be recited ſucceſſively, that where the firſt ended the next ſhould begin; whence *Diuchides* ſaith, he illuſtrated *Homer* more than *Piſiſtratus* (by whom the *Rhapſodies* were firſt collected) the principle Verſes were.

*They who inhabit* Athens, &c.

† Athen. diſp. 13. † He firſt tolerated common Curteſans, and with the Mony they paid to the State erected a Temple to *Venus* πανδήμου.

* Sect. Empiric. adverſ. Mathem. 6. * He firſt taught Souldiers to march by the ſound of Fifes and Harps, obſerving a kind of meaſure in their pace.

## CHAP. VIII.

*How he entertained* Anacharſis, *his Travels to* Ægypt, Cyprus, Miletus, Delphi, Corinth, *and* Creet.

IN the forty ſeventh Olympiad (according to (a) *Soſicrates*) *Anacharſis* came to *Athens*; *Eucrates* being Archon, (b) he went immediately to the houſe of *Solon*, and knocking at the door, ſaid he was a ſtranger deſirous of his friendſhip and Hoſpitality: *Solon* anſwered, *It is better to contract friendſhip at home; then you that are at home,* (replys *Anacharſis*) *make me your friend and gueſt. Solon* admiring his acuteneſs, entertained him kindly, and kept him ſome time with him, whilſt he was imployed about publick affairs, and ordering his Laws; which *Anacharſis* underſtanding, ſmiled, that he undertook to curb the injuſtice and covetouſneſs of Citizens by written Ordinances, nothing differing from Cobwebs, holding faſt the weak and poor, whilſt the powerful and rich break through them; whereto *Solon* anſwered, that *Men ſtand faſt to thoſe covenants, which it is not convenient for either party to break:* He gave the Citizens ſuch Laws, as it was evident to all, that to keep, were better than to tranſgreſs; but the event agreed more with the conjecture of *Anacharſis*, than the expectation of *Solon*.

(a) Plut. (b) Laert.

(c) Plut. (c) After his Laws were promulgated, ſome or other coming daily to him, either to praiſe, or diſpraiſe them, or to adviſe him to put in or out whatſoever came into their minds, the greater part to have the meaning explained, queſtioning how every thing was to be underſtood, and intreating him to unfold the ſence; he (conſidering, that not to ſatisfie them, would argue pride, to ſatisfie them would make him lyable to cenſure) determined to avoid ambiguities, importunities, and occaſions of blame; (for as he ſaid,

*In things that are not ſmall*
*'Tis hard to ſing to all.*)

Colouring his travail with being Maſter of a Ship, and having obtained leave of the *Athenians* to be abſent ten years, he put to Sea, hoping in that time his Laws would become familiar to them.

(d) Plut. (d) The firſt place of his arrival was *Ægypt*, where he dwelt, as himſelf ſaith,

*At* Nilus *mouth, near the* Canobian *Shoar.*

He ſtudied Philoſophy awhile with *Pſenophis*, of *Heliopolis*, and *Sonches* of *Sais*, the moſt learned of thoſe Prieſts, by whom, *Plato* affirms, he was taught the *Atlantick* language, which he afterward began to explain in verſe; when he queſtioned them in antiquities, the elder ſaid to him, *O* Solon, Solon, *you* Greeks *are alwaies Children, there is not one* Greek *an old Man.*

(e) Thence he went to *Cyprus*, where he was much favoured by *Philocyprus*, one of the Kings of that Country, who had a little Town built by *Demophoon*, Son of *Theſeus*, upon the River *Clarius*, in a ſtrong place, but rugged and barren: *Solon* perſwading him, there lying a pleaſant Plain underneath it, to transfer the Town thither, making it more ſpacious and delightful: *Solon* being preſent at the doing hereof, took care it might be Peopled, and aſſiſted the King to contrive it, as well for health as ſtrength; whereupon many came into *Philocyprus*, whom other Kings emulated; for this reaſon he aſcribed the honour thereof unto *Solon*, naming the City (which before was called Ἀρεά) from him, *Soli*. This foundation he mentions in his Elegies, addreſſing his ſpeech to *Philocyprus*.

(t) Plut.

*Maiſt thou in* Cyprus *long as King abide,*
*And o'r this People and this Town preſide;*
*In a fleet Veſſel from this Haven may*
Cythera *Crown'd with Violets me convey.*
*Her kind aſpect and happineſs may ſhe*
*Grant to this Town, a ſafe return to me.*

He viſited *Thales* alſo at *Miletus*, whoſe impoſture towards him (related already in *Plutarch's* words) receive from *Tzetzes*.

Solon's *friend* Thales *lead a ſingle life,*
*By* Solon *often mov'd to take a Wife;*
*Theſe a* Mileſian (Thales *ſo contriv'd*)
*Meeting, pretends from* Athens *late arriv'd:*
Solon *asks curiouſly what news was there;*
*One that's abroad, ſaith he, hath loſt his Heir,*
*The City waited on his obſequies.*
*Was it not* Solon's *Son,* Solon *replys?*
*To this the ſtranger (as ſuborn'd) aſſents:*
*He with torn hair in cries his paſſion vents;*
*Whom* Thales, (*tenderly embracing*) *Leave*
*This grief, ſaith he, I did thee but deceive;*
*'Tis for theſe reaſons Marriage I decline,*
*Which can deject ſo great a Soul as thine.*

Whether it belong to this deceit, or to a real loſs (f) *Dioſcorides*, and (g) *Stobæus* report, that weeping for the death of his Son, one told him, But this helps nothing, he anſwered, And therefore I weep.

(f) Laert. (g) Serm. 121.

(h) At *Delphi* he met with the reſt of the wiſe Men, and the year following at *Corinth*, by *Periander's* invitation, which was as *Plutarch* implies, long before *Piſiſtratus* came to Raign; nor doth (i) *Dion Chryſoſtom* intend the contrary, though ſo interpreted by (k) a learned perſon, his words importing only this; *Solon fled not the Tyranny of* Periander, *though he did that of* Piſiſtratus.

(h) Laert. (i) Orat. 37. (k) J. Meurſius.

That he went alſo to *Creet* ( perhaps to viſit *Epimenides* ) is evident, from an (*l*) Epiſtle of *Thales*.

(*l*) *ad Pherecyd.*

## CHAP. IX.

*The attribute of* Wiſe *conferred on him: his moral Sentences.*

* *Laert.* * WHen *Damaſius* ( the ſecond ) was Archon, ( in the year of the 49 Olympiad ) all the ſeven received the attribute of *Wiſe*: of theſe was *Solon*, upon whom ( † *Themiſtius* ſaith ) it was conferr'd as an honourable title full of dignity: * *Plutarch* avers that all of them ( except *Thales* ) were ſo called from their skill in civil affairs. And again, † In Philoſophy *Solon* chiefly affected ( as did likewiſe moſt of the wiſe Men ) that part of morality which concerns Politicks; and ſpeaking of *Meneſiphilus*, "he was not ( ſaith he ) an Orator of thoſe Philoſophers who are called natural, but embraced that wiſdom which teacheth government of a State, and prudence in publick actions, which he retained as a Sect delivered by ſucceſſion from *Solon*. "Whence * *Macrobius* inſtanceth *Solon*, as skilful in that kind of learning which draweth Philoſophy deeper, and eſtabliſheth a ſtate.

† *Orat.* 4.

* *Vit. Sol.*

† *Vit. Themiſt.*

* *Somn. Scip.* 2. 17.

Hereto may be added his moral learning, for which ( though *Socrates* reduced it firſt to a Science, and was thereupon honoured as the inventer thereof ) the ſeven were ſo famous, that ſome affirm the title of wiſe was given them only for excelling others in a laudable courſe of life, and comprehending ſome moral rules in ſhort ſentences; of theſe they had three ſorts, Apothegms, Precepts, and Ἀποφάσεις.

Of his Apothegms *Laertius* recites theſe, "Speech is the Image of Action; He is a "King who hath power. Laws are like Cob-"webs which entangle the leſſer ſort, the "greater break through: Thoſe who are in "favour with Princes reſemble counters uſed "in caſting accounts, which ſometimes ſtand "for a great number, ſometimes for a leſſer; ſo "thoſe are ſometimes honoured, ſometimes caſt "down. Being demanded how Men might be "brought to do no wrong, if, ſaid he, they who "have received none, and thoſe who are wrong-"ed be alike concern'd: Satiety comes of riches, "contumely of Satiety.

(*a*) *Vit. Sol.* (*a*) *Plutarch* and others, theſe; "He con-"ceived that City to be beſt govern'd, where "the People as eagerly proſecute wrongs done "to others, as to themſelves. (*b*) Being de-"manded how a City might be beſt ordered, "he anſwered if the Citizens obey'd the Ma-"giſtrates, the Magiſtrates the Laws; he af-"firmed that King and Tyrant ſhould become "moſt glorious, who would convert his Mo-"narchy to Democracy. He eſteemed that "Family beſt, wherein wealth is gotten not "unjuſtly, kept not unfaithfully, expended "not with repentance.

(*b*) *Sympoſ. ſept. Sapi.*

(*c*) *Ariſt. Ethic.* 1. 8. (*c*) He defined "the happy thoſe who are "competently furniſhed with outward things, "act honeſtly, and live temperately; which "definition *Ariſtotle* approves.

(*d*) He ſaid, "a Common-wealth conſiſts "of two things, reward and puniſhment.

(*d*) *Cicer. ad piſt.* 15. *ad Brut.*

(*e*) "Seeing one of his Friends much grieved, "he carried him to the Tower, and deſired "him to view all the buildings below, which "obſerving the other to have done, now ſaith "he, think with your ſelf, how many ſorrows "have heretofore and do at preſent dwell "under thoſe roofs, and ſhall in future ages: "and forbear to be troubled at the inconveni-"encies of mortality as they were only yours. "He ſaid alſo, that if all Men ſhould bring their "misfortunes together in one place, every one "would carry his own home again, rather than "take an equal ſhare out of the common "ſtock.

(*e*) *Val. Max.* 7. 2.

(*f*) "Being in drinking, demanded by *Pe-"riander*, whether he were ſilent through want "of diſcourſe, or through folly, anſwered, "no fool can be ſilent amidſt his cups. (*g*) He "ſaid, that City was beſt ordered, wherein "the good were rewarded, the bad puniſh-"ed.

(*f*) *Stob. Serm.* 34.

(*g*) *Stob. Serm.* 41.

(*h*) "He ſaid, a Man ought to fear nothing, "but that his end exclude not Philoſophy.

(*h*) *Johan. Sarisb. polycr.* l. 14.

(*i*) *Demoſthenes* recites a diſcourſe which he uſed to the Judges, in accuſing one who had moved a pernicious Law, to this effect; "It "is a Law generally received in all Cities, that "he who makes falſe Mony ſhould be put to "Death. Then he demanded of the Judges, "whether that Law ſeemed to them juſt and "commendable, whereunto they aſſenting, he "added, that he conceived Mony to be uſed a-"mongſt Citizens, in reſpect of private con-"tracts; but that Laws were the Mony of the "Common-wealth: therefore Judges ought "to puniſh thoſe, who embaſed the Mony of "the Common-wealth much more ſeverely, "than thoſe who embaſe that of private per-"ſons: and that they might better underſtand "it to be a far greater offence to corrupt Laws, "than adulterate Coyn, he added, that many "Cities uſe Mony of Silver allay'd with Braſs "or Lead, without any prejudice to them-"ſelves; but whoſoever ſhould uſe Laws ſo "adulterated, could not eſcape ruine and "death.

(*i*) *Orat. in Timocrat.*

(*k*) *Mimnermus* writing thus, (*k*) *Laert.*

*From trouble and diſeaſes free,*
*At threeſcore years let death take me.*

He reproved him, ſaying,

*By my advice, that wiſh extend,*
*Nor for his counſel ſlight thy friend.*
*Alter thy Song, and let it be,*
*At fourſcore years let death take me.*

His moral precepts are thus delivered by (*l*) *Demetrius Phalereus*, ſome whereof are cited by *Laertius*. "Nothing too much. Sit not as "Judge; if thou doſt, the condemned will e-"ſteem thee an enemy. Fly pleaſures, for it "brings forth ſorrow. Obſerve honeſty in thy "converſation more ſtrictly than an Oath. "Seal words with ſilence, ſilence with op-"portunity. Lie not, but ſpeak the truth. "Conſider on ſerious things. Say not ought "is

(*l*) *Stob. ſerm.* 3.

"is juſter than thy Parents. Procure not "friends in haſte, nor procur'd, part with in "haſte. By learning to obey, you ſhall know "how to command. What forfeiture you "impoſe on others, undergo your ſelf. Ad- "viſe not Citizens what is moſt pleaſant, but "what is beſt. Be not arrogant. Converſe "not with wicked perſons. Conſult the Gods. "Cheriſh thy Friend. Reverence thy Parents. "Make reaſon thy guide. What thou ſeeſt "ſpeak not. What thou knoweſt conceal. Be "mild to thoſe that belong to thee. Con- "jecture hidden things from apparent.

(m) *Clem. Alex. Strom.* His particular ſentence according to (m) *Didymus* and *Laertius* was, *Nothing too much*; according to *Auſonius*, *Know thy ſelf*, who aſcribes theſe alſo to him.

*Him I dare happy call whoſe end I ſee,*
*Match with thy like, unequals not agree.*
*By fortune guided, none to honour raiſe;*
*A friend in private, chide, in publick praiſe;*
*Honours atchiev'd created far exceed;*
*If fates be ſure, what helps it to take heed?*
*And if unſure, there is of fear leſs need.*

Of his ἀδήμενα *Laertius* mentions theſe.

*Of every Man be careful, leſt he bear*
*A Sword conceal'd within his breaſt, a clear*
*Aſpect, a double tongue, a mind ſevear.*

## CHAP. X.

*How he oppoſed* Piſiſtratus, *and reprehended* Theſpis.

* *Plut.* *During the abſence of *Solon*, the former diſſention broke forth again in the City: *Lycurgus* was head of the Country-men, *Megacles* of the Maritimes, *Piſiſtratus* of the Townſ-men, who were moſt violent againſt the rich; *Solon*'s Laws were ſtill obſerved in the City, but the People aimed at novelty and change, not as thinking it moſt juſt, but in hopes to be Maſters of other Mens goods and to ſuppreſs the adverſe party. *Solon*, whilſt things ſtood thus, returned to *Athens*, where he was much reverenced and honoured by all, but could not ſpeak or act in publick, through the weakneſs of his Body and Spirits, yet privately taking every one of the Commanders apart, he endeavoured to reconcile their differences, wherein *Piſiſtratus* ſeemed the moſt ready to be perſwaded, with whom he had a very ancient friendſhip, grounded as well upon their kindred, as upon the good qualities of *Piſiſtratus*, than whom (as *Solon* uſed to ſay) there could not be a perſon of more worth, if he were cured of his ambition.

† *Plut.* † About this time (according to *Plutarch*) which was in the fiftieth Olympiad, *Theſpis* began to preſent Tragedies (which *Suidas* erroneouſly accounts ten Olympiads later, as is obſerved by *Meurſius*) the People were much taken with the novelty of the thing, for as yet there were no contentions therein. *Solon* naturally deſirous to hear and learn, and by reaſon of his age indulging more to eaſe and pleaſure, feaſting and muſick, went to ſee *Theſpis* himſelf act, as was then the manner; the Play ended, he went to *Theſpis*, and asked him, if he were not aſhamed to ſpeak ſo many lies before ſo great an Auditory? *Theſpis* anſwered, it was no ſhame to act or ſay ſuch things in jeſt. *Solon* ſtriking the ground hard with his Staff, replyed, but in a ſhort time we who approve this kind of jeſt ſhall uſe it in earneſt, in our contracts and tranſactions. * *In fine, he abſolutely forbad him to teach or act Tragedies, conceiving their falſity unprofitable, whereto he diſſimulated the deceit of* Piſiſtratus, who ſoon after, † having wounded himſelf, came into the *Forum* in a Chariot, pretending to have been ſo uſed by his enemies in the behalf of the Commonwealth, and inflamed the People with much rage. *Solon* coming near to him, Son of *Hippocrates* (ſaith he) you act *Homer's Ulyſſes* ill in uſing the ſame means to deceive the Citizens, wherewith he (whipping himſelf) deluded the enemy. Immediately the People flocked in to defend *Piſiſtratus*: *Ariſto* mov'd he might be allowed a ſtanding guard of fifty Men: *Solon* roſe up to oppoſe it, uſing ſpeeches, the effect whereof, he afterwards thus expreſt in Verſe.

* *Laert.* † *Plut.*

*If evil your impieties befal,*
*Gods not the Author of thoſe miſchiefs call,*
*Your ſelves the cauſes, have given power to thoſe,*
*Who in requital, ſervitude impoſe.*
*Lion whom the footſteps of the Fox purſue,*
*Whoſe Souls deceit and vanity endue.*
*The Mans ſmooth tongue and ſpeech you only heed,*
*But never penetrate into the deed.*

He alſo foretold them the aims of *Piſiſtratus*, in an Elegy to this effect.

*Vapours condens'd ingender Hail and Snow,*
*And Thunder doth from radiant lightning flow.*
*The Sea is trouble by the raging wind,*
*When not diſturb'd by that, nothing more kind.*
*A City by great perſons is orethrown,*
*And taught beneath a Monarchy to groan.*

But ſeeing the poorer ſort much addicted to *Piſiſtratus*, and tumultuous, the richer afraid, conſulting their ſafety by flight, he retired, ſaying, *Athenians*, I am wiſer than ſome, valianter than others, wiſer than thoſe who underſtand not the deceit of *Piſiſtratus*, valianter than thoſe, who underſtand it, yet hold their peace, through fear. The Senate being of the ſame faction with *Piſiſtratus*, ſaid he was mad, whereto he anſwered,

*A little time will to the People clear*
*My madneſs, when th'midſt truth ſhall appear.*

The People having granted *Piſiſtratus* his requeſt concerning a guard, queſtion'd not the number of them, but conniv'd ſo long at his preſſing and maintaining as many Souldiers as he pleaſed, that at laſt he poſſeſt himſelf of the Tower; whereupon the City being in a tumult, *Megacles*, with the reſt of the *Alcmæonidæ* fled. *Solon* now very old, and deſtitute of thoſe that might back him, went into the *Forum*, * armed with a Spear * *Laert.*

and Shield, and made an Oration to the People, partly accusing them of folly and cowardise, partly inciting them not to forsake their liberty, using this celebrious speech, "It had been far easier to have suppress this "Tyranny in the growth, but much more "noble to cut it off now it is at the height. No Man daring to heat him, he went home, and taking his Arms, set them in the Street before his Door (*Laertius* saith, *before the Magazin*) saying, "I have helped my Country, "and the Law as much as lay in me; or as *Laertius*, "O Country, I have assisted thee "both in word and deed. *Plutarch* adds, that from that time he lived retired, addicted to his study; and told by many the Tyrant would put him to Death, and demanded wherein he confided so much, he answered, in his Age: but *Laertius* affirms (which seems truer) that as soon as he had laid down his Arms, he forsook the Country: and (*a*) *A. Gellius*, that in the Reign of *Scovius Tullius*, *Pisistratus* was Tyrant of *Athens*, *Solon* going first away into voluntary exile.

(*a*) *Lib.* 17. *cap.* 21.

## CHAP. XI.

### *How he travelled to* Lydia, *and* Cilicia.

*Solon* at his departure from *Athens*, received invitations from many; by *Thales* desired to come to *Miletus*, by *Bias*, to *Priene*, by *Epimenides*, to *Creet*, by *Cleobulus*, to *Lindus*, as is evident from their several Letters to that effect: even *Pisistratus* pressed him to return home by this Epistle.

Pisistratus *to* Solon.

"NEither am I the only person of the "*Greeks*, nor am I without right to "the Kingdom I possess, as being descended "from *Codrus*: that which the *Athenians*, ha-"ving sworn to give to *Codrus* and his Heirs, "took away, I have recovered; no other-"wise do I offend either God or Man; I "take care that the Common-wealth be go-"verned according to the Laws you ordained "for the *Athenians*, and that better than by a "Democracy: I suffer none to do wrong, "neither do I enjoy any priviledges of a Ty-"rant, more than Honour and Dignity, such "rewards only as were conferr'd upon "the antient Kings; every Man pays the "tenth of his Estate, not to me, but to the "maintenance of publick sacrifices, or other "charges of the Common-wealth, or against "time of War. You I blame not for disco-"vering my intents, you did it more in love "to the State, than in hate to me; besides, "you knew not what government I meant to "establish, which if you had, perhaps you "would have brooked my rule, and not ba-"nished your self; return therefore home, and "believe me without an Oath: *Solon* shall "never receive any displeasure from *Pisistratus*, "you know my very enemies have not, and if "you will vouchsafe to be of my friends, you "shall be of the first, for I never saw any thing "in you deceitful or false; if otherwise, you "will live with the *Athenians*, use your free-"dom, only deprive not your self of your "Country for my sake.

*Solon* returned this answer.

*Solon* to *Pisistratus*.

"I Believe I shall not suffer any harm by "you, for before you were Tyrant, I was "your friend, and at present am no more your "enemy, than any other *Athenian* who dislikes "Tyranny: whether it be better they be go-"verned by a single person, or by a Demo-"cracy, let both parties determine. I pro-"nounce you the best of Tyrants; but to re-"turn to *Athens* I think not fitting, lest I in-"cur blame, who setled an equality in the "*Athenian* Common-wealth, and would not "accept of the Tyranny; by returning, I shall "comply with thy actions.

*Cræsus* also sent to invite him, to whom he thus answered.

Solon *to* Cræsus.

"I Love your humanity towards us, and by "*Pallas*, but that I affect above all things to "live under a Democracy, I should much sooner "choose to live in your Kingdom, than at *A-*"*thens*, whilst *Pisistratus* rules there by force; "but it is most pleasing to me to live where "all things are just and equal; yet will I come "over to you, being desirous to become your "Guest.

*Solon* upon this invitation went to *Sandys*, where *Cræsus* (saith *Herodotus*) received him kindly: after the third or fourth day, the Officers at *Cræsus* appointment led him into the Treasuries, to shew him all their greatness and riches; when he had beheld all, *Cræsus* spoke thus unto him: "*Athenian* Guest, because we "have heard much fame of your wisdom and "experience, having out of love to Philosophy "travelled into many Countries, I have "a desire to enquire of you if ever you "saw any Man whom you could call most hap-"py. This he demanded, hoping himself to be esteemed such. *Solon* nothing flattering him, answered according to the truth, saying, "O King, *Tellus* the *Athenian*. At which "speech *Cræsus* wondering. Why do you "judge *Tellus* the most happy? Because (re-"plied *Solon*) in a well ordered state, he had "Children honest and good, and saw every "one of those have Children all living; thus "having passed his life as well as is possible for "Man, he ended it gloriously: a fight happen-"ing between the *Athenians* and their Neigh-"bours in *Eleusis*, he came in to their succour, "and putting the enemy to flight, died nobly; "the *Athenians* buried him in the place where "he fell, with much honour. Whilst *Solon* recounted the happiness of *Tellus*, *Cræsus* being mov'd, demanded to whom he assign'd the next place, making no question but himself should he named a second. "*Cleobis* (saith he) and "*Bito*, they were *Argives* by birth, they had "sufficient

"ſufficient wherewithal to maintain themſelves; and withal, ſo great ſtrength of Body, that both were alike victors in the publick Games, of whom it is thus reported; "the *Argives* celebrating the Feſtival of *Juno*, "it was neceſſary their Mother ſhould be drawn "to the Temple by a pair of Oxen, there being no Oxen in the Field ready, theſe young "Men, ſtreightned in time, underwent the "Yoke, and drew the Chariot of their Mother "forty five Stadia, till they came to the Temple; when they had ſo done, in the ſight of "all the People, they obtain'd the happieſt end "of their days, whereby the God declared it "better for a Man to die than to live; the *Argives*, preſſing about them, the Men applauding "the Piety of the Sons; the Women the happineſs of the Mother; the Mother her ſelf "infinitely joyed with the action, and the glory "thereof, ſtanding before the Image, prayed "the Goddeſs to give her Sons, *Cleobis* and *Bito*, "the beſt thing that could happen to Man; after this prayer, having ſacrificed and feaſted, "they lay down to ſleep in the Temple, and "never waked more, but ſo ended their days; "their Images (as of moſt excellent perſons) "were made by the *Argives*, and ſet up at *Delphi*. Theſe *Solon* ranked in the ſecond Degree. Hereat *Cræſus* growing angry; "Stranger (ſaid he) "doth our happineſs ſeem ſo deſpicable, "that you will not rank us equal with private "perſons? He anſwered, Do you enquire *Cræſus* concerning human affairs of me, who "know, that Divine Providence is ſevere and "full of alteration? In proceſs of time we ſee "many things we would not, we ſuffer many "things we would not; let us propoſe ſeventy "years, as the term of Mans life, which years "conſiſt of twenty five thouſand and two hundred days, beſides the additional month, if "we make one year longer than another by "that month, to make the time accord, the "additional months, belonging to thoſe ſeventy "years, will be thirty five, the days of thoſe "months a thouſand and fifty, whereof one is "not in all things like another: ſo that every "Man, O *Cræſus*, is miſerable! you appear to "me very rich, and are King over many, but "the queſtion you demand, I cannot reſolve, "until I hear you have ended your days happily; he who hath much wealth is not happier "than he who gets his living from day to day, "unleſs Fortune continuing all thoſe good "things to him, grant that he die well. There "are many Men very rich, yet unfortunate, many of moderate Eſtates, fortunate, of whom, "he who abounds in Wealth, and is not happy, "exceeds the fortunate only in two things, the "other him in many; the rich is more able to "ſatisfie his deſires, and to overcome great injuries; yet the fortunate excels him, he can"not indeed inflict hurt on others, and ſatisfie "his own deſires, his good fortune debars him "of theſe: but he is free from ills, healthful, "happy in his Children, and beautiful, if to this "a Man dies well, that is he whom you ſeek, "who deſerves to be called happy; before "death he cannot be ſtil'd happy, but fortunate; "yet for one Man to obtain all this is impoſ"ſible, as one Country cannot furniſh it ſelf "with all things, ſome it hath, others it wants, "that which hath moſt is beſt; ſo in Men, "no one is perfect; what one hath, the other "wants; he who hath conſtantly moſt, and "at laſt quietly departs this life, in opinion, "O King, deſerves to bear that name. In "every thing, we muſt have regard to the end, "whither it tends; for many, to whom God di"ſpenceth all good fortunes, he at laſt utterly "ſubverts. This Story is related by *Plutarch*, alſo mentioned by *Laertius*, who adds, that "*Cræſus* being magnificently adorned and ſeated on his Throne, asked him, *Whether he had "ever ſeen any thing more glorious?* who anſwered, "*Cocks, Pheaſants, and Peacocks, who are much "more beautiful in their natural flower.* † *Solon* after his diſcourſe with *Cræſus*, not ſoothing him, or making any eſteem of him, was diſmiſſed, and accounted unwiſe for neglecting the preſent good in regard to the future. * *Æſop*, the Writer of Fables was at that time at *Sardis*, ſent for thither by *Cræſus*, with whom he was much in favour; he was grieved to ſee *Solon* ſo unthankfully diſmiſt, and ſaid to him, *Solon*, we muſt either tell Kings nothing at all, or what may pleaſe them. No, ſaith *Solon*, either nothing at all, or what is beſt for them. Thus was *Solon* much deſpiſed by *Cræſus*.

† "Afterwards *Cræſus* being taken Priſoner "by *Cyrus* was at his command fettered and "ſet upon a great Pile of Wood to be burned: "as he was in this poſture, it came into his "mind what *Solon* had divinely ſaid to him, that "no living Man is happy; as ſoon as he re"membred thoſe words, he fell into a great "defection of ſpirit, and ſighing deeply, na"med *Solon* thrice, which *Cyrus* hearing, com"manded the Interpreters to ask upon whom "he called, they went to him and asked, he was "ſilent; at laſt preſſing him further, he anſwered, *Upon him who I deſire above all wealth, might have ſpoken with all Tyrants*; "not underſtanding, "after much preſſure and importunity, he told "them, Solon *an* Athenian *came long ſince to him, and beholding all his Wealth, valued it at nothing; moreover that all which he told him had come to paſs, nor did it more belong to him than to all Mankind, eſpecially to thoſe who think themſelves happy.* "Whilſt *Cræſus* ſaid this, the fire began to kin"dle, and the outward parts thereof to be ſei"zed by the flame. *Cyrus* being informed by "an Interpreter of all that *Cræſus* ſaid, began "to relent, knowing himſelf to be but a Man, "who delivered another Man, nothing inferiour "to him in Wealth, to be burned alive, fearing "to be puniſhed for that act, and conſidering "that nothing was certain in human affairs, he "commanded the fire to be inſtantly quenched, "and *Cræſus*, and thoſe that were with him to "be brought off, * whom ever after as along as "he lived, he had in eſteem. Thus *Solon* gained praiſe, that of two Kings, his ſpeech preſerved one, and inſtructed the other.

*Plutarch* relates this done in the former ten years travel of *Solon*, upon the finiſhing of his Laws, whence he maketh an Apology for the incongruity thereof with the rules of Chronology, which had leſs needed, if with *Laertius*, he had placed it after *Piſiſtratus* his uſurpation of the Tyranny.

† *Herodot.*

* *Plut.*

† *Herodot.*

* *Plut.*

*Laertius*

*Laertius* saith, he went from hence to *Cilicia*, and built there a City, called after him *Soleis*, whither he brought also some few *Athenians*, whose Language growing corrupt by that of the Country, they were said to solœcise; of this is the Etymologist doubtless to be understood, who derives Σολοικοὶ ἀπὸ σόλων χιλικίων (so read we, not ἀπὸ Σόλων & χιλιός.) This is also attested by *Suidas*, as a distinct relation from that of *Cyprus*, in confirmation whereof *Laertius* adds, the *Cilicians* were called *Solenses*, the *Cyprians*, *Solii*.

## CHAP. XII.

### *His Death.*

† *Plut.* * *De longævis.*

† HEraclides affirms, *Solon* lived long after *Pisistratus* began to Reign; * *Lucian* that his life extended to a hundred years; with whom those best agree, who say (as *Suidas* relates) he lived in the fifty sixth Olympiad; † but according to Phanias, Pisistratus *took the Tyranny upon him, when* Comias *was Archon, and* Solon *died*, Hegestratus *being Archon, who succeeded* Comias, *which was in the first year of the fifty fifth Olympiad.* If this latter opinion had not every where taken place of the other, the disagreement betwixt the time of *Solon*'s Death, and *Crœsus* Reign had not been urged by many, as an argument against the story of their meeting.

† *Plaut.*

*Var. Hist.* 8. 16. * *Lib.* 5. *cap.* 3.

He died (according to *Laertius*) aged eighty years (being, as * *Ælian* saith, very decrepit) in *Cyprus*, (as is likewise attested by (*Valerius Maximus*, and * *Suidas*) and left order with his Friends that they should carry his Bones to *Salamis*, and there causing them to be burnt, scatter the Ashes all over the Country; which story *Plutarch* (though he counts it fabulous) acknowledgeth to be attested by many Authors of credit, particularly *Aristotle*.

† *Laert.*

† *Laertius* confirms it by the testimony of *Cratinus*, who makes him speak thus:

*The Island I inhabit, sown*
*As fame reports, in* Ajax *Town.*

† *Val. Max.* 8. 7.

That desire of knowledge which he usually profest, continued with him to his end, † confirmed the last day of his life; his Friends sitting about him, and falling into some discourse, he raised his weary head, and being demanded why he did so, he answered, *That when I have learnt that, whatsoever it be, whereon you dispute, I may die.* † *Stob.* 29. † His Brothers Son singing an Ode of *Sappho*, he delighted therewith, bad him teach him it, and being demanded why, *that*, said he, *I may learn whilst I depart out of this life.*

† *Paus. Attic.* * *Demosth. in Arist.* 2. *Ælian. var. hist.* 8. 16.

After his Death, the *Athenians* erected his Statue in Brass, before † the checker'd Cloister * in the *Forum*: Another was set up at *Salamis*, hiding (as *Demosthenes* and *Æschines* describe it) the Hand within the Garment, in the same habit wherein he used to make Speeches to the *Athenians*; perhaps the same that carried this Inscription,

*Fam'd* Salamis, *the* Persian *pride cast down,*
*And gave to* Solon *Birth, the Laws renown.*

*Laertius* bestows this Epigram upon him,

*A Foreign* Cyprian *fire burn'd* Solon, *yet*
Salamis *keeps his Bones, their Ashes Wheat;*
*His Soul to Heaven mounts with his Laws, so light.*
*A burthen, they not clog, but help his flight.*

## CHAP. XIII.

### *His Writings.*

† *In Bruto.* * *De Orat. lib.* 1. † *Orat.* 21.

HIS excellency both in Rhetorick and Poetry is attested by many: *Cicero*, † 'Before *Solon*'s time, no Man is recorded for Eloquence. * And again, *Lycurgus*, and *Solon* we 'place in the number of the Eloquent. † *Dion*, 'Chrysostom, *Aristides*, *Lycurgus*, *Solon*, *Epaminondas*, and if there be any other in the same kind, 'ought to be esteemed Philosophers in the 'Common-wealth, or Orators, according to 'ingenious true Rhetorick. * *Aristides*, *Solon* is 'said to have sung those things which concern 'the *Megarenses*, but neither his Laws nor Orations, which sometimes he made for the rich 'to the Commons, sometimes for the Commons to the rich, did he sing or comprise in 'Verse, but used a Rhetorical form, excellently demonstrating in all these, that he deserved 'to be esteemed an Orator and a wise Man, 'having attained both those titles and faculties.

* *Orat. Plat.*

As to Poetry, *Plutarch* avers, 'he addicted 'himself thereto from the beginning, not in serious matters, but ludicrous, used (as it seems) 'for his exercise and pastime; afterwards he 'included many Philosophical sentences in 'Verse, and many affairs of State, not in relation to History, but to vindicate his own actions, sometimes also to correct and reprove the 'Athenians. *Plato* saith, ' * That at the *Apaturian* 'Feast, the Boys used to repeat his Poems; and 'that if he had applied himself to nothing 'but Poetry as others did, and had finished the 'History he brought out of *Egypt*, and had not 'been constrained by seditions and other distractions to lay aside that study, neither *Hesiod*, 'Homer, nor any of the Poets would have been 'more famous.

* *In Timæo.* * 1. *Crit.*

Of his Writings in Prose, we must with *Laertius* name in the first place his

*Laws*; of which already.

*Orations to the People.*

His *Poems* are cited under that general title by * *Phrynicus*, their particular subjects and titles these.

* *Eclog. dict. Attic.*

*Exhortations to himself*, mentioned by *Laertius*, * *Aristides*, and *Suidas*.

* *In Orat.* περὶ κοσμητ.

*Elegies.*

*Salamis*: of which *Chap.* 2.

*Of the* Athenian *Common-wealth*, which *Laertius* affirms to have extended to two thousand Verses, according to † *Pausanias*, and * *Philo*, *Elegiack.*

† *Attic.* * περὶ κοσμητ.

*Iambicks*, mentioned by *Laertius*, cited by *Athenæus* and *Aristides*.

*Epodes*,

*Epodes*, mentioned by *Laertius*.
*Elegies to King Cypranor*, cited by the author of *Aratus*, his life. Ἀδομένα, cited by *Laertius*.

Some (saith *Plutarch*) affirm, he began to reduce his own Laws into verse.

The last work he undertook was concerning the Atlantick speech or fable, which beginning late, he was deterred by the greatness of the work, as *Plutarch* saith, and prevented by death.

Besides those Epistles already alledged, these are preserved also by *Laertius*.

Solon *to* Periander.

"YOu send me word, there are many who "plot against you; if you should put them "all to death, it would advantage you nothing; "some one there may be of those, whom you sus- "pect not, who plots against you, either fearing "himself, or disdaining you, or desirous to "ingratiate himself with the City, though "you have done him no injury; it is best, if "you would be free from jealousie, to acquit "your self of the cause, but if you will continue "in Tyranny, take care to provide a greater "strength of strangers than is in your own City; "so shall you need to fear no Man, nor to put any to death.

Solon *to* Epimenides,

"NEither are my laws likely to benefit the "*Athenians* long, nor have you advanta- "ged the City by lustration; for divine right and "law-givers cannot alone benefit Cities; it im- "porteth much of what mind they are who lead "the common people; Divine rights and laws, "if they direct them well, are profitable, if "they direct them ill, profit nothing; neither "are those laws I gave in any better condition; "they who had charge of the Common-wealth, "not preventing *Pisistratus* his usurpation of "the tyranny, lost the City, of which, when "I foretold them, I could not be believed; the "Athenians would rather credit his flatteries, "than my truth; wherefore laying down my "Arms before the Magazin, I said, that I was "wiser than those who did not see *Pisistratus* "aimed at the Tyranny; and stouter than "those who durst not resist him: they repu- "ted *Solon* a Mad-man. Lastly, I made this "profession, O Country! behold *Solon* ready "to vindicate thee in word and deed: they "again esteem'd me mad. Thus I being the "only person that oppos'd *Pisistratus*, I came "away from them; let them guard him with "their arms if they please; for know (dear "friend) the Man came very cunningly by the "Kingdom, he complyed at first with the De- "mocraty, afterwards wounding himself, came "into *Eliæa*, crying out, he had received those "hurts from his Enemies, and required a guard "of four hundred young Men, which they "(not hearkening to me) granted; these car- "ried halberds: after this, he dissolved the po- "pular government; truly I laboured in vain "to free the poorer sort from mercenary slavery, "when they all now serve one *Pisistratus*.

Such fragments of his Poems as have been hitherto preserved are thus collected.

*Out of his Elegies.*

*SPrung from* Mnemosyne *and* Jove's *great line,*
*Pierian Muses, to my prayer encline,*
*Grant that my life and actions may call down*
*Blessings from Heaven, and raise on earth renown:*
*Sweet to my friends, and bitter to my foes,*
*To these my sight bring terror, joy to those.*
*Riches I wish, not riches that are plac't*
*In unjust means, for vengeance comes at last.*
*Riches dispenc'd by Heavens more bounteous hand,*
*A base on which we may unshaken stand.*
*But that which Men by injuries obtain,*
*That which by arts and deeds unjust they gain*
*Comes slowly, swiftly by reveng'd pursued,*
*And misery like a close spark include,*
*Which soon to a devouring flame dilates,*
*Wrong is a weak foundation for estates.*
Jove *doth the end of every thing survey:*
*As sudain vernal blasts chase clouds away.*
*Ransack the bottom of the roaring main,*
*Then swiftly overrun the fertile plain,*
*Ruffling the wealthy ears; at last they rise*
*To* Jove's *high seat, a calm then smooths the skies.*
*The* Sun's *rich lustre mildly gilds the green*
*Enamel of the Meads, no Clouds are seen.*
*Such is* Jove's *heavy anger diff'ring far*
*From Men whose every trifle leads to War:*
*They are not hid for ever, who offend.*
*In secret, judgment finds them in the end.*
*Some in the act are punisht, others late,*
*Even he who thinks he hath deluded fate;*
*At last resents it in just miseries,*
*Which Nephews for their Ancestors chastise.*
*We think it fares alike with good and bad;*
*Glory and self-conceit our fancies glad*
*Till suffering comes, then their griev'd spirits bleed,*
*Who did before their Souls with vain hope feed.*
*He whom incurable diseases seize,*
*Sooths his deluded thoughts, with hopes of ease.*
*The coward's valiant in his own esteem,*
*And to themselves, fair the deformed seem.*
*They who want means, by poverty oppress*
*Believe themselves of full estates possest.*
*All is attempted, some new seas explore*
*To bring home riches from a foreign shore:*
*Seas, on whose boisterous back secur'd they ride,*
*And in the mercy of the winds confide:*
*Others to crooked ploughs their Oxen yoke,*
*And Autumn with their plants and setts provoke.*
*Some* Vulcan's *and* Minerva's *arts admire,*
*And by their hands, their livelyhoods acquire.*
*Others the fair Olympian muses trace.*
*and lovely learning studiously embrace.*
*One by* Apollo *is prophetick made,*
*And tells what mischiefs others shall invade:*
*With him the Gods converse, but all the skill*
*In birds or victimes cannot hinder ill.*
*Some to Peonian knowledge are inclin'd.*
*Nor is the power of simples unconfin'd.*
*The smallest hurts sometimes increase and rage,*
*More than all art of Physick can assuage;*
*Sometimes the fury of the worst disease,*
*The hand by gentle stroking will appease.*
*Thus good or bad arrives as fates design,*
*Man cannot what the Gods dispenc'd decline.*
*All actions are uncertain, no Man knows*

*When*

*When he begins a work, how it ſhall cloſe.*
*Some, who their buſineſs weigh with prudent care,*
*Oft of the iſſue intercepted are:*
*Whilſt others who have raſhly ought deſign'd,*
*An end ſucceſsfull of their labours find.*
*There is no bound to thoſe who wealth acquire,*
*For they who are poſſeſt of moſt, deſire*
*As much again, and who can all content,*
*Even thoſe full bleſſings which the Gods have lent,*
*Man variouſly to his own harm applies,*
*Whom* Jove *by means as various doth chaſtiſe.*

## Again.

*OUr city never can ſubverted be*
*By* Jove, *or any other Deity:*
*For* Pallas *eye ſurveys with pious care*
*The walls, which by her hand protected are:*
*Yet the inhabitants of this great Town,*
*Fondly inclin'd to wealth, will throw it down;*
*And thoſe unjuſt great perſons who are bent*
*Others to wrong, themſelves to diſcontent;*
*For their inſatiate fancies have not power*
*T'enjoy the ſweetneſs of the inſtant hower,*
*But by all wicked means, intent on gain,*
*From hallowed, nor from publick things refrain.*
*Riches by theft and cozenage to poſſeſs,*
*The ſacred bounds of juſtice they tranſgreſs.*
*Who ſilent ſees the preſent, knows the paſt,*
*And will revenge theſe injuries at laſt:*
*Cauſing a cureleſs rupture in the ſtate,*
*And all our liberties ſhall captivate.*
*Rouſe War from his long ſlumber, who the flower*
*Of all our youths ſhall bloodily devour.*
*For Cities which injuriouſly oppoſe*
*Their friends, are ſoon invaded by their foes.*
*Theſe are the common evils; of the poor*
*Many tranſported to a foreign ſhore,*
*To bondage there, and fetters ſhall be ſold.*
*Each private houſe thus ſhares the publick fate,*
*Nor can exclude it with a barr'd-up gate;*
*For ſcaling furiouſly the higher walls,*
*On thoſe whom beds or corners hides it falls.*
*My Soul,* Athenians, *prompts me to relate*
*What miſeries upon injuſtice wait:*
*But juſtice all things orderly deſigns,*
*And in ſtrict fetters the unjuſt confines.*
*What's ſour, ſhe ſweetens, and allays what cloys.*
*Wrong ſhe repels, ill in the growth deſtroys,*
*Softens the ſtubborn, the unjuſt reforms,*
*And in the ſtate calms all ſeditious ſtorms:*
*Bitter diſſention by her raign ſuppreſt,*
*Who wiſely governs all things for the beſt.*

## Another.

*NO Man is bleſſed, bad is every one*
*That feels the warmth of the all-ſeeing Sun.*

## Another.

*LEt me not die unpitti'd, every friend*
*With ſighs and tears my lateſt hower attend.*

CHI-

CHILO.

## CHAP. I.

### Chilon *his Life.*

* *Laert.* † *Serm.* 28.

* CHilon was a *Lacedæmonian*, Son of *Damagetus*, corruptly termed in † *Stobæus*, *Pages*. He was eminent among the *Greeks* for two predictions.

**Herodot. lib.* 1. *Laert.*

The first to *Hippocrates*, * *to whom (being a private person) hapned a great prodigy at the Olympick Games: having prepared an offering, and filled a Cauldron with Flesh and Water, it boiled over without Fire: This portent* Chilon *(accidentally present) beholding, advised him that he should not take a Wife by whom he might have Issue; that if he had one, he should put her away, and if a Son, turn him out of Doors:* Hippocrates *not following this advice, brought up his Son* Pisistratus, *who in the sedition of the Maritimes and Country-Men at* Athens, *those led by* Megacles, *these by* Lycurgus, *stirred up a third faction, and gained the Tyranny.*

† Laert. † *He was much renowned also for his prediction concerning* Cythera *a* Lacedæmonian *Island; examining the Situation thereof, would to God (said he) it had never been; or since it is, it might be swallowed up by the Sea, and wisely did he foresee.* Damaratus, *a* Lacedæmonian *exile, counselled* Xerxes *to seize upon that Island, which advice if he had followed, would have ruined all* (a) Lib. 7. 235. Greece. His words (according to (a) *Herodotus*) were these: *You may effect your desires, if you send three hundred Ships to the* Lacedæmonian *Coast; there lies an Island, named* Cythera, *of which* Chilon, *a person of greatest wisdom amongst us, said, it were better for the* Lacedæmonians *that it were under Water than above: he, it seems, expected from it some such thing as I am now going to declare, not that he foresaw your Navy, but doubting any in the same kind; Let your Men issue out of this Island upon the* Lacedæmonians, *to strike them into terror.* (b) Laert. (b) Afterwards, in the time of the *Peloponesian* War, *Nicias* taking the Island, placed some *Athenians* therein, who much infested the *Lacedæmonians.*

*Laertius* saith, that *he was old in the fifty second Olympiad, at what time Æsop flourished*: that *he was Ephorus in the fifty sixth.* (*Casaubon* reads the fifty five) *but* Pamphila (continueth *Laertius saith in the sixth. He was first Ephorus, when* Euthydemus *was Archon, as* Soſicrates *also affirms, and first appointed the Ephori to be joyned with Kings, which* Satyrus *saith, was the institution of* Lycurgus. Hence it is doubtful whether *Chilon* was Ephorus in the sixth Olympiad, or in the fifty sixth; the latter is more probable, in as much as he bore that office when *Euthydemus* was Archon at *Athens*, which was in the fifty sixth Olympiad, as appears by the *Marmor Arundelianum*, where for Ευθυδήμου is corruptly read τῷ δήμῳ rendred *Archonte populo.* But it is likewise true, that the Ephori were first created about the sixth Olympiad, when *Polydorus* and *Theopompus* were Kings of *Lacedæmon*, a huudred and thirty years after *Lycurgus*, as *Plutarch* (in his Life affirms, from which time there were five annual Ephori chosen in *Lacedæmon*, whereof the first is called ἐπώνυμος, because the year had its denomination from him: the first of the first election (c) Plut. vit. Lycur. was (c) *Elected Chilon* in the fifty sixth Olympiad was the first of the five of his year; which might perhaps give the occasion of the mistake to them, who take him to be the first (d) In Euseb. p. 67. of that institution, of whom is (d) *Scaliger.*

(e) How he behav'd himself in this office, (e) Laert. may be gathered from his speech (f) *to his* (f) Laert. *Brother, displeased that himself was not Ephorus at the same time*: "*I can bear injuries, saith he, you cannot.*

He was so just in all his actions, (g) that in his old age he professed, he never had done (g) Lib. 1. cap. 3. any thing contrary, to the conscience of an upright Man, only that of one thing he was doubtful; having given sentence against his Friend according to Law, he advised his Friend to appeal from him (his Judge) so to (h) Lib. 1. c. 3. preserve both his Friend and the Law: (h) *A. Gellius* relates it thus; "When his life drew "towards an end, ready to be seized by death, "he spoke thus to his Friends about him: "My words and actions in this long term of "years, have been (almost all) such as I "need not repent of, which perhaps you also "know; truly even at this time I am certain, "I never committed any thing, the remem- "brance whereof begets any trouble in me, "unless this one thing only, which whether it "were done amiss or not, I am uncertain: I "sat with two others as Judge upon the Life "of my Friend; the Law was such, as the per- "son must of necessity be condemned; so that "either my Friend must lose his Life, or some "deceit be used towards the Law: revolving "many things in my mind for relief of a con- "dition so desperate, I conceived that which "I put in practice to be of all other the most "easie to be born: silently I condemned him, "and perswaded those others who judged to "absolve him: Thus preserving (in so great "a business) the duty both of a Judge and "Friend; but from that act I receive this trou- "ble, that I fear it is not free from perfidious- "ness and guilt, in the same business, at the "same time, and in a publick affair, to per- "swade others, contrary to what was in my "own judgment best.

## CHAP. II.

*His Moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verses.*

OF his Apothegms, these are remembered by *Laertius*; *he said, providence of future things collected by reason, is the vertue of a Man. Being demanded wherein the learned differ from the unlearned? he answered in a good hope: What is hard? to conceal secrets, to dispose of leisure well; and to be able to bear an injury.*

(a) Being invited to a Feast by *Periander*, (a) Plutarch. Simpos. sept. sapi. (with the rest of the wise-men) he would not promise to come before he knew what other company would be there, saying, *a Man is necessitated to brook an ill companion in a Ship at Sea, or in a Tent in a Camp; but to mix indifferently with all sorts of people at a Feast is indiscretion.* Upon the same occasion *Plutarch* recites these sentences of his; *A Prince must not think upon any transitory mortal things, but only upon the eternal, and immortal. That Common-wealth is best where the people mind the Law, more than the Lawyers. A family must resemble as much as possible a City governed by a King.* (b) *Hearing a* (b) Plut. de cap. ma. *Man say he had no enemy, he asked him if he had any friend; conceiving love and hate necessarily must follow one another.*

His moral precepts are thus delivered by (c) *Demetrius Phalereus. Know thy self. Speak* (c) Stob. serm. 28. *not much in thy drink, for thou wilt transgress.* (or as *Laertius*, rule thy tongue, especially at a Feast) *Threaten not free persons, for it is not just.* (*Laertius*, Threaten none, for that is like a Woman) *Speak not ill of thy Neighbour; if thou dost, thou shalt hear what will trouble thee. Go slowly to the feasts of thy friends, swiftly to their misfortunes.* (*Laertius*, go more readily to a friend in adversity than in prosperity.) *Celebrate Marriage frugally. Speak well of the dead. Reverence thy elder* (*Laertius*, honour age) *hate him who is inquisitive into the business of others. Prefer loss before unjust gain* (for that (adds *Laertius*)

*Laertius*) brings grief but once, this for ever) *deride not the unfortunate. If thou art ſtrong, behave thy ſelf mildly, that thou maiſt rather be reſpected than fear'd* (*Laertius*, of thy Neighbours, Learn to) *Order thy Houſe well. Let not thy tongue run before thy mind. Bridle thy anger. Covet not impoſſibilities. In the way haſten not forward. Shake not thy hand*, (*Laertius*, in diſcourſe) *for it is like a mad-man. Obey the Laws. Be reconciled to thoſe who have wrong'd you, but revenge contumelies.* To which *Laertius* adds theſe, *To preſerve thy ſelf. Not to hate divination, make uſe of quietneſs.*

(d) *Lib. 7. cap. 32.* (d) *Pliny* ſpeaking of Authority, ſaith, that *Men ranked* Chilon *amongſt Oracles, conſecrating three precepts of his at* Delphi, *in Golden letters, which are theſe: Every Man to know himſelf, and to deſire nothing too much; the companion of anothers Mony and ſtrife is miſery.*

(e) *A. Gell.* (e) He only kept within bounds the two moſt fierce affections of the Soul, Love, and Hate, ſaying, *Love with ſuch limitation, as if hereafter you might chance to hate: hate ſo far, as that perhaps you might hereafter love.*

*Auſonius* aſcribes to him the effect of theſe Verſes:

*Me, may the mean not fear, nor great deſpiſe,*
*Have death and health alike before thy eyes.*
*The benefits thou giveſt, remember never,*
*Of thoſe thou doſt receive, be mindful ever.*
*Learn of thy ſelf and friend t'orecome croſs fate,*
*Age, Youth reſembling, is a light eſtate,*
*Youth, Age reſembling, is a greater weight.*

His particular ſentence was, *To a ſurety, loſs is near.*

Of his Ἀδημάντα, *Laertius* mentions this, as moſt eminent.

*Gold's worth we by the touchſtone find,*
*Gold is the touchſtone of the mind.*

(f) He asked *Æſop* what *Jupiter* was doing, who anſwered, pulling down the high, and raiſing the low. (f) *Laert.*

## CHAP. III.

### *His Death, and Writings.*

HE died (according to (a) *Hermippus*) at *Piſa*, embracing his Son, victor in the Olympick Games, of the cæſtus, the weakneſs of his age overcome with exceſs of joy; all who were preſent at that great aſſembly attended on his Funerals, as is affirmed by (b) *Pliny* and *Laertius*, who hath this Epigram upon him, (a) *Laert.* (b) *Lib. 7. cap. 32.*

*To thee illuſtrious* Pollux *thanks I pay,*
*That* Chilon's *Son the Olive bore away.*
*The Father died ore-joy'd his Child to ſee*
*So Crown'd: a happy death! ſuch befal me.*

Upon his Statue, this Inſcription.

*The birth of* Chilon *Warlike* Sparta *grac'd,*
*Who of the ſeven, in the firſt rank was plac'd.*

(c) He was ſhort in ſpeech, whence *Ariſtagoras* calls that manner of ſpeaking *Chilonian*: (d) *Auſonius* alſo alludes hereto in the ſpeech he makes under his name. (c) *Laert.* (d) *Lud. ſept. ſap.*

(e) He writ Elegies extending almoſt to two hundred Verſes: there is likewiſe an Epiſtle of his extant to this effect. (e) *Laert.*

Chilon *to* Periander.

"YOU ſend me word of an expedition "you are preparing againſt Foreigners, "intending to go in perſon with your Army: "a Monarch, I think, hath little ſafety, even "at home. That Tyrant I eſteem happy who "dies at home a natural Death.

PITTACUS

## CHAP. I.

### Pittacus *his Life.*

†PITTACUS was of *Mitelene* (the chief City of *Lesbos*) Son of *Caicus*, * or (rather) *Hyrrhadius*, a *Thracian*, his Mother a *Lesbian*, born in the thirty second Olympiad.

*Laertius* saith, he flourished in the forty second Olympiad; * at that time he gave testimony of his great courage and love to his Country, in killing (assisted by the Brethren of *Alcæus* the Poet) *Melanchrus*, Tyrant of *Lesbos* and *Mitelene*.

(a) *Pittacus* grown eminent by this action, was by the *Mitelenæans* made General, and (b) *sent with a fleet against the* Athenians, with whom they had a long contest concerning the *Achillæan* Field; the ground of their difference this: (c) Pisistratus *took* Sigeum *by force from the* Mitelenæans, *and settled there* (*as King*) Hegesistratus *his natural Son, by an* Argive *Woman, who kept it, not without much dispute; for betwixt the* Mite-

† *Laert. & Suid.*
* So the *Vatican* MS. of *Suidas*, ϗ better than the printed Editions, which read ϛ.
* *Suid.*

(a) *Laert.*
(b) *Strab.*
(c) *Herod.* 5. 94.

Mitelenæans *and* Athenians *there was a long War; thoſe ſallying out of the* Achillæan *Town, theſe out of* Sigæum: (*d*) thoſe lay claim to the Town, as built by *Archæanactes* of *Mitelene*, of the Stones of old *Troy* (for the *Lesbians* challenged the greateſt part of *Troas* as their hereditary right, where they had built many Houſes, ſome, ſaith *Strabo*, ſtanding at this day, others demoliſhed) (*e*) *theſe oppoſed their claim; alledging the* Æolians *had no more right to this* Ilian *Country, than themſelves or any other of the* Greeks, *who aſſiſted* Menelaus *in the recovery of* Hellen. (*f*) The *Athenians* ſent thither as General *Phryno*, a tall robuſt Perſon, who had been Victor in all the Olympick Exerciſes; perhaps the ſame whom *Euſebius* names in the thirty ſixth Olympiad. (*g*) Pittacus *having been ſeveral times worſted in Battel, at laſt challenged* Phryno *to ſingle Combat, and met him, being armed with the Weapons of a Fiſherman, hiding a Net under his Shield, wherewith catching* Phryno *ſuddainly, he ſlew him with his Trident and Dagger, and by his death recovered the Field.* From this ſtratagem of *Pittacus*, was derived the like kind of fighting amongſt the *Roman* Gladiators, called *Retiarii* (deſcribed by (*h*) *Lipſius*) as is expreſly obſerved by *Polyænus* and (*i*) *Feſtus*.

(*k*) But this War ended not ſo; until at laſt both Parties referred themſelves to *Periander*, (*l*) chuſing him Umpire; he awarded that each ſide ſhould keep what they were in poſſeſſion of, whereby *Sigeum* fell to the *Athenians*. (*m*) Demetrius *argues* Timæus *of falſhood, for affirming* Periander *built* Achilleum (*a ſmall Town, where was the Tomb of* Achilles) *in oppoſition to the* Athenians, *of* Ilian *Stones, and thereby to have aided* Pittacus: *but neither was it built of ſuch Stones* (ſaith *Strabo*) *nor was* Periander *the founder: how could he be choſen Arbitrator, whoſe actions had declared him an Enemy?*

(*n*) Hereupon *Pittacus* was highly honoured by the *Mitelenæans*, who ((*o*) *being infeſted by baniſhed Perſons, under the leading of* Antimenides, *and* Alcæus *the Poet*) (*p*) either in obligation to his merit, or confidence in his equity, by their free votes ((*q*) *though* Alcæus *deny it*) inſtated him in the Tyranny; (*r*) *with many acclamations of praiſe, and a great concourſe of People* (as is manifeſt from *Alcæus*, who for that reaſon reprehends them.) (*s*) They alſo with general conſent offered him great Gifts, and bad him take of that Field which he recovered from the Citizens as much as he would. He darting his Spear, demanded only ſo much as that had paſſed over; which he dedicated to *Apollo*, called (even to the time of *Plutarch*, and *Laertius*) *the* Pittacæan *Field.* (*t*) *Soſicrates* avers, he took part of it for himſelf, ſaying, The half was more than the whole. (*u*) Thus *he diverted his mind from the gift, conceiving it not fitting to diminiſh the glory of the vertue, by the greatneſs of the reward.*

*Being poſſeſt of this power, he ſhewed the moderation wherewith his Breaſt was furniſhed, towards* Alcæus *the Poet, who had behaved himſelf pertinaciouſly againſt him, with bitter hate and ſcurrilous wit* (whereof ſee many inſtances in *Laertius*) Pittacus *only inform'd him how able he was to oppreſs him.*

During his Government, he made many Laws, one whereof is mentioned by (*x*) *Cicero*, forbidding *any Man to go to the Funeral of ſuch as he was not of Kin to.* Another by (*y*) *Ariſtotle*, that *whoſoever being drunk, ſhould ſtrike any Man, ſhould pay double as much as if he had been ſober*; or as *Laertius* delivers it, *whoſoever offended, being drunk, ſhould pay a double forfeit*; which he did to reſtrain the *Mitelenæans* from drunkenneſs, becauſe their Iſland abounded in Wine. His uſual exerciſe, even whilſt he was King, (as *Clearchus* affirms) was to grind Corn, eſteeming it a healthful exerciſe, much commending a Mill, that in ſo little room, it afforded exerciſe to many. There was a Song, (*z*) called for that reaſon Ἐπιμύλιον, of which *Thales* * affirms he heard a She-ſlave in *Lesbos* ſing the beginning as the ground, which was thus.

*Grind, grind my Mill amain,*
*For* Pittacus *the* Lesbian *King*
*To grind doth not diſdain.*

Being well in years, he was conſtrained to take upon himſelf the leading of an Army, whereupon he ſaid, *It is hard to be good*; which † *Simonides* mentions, ſaying,

*Hard to be truly honeſt, this*
*The* Pittaceian *Sentence is.*

*Plato* alſo remembers it in his *Protagoras* (where *Simonides* reproves *Pittacus* for ſaying, it is hard to continue good, which he affirms to be eaſie, but to become good, hard; wherein he differs from *Laertius* his expreſſion of it.

† He continued in the Government of the Kingdom ten years; * *Valerius Maximus* ſaith, *only as long as the War with the* Athenians *concerning* Sigeum *laſted, but afterwards as ſoon as Peace was obtained by Victory* (having in this time ſettled the affairs of the Common-wealth.) *he laid it down, notwithſtanding the* Mitelenæans *cried out to the contrary, leſt he ſhould continue Lord of the Citizens longer than the neceſſities of the Kingdom required*, and lived ten years after a private Perſon.

*He went to* Sardis *at what time* (*as ſome ſay, though others apply it to* Bias) (Cræſus *having made the* Grecians *in* Aſia *tributary, had given order for the building of a Navy to invade the Iſlanders: as ſoon as he came thither,* Cræſus *asked him what news from* Greece? *He by his anſwer, diverted the King from going forward with his building Ships: the Iſlanders, ſaith he, have bought a world of Horſes, intending an expedition againſt* Sardis; *and* Cræſus *thinking he had ſpoken truth, anſwered, I wiſh the Gods would put it in their minds to come againſt the* Lydians *on Horſe-back; he replied, It is not without reaſon, great King, that you wiſh and hope to catch the Iſlanders on Horſe-back in the Continent; and what think you the Iſlanders wiſh more, than (hearing your preparation to ſet out a Navy againſt them) that they may catch the* Lydians *upon the Sea, and revenge the cauſe of thoſe inland* Grecians *whom you have reduc'd to ſervitude.* Cræſus *much delighted with this ſpeech, and diſſwaded (for it ſeemed to him he ſpoke very ingeniouſly) from building a Navy, gave it over, and contracted amity with the* Ionian *Iſlands.*

(*x*) *De legib.* 2.
(*y*) *Polit.* 2. 12.
(*z*) *Pollux.*
* *Plut. Sym. poſ. ſept. ſap.*
† Hence correct *Suidas*, who ſaith *Simon.*
† *Laer.* * 6. 5.
*Herod.* 1. 27.

(*d*) *Strab. lib.* 13.
(*e*) *Herod. continues.*
(*f*) *Strab. Laert.*
(*g*) *Strab. Laert.*
(*h*) *Saturnal.*
(*i*) *In Retiario.*
(*k*) *Strab. Laert.*
(*l*) *Herod.* 5. 95.
(*m*) *Strab.*
(*n*) *Laert.*
(*o*) *Ariſt. polit.* 3. 14.
(*p*) *Val. Max.* 6. 5.
(*q*) *Plut. amator.*
(*r*) *Ariſtot. pol.* 3. 14.
(*s*) *Plut. de malig. Herod. Laert. Suid.*
(*t*) *Laert.*
(*u*) *Val. Max.* 6. 5.

*Val. Max.* 4. 1.

## CHAP. II.

*His moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verses.*

OF his Apothegms, *Laertius* recites these. *The Gods themselves cannot resist necessity. Power shows the Man. Being on a time demanded what is best, he answered, To do the present well. To* Crœsus, *who asked which was the greatest Government? That of various (Wood saith he) meaning the Law, (carved) in wooden Tables. To a* Phocæan, *who said, I must seek an honest Man: though you seek much, (saith he) you shall not find him. To some who demanded what was most pleasing, he answered, Time. He said it was the part of wise Men to foresee inconveniencies, and prevent them before they came; of valiant Men, to order them well when they come.*

† *Sympos. sept. sap.* Add these from † *Plutarch, That Prince is happy, who can make his subject afraid, not of him, but for him. That Common-wealth is best ordered, where the wicked have no command, and the good have. That House is best ordered, which needs nothing either of ornament or necessity.*

* *Athen. deipn. lib.* 10. * He counselled *Periander* to shun drunkenness and excess in feasting, lest he should be known to be what he was, not what he seemed.

† *Laert.* † To a young Man asking his advice concerning Marriage, what directions he gave, is thus expresst by *Callimachus.*

*An* Acarnæan *stranger* Pittacus
Hyrrhadius *Son of* Lesbos *question'd thus;*
*Father a double match is offered me;*
*The birth and means of one with mine agree;*
*The other far exceeds me, which is best?*
*By your advice my aim shall be addrest.*
*Lifting his Staff (his ages sole defence)*
*He pointing said, go fetch advice from thence*
*(There he espi'd some Boys by chance at play,*
*As they were whipping Tops along the way)*
*Follow their steps saith he. When nigh he drew,*
*He heard them say, an equal take to you;*
*By which direction guided, he forsook*
*The richer fortune, and the equal took;*
*Be you (as he) by this wise counsel led,*
*And take an equal to your Marriage bed.*

*Prom. vinct.* Whether *Æschylus* (as is observ'd by his Scholiast) alluded saying,

*Wise, truly wise was he*
*Who first sententiously*
*His judgment thus expresst,*
*An equal match is best.*

His moral Precepts are thus collected by * *Demetrius Phalereus.* * *Stob.* 28. "Know opportunity; "what thou intendest, speak not before thou "dost it, for being frustrate of thy hope, thou "will be derided. Use thy Friends. What "thou tak'st ill in thy Neighbour, do not thy "self. Reproach not the unhappy, for the "Hand of God is on them. Restore what is "committed to thy trust. Bear with thy Neighbour. Love thy Neighbour. Reproach not "thy Friend, though he recede from thee a "little; nor wish well to thy Enemy; it is a-"gainst reason. It is hard to foresee the fu-"ture, what is past is certain, what is to come "obscure. The Earth is faithful, the Sea faithless; Gain insatiable. Acquire honesty; seek "Obsequiousness; love Discipline, Temperance, Prudence, Truth, Faith, Experience, "Dexterity, Society, Diligence, Oeconomy "and Piety.

*Ausonius* cites these as his:

*None know to speak who know not to refrain,*
*One good Mans praise 'fore many ill Mens gain.*
*He's mad who envies in the happy, pride;*
*Or grief in the unhappy doth deride.*
*Who makes a Law must not that Law transgress:*
*Purchase all Friends thou canst in happiness,*
*And to the fewest trust in thy distress.*

† Of his Ἀδηφαγία, these were most celebrious, † *Laert.*

*Who hath a Quiver and a Bow,*
*Against a wicked Man should go,*
*Whose doubtful Tongue never expresst*
*The faithless meaning of his Breast.*

His particular Sentence was, *Know opportunity.*

## CHAP. III.

*His Death, Brother, Wife, Son, Writings.*

* HE lived to a full age, above seventy years, or (following the account of *Suidas* for his birth) eighty. † *Lucian* exceeds, who reckons him amongst those who lived one hundred years; for he † died when *Aristomenes* was Archon, in the third year of the fifty second Olympiad: upon his Monument this Epitaph, * *Laert.* † *Longev.* † *Laert.*

*Weep Citizens as sacred* Lesbos *weeps*
*For* Pittacus; *this Tomb his ashes keeps.*

He had a Brother, who dying without issue, his Estate devolved to *Pittacus*; whereupon, refusing the Wealth *Crœsus* offered him, he said, he had more by half than he desired.

He married a Wife of birth higher than himself, Sister to *Draco*, Son of *Penthilus*; she behaved her self imperiously towards him; whereof * *Plutarch* gives this instance, *Having invited some Friends, she came in and overthrew the Table; he seeing his Guests troubled, said, "Each of "you hath some misfortune, he is happiest who hath "no more than this. Laertius* saith, The advice he gave concerning equal Marriage (*Chap.* 2.) was out of a resentment of his own troubles. * *De anim. tranquil.*

* He had a Son named *Tyrrheus, who at* Cuma *sitting in a Barbers Shop* (as was used amongst the Ancients, by such as loved to discourse of News) *was casually killed by a Brasier with a blow of a Hatchet; The* Cumeans *took the offender and sent him to* Pittacus; *he being informed of the accident, set him at liberty, saying, Pardon is better than Penitence.* * *Laert.*

Of

Of his Writings *Laertius* mentions

Ἀδικία, already cited.
*Elegies*, amounting to 600 Verſes.
*Of Laws* in Proſe; directed to his own Countrymen.

*Epiſtles* of which this is preſerved;
*Pittacus* to *Cræſus*.
"You command me to come to *Lydia* to "behold your Wealth; without ſight whereof "I can eaſily believe the Son of *Alyattes*, to "be the richeſt of Kings, and therefore need "not in that reſpect go to *Sardis*; for I want "not Gold, but have enough even for my "Friends alſo; yet I will come to you to en- "joy your converſation as a Gueſt.

* There was another *Pittacus*, called the Leſſer, a Law-giver; mentioned by *Phavorinus* and *Demetrius*. * *Laert.*



## BIAS.

BIAS.

## CHAP. I.

### Bias *his Life.*

* *Laert.*

* BIAS was of *Priene*, Son of *Tutamis*; ſome affirm he was rich, others, that he had no Eſtate, but lived as an Inmate. *Satyrus* ranketh him firſt of the ſeven wiſe-men; the occaſion whereby that title was conferred on him, was this; he redeemed ſome captive *Meſſenian* Virgins, brought them up as his Daughters, gave them Portions, and ſo ſent them back to their Parents: a Tripod being afterwards found at *Athens* (as was related in the Life of *Thales*, the place only different) with this Inſcription in Gold, *To the Wiſe.* Theſe Virgins (as *Satyrus* affirms) or (as *Phanodicus*) their Father came into the congregation, and pronounced *Bias Wiſe*, declaring what he had done for them: hereupon the Tripod was ſent to him, which *Bias* beholding, averred *Apollo* to be the moſt wiſe, and

and would not accept it; some affirm he dedicated it to *Hercules* at *Thebes*, as being descended from the *Theban* Colony, sent to *Priene*.

That he made good this attribute, there are many instances; † *Alyattes* besieging *Priene*, *Bias* turned out of the Town two exceeding fat Mules, which coming to the Camp, *Crœsus* wondered to * see their plenty extended to the very Beasts, and desirous of reconcilement, sent a messenger to them. *Bias* causing many heaps of Sand to be made, and covered over with Wheat, shewed them to the messengers; whereof *Alyattes* informed, was more eager of Peace than before, and sent immediately to desire *Bias* to come to him; but I (answered he) wish *Alyattes* may feed on Onyons, meaning to weep.

† Some ascribe it to *Bias*, the diversion of *Crœsus* his expedition against the *Greek* Islands, by others imputed to *Pittacus* related in his Life.

* *Cyrus* having taken *Crœsus*, sent an Army against the *Grecians*; the *Ionians* much troubled, assembled at the *Panionium*, where *Bias* gave them wise Advice, which had they followed (saith *Herodotus*) they might have been the happiest of all the *Greeks*: He counselled them to joyn together in one Fleet, to sail to *Sardinia*, and there build one City common to all the *Ionians*; whereby they might preserve themselves from bondage, happy in possessing an Island far greater than all the rest, and commanding them; but if they continued in *Ionia*, there was no apparent hope of liberty. This advice was justified, the *Ionians* being subdued.

† Bias (*his Country* Priene *invaded by enemies, all, whom the cruelty of War suffered to escape, flying away laden with the most precious of their Wealth*) *being demanded why he carried none of his Goods with him. I* (*saith he*) *carry my Goods with me: He bore them* (adds *Valerius Maximus*) *in his breast, not to be seen by the eye, but prised by the Soul; enclosed in the narrow dwelling of the mind, not to be demolished by mortal hands, present with those who are settled, and not forsaking such as fly.*

* He refused not the amity of Kings, (as *Thales* did) particularly, that of *Amasis*, King of *Ægypt*, who sent him a victime, commanding him to take from it the best and worst part. *Bias* sent him the tongue, for which ingenuity, he was much admired.

† Another question of *Amasis* he resolved, whilst he was at *Corinth* (invited thither with the rest of the wise Men by *Periander*) where *Niloxenus* brought him this Letter.

Amasis *King of* Ægypt *saith thus to* Bias, *wisest of the* Greeks: *the King of* Æthiopia *contendeth with me for preheminence in Wisdom; master'd in other things, he in conclusion requires an absurd, strange thing, that I drink up the Sea; this proposition if I resolve, I shall have many of his Towns and Cities; if I resolve not, I must lose all those which are about* Elephantina. *Ponder it, and send* Niloxenus *back with all speed; what ever we can do for your Friends and Country, shall not be wanting.*

Having read the Letter, *Bias* with a short pause, recollecting himself, and having whispered to *Cleobulus* who sat next him. "What "(saith he) *Naucratites, Amasis*, who com- "mands so many Men, and possesseth so ex- "cellent a Country, will be, for a few obscure "contemptible Villages, drink up the Sea? "*Bias* (saith *Niloxenus* smiling) consider, as "if he meant to do it, how it might be ef- "fected. Bid the *Æthiopian* (replyed *Bias*) "withhold the Rivers from running into the "Sea, until he hath drunk off that which is "now Sea; for the imposition concerns that "only which is such at present, not what shall "be hereafter. *Niloxenus* embraced him with joy, the rest applauding his solution.

## CHAP. II.

*His moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verses.*

HIS Apothegms are thus delivered by *Laertius* and others. *He is unfortunate, who cannot bear misfortune. It is a disease of the mind to desire such things as cannot be obtained, and to be unmindful of the miseries of others. To one that asked what is hard, he answered, to bear courageously a change to the worse. Being at Sea in company with wicked men, who, a Storm arising, called upon the Gods; hold your peace, saith he, lest they know you are here. To a wicked Man enquiring what was Piety, he was silent, the other asking the reason of his silence: I answer not, saith he, because you enquire after that which nothing concerns you. Being demanded what is sweet to mankind, he answered, Hope. It is better to decide a difference betwixt our Enemies than Friends, for one of the Friends will certainly become an Enemy, one of the Enemies, a Friend. Being asked what a Man did with delight, he answered, gain by labour. We should so live, as though our life would be both long and short. So love, as if hereafter we might hate, conversing in friendship with caution, remembring that it may possibly convert to enmity.*

* *To one demanding whether he should take a Wife; she must be* (*saith he*) *either fair or foul; if fair, she will be common, if foul, a penance.* * A. Gel. 5. 11.

† *That Tyrant shall gain most glory, who first himself obeys the Laws of his Country: that Commonwealth is best ordered, wherein every Man fears the Law more than a Tyrant. That Family is best ordered, where the Master behaves himself voluntarily within doors, as he doth without by constraint of the Law.* † Plut.

* *Those who busie themselves in vain knowledge, resemble an Owle, which seeth only in the night, but is blind in the light; so is their mind sharp-sighted in vanity, dark at the approach of true light.* * Stob serm. 28.

*Ausonius* hath these under his name

*What is our chiefest good? a conscience free,*
*Our greatest ill man's, man's worst enemy.*
*Poor? th'avaricious. Rich? who nought desires.*
*A Wives best dower? the fame chast life acquires.*
*Chaste? she of whom report dare speak no ill.*
*Wise? who hath power to hurt, but wants the will.*
*A Fool? who wants the power, and yet would kill.*

† *Stob. ſerm.* 28.
* *Laert.*

His moral Precepts, according to † *Demetrius Phalereus* theſe. "Moſt Men are evil. "(* His particular Sentence) Before you do "any thing, behold your Face in a Glaſs; if it "ſeem handſom, do handſom things; if de-"formed, ſupply the defects of nature. Practiſe "honeſty. Undertake deliberately, but having "once begun, go through. Abhor to ſpeak haſtily, "[ *Lacr.* It is madneſs ] leſt thou ſin, for re-"pentance follows. Be neither ſimple nor ſub-"tle. Admit not imprudence. Love prudence. "Every where profeſs there are Gods. Weigh "what is to be done. Hear much. Speak ſea-"ſonably. If poor, reprove not the rich, un-"leſs great advantage may ariſe thereby. Praiſe "not an unworthy perſon for his wealth. Ac-"quire by perſwaſion, not by violence. When "thou doſt good, impute it not to thy ſelf, but "the Gods. In thy Youth, gain wealth, in "thy Age wiſdom. [ or as *Laertius*, from thy "Youth to thy Age, gain wiſdom, for it will "be more ſure to thee, than all other poſſeſ-"ſions ] Preſerve in thy actions remembrance; "in opportunity, caution; in thy manners, in-"genuity; in labour, patience; in fear, wari-"neſs; in wealth, love; in diſcourſe, per-"ſwaſion; in ſilence, a decorum; in ſentence, "juſtice; in boldneſs, fortitude; in action, "power; in glory, eminence; in thy nature, "generoſity.

† *Laert.*

† Of his Ἀδόμενα theſe were moſt eſteemed.

*To all the City where thou liv'ſt be kind,*
*They who moſt favour ſhow, moſt favour find:*
*But pride is often with deſtruction joyn'd.*

And

*Strength is a gift, which natures hand beſtows.*
*Rhetorick and policy the wiſe Soul knows,*
*Riches a preſent that from fortune flows.*

## CHAP. III.

*His Death, and Writings.*

* *Laert.*

*HE was much addicted to pleading, very earneſt therein, but always employed in juſt cauſes; which † *Demodicus* the *Alerian* implies, ſaying, *If thou chance to be a Judge, give Sentence on the* Prienæan *ſide*; and *Hipponax*, *to plead a cauſe better than* Bias *the* Prienæan. And in that manner he died, being very old, as he was pleading, having ended his ſpeech, he repoſed his head in the boſom of his Siſters Son; his adverſary having ended his defence; the Judges gave ſentence on *Bias* his ſide; the Court diſmiſt, he was found dead in his Nephew's boſom: the City beſtowed a magnificent Monument upon him, with this inſcription;

† *Laert.* μόδικος Ἀλιεύς; *perhaps it ſhould be* μόδικος Λίεύς.

Bias *of* Prienæan *fam'd deſcent*
*Lies here*, Ionia's *greateſt Ornament.*

They alſo dedicated a Temple to him, called the *Tutmaian*.

*Laertius* beſtows upon him this Epigram.

Bias *lies hidden here, whom* Hermes *lead*
*To th'grave, when Age had ſnow'd upon his head.*
*His head, which (pleading for his friend) enclin'd*
*Upon his Nephew to long ſleep reſign'd.*

He writ concerning *Ionia*, by what means it might be moſt happy (perhaps that counſel already mentioned) two thouſand Verſes.

CLEO-

CLEOBVLE

## CHAP. I.

### Cleobulus *his Life, Death, and Writings.*

* *Laert.* *CLEOBULUS was of *Lindus*, (a City of *Rhodes*) or, according to *Duris*, of *Caria*, Son of *Evagoras*, lineally deſcended from *Hercules*; excellent both in wiſdom, outward beauty, and † *ſtrength* beyond all thoſe of his time; learned in the Philoſophy of the Egyptians. That he was Tyrant of *Lindus*, is manifeſt from* *Plutarch*. *He re-edified the Temple of *Minerva*, founded by *Danaus*.

† *Suid.*

* *De ei delph.*

He had a daughter*whom he named *Eumetis*, but was called commonly from her Father *Cleobulina*: ſhe compoſed verſes and riddles, in Hexameters, famous for her wiſdom and acuteneſs in thoſe riddles, ſome of her queſtions having ſpread as far as *Egypt*, which ſhe uſed jocularly, like dice upon occaſions, only conteſting with ſuch as provoked her; ſhe was alſo indued with an admirable height of mind, and a wit both

† *Plut. conviv. ſept. ſap.*

Politick, and full of humanity, causing her Father to govern his people with more mildness. *Cratinus* also mentions her in a Comedy named from her *Cleobule*, often cited by *Athenæus*.

† *Laert.* † He died full of years, which extended to seventy: his Tomb carried this Inscription,

*Wise* Cleobulus's *death, the* Lindian *Shoar,*
*To which his birth was owing, doth deplore.*

* *Laert.* * He composed Verses and Riddles to the number of three thousand; of which was this Riddle concerning the Year, (by *Suidas* ascribed to his Daughter *Cleobulina.*)

*One Sire, twelve Sons, from every one a race*
*Of thirty Daughters with a double face:*
*Their looks are black and white successively;*
*Immortal they are all, and yet all die.*

† *Laert.* † *Some assert him the Author of this Epigram upon* Midas (*not* Homer; *who, as they account, lived long before* Midas, *though* Herodotus *otherwise.*)

*A brazen Virgin stretcht on* Midas *Tomb,*
*To last whilst Water runs, and Trees shall bloom;*
*Whilst Sun and Moon dart their successive beams,*
*And the rough Sea supplied by gentle streams.*
*I dwell upon this dismal Sepulchre,*
*To tell all those that pass,* Midas *lies here.*

There is likewise extant under his name this Epistle:

*Cleobulus* to *Solon.*

"YOU have many Friends, and a habitation every where; but I dare affirm, *Lin-*
"*dus* would be most pleasing to *Solon*, being go-
"verned by a Democracy; an Island where
"there is no fear of *Pisistratus*, thither your
"Friends will come to you from all parts.

## CHAP. II.

*His moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verses.*

† *Laert.* † OF his moral sayings are these: *Employ thy self in something excellent. Be not vain and ungrateful. Bestow your Daughters, Virgins in years, Matrons in discretion: implying, that the Virgins also should be instructed,* which the *Greeks* used not, the *Romans* brought them up in the Liberal Sciences. *Do good to your Friend that he may be more your Friend, your Enemy that he may become your Friend: for we should beware of the calumny of Friends, of the treachery of Enemies: When any Man goeth forth, let him consider what he is to do; when he returns, examine what he hath done.*

† *A Prince may be happy, if he trust none that are about him. That Common-wealth is best ordered,* † *Plut. Symp. Sept. Sap.* *wherein the Citizens fear reproach more than Law. That Family is best, wherein more love than fear the Master.*

His Precepts thus collected by * *Demetrius Phalereus*: *A mean is best.* († His particular sentence) *To reverence thy Father is duty. Take care of thy Body and Soul. Hear willingly, but trust not hastily.* (Or as *Laertius*, 'tis better to love to hear, than to love to speak.) *It is better to know many things,* (*Laertius*, to love knowledge) *than to be ignorant of all. Teach your Tongue to speak well. It is proper to vertue, and contrary to vice, to hate injustice.* (*Laertius*, be a Friend to vertue, a stranger to vice.) *Preserve thy Piety Advise thy Countrymen what is best. Govern thy Tongue.* (*Laertius*, pleasure.) *Do nothing by violence. Instruct thy Children. Pray to Fortune. Forgo enmity. The Enemy to thy Country, esteem thy own. Fight not, nor be kind to thy Wife in the presence of others, one argues folly, the other madness. Correct not your Servants when they are drunk, it shows as if you were drunk your self. Marry with your equal, for by matching into a higher Family, you procure Masters, not Kinsmen. Laugh not in compliance with him who derides others; for you will be hated by those he derides. Rich, be not exalted; poor, be not dejected.* (*Laertius* adds, Learn to bear the changes of Fortune.)

* *Stob. Serm.* † *Laert.*

*Ausonius* ascribes these to him,

*The more is in thy power, desire the less;*
*Not to be envi'd is unhappiness.*
*None long in his impieties can thrive,*
*In others much, nought in thy self forgive.*
*All Men would spare the good, the bad cast down,*
*We share not in our Ancestors renown:*
*But their inglorious actions often own.*

Of his Ἀπορήματα these were most noted. *Laert.*

*By ignorance most deeds are swaid,*
*In many specious words arraid;*
*But all things shall by time be weigh'd.*

PERI-

PERIANDER

## CHAP. I.

*The Country, Anceſtors, and Parents of* Periander.

*Periander* was Son of *Cypſelus* Tyrant of *Corinth*, his Mother *Cratea*, his Anceſtors the *Heraclidæ*, (* deſcended from *Hercules* and *Iardana*) Reigned Kings of *Lydia* five hundred and five years, the Son continually ſucceeding the Father for two and twenty Generations. The original of *Cypſelus*, and the manner of his obtaining the Kingdom receive thus from † *Herodotus*.

* *Laert.*
* *Herod.* 1. 7.
† *Lib.* 5. 92.

When *Corinth* was governed by an Oligarchy, inhabited by the *Bacchiadæ*, who never would marry out of their own Family, one of them (called *Amphion*) had a lame Daughter (by name *Labda*) whom when none of the *Bacchiadæ* would take to Wife, *Eetion* married (Son of *Echetrates* of the *Betrean* tribe, but deſcended afar off from *Lapithe* and *Canis*) having no Children, he conſulted the *Delphian* Oracle

Oracle about it; as ſoon as he entred, the Propheteſs ſpake thus to him.

Eetion *none will thee though great reſpect,*
*A ſtone from* Labdas *fruitful Womb expect,*
*Which ſhall the people Cruſh,* Corinth *Correct.*

This Oracle to *Eetion*, agreed with another deliver'd to the *Bacchiadæ* (though by them not underſtood) to this effect.

*A Lyon by an Eagle ſhall be laid*
*Upon a rock, fierce, making all afraid.*
Corinthians, *what I ſay conſider well,*
*Who in tall* Corinth *and* Pirene *dwell.*

The *Bacchiadæ* who could not comprehend the meaning of this Oracle, when they heard that to *Eetion*, underſtood their own by the affinity it had with the other, and thereupon ſecretly deſign'd amongſt themſelves to kill *Eetion*'s Child. His Wife being delivered, they ſent ten Men of their own to the tribe wherein *Eetion* dwelt, that they ſhould murther the Infant; when they came to *Petra* to *Eetion*'s Houſe, they demanded the Child. *Labda* (not knowing their intent, but thinking they came to congratulate with the Father,) brings her Son, and gives him into the hands of one of them: they had agreed (upon the way) that he into whoſe hands the Child were delivered ſhould daſh out its brains againſt the ground, but by divine Providence, the Child ſmiling upon him to whom *Labda* had given it, he was moved therewith to ſuch compaſſion, that he could not find in his heart to kill it, but delivered it to another, he to a third, until at laſt it paſt through the hands of all the ten; None of them having power to kill it, they reſtored it to the Mother. Then going forth and ſtanding before the door, they began to find fault with one another, but chiefly with him who took the Child firſt, for not performing the agreement; after ſome debate, they agreed to go in all and be equal ſharers in the murther; but it was decreed that *Eetion*'s Child ſhould be the oppreſſour of *Corinth*, for *Labda* ſtanding at the door heard all their diſcourſe, and fearing leſt their minds changing, they ſhould murther it, carried away the Child, and hid it in a meaſure of Corn (called *Cypſela*) a place which ſhe conceived they could never ſearch if they returned, and ſo it fell out: They came back and ſought all about; when they could not find him, they agreed amongſt themſelves to tell thoſe who ſent them, they had done what they required, and returning home, did ſo. *Eetion*'s Son growing up was called *Cypſelus* from the danger he had eſcaped in the Corn-meaſure; when he came to Mans eſtate, he conſulted with the *Delphian* Oracle, and received a doubtful anſwer, in confidence whereof he attempted *Corinth* and took it, the Oracle was this,

*Happy is* Cypſelus, *who to my fane*
*This viſit makes; he* Corinth's *Crown ſhall gain;*
*He and his Sons (but not their Sons) ſhall Reign.*

Being poſſeſt of the Kingdom, he perſecuted the *Corinthians*, depriving many of their Eſtates, more (by far) of their lives; having reigned thirty years, he dyed and was ſucceeded by his Son *Periander*, whoſe Reign compleated this Tyranny, which laſted according to *Ariſtotle* 73 years and ſix months: ſo that *Cypſelus* began to Reign in the ſecond year of the thirtieth Olympiad.

## CHAP. II.

*The time of his Birth, his Reign, and the change of his Diſpoſition.*

*Periander* (by computation from his death, which according to *Laertius* was in the eightieth year of his age, the laſt of the forty eighth Olympiad) was born in the laſt year of the tweenty ninth Olympiad. His Reign (according to * *Ariſtotle*'s account, laſting forty four years) begun in the fourth year of the thirty ſeventh Olympiad. *Suidas* ſaith, he ſucceeded in the Kingdom, † as being his Fathers eldeſt Son, which *Plutarch* calls, *a diſeaſe hereditary to him*, * flouriſhed in the thirty eighth Olympiad.

He * was at firſt of a mild gentle diſpoſition, but afterwards grew very rigid upon this occaſion. His Mother, whilſt he was very young, kept him much in her company, when he grew more in years, fell in love with him; with time, her paſſion encreaſed to ſuch extremity, that ſhe could no longer ſuppreſs it; aſſuming confidence, ſhe told her Son, there was a beautiful Lady fallen in love with him, and adviſed him not to ſlight her affection. He anſwer'd, he would not tranſgreſs Law and Vertue, by touching a married Woman. His Mother preſſed him with intreaties; at laſt he conſented; ſhe appointed a night, adviſing him not to have any light in his Chamber, nor to conſtrain the Lady to ſpeak, but to excuſe her for modeſtie's ſake. *Periander* engaged himſelf to do all ſhe directed. She, attired as richly as ſhe could, went to his Chamber, and departed again before day-break: on the morrow ſhe enquired if he were pleaſed, and if the Lady ſhould come again to him. *Periander* ſaid, it was his chiefeſt deſire, and that he affected her exceſſively. From that time ſhe viſited her Son often: he, at laſt, was moved with a great curioſity to know who ſhe was, and ſolicited his Mother very importunately that he might have ſome diſcourſe and acquaintance with her, ſeeing he was ſo much taken with love of her, affirming it was unreaſonable, he ſhould be denyed the ſight of one, with whom he had ſo often a nearer acquaintance. His Mother affirm'd it could not be done, in reſpect to the Modeſty of the Lady. Hereupon he gave one of his Servants order to hide a light in his Chamber: ſhe came as ſhe uſed, and when ſhe was aſleep, *Periander* roſe, took the light, and ſeeing it was his Mother, was about to have killed her, but with-held by ſome genius or apparition, forbore: From that time forward he was troubled in mind, grew cruel, and killed many of his Subjects. His Mother, much accuſing her unhappy genius, ſlew her ſelf.

* *Politic.* 5.

† *Excerpt. Nicol. Dam. Suid.*

* *Contin. ſt. Sap.*

* *Laert. Su.*
* *Farthen. tic. cap.* 1.

ſelf. *Laertius* ſaith, they were both conſcious hereof, and that being diſcovered, he grew cruel to every one.

† *Herod.* † In the beginning of his Reign, he was much more merciful than his Father, but keeping correſpondence by Meſſengers with *Thraſibulus* Tyrant of *Miletus* (* to whom in times paſt he had been a gueſt, before he arrived to the Government) he became at laſt much more bloody than his Father. He ſent an expreſs to *Thraſibulus*, to know what courſe he ſhould take to ſettle himſelf, and to govern the City in the beſt manner. *Thraſibulus* led the Meſſenger out of the Town, and as they walked together in a Corn field, queſtion'd him concerning his coming from *Corinth*, and in the mean time lopped off all the heads of Corn that grew higher than the reſt, and threw them away; in this manner he went over the whole field, not ſpeaking one word to the Meſſenger, and ſo ſent him home; where being returned, *Periander* greedily enquired what inſtructions he had brought; he anſwered, *Thraſibulus* had given him none, and that he wondered he would ſend him to a Mad-man, who deſtroyed his own goods. *Periander* enquired what *Thraſibulus* did, and immediately apprehended that he adviſed him to put the moſt eminent in the City to death. *Laertius* recites a Letter to that effect, which, if not ſuppoſititious, muſt have been ſent at another time after this Meſſenger departed.

* *Laert.*

*Thraſibulus* to *Periander*.

*I Gave your Meſſenger no anſwer, but carrying him into a field of Corn, lopped off with my ſtick ſuch Ears as grew higher than the reſt, whilſt he followed me; if you enquire, he will relate all to you that he hath heard or ſeen: Do you ſo likewiſe, if you mean to ſettle your ſelf in the Government, take off the heads of the chiefeſt Citizens, whether your profeſſed enemies, or others. A Tyrant muſt ſuſpect every friend.*

* *Politic.*

† *Excerpt. Nicol. Dam. Suid.*

* *Conviv. ſept. Sap.*

* *Laert. Su.*

* *Farthm. tic. cap. 1.*

Though * *Plutarch* deny he followed this advice, *Herodotus* avers, that from thence forward *Periander* exerciſed all cruelty upon his Subjects, diſpatching thoſe that had eſcaped the rigour and perſecutions of his Father. † He firſt appointed a guard of Halberdiers to ſecure his perſon, * which conſiſted of three hundred, and converted the Government to a Tyranny († through his cruelty and violence) He forbad the Citizens to keep any Servants, or to be idle, always finding ſome employment for them: If any Man ſat in the *Forum*, he was fined, for he feared leſt they ſhould plot againſt him. * The Citizens being deſirous to live ἐυ ἄσει he would not ſuffer them; He was always in War, being of a martial diſpoſition. † He made Ships with three banks of Oars, which he uſed in both Seas. He * attempted to dig the Iſthmus off from the Continent.

* *Sept. ſap. conviv.*

† *Laert.*

* *Suid.*

† *Excerpt. Nicol. Damaſcen. and Suidas from him.*

* *Laert.*

† *Suid.*

* *Laert.*

* Of his friendſhip and correſpondence with *Thraſibulus*, * *Herodotus* gives another inſtance, affirming he ſent to inform him of the Oracles anſwer to *Alyattes* King of *Lydia*, concerning the re-edifying of the Temple of *Minerva*, and adviſed him to provide before-hand for his own ſecurity.

* *Lib.* 1. 20.

* He made a vow, if he were victor in the Chariot-race at the Olympick games, to erect a ſtatue of Gold: He chanced to be victorious, and wanting Gold, beholding upon a Feſtival of that Country the Women richly adorned, he took off all their ornaments, and ſo ſent them home.

* *Laert.*

## CHAP. III.

*Of his being placed in the number of the ſeven Sages. His Sentences and Writings.*

PEriander (ſaith * *Plutarch*) being become a Tyrant by a hereditary diſeaſe derived to him by his Father, endeavoured to purge himſelf thereof as much as poſſible, by uſing the ſound converſation of good perſons, and invited Wiſe-men to come to him; † to which purpoſe he ſent this Epiſtle to thoſe of *Greece*, at ſuch time as they met at *Delphi*.

† *Sept. Sap. conv.*

* *Laert.*

Periander *to the Wiſe Men.*

*I Give* Pythian *and* Apollo *many thanks that you being met together there, will alſo by my Letters be brought to* Corinth, *I will entertain you as you well know very kindly. I hear that laſt year you met at the* Lydian *Kings in* Sardis: *delay not now to come to me, Tyrant of* Corinth, *for the* Corinthians *will look kindly upon you, if you come to the Houſe of* Periander.

Upon this invitation they went to him, not ſeven, but twice as many, of whom was *Diocles*, *Periander*'s friend, in whoſe name *Plutarch* makes a large deſcription of their entertainment, which was not in the City, but at the Port *Lecheon*, in a great Hall, appropriated to ſolemn Feaſts, joyning to the Temple of *Venus*, to whom he had not ſacrificed ſince the unhappy death of his Mother until that time, the particulars of the Feaſt, by reaſon of the largeneſs of the diſcourſe, we refer to *Plutarch*.

He was alſo himſelf put into the number of theſe Wiſemen, who, † *Plutarch* ſaith, were originally but five, but that afterwards *Cleobulus* Tyrant of *Lindus*, and *Periander* Tyrant of *Corinth*, who had neither Vertue nor Wiſdom, by the greatneſs of their power, the multitude of their friends, and the obligations they conferred upon thoſe that adhered to them, forced a reputation, and thruſt themſelves violently into the uſurped name of *Wiſemen*; to which end, they ſpread abroad ſentences and remarkable ſayings throughout all *Greece*, the very ſame which others had ſaid before, whereat the other firſt Sages were much diſpleaſed, yet would not diſcover or convince their vanity, nor have any publick Controverſie about that title with perſons of ſo much wealth and power, but meeting together at *Delphi*, after ſome private debate, they conſecrated there the Letter *E*, the fifth in the Alphabet, and in numeration, to teſtifie to the God of that Temple they were no more than five, and that

† *De ei Delph.*

that they rejected and excluded from their company, the ſixth and the ſeventh, as having no right thereto.

* *Suid.* † *Protagor.* * *Laert.* Of thoſe * who excluded him out of the number of the ſeven, ſome (as † *Plato*) ſubſtitute in his room *Myſo*: * others ſay there were two of this name, Couſins, one the Tyrant, the other of *Ambracia*: But *Ariſtotle* and others, aſſert him of *Corinth* to be the Wiſe, which attribute ſeems conferred upon him, not in reſpect to his Actions, but moral Sayings and Writings, which were theſe.

*Do nothing for gain, that is proper to Tradesmen. They who will rule ſafely, muſt be guarded with Love, not Armes. Being demanded why he continued King, becauſe (ſaith he) it is dangerous willingly to refrain, or unwillingly to be depoſed.*

† *Plut. ſept. ſap. conv.* † When the other ſix had given their opinions concerning Tyranny (at the Feaſt to which he invited them) he being deſired to add his, anſwered with a troubled countenance, *Enough hath been ſaid to deterr any Man of ſound judgment from rule.* When they had in like manner declared their opinions, concerning a Common-wealth, he added, *the reſult of all which had been ſaid, commended that Democracy moſt, which came neareſt an Ariſtocracy.*

* *Stob. 28.* * *Being demanded what was the greateſt in the leaſt, he anſwered, a good mind in a humane body.*

† *Stob. ibid.* * *Laert.* His precepts (according to † *Demetrius Phalereus*) were theſe, *Conſideration is all* (* which was his particular ſentence) *Quiet is good, temerity dangerous. Gain ſordid, the accuſation of nature. A Democracy is better than a Tyranny. Pleaſures are mortal, Vertues immortal. In good fortune be moderate, in bad prudent. It is better to die than to want. Study to be worthy of your Parents. Be praiſed living, beautified dead. To your friends in proſperity and adverſity be the ſame. What thou haſt promiſed amiſs, perform not.* [ *Laert.* Keep thy word. ] *Betray not ſecrets. So reproach, as if thou ſhouldſt ere long be a friend. Uſe new diet, but old laws. Puniſh thoſe who have ſinned: reſtrain thoſe that are about to ſin. Conceal thy misfortune that it may not glad thy enemies.*

*Auſonius* aſcribes theſe to him.

*Pleaſure and profit never diſagree.*
*As more ſolicitous, more happy be.*
*'Tis ill to wiſh, but worſe to fear to die,*
*With what neceſſity enjoynes, comply.*
*If thou art fear'd of many, many fear.*
*Be not exalted when thy fortune's clear.*
*Nor be dejected if a ſtorm appear.*

† *Laert.* † He writ two thouſand Verſes of moral inſtructions.

## CHAP. IV.

### *The Story of* Arion.

DUring the Feaſt we mentioned (by *Plutarch*'s account) or rather according to *Euſebius*, in the fortieth Olympiad, there happened a ſtrange accident, which (becauſe *Herodotus* calls it a miracle ſhewed to *Periander*) we ſhall relate in his words.

† *Lib. 1.* † *Arion* the moſt famous Lutiniſt of that time, having lived a long time with *Periander*, took a voyage to *Italy* and *Sicily*, there having gotten together much wealth, he deſigned to return to *Corinth*: at *Tarentum* he hired a *Corinthian* Veſſel, confiding above any in *Corinthians*; they, when they were at Sea, plotted to caſt *Arion* over-board, that they might be Maſters of his wealth, which he underſtanding, offered to give them all ſo they would ſave his life; they refuſing, bad him lay violent hands upon himſelf, if he would be buried in his own Country, otherwiſe to leap immediately into the Sea. *Arion* reduced to this extremity, intreated them to give him leave to put on his richeſt Ornaments, and ſo ſtanding upon the Poop of the Ship, to play a Tune, promiſing, as ſoon as he had done, to deliver himſelf into their hands. The men moved with a great deſire to hear the moſt excellent Lutiniſt in the World, retired from the Poop to the middle of the Ship: he puts on his beſt Ornaments, and ſtanding upon the Poop, began that Tune which they call the Morning hymn, aſſoon as he had ended it, he threw himſelf into the Sea, with his Ornaments and Lute; the Ship ſailed on to *Corinth*. * It is reported a Dolphin took him upon his back, and carryed him to *Tanarus*, where he landed, and took Shipping again for *Corinth*; he arrived there in the ſame habit, and related all that paſſed; which *Periander* not believing, committed him to cloſe cuſtody, not permitting him to go any whither, and in the mean time ſent for the Mariners; when they came he asked them news of *Arion*: They anſwered, he was very well in *Italy*, and that they left him ſafe at *Tarentum*: immediately *Arion* appeared, attired, as when he leaped out of the Ship, whereat they were ſo confounded, they could not ſay any thing in their own defence. This is atteſted both by the *Corinthians* and *Lesbians*. At *Tanarus* there is a little Image given as an offering of a Man ſitting upon a Dolphins back: that *Periander* cauſed ſuch a one to be made, is evident from this Epigram of *Bianor*.

*The Statue of* Arion *ore the main*
*Sailing upon a Dolphin's back was carv'd*
*By* Periander's *order. See, Men ſlain*
*By cruel Men, by Fiſhes kind preſerv'd.*

See alſo *A. Gellius* who tranſlates this of *Plutarch*, *Lucian*, and others.

## CHAP. V.

### *Of his Wife.*

† *Laert.* † HIS Wife was named *Lyſis*, by him called *Meliſſa*, Daughter to *Proclens*, Tyrant of *Epidaurus* and *Eriſthenea*, the Daughter of *Ariſtocratis*, by the Siſter of *Ariſtomedes*, which perſons ruled over the greateſt part of *Arcadia*. * He fell in love with her, ſeeing her in a *Peloponeſian* dreſs, in her Petticoat, without a Gown, giving drink to her Fathers Workmen: † Long after kil'd her in his fury,

* *Athen. Dip.* † *Laert.*

fury, big with Child, with a Stool, or a blow of his Foot, being wrought upon by the accusations of his Concubines, whom he afterward burned.

† *Herod.* 5. † He sent one day to *Thesprotos*, upon the River *Acheron*, to enquire by Necromancy concerning a *Depositum*. *Melissa* appearing, said, She would not tell them in what place it was laid, because she was cold and naked, the Cloths wherein she was buried doing her no good, for they were not burned, confirming the truth whereof by *Periander*'s putting Bread into a cold Oven; which answer carried to *Periander*, made good the suspition that (* *through excess of love*) γυναῖ᾽ ἦσαν Μελίσσῃ ἐμίγυ. Hereupon he caused Proclamation to be made, that all the *Corinthian* Women should come to *Juno*'s Temple to celebrate a Festival, attired in their richest Ornaments: when they came, having placed a Guard of Soldiers in ambush, he stripped them all, without any distinction (Free-women and Servants) of their Clothes, which he carried to *Melissa*'s Grave, and having pray'd, burn'd them to her: This done, he sent Messengers to enquire the second time; to whom *Melissa*'s Ghost appeared, and told them where the *Depositum* was laid.

* *Suid.*

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of his Children.*

† *Herod. lib.* 3. 49. † HE had by *Melissa* two Sons *Cypselus* and *Lycophron* the younger ingenious, the elder a fool; he had likewise a Daughter; his elder Son at the time of his Mothers death was eighteen years old, the younger seventeen. These their Grand-father by the Mothers side *Procleus* (Tyrant of *Epidaurus*) sent for over to him, and loved them much, as in reason he ought, being the Children of his own Daughter; when he was to send them back, he said to them, Do you know Children who slew your Mother? the elder took no heed to that speech, but *Lycophron* the younger was so troubled at it, that when he came to *Corinth*, he neither spoke to his Father, nor would make him any answer, looking upon him as the murderer of his Mother; whereat *Periander* at length became so incensed, that he turned him out of Doors. He being gone, *Periander* questioned the elder what discourse his Grand-father had with him; he related to him how kindly he used him, but told nothing of that which *Procleus* had said to them at their departure, for he had not taken any notice of it; *Periander* said, it was not possible but that he should say something more, and pressed him more strictly; at last he calling it to mind, told him this also; which *Periander* resenting, and not willing to use his Son more mildly, sent to the People with whom he lived in his ejection, forbidding them to receive him into any of their Houses. Turned out of that wherein he was, he sought to go into another, but was denied; *Periander* having threatned those that should entertain him, and commanded all to drive him away: expelled thence, he went to another of his acquaintance, who knowing him the Son of *Periander*, entertained him, though with fear: at length *Periander* proclaimed, That whosoever received him into their House, or spoke to him, should pay what fine to *Apollo* he should impose; from that time none durst venture to entertain him or speak to him; nor would he himself make trial of a thing which he knew to be desperate, but passed his time in the common walks. Four days after, *Periander* seeing him poor and extenuated with fasting, took compassion of him, and laying aside his anger, drew nigh to him, and said, "Son, which is better, to "undergo what you now suffer, or by obeying your Father to enjoy my Wealth and "Kingdom? you being my Son, and next "Heir to the Kingdom of fruitful *Corinth*, have "made choice of the life of a Vagabond, angrily opposing him whom you ought not to "oppose; if any unhappiness befel you in those "things whereof you suspect me, it befel me, "and I have so much the greater share therein, "in being the Instrument thereof; hear how "much better it is to be envied than to be "pitied, and what it is to be angry with our "Parents or Betters. In these words *Periander* reproved his Son; who made him no other answer, than "That he ought to pay a fine to "the God for speaking to him. *Periander* perceiving the evil of his Son to be incurable, removed him out of his sight, and sending him by Ship to *Corcyra*, of which he was also Tyrant: having thus disposed of him, he made War with his Father in law *Procleus*, as the chief cause of all that happened.

*Laertius* mentions an Epistle which he sent him to this effect:

Periander *to* Procleus.

*We committed unwillingly that crime upon your Daughter, but you, if willingly, you alienate my Sons mind from me, you do unjustly; therefore either soften his mind towards me, or I shall revenge this injury; I have satisfied your Daughter by burning in her honour the Garments of all the Women of* Corinth.

† In fine he took *Epidaurus* and *Procleus* therein, whom he preserved alive. † *Herod. ibid.*

* In process of time *Periander* growing old, and knowing himself to be no longer fit for the charge of the Common-wealth, sent to *Corcyra* to invite *Lycophron* to the Government of the Kingdom; conceiving his eldest Son uncapable of that office by reason of his stupidity. *Lycophron* would not vouchsafe so much as to speak to the Messenger. *Periander* (affectionate to him) sent the second time his Sons Sister, his own Daughter, hoping he would be sooner perswaded by her; she coming, said to him, "Brother, had you rather the "Kingdom should fall into the hands of o"thers, and our Father's House be dispersed, "than go home and have it your self? return "to your own House, injure your self no lon"ger; obstinacy is an unhappy inheritance: "cure not one evil with another; many prefer "compliance before justice; many in pursuit "of their Mothers right, lose their Fathers

* *Herod. ibid.*

"Kingdom: a Kingdom is a slippery thing, "coveted by many; our Father is old and feeble, "give not your own Goods to others. Thus she pleaded to him as her Father had instructed her; he answered he would never come to *Corinth* whilst his Father lived there: which as soon as *Periander* understood, he sent a Messenger the third time, to let him know, he would remove to *Corcyra*, and to command him to come to *Corinth* to take the Government upon him; to this the Son assented. *Periander* prepared for *Corcyra*, his Son for *Corinth*: the People of *Corcyra* informed hereof, that *Periander* might not come into their Country, kill'd his Son: in revenge of which fact *Periander* sent three hundred Boys of the chief of the *Corcyraans* to *Sardis* to *Alyattes* King of *Lydia*, there to be gelt: the *Corinthians* who had charge of them, were driven upon *Samos*, the *Samians* understanding to what end they were sent to *Sardis*, advised them to take Sanctuary in the Temple of *Diana*, and would not suffer them, as being Suppliants, to be pulled away: The *Corinthians* not permitting any Food to be given them, the *Samians* celebrated a Festival, which is observed (saith *Herodotus*) at this day; when night was come, the company of Youths and Maids danced whilst the Children were praying, and in their Dance having made Cakes of Meal and Hony, flung them amongst the Children, whereby they were sustained alive; this they did so long till the *Samians* who had charge of the Children, were fain to go away and leave them; then the *Samians* conveighed the Children home to *Corcyra*. * *Antenor* and *Dionysius* affirm the *Gnidians* came to *Samos* with a Fleet, drove away *Periander*'s Guard from the Temple, and carried the Children to *Corcyra*; for which reason the *Corcyraens* allowed the *Gnidians* many honours and immunities, which they gave not (even) to the *Samians*.

* *Plutarch. de malign. Herodot.*

## CHAP. VII.

### *His Death.*

* EXcessive melancholy (amidst these crosses) occasioned his death, in the last year of the 48th Olympiad, the eightieth of his age, being desirous none should know where he was buried, he thus contriv'd it. He commanded two Men to go to a certain place at night, and to kill whom they first met, and bury him. After them he sent four to kill and bury the two; after the four, more: They obeyed his order, the first killed him. The *Corinthians* erected for him an empty Monument with this Inscription. * *Laert.*

Periander *lies within* Corinthian *Ground,*
*For power and wisdom above all renown'd.*

*Laertius* hath this Epigram upon him:

*At whatsoev'r shall happen be not sad:*
*Alike for all that God dispenceth glad.*
*Wise* Periander *did through grief expire,*
*Because events not joyn'd with his desire.*

† *Stob. 28.*

# † SOSIADES

## His Collection of

## The Precepts of the seven *Sophists*.

*FOllow God. Obey the Law. Worship the Gods. Reverence thy Parents. Suffer for Justice. Understand what thou learnest. Know what thou hearest. Know thy self. About to marry, chuse opportunity. Consider mortal things. When thou art a guest, acknowledge it. Respect Hospitality: Command thy self. Relieve thy Friends. Govern thy anger. Exercise Prudence. Honour Providence. Use not Swearing. Love friendship. Apply thy self to Discipline. Pursue Glory. Emulate Wisdom. Speak well of that which is good. Disparage none. Praise vertue. Do what is just. Be kind to thy Friends. Revenge upon thy Enemies. Practise generosity. Abstain from evil. Be general. Keep what is thine. Refrain from what belongs to others. Speak words of good omen. Hear all things. Gratifie thy Friend. Nothing too much. Husband time. Regard the future. Hate injury. Have respect to thy Servants. Instruct thy Children. If thou hast ought, gratifie others. Fear deceit. Speak well of all. Be a lover of Wisdom. Judge according to equity. What thou knowest, do. Abstain from blood shed. Wish things possible. Converse with the wise. Examin wits. What thou hast received, restore. Distrust none. Make use of art. Defer not what thou intendest to give. Esteem benefits. Envy none. Guard thy self. Approve hope. Hate calumny. Possess justly. Reverence the good. Acknowledge thy Judge. Be moderate in Wedlock. Respect Fortune. Fly engagements for any. Converse with all. Make use of thy like, Regulate sumptuousness. Enjoy what thou possessest. Exercise modesty. Return benefits. Pray for prosperity. Love fortune. Hearing, see. Aim at things that may be acquired. Hate dissention. Abhor reproach. Curb thy Tongue. Repel injury. Determine equally. Make use of thy Wealth. Examine without corruption. Blame the present. Speak knowing. Use no violence. Live pleasantly. Converse mildly. Go through thy undertakings fearless. Be benign to all.*

*all. Confide not in thy Children. Govern thy Tongue. Do well to thy self. Be affable. Answer seasonably. Labour with equity. Do that whereof thou shalt not repent. When thou hast sinned, be penitent. Confine thy Eye. Counsel profitably. Perfect quickly. Preserve amity. Be grateful. Observe concord. Declare no secret. Fear what is more powerful. Pursue what is profitable. Wait for opportunity. Dissolve enmities. Expect age. Boast not of strength. Use to speak well. Fly hatred. Possess wealth justly. Forsake not glory. Hate malice. Be not weary of learning. Hazard thy self prudently. What thou jestest in, quit not. Admire Oracles. Love those thou maintainest. Blame not the absent. Reverence thy elders. Teach those that are younger. Confide not in Wealth. Stand in awe of thy self. Begin no injury. Crown thy Ancestors. Die for thy Country. Oppugne not life. Deride not the dead. Condole with the unhappy. Gratifie without damage. Be not troubled upon every occasion. Let thy Children be by a Free-woman. Promise none. Wrong not the dead. Suffer as mortal. Trust not Fortune. Be in childhood modest, in youth temperate, in manhood just, in old age prudent. Die untroubled.*

# AUSONII LUDUS
## Septem Sapientum.

## THE PROLOGUE.

THE ſeven wiſemen, (that name times paſt apply'd
To them, nor hath poſterity deny'd)
Themſelves this day unto your view preſent.
Why doſt thou bluſh Gown'd Roman? diſcontent
That ſuch Grave Men ſhould on the Stage be brought!
Is't ſhame to us? 'Twas none to *Athens* thought:
Whoſe Council-Chamber was their Theatre.
True; here for buſineſs ſeveral places are
Aſſign'd, the Cirque for meetings, Courts to take
Enrolments, *Forums* in which pleas to make:
But in old *Athens*, and all *Greece* was known
No other place for buſineſs but this one.
Which latter Luxury in [viz. *the Theatre*
[*Rome* did raiſe.
The Ædile heretofore did build for Plays
A Scaffold-ſtage, no work of Carved Stone;
So *Gallius* and *Murena*, 'tis well known.
But after, when great Men not ſparing Coſt,
Thought it the higheſt glory they could boaſt,
To build for Plays a Scene more eminent,
The Theatre grew to this vaſt extent;
Which *Pompey*, *Balbus*, *Caſar* did enlarge;
Vying which ſhould exceed for State and charge.
But to what end all this? we came not here
To tell you who firſt built the Theatre,
Forum, or City Gates, but t'uſher in
Grave Sages, who by Gods approv'd have been.
Such as in pleaſing and inſtructive verſe,
Their own judicious ſentences rehearſe,
Known to the Learned, and perhaps to you:
But if your Mem'ries cannot well renew
Things ſpoke ſo long ſince; the Comedian ſhall,
Who better than I knows them, tell you all.

*Enter* Comedian.

A Thenian *Solon*, Fame ſings, wrote at *Delphis* Γνῶθι σαυτὸν, whoſe ſenſe *Know thy ſelf*, is:
But this to Spartan *Chilon* moſt aſſign.
Some queſtion *Chilon*, whether this be thine,
Τελὸς ὁρᾶν μακρᾶ βίυ, *The cloſe*
*Of a long life regard*: but moſt ſuppoſe
That *Solon* this to *Lydian Cræſus* ſpake.
From *Lesbian Pittacus* this Motto take,
Γίγνοσκε καιρὸν: that's *Know time*: But he
By Καιρὸν here means *opportunity*.
Οἱ πλεῖστοι κακοὶ, *Bias*, did proceed
From thee; that is, *Moſt Men are ill*. Take heed
You not miſtake him; for by ill Men here
He means the ignorant: The next you hear
Is *Periander's* Μελέτη τὸ πᾶν,
That is, *Thought's All in All*; a Thoughtfull Man!
But *Lyndian Cleobulus* does proteſt
Ἄριστον Μέτρον; *Mean in all is beſt*.
*Thales*, ἐγγύα πάρεστι δ' ἄτη cries,
*Upon a Surety preſent damage lies*.
But this, 'for thoſe who gain by it, to tell,
May 'chance diſpleaſe: Now *Solon* comes, farewell. *Exit*.

*Enter* Solon.

LO! *Solon* in his Greeks dreſs treads the Stage,
To whom (as of the ſeven the greateſt Sage)
Fame gave the prize of wiſdom from the reſt;
But fame is not of Cenſure the ſtrict Teſt.
Nor firſt nor laſt I take my ſelf to be,
For there's no order in Equality.
Well did the *Delphick* Prophet ſport with him
Who ask'd, which firſt of the Wiſe-men might ſeem,
Saying; if on a Globe their names he writ,
None firſt or loweſt he ſhould find in it.
From midſt of that learn'd Round come I; that ſo
What once I ſpake to *Cræſus*, All here now
Might take as ſpoken to themſelves; 'tis this:
Ὁρᾶν Τελὸς μακρᾶ βίυ, which is,
*Mark the end of a long life*; *till when* forbear
To ſay, theſe wretched, or thoſe happy are:
For All *till* then are in a doubtful ſtate,
The proof of this we'l in few words relate.
*Cræſus* the King or Tyrant (chooſe you which)
Of *Lydia*, happy thought, and ſtrangely rich;
Who to his Gods did Gold-wall'd Temples build,
Invites me o'er, I to his ſummons yield.
His Royal ſummons went to *Lydia*,
Willing his Subjects by our means might find
Their King improv'd, and better'd in his mind.
He asks me whom I thought the happieſt Man?
I ſaid *Telana*, the *Athenian*,
Who his life nobly for his Country gave?
He piſhes at it, will another have.
I told him then *Aglaus*, who the Bounds
Ne'er paſt in all his life of his own Grounds.
Smiling, he ſays, What think you then of Me
Eſteem'd the happieſt in the whole World? We
Reply'd, his End could only make that known.
He takes this ill: I willing to be gone,
Kiſs his hand, and ſo leave him: For ſome ends,
Mean time, 'gainſt *Perſia* he a War intends;
And all things ready, does in perſon go.

How

How ſpeeds? he's vanquiſh'd, Priſoner to his Foe,
And ready now to yield his lateſt breath,
(For by the Victor he was doom'd to death)
Upon the funeral Pile, rounded with Flames
And ſmoak, he thus with a loud voice exclaims
O *Solon! Solon!* now I plainly ſee
Th'art a true Prophet! Thrice thus naming me;
Mov'd with which words, *Cyrus*, (the Conquerour)
Commands the Fire be quencht, which by a ſhower
Of Rain then falling, happily was laid.
Thence to the King, by a choice Guard convay'd
And queſtion'd who that *Solon* was? and why
He call'd ſo on his Name? He, for reply,
In Order all declares: Pitty at this
The heart of *Cyrus* moves; and *Cræſus* is
Receiv'd to Grace, who in a Princely Port
Liv'd after, honour'd in the *Perſian* Court.
Both Kings approv'd, and prais'd Me, but what I
Said then to one, let each Man here apply
As ſpoke t' himſelf, 'twas for that end I came.
Farewell: your liking let your hands proclaim.
[*Exit.*

*Enter* Chilon.

MY Hips with ſitting, Eyes with ſeeing ake,
Expecting when *Solon* an end would make.
How little and how long your Atticks prate!
Scarce in three hundred lines one word of weight,
Or a grave ſentence, how he lookt on me
At going off? ——Now *Spartan Chilon* ſee!
Who with *Laconian* Brevity commends
To you *the Knowledge of your ſelves*, kind Friends!
Γνῶθι σεαυτὸν carv'd in a *Delphos* Fane.
'Tis a hard work, but recompenc'd with Gain.
Try your own ſtrength; examine what 'tis you
Have done already, what you ought to do.
All Duties of our life, as Modeſty,
Honour and Conſtancy included be
In this, and glory, which we yet deſpiſe.
Farewell, your claps I not reſpect nor prize.
[*Exit.*

*Enter* Cleobulus.

I *Cleobulus*, though my Native Seat
Be a ſmall Iſle, am Author of a great
And glorious Sentence; Μέτρον ἄριστον,
*A mean is beſt*: You Sirs that ſit upon
The fourteen middle Benches next unto
Th' *Orcheſtra*, beſt may judge if this be true.
Your Nodd ſhews your aſſent: We thank you; but
We ſhall proceed in order: Was it not
One *Afer* (who a Man of your own Clime is)
That ſaid once in this place, *Ut ne quid Nimis?*
And hither does our Μηδὲν ἄγαν aime.
The Dorick and the Latine mean the ſame.
In ſpeaking, being ſilent, or in Sleep,
In good Turns, or in Bad, a mean ſtill keep,
In ſtudy, or what ever you intend.
I've ſaid, and that I mean, I keep here end.
[*Exit.*

*Enter* Thales.

I'M *Thales*, who maintain (as *Pindar* ſings)
Water to be the beſt and firſt of things.
*To whom by* Phœbus *Mandate, Fiſhers brought*
*A golden Tripod, which they fiſhing caught,*
By him as Preſent to the wiſeſt meant.
Which I refus'd, and unto others ſent
In knowledge my ſuperiors as I thought.
From one to th' other of the Sages brought,
By them again return'd, to me it came,
Who to *Apollo* conſecrate the ſame.
For Since to ſeek the wiſeſt, he enjoin'd,
I Judge no Man but God by that deſign'd.
Now on the Stage (as thoſe before) I come
T' aſſert the truth of my own Axiom.
Perhaps by ſome 'tmay be offenſive thought:
But not by thoſe by ſad experience taught.
Ἔγγυα πάρεσθ' ἄτη, ſay we,
*Be Surety, and be ſure a loſer be.*
A thouſand Inſtances I could produce
To prove Repentance is the only uſe
That can be made of it, but that we here
Examples by their Names to cite, forbear.
Make your own Application, and conceive
The Damage, Men by this ſole act receive.
Nor this our good intention take a miſs,
You that like, Clap, you that diſlike it, Hiſs.

*Enter* Bias

I Am *Prienean Bias*, who once taught
Οἱ πλεῖστοι κακοὶ, *That moſt Men are naught.*
I wiſh't had been unſpoke; for Truth gains Hate.
But by bad Men I mean illiterate,
And thoſe who barbarouſly all Laws confound,
Religion, Juſtice; for within this Round
I ſee none but are good: believe all thoſe
Whom I proclaim for bad amongſt your Foes:
Yet there is none ſo partially apply'd
To favour Vice, but with the good will ſide;
Whether he truly be ſuch, or would fain
Of a good Man the Reputation gain:
The hated name of an ill Man all ſhun.
Then (*moſt good Men*) your praiſe, and I ha' done.

*Enter* Pittacus.

I'M *Pittacus*, who once this Maxim penn'd,
Γίγνωσκε καιρὸν, That's, *time apprehend.*
But by Time we meant Time in Seaſon, as
*In tempore veni* is your *Roman* Phraſe.
And your own Comick Poet *Terence*, he,
Chief of all things makes opportunity,
Where *Dromo* comes unto *Antiphila*,
I'th nick of Time; conſider what I ſay,
And mark how great an inconvenience
Moſt ſuffer through this want of providence.
But now 'tis more than time we ſhould be gone;
Farewell, and give your Approbation. [*Exit.*

*Enter*

*Enter* Periander.

NOw on the Stage ſee *Periander* move!
He who once ſaid, and what he ſaid will prove,
Μελέτα τὸ πᾶν, *Thought is all in all.*
Since him a perfect Agent we may call,
Who firſt conſiders what he undergoes;
For we ſhould ſtill forecaſt, as *Terence* ſhows,
Th'event of buſineſs, whether good or bad,
E'r w'undertake it: where may beſt be had
Conveniency for Planting, where to Build,
When to wage War, and when to pitch a Field:
Nor inconſiderately take in hand
Or great, or ſmall Things, for that makes a ſtand
In the free progreſs of all new deſigns;
In which there's nothing policy enjoyns
Like conſultation; hence we ſee it clear,
Who uſe it not, by chance, not Counſel ſteer,
But I retire, whilſt you with better Fate
Imploy your Thoughts how to uphold your State.

ANA-

# ANACHARSIS.

## CHAP. I.

### Anacharsis *his Life and Writings.*

† Lib. 4. 46. THose *Nations* (saith † *Herodotus*) *which border upon the* Euxine *Sea, are of all most illiterate, the* Scythians *only excepted; we can alledge nothing relating to learning of any people within the compass of that Sea, neither know we any person learned but* * Strab. lib. 7. *the* Scythians Anacharsis; * *Amongst these*, notwithstanding the roughness of their education, (for *they fed upon Mares milk and dwelt in waggons*) *were some who far exceeded all in justice.*

† Laert. Such was *Anacharsis*, † Son of *Gnurus*, Brother of *Cadovides* King of *Scythia*; *his Mother a* Grecian, *by which means he had the advantage of two Languages*, but was owner of no other House than the custom of that Country allow'd, * Plut. conviv. sep. Sap. a Chariot, whence * he compared his dwelling to that of the Sun, carry'd in that manner round the Heavens.

† Ælian. var. hist. lib. 5. † The *Scythians* never travel beyond their own Confines, but *Anacharsis* as a person endued with more than ordinary wisdom extend- * Herod. 4. 46. † Laert. ed his journey further, * being sent by the King of *Scythia* to *Greece*, † He came to *Athens* in the first year of the 47 Olympiad, *Eucrates* being Archon: and * first met with *Toxaris* * Lucian. Scyth. one of his own Country, by whom, as the most compendious way to take a survey of *Athens* and *Greece*, he was addrest to *Solon*: how *Solon* received and entertained him is already related in his Life: he instructed him in the best Disciplines, recommended him to the favour of noblest persons, and sought all means of giving him respect and honour: *Anacharsis* admired his wisdom, continually followed him, in a short space learnt all things of him, and was kindly received by every one for his sake; being (as *Theoxenus* attests) the only stranger whom they incorporated into their City.

† Strab. lib. 7. † Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. † Clem. Alex. Strom. 5. † Ælian. lib. 2. † Thus was he much honoured by the *Grecians* for his Perfection, Wisdom, Temperance, wherein he excelled many of their Philosophers, whereupon they conferred the attribute of *wise* upon him, some accompting him one of the seven: *Periander* invited him with the rest to *Corinth*; the Feast is largely described by *Plutarch*: There *Anacharsis* carrying with him Chaplets of Flowers, Ivy, and Laurel, drunk, as the *Scythians* use, to * Athen. deipn. 10. great excess, * and required the prize of drinking to be given him, because he was first drunk: *In a race* (saith he) *he wins, who comes first at the Post, in drinking, he who comes first to the end deserves the reward.*

† Herod. 4. 76. † *Having seen much of the World, and improved his knowledge, he returned to* Scythia (as *Lucian* conjectures, not until *Solon* was dead) *As he sailed along the* Hellespont, *he put in at* Cyricum, *and finding the people celebrating a festival to the Mother of the Gods, with much splendor and munificence; he made a vow, if he got safe home, to sacrifice in the same manner as he had seen those of* Cyricum, *and to institute a* Vigil. *When he came into* Scythia, *he withdrew himself privately to* Hylæa, *near the* Achillean *course, a place abounding with Trees, and performed the Rites of the Goddess with a Timbrel* (*and Cymbal* * *about his Neck*) *A* Scythian *espying him, carried word to* Saulius *the King, who went immediately thither, and being an eye-witness thereof, shot him through with an arrow* († to punish his effeminacy, and prevent the infection thereof in others) * *And now if any enquire concerning* Anacharsis, *the* Scythians *deny they knew him, because he travelled into* Greece, *and affected the customs of that Country. As I am informed by* Timnes, *Tutor of* Spargapithes, *he was Uncle to* Indathyrsus, *King of* Scythia, *Son of* Gnurus, *Son of* Lycus, *Son of* Spargapithes: *Now* Anacharsis *being of this Family, it is manifest he was* † *slain by his Brother*, (that his Brother was King of *Scythia*, and slew him, is confirmed by *Laertius*, though he differ in the name) *for* Indathyrsus *was Son of* Saulius, Saulius *was he who slew* Anacharsis, and consequently is the same whom *Laertius* calls *Cadovides*, adding, *some report that he shot him in hunting; for being addicted to the* Greek *customs, and endeavouring to alter the Laws of* Scythia; *whereupon he dying, said, he returned safe out of* Greece, *guarded by his own wisdom, but was slain at home by the envy of others.* Upon him *Laertius* hath this Epigram,

* Clem. Alex. admonit. ad gent.
† Clem. Alex. ibid.
* Herod. continues.
† For τοῦ τῆς ἀδελφῆς φῶν read ἀδελφοῦ Spargapithes. I.
Lycus. I.
Gnurus. I.
Anacharsis. Saulius, or Cadvida. I.
Indathyrsus.

*From Travel* Anacharsis *came at last,*
*And* Scythia *in a* Grecian *mould would cast:*
*Whilst he was teaching how, by the surprize*
*Of a wing'd Arrow carried to the Skies.*

† There were many Statues erected in honour of him by the *Grecians*, upon which was writ, Γλῶσσα, χαρὰ ἀνδρῶν κρῖσις *. He was temperate and skilful in many things; he freely and largely discoursed of the manner of Diet and Medicine, which the *Scythians* used in curing the Sick. From the plain freedom he used in speech, arose a Proverb, *The* Scythian *phrase*. He writ eight hundred Verses of orders for the *Scythians* and *Greeks*, concerning frugal living, and martial affairs. There are also two Epistles of his extant.

† Laert. Plut. conviv. sep. Sap. * Laert.

### Anacharsis *to* Crœsus.

*KIng of the* Lydians, *I came into* Greece *to be informed of their Manners and Studies; I need not mony, it is enough if I can return into* Scythia *bettered: but I will come to* Sardys, *because I highly esteem your favour.*

* Anacharsis

* Cic. Tuscul. quæst. 5.

* Anacharsis to Hanno, *Health.*

(a) Clem. Alex. Cites this fragment, doubtless out of the same Epistle, Ἐμοὶ μείβλημα, χλαῖνα δειπνον, γάλα, τυρός. Strom. 1.

(a) MY apparel is a Scythian Rug, my shooes the hardness of my Feet, my Bed the Earth, my sauce Hunger: I feed on Milk, Cheese, and Flesh: you may come to me as to one that's contented: but those gifts which you so much esteem, bestow either on your Citizens, or the immortal Gods.

(b) Strab. lib. 7. (c) Laert. Suid.

(b) He is said to have invented Tinder, (c) the Anchor, and the Potters Wheel; but this latter is by *Strabo* evinc'd clearly to be false, because mentioned by *Homer*, who lived long before him, *Anacharsis* being in the time of *Crœsus*.

## CHAP. II.

*His Apophthegms.*

(d) Laert.

HIS Apophthegms are these, (d) *He said a Vine bare three Grapes, the first of Pleasure, the second of drunkenness, the third of Repentance. He wondered, that amongst the* Greeks, *Artists contended, and they who were no Artists determined. Being demanded by what means a Man might be brought not to love Wine, he said, by setting before his eyes the unseemly actions of Drunken persons. He wondered the* Greecians *who punished injuries by Law, rewarded the* Athletæ *at publick Exercises for beating one another. Being told a Ship is four inches thick, so far from death, said he, are they who sail. He said Oyl was a receipt procuring madness, because the* Athletæ, *the more they were anointed therewith, the more fierce they were against one another. How comes it, said he, that they who forbid lying, themselves lye openly, when they put off their Wares?* He wondered that *the* Greeks *in the beginning of a Feast drunk in little Cups, and when they were full, in great.* (e) *Being demanded by* Ardalus *whether there were any Flutes in* Scythia, *he answered, not so much as Vines* (which (f) *Aristotle* calls a demonstration ὅτι, by the remote cause) (g) Ardalus *adding, are there not Gods amongst the* Scythians? *yes, replyed he, which understand all Languages.* (h) *Being asked what Ship was safest, he answered, that which is in the Haven. He affirm'd the most remarkable thing he had seen among the* Grecians *to be this, That they left the Smoak upon the Mountains, and carried the Wood into their Cities. Being demanded whether the number of the dead or of the living were greatest; amongst which, saith he, do you account those who are at Sea? To an* Athenian, *who reproached him for being a* Scythian, *my Country (saith he) is a disgrace to me, but you are a disgrace to your Country. Being demanded what in Man is both good and bad, he answered the Tongue. He affirm'd it is better to have one friend worth much, than many worth nothing. He said the* Forum *was the proper place for Cheating and unjust Gain. To a young Man who reproached him at a Feast; Youth, saith he, if at these years you cannot bear Wine, when you grow old, you will not be able to bear Water.*

(e) Plut. conviv. sept. Sap. Strab. 15. (f) Analyt. post. 1. 13. (g) Plut. conviv. sept. Sap. (h) Laert.

(i) *When he returned to* Scythia, *he told the King who sent him, the* Greeks *were busied in all kinds of Wisdom, except the* Lacedæmonians, *who only knew how to give and receive prudently.* (i) Herod. 4. 46.

(k) *He said the* Greeks *made no other use of Mony but to account with it.* (l) *At a publick assembly in* Athens, *he said, he wondred, why in the* Greek *Convocations, wise Men propounded businesses and Fools determin'd it.* * *That Prince is happy who is wise. That City is best, wherein (all things else being equal) Vertue hath the better condition, Vice the worse.* (k) Plut. de profect. virtut. lent. (l) Plut. vit. Sol. * Plut. conv. sept. Sap.

(m) *To one who, as they were drinking, said, beholding his Wife,* Anacharsis, *you have married one who is nothing handsome: I am (answered he) of that opinion also; but put less Water in my Wine, that I may make her handsome.* (m) Stob. serm. 16.

*Relating the qualities of the Vine to the King of* Scythia, *and showing him some slips thereof, he added, and by this time it would have reached into* Scythia, *if the* Greeks *did not every year cut off its branches.* * *At a Feast, such being sent for, as might procure mirth, he alone smiled not; afterwards, an Ape being brought in, he laughed, saying, that beast is ridiculous by nature, Man by art and study.* Athen. deipn. lib. 10. * Athen. deipn. lib. 10. * Athen. deipn. lib. 14. * Clem. Alex. strom. lib. 5. * Clem. strom. 1.

*Whilst he slept, he used* κατέχειν τῇ μὲν γλώσσῃ τὸ ἀκόλαστον τῇ δὲ δεξιᾷ δὲ τὸ σῶμα, *implying, that a Man ought to take great care to govern both, but that it is harder to restrain our pleasure than our Tongue. He said that to him all the* Grecians *were* Scythians.

# MYSON.

† Laert.

MYSON was (according to *Hermippus*) Son of *Stremon*, born at *Chene*, a Village either of *Oetæa*, or *Lacedæmonia*, his Father a Tyrant. *Anacharsis* demanding of the Oracle, if any were wiser, was answered (as was in the Life of *Thales* mentioned of *Chilon*)

*Oetean* Myson *I declare*
*Wiser than those who wisest are.*

His curiosity encreasing by this answer, he went to the Village, and finding him fitting a Plough share to the Plough, said, *Myso*, It is not yet time to Plough: But it is (answered he) to prepare. Others affirm the Oracle called him *Etean*, about which there is much difference: *Parmenides* saith, that *Etea* is a *Lacedæmonian* Village, whereof *Myson* was. *Sosicrates*, that he was *Oetean* by his Father, *Chenean* by his Mother. *Euthyphron*, that he was a *Cretan*, *Etea* a City of *Creet*. *Anaxilaus* an *Arcadian*. *Hipponax* mentions him in these words,

words. *And* Myſo, *whom* Apollo *declared the wiſeſt of all men.* *Ariſtomenus* affirms, he was of the ſame humor as *Timon* and *Apemantus*, a Man-hater. He retired from *Lacedæmon* into the Deſert, and was there ſurprized all alone; ſmiling, being demanded why he ſmiled, no Man being preſent, he anſwered, for that reaſon. *Ariſtoxenus* ſaith, he was of no account, becauſe not of the City, but of an obſcure Village; whence ſome aſcribe his ſayings to *Piſiſtratus*; but others reckon him one of the Seven; *Plato* puts him in the room of *Periander*. He ſaid, *we muſt not ſeek things from words, but words from things; things were not made for words, but words for things.* He dyed 97 years old.

# EPIMENIDES.

*Epimenides* is by all acknowledged a *Cretan* (though contrary to the cuſtom of that place he wore long Hair;) but in the Town where he was born they agree not. *Laertius* following the greater part of Writers ſaith it was (a) *Cnoſſus*, *Strabo*, *Phæſtus*. There is no leſs difference about the names of his *Parents*; ſome call his Father *Phæſtius*, or *Phæſtus*, others *Doſiades*, his Mother *Blaſta*, others *Agaſiarchus*; *Apollonius*, *Bolus*, *Laertius*, and *Suidas*, name his Mother *Blaſta*, *Plutarch* (b) *Balta*, ſuppoſed a Nymph.

(a) *Val. Max.* 8. 13.

(b) One of theſe names perhaps is corrupt.

It is reported, that when he was a Youth, being ſent by his Father and Brethren to their Field to fetch home a Sheep to the City, tir'd with the heat and travel in ſearch thereof, he withdrew himſelf at Noon (or as *Apollonius*, at night) from the common way into a private Cave, where he ſlept (according to (c) *Theopompus* fifty ſeven years, according to (d) *Varro*, (e) *Plutarch*, and (f) *Tertullian*, fifty, (g) *Pauſanas* forty, in which interval of time, moſt of his kindred died; at the end hereof awaking, he betook himſelf again to the ſearch of his Sheep, thinking it the ſame, or the next day to that wherein he lay down, and that he had ſlept but a little; while not finding it, he returned to the Field where he ſaw all things changed, and a ſtranger in poſſeſſion thereof: thence to the City much amazed; going into his own Houſe, they queſtion'd who he was; at laſt he met with his younger Brother, now grown Old, by whom he was informed of all that paſſed, and the time of his abſence. *Plutarch* ſaith, he waked an old Man; (h) *Pliny* and *Laertius*, that he grew old in as many days as he had ſlept years: (i) ſome affirm he ſlept not, but retired a while, employing himſelf in cutting up Roots.

(c) *Apollon. hiſt. com. cap.* 1. *Plin.* 7. 52. *Lætr.*
(d) *De ling. lat.* 6.
(e) *An ſeni ſit gerenda reſp.*
(f) *De anima.* 45.
(g) *Attic.* the number in *Suidas* ſeems falſe, as alſo in the Vatican Appendix of adages; one hath 6. the other 7.
(h) *Plin.* 7. 52.
(i) *Laert. Suid.*

Many (other) wonders are reported of him; (*) ſome ſay, he received food of the Nymphs, which he kept in an Oxes hoof, and took thereof a little every day, requiring no other ſuſtenance, never being ſeen to eat, (k) he often counterfeited Reſurrection from Death to Life; his (l) Soul going out of his Body whenſoever he pleaſed, and returning again.

(*) *Apollon.* (*) *Laert.*
(k) *Laert.*
(l) *Suid.*

(m) He is reported the firſt that luſtrated Houſes and Fields, (n) which he performed by Verſe. To this end the *Athenians* in the forty ſixth Olympiad, viſited with a Plague, and commanded by the Oracle to luſtrate the City, ſent *Nicias*, Son of *Niceratus* with a Ship to *Creet*, to deſire *Epimenides* to come to them, which he did, and there contracted acquaintance with *Solon*, whom he privately inſtructed, ſetting him in the way of making Laws. He reduced the divine rites to a leſſer charge; he moderated the Mournings of the Citizens, he added ſome Sacrifices to the ceremonies of Funerals, taking away barbarous cuſtoms which the Women uſed upon thoſe occaſions: and (which was of greateſt concernment) by Propitiations, Procurations, and Offerings, he luſtrated and expiated the City, rendring the people more obſequious to juſtice and unity, (o) and ſtaied the Peſtilence in this manner: He took Sheep, Black and White, and brought them into the *Areopagus*; there he let them looſe, to go whither they would, giving order to thoſe who followed them, that whenſoever any of them lay down, they ſhould ſacrifice in that place to the proper Deity, whereby the Plague ceaſed. Hence it is, that at this day, (ſaith *Laertius*) are to be ſeen in many *Athenian* Villages, nameleſs Altars, Monuments of that expiation. Some affirm he imputed it to the *Cylonian* impiety (of which already in the Life of *Solon*) and aſſwaged it, by putting to death two young Men, *Cratinus* and *Cteſibius*.

(m) (n) *Strabo.*
(o) *Laert.*

(p) He is ſuppoſed firſt to have built Temples; one he erected in *Athens* to the *Eumenides*; another he intended to conſecrate to the Nymphs, but a voice from Heaven was heard in theſe words, *Epimenides, not to the Nymphs, but to* Jupiter.

(p) *Laert.*

(q) Beholding the haven *Munychia*, he ſaid to thoſe who ſtood by, how blind is Man to the future! The *Athenians* would tear this Haven in pieces with their Teeth, if they foreſaw how much it will infeſt the City: This he foretold many years before it came to paſs, which was in the ſecond year of the 114 Olympiad, when *Antipater* put a Gariſon of *Macedonians* into the *Munychia*.

(q) *Plut. vit. Sol.*

The *Athenians* being afraid of the *Perſian* Navy, he told them, it would not invade them for many years, and when it did, the *Perſians* ſhould not effect the leaſt of their hopes, but depart home with greater loſs to themſelves than they had given their Adverſaries: which was fulfilled in the fights at *Marathon* and *Salamis*.

He foretold the *Lacedemonians*, (and *Cretans* alſo) the overthrow they ſhould receive by the *Arcadians*, which happened when *Euricrates* and *Archidamus* Reigned in *Lacedæmon*.

(a) *Laert.* (b) *Plat.* (c) *Plut. Sol.* (d) *Laert.* (e) *Tit.* 1.

Theſe predictions (for which the (a) *Grecians* eſteemed him (b) divine) beloved of the Gods, (c) and put him in the number of their Sophiſts; the (d) *Cretans*, (whoſe Prophet he is ſtiled by (e) Saint *Paul*) ſacrificed to him as a God) were either not known, or not credited by *Ariſtotle*, who avers, he uſed not to propheſy of future things, but only ſuch as were paſt and obſcure.

For his luſtration of the City and other things he was much honoured by the *Athenians* who offered him many gifts, would have rewarded him with a Talent, and appointed a Ship to tranſport him back to *Creet*: he refuſed their gift and mony, nor would accept of any thing but a little branch of ſacred Olive, out of the Tower, wherewith (having procured a league betwixt the *Cnoſſians* and *Athenians*) he returned home; and ſoon after died (*f*) 157 years old, or according to (*g*) others 150, the *Cretans* ſay he wanted but one of 300. *Xenophanes* affirms he heard him when he was 154 years of age. His body the *Lacedemonians* kept by direction of the Oracle. It was taken up many years after, marked all over with Characters, whence aroſe a Proverb, concerning abſtruſe things, *the skin of* Epimenides; He called himſelf *Æacus*, others named him *Cures*.

(f) *Laert. citing Phlegon. Plin.* 1. 52. (g) *Apollon. Hiſt. com.* 1. *citing Phlegon. Suid.*

* *Suid.* He was a great * Poet, and writ many things in verſe; the ſubjects of his Writings were theſe.

*Initiations*, *Auſtrations*, and other obſcure matters in verſe.

*The generation and Theogony of the* Curetes *and* Coribantes, 5000 verſes.

*The building of* Argo, *and expedition of* Jaſon to Colchos, 6500 verſes.

*Of Sacrifices*, in proſe.

*Of the* Cretan *Common-wealth.*

*Of* Minos *and* Radamanthus.

* *Of Oracles and Reſponſes*, out of which Saint *Paul* cites this verſe. * *D. Hieronym. in Epiſtol. ad Titum.* ſee the place. (*) *Tit.* 11.2.

Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί.

*The* Cretans *are always liers, evil beaſts, ſlow bellies.*

There is extant under his name (ſaith *Laertius*) an Epiſtle to *Solon* concerning the orders of Government given by *Minos* to the *Cretans*: which *Demetrius* conceives of later date, not written in the *Cretan* but *Athenian* language; but I have met with another to this effect.

### Epimenides *to* Solon.

*BE of comfort friend; for if* Piſiſtratus *were Ruler of* Athenians, *inured to ſervitude and void of Diſcipline, his way perhaps might continue for ever. But now he ſubjects not baſe people, but ſuch as are mindful of* Solon's *inſtructions, who aſhamed of their bondage will not brook his Tyranny. And though he ſhould ſettle himſelf in the Government unmoveable, yet I hope it will not devolve to his Children; for it is hard for free perſons, brought up under excellent laws, to ſuffer bondage. As for you, wander not, but come to* Creet *to me, where you will find no oppreſſive Monarch. If in travelling up and down you ſhould light upon ſome of his Friends, I fear you may ſuffer ſome miſchief.*

(*h*) There were two more of this name, one a Genealogiſt: the other writ in the Dorick dialect concerning *Rhodes*. (*h*) *Laert.*

# PHERECYDES.

*Pherecydes* was of *Syrus* (one of the *Cyclades* near *Delus*) Son of *Badys*, or as others, *Babis*; born according to *Suidas* in the 46 Olympiad; he lived in the time of *Alyattes* King of *Lydia*; contemporary with the ſeven Sophiſts by ſome accompted one of them. *Laertius* ſaith he was in the fifty ninth Olympiad, (*a*) *Cicero* in the time of *Servius Tullus*.

(a) *Tuſc quæſt.* 1.

There are who affirm he heard *Pittacus*; others ſay he had no Maſter, but procured and ſtudied by himſelf the abſtruſe Books of the *Phœnicians*.

(*b*) Many ſtrange things are related of him; (*c*) In *Syrus* being thirſty, he required Water of one of his Scholars, which ((*d*) being drawn out of a Well) he drank, and thereupon declared there would be an Earthquake within three days in that Iſland; which happening as he foretold, gained him much credit: though aſcribed by *Cicero* not to a divine but natural cauſe.

(*b*) *Laert.* (*c Apollon. hiſt. comment. cap.* 5. (*d*) *Laert.*

(*e*) Again going to *Juno*'s Temple in *Janus*, he beheld a Ship with full ſail entering the Harbour, he ſaid to thoſe that were preſent, it would never come into the Haven, whilſt he was ſpeaking, a ſtorm aroſe and the Ship ſunk in their ſight. (*e*) *Apollon. ibid. Laert.*

(*f*) Going by *Meſſana* to *Olympia*, he adviſed *Perilaus*, at whoſe houſe he lay, to remove thence with all his Family; which he obey'd not: *Meſſana* was ſoon after taken. (*f*) *Laert.*

(*g*) He bad the *Lacedæmonians* not to eſteem Gold or Silver. *Hercules* having ſo commanded him in a Dream: who appeared likewiſe to the Kings, and bad them obey *Pherecydes*: this ſome aſcribe to *Pythagoras*. (*g*) *Laert.*

He held opinions contrary to *Thales*, but (*h*) agreed with him in that of Water, that it is principle of all things. He ſaid the Gods called a (*h*) *Achil. Tat. Iſag. in Art.*

Table

Table Θωμὰς. (a) He first asserted the immortality of the Soul, according to some. (b) *Tzetzes* affirms he was Master to *Thales*, but that suits not with their times: That he instructed *Pythagoras* is generally acknowledg'd.

(i) *Cicer. Tusc. quæst.* 1.
(k) *Chiliad.*

The manner of his death is variously related. (c) *Hermippus* saith, in a War betwixt the *Ephesians* and *Magnesians*, he desirous the *Ephesians* might be Victors, demanded of one present, whence he was, who answered of *Ephesus*: draw me then, saith he, by the leggs into the *Magnesian* Territory, and bid your Country men, after they have gained the battle, bury me. I am *Pherecydes*. This message he delivered; they overcame the *Magnesians* and finding *Pherecydes* dead, buried him honourably: some affirm he went to *Delphi* and threw himself from the *Corycean* Mountain; But the more general opinion is that (d) he died most miserably, his whole body eaten up with Lice (*Pliny* saith, with Serpents which broke out of his Skin) whereby when his Face became deform'd, he avoided and refused the sight of his acquaintance; when any one came to visit him (as *Pythagoras* did) and demanded how he did, he putting out his finger at the Key hole, consumed by his disease, showed them the condition of his whole body: Saying χεὶ δίλα, the skin showeth: which words the Philosophers take in an ill sense: The *Delians* affirm the God of that place sent this Disease to him out of anger, because he boasted much of his own wisdom to his Disciples, saying if he should never sacrifice to any God, he should lead a life no less pleasant than those that offered Hecatombs. *Pythagoras* buried him; his Tomb carried this Inscription.

(l) *Lart.*

(m) *Ælian.* 4. 28. see also 5. 2.

*Of wisdom I comprise the utmost bound;*
*Who further would be satisfied, must sound*
Pythagoras, *of* Greeks *the most renown'd.*

Some affirm he was the first that writ in Prose, which others ascribe to *Cadmus*. He writ *Heptamuchos* or *Theocrasia*; perhaps the same with his *Theology*, ten Books containing the Origin and Succession of the Gods (if not mistaken for the Theogony of the younger *Pherecydes*) an obscure dark work, the Allegories whereof *Isidore* cited by *Clemens Alexandrinus* conceives taken from the Prophecy of *Cham*.

Concerning this Book there is extant an Epistle under the name of *Pherecydes*, but may well be suspected to be spurious.

Pherecydes *to* Thales.

*WELL may you die whenever your fatal hour arrives; as soon as I received your Letter I fell sick, was overrun with lice, and had a feaver, whereupon I gave order to my Servants, that as soon as I were buried they should carry the Book to you; if you with the rest of the wise men approve it, publish it; if you approve it not, publish it not, for me it doth not please; there is no certainty in it: whatsoever the Theologist saith, you must understand otherwise; for I write in Fables. Constrain'd by my Disease, I have not admitted of any Physician or Friend, but when they came to the door, and asked how it was with me, putting my finger out at the Key-hole, I shewed them how desperate ill I was, and bespoke them to come on the morrow to the funeral of* Pherecydes.

There was another of this name of the same Island, an Astrologer: there are more mentioned by *Suidas*.

# THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

## The Second Part,

Containing the *Ionick* Philosophers.

# ANAXIMANDER.

## CHAP. I.

*Of his Life.*

(a) *Laert. præf.* (a) PHilosophy had a twofold beginning, one from *Anaximander*, another from *Pythagoras*. *Anaximander* was Disciple to *Thales*; whence that Philosophy was called *Ionick*; *Thales* being an Ionian, for he was of *Miletus*. *Pythagoras* was Disciple to *Pherecydes*; that King of Philosophy called, from the place where he taught, *Italick*. *Thales* was succeeded by *Anaximander*, *Anaximander* by *Anaximenes*, *Anaximenes* by *Anaxagoras*, *Anaxagoras* by *Arceolaus*, in whom (as *Plutarch*, *Laertius* and others affirm) it ended, *Socrates* (the Scholar of *Archelaus*) introducing Morality.

(b) *Cic. acad. quæst.* 4. (c) *Suid.* (d) *Strab. lib.* 1. & 4. (e) *Clem. Alex. Strom.* 1. (f) *Laert.* *Anaximander* a Milesian, (b) Countryman, Companion and (c) Kinsman of *Thales* was his Disciple also, and (d) successor in the propagation of his Doctrine; Son of *Praxiades* (corruptly called by (e) some *Praxidamus*) born the third year of the 42 Olympiad. (f) He flourished most in the time of *Polycrates* Tyrant of *Samos*.

(g) *Suid.* * *Strab. lib.* 1. (g) He demonstrated the compendium of Geometry; * being next *Homer*, the first Master of that science; he first set forth a Geographick Table, of which *Laertius* is to be understood, who affirms, *he designed the Circumference of the Sea and Land.*

(h) *Plin.* 2. 8. (i) *Laert.* (k) *Suid.* (l) *Laert.* (h) In the 50 Olympiad he found out the obliquity of the Zodiack, *that* is (saith *Pliny*) *he opened the gates of things.* (i) He invented the *Gnomon*, and set up the first in an open place at *Lacedæmon*. (k) He found out the Æquinoctial Solstices and Horologies; (l) He framed *Horoscopes* to denote the Tropicks and Æquinoxes; whence (m) *Salmasius* conceives the use of his dial was only to delineate the Tropick and Æquinoctial points; that they did not serve to distinguish the hours or twelve parts of the day, he proveth, because the very name ὥρα in that sence or the division of the day into twelve equal parts, was not known a long time after.

(m) *Plinian. Exercit.* (n) *Cicer. divinat. Plin.* 2. 79. (n) He advised the Lacedæmonians to quit their City and houses, and to lie armed in the open Field, foretelling an Earth-quake which threw down the whole City, and tore away piece of the Mountain *Taygetus*.

(o) *Laert.* (o) As he sung, the Boyes used to deride him, whereupon he said, We must learn to sing better for the Boyes.

Of his Auditors are remembred *Anaximenes* and *Parmenides*.

Of his writings these.

(p) *Suid.* (p) Περὶ φύσιως, *Of Nature.* This treatise perhaps *Laertius* means, who saith he digested his opinions into Commentaries, which Book fell into the hands of *Apollodorus* the *Athenian*.

Γῆς περίοδος.
Περὶ τῶν ἀπλανῶν.

*Of the Sphere, with other things.*

He was according to *Apollodorus* 64 years old the second year of the 58 Olympiad, and died soon after.

CHAP.

## CHAP. II.

### Of his Opinions.

Sect. 1. *That infinity is the principle of all things.*

(a) *Acad. quæſt.* 4. THales (ſaith *Cicero* (a) *who held that all things conſiſt of Water, could not perſwade his Countriman and Companion* Anaximander *thereto, for he aſſerted* That *infinity is that whereof all things were* made; or (according to (b) *Plutarch, Laertius,* and (c) *Juſtine Martyr*) *that it is the principle and Element of things* (for theſe two he confounded, as was obſerv'd of his Maſter *Thales*) (d) *but not declared what this infinity is, whether Air, Water, Earth, or any other body,* for which he was condemned by *Plutarch.*

(b) *De plac. phil.* 1. 3.
(c) *Paræn. ad Græc.*
(d) *Laert.*

(e) *Symplic. in phyſ.* 1. 2. *phyſ.* 1. 5. (f) *Plut. plac. phil.* 1. 3. (g) *Laert.* That *it is* (e) *one, infinite in magnitude* (not number) whence (f) *Ariſtotle* reprehends him for imagining contrarieties can proceed from the ſame principle. (g) That *it is for that reaſon infinite that it may not fail.*

(h) *Cap.* 6. (i) *Cicer. Acad. quæſt.* 4. (k) *Plut. plac. phil.* 1. 3. *Juſt. Mart. paræn.* (h) That *the parts thereof are changed; the whole is immutable.* (i) *Simplicius* ſaith moveable) (k) That *out of it all things proceed, and reſolve into it.*

That *there are infinite worlds generated which corrupt into that whereof they were generated.*

Sect. 2. *Of the Heavens.*

(l) *De nat. deor.* 1. HIs opinion (according to (l) *Cicero*) was, that *the Gods are native* (having a beginning) *riſing and ſetting by long intervals,* and (m) *Plac. phil.* 2. 7. that *there are innumerable Worlds:* This (m) *Plutarch* and *Stobeus* apply to the Heavens and Stars. *But how can we* (adds *Cicero*) *underſtand a God that is not Eternal.* (n) That *Heaven conſiſts of cold and heat mixed.*

(n) *Stob.*

That *the Stars are globous inſtances conſiſting of Air full of Fire, reſpiring Flames at ſome certain* (o) *Stob.* *part:* (o) *moved by the circles and Sphears wherein they inhere; which aſſertion* Ariſtotle *borrowed from hence.*

(p) *Stob.* (p) That *the Sun is ſeated higheſt, the Moon next, then the fixed Stars and Planets.*

(q) *Plut. plac. Phil.* 2. 20. That *the circle of the Sun is* (q) 28. *times* (Theodoret ſaith 26.) *greater than the Earth, having a hollow circle about it like a Chariot Wheel, full of Fire; in one part where ſ there is a Mouth, at which the Fire is ſeen as out of the hole of a Flute, which is the Sun* (r) *equal in bigneſs with the Earth.*

(r) *Plut. plac. phil.* 2. 21. (ſ) *Laert.* (ſ) That *the cauſe of the Sun's Eclipſe is the ſtopping that hole in the midſt, out of which the Fire iſſues.*

(t) *Plut. plac. phil.* 2. 24. *Stob.* (t) That *the circle of the Moon is* 29. *times greater than the Earth, like a Chariot Wheel, having a hollow Orb, in the midſt full of Fire* (*like the Sun*) *and oblique, breathing Fire out at one part as out of a Tunnel.*

(u) *Plut. plac. phil.* 2. 25. (u) That *the Eclipſe of the Moon happens according to her converſions, when the Mouth out of which the Fire iſſueth, is ſtopped.*

(w) *Plut. plac. phil.* 2. 28. (x) *Laert.* (w) That *the Moon hath a light of her own: but very thin;* (x) that *ſhe ſhineth in the Light ſhe borroweth from the Sun;* which two aſſertions are ſo far (z) from being inconſiſtent, that it is the common opinion (a) both are true.

(z) *As a learned perſon conceives, upon thoſe words of Laert.*

Sect. 3. *Of Meteors.*

(a) *See Eraſm. Reinholdus in Theonicas Purbachii pag.* 164. (b) *Plut. plac. phil.* 3. 7. (b) THat *wind is a fluxion of the air, when the moſt ſubtle and liquid parts thereof are either ſtirr'd or reſolved by the Sun.*

(c) *Plut. plac. phil.* 3. 3. *Stob.* (c) That *Thunders, Lightnings, Preſters, and Whirlwinds are cauſed by the wind incloſed in a thick Cloud, which by reaſon of its lightneſs breaketh forth violently; the rupture of the Cloud maketh a crack, and the divulſion by reaſon of the blackneſs cauſeth a flaſhing light.* (d) *Seneca* more expreſly, *He aſcribed all to Wind. Thunder* (ſaith he) *is the ſound of a breaking Cloud: why unequal? becauſe the breakings are unequal. Why doth it thunder in a clear day? Becauſe even then the wind breaks through the thick and dry Air. Why ſometimes doth it thunder and not lighten? Becauſe the thinner and weaker Spirit is able to make a flame but not a ſound. What is lightning? The agitation of the Air ſevering it ſelf and ruſhing down, diſcloſing a faint Fire. What is Thunder? The motion of a piercing thick Spirit.*

(d) *Nat. quæſt.* 2. 18.

(e) *Sen. nat. quæſt.* 2. 19. (e) *All things are ſo ordered, that ſome influence deſcend from the Æther upon inferiour things; ſo Fire ſounds, forced upon cold Clouds: When it breaks them it ſhines; the fewer Flames beget lightnings, the greater, Thunder: a great part, the reſt was altered from its natural kind by his exceſſive heat.*

(f) *Plut. plac. phil.* (f) That *the firſt creatures were bred in humidity, and incloſed within ſharp Thorny Barks, but as they grew older they became dryer, and at laſt the Bark being broken round about them, they lived ſome little time after it.*

# ANAXIMENES.

## CHAP. I.

### *His Life.*

(a) *Laert.*

(a) *Anaximenes*, was a *Milesian*, Son of *Eurystratus*, (b) Friend, (c) Disciple and Successour to *Anaximander*. According to *Eusebius* he flourish'd in the second year of the 56. Olympiad *Suidas* saith he liv'd in the 55. Olympiad at the taking of *Sardys*, when *Cyrus* overthrew *Crœsus*. So that the accompt of (e) *Apollodorus*, (who affirms he was born in the 63. Olympiad) is corrupt. He heard also, as some affirm, *Parmenides*. He used the Ionick Dialect, plain and incompos'd. (f) *Pliny* calls him the inventour of Gnomonicks; but perhaps it is a mistake for *Anaximander*. Of his auditors were *Anaxagoras* and *Diogenes Apollonites*.

(b) *Simplic.*
(c) *Cic. acad. quæst. Plin. 2. 76.*
(d) *Suid.*
(e) *Laert.*
(f) *Lib. 2.*

These two Epistles of his are preserved by *Laertius*.

Anaximenes *to* Pythagoras.

THales *having lived happily even to old age, ended his days unfortunately. One night going out of his House (as he used) with his maid to contemplate the Stars, gazing and not taking heed to the place, he lighted upon a precipice and fell down. This was the fate of the* Milesian *Astronomer. But let us who were his Auditors, preserve the memory of the person, and our Sons and auditors after us. Let us still retain his sayings, and begin all our discourses with* Thales.

Anaximenes *to* Pythagoras.

YOu *are more advised than we, who leaving* Samos *for* Crotona *live there in quiet, the* Æacides *prove injurious to others, and the* Milesians *want not Tyrants of their own choosing. The King of* Media *is likewise terrible to us, but would not be so, should we pay him tribute. The Ionians are resolved to War with the* Medes *for the general liberty, and if they fight we have no hope of safety. How then can* Anaximenes *perplexed with fear of death and slavery apply his mind to Celestial speculations. But you are coveted by the* Crotonians, *and all* Italians; *Auditors come to you as far as from* Sicily.

## CHAP. II.

### *His Opinions.*

Sect. 1. *That the Air is the Principle of all things.*

*Plut de. plac. Justin Martyr. paræn. 1. 3. phil.*

HE held that the *Air is the Principle of the Universe, of which all things are engendred, and into which they resolve; Our Souls by which we live are Air, so Spirit and Air contain in being all the World; for Spirit and Air are two names signifying one thing.*

That (a) *the Air is God, begotten, immense, infinite, ever in motion*; (b) but *that those things which arise out of it are finite. First is begotten, Earth, Water, Fire, then of these all things.* That the Air is God understands of the faculties penetrating through the Elements or Bodies.

(a) *Cic. de nat. deor. 1.*
(b) *Cic. acad. quæst. 4.*

Sect. 2. *Of the Heavens.*

THat (c) *the outward superficies of Heaven is Earthly.*

(c) *Plut. plac. phil. 2. 11.*

That *the Stars are of a Fiery substance, invisible, Earthly Bodies intermixt with them; that they are inherent, as nails in Crystal.*

That (d) *they are forced back by the thick resisting Air,* (e) *and move not above (or under) but about the Earth.*

(d) *Plut. plac. phil. 2. 23.*
(e) *Laert.*

(f) That *the Sun is flat as a plate, of fiery substance.*

(f) *Plut. plac. phil. 2. 19.*

That (g) *the Signs of summer and winter come not by the Moon, but by the Sun only.*

(g) *Plut. plac. phil. 2. 19.*

That (h) *the Sun is eclipsed when the Mouth out of which issueth his heat is closed.*

(h) *Plut. plac. phil. 2. 24.*

That the *Moon is likewise of a Fiery nature.*

*Plut.*

That *the Moon is eclipsed when the Mouth out of which issueth her heat, is closed.*

*Plut. plac. phil. 2. 29.*

Sect. 3. Of *Meteors.*

THat *the Clouds are made by condensation of Air, rain by condensation of the Clouds, out of which it is squeezed; snow of rain congeal'd in falling, and hail of the same contracted by a cold Wind.*

*Plut. plac. phil. 3. 4.*

Concerning Thunder, lightning, &c. to the assertion of *Anaximander* he added the comparison of the Sea, *which being broken with Oars shineth.*

*Stob.*

That *the rainbow is made by reflection of the Sun beams upon a thick Cloud, which, not able to pierce it, are refracted upon it.*

*Plut. de plac. phil. 3. 5.*

That *Earthquakes proceed from the rarity and dryness of the Earth, one being caus'd by excessive heat, the other by excessive cold.* Further explained by (i) *Aristotle* thus; *He held that the Earth, as well when it is moist as when it is dry, breaketh, and by these great pieces thereof which use to fall upon it, is shaken: Hence it is that Earthquakes happen either in droughts or great rains: by droughts it is broken, and by great showers excessively moistened parts likewise in sunder.*

*Plutarch. de plac. 3. 15.*
(i) *Meteor. 2. 7. Senec. nat. quæst. 6. 10.*

He called *the contraction and condensation of matter, cold; the laxation and rarity thereof, heat; whence a Man breaths out of his mouth both hot and cold; his breath compress by his lips, and condens'd is cold; but breathed forth with an open mouth is hot by reason of the rarity.*

*Plutarch. de primo. frig.*

# ANAXAGORAS.

## CHAP. I.

### Anaxogoras's *Country, time, and ſtudy of Philoſophy.*

*Laert.* ANaxagoras was of *Glazomene*, Son of *Hegeſibulus* or *Eubulus*, born in the 70th. Olympiad according to *Apollodorus*; in the firſt year thereof; Eminent for his noble birth and wealthy fortunes, but more for his magnanimous contempt of them. (a) He left his Lands and Patrimony, (ſaith (b) *Cicero*,) to learn and obtain the divine delight of Philoſophy: and (c) converted himſelf from civil affairs to the knowledge of things. *Suidas* affirms he left his Grounds to Sheep and Camels to be eaten up: and therefore *Apollonius Tyaneus* ſaid, he read Philoſophy to Beaſts rather than to Men. (d) *Plato* derides him for quitting his Eſtate; *Laertius* reports he aſſign'd it to his Friends; whereupon being by them accuſed of improvidence; why (anſwered he) *do not you take care of it?* To one who reproved him as taking no care of his Country, *wrong me not*, ſaith he, *my greateſt care is my Country*, pointing to the Heavens. To another asking for what end he was born, he anſwered, *to contemplate the Sun, Moon and Heavens.* (e) In fine, he withdrew himſelf to contemplation of natural Philoſophy not regarding civil affairs. In this ſtudy *Anaximenes* was his Maſter (f) from whom he received his learning.

(a) *Plut. contra uſar. Lyſand.*
(b) *Tuſc. quæſt.* 5.
(c) *De orator.* 3.
(d) *Hipp. mai.*
(e) *Laert.*
(f) *Cicer. de Nat. deor.* 1.

(g) In the twentieth year of his age the firſt of the 75. Olympiad, *Colliades* being Archon (whom *Laertius* corruptly calls *Callias*) at the time of *Xerxes*'s expedition into *Greece* he went to *Athens* to ſtudy Philoſophy, where he continued thirty years, and was honoured with the title of Νῦς *the Mind*, as being the firſt that added that principle to matter, ſo *Amon.*

*Where dwells fam'd* Anaxagoras, *the mind,*
(h) *For he that agent firſt to matter joyn'd,*
*Which things confuſed orderly deſign'd.*

(g) *Laert.*
(h) *Laert. perhaps* ὃ τῶ νοῦν ἀυλῶς.

## CAHP. II.

### *Of his Opinions.*

Sect. 1. *Of the firſt principles, and beginning of things.*

HE held that *the material principle of all things is one and many* (ὁμοιομερῆ *its parts infinite, ſimilar, and contrary, continuous to the touch,* (i) *ſuſtaining themſelves, not contain'd by any other. His* grounds theſe: Firſt, becauſe, according to the common rule of natural Philoſophers, of nothing proceeds nothing, it is not poſſible any thing can be made of that which is not; or that which hath a being can be reſolved into that which hath none. Secondly, becauſe contraries are made mutually of each other, therefore they were in each other before; for if it be neceſſary, that whatſoever is made, be made of that which is, or is not, but that it ſhould be made of that which is not impoſſible, wherein all agree, that ever diſcourſed upon nature, it follows neceſſarily, that they be made of things that are, and are within theſe very things, though by reaſon of their ſmallneſs, not diſcernable by us: Hence is it that they ſay, every thing is mixt with every thing; becauſe they ſee any thing made of any thing: but things ſeem different, and are called diverſe in reſpect to one another, by reaſon that the multitude of infinites which are within aboundeth in the miſtion; for the whole is neither quite White nor Black, Fleſh nor Bone, but every thing ſeemeth to be of the Nature of that whereof it hath moſt (k) of ſimple nouriſhment, as bread, Water, and the like, are bred the hair, veins, arteries, Nerves, Bones, and other parts of the Body, all things are therefore in this food, as Nerves, Bones, and the like, diſcernable by reaſon, though not by ſenſe: Of theſe Atomes the whole World conſiſteth, (l) as Gold of grains; theſe homogeneal parts are the matter of all things; his opinion is thus expreſt by (m) *Lucretius.*

(i) *Plut. plac. phil.* 1. 3.
* *Ariſt. phyſ.* 3. 4.
† *Ariſt. phyſ.* 3. 7.
(k) *Plut.*
(l) *Laert.*
(m) *Lib.* 1.

*Next* Anaxagoras *we muſt purſue,*
*And his* Homoiomeria *review;*
*A term that's no where mention'd but among*
*The Greeks; too copious for our narrow tongue:*
*Yet may the ſenſe be in more words arraid;*
*The principle of all things, entrails made*
*Of ſmalleſt entrails, bone of ſmalleſt bone,*
*Blood of ſmall ſanguine drops reduc'd to one;*
*Gold of ſmall grains, earth of ſmall ſands compacted,*
*Small drops to water, ſparks to fire contracted;*
*The like in every thing ſuppos'd, yet he*
*Nature aſſerted from all vacuum free;*
*And held that each corporeal being might*
*Be ſubdivided into infinite.*

That (n) God is an infinite ſelf-moving mind that this divine (o) infinite Mind, not incloſed in any Body, (p) is the efficient cauſe of all things; out of the infinite matter conſiſting of ſimilar parts, every thing being made according to its ſpecies by the divine mind, who when all things were at firſt confuſedly mingled together, came and reduced them to order.

(n) *Lactan. falſ. rel.* 1. 5.
(o) *Cic. nat. deor.* 1.
(p) *Auguſt. civ. del.* 8. 2.

Sect. 2. *Of the Heavens.*

THat *the higher parts of the World are full of Fire, the power that is there he called æther,* and that properly, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, for the body, which is continually in quick motion, is conceived

*Ariſt. Met.* 1. 3.

ceived to be divine by nature, for that reason called æther, none of those that are here below being of that kind.

(q) Plut. plac. phil. 2. 13. That "(q) the ambient æther being of a 'fiery nature by the swiftness of its motion, 'snatcheth up Stones from the Earth, which (r) Plut. plac. phil. 2. 16. 'being set on Fire, become Stars, (r) all car- 'ried from East to West.

(s) Plut. plac. phil. 2. 23. That (s) "the Stars are impelled by the con- 'densation of the Air about the Poles, which the Sun makes more strong by compressing.

Achil. Tat. isag. in Arat. That 'the Stars are earthly, and that after 'the first secretion of the Elemens, the Fire 'separating it self, drew some parts of the Earth 'to its own nature, and made them like Fire: 'Whereupon he farther affirmed

(t) Plut. plac. phil. 2. 20. Laert. Achil. Tat. Isag. in Arat. '(t) The Sun is a burning Plate or Stone, '(u) many times bigger than *Peloponnesus*, whose 'conversion is made by the repulse of the 'Northern Air, which he, by compressing, 'makes more strong.

(u) Plut. plac. phil. 2. 21. (w) Plut. plac. phil. 2. 25. (w) That 'the Moon is a dark Body, en- 'lightned by the Sun, habitable, having Plains, 'Hills and Waters; that (x) the inequality (x) Plut. plac. phil. 2. 30. Laert. 'in her Face proceeds from a mixture, cold 'and earthly, for there is darkness mixt with 'her fiery nature, whence she is called a Star (y) In Cratylo. 'of false light. (y) *Plato* saith, That the Moon was occasion of dishonour to him, because he assumed the original of this opinion of her borrowing light to himself, whereas it was much more antient.

(z) Plut. plac. phil. 3. 1. That '(z) the milky way is the shadow of 'the Earth upon that part of Heaven, when 'the Sun, being underneath, enlightens not all: (a) Meteor. 1. 8. '(a) Or as *Aristotle*, that the Milky way is the 'light of some Stars, for the Sun being under 'the Earth, looks not upon some Stars, the 'light of those on whom he looks is not seen, 'being swallowed up in his; the proper light 'of those which are hindred by the Earth 'from the Suns illumination, is the *Galaxy*; 'Laertius saith, he held the *Galaxy* to be the 'reflection of the light of the Sun.

## Sect. 3. *Of Meteors.*

Arist. Meteor. 1. 6. THat 'Comets are the co-apparition of wandring Stars, which approach so near each other, as that they seem to touch one another: Or as *Laertius* 'the concourse of Pla- 'nets, emitting flames.

That 'falling Stars are shot down from the 'æther, as sparkles, and therefore soon ex- 'tinguished.

(b) Laert. Plut. plac. phil. 3. 5. That '(b) Thunder is the Collision of 'Clouds, lightning their mutual attrition: Or as *Plutarch*; 'the cold falling upon the hot, or 'the ætherial upon the aerial, the noise which it 'makes is Thunder: of the blackness of the 'Clouds is caused lightning, of the greatness 'of the light Thunderbolts, of the more cor- 'poreal fire whirle-winds, of the more cloudy 'Presters.

That 'lightning distils from the æther; and that 'from that great heat of Heaven many 'things fall down, which the Clouds preserve a 'long time enclosed.

Plut. plac. phil. 3. 5. That the 'Rain-bow is a refraction of the 'Suns light upon a thick dark Cloud, opposite 'to him as a looking-glass; by the same reason (saith he) appeared chiefly in *Pontus*, two, or more Suns.

That 'Winds proceed from extenuation of Laert. 'the Air, by the Sun.

That 'Earth-quakes are caused by the Air Arist. Meteor. 2. 7. Plut. plac. phil. 3. 15. Senec. nat. quæst. 6. 'or Æther, which being of its own nature 'apt to ascend, when it gets into the Veins and 'Caverns of the Earth, finding difficulty in the 'getting out, causeth that shaking; for the 'upper parts of the Earth contract themselves 'by the benefit of Rain, Nature having made 'the whole Body thereof alike, lax and spungy, 'the parts, as in a Ball, superiour, and inferiour; 'the superiour, that which is inhabited by us, 'the inferiour, the other: This wind getting 'into the inferiour parts, breaks the condensed 'Air, with the same force as we see Clouds 'broken, when, upon the collision of them, 'and motion of the agitated Air, fire breaks 'forth: this Air falls upon that which is next, 'seeking to get out, and tears in pieces what- 'soever it meets, until through those narrow 'passages, it either finds a way to Heaven, or 'forceth one: which *Laertius* obscurely ex- 'presseth, the repulsion of the Air upon the 'Earth.

That 'Snow is not white, but black, nor Cic. Acad. quæst. 4. 'did it seem white to him, because he knew 'the Water whereof it is congealed to be 'black.

## Sect. 4. *Of the Earth.*

THat 'the beginning of motion proceeding Laert. 'from the mind, the heavy bodies ob- 'tained the lowest place, as the Earth; the 'light the highest, as the fire: those betwixt 'both, the middle, as the Air and Water: 'thus the Sea subsists upon the superficies of 'the Earth, which is flat, the humidity being 'rarified by the Sun.

That 'the primitive humidity being diffused, Plut. plac. phil. 3. 16. 'as a Pool was burned by the motion of the 'Sun about it, and the unctuous part being ex- 'haled, the remainder became Salt.

That 'as soon as the World was made, and Plut. plac. phil. 2. 8. 'living Creatures produced out of the World, 'the World enclined of it self towards the 'South, according to divine Providence; 'that some parts thereof might be habitable, 'others not habitable, by reason of the ex- 'tremities of heat and cold.

That 'the mistion of the Elements is by ap- Plut. plac. phil. 1. 17. 'position.

That 'the inundation of *Nilus* is caused by Plut. plac. phil. 4. 1. 'the Snow of *Æthiopia*, which is dissolved in 'Summer, and congealed in Winter.

## Sect. 5. *Of living Creatures.*

THat 'Creatures were first generated of Laert. 'humidity, calidity, and earthly mat- 'ter; afterwards mutually of one another, 'Males on the right side, Females on the 'left.

That 'the Soul is that which moveth, '(a) that it is aerial, and hath a Body of the (a) Plut. plac. phil. 4. 1. 'nature of Air.

(b) Plut. plac. phil. 5. 24. (b) That 'there is a Death of the Soul 'likewiſe, which is ſeparation from the Body. That all Animals have active reaſon.

(c) Plut. plac. phil. 5. 25. (c That ſleep is an action of the Body, not of the Soul.

(d) Plut. plac. phil. 5. 25. (d That in the hand of Man conſiſts all his Skill.

(e) Plut. de amore frat. (e That 'the Voice is made by the Wind, 'hitting againſt firm reſiſting Air, returning 'the counter-blow to our Ears, which is 'the manner whereby alſo the repercuſſion 'of the Air is formed, called Echo.

† Ariſt. That '† the Gall is the cauſe of acute 'diſeaſes, which overflowing, is diſperſed 'into the Lungs, Veins, and Coſts.

## CHAP. III.

### *His Predictions.*

SVidas ſaith, he foretold many things: of thoſe, two inſtances only have been hitherto preſerved. The firſt thus related by *Pliny*, *The* Grecians *celebrate* Anaxagoras *of the* Clozomenian, *and for foretelling by his learning and Science in the ſecond year of the* 78. *Olympiad, on what day a Stone would fall from the Sun, which happen'd in the day time in a part of* Thrace *at the River* Agos, *which Stone is at this day ſhewn about the bigneſs of a Beam, of an aduſt colour, a Comet alſo burning in thoſe nights.*

* Vit. Lyſand. * *Plutarch* adds, that it was in his time not only ſhewn, but reverenced by the *Peloponneſians*. *Euſebius* reckons the fall of this Stone upon the fourth year of the 78. Olympiad, which is two years after *Pliny*'s account of the Prediction. *Silenus* cited by *Laertius*, ſaith, it fell when *Dimylus* was Archon, which if it be to be read *Dyphilus* (for the other name is not to be found near theſe times) will be the firſt year of the 84. Olympiad. But the Marble at *Arundel Houſe* (graven about the 129. Olympiad, to be preferred before any other Chronological account) expreſsly names the fall upon the 4th year upon the 77. Olympiad, when *Theagenides* was Archon, two years before. *Pliny* ſaith it was foretold. It was believed to have portended (as *Plutarch* teſtifies) the great defeat given to the *Athenians* by *Lyſander* at the River *Agos* 62. years after, *viz.* the fourth year of the 93. Olympiad.

† Meteor. 1. 7. Of the wonder † *Ariſtotle* gives a very ſlight account, affirming 'it was a Stone ſnatch-'ed up by the Wind, and fell in the day time, 'a Comet happening in thoſe nights, which is

* Vit. Lyſand. diſproved by * *Plutarch*, who hath this large Diſcourſe upon it: 'It is ſaid that *Anaxagoras* 'did Prognoſticate that one of the Bodies in-'cluded the Heavens it ſhould be looſed by 'ſhaking, and fall to the ground, the Stars are 'not in place where they were firſt created, they 'are heavy bodies, of the Nature of Stone, 'ſhining by reflection of the æther, being drawn 'up by force, and kept there by the violence of 'that circular motion, as at the beginning in 'the firſt ſeparation of things, cold and heavy 'they were reſtrained. There is another opinion 'more probable which ſaith, thoſe which we 'call falling Stars are not fluxions of the 'æther extinguiſht in the Air almoſt as ſoon as 'lighted, nor inflammations or combuſtions of 'any part of the Air, which by it ſpreadeth 'upwards, but they are cœleſtial bodies failing 'of their retention by the ordinary courſe of 'Heaven thrown down, not upon the habi-'table Earth, but into the Sea, which is the 'cauſe we do not ſee them; yet the aſſertion of '*Anaxagoras* is confirmed by *Damachus*, who 'writeth in his Book of Religion, that 75. 'daies together before this Stone fell, they ſaw 'a great body of fire in the Air like a Cloud 'enflamed, which tarried not in one place, 'but went and came, uncertainly removing, 'from the driving whereof iſſued flaſhes of fire 'that fell in many places like falling Stars; 'when this great body of fire fell in that part 'of the Earth, the Inhabitants emboldned, 'came to the place to ſee what it was, and found 'no appearance of fire but a great ſtone on the 'ground, nothing, in compariſon of that body 'of fire. Herein *Damachus* had need of favorable hearers: But if what he ſaith be true, he 'confuteth thoſe Arguments who maintain it 'was a piece of a Rock by the force of a boi-'ſtrous Wind torn from the top of a Mountain, 'and carried in the Air ſo long as this Whirl-'wind continued, but ſo ſoon as that was laid, 'the ſtone fell immediately; unleſs this light-'ning body which appeared ſo many days was 'fire indeed, which coming to diſſolve, and to 'be put out did beget this violent ſtorm of 'force to tear off the ſtone, and caſt it down.

† Senec. nat. quæſt. 7. 5. This it is likely * *Charimander* meant, who in his Book of Comets ſaith, *Anaxagoras* obſerved in the Heavens a great unaccuſtomed light of the greatneſs of a huge Pillar, and that it ſhined for many days.

† Suid. The other memorable Prediction of *Anaxagoras* was † of a Storm, which he ſignified by going to the Olympick Games, when the Weather was fair in a ſhaggy Gown, the Rain pouring down all the *Grecians* (ſaith *Ælian*) ſaw and gloried, that he knew more divinely than according to human Nature.

## CHAP. IV.

### *His Scholars and Auditors.*

THeſe are remembred as his Scholars and Auditors.

(a) Cicer. (a) *Pericles* Son of *Xantippus* being inſtructed by *Anaxagoras*, could eaſily reduce the exerciſe of his mind from ſecret abſtruſive things to

(b) Plut. vit. Pericl. publick popular cauſes, (b) *Pericles* much eſteemed him, was by him inſtructed in Natural Philoſophy; and beſides other virtues, freed from ſuperſtitious fears ariſing from ignorance of Phyſical Cauſes; whereof there is this inſtance, the head of a Ram with but one horn being brought to *Pericles*, was by the Southſayers interpreted prodigious: *Anaxagoras* opening it, ſhowed that the brain filled not its natural place, but contracted by degrees in an oval form toward that part where the horn grew. Afterwards *Anaxagoras* neglected and decrepit with age in a melancholy reſentment thereof lay down and cover'd his face, reſolving to ſtarve himſelf; which *Pericles* hearing, came immediately to him bewailing, not *Anaxagoras*, but himſelf, who ſhould loſe ſo excellent a Coun-

Counſellor: *Anaxagoras* uncovering his face, ſaid, They, *Pericles*, who would uſe a Lamp, muſt apply it with Oil.

*Archelaus*, Son of *Apollodorus*, was Diſciple to *Anaxagoras*, and, as *Laertius* affirms, called the Natural Philoſopher for firſt bringing that kind of Learning to *Athens*; but how that conſiſts with his relation to *Anaxagoras*, who, as he acknowledgeth, ſtudied Natural Philoſophy thirty years in *Athens*, *Caſaubon* juſtly queſtions.

*Euripides*, * as the writer of his life affirms, Son of *Mneſarchus*, born at the firſt time of *Xerxes*'s expedition into *Greece*, the ſame day that the *Grecians* overthrew the *Perſians*, was firſt a Painter, then an Auditor of *Anaxagoras*; but ſeeing him perſecuted for his opinions, laſtly converted himſelf to Tragick Poeſie.

*Socrates*, Son of *Sophroniſcus*, was, according to *Ariſtoxenus*, an Auditor of *Anaxagoras* till he left the City, and thereupon applied himſelf to *Archelaus*, which *Porphyrius* reckons above the 17th year of his age, or rather the nineteenth.

*Democritus* alſo is by ſome affirmed, being younger than *Anaxagoras* forty years, to have applied himſelf to him; but *Laertius* affirms he could not endure *Democritus*, and ſhun'd his converſation; *Phavorinus* likewiſe atteſts, that becauſe he would not admit him, *Democritus* profeſs'd himſelf his Enemy, and denied his opinions of the Sun and Moon, but ſaid they were ancient, and that he ſtole them, as likewiſe his deſcription of the World, and the aſſertion concerning the mind.

*Metrodorus* of *Lampſacum* is likewiſe mentioned by *Laertius* as friend to *Anaxagoras*.

* His words (becauſe never publiſhed) theſe: Διήκουσε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρου τοῦ Κλαζομενίου ὅτε βαρβαρίαν ὑβρίσθη, ὁ Ἀναξαγόρειον ἰδίως ὑποσύνταξιν δι' ἀπορρήτου εἴσηξε δόγματα.

## CHAP. V.

### *Of his Trial, Death, Sentences and Writings.*

OF his Trial, ſaith *Laertius*, there are ſeveral reports. *Sotion* in his Treatiſe of the ſucceſſion of Philoſophers ſaith, he was accuſed by *Cleon* of impiety, for aſſerting the Sun to be a burning Plate; but being defended by *Pericles* his Scholar, he was fined five Talents and baniſh'd.

*Laert.* *Satyrus*, that he was cited to the Court by *Thucydides*, who was of the contrary faction of *Pericles*, accuſed not only of impiety, but of holding intelligence with the *Perſians*, and in his abſence condemned to death; when news was brought him at the ſame time both of the death of his Sons, which (according to *Ælian*) were two, all that he had, and his own condemnation of the latter, he ſaid, Nature long ſince condemned both them and me to death; of his (*d*) Sons ((*e*) with a calm look) (*f*) *You tell me nothing new or unexpected; I knew that I begat them mortal*, which ſome aſcribe to *Solon*, others to *Xenophon*; *Demetrius Phalereus* ſaith, he buried them with his own hands.

*Cic. Tuſc. queſt. 3. Plat. de ira cohib.* * *Var. hiſt. 3.*

(*d*) *Plut. conſol. ad Apol.* (*e*) *Simplic. in Epictet.* (*f*) *Val. Max. 5. 10.*

(*g*) *Hermippus*, he was impriſon'd to be put to death, but *Pericles* appearing before the Judges, aſked if they knew any thing in his life that they could accuſe? to which they anſwered nothing; but I, ſaith he, am his Diſciple, then be not tranſported by *Calumnies* to kill the Man, but believe me and ſet him at liberty; ſo he was diſmiſſed, but not able to brook the diſgrace, he kill'd himſelf.

(*g*)

(*h*) *Hieronymus* ſaith, that *Pericles* brought him into the Court in poor Garments extenuated with ſickneſs, an object fitter for compaſſion than Juſtice. And thus much ſaith *Laertius* of his Trial. (*h*) *Laert.*

*Suidas*, that he was caſt into Priſon by the *Athenians* for introducing a new opinion concerning God, and baniſh'd the City, though *Pericles* undertook to plead his cauſe, and that going to *Lampſacum* he the[illegible]arv'd himſelf to death.

*Joſephus*, that the *Athenians* believing the Sun to be God, which he affirm'd to be without ſenſe and knowledge, he was by the votes of a few of them condemned to death.

But if we credit (*i*) *Plutarch*, he was neither condemned nor accuſed but by *Pericles*, who fear'd the Ordinance of *Diopithes*, which cited thoſe that held prophane or ſublime Opinions ſent out of the City. (*k*) Yet elſewhere he confeſſeth he was accuſed. (*i*) *Vit. Pericl.* (*k*) *De ſuperſtit.*

His departure from *Athens*, being thirty years after his coming thither, falls the third year of the eighty ſecond Olympiad, the ſixty third of his age. Thence he went to *Lampſacum*, where he continued the reſt of his age, which extended to twenty two more, ſo little mindful of *Athens*, or of his Country, as to one, who told him that he was deprived of the *Athenians*; he anſwered, no, but they of me; and (*l*) to his Friends, who when he fell ſick, aſked, if he would be carried to *Clazomona* his Country; no, ſaid he, there is no need, the way to the Grave is alike every where. (*m*) Before he died, the Magiſtrates of the City asked him, if he would they ſhould do any thing for him; he anſwered, that his only requeſt was, that the Boys might have leave to play yearly on that day of the month, whereon he died; which cuſtom (ſaith *Laertius*) is continued to this time. Thoſe of *Lampſacum* buried him magnificently with this Epitaph: (*l*) *Cic. Tuſc. queſt. 1.* (*m*) *Plut. inſtruct. polit.*

*Here lies, who through the trueſt paths did paſs*
*O'th World Celeſtial,* Anaxagoras.

*Ælian* mentions two Altars erected to him; one inſcribed to the mind, the other to truth. *Laertius* concludes his Life with this *Epigram:*

*Fam'd* Anaxagoras *the Sun defin'd*
*A burning Plate, for which to die deſign'd:*
*Sav'd by his Scholar* Pericles; *but he*
* *Abandon'd life to ſeek Philoſophy.* * *Ælian.*

† He is obſerved never to have been ſeen either to laugh or ſmile. † *Laert.*

* Being demanded if the Mountains of *Lampſacum* would in time become Sea; he anſwered, yes, if time fail not firſt. * *Laert.*

† Beholding the Tomb of *Mauſolus*, he ſaid, a ſumptuous Monument was a ſign the ſubſtance was turned into Stone. † *Laert.*

* He firſt affirmed the Poeſie of *Homer* to conſiſt of Virtue and Juſtice; to which *Metrodorus* added, that the Poet was skilful in Natural Philoſophy. * *Laert.*

(*n*) He conceived that there are two leſſons of death, the time before our birth, and ſleep. (*n*) *Stob.*

*Laertius* and *Clemens Alexandrinus* assert him first of the Philosophers that put forth a Book. He writ

*Of Natural Philosophy*, out of which *Aristotle* cites the fragments, *All these things were together*: which was the beginning of the Book: and, *To be such is to be changed.* (o) *Plato* this, *the mind is the disposer and cause of all things.* (p) *Athenæus* this, *what is commonly called the Milk of the Hen, is the White of the Egg.* (q) *Plato* censures the Book as not using the mind at all, nor assigning any cause of the order of things, but aerial, ætherial and aquatick Natures, and the like incredible things for causes.

(o) *Phys.* 1. 3. *Plut. Georg.*
(p) *Hip. mai.*
(q) *Lib.* 2.

*The quadrature of the Circle*; which Treatise, (r) *Plutarch* saith, he composed during his imprisonment. (r) *De exsil.*

(s) There were three more of the same name; the first an Orator, follower of *Isocrates*: the second a Statuary, mentioned by *Antigonus*: the last a *Grammarian*, Scholar to *Zenodotus*. (s) *Laert.*

# ARCHELAUS.

*Laert.*

ARCHELAUS was either an *Athenian*, or a *Milesian*; his Father *Apollodorus*, or according to some, *Mylon*; he was Scholar to *Anaxagoras*, Master to *Socrates*. He first transferr'd Natural Philosophy out of *Ionia* to *Athens* (but how that can be, when *Anaxagoras* his Master taught there thirty years, *Casaubon* justly questions) and therefore was called *the Natural Philosopher*: in him Natural Philosophy ended, *Socrates* his Scholar introducing morality; but he seemeth also to have touched Moral Philosophy, for he treated of Laws, of things honest and just; from whom *Socrates* receiving his Learning, because he increased it, is therefore thought to have invented it; whereas as *Gassendus* observes, Moral Philosophy was far more ancient, that being the principle ground of the Attribute of *Wise* conferred upon the Seven, whose learning lay chiefly that way: but *Socrates* is called the Author thereof, because he first reduced it to a Science. *Archelaus* asserted,

† *Stob.*

* *Plut. plac. phil.* 1. 3.

*That the principles of all things are twofold, one incorporeal,* † *the Mind, (not maker of the World) the corporeal, infinite in number, and dissimilar* * *which is the Air, and its rarefaction and condensation, whereof one is Fire, the other Water.*

That *the Universe is infinite.*

That *the causes of Generation are two; heat and cold.*

That *the Stars are burning Iron Plates.*

That *the Sun is the greatest of Stars.*

That *the Sea is made by percolation of the hollow parts of the Earth.*

That *living Creatures are generated of Slime or warm Earth, emitting a milky kind of Slime like the Chile*; that *this humid matter being dissolved by the Fire, that of it which settles into a fiery substance is Earth, that which evaporates is Air.*

That *the Winds getting into the hollow places of the Earth, filling all the spaces, the Air condensed as much as possible, the Wind that comes next presseth the first, forcing and disturbing it by frequent impulsions. This Wind seeking a room through the narrow places, endeavoureth to break Prison, whereby it happens the Wind struggling for passage, that the Earth is moved.* *Sen. Nat. quæst.* 6. 12.

Of the definition of the *Voice*, by *Plutarch* attributed to *Anaxagoras*, *Laertius* makes *Archelaus* the Author, describing it a *percussion* of the Air.

That *what is just, or dishoneſt is defined by Law, not by Nature.*

† These five, *Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus*, by continual descent succeeding one another, compleat the *Ionick* Sect. † *Plut. Lart.*

THE

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

## The Third Part,

Containing the *Socratick* Philoſophers.

*SOCRATES.*

## CHAP. I.

### Socrates, *his Country, Parents, and time of Birth.*

Laert. *SOCRATES* was by Country an *Athenian*, born at *Alopece*, a Town, according to *Suidas* and *Phavorinus*, belonging to the *Antiochian* Tribe. This was one of thoſe ſmall Villages ſcattered through *Attica*, before *Theſeus* reduc'd the People into the Walls of a City, which notwith-

notwithstanding his Decree, were not deserted, but continued and preserved by their Inhabitants.

(a) Laert. Plut. Thest. Alcib. (b) Liban. (b) Laert. λιθοξόος. Val. Max. marmoravius. (d Theætt. (e Deipnos. 5. * Liban. Apol.

His Parents were very mean; (a) *Sophroniscus* (an b) *Athenian*) his Father, (c) a Statuary, or Carver of Images in Stone; *Phænareta*, his Mother, a Midwife, a Woman of a bold, generous and quick spirit, as is implied by the Character (d) *Plato* gives her (though wrested by (e) *Athenæus*) of which professions of his Parents, he is *observed to have been so far from being asham'd, that he often took occasion to mention them.

(f) Apolog. (g) Laert.

*Apollodorus*, *Laertius* and *Suidas* affirm he was born in the fourth year of the seventy seventh Olympiad; which may likewise be collected from the Marble at *Arundel-House*, which saith *he died when* Laches *was Archon*, and reckons seventy years of his life, which was compleat, because f) *Plato* says πρὸ ἑβδομηκόντα: and from (g) *Demetrius Phalereus* (who was himself Archon the fourth year of the hundred and seventeenth Olympiad) who saith, *he died the first year of the ninety fifth Olympiad*, when he had lived seventy years, the seventieth year inclusively upwards, is the fourth of the seventy seventh Olympiad, when *Apsephion*, (or, as some call him, *Aphepsion*) was Archon, of whose name, in † *Diodorus Siculus*, no more is left than * ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, which should be ΑΦΕΨΙΩΝ, but hath been incuriously alter'd into ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, which if † *Meursius* had observed, he had not corrected *Laertius* without cause, nor he and *Allatius* follow'd the mistake of *Scaliger* (whom they term *Anonymus*) in placing *Aphepsion* in the fourth year of the seventy fourth Olympiad.

† Lib. 11. * Archont. 2.7. † Dialog. de script. Socr.

(b) Laert.

The day of *Socrates* birth, was (b) according to *Apollodorus*, the sixth of the month *Thargelion*, memorable (saith *Laertius*) for the birth of *Diana*, according to the traditions of the *Delians*; upon which day the *Athenians* did yearly lustrate their City. Many other good fortunes happening to the *Athenians* upon this day are recorded by (i) *Ælian*. The day following, *viz.* the seventh of this month was the birthday of *Plato*, both which were kept with much solemnity by the *Greek* Philosophers (*even to the time of *Plotinus*) as is affirmed by i) *Plutarch*, who thereupon observes it as the effect rather of Providence, than of chance, that their birth-days should be so near, and that of the Master precede the Scholars.

(i) Var. hist. 2. * Porphyr. vit. Plut. (i) Sympos. 8. 1.

To accommodate this time with our account, is neither easie nor certain, yet in respect it may give some satisfaction by way of conjecture, we shall found it upon these Hypotheses, taking that order of months which *Petavius* gives.

1. That after the Olympiads, the beginning of the *Grecian* year was always on the first of *Hecatombæon*, and Olympick Games on the fifteenth.

2. That the Neomenia of *Hecatombæon*, did (at least in the times wherein we enquire) never precede the Solstice, being then about the Calends, or *pridie Calendarum Julii*, they supposing them in *octavis signorum*, it did not precede the ninth of *July*. This *postulatum*, though it be doubly question'd by *Petavius*, yet none of his Arguments pretend beyond *Meton*'s time.

3. That upon that supposition, if *Scaliger* hath rightly order'd the Neomenia in his Olympick Period (against which *Petavius* brings no one sufficient Argument) and consequently the rest, the Olympick Period doth certainly exhibit the Neomenia of *Hecatombæon*. It is true that *Petavius* disputes the Period of seventy six years, as having never been used till *Calippus* his time, but we take it here only proleptically, as the *Julian* year, to which we would accommodate it.

4. That this being after *Solon*'s time, the Civil year was Lunary (and consisted of months, which were alternately of twenty nine, and thirty days,) at *Athens*, though divers places of *Greece*, especially the more remote from thence, did not for a long time after part with their tricenary months.

These things supposed the sixth of *Thargelion*, (will, according to the *Julian* account, taken proleptically) fall upon *Tuesday* the twentieth of *May*: according to the *Gregorian*, upon *Tuesday* the thirtieth of *May*, in the year of the *Julian* Period 4247, before the Incarnation 467 years, the fourth year of the seventy seventh Olympiad, at which time *Socrates* was born.

## CHAP. II.

### *His first Education.*

* *Lutarch* saith, that as soon as he was born, *Sophroniscus* his Father consulting the Oracle, was by it advis'd to suffer his Son to do what he pleas'd, never compelling him to do what he disliked, nor diverting him from that whereto he was enclined; to give thanks for him by Sacrifice to *Jupiter Agoræus* and the Muses; to be no further sollicitous for him, he had one guide of his life within him, better than five hundred Masters. * De Gen. Soc.

But his Father not observant of the Oracle's direction, apply'd him to his own Trade of carving Statues, contrary to his inclination, whereupon † some have argu'd him of disobedience, reporting that oftentimes, when his Father bad him work, he refused, and went away following his own will. † Aristoxenus apud Theodoret. de Græc. affect. cur. lib. 12.

His Father dying, left him (according to * *Libanius*) fourscore Minæ, which being entrusted with a Friend for improvement, they miscarried. This loss (though it were of all his stock, and he thereby reduc'd to incredible poverty) *Socrates* past over with silence, but was thereupon necessitated to continue his Trade for ordinary subsistence. † This *Suidas* intimates when he saith he was first a Statuary. * *Duris*, † *Pausanias*, and the Scholiast of *Aristophanes* affirm three Statues of the Graces cloathed, (for so they were most anciently made, not naked) set up before the entrance into the Tower at *Athens*, were his work. *Pausanias* implieth as much of a Statue of *Mercury* in the same place; which † *Pliny* seems not to have understood, who saith, they were made by a certain Person named *Socrates*, but not the Painter. Hence *Timon*, * Apol. Soc. † Laert. * Lib. 9. † In nub. † 36. 5.

From

*From these the fluent Statuary came*
*Honour'd through* Greece, *who did against the name*
*Of Orator abusively declaim.*

But being naturally averse from this profession, he only follow'd it when necessity enforc'd him: *Aristoxenus* saith, he wrought for Mony, and laid up what he got till it came to a little stock, which being spent, he betook himself again to the same course.

These intermissions of his Trade were bestow'd upon Philosophy; whereunto he was naturally addicted, which being observed by *Crito* a rich Philosopher of *Athens*, † he took him from his Shop, being much in love with his candor and ingenuity, and instructed, or rather gave him the means to be instructed by others; taking * so much care of him, that he never suffer'd him to want necessaries. And though his poverty were at first so great as to be brought by † some into a Proverb, yet he became at last, as * *Demetrius* affirms, Master of a House, and fourscore Minæ, which *Crito* put out to interest: But *his mind* (saith † *Libanius*) *was raised far above his fortune, and more to the advantage of his Country; not aiming at wealth, or the acquisition thereof by sordid Arts, he considered that of all things which Man can call his, the Soul is the chief; That he only is truly happy, who purifies that from vice; That the only means conducing thereto, is Wisdom, in pursuit whereof he neglecteth all other ways of profit and pleasure.*

† Laert.
* Laert. vit. Crit.
† Ælian. var. hist. 2. Plut. de util. virtut.
* Plutarch. comparat. vit. Aristid. & Caton.
† Apolog.

## CHAP. III.

### *His Master.*

THE first Master of *Socrates* was * *Anaxagoras*, whereby, amongst other circumstances, it is demonstrable, that the account of *Laertius* is corrupt, *Anaxagoras* not dying in the seventy eighth, but eighty eighth Olympiad.

*Aristoneus* saith, that as soon as *Anaxagoras* left the City, he applied himself to † *Archelaus*, which, according to *Porphyrius*, was in the seventeenth year of his age. * Of him he was much belov'd, and travell'd with him to *Samos*, to *Pytho*, and to the *Isthmus*.

He was Scholar likewise to *Damon*, whom *Plato* calls a most pleasing teacher of Musick, and all other things that he would teach himself, to young Men. *Damon* was Scholar to *Agathocles*, Master to *Pericles*, *Clinias* and others; intimate with *Prodicus*. He was banish'd by the unjust † *Ostracism* of the *Athenians* for his excellence in Musick.

He heard also (* as he acknowledgeth) *Prodicus* the Sophist a *Cian*, whom *Eusebius* ranks in the eighty sixth Olympiad, contemporary with *Gorgias*, *Hippias*, and *Hippocrates* the Physician.

To these add *Diotyma* and *Aspasia*, Women excellently learned, the first suppos'd to have been inspir'd with a prophetical spirit. By her he affirmeth that he was instructed concerning love, by corporeal beauty to find out that of the Soul; of the Angelical mind, of God. See *Plato's Phædrus*, and that long discourse in his Symposium upon this subject, which *Socrates* confesseth to be owing to her.

* Laert.
† Cic. Tusc. quæst. 5.
* Laert.
† Plut.
† Plat. Men.

*Aspasia* was a famous *Milesian* Woman, not only excellent her self in Rhetorick, but brought many Scholars to great perfection in it, of whom were *Pericles* the *Athenian*, and († as himself acknowledgeth) *Socrates*.

* Of *Euenus* he learn'd Poetry, of *Ichomachus*, Husbandry, of † *Theodorus*, Geometry.

* *Aristagoras* a *Melian*, is named likewise as his Master.

Last in his Catalogue is *Connus*, † *nobilissimus fidicen*, as *Cicero* terms him, which art *Socrates* learn'd of him in his * old age, † for which the Boys derided *Connus*, and called him, The old Mans Master.

† Plut. Menex.
* Maxim. Tyr.
† Plat. Theæt.
* Schol. Aristoph. in Nub.
† Epist. 9. 22.
* Quintil. 1. 10.
† Plat. Euthyd.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Of his School, and manner of Teaching.*

THAT *Socrates* had a proper School, may be argu'd from † *Aristophanes*, who derides some particulars in it, and calls it his *Phrontisterium*.

* *Plato* and † *Phædrus* mention as places frequented by him and his Auditors, the *Academy*, *Lycæum*, *and a pleasant Meadow without the City on the side of the River* Ilissus, *where grew a very fair Plain tree. Thence according to the fable,* Boreas *snatch'd away* Orithia, *to whom three furlongs from thence there was a Temple, and another to* Diana.

* Xenophon *affirms, he was continually abroad, that in the morning he visited the places of publick walking and exercise; when it was full, the* Forum; *and the rest of the day he sought out the most populous meetings, where he disputed openly for every one to hear that would.*

*He did only teach,* saith † Plutarch, *when the Benches were prepar'd, and himself in the Chair, or in set hours of reading and discourse, or appointments of walking with his Friends, but even when he played, when he eat or drank, when he was in the Camp or Market; finally, when he was in Prison; thus he made every place a School of Vertue.*

His manner of Teaching was answerable to his Opinion, that the Soul pre-existent to the Body, in her first separate condition, endowed with perfect knowledge, by immersion into matter, became stupified, and in a manner lost, until awakened by discourse from sensible objects; whereby by degrees she recovers her first knowledge; for this reason he taught only by *Irony* and *Induction:* the first * *Quintilian* defines *an absolute dissimulation of the Will more apparent than confest; so as in that, the words are different from the words, in this, the sense from the speech, whilst the whole confirmation of the cause, even the whole life seems to carry an* Irony, *such was the life of* Socrates, *who was for that reason called* εἴρων; *that is, one that personates an unlearned Man, and is an admirer of others as Wise.* † *In this* Irony (saith *Cicero*) *and dissimulation he far exceeded all Men in pleasantness and urbanity; it is a very elegant, sweet and facete kind of speech; acute with gravity, accommodated with Rhetorick, words, and pleasant speeches;* * *he detracted from himself in dispute, and attributed more to those he meant to confute, so that when he said, or thought another thing, he freely used that dissimulation which the* Greeks *call* Irony; *which* Annius *also saith, was in* Africanus.

† Nub.
* Phædr.
† Epist. Socratic.
* Memor. 1.
† Utrum sen. ger. resp.
* Lib. 9. cap. 2.
† De orat. 2.
* Cicer. Acad. quæst. 4.

*Induction*

(a) De Invent. 1. *Induction is by* (a) Cicero *defined a manner of Discourse, which gains the assent of him with whom it is held, to things not doubtful, by which assents it causeth that he yield to a doubtful thing, by reason of the likeness it hath to those things wherennto he assented: this kind of speech* Socrates *most used, because he would not himself use any argument of perswasion, but rather chose to work something out of that which he granted him with whom he disputed, which he, by reason of that which he already yielded unto, must necessarily approve; of which he gives a large example in* Plato's

(b) Plat. Lach. (b) Meno. Thus, *whosoever disputed with him of what*

(c) Liban. Apol. *subject soever,* ( (c) his end being only to promote vertue ) *was at last brought round about to give an account of his life past and present, whereinto being once entred, he never gave him over till he had sufficiently examined those things, and never*

(d) Plat. Euthyphr. *let them go* ( (d) Proteus *like* ) *till they came at last to themselves.*

(e) Plat. Theæt. Plutarth. quæst. Platon. 1. For this reason (e) he used to say, his skill had some affinity with that of his Mother, he being like a Midwife, though barren ( as he modestly affirms ) in himself, endeavoured with a particular gift in assisting others, to bring forth

(f) Schol. Aristoph. in nub. p. 129. what they had within themselves; ( f ) and this was one reason why he refused to take Mony, affirming that he knew nothing him-

(g) Plat. Apol. self, and that ( g ) he was never Master to any.

(h) Laert. vit. Xenoph. These disputes of *Socrates* were committed to writing by his Scholars, wherein (h) *Xenophon* gave example to the rest, in doing it first, as also with most punctualness, as *Plato* with most liberty, intermixing so much of his own, as it is not easie to distinguish the Master from the

(i) Laert. vit. Plat. Scholar; (i) whence *Socrates* hearing him recite his *Lysis*, said, how many things doth this

(k) Epist. ad Æschin. young Man feign of me? And (k) Xenophon *denying* Socrates *ever disputed of Heaven, or of natural causes, or the other disciplines which the* Greeks *call* μαθήματα, *saith, they, who ascribe such dissertations to him, lye falsely, wherein* ( as

(l) 14. 3. (l) *A.* Gellius obserues *he intends* Plato, *in whose books* Socrates *discourseth of Natural Philosophy, Musick, and Geometry.*

## CHAP. V.

### *Of his Philosophy.*

(a) Histor. Eccles. 10. 36. PORphyrius ( who was so abusive, as (a) *Nicephorus* observes, that he traduced *Socrates* with no less bitterness, than as if he endeavoured to outdo his accusers, *Anytus* and *Melitus* ) af-

(b) Theodoret. firms; (b) *He was ingenious in nothing, unlearned in all, scarce able to write, which when upon any occasion he did, it was to derision, and that he could read no better than a stammering Schoolboy*: To which we shall oppose these Authorities: *Xenophon* who attests he was excellent in all kinds of learning, instanceth in Arithmetick, Geometry, and Astrology; *Plato*, in Natural Philosophy; *Idomeneus*, in Rhetorick; *Laertius*, in Medicine: In a word, *Cicero* averrs, that *by the testimony of learned men, and the judgment of all* Greece, *as well in wisdom, acuteness, politeness, and subtilty, as in eloquence, variety, and copiousness, to whatsoever part he gave himself, he was without exception Prince of all.*

Having searched into all kinds of Science, he observed these inconveniences and imperfections: (c) First, That it was improper to (c) Xen. mem. 1. pag. 710. leave those affairs which concern mankind, to enquire into things without us. Secondly, That these things are above the reach of Man, whence are occasioned all disputes and oppositions, some acknowledging no God, others worshipping Stocks and Stones; some asserting one simple Being, others infinite; some that all things are moved, others, that all things are immovable. And Thirdly, that these things, if attained, could not be practised, for he who contemplating divine mysteries, enquires by what necessity things were made, cannot himself make any thing, or upon occasion produce Winds, Waters, Seasons, or the like.

Thus esteeming speculative knowledge as far only as it conduceth to practice, he cut off in all Sciences what he conceived of least use:

(d) Xenoph. mem. 4. (e) De leg. (d) In *Arithmetick*, he approved only as much as was necessary ( (e) *Plato* instanceth in Merchandise and Tacticks ) but to proceed to useless operations he disallowed. In *Geometry* he allowed that part which teacheth measuring, as no less easie than useful; but to proceed to infinite propositions and demonstrations he disallowed, as wholly unprofitable. In *Astrology* he approved the knowledge of the Stars, and observation of the Night, Months, and Seasons, as being easily learned, and very beneficial in Navigation, and to those who hunt by night; but to examine the difference of Spheres, distance of Stars from the Earth, and their Circles, he disswaded as useless.

(f) Laert. (g) Acad. quæst. 1. ( f ) Finally, *Noting how little advantage speculation brought to the life and conversation of mankind, he reduced her to action. He first,* saith (g) *Cicero, called Philosophy away from things involved by nature in secrecy, wherein, untill his time, all Philosophers had been employed, and brought her to common life, to enquire of vertues, and vices, good and evil.*

Man who was the sole subject of his Philosophy, having a twofold relation of divine speculation, and humane conversation, his Doctrines were in the former respect *Metaphysical*, in the latter *Moral.*

### Sect. 1. *Meaphysicks.*

HIS Metaphysical opinions are thus collected and abridged out of *Plato, Xenophon, Plutarch*, and others.

Plat. Phæd. ‘ Philosophy is the way to true happiness. ‘ the offices whereof are two, to contemplate ‘ God, and to abstract the Soul from corporeal ‘ sense.

Plutarch. plat. phil. 1. 3. ‘ There are three principles of all things, *God*, ‘ *matter*, and *Ideas*, *God* is the universal intel- ‘ lect, *matter* the subject of generation and cor- ‘ ruption; *Idea* an incorporeal substance, the ‘ intellect of God; God the intellect of the ‘ World.

Plat. Phæd. ‘ God is one τὸ ὂν αὐτῷ ἕκαστον ἑκαστον, αὐτῷ τὸ- ‘ κάλον, αὐτο τὸ ζωῆς εἶδος; perfect in himself, giving

ing

'ing the being, and well being of every Crea-
'ture; what he is (ſaith he) I know not,
'what he is not I know.

* Xen. memor. 1. '* That God, not chance, made the World
'and all Creatures, is demonſtrable from the
'reaſonable diſpoſition of their parts, as well
'for uſe as defence, from their care to preſerve
'themſelves, and continue their ſpecies, that he
'particularly regards Man in his body, from
'the excellent upright form thereof, from the
'gift of ſpeech, from allowance τὰς τῶν ἀφε-
'δισῶν ὑδρὰς συνεχῶς παρέχειν in his Soul, from
'the excellency thereof above others; in both
'for divinations, predicting dangers; that he
'regards particulars; from his care of the
'whole ſpecies; that he will reward ſuch as
'pleaſe him, and puniſh ſuch as diſpleaſe him
'from his power to do it, from the belief he
'hath imprinted in a Man that he will do it;
'profeſt by the moſt wiſe and civilized Cities
'and Ages; that he at once ſeeth all things,
'from the inſtances of the eye, which at once
'over-runs many miles; and of the mind, which
'at once conſidereth things done in the moſt
'diſtant places. Finally, that he is ſuch, and
'ſo great, as that he at once ſees all, hears all,
'is every where, and orders all, This is the ſum
of his diſcourſe with *Ariſtodemus*, to which we
may annex what is cited under his name (if
not miſtaken) by *Stobæus*,

*Care, if by care ought may effected be,*
*If not, why car'ſt thou, when God cares for thee?*

† Xen. memor. 1. pag. 711. † He held, 'that the Gods knew all things,
'ſaid, done, or ſilently deſired.

* Xen. memor. 4. '* That God takes care of all Creatures, is
'demonſtrable from the benefits he gives them
'of Light, Water, and Fire ſeaſonable produ-
'ction of fruits of the Earth; that he hath
'particular care of Man, from the nouriſh-
'ment of all Plants and Creatures for Mans
'ſervice, from their ſubjection to Man, though
'they excuſed him never ſo much in ſtrength,
'from the variety of Mans ſenſe, accommo-
'dated to the variety of objects, for neceſſi-
'ty, uſe, and pleaſure; from reaſon, where-
'by he diſcourſed through reminiſcence, from
'ſenſible objects, from ſpeech, whereby
'he communicates all that he knows, gives
'Laws, and governs ſtates; that God, not-
'withſtanding he is inviſible, hath a being from
'the inſtances of his Miniſters, inviſible alſo,
'as Thunder and Wind, from the Soul of Man
'which hath ſomething with the divine nature
'in governing thoſe that cannot ſee it. This
'is the effect of his diſcourſe with *Euthidemus*.

'The Soul is immortal, for what is always
Schol. Ariſtoph. in nub. p. 128. 'moveable is immortal; but that which mov-
'eth another, or is moved by another, hath a
'Ceſſation of motion and Life.

'The Soul is Præexiſtent to the body, en-
'dued with knowledge of eternal Ideas, which
'in her union to the body ſhe loſeth, as ſtu-
'pified, until awakened by diſcourſe from ſen-
Plat. Phed. 'ſible objects. Thus is all her learning only re-
'miniſcence, a recovery of her firſt knowledge.

'The body being compounded is diſſol-
'ved by death, the Soul being ſimple, paſ-
'ſeth into another life, incapable of Corruption.

'The Souls of Men are divine, to whom, Cic. de amicit
'when they go out of the body, the way of
'their return to Heaven is open, which to the
'beſt and moſt juſt is the moſt expedite.

'The Souls of the good after death, are in Plat. Phæd.
'a happy eſtate, united to God in a bleſſed in-
'acceſſible place; the bad, in convenient
'places, ſuffer condign Puniſhment; but to de-
'fine what thoſe places are, is *hominis νοῦν μὴ* Stob. Eth. 262.
'*ἔχοντος*; whence being demanded what things
'were in the other World, he anſwered, nei-
'ther was I ever there, nor ever did I ſpeak
'with any that came from thence.

## Sect. 2. *Ethicks.*

HIS Morals, conſider a Man either as a ſingle perſon, or as the Father of a Family, or as a member of the Commonwealth; In the firſt reſpect are his Ethicks, wherein ſuch ſentences as have been preſerved by *Xenophon*, *Diogenes*, *Laertius*, *Stobæus*, and others, are thus collected.

### *Of Vertue and Vice.*

'HE exhorted his friends to endeavour to Xen. mem. 1.
'be the moſt wiſe and beneficial, be- p. 720.
'cauſe, what wants reaſon, wants reſpect, as
'the bodies of dead friends, and hair, nails,
'and the like, which are cut off and caſt a-
'way.

'To be employed is good and beneficial, to Xen. mem. 1. p.
'be idle, hurtful and evil: they that do good 720.
'are imployed, they that ſpend their time in
'vain recreations are idle.

'He that hath moſt advantage by gifts of Xen. mem. 3.
'nature, as well as he that hath leaſt, muſt learn p. 778.
'and meditate on thoſe things wherein he
'would be excellent.

'He only is idle who might be better im- Xen. mem. 3. p.
'ployed. 779.

'To do good, is the beſt courſe of life, there- Xen. mem. 3.
'in fortune hath ſhare. p. 78.

'They are beſt, and beſt pleaſing to God, Xen. mem. 3.
'who do any thing, with any art or calling; p. 780.
'who followeth none, is uſeleſs to the publick,
'and hated of God.

'* He taught every where, 'that a juſt Man * Clem. Alex.
'and a happy were all one, and uſed to curſe Strom. 2. 417.
'him who firſt by opinion divided honeſty
'and profit (which are coherent by Nature) Cicer. de offic.
'as having done an impious act, for they are 3. & de leg. 1.
'truly wicked who ſeparate profitable and
'juſt, which depends on Law. The Stoicks
have followed him ſo far, that whatſoever is
honeſt, the ſame they eſteem profitable.

He asked *Memnon*, a *Theſſalian*, who thought Plut. de amicor.
himſelf very learned, and that he had reached multit. p. 93.
(as *Empedocles* ſaith) the top of wiſdom,
'What is Vertue? He anſwered readily and
'boldly, that there is one vertue of a Child,
'another of an old Man, one of a Man, ano-
'ther of a Woman, one of a Magiſtrate, an-
'other of a private Perſon, one of a Maſter,
'another of a Servant. Very good, replies *So-*
'*crates*: I ask for one vertue, and you give us
'a whole ſwarm; truly conceiving, that he
'knew not one vertue, who named ſo many.

*Plut. de lib. educ.* Being demanded by *Gorgias* "if he accounted not the great King of *Persia* happy? 'I know not, answered he, how he is furnished with learning and vertue: as conceiving that true happiness consisteth in these two, not in the frail gifts of fortune.

*Laert.* *Euripides* in his *Auge* saying of vertue; 'It is 'best carelessly to part with these; he rose up and went away, saying, 'It was ridiculous to seek 'a lost servant, or to suffer vertue so to go a-'way.

*Laert.* He said, 'he wondered at those who carve
*Laert.* 'Images of Stone, that they take such care to
*Laert.* 'make Stones resemble Men, whilst they neglect, and suffer themselves to resemble 'Stones.

*What παιδεία μικρὰ means, is explained by Aristotle, polit. 5. 3. & physic. 5. 4.* He advised 'young Men to behold themselves every day in a Glass, that if they were 'beautiful, they might study to deserve it; 'if deformed, to supply or hide it by learning.

** Clem. Alex. strom. 5.* He said, 'to begin well is not a small thing, '* but depending on a small moment.

He said, 'vertue was the beauty, vice the 'deformity of the Soul.

*† Nonn. in Greg. Stelient.* † He said, 'outward beauty was a sign of 'inward beauty, and therefore chose such Auditors.

*Stob. Ecl. serm. 1.* 'In the life of Man, as in an Image, every 'part ought be beautiful.

*Stob. 1.* 'Incense to God, praise is due to good 'Men.

*Stob. 1.* 'Who are undeservedly accused ought to be 'defended; who excel others in any good 'quality, to be praised.

*Stob. 1.* 'A Horse is not known to be good by his 'furniture, but qualities, a Man by his mind, 'not wealth.

*Stob. 37.* 'It is not possible to cover fire with a Garment, sin with time.

*Stob. 46.* Being demanded *who live without perturbation?* he answered, *they who are conscious to themselves of no ill.*

*Stob. 218.* To one who demanded *what Nobility is*, he answered, *a good temper of Soul and Body.*

### *Of Affections, Love, Envy, Grief, &c.*

*Xen. mem. 2.* THat 'two Brothers God meant should be 'more helpful to each other than two 'hands, feet, eyes, or whatsoever nature hath 'formed; doubtless because if they love, they 'may at great distance mutually help one another is the scope of his discourse with *Chærates.*

*Xen. mem. 3.* That 'all things are good and fair to those 'things wherewith they agree, but ill and deformed in respect of those things with which 'they agree not, is the conclusion of his second 'Discourse with *Aristippus.*

*Xen. mem. 3.* 'Envy is a grief, not at the adversity of 'friends, nor the prosperity of Enemies, but 'at the prosperity of Friends; for many are 'so foolishly enclined as to malign those in 'good fortune, whom in misfortune they pitied.

*Stob. 1.* 'A Ship ought not to trust to one Anchor, 'nor Life to one hope.

*Stob. 16.* 'To ground hopes on an ill opinion is to trust 'a Ship to a slight Anchor.

'The beauty of fame is blasted by envy as *Stob. 139.* 'by a sickness.

'Many adorn the Tombs of those, whom li- *Stob. 139.* 'ving they persecuted with envy.

'Envy is the Saw of the Soul. *Stob. 139.*

'Nothing is pleasant or unpleasant by nature *Stob. 144.* 'but by custom.

'Unseasonable love is like hate. *Stob. 215.*

Being demanded, 'what is grievous to the *Stob. 240.* 'good, he answered, the prosperity of the 'wicked.

Being demanded 'how a Man might live *Stob. 240.* 'without trouble, he answered, it was not possible but that he who lives in a City or a Family must sometimes be afflicted.

'Wicked hopes, like ill guides, deceive a *Stob. 258.* 'Man and lead him into sin.

'A Woman cannot conceive without a *Stob. 261.* 'Man, nor a good hope produce any benefit 'without labour.

'Winter had need of Garments, old age of *Stob. 265.* 'disingagement from grief.

'In life as in a Theatre, we should continue, *Stob. 892.* 'so long as the sight of things, and actions of 'life seem delightful.

'The mad should be bound, the ignorant in- *Xen. mem. 1. p.* 'structed. *719.*

That 'we should endeavour to shun the *Xen. mem. 2.* 'censorious, and to apply our selves to such as 'are candid, that we should undertake only 'such things as we can perform, and decline 'such as we cannot; That whensoever we 'undertake any thing, we should employ there-'in our utmost study and endeavour, is the sum 'of his advice to *Eutherus.*

He said, 'the office of a wise Man is to *Xen. mem. 3.* 'discern what is good and honest, and to shun 'that which is dishonest.

'They who know what they ought to do, *Xen. mem. 3.* 'and do it not, are not wise and temperate, but 'fools and stupid.

'Justice and every other Virtue is wisdom. *Xen. mem. 3.*

'To be ignorant of our selves, to seem to *Xen. mem. 3.* 'know those things whereof we are ignorant, 'is next to madness.

That 'a pious person is rightly defined, such *Xen mem. 4.* 'a one as knows what is lawful, as to the 'gods, just, he that knows what is lawful to 'Men, that a Man is wise as far as he knows, 'that what is profitable is fair to that whereto 'it is profitable, that they who know how to 'use terrible things and dangerous are valiant, 'the contrary timorous, is the sum of his 'Discourse with *Euthidumus.*

He conceived 'the only wisdom of Man *Cicer.* 'to consist in not thinking he understands those 'things which he doth not understand.

To one that complained he had not benefited *Senec. Epist.* himself by travel, *and not without reason*, saith *103.* he, *because thou didst travel with thy self.*

He affirmed 'there is but one good thing, *Laert.* 'knowledge, one ill, ignorance, but that 'riches and nobility had nothing in them of 'worth, but on the contrary all evils.

'When a wise Man openeth his mouth, his *Stob. 1.* 'virtues are as manifest, as Images in a 'Temple.

'In Navigation we ought to be guided by *Stob. 28. & 4.* 'the Pilot, in the course of life, by those of 'better judgment.

Being

Stob. 28. Being demanded what wiſdom was, he anſwered, *the compoſure of the Soul*; being demanded who were wiſe, they, ſaid he, *who do not eaſily err.*

Stob. 28. 'The Souls reaſon augmenteth it ſelf as 'in a Play, the wiſeſt not the richeſt ought to 'bear the prize.

Stob. 32. 'Fugitives fear though not purſued, fools 'though not in adverſity are troubled.

Stob. 32. Seeing a young man rich and unlearned, *behold* (ſaith he) *a golden ſlave.*

Stob. 32. 'The luxurious is hardly cured in ſickneſs, 'the fool in adverſity.

Stob. 32. 'The coward uſeth Arms againſt himſelf, 'the fool Mony.

Stob. 32. '*Achilles* armour fits not *Therſites*, nor the 'good habits of the Soul a fool.

Stob. 87. 'Be not forward in ſpeech, for many times 'the tongue hath cut off the head.

Stob. 211. 'In War, Steel is better than Gold, in 'life, wiſdom excelleth wealth.

### *Of Piety and Obedience.*

Xen. mem. 2. THat the 'greateſt of vices is ingratitude, 'of obligations that to Parents, that a 'diſobedient Son the Gods will not bleſs, nor 'Men love, as doubting his return of either, 'knowing he doth it not where ſo much is 'due; is the ſum of his Diſcourſe with *Apiles.*

Xen. mem. 1. 722. 4. 804. 'Our prayers ſhould be for bleſſings in 'general, for God knows beſt what is good 'for us; our offerings proportioned to our a-'bilities, for he conſiders integrity, not mu-'nificence.

Xen. mem. 1. 722. He ſaid (with the *Pythian* Oracle) that 'the Gods are to be worſhipped according to 'the Law of the City where a Man lives, they 'who do otherwiſe, he thought ſuperſtitious and 'vain.

Xen. mem. 4. 803. 'The beſt way of worſhipping God, is to 'do what he commands.

Stob. 43. 'Superſtition is obedient to pride, as its 'parent.

Stob. 193. 'A harſh Father like a ſevere Law, muſt not-'withſtanding be obeyed.

Stob. 201. 'The reproof of a Father is a kind remedy; 'it brings more eaſe than pain.

### *Of Fortitude and Imbecillity.*

Xen. mem. 1. THat 'a Man ought to inure himſelf to vo-'luntary labour and ſufferance, ſo as what 'ſhall be impoſed by neceſſity, may appear in 'him not compulſive but free; that ſoft ways 'of living in pleaſures beget no good conſti-'tution of Body, nor knowledge of the 'mind; that tolerance raiſeth us to high 'attempts, is the effect of his Diſcourſe with '*Ariſtippus.*

Xen. mem. 3. To one who was fearful to go ſo far on foot as *Olympia*, *he demonſtrated* (to make the jour-ney ſeem eaſie) *that it was no more than his daily walk within doors, if extended at length, would eaſily reach.*

† Xen. mem. 3. † One that complained he was weary of a journey, 'he reproved him for being more weary 'than his ſervant that followed him laden.

Plut. conſol. ad Apollon. He ſaid, 'death reſembled either a deep 'ſleep, or a long journey out of our Native 'Country, or an abſolute annihilation of Soul 'and Body, examining all which he affirmed, 'death to be in none of thoſe reſpects evil; as 'to the firſt, ſaith *Plutarch*, it is not ill with thoſe that ſleep, and we eſteem that ſleep 'ſweeteſt which is deepeſt; and if we look on 'it as a journey, it is rather a bleſſing, for there-'by we are freed from the ſlavery and affections 'of the fleſh which poſſeſs and infatuate the 'mind; in the laſt reſpect, it makes us inſen-'ſible of ill and pain, as well as of good and 'pleaſure.

Stob. 1. & 296. 'A ſtatue ſtands firm on its baſe, a vertuous 'Man on firm reſolutions.

Stob. 5. 'Voluntary labours are delighted with aſ-'ſurance of eaſe; idleneſs, and tranſitory plea-'ſures beget neither a good conſtitution of Body, 'nor any good habit in the Soul.

* Stob. 48. * Being demanded 'what is ſtrength? he 'anſwered, the motion of the Soul with the 'Body.

Stob. 49. 'Seeing the Gates of *Corinth* ſtrongly barr'd, 'he asked, dwell Women here?

Stob. 269. 'An honeſt death, is better than a diſhoneſt 'life.

Ælian. var. hiſt. He uſed to ſay, 'liberty is Siſter to ſloth, 'inſtancing in the *Indians* and *Perſians*, both 'lazy; the *Phrygians* and *Lydians* very induſtri-'ous, as being under ſervitude.

### *Of Temperance, Continence, and Contentedneſs.*

Xen. mem. 1. HE adviſed 'to ſhun all occaſions of in-'continence, affirming that ſuch as con-'verſed much with fair Women could not 'eaſily be continent.

Xen. mem. 1. That 'the ſight and kiſſes of the fair, in-'fuſe a Poiſon more dangerous than that of 'Scorpions and Spiders, is the ſum of his Di-'ſcourſe to *Xenophon* and *Critobulus.*

Xen. mem. 1. That 'a free Man ought not to entertain a 'ſervant addicted to pleaſures, that he which 'is ſlave to pleaſures, ſhould pray to the gods 'for better Maſters, is the concluſion of his 'Diſcourſe *de continentia.*

Xen. mem. 1. That 'happineſs conſiſts not in luxury and 'pride, that to want nothing is divine, to 'want the leaſt next to divine, is the con-'cluſion of his Dicourſe with *Autipho.*

Xen. mem. 3. 'He adviſed ſuch as could not eaſily abſtain 'at feaſts, to take heed of ſuch things as per-'ſwade thoſe that are not hungry to eat, and thoſe 'that are not thirſty to drink, for they deſtroy-'ed the appetite, the head, and the Soul. He uſed to ſay merrily, '*Circe* turned Men 'into Swine, by feaſting them with ſuch meats; 'but that *Ulyſſes*, partly through *Minerva's* ad-'vice, partly through his own temperance, re-'fraining from ſuch things, remained un-'changed.

Xen. mem. 3. That 'health of Body ought diligently to 'be preſerved, as that whereon all knowledge 'of the Soul depends, is the ſum of his diſcourſe with *Epigenes.*

Xn. mem. 3. He adviſed one that complained, he took no delight in his meat, 'to refrain from eating, 'whereby his diet would become more plea-'ſant, cheap, and wholeſome.

Xen. mem. 3. In the word ἐυωχεῖσθαι (*to feaſt*) the particle εὖ implies, that we ſhould eat only ſuch things

'as will not hurt the mind nor the body, and
Xen. mem. 4. 'are eaſie to be gotten.

That 'only temperate perſons, that diſcern 'and chooſe the beſt things, refraining from the 'worſt; that by temperance Men become the 'moſt excellent, and moſt happy, fitteſt 'for diſcourſe: is the ſumm of his diſcourſe with 'Euthidemus.

Plut. de anim. tranquil. Hearing one of his Friends ſay, 'this Town 'is exceeding dear, Chiar Wine coſts a Mina, 'Purple three, a pint of Honey five Denaries, 'he carried him to the Meal-men, here, ſaith 'he, a pint is ſold for an obolus; it is cheap 'living in this Town: then to thoſe that ſold 'Olives, a Chœnix two farthings; thence to 'the frippery, a Suit ten Drachms; things are cheap in this Town.

Laert. He ſaid, 'the hungry wanted no ſauce, the 'thirſty no choice of Wines.

Laert. He commended 'quiet and leaſure above all things.

Laert. He ſaid, 'they who buy early fruits at dear 'rates, believe they will not come in their 'due ſeaſon.

Laert. Being asked what was a young mans vertue? 'he anſwered, to do nothing too much.

Laert. Seeing one eat broth very greedily, he ſaid, 'Which of you here preſent uſeth bread for 'Broth, and Broth for bread? Of which, ſee 'more at large, *Xenophon* his *Memorab. Lib.*

Ælian. var. hiſt. 9. One ſaying, that it was a great matter to abſtain from what a Man deſires, he anſwered, but it is much a greater not to deſire at all.

Stob. 28. 'A clear Fire becomes the Chimney, ſe-
Stob. 37. 'renity the mind.

He ſaid, 'We ought not to ſeek pleaſures 'in others, but in our ſelves, the body being 'prediſpoſed according as it ought.

Stob. 37. He ſaid, 'It is the property of God to need 'nothing, to need leaſt, nigheſt to God.

Stob. 37. Being demanded from what things we ought to refrain moſt, he anſwered, 'from ſordid unjuſt pleaſures.

Stob. 37. 'Contentedneſs is like a ſhort and pleaſant 'way, it hath much delight, little toil.

Stob. 37. 'He that would ſee vertue as his Country, 'muſt paſs by pleaſures, as *Syrens*.

Stob. 40. Being demanded whom he thought richeſt, 'he anſwered, him who is contented with leaſt, 'for content is the riches of Nature.

Stob. 8. 4. Being demanded what continence is, he 'anſwered 'government of corporal plea-ſures.

Stob. 87. He ſaid, 'the wicked live to eat, but the good eat to live.

Stob. 183. 'When a Woman ſaith ſhe loveth thee, 'take heed of thoſe words, more than when 'ſhe revileth thee.

### *Of Liberality, Prodigality, and Covetouſneſs.*

Xen. mem. 1. HE conceived, that 'they who took Mony 'of any, owned them for their Maſters 'in the meaneſt degree of ſervitude.

Xen. mem. 1. That 'Wiſdom is proſtituted as well as 'beauty, by taking Mony for it; that he who 'meets with an ingenious perſon, ought to ac-'quaint him with all the good he can, gratis, 'whereby he acquires a Friend, and doth the 'part of a good member of a Common-wealth; 'is the ſumm of his ſecond diſcourſe with *Antipho*.

He ſaid, if a rich Man be proud of his D. Baſil. hom. 24. de legend. lib. gentil. Stob. 28. 'wealth, that 'he could not praiſe him, till he 'knew how he would employ it.

'None can ſafely manage a Horſe without 'a Bit, nor riches without reaſon.

He compared 'covetous perſons to birds, Stob. 54. 'one devours what ever it meets till it choaks 'it ſelf, the reſt falling upon what the firſt left, 'are one after another choaked alſo.

'The wealth of covetous perſons is like the Stob. 55. 'Sun after he is ſet, delights none.

'He that gives to a rich Man throws water Stob. 77. into the Sea.

'The Life of a covetous perſon is like the Stob. 78. 'feaſts made for the dead, he hath all, but enjoys 'nothing.

'He compared 'the wealth of prodigals to Stob. 230. 'fig-trees, growing on a precipice: for theſe, 'none are the better, but Kites and Crows; for thoſe only harlots and flatterers.

Being demanded who were covetous, he Stob. 232. 'anſwered, 'ſuch as ſeek after ſordid gain, and 'neglect their neceſſary friends.

'Wine changeth with the Veſſel, riches fol- Stob. 231. 'low the manners of the owner.

### *Of Magnanimity and Pride.*

TO one angry for having ſaluted a Man that Xen. mem. 1. returned not his ſalutation; 'It is ridicu-'lous, ſaith he, if you are not angry with every 'one you meet of worſe ſhape or form than 'your ſelf, to be angry with any for having leſs 'manners.

'Pride like an ill Potter or Statuary repreſents Stob. 43. 'the forms of things inverted.

'Wind puffs up empty bladders, opinion Stob. 43. 'Fools.

'To be exalted with good fortune, is to Stob. 246. 'run in a ſlippery way.

### *Of Patience.*

'THere is leſs danger in drinking intempe- Plut. de his qui ſero a Num. 'rately of troubled water, than with a 'troubled mind full of wrath, before it be 'allayed and purified, to ſatisfie thy anger in the 'puniſhment of a Kinſman or Countryman.

'If every one ſhould bring his misfortunes Plut. de cu ad Apoll. 'into a publick ſtock to be ſhar'd alike amongſt 'all Men, the greater part of thoſe that now 'complain ſo much, would be contented and 'glad to keep their own.

'It is all one if a Man being overcome in any Stob. 256. 'gymnick ſports ſhould ſue his adverſary, as 'for a Man over-maſter'd by Fortune to accuſe 'her; not knowing upon what conditions we 'entered into the conteſts of life.

### *Of Veracity and Flattery.*

'THere is no better way to glory than to Xen. mem. 'endeavhur to be good, as well as to 'ſeem ſuch.

'The kindneſs of flatterers is chaſed away by 'adverſity.

'Hunters

Stob. 64. 'Hunters take Hares with hounds, many take
Stob. 64. 'Fools with their own praiſes.
Stob. 64. 'Wolves reſemble Dogs, and flatterers 'Friends, but their aimes are quite contrary.
Stob. 64. 'Flattery is like a painted armour, only for 'ſhow, not uſe.
Stob. 69. 'Think not thoſe faithful who praiſe all thy 'words and actions, but thoſe who reprove thy 'faults.
Stob. 71. 'Suffer not a talker and ſlanderer, for he tells 'not thee any thing out of good will; but 'as he diſcourſeth the ſecrets of others, ſo will 'be thine to others.
Stob. 114. 'Good Men muſt let the World ſee that their manners are more firm than an oath.

*Of Urbanity and Converſation.*

Plut. de ſanit. tuend. 'A Little Hall will ſerve to dance in, and 'every place and poſture to ſpeak.
Stob. 37. 'Wind kindles Fire, Converſation Love.
Stob. 67. 'Freedom of diſcourſe like the ſeaſons of the 'year, is beſt in its proper time.
Stob. 134. 'It's arrogance to ſpeak all, and to be unwilling to hear any thing.
Stob. 296. 'Converſe at diſtance, and ſoftly with 'thoſe that are in Authority.

*Of Juſtice.*

Xen. mem. 4. THat the Gods preſcribe juſt things by 'law, and that juſt and lawful is to them the ſame thing, is the ſumm of his diſcourſe with *Hippias*.
Stob. 52. 'They who convert goods ill gotten to 'good uſes in a Common-wealth, do like 'thoſe who make religious uſe of ſacri'ledge.

*Of Friendſhip.*

Xen. mem. 2. THat 'a diſcreet vertuous friend is of all 'poſſeſſions the moſt fertile, and ought 'chiefly to be regarded, is the ſcope of his diſcourſe, *de amicitia*.
Xen. mem. 2. That 'every man ſhould examine himſelf 'of what value he is to his friend, and 'endeavour to be of the moſt worth he can to 'him, is the effect of his diſcourſe with *Antiſthenes*.
Xen. mem. 2. That 'wicked Men cannot be friends, either 'amongſt themſelves, or with the good: 'That the way to procure friends is firſt, to 'endeavour to be good, wherein he would 'ſeem good; that all vertues may be augmented by ſtudy and learning, is the ſcope of 'his diſcourſe with *Critobulus*.
Xen. mem. 2. That 'we ought to our utmoſt abilities to 'relieve the neceſſities of our friends, is the 'effect of his diſcourſe with *Ariſtarchus*.
Plut. de frat. amor. He ſaid, 'he had rather have *Darius* to his 'friend, then his *Daricks*, a coyn ſo named from 'him.
Laert. He wondered that 'every man kept an inventory of his goods, none of his friends.
Stob. 213. 'They who violate friendſhip, though 'they eſcape the puniſhment of their 'friends, ſhall not eſcape the vengeance of 'God.

Stob. 213. 'They who forſake their own brethren to 'ſeek out other friends, are like thoſe who let 'their own grounds lie fallow to till anothers.
Stob. 213. 'Fear not a friend in adverſity.
Stob. 218. 'We eſteem not that corn beſt which grows 'on the faireſt ground, but that which nouriſheth beſt, nor him a good perſon or friend 'who is of higheſt birth, but moſt noble in qua'lities.
Stob. 258. 'Phyſicians muſt relieve the ſick, friends the afflicted.
Stob. 263. 'Its pleaſant to grow old with a good 'friend and ſound ſenſe.

## Sect. 3. *Oeconomicks.*

IN the ſecond reſpect are his Oeconomicks, which he learned of *Iſchomachus*, by *Xenophon* expreſly delivered in a treatiſe upon that ſubject, to which add theſe few ſentences.

Xen. mem. 3. So 'contrive the building of your houſe, as 'that thoſe parts which are towards the South 'may be higheſt, that the winter Sun be not 'excluded: thoſe towards the North loweſt; 'that they may be leſs ſubject to wind; In 'fine, ſo order it that a Man may live in eve'ry quarter thereof with moſt delight and ſafety: 'Pictures and colours take away more plea'ſantneſs than they afford.

Xen. mem. 3. p. 7. 88. ſee more there, Laert. To one who beat his ſervant for being glutonous, covetous, and idle, he ſaid, *did you at any time conſider whether you deſerve not more to be beaten your ſelf?*

Stob. 183. To one that asked his advice about taking a Wife, *whether you do or do not*, ſaith he, *you will repent it.*

Stob. 183. To others that asked his opinion concerning martiage, he ſaid, *As Fiſhes in a net would fain get out, and thoſe without would get in, take heed young Men it be not ſo with you.*

Stob. 193. *Men muſt obey the laws of their Country, Wives their Husbands.*

## Sect. 4. *Politicks.*

IN the 3d reſpect are his Politicks, which *Heſychius Illuſtrius* makes to be the ſame which *Plato* hath delivered under this name, where you may have them though diſguiſed with the language and additions of *Plato*; to which may be annexed thoſe ſentences of his in that kind out of *Xenophon*, *Stobæus*, and others.

Xen. mem. 1. 'They who cannot upon occaſion be uſe'ful either to an Army, a City, or a Common'wealth; yet have confidence of themſelves, 'ought, though never ſo rich, to be under re'ſtraint.

Xen. mem. 1. *Antipho* demanding 'how he might make o'thers skilful in Politicks whileſt himſelf med'led not therein, although he knew that he could 'manage them, which way ſaith he; *Antipho*. 'I do moſt act the buſineſs of the Common'wealth, if I practiſe it only, or if I endeavour 'to make many able to act therein.

Xen. mem. 3. 'That place is fitteſt for Temples and Altars 'which is moſt open, and yet retired; for it 'is fitting that they who pray, ſee, and no leſs 'fitting that they come thither pure.

'They

Xen. mem. 3. 779. 'They are not Kings, who are in possession of a Throne, or come unjustly by it, but they who know how to govern.

Xenop. mem. 4. 813. 'A King is a ruler of willing Subjects according to the Laws, a Tyrant is a ruler of subjects against their will, not according to the Laws, but arbitrary; an Aristocracy is that government wherein the Magistrates are.

Xen. mem. 4. 'The offices of a good Citizen are in peace to enrich the Common-wealth, in War to subdue the Enemies thereof, in Embassy to make friends of foes, in sedition to appease the people by eloquence.

Laert. 'Of common people he said, they were as if a Man should except against one piece of bad money, and accept a great sum of the same.

Clem. Alex. strom. 4. Stob. 141. He said, 'the Law was not made for the good.

Stob. 141. 'Deserving persons ought to be sharers in the good fortunes of the Common-wealth.

Stob. 141. Being demanded *what City is strongest?* he said, that *which hath good Men.*

Stob. 141. Being demanded *what City is best ordered?* he said, *that wherein the Magistrates friendly agree.*

Stob. 141. Being demanded *what City is best?* he said, *that wherein are proposed most rewards for virtue.*

Stob. 141. Being demanded *what City lives best?* he said, *that which liveth according to law, and punisheth the unjust.*

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of his Dæmon.*

THat *Socrates* had an attendant Spirit (meant as *Plutarch* conceives by the * Oracles answer to his Father) which diverted him from dangers, is impugned by *Athenæus*, not without much prejudice, which the bitterness of the discourse betrays. Souls that are not candid, and think ill of the best, saith *Origen*, never refrain from Calumny, seeing that they mock even the Genius of *Socrates* as a feigned thing. On the contrary, we have the testimony of *Plato*, *Xenophon* and † *Antisthenes* contemporary with him, confirmed by *Laertius*, *Plutarch*, *Maximus Tyrius*, *Dion Chrysostomus*, *Cicero*, *Apuleius*, by Fathers, *Tertullian*, *Origen*, *Clemens Alexandrinus* and others, whereof a great many instances (as *Cicero* saith) were collected by *Antipater*: these only preserv'd by others Authors.

* Sup. cap. 2.

† Apud Athenæum.

De divinat. lib. 1.

* Plut. de Gen. Soc. Theocritus *going to consult* Enthyphron a *Soothsayer, found him with much company walking in the streets, amongst whom were* Simias *and* Socrates, *who was very busie, asking him many questions. In the midst of his discourse he made a suddain stop, and after some pause, turned back, and went down another street, calling out to the rest of the company to return and follow him, as being warned by the Dæmon. The greatest part did so, the rest went forward, on purpose to confute the* Dæmon, *and drew along with them one* Charillus *that played on the flute; but in the way which was so narrow, as not to give them room to pass by, they were met and overturn'd in the dirt by a great herd of Swine; by repetition of which accident,* Charillus *often afterwards defended the* Dæmon.

Nor did the advice of this spiritual attendant only respect the good of *Socrates*, but extended to such friends as conversed with him, whereof himself gives these instances.

† Plato, Tim. Ælian. var. hist. 8. 1. * Charmides *Son of* Glauco, *going to exercise in the Nemean race, as he was discoursing with* Socrates, *was by him upon notice of the voice dissuaded from going, to which he answered, that perhaps the voice only meant that he should not get the victory, but, saith he, however I shall advantage my self by exercising at this time, which said, he went to the Games; where he met with some accident, which though it be not related, is acknowledg'd to have justified the counsel given him by the Dæmon.*

* Plat. Tim. Timarchus *and* Philemon *Son of* Philemonides *having plotted together to murther* Nicias, *Son of* Hircoscomander, *were at the same time drinking with* Socrates. Timarchus *with intention to execute what they had determin'd, offer'd to rise from the table, saying to* Socrates, *Well* Socrates, *drink you on, I will but step a little way and return immediately. Rise, not said* Socrates, (*hearing the Dæmon as soon as he spake*) *for the Dæmon hath given me the accustomed sign; whereupon he sate still: presently after he offer'd again to be gone;* Socrates *hearing the voice, withheld him. At last, as* Socrates *was diverted by something, and did not mind him, he stole away and committed the murther, for which being brought to execution, his last words to his brother* Clitomachus *were, that he was come to that untimely end for not obeying* Socrates.

Another time, *seeing his friend* Crito's *eie ti'd up, he asked him the reason, who answering, that as he walked in the field, one pulling a bough, it gave a jerk back, and hit him in the eye; Then you did not take my advice, replies* Socrates, *for I call'd you back, making use, as I have accustomed, of divine presage.* Cic. de divinat. 3.

That it had likewise a great influence upon the Souls of those who conversed with him, and liv'd with him, † he alledgeth as examples *Aristides* Son of *Lysimachus*, and *Thucydides* Son of *Melissus*. The first leaving *Socrates* to go to the Wars, lost, with his company, the habit of learning, which he acknowledg'd to have gained, not by any verbal instructions, of which he had none from him, but by being near him, seeing him, and sitting in the same room with him. The second as easily, by the same means attained the same habit. † Plat. Tim.

And not only to particular persons, but to general affairs did these predictions extend: He foretold some friends the defeat of the *Athenian* Army in *Sicily*, as is attested by *Plutarch*, and mentioned by himself in *Plato*, where he gives another fair example, or rather tryal of the truth of the *Dæmons* predictions, speaking of a business, whereof the event was at that time doubtful: * *You will hear, saith he, from many in* Sicily, *to whom it is known what I foretold concerning the destruction of the Army, and we may now have an experiment if the* Dæmon *speak true.* Samionus, *Son of* Calus, *is gone in an expedition, the sign came to me: he goes with* Thrasylus *to War against* Ephesus *and* Ionia: *my opinion is, that he will either be slain, or at least in much danger, I greatly fear the whole design.* These are his words in *Plato*, delivered before the event of that action, which fell out according to his prediction; for † *Thrasylus* was repulsed, and beaten by the Ephesians, † Xenoph. lib. Grac. 1.

* Plat. Tim.

the

the *Athenians* put to flight, with the loſs of four hundred Men; of which Victory the *Epheſians* erected two Trophies: This was in the twenty one year of the *Peloponneſian* War.

We have alledg'd the univerſal conſent of Authors, that *Socrates* had ſuch a ſpiritual attendant; yet is there ſome diſagreement concerning the name, more concerning the nature of it.

It is commonly named his *Dæmon*, by which title, he himſelf owned it: *Plato* ſometimes calls it his *Guardian*, *Apuleius* his God, *becauſe* (ſaith Saint * *Auguſtin*) *the name of* Dæmon *at laſt grew odious*. But we muſt obſerve, that he did not account it a God, but ſent from God, and in that ſence affirmed the ſigns to come from God, to wit, by mediation of this ſpirit. This, beſides other places we may argue from his firſt Epiſtle, where he ſpeaks of the ſign it ſelf; he uſeth the word *Dæmon*, when of the advice, whereof that ſign was the inſtrument, he names God. Thus are we to underſtand theſe, and all other places of the ſame nature in *Plato*, where *Socrates* ſpeaking of the *Dæmon* ſaith, *if it pleaſe God, you ſhall learn much, and the ſign from God did not offer to ſtay me.*

* De civ. dei. 8. 4.

As for the ſign or manner of the prediction, † ſome affirm it was *by ſneezing, either of himſelf or others; if any chanced to ſneeze ſtanding before him, behind him, or on his right hand, he went immediately about that which he intended; if on the left hand, he refrained or deſiſted: if he ſneezed himſelf before the enterpriſe, it was applauſive, if in the action, diſſwaſive.* There needs not much argument to prove this opinion. If this ſternutation proceeded either from chance, or his natural conſtitution, it could not have that provident ſupernatural effect; if it proceeded from ſome more excellent outward cauſe, we recur to the Genius.

† Plutarch. de gen. Socr.

Others confine this preſcience within the Soul of *Socrates* himſelf, that he ſaid, *his Genius adviſed him*, they interpret it, as we uſually ſay, *his mind gave him, or ſo inclined him*: In this ſenſe indeed *Dæmon* is not ſeldom taken; but this is inconſiſtent with the deſcription which *Socrates* gives of a voice and ſigns *ab exteriore*, beſides this knowledge is not above humane nature.

*Plutarch* having exploded the opinion of *Terpſion* concerning ſneezing, conjectured firſt, that it might be ſome apparition; but at laſt concludes, that it was his obſervation of ſome inarticulate unaccuſtomed ſound (or voice) conveighed to him by ſome extraordinary way, as we ſee in Dreams. This avoids not the inconvenience of the former; if *Socrates* did firſt of himſelf interpret this ſound, it is the ſame with the laſt opinion, that his Soul had a Prophetick inſpiration, if by any help, it will come at laſt to the Genius.

Some conceive it to be one of thoſe Spirits which have the particular care of Men; which *Maximus Tyrius*, and *Apuleius* deſcribe in ſuch manner, that they want only the name of a good Angel.

* De Orig. error. 2. 15.

But there want not thoſe who give it that appellation: * *Lactantius* having proved that God ſends Angels to guard mankind, adds, *and* Socrates *affirmed that there was a* Dæmon *conſtantly near him, which kept him company from a Child, by whoſe beck and inſtruction he guided his life.* *Euſebius* upon theſe words of the Pſalmiſt, *He hath given his Angels charge over thee, that they ſhould keep thee in all thy ways. We learn out of Scripture* (ſaith he) *that every Man hath a Guardian appointed him from above; and* Plato *doubteth not to write in this manner: All Souls having choſen a condition of living, they proceed in order thereto, being moved by the* Dæmon, *which is proper to every one, and is ſent along with them to preſerve them in this life, and to perfect thoſe things whereof they have made choice.* And immediately after; *You may believe*, ſaith he, *that* Socrates *meant this, when he often affirmed that he was governed by a* Dæmon. More plainly † *Eugubinus*, *the* Dæmon *of* Socrates, ſaith he, *mentioned ſo often by* Plato (*ſeeing that* Socrates *was a good Man, and exhorted all Men to vertue, and by the* Dæmon *was always excited to that which was good*) *may perhaps not unjuſtly be thought his Angel, as that which appeared to* Balaam *the Prophet, and diverted him from his wickedneſs.* * But *Ficinus* expreſly; *If you are not pleaſed*, ſaith he, ſpeaking of this Spirit, *to call the familiar guide of a Man his Spirit, call it, if you pleaſe, his good Angel.*

In Pſal. 91.

† De perenn. philo. 25.

* Argum. ad Apol. Soc.

The chiefeſt argument of * *Collius*, who oppoſeth this opinion, and endeavours to prove it was an evil Spirit, is, that the *Dæmon* never diſſwaded or diverted from vice, but only from outward danger, whereas the contrary is evident enough from the foregoing Story of *Timarchus* and *Philemon*.

* De anim. gan. 5. 14.

True it is, that the advice of the *Dæmon* was always diſſwaſive, *never*, as *Cicero* ſaith, *impulſive, often coercive.* *Apuleius* flatters *Socrates* with this reaſon; *Socrates*, ſaith he, *as being a Man abſolute and perfect of himſelf, ready in all offices that concerned him, never needed any exhorter, but ſometimes a prohibitour, if it happened there were any danger in that which he went about, that being forewarned he might take heed, and decline the undertaking for that time; which afterwards he might re-aſſume, or attempt ſome other way.*

* De divinat. 1.

## CHAP. VII.

### *His Military Actions.*

† IT is obſerved by many, that *Socrates* little affected travel, his life being wholly ſpent at home, ſaving when he went out in Military ſervice.

† Laert.

In the ſecond year of the eighty ſixth Olympiad broke forth a War, the greateſt that ever happened amongſt the *Grecians*, betwixt the *Lacædemonians* and the *Athenians*, the occaſions and pretexts of it ariſing from the controverſies of the *Athenians* with the *Corinthians*, concerning *Corcyra*, and *Polydæa*, both which being revolted from the *Athenians*, to whom they had been tributary, ſought for aid from the *Lacædemonians*, who ſent Forces to the relief of *Polidæa*.

In

In this War was *Socrates* thrice perſonally engaged; firſt, at the Siege of *Polidæa*, in the year of the Olympiad, againſt which the *Athenians* ſent one thouſand ſix hundred choice Men of Arms, under the conduct of *Phormis*, who beſieged it from the Sea by his Gallys, and on the Land ſide by a Wall: amongſt theſe were *Socrates* and *Alcibiades*: *Laertius* ſaith, *they were on the Sea ſide*, and that *there was no means to come on the Land ſide further*: * *Plato*, that *they ſerved both a foot*, which diſagrees not with the other; for there was not any ſet Battle during all the time of the ſiege, only Sallies and Skirmiſhes. Here, † *Alcibiades* his Comerade, atteſts, Socrates *outwent all Souldiers in hardineſs; and if at any time*, ſaith he, *as it often happens in War, the proviſions failed, there was none could bear the want of Meat and Drink like him, yet on the other ſide in times of feaſting, he only ſeem'd to enjoy them, and though of himſelf he would not drink, yet being invited, he far out-drank all others, and which is ſtrangeſt of all, never any Man ſaw him drunk. The exceſſes of cold in the Winter, which in that Country are extraordinary, he as wonderfully endured, when the Froſt was ſo ſharp, that very few durſt go out of their Tents, and thoſe wrapping their Legs and Thighs in Skins and Furs, he went along with them, having no more Cloths than thoſe he uſually wore. He walked bare footed upon the Ice with leſs tenderneſs than others in Shoos, to the wonder of the Souldiers, who thought themſelves reproached by his hardineſs. His contemplative rapture at the ſame time was no leſs worthy admiration; he fell into a deep contemplation one morning, and continued all the while ſtanding in the ſame poſture, at noon it was taken notice of by the Souldiers, who told him from one to another, that* Socrates *had ſtood ſtill in the ſame place all that morning: in the evening ſome* Ionian *Souldiers wrapping themſelves warm, came and lay down by him in the open Field, to watch if he would continue all night in the ſame poſture, which he did, until the morning, and as ſoon as the Sun aroſe, ſaluted it, and retir'd.* Of theſe kind of raptures *A. Gellius* ſaith he had many. We muſt not omit how he behaved himſelf there in fight; * ſeeing his friend *Alcibiades* deeply engaged, and much wounded, he ſtepped before him, defended him and his Arms from the Enemy, and brought him ſafely off. Nor was his modeſty inferiour to his love or courage, for whereas after the Battle the Generals were to beſtow an honourable reward upon him that had fought beſt, the Judges aſſigned it to *Socrates*, he declin'd it, and by his earneſt interceſſion, procur'd that it might be conferred upon *Alcibiades*.

The ſecond action of *Socrates* was in the firſt year of the eighty ninth Olympiad at *Delium*, a Town in *Boetia*, which the *Athenians* took. *The* Boetians (ſaith *Thucydides*) *led by* Pagondas, *followed them, and bid them Battle, the left Wing of the* Boetians, *to the very middle of the Army was overthrown by the* Athenians, *and fled to the other parts, where they were yet in fight: but the right had the better of the* Athenians, *and by little and little forced them to give ground, and followed them from the very firſt.* Pagondas, *whilſt the left Wing of his Army was in diſtreſs, ſent two Companies of Horſe ſecretly about the Hill, whereby that Wing of the* Athenians *which was Victorious, apprehending upon their ſudden appearing that they had been a freſh Army, was put into a fright, and the whole Army of the* Athenians, *now doubly terrified by this accident, and by the* Thæbans *that continually won ground, and broke their ranks, betook themſelves to flight, ſome fled towards* Delium *and the Sea, others the Mountain* Parnes, *and others other ways, as to each appeared hope of ſafety. The* Boetians, *eſpecially their Horſe, and thoſe* Locrians *that came in, after the enemy was defeated, followed killing them. Socrates* in this engagement behaved himſelf with his accouſtomed valour (ſo well, that † *Laches* confeſſeth, if the reſt had fought like him, they had not loſt the day) and care of his friends; * for *ſeeing* Xenophon *unhorſed in the flight, and thrown down on the ground (himſelf likewiſe having his Horſe ſlain under him, fought on foot) he took him upon his Shoulders, and carried him many a ſtadia, and defended him until they gave him over the purſuit.* And being thus at the loſs of the day, with other diſperſed in flight amongſt whom was *Laches* the Archon, and *Alcibiades*) * *in the conſtant ſlowneſs of his retreat expreſſed a courage far above* Laches, *frequently looking back and round about, as greedy to be reveng'd of the enemy, if any ſhould purſue them; which was the means that brought him off more ſafely, for they who expreſs leaſt fear in their retreat, are leſs ſubject to be aſſaulted, than ſuch as repoſe their confidence in flying.*

† As they came to a way that was divided into two, *Socrates* made a ſtand, and adviſ'd thoſe that were with him not to take that way which they were going into, along the Mountain *Parne*, but the other by the way *Retiſte*, for, ſaith he, I heard the *Dæmon*'s voice. The greater part were angry, as if he had trifled at a time ſo ſerious; ſome few were perſwaded to go along, amongſt whom were *Laches* and *Alcibiades*, and got ſafely home; the reſt were met by ſome Horſemen, who returning from the purſuit, fell upon them; they at firſt reſiſted, but at laſt encloſed by the Enemy who exceeded them in number; they gave back, and were in the end oppreſt, and all killed except one, who by the help of his Shield getting away, brought the news to *Athens*, and *Pyrilampes* Son of *Antiphon*, who being wounded by a Javelin, was taken Priſoner; and when he heard by thoſe that were ſent from *Athens* to *Thebes* to treat of peace, that *Socrates* and the reſt with him got ſafe home; he openly profeſt to the *Thebans*, that *Socrates* had often called him and others of his company back, who not following the advice of his Genius were ſlain.

The laſt Military engagement was the ſame year at * *Amphipolis*, † which was then taken by *Braſidas* the *Lacedæmonian* General.

CHAP.

## CHAP. IX.

*How he carried himself in the Democracy and the Oligarchy.*

*Socrates* forbore to accept any office in the Common-wealth, ( except in his later years that of Senatour ) either ( as * *Ælian* saith ) becauſe he ſaw the *Athenian* Government, though under the form of a Democracy, was yet nearer to a Tyranny or Monarchy, or † as himſelf profeſſeth, being diſſwaded by his Genius from medling in publick affairs, which advice was his preſervation, being too honeſt to comply with the injuſtices of the Common-wealth, and to oppoſe them was extreamly dangerous, as he found experimentally in that ſhort time.

* *Var. hiſt.* 3.

† *Plat. Apol.*

* He was choſen to the Senate for the *Antiochian* Tribe, whereunto ( † as we have ſaid ) *Alopece* the Town where he was born belonged, and * in order thereto took the Oath which *Solon* appointed to be given to every Senatour, to give ſentence according to the Laws, not biaſſed either by favour, hatred, or any other pretext: In the third year of the 93. Olympiad ( † the preheminence coming in courſe to the *Antiochian* Tribe, and *Socrates* thereupon becoming Preſident of the People ) he had this occaſion of manifeſting his conſtancy. * There hapn'd a Sea-fight betwen the *Athenians* and the *Lacedæmonians* at *Arginuſæ*: The *Athenian* Commanders were ten; the *Lacedæmonians* Commander in chief, *Callicratidas*; the *Lacedæmonians* were overthrown, their Admiral ſunk; the *Athenians* went back to *Arginuſæ* with the loſs of twenty five Ships, and all the Men in them except ſome few that eſcaped to Land; the ten Commanders order'd *Theramenes* and *Thraſibulus* ( Captains of the Galleys ) to look out after the Veſſels that were Shipwrackt, which as they were going to do, a ſuddain tempeſt aroſe and hindered them; ſix of thoſe Commanders returned to *Athens* where they no ſooner came, but upon the account they gave of the fight, the Senate committed them to Priſon; *Theramenes* was their Accuſer, who urged that they might be queſtion'd for not relieving thoſe that were loſt by Shipwrack; the Commanders juſtly anſwer'd, that they had given order for their relief, and that *Theramenes* and *Thraſibulus*, on whom that charge was impoſed, were ( if any ) to be condemned; but that they would not retort the fault on their accuſers, for the Tempeſt ſufficiently excuſed them. This ſatisfied the Senate for that time, but at the next feaſt being the *Apaturia*, ſome friends of *Theramenes*, by his inſtigation ſhaving their Hair, and putting on mourning Apparel, pretending to be Kinſmen of thoſe that were drowned, came in that habit to the Senate, and cauſing the charge againſt the ten Commanders to be renewed, ſo much incenſed the People, that they by menaces contrary to all Law, enforced the Senate to condemn them. *Socrates* being order'd to write the decree againſt them, avoided it by pretending he could not write, and knew not the form, which occaſion'd laughter in the Senate ( and perhaps that aſperſion of *Porphyrius*, that he was ſcarce able to write, which when he did, it was to deriſion ) but the true reaſon is by *Athenæus* acknowledg'd to be his conſtant fortitude, in that he would not violate the Laws of the Common-wealth contrary to the Oath he had taken, † to which he took more heed than to the violence wherewith he was threatned; for when the Senate proceeded to their condemnation, * he alone oppoſed it with his ſuffrage, whereupon many Oratours prepared to accuſe him, and the People cried out with loud clamours, that he might be brought to anſwer for it: but he choſe rather to hazard himſelf for Law and Juſtice, than through fear of impriſonment and death to conſent to injuſtice, as the death of theſe Men was afterwards known to be, even to the *Athenians* themſelves: and was ſoon after puniſhed in *Theramenes* by the like, wherein *Socrates* gave the ſame teſtimony of his Courage upon this occaſion.

*Xen. memor.* 1. p. 711.

† *Plat. Apol.*

* *Xenoph. hiſt. Græc.* 1.

† *Xenoph. memor.* 1.

* *Laert.* Ἀλλὰ καὶ μόνῳ (perhaps μόνον) ἀποψηφίσασθαι ἔφη θανάτου τοῦ κρίναντος.

*Athens* after a long War with the *Lacedæmonians* of 27. years, being taken at laſt by *Lyſander*, the *Lacedæmonian* General in the firſt year of the 94th Olympiad, there grew ſome debate concerning the alteration of the Government, from a Democracy to an Oligarchy; *Theramenes* ſtood for the continuance of the Democracy, but being overſway'd by the power and threats of *Lyſander*; yielded to the conſtitution of thirty perſons, † by title Governours, in effect Tyrants, of which number was *Theramenes* ( whom they took, in regard of his known moderation and equity, to bridle the rapine and avarice of others ) *Critias*, ( firſt a friend, but now a great enemy to *Socrates* for reproving his love of *Euridamus* ) *Charicles* and others, whoſe names are ſet down by *Xenophon*, as are alſo their murders, unjuſt ſequeſtrations of Lands, and confiſcations of Goods; they began with puniſhment of the worſt perſons, proceeded to the richeſt, and ended with the beſt. Never ( ſaith *Seneca* ) was any City more miſerable; 1300. ( *Æſchines* ſaith, 1500. ) of the beſt perſons they put to death without any legal Trial, nor was their fury thereby aſſwaged, but more exaſperated; that City where was the *Areopagus*, the moſt religious Court of Judicature, where the Senate and People like the Senate uſed to aſſemble, was daily made a ſad Colledge of Executioners, an unhappy Court too narrow for the Tyrants without reſt from oppreſſion, without hope of liberty *or remedy*. All fled the City but *Socrates*, who *all this while ſet not his Foot out of the Gates*; he was continually amongſt the People, comforted the lamenting Fathers, encourag'd thoſe that deſpair'd of the State, reproached to the rich, that had lived in fear to loſe their wealth, the late repentance of their dangerous avarice, and to thoſe that would imitate him, gave great examples, whilſt he walked free amidſt the thirty oppreſſours.

† *Diod. Sic. lib.* 14.

*Theramenes* oppoſing this cruelty and injuſtice, was accuſed by *Critias* for betraying the truſt of the Common-wealth, whereof he acquitted himſelf to the ſatisfaction of the Senate; but *Critias* and his faction, fearing he might overthrow the Oligarchy, ſeized upon him with a Troop of Souldiers; *Theramenes* run to the Al-

tar, but being dragg'd from thence by the officers, he behaved himſelf like (ſaith *Diodorus*) the Diſciple of *Socrates*; the People pitied him, but none of them durſt offer to help him, becauſe he was compaſs'd in by the Souldiers, except *Socrates* and two of his companions, who ran to him and endeavoured to reſcue him out of the hands of the Officers; *Theramenes* deſired them to forbear, telling them that he much loved and commended their kindneſs and vertue, but that it would be the greateſt misfortune he could have, if their love to him ſhould occaſion their deaths; whereupon *Socrates* and his Companions ſeeing none come in to join with them in his aid, and that the contrary party was too ſtrong for them, gave over: *Theramenes* was carried to Priſon, and there (being ſentenced to drink Hemlock) died.

*Ælian. var. hiſt. 2.* Theſe outrages of the thirty Tyrants *Socrates* did not forbear to cenſure: * *Seeing many eminent perſons put to death, and the rich circumvented and betray'd to exceſſive puniſhments, he ſaid to* Antiſthenes, *Doth it repent thee that we have done nothing in our whole lives great and remarkable, as thoſe Monarchs, who are deſcribed in Tragedies,* Atreus's, Thyeſtes's, Agamemnon's *and* Ægiſthus's? *they are in thoſe playes beheaded, feaſted with their own Fleſh, and generally deſtroyed; But no Poet was ever ſo bold and impudent as to bring a Hog killed upon the Stage.*

† *Laert.* † To another *who murmur'd becauſe he was not looked upon ſince they began to rule, are you ſorry for it ſaid he?* He ſaid likewiſe, * *that it were ſtrange if a Neatherd who diminiſhed and impoveriſhed his herd, ſhould not confeſs himſelf an ill Neatherd; but more ſtrange that one who being ſet over a City, made the Citizens worſe, and their number leſs, ſhould not confeſs himſelf an ill Governour. This came to their knowledge: whereupon* Critias *and* Charicles *ſent for him, and forbad him ſtrictly to teach or diſcourſe with any of the young Men.* Socrates *asked them, if in acts of prohibition he might be permitted to queſtion what he underſtood not, which they granting; Then (continues he) I am ready to obey the Laws, but leſt I tranſgreſs them through ignorance, I deſire to be informed, whether when you forbid me the act of ſpeaking, this act be to be underſtood of things ſpoken rightly or not rightly; if of the firſt, I muſt abſtain from ſpeaking what is right; if of the ſecond, I muſt take care to ſpeak nothing but what is right; Hereupon* Charicles *being diſpleaſed, ſaid, Since you underſtood not that,* Socrates, *we command you what is eaſier to be underſtood, that hence forward you ſpeak not at all with any of the young Men; To take away all ambiguity, replies* Socrates, *that I may not exceed my limitation; let me know expreſly at what years you call a Man young: So long, ſaith* Charicles, *as he is uncapable of being Senatour, and hath not attained to the height of his judgment; you are not to ſpeak with any under thirty; May I not buy, anſwers* Socrates, *of any under that age, nor ask them the price of any thing? That you may, ſaith* Charicles, *but your cuſtom is to ask queſtions of things which you know very well; forbear thoſe: And ſhall I not then, replies* Socrates, *make anſwer if any one ask me where* Charicles *dwells, or where* Critias *is?* To *ſuch queſtions, ſaith* Charicles, *you may. You muſt (continues* Critias*) refrain from the artificers, whoſe ears you have ſufficiently grated with your impertinent Diſcourſe; I muſt then abſtain (ſaith* Socrates*) from Juſtice, Piety, and the like; Even from the very Neatherds, replies* Charicles, *which unleſs you do, take heed your herd come not ſhort home.*

This ill will and jealouſie which they had conceived againſt *Socrates* was increaſed by the ſecret departure of ſome friends of his out of the City, which was reported to be done by his contrivement, to give intelligence to the *Thebans*: nor was that ſuſpicion without reaſon; as is manifeſt by his laſt Epiſtle: hereupon they ſummon'd him into the Court, where ſome complaints were brought againſt him, of which having acquitted himſelf, they (to get a better cauſe of quarrel againſt him) gave order to him and four more to go to the *Pyræum*, and to apprehend *Leon*, whom they meant to put to death, that they might poſſeſs his Eſtate: But *Socrates* refuſed, adding, that he would never willingly aſſiſt an unjuſt act; whereupon *Charicles* ſaid, Doſt thou think, *Socrates*, to talk thus peremptorily, and not to ſuffer? A thouſand ills, anſwered *Socrates*, but none ſo grievous as to do unjuſtly. *Charicles* made no reply, nor any of the reſt; the other four went for *Leon*, *Socrates* directly to his Houſe; but from thence forward, the jealouſie they had of him was ſo much encreaſed, that * if their power had not been ſoon diſſolved, they would have gone near to have taken away his life. * *Plat. Apol.*

## CHAP. XI.

*His falling out with the Sophiſts, and with* Anytus.

THe Sophiſts, *Maſters of language in thoſe times,* ſaith † *Cicero*, (*whereof were* Gorgias *of* Leontium, Thraſymachus *of* Chalcedon, Protagoras *of* Abdera, Prodicus *a* Cian, Hippias *an* Elian, *and many others*) *profeſt in arrogant words to teach, how an inferiour cauſe (ſuch was their Phraſe) might by ſpeaking, be made ſuperiour,* * *and uſed a ſweet fluent kind of Rhetorick, argute in ſentence, lofty in words, fitter for oſtentation than pleading, for the Schools and Academies, rather than the* Forum, were ſo highly eſteem'd, that † *whereſoever they came, they could perſwade the young Men to forſake all other converſation for theirs.* * Theſe Socrates *oppoſed, and often by his ſubtlety of diſputing, refeling their principles,* † *with his accuſtomed interrogatories, demonſtrated, that they were indeed much beneath the eſteem they had gained, that they themſelves underſtood nothing of that which they undertook to teach others; he withdrew the young Men from their empty converſation: Theſe, who till then had been looked upon as Angels for Wit and Eloquence, he proved to be vain affecters of words, ignorant of thoſe things which they profeſs'd, and had more need to give mony to be taught, than to take (as they uſed) mony for teaching. The* Athenians *taken with theſe reproofs which* Socrates *gave them, derided them, and excited their Children to the ſtudy of ſolid Vertue.* † *Brut.* * *Cic. Orat.* † *Liban. Apol.* * *Cic. Brut.* † *Liban. Apol.*

Another

Another quarrel *Socrates* had of long continuance, for it was the occasion of his death, but begun many years before, with *Anytus*, an Oratour by profession, privately maintained and enriched by Leather-sellers: He had put two of his Sons to *Socrates* to be taught, but not being pleased, that whilst they were in that way, they had not learned so much, as to be able thereby to get their living; he took them from *Socrates* and put them to that trade which himself was ashamed to own; wherewith *Socrates* being much displeased in respect of the two youths, whose ruine he presaged, (and truly, for they fell afterwards into debaucheries which occasion'd it) spared not to reproach *Anytus* in discoursing to his Scholars, * telling them, 'That the Trade of Dressing Leather 'was not fit to be spoken of amongst young 'Men; for they who benefit themselves by 'any Art, cherish and profess it, as *Acumenus* 'Physick, *Damon* and *Connus* Musick; even *A*-'*nytus*, whilst his Sons were his Scholars, was 'not ashamed of that which they learn'd, 'though it were not sufficient to maintain them 'by pleading; but for himself, he gloried that 'he walked invisible with *Pluto*'s Helmet, or '*Gyges*'s Ring, concealing from the People the 'true means of his subsistence, which indeed 'was by Dressing Leather, which was not just; 'to be ashamed of the Trade, and not of the 'profit; for he ought to own this, or to dis-'claim that.

* *Socratic. Epist.* 14.

'*Anytus* (saith * *Ælian*) to answer this re-'proach, studied all occasions and ways of re-'venge; but feared the *Athenians*, doubting if 'he should accuse *Socrates*, how they would 'take it, his name being in high esteem for ma-'ny respects, chiefly for opposing the *Sophists*, 'who neither taught nor knew any solid Lear-'ning. He † advised with *Melitus*, a young Man, an Orator unknown to *Socrates*, described by * *Plato*, with long plain Hair, a high Nose, and a thin Beard, one that for a Drachm might be bought into any thing, by whose counsel * 'He begins, by making trial in lesser 'things, to sound how the *Athenians* would en-'tertain a charge against his life; for to have 'accused him upon the very first, he conceived 'unsafe, as well for the reason already-menti-'oned, as least the friends and followers of *So*-'*crates* should divert the anger of the Judges 'upon himself, for falsly accusing a Person so 'far from being guilty of any wrong to the 'State, that he was the only ornament thereof. 'To this end he suborns *Aristophanes*, a Co-'mick Poet, whose only business was to raise 'mirth, to bring *Socrates* upon the Stage, tax-'ing him with crimes which most Men knew 'him free from, impertinent discourse, making 'an ill Cause by argument seem good, intro-'ducing new and strange Deities, whilst him-'self believed and reverenced none; hereby 'to insinuate an ill opinion of him, even into 'those who most frequented him. *Aristophanes* 'taking this Theme, interweaves it with much 'abusive mirth; the best of the *Grecians* was 'his subject, not *Cleon*, the *Lacedæmonians*, the '*Thebans*, or *Pericles* himself, but a person dear 'to all the Gods, especially *Apollo*. At first '(by reason of the novelty of the thing, the 'unusual personating of *Socrates* upon the Stage) 'the *Athenians*, who expected nothing less, were 'struck with wonder: Then, (being naturally 'envious, apt to detract from the best persons, 'not only of such as bore office in the Com-'mon-wealth, but any that were eminent for 'Learning and Vertue) they begun to be ta-'ken with the *Clouds*, (so was the Play named) 'and cried up the Actor that personated *So*-'*crates* with more applause than ever any be-'fore, giving him with many shouts the Victo-'ry, and sending word to the Judges, that they 'should set down no name but that of *Aristo*-'*phanes*. *Socrates* came seldom to the Theatre, 'unless when *Euripides* contested with any new 'Tragedian, there, or in the *Pyræum*, then he 'went, for he affected the wisdom, goodness, 'and sweetness of his Verse; sometimes *Al*-'*cibiades* and *Critias* would invite him to a Co-'medy, and in a manner compel him; for he 'was so far from esteeming Comedians, that 'he contemned them, as lying, abusive, and un-'profitable; whereat they were much displea-'sed: These (with other things suggested by '*Anytus* and *Melitus*) were the ground of *Ari*-'*stophanes* his Comedy, who, it is likely, got a 'great sum of Mony by it, they being eager 'in prosecution of their design, and he prepa-'red by want, and malice, to receive their im-'pression: In fine, the Play got extraordinary 'credit, that of *Cratinus* being verified,

* *Var. hist.*

† *Schol. Aristoph.*

* *Liban.*

* *Ælian.*

*The Theatre was then*
*Fill'd with malicious Men.*

'It being at that time the Feast of *Bacchus*, 'a multitude of *Grecians* went to see the Play: '*Socrates* being personated on the Stage and often 'named, (nor was it much the Players should re-'present him, for the Potters frequently did 'it upon their Stone Jugs) the Strangers that 'were present (not knowing whom the Co-'medy abused) raised a hum and whisper, 'every one asking who that *Socrates* was? which 'he observing (for he came not thither by 'chance, but because he knew himself should 'be abused in the Play, had chosen the most 'conspicuous Seat in the Theatre) to put the 'Strangers out of doubt, he rose up, and all 'the while the Play lasted, continued in that po-'sture, (* laughing) † one that was present 'asked him, If it did not vex him to see him-'self brought upon the Stage? *Not at all*, (an-swered he) *methinks I am at a Feast, where eve-ry one enjoys me.* * This Comedy was first acted when *Isarchus* was Archon, *Cratinus* Victor in the first year of the eighty ninth Olympiad: *Aristophanes* being by some reprehended for it, to vindicate himself, caused it to be acted again the year following, *Amintas* being Archon, but with worse order than at first.

* *Ælian. var. hist.* 5.
† *Plut. de educand. lib.*
* *Schol. Aristoph.*

* *Amipsias* also (another comick Poet) derided him thus in *Tribone*, * *Laert.*

*O* Socrates, *the best of few, the vainest*
*Of many Men; and art thou come amongst us?*
*Where is thy Gown? did not this great misfortune*
*Befal thee by the Leather-dresser's help?*

## CHAP. X.

### His Trial.

*Plat. Apul. Liban. Apol.*

* MAny years past since the first falling out betwixt *Socrates* and *Anytus*, during which time one continued openly reproving the other, secretly undermining, until at length *Anytus* seeing the time sute with his design, procur'd *Melitus* to prefer a bill against him to the Senate, in these terms.

Melitus *Son of* Melitus, *a Pythean, accuseth* Socrates *Son of* Sophroniscus *an Alopecian.* Socrates *violates the Law, not believing the deities which this City believeth, but introducing other new Gods. He violates the Law likewise in corrupting youth; the punishment Death.*

† *See Suidas upon that word.* * *Liban. Apol. p.* 644.

This Bill being prefer'd upon oath (*Plato* † ἀντωμοσία) *Crito* became bound to the Judges for his appearance at the day of trial. * Soon after *Anytus sent privately to him, desiring him to forbear the mention of his Trade, and assuring him that he would thereupon withdraw his action; but* Socrates *return'd him answer, that he would never forbear speaking truth as long as he lived, that he would always use the same speeches concerning him; that his accusation was not of force enough to make him refrain from speaking those things which he thought himself before obliged to say.*

* *Xenoph. Apol. & memor.* 4.

* The interval of time betwixt his accusation and trial, he imploy'd in his usual Philosophical exercises, not taking any care to provide his defence, for which being observ'd and questioned by *Hermogenes* Son of *Hipponicus*, 'I provide 'apology enough (saith he) in considering 'and pursuing the constant course of my life; '*Hermogenes* demanding how that could be? be-'cause (saith he) I never did any unjust act, 'which I conceive the best apologie: but we 'often see Judges (saith *Hermogenes*) overswai'd 'by Rhetorick, to condemn the innocent and ac-'quit the guilty: the truth is, (replyed *Socrates*) 'going about to make my apology, I was twice 'withheld by the *Damon*, whereat *Hermoge-'nes* wondring, Is it strange (continues he) 'that God should think it fit for me to dye at 'this time? hitherto no Man hath lived more 'uprightly; which as it is now my greatest com-'fort, so it was the greatest delight to my self 'and friends; if I live longer, I know I must 'undergo what is proper to old age, defects of 'hearing and sight, slowness to apprehend, 'aptness to forget, how can I then be pleased to 'live longer and grow worse: It is likely God 'in his love to me hath ordained that I should 'die in the most convenient age, and by the 'gentlest means; for if I die by sentence, I am 'allowed the benefit of the most easie kind of 'death; I shall give my friends the least trouble, 'I shall do nothing unseemly before those that 'are present, and shall depart sound in Body 'and Soul; is not this very desireable? God with 'much reason forbids me to make any defence; 'If I could effect it, I should only stay longer 'to be taken away by the torment of diseases 'and imperfections of age, which truly *Her-'mogenes* I desire not; If when I give an accompt 'of my actions towards God and Men, the 'Judges think fit to condemn me, I will rather 'chuse to die than to beg *of them a Life worse than* 'Death. Other friends used the same perswasi-'ons to him with assurance of victory. † *Lysias* 'an excellent Orator offered him an Oration, 'which he had written in his defence, desiring 'him if he thought good to make use of it at 'his tryal; *Socrates* perused it, and told him, 'that it was a good one, but not fit for him. *Ly-'sias* asking how that could be? Why (saith he) 'may not a garment or Shoos be rich, yet 'not fit for me? if you should bring me *Sicyoni-an* Shoos, I would not wear them though they were fit for my feet, because they are effemi-nate: he conceived the Oration to be ingenious and eloquent, but not stout and manly, * for though it were very bitter against the Judges, yet † was it more Rhetorical than became a Philo-sopher.

† *Cicer. de Orat.* 1. *Laert.*

* *Plut.*

† *Laert.*

The day of tryal being come, * *Anytus*, *Lyco*, and *Melitus* prepared to accuse him, one in behalf of the people, the second of the Oratours, the last of the Poets: *Melitus* first went up into the Chair proper for that purpose, and there spoke an Oration which was in it self mean enough, but withal deliver'd so unhappily and School-boy-like, that sometimes he was out with fear, and turned about to be prompted like a Player, enough to beget laughter, even in those that were most concern'd in so serious a cause: Part of the effect whereof seems to be the same which is thus by *Xenophon* dispersedly deliver'd, some particulars whereof are confirmed by *Libanius*.

* *Plat. Apul.*

'That *Socrates* perswaded his auditors to con-'temn the received Laws, saying, it was fit 'only for Fools to be govern'd by a Bean, (mean-'ing the suffrages of the Senate so gather'd.)

'That he was intimately conversant with '*Critias* and *Alcibiades*, one most covetous and 'violent in the Oligarchy, the other ambitious 'of Tyranny.

'That he taught direspect and disobedience to 'Parents, telling his Scholars he would make 'them wiser than their Fathers, and that it was 'lawful for any one to bind his Father if he 'were mad, and for those that were the more 'wise, to do as much to those that were less wise.

'That he taught also direspect of all other 'kinsmen, saying they were not useful to the 'sick, or to the accused, the first being in more 'need of a Physician, the latter of an Orator, that 'the good will of unable friends was nothing 'worth, that only the most knowing persons 'were most worthy of honour; by which means 'he would arrogate all respect to himself.

'That he selected out of the Poets some ill 'places, and perverted others that were not so, 'to excite his friends to impious actions; as that 'of *Hesiod*,

*There is no work pursued shame;*
*'Tis idleness that merits blame.*

'He expounded, as if the Poet meant all 'acts might be committed for gain.

'That he often repeated and misinterpreted 'these words of *Homer*, as if the Poet allowed 'the poor to be beaten.

*When*

*When he a Prince or ſome great perſon meets.*
*Such with ſoft language kindly thus he greets;*
*Happy above the reach of fear are you;*
*Sit down, and bid your followers do ſo too.*
*But of the lower ſort when any ſpeaks,*
*Forth theſe words with blows his anger breaks,*
*Be quiet; to thy betters, wretch, ſubmit;*
*For action and advice alike unfit.*

*Melitus* (his Oration ended) came down; * *Liban. Apol.* * next him came *Anytus* with a long malicious ſpeech, and laſt of all *Lyco* with all the artifice of Rhetorick concluded the accuſation.

† *Cic. Tuſc. queſt.* 1. *Socrates* † would not (as was the cuſtom) procure an Advocate to plead for him; all the while his accuſers were ſpeaking, he ſeemed to employ his mind about nothing leſs: as ſoon as they had done, he went up into the Chair, * *Cic. de divinat.* 1. (* in which action he obſerved that the Dæmon did not withhold him) and with † an angry ſmile † *Socratic. Epiſt.* 14. begun this * unpremeditated anſwer, † not as * *Plat. Apol.* a ſuppliant or guilty perſon, but as if Maſter of † *Cic. Tuſc. quæſt.* 1. the Judges themſelves, with a free contumacy proceeding not from pride, but the greatneſs of his mind.

* *Xenoph.* '* But I wonder firſt (*Athenians*) how *Me-*
'*litus* came by this knowledge, that (as he ſaith)
'I do not worſhip thoſe Gods the City wor-
'ſhips? Others have ſeen me (and ſo might
'*Melitus* if he had pleas'd) Sacrifice at common
'feſtivals on the Publick Altars; How do I
'introduce new deities when I profeſs to be di-
'rected in all my actions by the voice of God?
'they who obſerve the notes of Birds, or an-
'ſwers of Men, are guided by the voice: none
'doubts of Thunder whether it be loud or ora-
'culous: Doth not the Prieſteſs on the Tripod
'convey to us by voice what the God delivers to
'her? and that he foreknows events, commu-
'nicating them to whom pleaſeth him, all Men
'(as well as I) believe and profeſs: others call
'thoſe that foretell events, Augurs, Sooth-
'ſayers and Diviners, I the Dæmon, and (I
'conceive) more religiouſly than they who aſ-
'cribe a Divine power to Birds: That I am no
'impoſtor herein, many can atteſt, who have as-
'ked my advice, and never found it fail. (Here
there aroſe a murmur in the Senate, ſome not
believing, others envying what he ſaid, that
ſhe ſhould ſurpaſs them in ſuch a particular
favour of the deity;) 'Let ſuch as are incre-
'dulous hear this alſo to confirm their opinion
'that I am not favour'd of the Gods; when *Cha-*
'*rephon* in the preſence of many witneſſes queſti-
'on'd the Delphian Oracle concerning me,
'*Apollo* anſwered, that no Man was more free,
'more juſt, or more wiſe; (here another mur-
'mur aroſe amongſt the Judges: he proceeded)
'Yet the ſame God ſaid more of *Lycurgus* the
'*Lacedæmonian* Lawgiver, that he knew not
'whether to call him a God or a Man; me he
'compared not with the Gods, though he gave
'me the priority amongſt Men. But truſt not
'the God herein, conſider me exactly your ſelves;
'whom know you leſs a Servant to corporeal
'pleaſures? whom more free? I accept not
'either rewards or gifts? who more juſt than
'he who ſo conforms himſelf to the preſent time,
'as he needs not the help of any other; who
'will ſay he deſerves not the title of wiſe, who
'ſince he was able, never deſiſted to learn by en-
'quiry all good poſſible: and that I took not
'this pains in vain, is evident in that, many
'Citizens and ſtrangers ſtudious of virtue, pre-
'fer my converſation above all others: what
'is the reaſon that though all Men know I have
'no wealth to requite them, ſo many deſire
'to oblige me by gifts? that I require no re-
'turn from any, yet engage ſo many? that when
'the City being beſieged, every one lamented
'his condition, I was no more mov'd than when
'it was moſt flouriſhing? That whilſt others
'lay out money on outward things to pleaſe
'themſelves, I furniſh my ſelf from within, my
'ſelf with things that pleaſe me better? If none
'can diſprove what I have ſaid, deſerve I not
'the commendations both of Gods and men?
'and yet you *Melitus* pretend that with theſe
'inſtructions I corrupt youth; Every one knows
'what it is to corrupt youth; Can you name
'but one that I of religious have made impious,
'of modeſt impudent, of frugal, prodigal, of
'ſober, debauch'd, of hardy effeminate, or
'the like? But I know thoſe, anſwer'd *Meli-*
'*tus*, whom you have perſwaded to be more
'obedient to you than to their own Parents:
'That as far as concerns inſtruction, replied
'*Socrates*, I confeſs this they know to be
'my proper care: for their health Men obey
'Phyſicians before their Parents, in Law-ſuits
'Counſellors before their kindred; do you
'not in War prefer the moſt experienced Souldi-
'ers to command before your own Allies? yes,
'anſwers *Melitus*, 'tis fit we ſhould; and do
'you think it reaſon then, replies *Socrates*, if
'others are preferr'd for ſuch things as they are
'excellent in, that becauſe in the opinion of
'ſome, I have an advantage beyond others in
'educating youth, which is the greateſt be-
'nefit amongſt Men, I ought therefore to die †. † *Plut. de*
'*Anytus* and *Melitus* (ſaith he, addreſſing him- *tranqu. anim.*
'ſelf to the Judges) may procure my death,
'hurt me they cannot: * To fear death is to * *Plut. de con-*
'ſeem wiſe, and not to be ſo; for it is to pre- *ſol. ad Apol.*
'tend to underſtand that which we underſtand
'not; no Man knows what death is, whether it
'be not the greateſt happineſs that can arrive
'to a Man, and yet all fear and ſhun it as if they
'were ſure it were the greateſt misfortune.

This and more (ſaith *Xenophon*) was ſaid both by himſelf and his friends, but the Judges were ſo little pleaſed with his unuſual manner of pleading, that † as *Plato* went up into the Chair and began a ſpeech in theſe words: † *Laert.* *Though I,* Athenians, *am the youngeſt of thoſe that come up in this place*, they all cried out, *of thoſe that go down*, which he thereupon was conſtrained to do, and they proceeding to vote, *Socrates* was caſt by 281. voices; It was the cuſtom of *Athens*, as *Cicero* obſerves, when any one was caſt, if the fault were not capital, to impoſe a pecuniary mulct; when the Judges had voted in that manner, the guilty perſon was asked the higheſt rate whereat he eſtimated his offence; The Judges willing to favour *Socrates*, propounded that demand to him, He anſwered 25. (or as *Eubulides* ſaith, 100. drachms, nor would he ſuffer * his friends, † *Plato, Crito, Critobulus*, and *Apollo-* * *Xenoph.* *dorus* (who deſired him to eſtimate it at 50. † *Plat Apol.*

minæ,

*minæ*, promiſing to undertake the ſum) to pay any thing for him, ſaying, That to pay a penalty was to own an offence, and telling the Judges that (for what he ſtood accuſed) he deſerved the higheſt honours and rewards, and daily ſuſtenance at the publick charge out of the *Prytanæum*, which was the greateſt honour that was amongſt the *Grecians*; with this anſwer, the Judges were ſo exaſperated, that they condemned him to death by 80. Votes more.

* *Xen. Apol.* * The ſentence being paſt, he could not forbear ſmiling, and turning to his friends, ſaith thus, they who have ſuborned falſe witneſſes againſt me, and they who have born ſuch teſtimonies, are, doubtleſs, conſcious to themſelves of great impiety and injuſtice; but as for me, what ſhould more deject me now than before I was condemned, being nothing the more guilty: they could not prove I named any new Gods for *Jupiter*, *Juno*, and the reſt, or ſwore by ſuch: How did I corrupt young Men by inuring them to ſufferance and frugality? of capital offences, as Sacriledge, Theft, and Treaſon, my very adverſaries acquit me; which makes me wonder how I come to be condemned to dye; yet that I dye unjuſtly will not trouble me, it is not a reproach to me, but to thoſe who condemned me; I am much ſatisfied with the example of *Palamedes*, who ſuffered death in the like manner; he is much more commended than *Ulyſſes* the procurer of his death; I know, both future and paſt times will witneſs, I never hurt, or injur'd any, but on the contrary have advantaged all that converſed with me to my utmoſt ability, communicating what good I could, *gratis*. This ſaid, he went away, his carriage anſwerable to his words, his eyes, geſture, and gate expreſſing much chearfulneſs.

## CHAP. XI.

### *His impriſonment.*

† *Conſol. ad Helv.* SOcrates (ſaith † *Seneca*) *with the ſame reſolved look, wherewith he ſingly oppos'd the thirty Tyrants, entered the Priſon, and took away all ignominy from the place, which could not be a Priſon whilſt he was there:* Here (* being fettered by the eleven Officers) he continued † thirty days after he was condemned upon this occaſion: * The Ship which carried *Theſeus* and fourteen more perſons into *Creet*; he vowed if they got ſafe home (as it fortuned they did) to dedicate to *Apollo*, and to ſend it every year with a preſent to *Delos*, which cuſtom the *Athenians* religiouſly obſerved; before the ſolemnity, they uſed to luſtrate their City, and all condemned perſons were reprieved till it returned from *Delos*, which ſometimes, the wind not ſerving, was a long time. The Prieſt of *Apollo* began the ſolemnity, by crowning the Poop of the Ship, which happening the day before *Socrates* was condemned, occaſioned his lying in Priſon ſo long after.

* *Maxim. Tyr.*

† *Xen. memor.* 4.

* *Plat. Phæd.*

In this interval he was viſited by his friends, with whom he paſt the time in diſpute after his uſual manner: he was often ſolicited by them to an eſcape, ſome of them offered to carry him away by force, which he not only refuſed, but derided, asking, If they knew any place out of *Attica* whither death could not come? (*a*) *Crito*, two days before his death, came very early in the morning to him to the ſame purpoſe, having by his frequent viſits and gifts gained ſome intereſt in the Jaylour, but finding him aſleep, ſat ſtill by him, admiring in the ſoundneſs of his ſleep, the happy equality of his mind; as ſoon as he waked, he told him, that he came to bring ſad news, if not ſuch to him, yet to all his friends, that the Ship would certainly be at home to morrow at furtheſt (ſome that came from *Sunium* affirming they had left it there) but that in all likelyhood it would come that day, and he ſhould dye the next. In good time be it, anſwered *Socrates*, but I do not believe it will come to day; for the day following I muſt dye, as they ſay, who have the power in their hands; but that I ſhall not dye to morrow but the day after, I gueſs by a Dream I had this night, that a Woman very beautiful in a white Garment, ſaluted me by my name, ſaying,

(a) Plat. Cri.

*Thou, ere three days are told,*
*Rich* Phthya *ſhalt behold.*

(The ſame relation, according to *Laertius*, he made to *Æſchines*) this occaſion *Crito* took to perſwade him to ſave himſelf, which he preſt with many arguments; 'That his friends 'would be accuſed of covetouſneſs, as more 'deſirous to ſpare their wealth, than to re'deem him; that it might be effected with little trouble and expence to them who were provided for it; that himſelf was rich enough to do it, or if not, *Simmias*, *Cebes* aud others would joyn with him; 'that he ought not vo'luntarily to thruſt himſelf into deſtruction, 'when he might avoid it; that he ſhould leave 'his Children in an uncertain mean eſtate; 'that it would not be conſtrued conſtancy 'but want of courage. Conſider well theſe 'reaſons, ſaith he, or rather (for it is now no 'time to ſtand conſidering) be perſwaded, 'what is to be done, muſt be done this night, 'or it will be too late. *Socrates* anſwered, 'that his chearful readineſs to relieve him 'was much to be eſteemed, if agreeable to 'juſtice, otherwiſe, the leſs juſt, the more 'blameable: that opinion and cenſure ought 'not to be regarded, but truth and equity; 'that wrong muſt not be requited with wrong; 'that faith ſhould be kept more ſtrictly with a 'City, than with private perſons; that he 'had voluntarily ſubjected himſelf to the 'Laws of his Country, by living under their 'government, and to violate them at laſt, 'were great injuſtice: that by breaking Pri'ſon, he ſhould not only draw his friends in'to many inconveniences, but himſelf alſo 'into many dangers, only to live and dye in 'exile; that in ſuch a condition, he ſhould be 'nothing more capable to bring up his Children

'dren well, but dying honeſtly, his friends 'would take the more care of them: That 'whatſoever inconvenience might enſue, no-'thing was to be preferred before juſtice; that 'if he ſhould eſcape by treachery, the remain-'der of his life would be never the more hap-'py, nor himſelf after death better entertain'd 'in the next World. Theſe things (ſaith he) 'I hear like the *Corybantian* Pipes, the ſound 'of theſe words makes me deaf to every thing 'elſe; therefore whatever you ſhall ſay to the 'contrary, will be to no purpoſe; but if you 'have any other buſineſs, ſpeak. *Crito* an-'ſwering, he had not any elſe; as for this 'then (concludes he) ſpeake no more of it, 'let us go the way which God points out to 'us.

## CHAP. XII.

*The time and manner of his Death.*

THE time of *Socrates*'s death, is formerly touch'd; the Marble at *Arundel-Houſe* ſaith, he died when *Laches* was Archon, aged ſeventy years, which (according to *Plato*) were compleat, for he ſaith, πλέω ἐβδομηκόντα. * *Demetrius Phalereus* ſaith, he dyed the firſt year of the ninty fifth Olympiad, having lived ſeventy years. † *Diodorus Siculus* avers, it was done in that year, *Laches* being Archon.

* Lært.

† Lært.

Although there be not any thing in the *Greek* Story ſettled by better Authority, than the years of *Socrates*; *Leo Allatius* with much confidence, and little reaſon, controverts the received Chronology of his life and death, the occaſion is this; the fourteenth of the *Socratick* Epiſtles publiſht by him, mentioneth an Oration of *Polycrates*, as ſpoken at the Arraignment of *Socrates*; but the Walls of *Athens* repaired by *Conon* ſix years after the death of *Socrates*, being ſpoken of in that Oration, the Epiſtle is thereby rendred ſuſpicious, the truth ſeems to be this: After the death of *Socrates*, it became an ordinary Theme in the Schools of Rhetorick (which was at that time much ſtudied at *Athens*) to ſpeak for and againſt *Socrates*: *Polycrates*, a Sophiſter, to exerciſe his wit, wrote an invective: *Lyſias*, a famous Oratour, who died about the 100 Olympiad, had written (as we have already ſaid) an Apologetick, which is by the Scholiaſt of *Ariſtides* cited in anſwer to *Polycrates*. Apologies were in like manner written by *Plato*, * *Xenophon*, and (long after by) *Libanius*; although *Iſocrates* admoniſhed *Polycrates* of certain errors in his Oration againſt *Socrates*, yet the Anachroniſm continued, for Chronology was not yet ſtudied in *Athens*; and thence it is that *Plato* himſelf is in that reſpect ſo much reprehended by *Athenæus*, *Ariſtides*, *Macrobius*, and others: the Writer of the *Socratical* Epiſtle admits *Polycrates* as the accuſer at the Trial, and the Oration as then, and there ſpoken, ſo alſo doth *Hermippus* whom *Laertius* cites to the ſame effect; but *Phavorinus* a Critick of later times, when Chronology was more exact, detects the error by computation of times: *Allatius* will by no means have the criticiſm of *Phavorinus* allowed, and labours to introduce an uncertainty of the time, to the end he may perſwade that *Socrates* lived beyond the reparation of the Walls of *Athens*: the great Engine wherewith he labours to demoliſh all that hath been aſſerted by the ancients, is the teſtimony of *Suidas*, who (I know not upon what Authority) ſaith, he lived eighty years: his ſmaller Artillery are the groundleſs emendation of *Meurſius*, and the miſtake of *Scaliger* before noted; the abſurd Metachroniſm of the *Chronicum Alexandrinum*, which makes *Socrates* die in the one hundred and fourth Olympiad, and in the ninetieth year of his Age; the aniſtoreſie of the unknown writers of *Ariſtotle*'s Life, who ſuppoſeth him in the ſeventeenth year of his Age to have heard *Socrates* three years, and which is moſt ridiculous, the notorious anachroniſms of *Plato* muſt ſerve as irrefragable arguments to impugne the truth. With theſe proofs in the ſophiſtical diſguiſe of a Dialogue, he endeavours to puzzle the unwary Reader.

* Memorab. lib. 1.

The manner of his death receive from *Plato* in the perſon of *Phædo* an Eye-witneſs; 'Every day (ſaith he) I went with other friends 'of his to viſit him; we met in the Court 'where he was tried, it being near the Priſon; 'where we entertain'd our ſelves with diſcourſe 'till the Priſon was open'd, then went in unto 'him and ſpent many times the whole day 'with him. But that day we met ſooner than 'ordinary, for the evening before as we came 'out of the Priſon, we heard the Ship was 'come from *Delos*, and thereupon we appoint-'ed to meet early the next morning at the uſu-'al place, where being come, the Porter came 'out to us, and told us that we muſt ſtay a 'while before we could be admitted, for the 'eleven Officers were there taking off his 'Fetters, having brought him word that he 'muſt die to day: not long after he came 'out again, and told us we might go in, where 'when we came, we found *Socrates* his Fet-'ters newly taken off, and *Xantippe* ſitting 'by him with a Child in her Arms: She 'as ſoon as ſhe ſaw us, burſt forth into 'tears, and cried out, Ah, *Socrates*, this is 'the laſt time thy friends ſhall ever ſpeak to 'thee, or thou to them. *Crito* (ſaith *Socrates*, 'addreſſing himſelf to him) let ſome body 'carry her home; whereupon ſome of *Crito*'s 'ſervants led her away exclaiming, and beat-'ing her breaſt. *Socrates* who was ſitting up-'on the Bed, drew up his Leg and rubb'd it, 'ſaying the whilſt, How ſtrange a thing, friends, 'is that which Men call pleaſure, how near 'a kin to pain to which it ſeems ſo contrary? 'they arrive not indeed together, but he that 'takes one, is immediately overtaken by the 'other, as if they were tied together: If 'Æſop had obſerv'd this, certainly he would 'have made ſome Fable of it, as if God wil-'ling to compoſe their difference, had join-'ed them by the end, not being able to make 'them abſolutely one; ſo that whoſoever hath 'one, muſt ſtraight have the other alſo; as 'it happens to me at this time, the pain my Fetters

'Fetters even now gave me, is now turned to 'a kind of pleaſure, and tickles me. You have 'opportunely (ſaid *Cebes*) put me in mind to 'ask, why ſince your impriſonment (which 'you never did before) you have writ Po-'ems, a Hymn to *Apollo*, and *Æſop*'s Fables 'render'd into Verſe; many have queſtion'd 'me about it, particularly *Euenus*, if he repeat 'this demand, what anſwer ſhall I give him? 'Tell him (anſwers *Socrates*) that truly I did 'it not to contend with him and his Verſes, 'but to comply with a Dream (which I have 'had more than once) enjoyning me to pra-'ctiſe Muſick; in obedience whereunto I firſt 'made Verſes in honour of the God whoſe 'feaſt this was; Then, conceiving it eſſential 'to a Poet to write fictions, which of my ſelf, 'I uſe not, I made uſe of ſome of *Æſop*'s 'which I had in memory, as they firſt came 'into fancy; tell *Euenus* this, and bid him from 'me, farewel, and if he be wiſe, follow me, for 'it ſeems I muſt go hence to day, the *Athenians* 'have ſo order'd it. What is that, ſaid *Simmias*, 'which you bid *Euenus* do? I have often con-'verſed with him, but as far as I underſtand 'him, he will not be at all ready to be rul'd by 'you; what, ſaith he, is he not a Philoſo-'pher? he ſeems ſo, anſwers *Simmias*; then 'he will (replyed *Socrates*) and ſo will all 'who deſerve that name; but perhaps he will 'not lay violent hands upon himſelf, that is 'not lawful: and as he was ſpeaking thus, he 'ſet down his Leg again to the ground, and 'ſitting ſo, continued all the reſt of the di-'ſpute. Then *Cebes* asking why, how it could 'be that it ſhould be prohibited to ones ſelf, 'yet that a Philoſopher ought to deſire to 'follow a dying perſon? he anſwered, Men 'are the poſſeſſions of God, would you not be 'angry if your ſlave ſhould kill himſelf againſt 'your will, and if it were in your power pu-'niſh him? we muſt expect a Summons from 'God, an inevitable neceſſity (ſuch as I have 'at this time) to take us hence. This is truth, 'replied *Cebes*, but what you aſſerted even 'now is inconſiſtent with it; God taking care 'of us as his poſſeſſions, can a wiſe Man de-'ſire to be out of his protection? he cannot think 'to mend his condition by freeing himſelf 'from ſo excellent a Government. *Socrates* 'ſeemed much pleaſed with the ſubtlety of '*Cebes*, and turning to us ſaid, *Cebes* is always 'inquiſitive, nor will eaſily admit any thing; 'to me, ſaid *Simmias*, what he hath ſaid ſeems 'reaſon, how can wiſe Men endure, much 'leſs endeavour to part with thoſe that are ſo 'much better than themſelves? but *Cebes* here-'in reflects upon you, who are ſo ready to 'leave us, and the Gods whom you acknow-'ledge good Governours: you ſay well, an-'ſwers *Socrates*, I ſuppoſe you would have me 'anſwer as in a Court of Judicature; by all 'means, ſaith *Simmias*, well then, replies he, 'I will endeavour to defend my ſelf better a-'gainſt you than I did before the Judges: 'Truly did I not believe I ſhould go to juſt Gods, 'and to Men better than any living, I were 'inexcuſable for contemning death; but I am 'ſure to go to the Gods, very good Maſters, 'and hope to meet with good Men, and am 'of good courage, hoping that ſomething of 'Man ſubſiſts after death, and that it is then 'much better with the good than with the 'bad. Here *Crito* interrupting him, told him 'that he who was to adminiſter the Poiſon, 'advis'd him to ſpeak little, and not heat himſelf 'with diſpute, for it agreed not with that 'kind of Poiſon, which ſome neglecting, 'had bin conſtrained to take it two or three 'times: mind him not, ſaid *Socrates*, let him 'provide as much as may ſerve twice or thrice, 'if need be; then he proceeded in a large Diſcourſe to declare that the chief office of a Philoſopher is to meditate on death; therefore he ought not to fear the approach of it; That as death is the ſolution of the Soul from the Body, ſo is it the office of a Philoſopher to free the Soul from corporeal affections; That if we underſtand the better, the more the Soul is diſengaged from ſenſe, we ſhall underſtand moſt perfectly when ſhe is wholly freed from the Body by death, which perfection of knowledge is the ſole end of Philoſophy.

This part of the diſcourſe ended, *Cebes* occaſions the renewing of it by the deſiring him to prove the immortality of the Soul, which he doth firſt from the neceſſary ſucceſſion of generation and corruption as contraries, the ground of the *Pythagorean* tranſmigration; next from the Souls manner of reaſoning, which being only by reminiſcence argues it had a being before the Body (when it had perfect knowledge of thoſe Ideas which upon occaſion of ſenſible objects it recovers) and conſequently ſhall ſubſiſt after it; much more is ſpoken by *Plato* under his name, whereof almoſt all is manifeſtly *Plato*'s own, nor is it poſſible to ſelect that which is not from the reſt; the concluſion of his diſcourſe (as contracted by *Cicero*) was, 'That there are two *Tuſc. quæſt.* 'ways, and a twofold courſe of Souls when *pag.* 127. 'they go out of the Body: for ſuch as have 'defiled themſelves with humane vices given 'over to pleaſures wherewith they are blin-'ded, according as they are polluted with do-'meſtick ſins, or have uſed inexpiable deceits 'to wrong the publick, take a by-way ſeclu-'ded from the Counſel of the Gods: But they 'who have preſerved themſelves intire and 'chaſt from the leaſt contagion of their Bodies, 'having always withdrawn themſelves from 'them, and in humane fleſh imitated the lives 'of Gods, find a ready way open for them, 'leading them to thoſe from whom they came: 'and as Swans are (not without reaſon) ſa-'cred to *Apollo*, becauſe they ſeem to have 'learnt divination from him, whereby foreſee-'ing the good that is in death they dye with 'Songs and delight; ſo ought all good and 'knowing perſons to do: * Let every one * *Plat.* 'therefore prepare for this journey againſt the 'time that fate ſhall call him away; You *Simmi-'as*, *Cebes*, and the reſt here preſent ſhall go at 'your appointed hour, me fate now ſum-'mons (as the Tragedian ſaith) and perhaps 'it is time that I go into the Bath, for I think it 'beſt to waſh before I take the Poiſon, that I 'may ſave the Women the labour of waſhing 'me when I am dead.

'When

'When he had made an end of ſpeaking, 'Crito asked him what directions he would 'leave concerning his Sons and other affairs, 'and if they could do any thing that might 'be acceptable to him? I deſire no more '(ſaith he) than what I have often told you, 'if you take care of your ſelves, whatſoever 'you do will be acceptable to me and mine, 'though you promiſe nothing; if you ne-'glect your ſelves and vertue, you can do 'nothing acceptable to us, though you pro-'miſe never ſo much; that, anſwered *Crito*, 'we ſhall obſerve; but how will you be bu-'ried? as you think good, ſaith he, if you can 'catch me, and that I give you not the ſlip, 'then with a ſmile applying himſelf to us, I 'cannot perſwade *Crito*, ſaith he, that I am 'any thing more than the Carkaſs you will a-'non behold, and therefore he takes this care 'for my enterrment; it ſeems that what even 'now I told him that as ſoon as I have taken 'the Poiſon I ſhall go to the joys of the bleſ-'ſed, hath been to little purpoſe; he was my 'Bail, bound to the Judges for my appearance, 'you muſt now be my Sureties to him that I 'am departed; let him not ſay that *Socrates* is 'carried to the Grave, or laid under ground, 'for know, dear *Crito*, ſuch a miſtake were a 'wrong to my Soul; be not dejected; tell the 'World my Body only is buried, and that af-'ter what manner thou pleaſeſt. This ſaid, 'he aroſe and retir'd into an inner Room, ta-'king *Crito* with him, leaving us diſcourſing 'upon our own miſery, ſhortly to be deprived 'like Orphans of ſo dear a Father. Af-'ter his bathing, came his Wife and the other 'Women of his Family with his Sons, two 'of them Children, one a youth; when he had 'taken order with theſe about his domeſtick 'affairs, he diſmiſt them and came out to 'us.

'It was now Sun-ſet (for he had ſtaid long 'within) when the Officer entred, and after a 'little pauſe ſaid, I have not, *Socrates*, obſerv'd 'that carriage in you which I have found in 'others, but as I thought you the moſt generous, 'the mildeſt and beſt of all Men that ever came 'into this place, ſo I now ſee you hate me, not 'for that whereof others are the cauſe: you 'know the meſſage I bring, farewel, bear what 'you cannot remedy: with that he departed 'weeping; and fare thee well, (ſaid *Socrates*) 'I will: How civil is this Man? I found him 'the ſame all the time of my impriſonment, he 'would often viſit me, diſcourſe with me, uſed 'me always courteouſly, and now ſee how kind-'ly he weeps for me: but come, *Crito*, let us do 'as he bids us, if the Poiſon be ready, let it be 'brought in; the Sun is yet ſcarce ſet, anſwers 'Crito: others take it late after a plentiful Sup-'per and full Cups; make not ſo much haſte, 'there is time enough; he replies, they who do 'ſo think they gain time, but what ſhall I gain 'by drinking it late? only deceive my ſelf as 'covetous of life, and ſparing of that which is no 'longer mine; pray let it be as I ſay; then 'Crito ſent one of the Attendants, who immedi-'ately returned, and with him the Man that 'was to adminiſter the Poiſon, bringing a Cup 'in his hand, to whom *Socrates*, prethee honeſt 'friend (for thou art well verſt in theſe buſi-'neſſes) what muſt I do? nothing, ſaid he, but 'as ſoon as you have drunk, walk till you find 'your legs begin to fail, then lie down, and in 'ſo ſaying, he gave him the Cup; *Socrates* 'took it chearfully, not changing either coun-'tenance, or colour; and looking pleaſantly up-'on him, demanded whether he might ſpill 'any of it in libation, who anſwered, he had 'made no more than would juſt ſerve; yet, 'ſaith *Socrates*, I may pray to God, and will 'that my paſſage hence may be happy, which 'I beſeech him to grant, and in the ſame in-'ſtant drank it off eaſily without any diſtur-'bance; many of us who till now had refrained 'from tears, when we ſaw him put the Cup 'to his Mouth and drink off the Poiſon, were 'not able to contain any longer; which *Socra-'tes* obſerving, *friend* (ſaith he) *what mean you? 'for this reaſon I ſent away the Women leſt they 'ſhould be ſo unquiet: I have heard we ſhould die with 'gratulation and applauſe, be quiet then and take it 'patiently*; Theſe words made us with ſhame 'ſuppreſs our tears; when he had walked a 'while, perceiving his legs to fail, he lay 'down on his back as the Executioner directed 'him; who looking on his feet pinched them 'hard, asked him if he felt it, he anſwered no; 'he did the like to his legs, and ſhowing us how 'every part ſucceſſively grew cold and ſtiff, 'told us when that chilneſs came at his heart he 'would die; not long after he ſpake theſe 'his laſt words, *O* Crito *I owe* Æſculapius *a 'Cock, pay it, neglect it not.* It ſhall be done, 'ſaith *Crito*, will you have any thing elſe? he 'made no anſwer, lay ſtill a while, then ſtretch-'ed himſelf forth; with that the Executioner 'uncovered him, his eyes were ſet, *Crito* cloſed 'them. This (ſaith *Plato*) was the end of 'the beſt, the wiſeſt, and moſt juſt of Men: A Story, which *Cicero* profeſſeth, he never read without tears.

*Ariſtotle* ſaith, that a *Magus* coming from *Syria* to *Athens*, not only reprehended *Socrates* for many things, but foretold him alſo that he ſhould die a violent death. *Laertius* cloſeth his life with this Epigram,

*Drink* Socrates *with* Jove, *next whom enthron'd,*
*By Gods, and wiſdom's ſelf as wiſeſt own'd.*
*Thee, the* Athenians *gave a poiſ'nous draught,*
*But firſt the ſame they from thy lips had quaft.*

## CHAP. XIV.

### *What happened after his Death.*

HE was buried with tears and much ſolemnity (contrary to his own direction) by his friends, amongſt whom, † the exceſſive grief of *Plato* is obſerved by *Plutarch*, and the mourning habit of *Iſocrates*: As ſoon as they had performed that laſt ſervice, fearing the cruelty of the Tyrants, they ſtole out of the City, the greater part to *Megara* to *Euclid*, where they were kindly received, † the reſt to other parts.

† *Plut. de vit. mor.*

* *Plut. vit. d'c. Orat.*

† *Liban.*

†Socrat. Epist. * Soon after, a *Lacedæmonian* youth, who had never more acquaintance with *Socrates* than what fame gave him, took a journey to *Athens*, intending to become his Disciple; being come as far as the City-Gates, and ready to enter, with joy to be so near the end at which he aimed, instead of *Socrates*, he meets there the news of his death, whereat he was so troubled, that he would not go within the City-gates, but enquiring the place where he was buried, went thither, and breaks forth into a passionate discourse, accompanyed with many tears, to the enclosed dead Body; when night was come, he fell asleep upon the Sepulcher; the next morning, affectionately kissing the dust that lay upon it, and with much passion taking leave of the place, he returned to *Megara*.

*Suidas* tells a like Story (for that there were more examples than one in this kind, *Libanius* implies) of a *Chian*, named *Cyrsas*, who coming to *Athens* to hear *Socrates*, went to his Tomb, and slept there, to whom *Socrates* appeared in a dream, and discoursed with him; with which only satisfaction he went directly home again.

†Socrat. Epist. † By these accidents the *Athenians* were awakened into a sense of their injustice, considering they were obnoxious to the censure of the *Lacedæmonians* by extraordinary crimes, whose Children were so affectionate to the Philosophers whom they had murdered, as to take such long journeys to see *Socrates*, whom they would not keep when he was with them; hereat they became so exasperated, that they were ready to tear those wicked Men, that were the occasion of his death, piecemeal with their Teeth, the whole City cried out, they disclaimed the act, and that the authors thereof ought to be put to death, † *Antisthenes* furthered their rage by this means, *Some young Men of* Pontus *invited to* Athens *by the fame of* Socrates, *met with* Antisthenes, *who carried them to* Anytus, *telling them, he was much wiser than* Socrates; *whereupon those that were present, with much indignation, turned* Anytus *out of the City:* thence he went to *Heraclea*, where some say the Citizens also expelled him, * others that they stoned him to death: *Melitus* was by the *Athenians* condemned and put to death, * others affirm the like of all his accusers without tryal, * *Plutarch*, *that they so much hated them, as they would not suffer them to kindle fire at their houses, they would not answer them any question, they would not wash with them, but threw away the water they had touch'd as impure, until unable to brook this hatred, they hanged themselves.*

† Laert. vit. Antisth.

*Themist. Orat. 2.

* Laert.

* Diod. Sic. 14.

Socratic. Epist.

* De invid. & dio.

In further testimony of their penitence, they called home his friends to their former liberty of meeting, they forbad publick spectacles of games and wrestling for a time, they caused his Statue, made in Brass by *Lysippus*, to be set up in the *Pompeum*, and (a Plague ensuing, which they imputed to the injustice of this act) they made an order, that no Man should mention *Socrates* publickly, or on the Theater, that so they might forget what they had done: *Euripides* (restrained by this order from doing it directly) reproached them covertly in a Tragedy, named *Palamedes* (in whom he alluded to *Socrates*) particularly in these verses.

*A Philomele ne'er mischief knew,* *
*Is slain (alas) is slain by you.*

* Τὸν ἀεὶ μὲν ἀλγύνουσαν ἀηδόνα: Fuit μύθος seems to have been some gloss to explain ἀηδόνα. So Callimach. Epig. Ἀεὶ δὲ τὴν ζωὸν ἀηδόνες.

At which words, all the spectators understanding they were meant of *Socrates*, fell a weeping.

† In Æditt.

*The death of this sole person* (saith † *Eunapius*) *brought a general calamity upon the City; for it may easily be collected by computation of times, that from thence forward the* Athenians *did nothing considerable, but the City by degrees decayed, and with it all* Greece.

## CHAP. XV.

### *Of his person and vertues.*

AS to his person, he was (a) very unhandsome, of a melancholy complexion, (b) bald, (c) a flat nose, eyes sticking out, a severe down-cast look, difficult in speech, and (d) too concise, his language rough and careless, but more efficacious than all the eloquence of *Themistocles*, *Pericles*, or any other; so acute, that he could maintain either side in any question, and therefore is reproached by *Aristophanes*, as having two languages, whereof one was to defend wrong; fervent in dispute, often so transported, that he would beat himself, and tear his Beard, to the derision of the standers by, which he took quietly: Patient to be redargued; (e) sometimes he covered his face in discourse, that he might not be diverted by any object of sight: (f) His constitution strong and hardy, (g) which he preserved such, by taking diligent care of his health; (h) well bearing cold, hunger, and upon occasions, excess of Wine without disturbance: (i) His habit the same in Winter as in Summer, having but one garment a year; (k) no Shoos, his diet sparing. In fine, his countenance promised so little, that (l) *Zopyrus* a Physiognomist who undertook to discover the dispositions of Men by their looks, said, he was stupid, because there were obstructions in his jugular parts; adding, he was given to Women and many other vices; whereat *Alcibiades*, and other friends of his that were present, knowing him free from those imputations, fell a laughing; but *Socrates* justined his skill, answering, he was by nature prone to those vices, but suppreſt his inclinations by reason, whence (m) *Alcibiades* used to say, he resembled the image of *Silenus* ((n) as he did indeed in his countenance, baldness, and flat nose) carved on the outside of little Boxes, sitting, and playing on a Pipe, for as those Boxes within held images of the Gods, so was he adorned with chastity, integrity, and all inward beauty, ravished, as (o) *Plutarch* saith, with a divine zeal to vertue, in all kinds whereof *Xenophon*, *Laertius*, and others, assert these instances.

(a) Plat. Phædr. Theæt.
(b) Schol. Aristoph.
(c) Plat. Phædr. Theætet.
(d) Plat. Protagor.
(e) Plut. Phædr.
(f) Sen. Epist. 1. 103.
(g) Xenoph. mem. 1. Laert.
(h) Plat. Sympos.
(i) Socrat. Epist. Liban.
(k) Plat. Phædr.
(l) Cicer. Tusc. quæst. 5. & fato.
(m) Plat. conviv.
(n) Schol. Aristoph. p. 136.
(o) Adversus Colot.

(p) *He was so wise, that he never erred in judging betwixt better and worse, nor thereto needed any other help:* Yet he constantly professed, that he only knew that he knew nothing: (q) for which reason he was by the Oracle of *Apollo* at *Delphi*, declared of all men the most wise in

(p) Xenoph.
(q) Plat. adversus Cotol. Liban. Apolog.

in this manner to *Charephon*, many witneſſes being preſent;

(r) Schol. Ariſtoph.

(r) *Wiſe* Sophocles, *wiſer* Euripides,
*But wiſeſt of all Men is* Socrates.

(ſ) Academ. quæſt. 1.

(ſ) *Apollo* (ſaith *Cicero*) conceiving the only wiſdom of mankind to conſiſt in not thinking themſelves to know thoſe things whereof they are ignorant. (t) This Oracle, though, he were nothing exalted with it himſelf, procured him much envy.

(t) Laert.

(u) Xen. memor. 4. p. 818. (w) Xen. mem. 1. p. 710.

(u) *He was ſo religious, that he never did any thing, without adviſing, firſt with the Gods,* (w) *never was known to attempt or ſpeak any impiety.*

(x) Plat. Phil.

(x) He bare a reverence to the Gods, not humane, but ſuch as tranſcended the greateſt fear: (y) Some ſay it was out of his great reverence to the Divinity that he uſed to ſwear by ((z) a Cock) a Dog, and a Plane-Tree, (under which they uſed to ſit) though it were interpreted Atheiſm.

(y) Suid.

(z) Schol. Ariſtoph.

(a) Laert.

(a) *He was conſtant, and a lover of the publick good, as appears in his acquitting the ten Captains, in his denying thirty Tyrants to fetch* Leon *in, his refuſing to eſcape out of Priſon, and reproving ſuch as grieved for his death.* (b) *Xantippe* uſed to ſay, that when the State was oppreſt with a thouſand miſeries, he always went abroad and came home with the ſame look, (c) never more chearful, or more troubled; for he bore a mind ſmooth and chearful upon all occaſions, far remote from grief, and above all fear: In his declining age, falling ſick, he was asked by one that came to viſit him, how he did? Very well (ſaith he) either way; if I live, I ſhall have more æmulation, if I dye, more praiſe.

(b) Ælian. Cic. Tuſc. quæſt. 3. offic. 1.

(c) Plin. 7. 29.

(d) Xenoph. mem. 4. 818.

(d) *He was ſo temperate, that he never preferred that which is pleaſant before that which is wholſome.* He never did eat more than appetite (which was his ſauce) made delightful; all drink was pleaſing to him, becauſe he never drank but when he was thirſty, and then with ſuch temperate caution, that (e) he poured out the firſt draught of water upon the ground, and if he were at any time invited to a feaſt, he, which to others is very difficult, with much eaſe took care not to eat more than conſiſted with his health, (f) whereof he was very careful, becauſe the exerciſes of the Soul depend thereon; and in order thereto, uſed to walk conſtantly before meals; whereupon being asked by one that obſerved it, what he did? I get broth, ſaith he, for my Supper. To this temperance it is imputed, though * *Athens* were often in his time viſited with the peſtilence, he alone eſcaped it.

(e) Plut.

(f) Xen. mem. 1. p. 712.

* Ælian. 13.

† Xenoph. memor. 1. p. 711. (h) Liban.

† *He was ſo frugal, that how little ſoever he had, it was always enough.* (h) Wanting the means to live ſplendidly, he ought not anxiouſly how to acquire more, but how to accommodate his manner of life to that which he had, (i) wherewith he was ſo contented, that he affirmed himſelf to come neareſt the Gods, becauſe he wanted leaſt. Seeing the great variety of things expoſed to ſale, he would ſay to himſelf, how many things there are that I need not; and often had in his Mouth theſe verſes.

(i) Laert.

*Purple, which Gold and Gems adorn,*
*Is by Tragedians to be worn.*

*Alcibiades* ambitiouſly munificent, ſent him many great Preſents; *Xantippe* admiring their value, deſired him to accept them: We (anſwered *Socrates*) will conteſt in liberality with *Alcibiades*, not accepting, by a kind of munificence what he hath ſent us. Ælian. 9

(k) To the ſame, who offered him a large plot of ground to build a houſe upon: And if I wanted ſhoos, (ſaith he) would you give me leather to make them? but deſerve I not to be derided if I accepted it? (k) Laert.

(l) He ſlighted *Archelaus*, King of *Macedonia*, and *Scopas*, Son of *Cranonias*, and *Eurilocus*, Son of *Lariſæus*, not accepting their Mony, nor going to them. (m) *Archelaus* ſending to him to deſire his company; He ſaid, he would not go to one, from whom he ſhould receive benefits, which he could not equal with return. (n) To *Perdiccas*, who demanded why he would not come to him, he anſwered, leſt I die the moſt ignoble death; that is, leſt I receive a benefit I cannot requite. (l) Laert. (m) Sener. de benefic. 5. 6. (n) Antonin. vit. lib. 11.

Coming home late one night from a feaſt, ſome wild young Men knowing of his return, lay in wait for him, attired like furies, with vizards and torches, whereby they uſed to affright ſuch as they met? *Socrates*, as ſoon as he ſaw them, nothing troubled, made a ſtand, and fell to queſtion them, according to his uſual manner, as if he had been in the *Lyceum*, or *Academy*. Ælian. 9.

(o) *He deſpiſed thoſe that cavilled at him,* (p) Being told, that ſuch a one had reviled him behind his back: Let him beat me, ſaith he, whilſt I am not by; and that another ſpoke ill of him: He hath not yet learnt, ſaith he, to ſpeak well. (o) Laert. (p) Stob. 71. (p) Laert.

(q) Being kicked by an inſolent young fellow, and ſeeing thoſe that were with him much incenſed, ready to purſue him; he ſaid, what if an Aſs kick me, would you have me kick again, or ſue him? but the fellow eſcaped not unpuniſhed, for every one reproached him for this inſolence, and called him the reviler, ſo that at laſt, for vexation, he hanged himſelf. (q) Plut. de educ. liber.

Another ſtriking him a box on the ear, he ſaid no more, but that it was hard a Man knew not when to go abroad with a helmet. Senec. de ira, 3.

Another fell upon him with much violence, which he endured without the leaſt diſturbance, ſuffering him to vent his anger, which he did ſo long, till he made his face all ſwelled and bruiſed. D. Baſil.

Whenſoever he perceived himſelf to grow incenſed with any of his friends, Plut. de ira cohib.

*Before the ſtorm aroſe;*
*He to a harbour goes.*

He uſed to moderate his voice, to look ſmilingly and moderately upon them, reſerving himſelf untainted with paſſion, by recourſe to the contrary.

(r) *He taught not ſuch as converſed with him to be covetous, for he took no Mony of his Scholars, therein expreſſing his own liberality.* (r) Xenoph. memor. pag. 712.

(s) Laert. (s) *Hunger or want could never force him to flatter any*: Yet was he very complaisant and facete in company: as he one day openly at dinner reproved one of his friends something harshly, *Plato* said to him, had not this been better told in private? *Socrates* immediately answered, and had not you done better, if you had told me so in private? (t) Being demanded what Countriman he was? He answered, neither of *Athens*, nor *Greece*, but of the World. Sometimes he would feast in a fine Robe, as *Plato* describes him, and when the time allowed, learned to Sing, saying, it was no shame to learn any thing which one knew not: He also danced every day, conceiving that exercise healthful; (u) nor was he ashamed to play with little Children.

(t) Plut. de exsul.

(u) Senec. de tranquil.

(w) Xenoph. memor. 4. p. 818. (w) *He was so just, that he never in the least wronged any Man, but on the contrary, benefited all such as conversed with him, as much as he could.*

(x) Quintil. 8. 4. (x) *His continence was invincible*: He despised the beauty of *Alcibiades*, derided *Theodota* and *Calliste*, two eminent Courtesans of that time.

(y) Xen. memor. 1. p. 731. (y) *He took great delight in the conversation of good Men, to such he communicated whatsoever he knew; with them he studied the writings of the antient wisemen, selecting what was good out of them* (which confirms what was said before in the life of *Solon*, that Moral Philosophy was commenc'd by the Sophoi) *and esteemed this mutual friendship which he contracted with them above all treasure.* (z) Towards this his outward endeavour was so affected and desired by them, as much as he affected and desired them.

(z) Xenoph. memor. 2. p. 752.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *His Wives and Children.*

HE had two Wives, the first *Xantippe*, a Citizens Daughter of *Athens*, as *Theodoret* affirms, who adds, that she was dishoneſt before he Married her, even with himself, besides others: *Athenæus* also saith, that after he was Married, he lent her to a friend, and that *Alcibiades* lay with her: But *Aristoxenus*, and *Porphyrius*, from whom these aspersions are derived, have been noted of too much malignity, to be of any authority.

(a) 1. 17. She was (according to the Character (a) *A. Gellius* gives her) curst, froward, chiding, and scolding always both day and night, (b) and for that reason he chose her, as he profest to *Antisthenes*, from observing, that they who would be excellent in Horsemanship, chose the rougheſt Horses, knowing, if they are able to manage them, they may easily rule others: He, desirous to use much conversation with Men, took her to Wife; knowing, if he could bear with her, he might easily converse with all Men. To *Alcibiades*, who said, her scolding was intolerable, he profest it was nothing to him, being used to it, like such as live in the continual noise of a Mill: Besides, saith he, cannot you endure the cackling of Hens? but they, answered *Alcibiades*, bring me Eggs and Chickens: and my *Xantippe*, replies *Socrates*, Children.

(b) Laert.

Of her impatience, and his sufferance, there are several instances; (c) one day before some of his friends, she fell into the usual extravagances of her passion, whereupon he not answering any thing, went forth with them, but was no sooner out of the door, when she running up into the Chamber, threw down water upon his head, whereat turning to his friends, Did I not tell you, saith he, that after so much Thunder we should have Rain?

(c) Lam.

(d) Another time she pulled his Cloak off from his Shoulders in the open *Forum*; some friends present counselled him to beat her: Yes, saith he, that whilst we two fight; you may all stand by, and cry, Well done, *Socrates*, to him *Xantippe*.

(d) Lam.

To some other Story in the same kind, (e) *Antoninus* alludes in these words: *how* Socrates *looked when he was fain to gird himself with a skin*, Xantippe *having taken his cloaths away, and carried them forth with her, and what he said to his friends, who out of a modest respectfulness, went back, seeing him so attired.*

(e) Lib. 2. 2

Having brought *Euthydemus* from the *Palestræ* to dine with him, *Xantippe* running to the table, angry, and scolding, overturned it; *Euthydemus* much troubled, rose up, and would have gone away, when *Socrates* did not: a Hen, saith he, the other day did the very same thing at your House, yet I was not angry thereat.

Plut. de in. cohib.

*Alcibiades* having sent him a curious Marchpane, *Xantippe* furiously (as her manner was) threw it out of the Basket, and trod upon it: whereat *Socrates* laughing, *and shall not you* (saith he) *lose your share in it?*

Ælian. in. hist. 11. 12.

Another time she offered to go to a publick show attired undecently; Take heed, saith he, you be not rather the spectacle than the spectator.

Ælian. 7. 10. Laert. Stob.

With reason therefore he said, I had three evils, Grammar, Poesy, and an ill Wife; two I have shaken off, but my ill Wife I cannot.

Stob. 183.

His other Wife was named *Myrto*, (f) Niece to *Lysimachus* Daughter of *Aristides*, not the just, as *Laertius*, and from him *Suidas* affirm; but another of that name, the third from him, as is observed by *Athenæus*, for the two Daughters of *Aristides* the just, could not but be of great age before the 77. Olympiad, wherein *Socrates* was born, long before which time *Aristides* died an old Man in *Exile*; for that *Themistocles* died the second year of the 77. Olympiad is certain, and as *Æmilius Probus* affirms, *Aristides* dyed four years before *Themistocles* was banished *Athens*, hereupon *Plutarch* more cautiously calls her not the Daughter, but Niece of *Aristides*.

(f) Theod

Some because *Xantippe* (as is manifest from *Plato*) out-lived him, believe he was first married to *Myrto*, but that he had both these Wives at the same time, which is attested by *Demetrius Phalerens*, *Aristoxenus* (to whom *Athenæus* saith, that *Aristotle* gave the ground) *Callisthenes* and *Porphyrius*: whence *Aristippus* in his (g) Epistle to his Daughter *Myrto*, advised her to go to *Athens*, and above all to honour *Xantippe* and *Myrto*, and to live with them as he with *Socrates*.

(g) Socratic. Epist.

The

The occasion, whereupon the *Athenians*, who from the time of *Cecrops* had strictly observed single Marriage, allowed bigamy, in the time of *Socrates*, was this; In the second year of the 87. Olympiad, and the third of the 88. *Athens* was visited extreamly with the Pestilence, which attended by War and famine, occasioned so great a scarcity of Men, that they made an edict it might be lawful for any that would to take two Wives. *Euripides* made use of this indulgence, and that *Socrates* also did so, is attested by *Satyrus* the peripatetick, and *Hieronymus* the *Rhodian*, who recorded the order; to which *Athenæus* imputes the silence of the Comick Poets in this particular, who omitted no grounds of reproach. *Plutarch* implies, that he took her out of charity, for she was a widow (g) without any portion or Dowery) extreamly in want.

(g) *Laert.*

(h) *Theodoret.* (i) *Porphyrius* reports, that when these two (*Xantippe* and *Myrto*) quarrel'd, they would at last fall both upon *Socrates*, and beat him, because he stood by and never parted them, but laughed as well when they fought with him, as with one another.

By *Xantippe* he had a son named *Lamprocles*, who could not brook her impatience so well as his Father, and being vext by her into disobedience, was reclaimed by *Socrates*; He died young, as may be gathered from *Plutarch*, who saith, *Timarchus* of *Charonea*, dying very young, desired earnestly of *Socrates* that he might be buried near his Son *Lamprocles*, who died but few days before, being his dear friend, and of the same age. It appears from *Plato*, that he had more Sons by her, for in his Apology he mentions three, two grown Men; the other a Child, which seems to be the same, brought by *Xantippe* to him in Prison the day of his Death, and as *Plato* describes it, held in her lap.

By *Myrto* he had two Sons: the eldest *Sophroniscus*, the youngest *Menedemus*, or *Menexenus*, though some say he had *Menedemus* by *Xantippe*.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *His Scholars and Auditors.*

(a) *De Orator. lib. 3.* WHereas (saith (a) *Cicero*) *many springing from* Socrates *by reason that out of his several various disputes diffused every where, one laid hold of one thing, another of another; there were some, as it were, so many several Families differing amongst themselves, much disjoyned and disagreeing; yet all these Philosophers would be called, and conceived themselves to be Socraticks: of these were*

Plato, *from whom came* Aristotle *and* Xenocrates, *the first taking the name of* Peripatetick, *the other of* Academic.

Antisthenes, *who chiefly affected the patience and hardiness in* Socrates *his discourse, from whom came first the* Cynics, *then the* Stoicks.

Aristippus, *who was more delighted with his more voluptuous disputations, from him sprung the* Cyrenaick *Philosophy.*

*Others there were who likewise called themselves* Socraticks, *but their Sects by the strength and arguments of the former are broken and quite extinct: such were*

Phædo, *an* Elean, *who instituted a particular School, from him called* Eliack, *which afterwards was called* Eretriack, *from* Menedemus *who taught at* Eretria, *from him* Pyrrho, *thence the* Pyrrhonians.

Euclid *of* Megara, *institutor of the* Megarick *School, so named from* Clinomachus *his Disciple called the Dialectick, ending in* Zeno *the* Citian, *who introduced the Stoick.*

The Herillians *are named also as a Scot that would be called* Socratick. To these recited by *Cicero, Suidas* adds

*Bryso* of *Heraclea*, who together with *Euclid* invented disputative Logick.

*Theodorus* sirnamed the *Atheist*, who invented a peculiar Sect called *Theodorean*, the opinion which he taught was ἀδιαφορία indifference.

Other Disciples of *Socrates* there were, who followed his Philosophy, not appropriating out of it any particular Sect, and therefore most properly deserve the title of *Socraticks*, such are *Crito*, *Chærephon*, *Xenophon*, *Æschines*, *Simias*, *Cebes*, *Glauco*, and *Terpsion*.

The last kind of his auditours were those who made no profession of Philosophy, of whom were

*Critias* and *Alcibiades*, who afterwards proved the most ambitious Spirits of the *Athenians*, but it was discovered in neither whilst they convers'd with *Socrates*, either that their youth was not capable of expressing their vice, or that they cunningly complied (as *Xenophon* conjectures) with *Socrates*, in hopes of being by his conversation enabled to manage their forward designs, which as soon as they attempted they left off their friendship with *Socrates*, *Critias* fell from him and converted his affection into hate, because he reproved his love to *Euthydemus*; *Alcibiades* naturally dissolute, was reclaim'd by *Socrates* and continued such whilst he conversed with him; He was of form so exquisite as gave occasion to some to caluminate the friendship betwixt him and *Socrates*, to which effect *Aristoxenus* is cited by *Laertius* and *Athenæus*, and some verses of *Aspasia* by the latter; his vindication we refer to *Plato* and *Xenophon*.

Of *Socrates* his instructions to *Alcibiades* there are these instances.

(b) He told him that he was nothing of what a Man ought to be; that he had no advantage by the greatness of his birth above an ordinary Porter; whereat *Alcibiades* much troubled with tears besought him to instruct him in virtue, and to reform his vices.

(b) *Cicer. Tusc. quæst. Plat. conviv. Plutarch.*

(c) Perceiving *Alcibiades* to be exceeding proud of his Riches and lands; he showed him a Map of the World, and bad him find *Attica* therein; which done, he desired that he would show him his own lands; he answered, they were not there. Do you boast, replies *Socrates*, of that which you see is no (considerable) part of the Earth?

(c) *Ælian. 3. 28.*

(d) *Alcibiades* being by reason of his youth bashful and fearful to make an Oration to the people, *Socrates* thus encouraged him, Do you not esteem (saith he that Shoomaker (naming him) an inconsiderable fellow? *Alcibiades* assenting, and so likewise (continues he) that Crier and

(d) *Ælian. 2. 1.*

and that Tentmaker? *Alcibiades* granting this, doth not, saith he, the *Athenian* Commonwealth consist of these? if you contemn them single, fear them not in assembly. To these add

(e) *Laert. vit. Crit.* (e) The four Sons of *Crito* the Philosopher; The eldest *Critobulus* (f) exceeding handsome and rich, but by *Socrates* (who valued his own estate at five *minæ*) (g) demonstrated to be poorer than himself.

(f) *Macrob. Saturn. 7. 3.*

(g) *Xenoph. mem.*

(h) *Xenoph. mem.* The second *Aermogenes*, (h) who falling into poverty, *Socrates* perswaded *Diodorus* his friend to entertain.

(i) *Xenoph. mem. 4. p. 786.* The third *Epigenes*, (i) a young Man of an infirm body whom *Socrates* advised to study his own health, as that wherein consisted the well-being and knowledge of his mind.

The youngest *Crefippus*.

Ἅπτα μαθητὰς ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς, Σοκράτης δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς καὶ φιλοσοφικοῖς. Of Poets, *Euripides* (as the writer of his life affirms and *Euenus*.

(k) ὡς ἀναγινωσκόμενον, μᾶλλον ἢ χ ὅλον (read ἔυκολον, to which effect also Plutarch) νομίζεσθαι, χαλεπὸν δὲ εὐείσκεσθαι ζηλᾶν πεφυκότος. *Dion. Halicarn. in Critic.* Of Oratous *Lysias*, eminent in that kind (k) easie to be understood, hard to be imitated; he came to *Athens* in the second year of the 82. Olympiad. *Lysis*, whom of refractory he made pliant, and *Isocrates*, of whom when very young, *Socrates* presaged great things. In the number of his Scholars and Auditors were also

(l) *Plat. Apol.* (l) *Adimantus* and (m) *Glauco* Sons to *Ariſto*, brothers to *Plato*: and *Charmides* Son of *Glauco*.

(m) *Xenop. mem. 3. p. 772. & p. 774. Laert.* *Glauco* before he was 20. years old had taken upon him to be an Orator, and aimed at some great office in the Common-wealth, not to be wrought off from this fancy which made him every where appear ridiculous, untill addrest by some friends to *Socrates*, who made him acknowledge his own error and ignorance of that which he had undertaken. On the contrary his Son *Glauco* of excellent parts fit for any office in the Common-wealth, yet timorously shunning all publick affairs, was by *Socrates* induced to undertake the Magistracy.

(n) *Plat. Apol.* (n) *Nicoſtraſtus* Son of *Theodotides* and his brother *Theodotus*.

(o) *Plat. ibid.* (o) *Æantodorus*, and his brother *Apollodorus*. *Lyſanias*, Father of *Æſchines*.

(p) *Xenoph. mem. 2. p. 743.* (p) *Charecrates*, brother to *Charephon*, betwixt whom there was a great quarrel, but reconciled by *Socrates*.

(q) *Plat. Apol.* (q) *Paralus*, Son of *Demodocus* whose brother was *Theages*.

(r) *Plat. Apol.* (r) *Antipho* a Cephisiean, Father of *Epigenes*: with whom he discourses of self-sufficience,

(ſ) *Memor. 1. p. 729. 731. 732.* teaching *gratis*, and of veracity in (ſ) *Xenophon*.

*Eumares* a Phliasian, and *Xenomedes*, an *Athenian*.

Besides these, there are with whom *Socrates* discoursed and instructed.

(t) *Xen. mem. 1. p. 725.* (t) *Ariſtodemus* sirnamed *the little*, who would not sacrifice, pray, or use divination, but derided all such as did, was by *Socrates* convinc'd.

(u) *Xen. mem. 2.* (u) *Ariſtarchus* troubled that he had a charge of kindred lying upon him, by *Socrates* converted to a willing liberality towards them.

*Xen. mem. 2.* *Eutherus*, who returning from travel, his lands taken away, his Father having left him nothing, chose rather to follow a trade than to apply himself to friends, but diverted by *Socrates*.

*Xen. mem. 2.* *Diodorus*, whom *Socrates* perswaded to take *Hermogenes*.

*Xen. mem. 4.* *Enthydemus*, who had collected many sentences of Poets and Sophists, thought he excelled all his equals, and hoped no less of his superiours, was by *Socrates* constrained to acknowledge his own error and ignorance, and departed much troubled.

*Xen. mem. 4.* *Hippias* an *Elean*, with whom *Socrates* discoursed of Justice.

(w) *Xenoph.* (x) *Laert.* (y) Περὶ στρουθοῦ ἐστι ὃς ἀλεκτορίδας Ἰνδικὰς ἐκτρέφει ἃς ὁρῶν ἀλεκτρυόνας ἑαυτῶν ὑπερεχούσας ἐπαίρεται καὶ ἀνθίσταται μαχόμενος. (z) *Plat. Laert.* (w) *Nicomedes*, *Pericles* and *Iphicrates*, with whom he discoursed concerning the office of a General. (x) Into the last he infused courage by showing him the Cocks of *Midas* (y) brustling against those of *Callias*.

(z) *Theætetus* disputing of knowledge, he dismist, inspired as it were with divine wisdom.

(a) *Plat. Laert.* (a) *Euthyphron* who intended to accuse his own Father, he disswaded.

(b) *Xenophon mem. 3.* With *Parrhasius* a Painter, *Clito* a Statuary, and *Pistias* an armourer: he disputes in (b) *Xenophon* concerning their several Arts.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *His Writings.*

THey who affirm that *Socrates* writ nothing (as *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, *Dion*, *Chrysostom*, *Aristides*, *Origen*, and others) mean in respect to his Philosophy, in which kind he never wrote any thing himself, but what he discoursed was committed to writing by *Xenophon*, *Plato* and others of his Scholars. Hence the works of *Plato* (particularly *Phædo*,) went under the name of *Socrates*, and are so cited by *Aristotle*; But that some things were written by *Socrates* himself, is evident from those who affirm

(c) *Laert.* (c) *He writ together with* Euripides, and aided him in making Tragedies, whence *Mneſilochus*.

*The Phrygians is* Euripides *new play.*
*But* Socrates *gave it the best array.*

And again, *Euripides is steer'd by* Socrates *and* Callias.

*Now thou with pride and self-conceit ore'flowest;*
*But all the cause to* Socrates *thou owest.*

(d) *Tusc. quæst. 4.* Hither refer we that of (d) *Cicero*, who saith, when *Euripides* made his play *Oreſtes*, *Socrates* revoked the three first verses. He writ also *Some Fables of* Æsop *in verse*, not very elegant, mentioned by *Plato*, *Plutarch*, and *Laertius*, beginning thus:

*To those who dwelt in* Corinth, Æsop *said,*
*Vertue with vulgar wisdom be not weigh'd.*

*A Pean or hymn in honour of* Apollo *and* Diana: One that went under his name beginning thus.

*Delian*

Dælian Apollo, *and thou fair,*
Diana, *hail*; *immortal pair.*

is by *Dyonysidorus* denied to be his: This is mentioned also by *Plato*, to which some add

(e) Laert. vit. Xenoph. (e) *The Encomium of* Gryllus, Son of *Xenophon*, slain in the *Mantinean* fight, which the disagreement of times will not allow; more certain it is he framed

(f) *Dialogues*, which he gave to *Æschines*, seeing him in want, that he might get mony by them; to these add (f) Laert. vit. Æschin.

*Epistles*, some whereof are published by *Leo Allatius*; that he writ more is implyed by *Arrian* and *Athenæus*

# Socrates his Epistles.

## *Epistle I.*

YOU seem unacquainted with my resolutions, else you would not have sent the second time, and enlarged your offers; but you believe *Socrates*, as well as the Sophists, mercenary of his counsel, (a) and that what I writ before was not real, but only to draw great overtures from you: therefore now you promise wonders, in confidence to oblige me by your many Presents to quit my interest and commerce with the *Athenians*, and to come over to you: I think it most unbeseeming a Philosopher to sell his advice, and extreamly contrary to my practice; for ever since by Gods command I first entered into Philosophy, I was never known to take any thing, but keep my exercises in publick, (b) for every one to hear that will; I neither lock the door when I teach, as is reported of *Pythagoras*, nor go abroad to the multitude, and exact Mony of the hearers, as some heretofore have done, and some in our times yet do; I have enough from within my self, should I accept of more from others, I know not where to deposite it, nor whom to trust better than the givers themselves, whose faith, if I suspect, I shall be thought improvident to confide in; if honest, I can receive from them, though I lay up nothing with them; for they that would be faithful keepers of mony, will not be unfaithful preservers of their own gratitude, and they will never go about to defraud me of what they would have given, but receiving that of me *gratis*, for which others take mony, they will (c) consider me when I want. In a word, if friends, they will, (d) like you, impart of their own to us; if not friends, they will seek to deprive us of what is ours.

Besides, I have not leisure to hoard up Mony, but wonder at them that say, they get riches (e) for their own sake, and have a high opinion of themselves for their means, who neglect learning to addict themselves to gain, and so become admired for their riches, derided for their ignorance, esteemed for all things except themselves. (f) But if we so much abhor to have recourse to friends, (g) to depend on others to eat their bread, how comes it that we are not ashamed to suffer the same from Mony? do we not know that these Men are respected only for their wealth, and if fortune turn, they live in all disrespect? they are not fully contented when they are in esteem, because it is not for their own sakes, but in disesteem are much more discontented, being themselves the cause of their own dishonour.

First, therefore you were mistaken, if you did imagine *Socrates* would do that for Mony which he would not without, not knowing that many occasions, but chiefly the necessities of my Country detain me: wonder not that I say I discharge my Countries business, being not imployed either in Army or Court, every one ought to apply himself to that which he is capable of, (h) things above his reach he must leave to others, and perform those that are within his compass: and in such Cities as this, not only counsellors or commanders for Sea or Land are requisite, but some likewise, that may (i) admonish others in their offices; for it is (k) nothing strange, that they fall as it were asleep, under the weight of their charge, and need a goad to waken them: Over these God hath placed me, for which I become, and not without cause, odious to them.

But he, in whom I most confide, will not suffer me to go, he knows better than my self what is good for me; when I resolved to come to thee, he with-held me, and when thou sentest the second time, forbid me, I dare not disobey him. *Pindar* taught this wisdom, saying, *When God points out the beginning of any work, it is the direct way to obtain vertue, the end glorious*: The verses are much to this purpose. Other Poets have said as much of the Gods, that what is undertaken with their advice, succeeds well; but what without God, is unprofitable to the undertakers. The wisest Cities of *Greece* consult the Oracle of *Delphi*, and as many as follow it have good success, who do not most commonly receive prejudice.

Yet I shall not wonder, if you give no faith to what I deliver of the *Demon*, for I have met with not a few alike incredulous; most of those that were in the *Delian* fight did not believe me; I was then in Arms, and sallied out of the City with the people to skirmish, many of us were dispersed in fight, and as we came to a certain way, the accustomed sign came upon me; I stopt,

(a) Allatius otherwise.

(b) τῷ ἀεὶ τι ὄντι, ᾧ μή. in this sence the words are passable (so is not the interpretation of Allatius, *æque omnibus audiendi etiam si nolint potestate facta.*) But I conceive the words of Socrates were τῷ αἰσθομένῳ τι καὶ μή.

(c) Allatius otherwise.

(d) For εἰς, ὑμῖν reading ὡς ὑμεῖς ὑμῖν.

(e) This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the particle καὶ, before αὐτὸς.

(f) otherways Allatius.

(g) reading προῖκα.

(h) Ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἐπέρων ἔχειν τὴν αἰτίαν, τῶν δὲ καὶ θάπτειν αὐτός. *Others* τῶν μὲν ἐπέρων; *by which we may have some light to find perhaps the true reading,* ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἐπὶ ἀνέχοι τὴν αἰτίαν.

(i) Allatius, otherwise.

(k) *Perhaps* ὑδὲν θαυμαστόν.

ſtopt, and ſaid, in my opinion, friends, we ſhould not go this way, for I heard the *Dæmon*'s voice: the greater part were angry, as if I had trifled at a time ſo ſerious; ſome few were perſwaded to go along with me another way, and got ſafe home; one that came from the others brought word they were all ſlain: ſome Horſemen returning from the purſuit, had fallen upon them, whom they at firſt reſiſted, but being at laſt encloſed by them, who were more in number, they gave back, and were in the end oppreſſed and killed; he that brought this news was dangerouſly wounded, and eſcaped only by help of his ſhield. I have alſo by inſtructions from God, foretold many events to particular perſons.

You offer part of your Kingdom, and invite me to it, not as to a changed government; but to rule both your Subjects and your ſelf: but I confeſs, I have not learned to command, and would no more undertake to rule, not knowing how then to play at Dice, having never been taught: And doubtleſs if other Men were of the ſame mind, there would be fewer troubles in life; whereas now the confidence of ſuch as are ignorant, undertaking things they do not underſtand, occaſions theſe many diſturbances: Hence is it, they make fortune greater than ſhe is, and by their own folly, increaſe her power. Beſides, I am not ignorant, that a King ought to be more honoured and admired than a private Perſon, and as I would not undertake to be a Horſeman having no skill in Horſemanſhip, but had much rather be a Footman, though the charge be leſs honourable: the ſame is my opinion as touching Kings and private Perſons, nor puffed up by ambition will I deſire more glorious afflictions: they who invented the fable of *Bellerophon* ſeemed to imply ſomething to this purpoſe, for he was oppreſt with misfortunes, not becauſe he ſought to riſe higher in place, but for aiming at things above him, and being thrown down from his hopes, led the reſt of his life poorly and ignominiouſly, driven by mocks out of Cities into the Wilderneſs, and ſhunning path ways, not what we commonly call to, but the freedom wherewith every one orders his life. But let this be taken how the Poets pleaſe, my reſolution you now hear again, that I will not change this place for that, (*l*) conceiving this fitteſt for me: nor is God willing I ſhould, who hath been ever until now, my counſellor and guide.

(*l*) ἀμείνω δοκῶν Others, ἀμείνειν δοκῶν. Perhaps ἀμείνον εἶναι δοκῶν. Or ἐμμενεῖν δοκῶν.

### *Epiſt. II.*

YOU are not ignorant how great eſteem we have of *Chærephon*, who being choſen Ambaſſadour by the City to the *Peloponneſians*, will perhaps come to you; a Philoſopher is entertained with ſmall trouble, but the journey is dangerous, eſpecially becauſe of the tumults that are there at this time, from which, if thou protect him, thou wilt preſerve our friend and infinitely engage us.

### *Epiſt. III.*

ANeſo of *Amphipolis* was commended to me at *Potidæa*, he is now coming to *Athens*, being thrown out of his houſe by the people; for at preſent, affairs are much embroiled and clouded there, but I believe within a little while they will clear up. In aſſiſting him, you will oblige a deſerving perſon, and benefit both the Cities; *Amphipolis*, leſt by rebelling it incurr irremediable danger: Ours, leſt we be involved in their troubles as at this preſent we are reduced almoſt to extremity for *Potidæa*.

### *Epiſt. IV.*

MEeting with *Critobulus*, I perſwaded him to ſtudy Philoſophy, but I think he is of another mind, and more addicted to affairs of State, in which he intends to make choice of the fitteſt Method, and beſt inſtructor, for the moſt excellent ſojourn now in *Athens*, and with many of them we are intimate. Thus much concerning him; as for us, *Xantippe* and the Children are well, and I continue to do, as when you were with me.

### *Epiſt. V.*

WE hear you are at *Thebes*, and (*m*) *Proxenus* gone into *Aſia*, to take part with *Cyrus*; whether your deſigns will proſper God knows, they are here condemned by many, for it is conceived unfit the *Athenians* ſhould aſſiſt *Cyrus*, through whoſe means they were deprived of command by the *Lacedæmonians*, and fight for him, who fought againſt them. It is not therefore ſtrange if the State being altered, ſome be ready of themſelves to accuſe you of temporiſing, and the better your ſucceſs is, the greater will be their calumnies; for I am well acquainted with the diſpoſitions of ſome: But ſince we have undertaken this, let us prove our ſelves honeſt Men, and call to mind what we uſe to ſay of vertue, accounting this one of the beſt ſentences of the Poet, Our Father's houſe muſt not be diſcredited. Know therefore, that to War, theſe two are requiſite, Courage and Bountry; for this, we are loved of our friends; for that, feated of our Enemies: of both, thou haſt domeſtick precedents.

(*m*) Read Προξενὸς κατελαβὼν τὸν Ἀσίαν διαβαλῶν τὸν Ἀσίαν

### *Epiſt. VI.*

I Have taken ſuch care of your ſtrangers as you deſired, and retained one to plead their cauſe before the people, (*n*) a friend of ours, who profeſt himſelf the readier to undertake it, out of his deſire to ſerve thee.

(*n*) Perhaps Lyſias.

As for that which you write in jeſt concerning wealth, and ſuch as are ſollicitous for it, perhaps it is not unreaſonable. Firſt, becauſe whilſt others ſtudy to be rich, I chooſe to live meanly. Then though I might receive many gifts and Legacies from living and dead friends; yet I freely diſclaim them, and for a Man thus enclined, to be by others judged mad, is nothing ſtrange: But we muſt examine not this only, but the reſt of our life; and ſince we diſagree in the uſe, no wonder that we differ in the acquiſition of (*o*) Riches; my diet is very ſparing, my habit the ſame in Winter as in Summer: I never wear ſhoos, I am not taken

(*o*) For πλούτων read μάπτων.

ken with Popular applauſe, but with the ſtudy of wiſdom and integrity. But they who are intemperate, Luxurious in meat, not every year, but every day putting on new apparel, are tranſported with unlawful delights, and as they who loſe their natural complexion have recourſe to paint. So theſe loſing the true glory of virtue which every one ought to have, flie to that which depends upon complaiſance with others, courting vulgar applauſe with Largeſſes and Feaſts. Hence I ſuppoſe it comes, that they need much wealth; They themſelves cannot live upon a little, nor will others admit them into their ſociety, unleſs they receive a ſalary for commending them.

But my life is well as to both theſe, I will not deny but in ſome things I may fail, I know that wiſeſt Men prefer thoſe, moſt Men theſe; Reflecting ſometimes within my ſelf upon God; I find that he exceeds us, in that he hath need of nothing; it is the property of a moſt excellent nature not to want any thing, and to comprehend within himſelf all that he enjoys. Thus is he wiſer than others, who imitates the moſt wiſe (*p*), and happier, who reſembles the moſt happy. If riches could do this, riches were to be preferr'd; but ſince vertue only can obtain it, it were folly to forſake the real good to purſue the ſeeming. Hence I cannot eaſily be perſwaded but that my Condition is better than theirs.

As for Children, who as you ſay ought to be provided for, the care that I take for them, all Men may ſee, I know but one ground of happineſs, wiſdom. The fool who repoſeth his truſt in Gold, poſſeſſeth not that which he hath, and is withal ſo much more miſerable than others, in that they who are oppreſt with poverty may grow wiſe hereafter. But he out of an opinion of his own happineſs, neglecting true gain corrupted with plenty. (*r*) Beſides that he never yet obtained, mans eſſential good is depriv'd of hope thereof for the future. Nor is it poſſible that ſuch a Man can go on ſecurely to virtue, who is entangled in the flatteries of thoſe who are Maſters in all inſinuating Arts, and in the Charms of pleaſures which glide into the Soul through every ſenſe, and drive out all ſound and wiſe judgment. How then can he chooſe but give his Children occaſion of folly rather than inſtruction, who not only in words but actions expreſſeth that in theſe things he hath placed his hope, who not proving good, their ſubſiſtence fails, and they die miſerably for want of food: Juſtly puniſh'd for their idleneſs; Parents are by Law enjoyned to bring up their Children till they are Men. But you, perhaps ſome Citizen may ſay to his Sons greedy to inherit, ſpare me not dying, and whilſt you live relie for maintenance upon me, though dead not aſhamed to lead a life more lazy than death; you expect that my fortunes ſhould extend to others even after my deceaſe, but your own are not competent for your ſelves whilſt you are yet alive. Such rough ſpeeches happily he will uſe to his Children, taking the liberty both of a Father and a Patriot. My fortunes in the eſtimate of other Men are mean, but in the effect nothing inferior to the Rich. I will not leave my Children Mony, but a more honorable heritage, diſcreet friends, whom as long as they keep they can want as neceſſaries, and if they uſe them ill, doubtleſs they would uſe their Mony worſe.

But if to you, who know the negligence of friends, I ſeem to give ill advice; I anſwer, that all Men are not alike affected to their friends, for ſome take care of them after they are dead, and it is likely that ours are not of a neglectful humour, but pleas'd with the paſt advantage they have received by us, no leſs than with the preſent of a ſhort benefit, the requital is ſhort; laſting benefits produce a return equal to their profit, and I foreſee that what is mine, will hereafter appear more gracious to my friends, and therefore I exact no rewards of them. I account nothing of equal value in exchange with Philoſophy but friendſhip, nor like the Sophiſts have I any diffidence of thoſe things that are mine, for being old they renew, and in their decaying age (*t*) flouriſh, which makes them more acceptable to the Diſciples, and their Father more eſteemed; (*u*) Living he obtains honour, dead is thought worthy of memory, and if he leave a Kinſman behind him, they will reſpect him like his Nephews and Brethren, and ſhow him all kindneſs, as being allied to him by more than a Natural affinity; Neither if they would, can they neglect him in misfortunes, no more than we can ſlight them, who are near to us in Blood; for affinity in Soul forceth them to relieve the Son of the dead as if he were their own Brother; when they call to mind his Father, whoſe diſhonour they account their own.

Now judge if I order my affairs ill, or take no care for my Children, ſo as when I die they ſhall be deſtitute of neceſſaries, who leave them not wealth but ſuch Guardians as will have a care of them, and wealth. No Hiſtory makes mention of any Man that hath been made better by riches; A tried friend in this is to be preferr'd before tried Gold, that he is not beneficial to every one who deſires him, but to thoſe he loves beſt. Nor doth he ſupply only the neceſſities of life, but is ſerviceable as well to the Soul of him that hath him, and is moſt conducing to virtue, without which nothing profiteth; but we will conſider more exactly upon theſe things when we meet; thus much may ſerve as a curſory anſwer to your demand.

(*p*) Read μακαριώτατον ὑπάρχειν, &c.

(*q*) Perhaps. πρὸς οἷς ἅλυτον ἔσται, ἤδη γε τῶν ὄντως ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν προαπεστέρηται, &c. οἱ μὲν ἧς ἐπιτύχει δεῖ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν μεγαπεστερῆσθαι τὴν ἕξιν μᾶλλ. &c. Certainly Allatius cannot convince πρὸς ἧς to be uſed for παρὰ or ἢ ὡ.

(*r*) Others ἀν, ἀλόγοις ἄνον &c. which I chooſe, reading immediatly after for ἁλόσαντες, ἁλῶσαί τε.

(*t*) Perhaps ἀναθρεῖδαι. So Allatius ſeems to read.

(*u*) For μεῖ ὢν reading μειῶν.

## *Epiſt. VII.*

I Wonder not at what you write, that you do ſuſpect the Thirty continue the ſame mind to us ſince your departure, which they had when you were here. As ſoon as you were gone, they began to have a jealouſie of me, and there paſt amongſt them a murmur that theſe things were not done without *Socrates*; within few days they cited me to the Court, where ſome complaints were preferr'd againſt me, and when I defended my ſelf, they commanded me to go to the *Pyraum* to apprehend *Leon*, their intention was to put him to death, that they might enjoy his eſtate, and make me partner in their injuſtice: when I refuſed, and

ſaid ſomething to this effect that I would never willingly ſubſcribe to an unjuſt act; *Charicles* was preſent, and inwardly vext, *Socrates*, ſaith he, doſt thou think to talk thus peremptorily, and not ſuffer ten thouſand ills? *Charicles*, ſaid I, but none ſo hainous as to do unjuſtly. He anſwered not a word, nor any of the reſt, but ever ſince they have liked me the worſe.

As for you, ſome were then preſent, reported that your affairs ſucceed to your wiſh, that the *Thebans* in your exile received you kindly, and will aſſiſt your return to their utmoſt. Some were troubled at this news, and the more becauſe it leſſen'd their hopes of ſupply from *Lacedemon*, for they who came along with the Ambaſſadours, affirmed, that the *Lacedemonians* were engaged in a great War, and the *Ephori* hearing of theſe troubles, were diſcontented, and ſaid, that the *Lacedominians* had not intruſted them with the City to ſee it deſtroy'd; (*u*) for if they would have done ſo, it were moſt eaſie for them who had the Command, being withal inſtigated thereunto by the *Corinthians* and *Thebans*, and that the City might be better govern'd under an *Oligarchy* than a *Democracy*. If all this be true, and your affairs ſucceed as they report, there is great likelyhood that upon your coming in with the *Thebans*, the *Lacedemonians* not aiding theſe, all things here may be eaſily compoſed. Beſides, many of the Natives who now are quiet through fear, if they perceived never ſo little that you were firm, will readily forſake this party, becauſe in this government of the City nothing is left them entire but through many and continual enormities all is in confuſion; the greater part is revolted as well as you, the reſt if they had the leaſt encouragement from abroad would ſuffer the ſame that you have. So that if no other, yet this example would manifeſt that the greateſt unhappineſs of Cities is the wickedneſs of their Rulers, for they are ſo blinded with ſelf intereſt that they will not deſiſt, though they ſee all things go to ruine, but with what they firſt troubled, think to ſettle affairs, continuing baniſhments, ſequeſtrations, and unjuſt deaths; not conſidering he is an ill Phyſician who preſcribes for a Remedy the cauſe of the diſeaſe. But thoſe are incurable; you ſhall do well to have a care of your ſelf, for all that are here have but this hope left, if you act wiſely, to be freed from a heavy and grievous Tyranny.

(*u*) *Perhaps* ἐρεσίᾳ κραπίσαι, πονηρὰς ἐς ἐβέλοντο, *&c.*

THE

# THE CLOUDS OF ARISTOPHANES:

*Added (not as a Comical divertiſement for the Reader, who can expect little in that kind from a ſubject ſo antient, and particular, but) as a neceſſary ſupplement to the life of* Socrates.

## ACT I. SCENE I.

*Strepſiades, Phidippides, Servant.*

*Strepſ.* OH, oh,
Great *Jove*, how long a night is this, how endleſs!
Will't near be day? I heard the Cock again,
Yet ſtill my Servants ſnore; 'tis but of late
They durſt do thus: (*a*) curſe o'this War that awes me,
And will not ſuffer me to beat the Rogues.
My good Son ſleeps too, wrapt ore head and Ears:
Well, let me try to bear them company;
Alas, I cannot, ſo perplext and tortur'd
With charges, Bills for Horſe meat, intereſt:
All for this hopeful Son, who in's curl'd locks,
Aids matches, keeps his Coach, and dreams of Horſes,
Whilſt I (unhappy!) ſee'th unwelcome Moon
Bring on the Quarter day, and threaten uſemony.
Boy, ſnuff the light, bring my account-book hither,
That I may ſumm my debts and intereſt:
Let's ſee, twelve pound to *Paſia*, ha! twelve pound
To *Paſia*, how laid out? to buy (*b*) *Coppatia*:
Would I had paid this eye for him.
*Phid.* Hold *Philo*,
You'r out of the way, begin again.
*Strepſ.* I this,
This is the miſery that ruines me;
His very ſleeps are taken up with Horſes.
*Phid.* How many courſes will the manage hold.
*Strepſ.* Many a weary courſe thou leads thy Father:
But how much more owe I than this to *Paſia*?
Three pound t' *Aminias* for Chariot Wheels.
*Phid.* Go ſirrah, take that Horſe and turn him out.
*Strepſ.* I, thou haſt turned me out of all my means,
Charges at Law will eat me up, my Creditours
Threaten to ſue me to an execution.
*Phid.* Why do you wake all night, and toſs ſo, Father?
*Strepſ.* I cannot ſleep the Scrivener doth ſo bite me.
*Phid.* Yet let me reſt a little longer,
*Strepſ.* Do ſo.
All theſe will one day light upon thy head,
Curs'd be the hour when I firſt ſaw thy Mother,
I liv'd before moſt ſweetly in the Country,
Well ſtock't with Sheep and Bees, Olives and Grapes,
Till from the *Megaclean* houſe took I
This Niece of *Megacles* out of the City,
Well faſhion'd, highly bred, and richly cloathed;
We Married, as I ſaid, and lay together:
I ſmelling ſtrong of Drugs and greaſie Wool;
But ſhe of Unguents, *Crocus*, wanton Kiſſes,
Of vain expence, dainties, and luxury;
I will not tell the idle life ſhe led,
And yet ſhe ſpun that I have often told her,
Showing this Coat, you ſpin a fair thread, Woman.
*Serv.* Sir, all the Oyl ith' Lamp is waſted.
*Strepſ.* Ha?
Why didſt thou put in ſuch a Drunken wiek?
If thou wert near me I would beat thee.
*Ser.* Why, Sir?

(*a*) The *Athenians* in time of War with the *Lacedemonians* made an Edict, that no man ſhould beat his Servants, leſt they ſhould run over to the Enemy. *Schol.*

(*b*) Their Horſes were named from the marks they had, if K, *Copatia*; if an S, *Amphoras*. *Schol.*

ἀπαδᾶν, λίαν τρυφᾶν καὶ ἀπαλᾶν. *Sch. MS.*

*Strepſ.* Becauſe the wiek is thicker than the Oyl.
Well, my good Wife and I betwixt us got
At laſt this Son; about his name we differ'd;
Shee'd have it ſomething that belong'd to Horſes,
*Callippides*, *Xantippus*, *or Charippus*;
I from his Grandfather; *Phidonides*.
Long time we wrangled thus, at laſt agreed
He ſhould be called *Phidippides*; this Son
She takes, and ſtroaking kindly, thus inſtructs him,
"When thou art grown a Man, frequent the "City,
"Follow the faſhion, keep a Coach and Horſes,
"Like *Megacles* thy Uncle. No, ſaid I,
"Go in a homely Coat, and drive thy Goats
"Into (d) *Phalleus*, as thy Father doth.
(d) *A ſtony Craggy* place in *Attica*, in ſuch Goats delight moſt. *Scoli. M. S.*
But my advice prevailed ſo little on him,
That now he waſts my means in keeping Horſes,
Which all this night I have been thinking how
To remedy, and now have found the way;
To which could I perſwade him, I were happy.
*Phidippides*, *Phidippides*,
*Phid.* Your will, Sir.
*Strepſ.* Kiſs me, give me thy hand.
*Phid.* Here, Sir.
*Strepſ.* Doſt love me?
*Phid.* By *Neptune* God of Horſes.
*Strepſ.* Do not name
That God, for 'tis from him ſprings all my "ſorrow.
But if thou lov'ſt me truly, heartily,
O Son, be rul'd.
*Phid.* In what ſhould I be rul'd?
*Strepſ.* Change without more delay thy courſe of life,
And do as I would have thee.
*Phid.* What is that?
*Strepſ.* But wilt thou do it?
*Phid.* Yes by *Bacchus* will I.
*Strepſ.* Come hither then, ſeeſt thou that little door?
That is the (e) *Phrontiſterium* of wiſe Souls,
(e) Ἐν ᾧ δηλονότι καὶ φρονιτίζουσι περὶ θεῶν καὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων. *Schol. M. S.*
Of learned Men, that tell us Heaven's an Oven,
And we the Coals incloſed in the wide arch:
They, if we give 'em but a little mony,
Will teach us gain all cauſes, right or wrong.
*Phid.* Who can theſe be?
*Strepſ.* Their names I know not; good
They are, and buſied in continual ſtudy.
*Phid.* Oh now I know the wretches that you mean,
The meager, wan, proud, bare-foot, begging fellows,
Whoſe evil Genius's are *Socrates*
And *Charephon*.
*Strepſ.* Peace, talk no more ſo idly;
If you obey a Father, let me ſee you
Give ore your Horſes, and turn one of theſe.
*Phid.* Not I, by *Bacchus*, no though you ſhould tempt me
(f) δεινὸς ἱπποτρόφος. *Schol. M. S.*
With all (f) *Leogoras* his breed of Racers.
*Strepſ.* Dear Son be rul'd and learn.
*Phid.* What ſhould I learn?
*Strepſ.* 'Tis ſaid they have two tongues, and one of them
Able to prove any injuſtice reaſon;
Couldſt thou but learn that language, we were made,
And might diſpute our ſtubborn Creditours
Out of the debts I have incurr'd for thee;
They get not then a penny more than words.
*Phid.* I cannot do't, were I ſo lean and pale,
I durſt not look a Jocky in the face.
*Strepſ.* By *Ceres* then you ſtay with me no longer,
You, nor your Coach-horſe, nor your *Samphoras*,
But all together pack out of my doors.
My Uncle *Megacles* will neither ſee
Me nor my Horſes want, ſo long I care not.
*Exit.*

## SCENE II.

*Strepſiades*, *Scholar.*

*Strepſ.* THough I have fail'd, I'll not give over thus,
But ſay my Prayers, and go my ſelf to School
To learn this Art: but how can I, by Age
Dull and forgetful, reach ſuch ſubtleties?
Yet on I will, why ſhould I doubt? ho, friend.
*Schol.* A miſchief on you, who's that knocks at Door?
*Strepſ.* *Strepſiades*, *Cecinnian Phædo*'s Son.
*Schol.* 'Twas rudely done to knock ſo hard, y'have made
My labouring brain miſcarry of a Notion.
*Strepſ.* Forgive me, I was bred far off 'ith' Country:
But pray what notion was't that prov'd abortive?
*Schol.* 'Tis lawful to diſcover that to none
But fellow-ſcholars.
*Strepſ.* Then you may tell me,
For I come hither to be one of you.
*Schol.* I will; ſo will value't as a myſtery.
*Socrates* t'other day ask'd *Charephon*
How many of her feet a Flea could leap,
For one by chance had bit *Charephon*'s Eye-brow,
And leap'd from thence upon the head of *Socrates*.
*Strepſ.* How could he meaſure this?
*Schol.* Moſt dexterouſly.
Both feet oth' Flea he dipt in melting Wax,
Which ſtrait congeals to Shoos; theſe he plucks off,
And with them moſt exactly meaſures it.
*Strepſ.* Great *Jupiter*, how ſubtle are theſe wits!
*Schol.* If you ſhould hear their other ſpeculations,
You would ſay ſo indeed.
*Strepſ.* Pray what was that?
*Schol.* This *Charephon* the *Sphettian* ask'd him once,
If a Gnat ſounded from her mouth or tail.
*Strepſ.* And what ſaid he?
It had a ſtrait thin Gut,
At end of it a Bladder, into which
The Air being forc'd, ſounded in breaking forth.
*Strepſ.* Then I perceive that a Gnat's tail's a Trumpet;
How bleſt is this Anatomiſt of Gnats!
Sure he can hide himſelf from purblind juſtice,
That knows ſo well theſe dark inteſtine ways.
Why ſhould we cry up *Thales* any longer?
Come

Come open me your *Phrontiſterium*
And quickly let me ſee this *Socrates*,
I long to learn, open the Door--- * O *Hercules*,
What ſtrange Beaſts have we here?
*Schol.* Why do you wonder?
Whom do they look like think you?
*Strepſ.* Like the poor
*Lacedæmonian* Captives tane at † *Pylus*.
Why look they ſo intently on the ground?
Theſe ſeek out things that appertain to Earth?
Oh they ſeek Leeks; trouble your ſelves no more, friends,
For I know better where are good and great ones.
*Schol.* Come let's go in.
*Strepſ.* Let's ſtay a while and talk with 'em.
*Schol.* No, no, they cannot long endure the Air.
*Strepſ.* What's this, for Heavens ſake ſay?
*Schol.* This is Aſtronomy.
*Strepſ.* And this?
*Schol.* Geometry.
*Strepſ.* But what is't good for?
*Schol.* To meaſure Land.
*Strepſ.* What, arable or paſture?
*Schol.* No, the whole Earth.
*Strepſ.* A pretty jeſt indeed.
That were a mighty help to Husbandmen.
*Schol.* Here's all the World, and this is *Athens*.
*Strepſ.* How?
I'le ſcarce believe that, what's become o'th' Judges?
Where the *Cicynnians* my Country-men?
*Schol.* Here; this *Eubœa*; ſee how far 'tis ſtretch'd.
*Strepſ.* I, almoſt ſtretch'd in pieces betwixt us,
And *Pericles*; and where is *Lacedæmon*?
*Schol.* Here.
*Strepſ.* 'Tis too nigh us, why, with all your skill
Do you not help to thruſt it farther off?
*Schol.* It is not poſſible.
*Strepſ.* No? you will rue't then.
But what Man's that hangs yonder in the Basket?
*Schol.* That's he.
*Strepſ.* He, what he?
*Schol.* *Socrates*.
*Strepſ.* How, *Socrates*?
Call him.
*Schol.* Call him your ſelf, I'm not at leiſure.

* The School diſcovered; the Scholars in ſeveral poſtures: *Socrates* hanging in a Basket.
† *Suid. lib.*

## SCENE III.

*Strepſiades, Socrates.*

*Strepſ.* HO *Socrates*.
*Socr.* * Why doſt thou call me mortal?
*Strepſ.* Firſt I would gladly know what thou doſt there?
*Socr.* I walk ith' Air, and gaze upon the Sun.
*Strepſ.* Why in a Basket doſt thou view the Gods,
Not from the ground?
*Strepſ.* I could not elevate
My thoughts to contemplation of theſe myſteries,
Unleſs my Intellect were thus ſuſpended,
Where my thin thoughts melt into Air (their likeneſs)
Stood I upon the ground, I ſhould find nothing,
Though I ſought ne'er ſo ſtrictly up and down,
For the magnetick vertue of the Earth
Would draw away the humour of my Brain,
Juſt as we ſee in Noſe-ſmart.
*Strepſ.* How, how's that?
Doth the Brain draw the humour out of Noſe-ſmart?
Come down, ſweet *Socrates*, and teach me quickly
The knowledge of thoſe things for which I came.
*Socr.* What cameſt thou for?
*Strepſ.* To learn the art of ſpeaking,
With debts and uſury I'm torn in pieces,
Toſt up and down, forc'd to pawn all my Goods.
*Socr.* On what occaſion did you run in debt?
*Strepſ.* By Horſes eaten into this conſumption;
And I would learn of you other language
Which teacheth Men to pay nothing: for which
By all the Gods I'l give you what you'l ask.
*Socr.* By all what Gods? we do not here allow
Thoſe Gods the City worſhips.
*Strepſ.* How then ſwear you,
By Copper farthings like the *Byzantines*?
*Socr.* Wouldſt thou be skilful in Divine affairs?
*Strepſ.* By *Jove* (if any ſuch there be) I would.
*Socr.* You muſt be then acquainted with the *Clouds*,
Our reverend Goddeſſes.
*Strepſ.* With all my heart.
*Socr.* Sit down upon this Couch then.
*Strepſ.* Well.
*Socr.* Now take
This Garland.
*Strepſ.* Why a Garland? alas, *Socrates*,
D'ee mean (like *Athamas*) to ſacrifice me?
*Socr.* No, theſe are Rites that every one performs
At his admiſſion.
*Strepſ.* But what ſhall I gain by't?
*Socr.* Thou ſhalt be made moſt voluble in ſpeech,
A very rattle, bolting words as fine
As Flower.
*Strepſ.* Th'art right by *Jove*, I ſhall be powder'd.
*Socr.* Silence, old Man, and liſten to our prayer.
'Great King, unbounded Air, whoſe armes
'are hurl'd
'About the ſurface of this pendant World,
'Bright Æther, reverend Clouds, that from your
'Sphear
'Thunder and Lightning dart, riſe and appear.
*Strepſ.* Not yet, not yet, till I have wrapt my ſelf
Cloſe in my Cloak, leſt I be wet: twas ill
That I forgat to bring my Riding Hood.
*Socr.* 'Your power, great Clouds, make to
'this ſuppliant known
'Whether now ſeated on *Olympus* Throne,
'Or whether you your ſecret Revels keep
'In the wide Gardens of your Sire the deep:
'Or of his flowing Cryſtal ſeven-mouth'd *Nile*,
'In golden Ewers wantonly beguile:
'Or in *Mauritian* marſhes keep your Court;
'Or on the Snowy top of *Mimas* ſport.
'Come, to our fervent vows propitious be;
'Grace with your preſence our ſolemnity.
'We humid fleeting Deities,
'The bright unbounded Clouds thus riſe
'From

* The words of *Silenus* (whom *Socrates* reſembled for deformity) in *Pindar. Schol.*

Chorus of Clouds.

'From our old Sire, the grumbling Flood,
'Above the talleſt Hill or Wood,
'To thoſe high watch-towers, whence we may
'The hollowed fruitful ground ſurvey;
'Rivers that in ſoft murmurs glide.
'And the lowd Sea's rebellious Tide;
'From thence Heavens reſtleſs eye diſplaies
'The ſplendour of his glorious raies,
'Chaſing all dusky miſts, that we
'In ſhapes divine may mortals ſee.

*Socr.* Thanks reverend Clouds for favouring thus our prayer.
Did you not hear'm ſpeak in Thunder to us?

*Strepſ.* Great Clouds, I worſhip too, but am ſo frighted,
I ſcarce can hold from anſwering your Thunder.

*Socr.* Jeſt not profanely in ſuch ſacred Rites:
Peace, for the ſwarm of Goddeſſes come ſinging.

*Chor.* 'Come Virgin Miſtreſſes of ſhowers,
'Let's viſit *Pallas* pregnant Bowers,
'The far renowned *Cecropian* Plain
'Where ſhines the * *Eleuſinian* Fane,
'Where are the moſt retir'd aboads,
'Statues and Temples of the Gods:
'Where Altars blaze with Incenſe, where
'The holy-day laſts all the year;
'Where the brisk Graces every Spring,
'And Youths with Virgins dance and ſing.

* μυσηδικὸς δῆμος at *Eleuſis* in *Attica* were celebrated the myſteries of *Ceres*, to which *Athenians* only were admitted, not ſtrangers; if any one diſcovered them to a perſon not initiated, they were both put to death. *Schol.* M S.

*Strepſ.* Tell me good *Socrates*, what things are theſe
That ſpeak ſo finely? are they Ladies?

*Socr.* No,
They're *Clouds*, the Deities of idle Men;
From theſe we have our ſenſe, diſcourſe, and reaſon,
Our high Capricio's, and elaborate whimſeys.

*Strepſ.* My Soul, my thought, did leap, while they were ſpeaking,
And now moſt ſubtly would diſpute of ſmoak,
Sharply confute opinion with opinion:
Oh how I long to ſee them once again.

*Socr.* Look yonder towards *Parnes*, look how gently
They glide to Earth.

*Strepſ.* Where? ſhow me.

*Socr.* See in ſholes
They creep into the Caverns of the Mountain.

*Strepſ.* What things are theſe? I cannot yet behold 'em.

*Socr.* There in the entrance, look.

*Strepſ.* Yet I ſcarce ſee them.

*Socr.* Either thou ſeeſt them now, or thou art blind.

*Strepſ.* I do by *Jove*, great Clouds, for you hold all!

*Socr.* Didſt thou not know theſe Deities before?

*Strepſ.* Not I, I thought them only miſts and vapours.

*Socr.* Thou kneweſt not then thoſe who maintain the Sophiſts.

*Strepſ.* If theſe be Clouds, how comes it that they look
Like Women? for the Clouds have no ſuch ſhape.

*Socr.* No, what ſhape have they then?

*Strepſ.* I know not juſtly;
They look like flying Fleeces, but by *Jove*,
Nothing at all like Women; theſe have Noſes.

*Socr.* * Anſwer to what I ask.

* The *Socratick* way of diſpute by queſtion.

*Strepſ.* Ask me quickly.

*Socr.* Didſt ere behold a Cloud ſhap'd like a Centaure,
A Leopard, Bull, or Wolf?

*Strepſ.* I have, what then?

*Socr.* The Clouds can take what form they liſt, as when
They ſee a hairy fellow curl'd like *Clitus*,
They mock his madneſs in a Centaures ſhape.

*Strepſ.* And when they ſee one that defrauds or plunders
The Common wealth, like *Sinon*, what then do they?

*Socr.* They do reſemble him, turn ravenous Wolves,
This was the reaſon yeſterday, when they
Beheld * *Cleonymus*, they fled like Deer:
And ſeeing † *Cliſthenes*, are now turn'd Women.

* Coward.
† Effeminately attired.

*Strepſ.* Great Queens, if you are deſign'd to ſpeak to mortals,
Make me acquainted with your rumbling voice.

*Chor.* 'All hail old Man, who doſt on Wiſdom prey,
'And thou the Prieſt of ſubtle trifles ſay,
'What wouldſt thou have with us, to none but thee,
'Of all the Meteor Sophiſts thus ſtoop we;
'Save *Prodicus*, to him as grave and wiſe,
'To thee, becauſe thou walkſt upright, thy eyes
'Rowling on every ſide, thy look ſevere
'And barefoot many miſeries doſt bear.

*Strepſ.* Good Heavens, what voice is this, how ſtrange and ſtately?

*Socr.* Theſe are our Goddeſſes, the reſt are toys.

*Strepſ.* Is then Olympian *Jove* no Deity?

*Socr.* What *Jove*? there's no ſuch thing; meer fancy.

*Strepſ.* How?
Whence then proceeds all * rain?

* Whereof *Jupiter* was the particular Deity; thence ſirnamed Τὸ ὀμβρεῖος.

*Socr.* Only from theſe.
Didſt thou ere ſee a ſhower without them? take
The Clouds away, and Heaven muſt rain fair weather.

*Strepſ.* By *Phœbus* thou haſt clear'd it well, till now
I thought *Jove* made Water through a ſive.
But whence comes Thunder? when I'me ſick, that frights me,
Theſe thunder as they tumble up and down.
How can that be?

*Socr.* † When they are full of water,
By their own weight, driven upon one another,
They roar and break.

† Deriding *Socrates* as ignorant in Natural Philoſophy.

*Strepſ.* But who is it that drives them,
Is not that *Jove*?

*Socr.* No, an ætherial Whirlwind.

*Strepſ.* A Whirl-wind, hum! I knew not that till now.
But whence comes Lightning then, that glittering Fire
Which terrifies and burns us? *Jupiter*
Uſeth to dart this down on perjur'd Men.

*Socr.* And how (thou phlegmatick, * dull Saturnine,)
If darted on the perjur'd, how comes *Sinon*,
*Theorus*, and *Cleonymus* to 'ſcape it?
No, his own Temple, or the *Sunian* Promontory,

Or

Or ſturdy Oaks he ſtrikes, did they ere wrong him?
Did the Oak ere forſwear it ſelf?
*Strepſ.* I know not:
That which you ſay ſeems reaſon; but what then
Is lightning?
*Socr.* When the winds are ſhut up cloſe,
They ſwell the Clouds like Bladders, and at laſt
Break out with violence and horrid noiſes;
And by contrition kindle one another.
But thou who ſearcheſt amongſt us for wiſdom,
How happy wilt thou be above all *Grecians*
If thou conceive well, and remember, and
Canſt ſuffer much, and never wilt be tir'd
Standing or walking, nor have ſenſe of Froſt,
Nor care for dining, and refrain from Wine,
From exerciſes, and all other toyes.
*Strepſ.* O for a ſolid Soul reſtleſs with cares,
Sparing, ſelf torturing, one that can feaſt
Upon a Diſh of Herbs, you never could
Be better fitted; a meer Anvile I.
*Socr.* Doſt thou believe no Gods but thoſe we teach?
The Chaos, Clouds and Tongue, only theſe three.
*Strepſ.* I'l not ſo much as ſpeak of any other,
Much leſs beſtow an offering on their Altars.
*Chor.* 'Say boldly then, ſay what is thy requeſt,
'For if thou honour us thou ſhalt be bleſt.
*Strepſ.* Great Queens I ſue for a ſmall matter, that
I may out talk all *Greeks* a hundred furlongs.
*Chor.* 'To thee alone this gift we will allow,
'None ſpeak ſuch mighty ſentences as Thou.
*Strepſ.* I do not care for mighty ſentences,
But ſubtle ones to cheat my Creditours.
*Chor.* 'It is not much thou ask'ſt, and ſhalt obtain it,
'Learn of our Miniſters and thou ſhalt gain it.
*Strepſ.* I ſhall, relying on your promiſe; forc'd
By want, *Cappatia* and a luckleſs match.
Now let 'em uſe me as they liſt, beat, ſtarve me,
Burn, freeze, or flea me, ſo I ſcape my debts:
I care not though Men call me impudent,
Smooth-tongu'd, audacious, petulant, abominable,
Forger of words and lies, contentious Barretour,
Old, winding, bragging, teſty, crafty Fox.
*Socr.* Said like a Man of courage: if thou learn
Of me, thy fame ſhall ſpread wide as the Heavens.
*Strepſ.* What ſhall I do?
*Socr.* Thou ſhalt ſpend all thy time
With me; a life the happieſt in the World.
*Strepſ.* I long to ſee that day.
*Socr.* Thy Door ſhall always
Be throng'd with Clients that will come to thee
For Counſel, and diſcourſe of Caſes worth
The wealth of Kingdoms, to thy hearts deſire.
*Chor.* 'Try this old Man, firſt ſee if he be 'fit;
'Put him to th'teſt, and ſound the depth of's wit.

*Socr.* Come tell me now your diſpoſition,
That when I know it I may fit my Machines
Accordingly.
*Strepſ.* You will not undermine me.
*Socr.* No, I would know if you have any memory.
*Strepſ.* Yes, when another owes me any thing,
I can remember very well, but what
I owe my ſelf, I'm ready to forget.
*Socr.* Haſt thou a natural faculty in ſpeaking?
*Strepſ.* No, I can mar words ſooner far than make 'em.
*Socr.* How wilt thou learn then?
*Strepſ.* Fear me not, I tell you
Well, when I make ſome learned deep diſcourſe.
*Socr.* † You muſt be ſure to catch't up preſently.
*Strepſ.* What muſt I ſnap at learning like a Dog?
*Socr.* This is a very fool, an unknown Clown;
I am afraid old Man thou wilt need whipping.
What if thou ſhouldſt be beaten?
*Strepſ.* Then I'm beaten.
*Socr.* But what wouldſt do?
*Strepſ.* I would take witneſs on't
And ſue them on an action of Battery.
*Socr.* Off with your Cloak.
*Strepſ.* Why, how have I offended?
*Socr.* No; but our orders admit none but naked.
*Strepſ.* I came not hither to ſteal any thing.
*Socr.* Down with your Cloak, why doſt thou trifle.
*Strepſ.* Now
Tell me if I prove apt and diligent,
Of all your Scholars who ſhall I come higheſt?
*Socr.* Thou mayſt perhaps be like our *Chærephon.*
*Strepſ.* Alas, Alas! what an Anatomy?
*Socr.* No, no: but if thou wilt be any thing,
Follow me without more delay.
*Strepſ.* I want
A Cake for your *Cerberus*; I go me thinks
As if 'twere into the *Trophonian* Cave.
*Socr.* On, on, why ſtayſt thou gazing at the door?
*Chor.* "Go, for thy courage bleſt whoſe "aged mind
"To wiſdom ſoars, and leaves the young be-"hind.

† As the Scholars of *Socrates* uſed, eſpecially *Xenophon* and *Plato.*

## ACT. II.

*Socrates, Strepſiades.*

*Socr.* BY *Chaos*, and this Air I breath, I never
Met any thing ſo ſtupid as this fellow,
So clowniſh and oblivious; eathe toyes
He learns, not half ſo faſt as he forgets 'em,
I'l call him forth; what, ho *Strepſiades*;
Come out and bring your bed along with you.
*Strepſ.* The Fleas will hardly let me bring my ſelf.
*Socr.* Quick, down with't there; and mark what I ſay to you.
*Strepſ.* I'm ready.
*Socr.* What have you moſt mind to learn.
Meaſures, or Verſe, or Rhyme?
*Strepſ.* By all means meaſures;

For

For I was cheated by a Meal-man lately
Two pecks.
*Socr.* That's not the thing that I demand;
I'de know which you conceive the fairest measure,
The *Trimeter* or the *Tetrameter*.
*Strepſ.* The fairest measure in my mind's a Bushel.
*Socr.* 'Tis nothing that you say.
*Strepſ.* What will you lay
That your Tetrameter holds not a Bushel.
*Socr.* Away, away, how dull thou art, and blockish.
But thou wilt be perhaps more apt at Rime.
*Strepſ.* What help can rimes afford me in my meal.
*Socr.* First they will make thee pleasant in all company.
Then thou shalt know which suits with Anapæstick,
And which with Dactyles
*Strepſ.* Dactyles? I know that sure.
*Socr.* Why what's a Dactyle.
*Strepſ.* What, but this same finger,
'Thas been a Dactyle ere since I was a Child.
*Socr.* Th'art an unprofitable Dunce.
*Strepſ.* I care not
For learning these devices.
*Socr.* What then wouldst thou?
*Strepſ.* That, unjust and cheating Sophistry.
*Socr.* But there are things that must be learnt before
You come to that; what Creatures are there Masculine.
*Strepſ.* Sure I know that, or I were mad indeed.
A Ram, a Bull, a Goat, a Dog, a Pigeon.
*Socr.* * See how thou err'st, that call'st both male and Female
A Pigeon.
*Strepſ.* Right, by *Neptune*, how then must I?
*Socr.* Call this a Cock-pigeon, and that a Hen.
*Strepſ.* A Pigeon, Cock and Hen, ha! by this Air,
For this sole document, I will replenish
Your † *Cardopus*, with meal.
*Socr.* Again th'art wrong;
Thou call'st it *Cardopus*, but 'tis *hæc Cardopus*,
And therefore henceforth call it *Cardopa*.
Next it is fit you know which names are Masculine,
And which are feminine.
*Strepſ.* I know well which
Are feminine, I'me sure.
*Socr.* Let's hear.
*Strepſ.* *Philina*,
*Cletagora*, *Demetria*, and *Lysinna*
*Socr.* And which are Masculine?
*Strepſ.* A World, *Philoxenus*,
*Milesias*, and *Aminias*.
*Socr.* Thou art out.
*Strepſ.* Are not these Masculine with you?
*Socr.* * By no means.
How if you saw *Amynias*, would you call him?
*Strepſ.* *Amynia*, ho!
*Socr.* What, make a Woman of him?
*Strepſ.* And reason good, h'has thrown away his arms,
And will not fight. But to what purpose learn I
These common trifles?

*Socr.* Not so common neither,
But come, lie down.
*Strepſ.* What must I do?
*Socr.* Consider
Within your self the business that concerns you.
*Strepſ.* Not in this bed, I thank you, if I must
Lie down, Ile meditate upon the ground
*Socr.* But here's no room besides.
*Strepſ.* Wretch that I am.
How shall I be tormented with these fleas!
*Socr.* Now think into the depth of thy affairs,
Try every turn and winding, every double;
And if you stick at any thing: give't ore,
And to some other; but be sure you sleep not.
*Strepſ.* Oh, oh.
*Socr.* How now, the matter?
*Strepſ.* I am kill'd
By these blood-suckers, these *Corinthians*.
*Socr.* Do not torment your self.
*Strepſ.* How can I choose
When I have neither money left, nor colour,
Scarce life, no Shoos, grown almost to a Ghost
With watching?
*Socr.* Now what think y'on, nothing?
*Strepſ.* Yes
By *Neptune*.
*Socr.* What?
*Strepſ.* I'me thinking if the Fleas
Will leave a piece of me or not.
*Socr.* Death on thee.
*Strepſ.* You might have spar'd your curse, I'm dead already.
*Socr.* Fy, fy, you must not be so tender, * cover
Your face, and study for some subtle cheat.
*Strepſ.* Would I could learn to cheat these wicked Fleas.
*Socr.* Let's see what does he? what, asleep, ha'ye thought
Of nothing yet?
*Strepſ.* What would you have me think on?
*Socr.* What would you learn?
*Strepſ.* I've told you that already
A thousand times; I'd learn to pay no usemony.
*Socr.* Come then, cover your self, and subtilize
Your thoughts, dissect your business into Atomes.
*Strepſ.* Alas.
*Socr.* Ly still; and if you stick at any thing,
Pass by't a while, and come to it again.
*Strepſ.* Ho, my dear *Socrates*.
*Socr.* What is't old Man?
*Strepſ.* I have found out that will do't.
*Socr.* As how.
*Strepſ.* First tell me
Where I may meet with some *Thessalian* w'tch;
For I would steal the Moon one of these nights,
And having got her, lock her in a Chest
As charily, as I would keep a Glass.
*Socr.* What wilt thou get by that?
*Strepſ.* What, if the Moon
Ne'r rise again, I'me bound to pay no use.
*Socr.* How so?
*Strepſ.* 'Cause use you know is paid by th' Month.

*Socr.*

* Deriding *Socrates* as ignorant in Grammar.

† A meal-trough, the *Greek* word hath a Masculine termination but feminine article.

* Effeminate Cowards.

* So *Socrates* disputes in *Plato's Phædras*, that exteriour objects might not divert him; which *Aristophanes* here derides.

*Socr.* 'Tis well, but I'le propound another
business;
Suppose that you were tyed upon a statute
To pay five Talents, could you raise figures?
*Strepf.* I know not, but I'le try.
*Socr.* You must not limit
Your thoughts so narrowly within your self,
But like a Beetle fetter'd in a thread,
Allow them play and flutter in the Air.
*Strepf.* I ha't, I ha't, the rarest way to cancel
A deed, as you'l confess when you have heard it.
*Socr.* What is't?
*Strepf.* Did you nere see at any Grocers
A clear transparant stone, with which they use
To kindle fire?
*Socr.* You mean a Burning-glass.
*Strepf.* The very same.
*Socr.* What wouldst thou do with it?
*Strepf.* Whilst that the Scrivener writes the
deed, d'ee mark,
Thus standing by him with my Burning glass
Against the Sun, I'le burn out every letter.
*Socr.* Wisely by all the Graces.
*Strepf.* How I long
To cancel thus a bond of fifty pound.
*Socr.* 'Tis well, now tell me if thy adversary
Sue thee, and thou art like to be orethrown
For want of witnesses, how wilt thou void
His suit?
*Strepf.* Most easily.
*Socr.* Which way?
*Strepf.* Before
It comes to judgment, I would hang my self.
*Socr.* Push, thou sayst nothing.
*Strepf.* Yes, by *Jove* there's none
Will prosecute a suit against the dead.
*Socr.* Away, thou foolst, i'l teach no more.
*Strepf.* Dear *Socrates*,
Why?
*Socr.* Thou forget'st as fast as thou canst learn.
Tell me the first thing thou wert taught to day.
*Strepf.* The first, stay let me see; the first
thing say you?
How call you that we use to put our meal in?
Wretch, Iv'e forgot it!
*Socr.* See, deserv'st thou not
Forgetful to be punish'd for a dunce.
*Strepf.* Alas what shall I do? for if I learn
not
The cheating language, I am quite undone?
Good Clouds advise me what course I shall
take.
*Cho.* "If an ingenious Son thou hast at home,
"Thou hadst best send him hither in thy room.
*Strepf.* I have a Son, and he's ingenious too;
But will not learn, the more my misery.
*Cho.* And wilt thou suffer't?
*Strepf.* Of a promising person
His Mother is a Woman of great Spirit:
Once more Ile try; if he refuse, I'l make
No more ado but turn him out of doors;
Stay but a while, I will be quickly back.

## ACT. III.

*Strepsiades, Phidippides, Socrates.*

*Strepf.* NOw by the Clouds thou staist no
longer here?
Hence, and go feed in *Megacles* his stable.
*Phid.* Alas what fury hath possest you, Father?
By *Jove* I think you are besides your self.
*Strepf.* See, see, he swears by *Jove*? art
thou not mad
At these years to believe there is a *Jove*?
*Phid.* Is truth to be derided?
*Strepf.* Well I see
'Th' art still a Child and credit'st old wives
tales.
Come, and I will tell thee that shall make thee
A Man, so you be sure to tell it no body.
*Phid.* Pretty; what is't?
*Strepf.* Thou swor'st e'n now by *Jove*.
*Phid.* I did so.
*Strepf.* See how good it is to learn;
There's no such thing as *Jove*.
*Phid.* What then?
*Strepf.* A Whirlwind
Hath blown *Jove* quite away, and rules all Hea-
ven.
*Phid.* What fooleries are these?
*Strepf.* They're serious truth, Son.
*Phid.* who tells you so?
*Strepf.* Our *Socrates* the *Melian,
And *Charephon*, that trace the steps of fleas.
*Phid.* How are you grown to such a height
of madness
As to believe such melancholy dreamers?
*Strepf.* Good words: defame not Men of
such deep wisdom
And subtle Spirits; these live sparingly,
Are never at the charges of a Barber,
Unguents, or Baths, whereas thou wastes my
means
As freely as If I were dead already.
Come then, and be their Scholar in my
room.
*Phid.* What can be learnt that's good of such
as they are?
*Strepf.* All things that are accompted wisdom,
Boy;
And first to know thy self, and what a dunce
Thou art, how blockish, rustick and forgetful.
But stay a little, cover thy face a while.
*Phid.* Alas my Father's mad, what shall I
do,
Accuse him to the Court of folly, or
Bespeak a Coffin for him, for he talks
Idly, as he were drawing on?
*Strepf.* Come on now.
Let's see, what's that?
*Phid.* A Pigeon.
*Strepf.* Good; and that?
*Phid.* A Pigeon.
*Strepf.* Both the same? ridiculous.
Take heed you make not such mistakes here-
after.
This you must call a Cock, and that a Hen.
*Phid.* A Hen? It this the goodly learning,
Father,
You got since your admission 'mongst these
Earth-Worms?
*Strepf.* This and a great deal more; but be-
ing old,
I soon forget what I am taught.
*Phid.* I think
'Twas want of memory made you lose your
Cloak.
*Strepf.* No, 'tis hung up upon the Arts and
Sciences.

*Phid.* And

*As if he should say, the *Atheist*: for the *Melians* were infamous for *Atheism* from *Diagoras* who profest it: *Socrates* was Scholar to *Aristagoras* a *Melian*. See Chap. 3.

*Phid.* And where your Shooes?
*Strepſ.* Loſt for the common good,
Like *Pericles*: But let's be gone, and ſee
You learn t'obey me, and to wrong all elſe.
Remember that I bought thee, when thou wert
But ſix years old, a little Cart to play with.
*Phid.* Alas you'l be the firſt that will repent this.
*Strepſ.* Take you no care for that; do as I bid you.
Ho, *Socrates*, I've brought my Son at laſt,
Though much againſt his will.
*Socr.* I, that's becauſe
He's rude, untaught, a Child of ignorance,
And unacquainted with our hungry baskets.
*Phid.* Go hang your ſelf in one of them.
*Strepſ.* How impudence! doſt thou talk thus to thy Maſter?
*Socr.* So go hang, with what a ſeeming grace was that pronounc'd!
How do you think that he ſhould ever learn
To overthrow a nimble adverſary,
Or win a Judge's heart with Rhetorick?
*Strepſ.* Fear not, but teach him; he's ingenious
By nature; for when he was but a little one,
Hee'd build you Houſes, and make leather Coaches,
And Ships, and cut Frogs out of apple parings.
What's your opinion then? do you not think
He's capable to learn both languages?
Or if not both, be ſure he learn the worſe.
*Socr.* Well, we ſhall try what may be done with him.
*Strepſ.* Farewell, and ſo remember that in all
I ſay that's juſt, you learn to contradict me.

## ACT. III.

### SCENE I. *Strepſiades.*

*Strepſ.* THe * fifth, the fourth, the third, the ſecond; hum.
The moſt abhorr'd and dreadful day's at hand,
The old and new; all I ow Mony to
Threaten to ſue, and vow my utter ruine;
Yet I require nothing but what is juſt reaton:
My friend forbear me till ſome other time;
But they all anſwer me, words are no payment,
Revile me, ſwear they'l put their bonds in ſuit,
And let 'em, what care I, ſo my *Phidippides*
Have learnt the art of cheating: I ſhall know ſtraight;
It is but knocking at the School, ho Son.

* From the twentieth day of the Month they reckon'd backward, ſee the life of *Solon*. Chap.

### SCENE II. *Strepſiades, Socrates.*

*Socr.* SAve you, *Strepſiades*.
*Strepſ.* The like to you.
† Firſt take this Bag of Meal, for it is fit
We pay our duty to our reverend Maſter,
Now tell me, has my Son attain'd the art
For which I plac'd him with you?
*Socr.* Yes exactly.
*Strepſ.* Thanks to deceit, the Queen that governs all things.
*Socr.* Now you may overthrow all adverſaries.
*Strepſ.* What though a witneſs ſwear that I have borrowed.
*Socr.* I, though a thouſand ſwear't.
*Strepſ.* Iò. Iò.
Triumph my Boyes, wo to you Money-mongers,
You and your bonds, your uſe on uſe may hang now,
Youl'l trouble me no more! O what a Son
Have I, that fenceth with a two-edg'd tongue,
My Houſes prop and Guardian, my foes terrour,
Quickly come forth, and meet my glad embraces,
Come forth and hear thy Father.
*Socr.* See the Man.
*Strepſ.* O my dear boy!
*Socr.* Away and take him with you.

† Such gifts *Socrates* ſometimes accepted, though not Mony. See Chap.

### SCENE III.

*Strepſiades, Phidippides.*

*Strepſ.* IO my Son! O how I joy to ſee
Thy chang'd complexion! Thou lookſt now me thinks
As if thou wert inſpir'd with contraction,
I read croſs queſtions in thy very face,
Thy very eyes me thinks ſay, how, how's that?
Thou canſt perſwade the World that thou art wrong'd,
When thou art, he that does the wrong. I ſee't,
I plainly ſee't; a very Attick mine;
Now let it be thy ſtudy to recover
Him, whom thou almoſt haſt undone.
*Phid.* Why, what
Is that you fear?
*Strepſ.* The old and the new day.
*Phid.* Can one and the ſame day be old and new?
*Strepſ.* I know that: I'm ſure my Creditors
By joint conſent that day threaten to ſue me.
*Phid.* They'l looſe by it if they do: for; 'tis impoſſible
To make two days of one.
*Strepſ.* How is't impoſſible?
*Phid.* As for a Woman to be old and young
At once.
*Strepſ.* But Law has ſo determined it
*Phid.* But theſe Men know not what the Law doth mean.
*Strepſ.* Why what's the meaning of it.
† *Phil.* Antient *Solon* † See the Life of *Solon*. Ch.
Was naturally a lover of the people.
*Strepſ.* What's that to this?
*Phid.* He did appoint two days,
The laſt day of the old month for citation,
The firſt oth' new for payment of the mony.
*Strepſ.* But why the laſt day for citations?
*Phil.* That
The debtor having thus one day of warning
Might fly and ſhun the trouble of the next.
*Socr.* Why do the Magiſtrates then take all forfeits
Upon the old and new day?
*Phid.* They are hungry,
And taſt their meat before they ſhould fall to.
*Strepſ.* Io, ye fools that ſit ſtill and do nothing,
We that are wiſe and quick have done the buſineſs;
Ye Blocks, ye Stones, ye Sheep, ye empty Bubbles; Let

Let me congratulate this Son of mine,
My ſelf and my Good Fortune in a Song.
'Now *Strepſiades* th'art bleſt,
'Of the moſt diſcreet the beſt,
'What a Son thou haſt, now may
'All my æmulous Neighbours ſay,
'When they hear that he alone
'Hath my creditours orethrown.
But come my Boy, now thou ſhalt feaſt with me.

Sect. 4. *Paſias*, *Strepſiades*, *Witneſs*.

*Paſ.* AND muſt a Man be outed of his own thus?
Better take any courſe than ſuffer this.
You muſt aſſiſt me in this buſineſs neighbour,
That I may call my debtor to account;
There's one friend made a foe; yet I'l not ſhame
My Country, ere I do't, I'l give him warning.
*Strepſiades.*
*Strepſ.* How now, what would you have?
*Paſ.* The old and new daies come.
*Strepſ.* Bear witneſs friend,
He nam'd two daies. What ſum is't you demand.
*Paſ.* Twelve pounds you borrow'd when you bought your Son
A Race-horſe; with the intereſt.
*Strepſ.* A Race-horſe,
You know I neer car'd for'm in my life.
*Paſ.* And ſwor'ſt by *Jove* and all the Gods to pay it.
*Strepſ.* By *Jove*? 'twas then before my Son had learn't
The all-convincing Speech.
*Paſ.* You'l not deny't.
*Strepſ.* What have I got but that, for all this learning?
*Paſ.* Dar'ſt thou deny't, if I ſhould put thee to
Thy Oath, and make thee call the Gods to witneſs it?
*Strepſ.* What Gods de'e mean?
*Paſ.* *Jove*, *Mercury*, and *Neptune*.
*Strepſ.* By *Jove*? yes that I will I hold thee three pence.
*Paſ.* Curſe on thee for this impudence.
*Strepſ.* If thou wert rubb'd with Salt, 'twould make thy wit the quicker.
*Paſ.* D'e laugh at me?
*Strepſ.* Thou wilt take up ſix buſhels.
*Paſ.* So help me *Jupiter*, and all the Gods,
I will be even with you for this ſcorn.
*Strepſ.* I am extreamly taken with your Gods,
And this ſame *Jupiter* you ſwear by, they
Are excellent paſtime to a knowing Man.
*Paſ.* Well, you will one day anſwer for theſe words.
But tell me, whether I ſhall have my Mony
Or not, give me my anſwer, and I'm gone.
*Strepſ.* Stay but a little, I will anſwer preſently,
And plainly.
*Paſ.* Sure he's gone to fetch the Mony
*Strepſ.* Where is the Man that comes to ask me Mony?
Tell me, what's this?
*Paſ.* That which it is, a *Cardopus*.
*Strepſ.* You ask for Mony, and ſo very a dunce;
I'le never whilſt I live pay him a penny,
That calls a *Cardopa* a *Cardopus*.
*Paſ.* You will not pay then?
*Strepſ.* Not for ought I know:
You'l ſtay no longer, pray about your buſineſs.
*Paſ.* Yes, I'le be gone, but in the mean time know
I'le have my Mony, if I live this day.
*Strepſ.* You may chance go without it; yet I'm ſorry
You ſhould be puniſh'd ſo for a miſtake,
For ſaying *Cardopus* for *Cardopa*.

## SCENE VIII.

*Amynias*, *Strepſiades*, *Witneſs*.

*Amyn.* OH, oh, alas!
*Strepſ.* Who's that keeps ſuch a bawling?
What art thou? one of * *Karkinus* his Sons?
*Amyn.* 'Tis I unhappy!
*Strepſ.* Keep it to thy ſelf.
*Amyn.* Unlucky chance, oh cruel deſtiny,
To ſpoil at once my Cart and all my Horſes!
† Oh *Pallas*, how unkindly haſt thou us'd me?
*Strepſ.* What hurt did ere *Tlepolemus* do thee?
*Amyn.* Deride me not, but rather bid your Son
Pay me the Mony which he had of me,
For I was never in more need of it.
*Strepſ.* What Mony Man?
*Amyn.* That which he borrowed of me.
*Strepſ.* Then I perceive you're in a ſad condition.
*Amyn.* I had a ſcurvy fall driving my Horſes.
*Strepſ.* Thou doſt but jeſt, 'twas driving an Aſs rather.
*Amyn.* I do not jeſt when I demand my Mony.
*Strepſ.* Upon my word thou art not right.
*Amyn.* How ſo?
*Strepſ.* Thy brain methinks is troubled.
*Amyn.* Either pay me
My Mony ſtrait, or I will trouble you.
*Strepſ.* Tell me, doth *Jove* beget and ſend down Rain,
Or doth the Sun exhale it from the Sea?
*Amyn.* I neither know nor care.
*Strepſ.* What? are you fit
To receive Mony, and ſo ignorant
Of theſe ſublime and ſubtle myſteries?
*Amyn.* Well, if you cannot let me have the principal,
Pay me the Intereſt.
*Strepſ.* Intereſt, what kind
Of creature's that?
*Amyn.* What, but th'encreaſe of Mony
By months, and days, as time runs on.
*Strepſ.* 'Tis well.
And do you think the Sea is fuller now
Than 'twas at firſt?
*Amyn.* No, not a drop, it is
Not fit it ſhould.
*Strepſ.* The Sea by your confeſſion
Is nothing grown; then with what conſcience

* Which were *Xenocles*, *Xenotimus*, and *Demotimus*, Tragick Poets and Actors.

† This and the following line are taken from *Xenocles* the Tragedian, which is the reaſon of *Strepſiades* his anſwer.

Can you desire your Mony should encrease.
Go get you from my Doors, fetch me a whip there.
*Witn.* Well, I'le bear witness for him.
*Strepf.* Why de'e not go, will you move * *Samphoras*?
* The Horse's name which he bought of him.
*Amyn.* Is not this riotous?
*Strepf.* Will you be gone?
Or shall I lead you in a Chain, and make you
Shew tricks? if you but stay a little longer,
I'le send you, and your Cart and Horses packing.
*Chor.* 'Now observe what 'tis to bend
'Studies to an evil end.
'This old Man, that is intent
'Creditours to circumvent,
'Foolishly himself hath crost,
'And will find so to his cost;
'That in this false Art his Son
'Hath attain'd perfection:
'Justice cunning to refute,
'That at last hee'l wish him mute.

## ACT V.

### SCENE I.

*Strepsiades, Phidippides.*

*Strepf.* O Neighbours, Kinsmen, Countrymen, help, help,
I'm beat all, all over: oh my head, my back!
Thou strik'st thy Father, Rogue.
*Phid.* I do so, Father.
*Strepf.* See, see, he stands in't too.
*Phid.* I do indeed.
*Strepf.* Thief, Villain, Parricide.
*Phid.* More I beseech you,
I am much taken with these pretty Titles.
*Strepf.* Rascal.
*Phid.* Pray stick me fuller of these Roses:
*Strepf.* Dost beat thy Father?
*Phid.* Yes, by *Jove*, and justly.
*Strepf.* Oh, Rogue, what justice can there be in that?
*Phid.* I will demonstrate it by argument.
*Strepf.* By argument?
*Phid.* Most easily, which language
Shall I dispute in?
*Strepf.* Language?
*Phid.* Yes the greater
Or lesser?
*Strepf.* I have bred thee well indeed
If thou canst make this good, that any Son
May beat his Father.
*Phid.* You'l confess as much
If I so prove it, that you cannot answer't.
*Strepf.* Well, I will hear for once what you can say.

### SCENE II.

*Chorus, Strepf. Phidip.*

*Chor.* 'OLD Man it much concerns you to confute
'Your Son, whose confidence appears to suit
'With a just cause; how happen'd this dispute?
*Strepf.* I shall relate it from the first; as soon
As we had din'd, I took a Lute and bid him
Sing the Ship-shearing of *Simonides*:
He told me 'twas an old and ugly fashion
To sing at dinner like a Millers Wife.
*Phid.* And was not this sufficient to deserve
A beating; when you'd make Men chirp like
† Grass-hoppers? At noon. *Virg. ecl.* 2.
*Strepf.* Just so he said within; and added that *Simonides* was an unpleasant Poet.
I must confess I hardly could forbear him;
But then I bid him take a Myrtle branch
And act some piece of *Æschylus*, that *Æschylus*,
Saith he, is of all Poets the absurdest,
The harshest, most disorderly and bumbast.
Did not my heart pant at this language think you?
Yet I repress it; then said I, rehearse
A learned speech out of some modern wit;
He strait repeats out of *Euripides*
A tedious long Oration, how the Brother
(Good Heavens) did violate his Sisters Bed.
Here I confess I could contain no longer
But chid him sharply; to dispute we went,
Words upon words, till he at last to blows,
To strike, to pull, to tear me.
*Phid.* And not justly?
You that would discommend *Euripides*,
The wisest of all Poets.
*Strepf.* Wisest? ah
What did I say, I shall be beat agen?
*Phid.* By *Jove*, and you deserve't.
*Strepf.* How, deserve it?
Ungrateful wretch, have I not brought thee up,
Fed and maintain'd thee from a little one,
Supplied thy wants? how then can I deserve it?
*Chor.* 'Now I believe each youthful breast
'With expectation possest,
'That if the glory of the day
'Be from the Plantiff born away,
'By this example they may all
'Upon the old Men heavy fall;
'What you have done with utmost art,
'To justifie is now your part.
*Phid.* How sweet it is to study, sage new things;
And to contemn all fundamental Laws!
When I applied my mind to Horse-coursing
I could no speak three words but I was out;
Now since I gave it ore, I am acquainted
With ponderous sentences and subtle reasons,
Able to prove I ought to beat my Father.
*Strepf.* Nay, follow racing still, for I had rather
Maintain thy Horses than be beaten thus.
*Phid.* I will begin where you did interrupt me,
And first will ask, did you not beat me when
I was a Child?
*Strepf.* But that was out of love.
*Phid.* 'Tis very right, tell me then, ought not I
To recompence your love with equal love;
If to be beaten be to be belov'd,
Why should I suffer stripes, and you have none?
I am by nature born as free as you;
Nor is it fit the Sons should be chastiz'd,
And not their Parents.
*Strepf.* Why?
*Phid.* You urge the Law,
That doth allow all Children to be beaten:
To which I answer, Old Men are twice Children,
And therefore ought, when they offend, be punish'd
As well as we.
*Strepf.* But there's no Law that says

The

The Parents ſhould be puniſhed.
*Phid.* Was not he
Who made that Law, a Man as you and I?
He form'd a Law, which all the old Men follow'd;
Why may not I as well preſcribe another,
And all the young Men follow my advice?
But all the blows before this Law was made
Muſt be forgiven without all diſpute.
Beſides, mark how the Cocks and other creatures
Fight with their Sires, who differ not at all
From us, ſave only that they make no Laws.
*Strepſ.* Why then if you will imitate the Cocks,
Do you not dine upon a Dung-hill, and
Lodge in a Hen-rooſt?
*Phid.* 'Tis not all one caſe,
Our *Socrates* doth not approve ſo far.
*Strepſ.* Approve not then their fighting, but in this
Thou plead'ſt againſt thy ſelf.
*Phid.* How ſo?
*Strepſ.* Becauſe
Th'authority I exerciſe ore thee
Will be thine own, when ere thou haſt a Son.
*Phid.* But if I ne'r have any, then I never
Shall have authority, and you will go
To th' Grave deriding me.
*Strepſ.* 'Tis too much reaſon.
*Phid.* Hear now another argument.
*Strepſ.* I'me loſt.
*Phid.* And then perhaps you'l take the blows I give you
Not half ſo ill.
*Strepſ.* What good ſhall I get by them?
*Phid.* I'le beat my Mother too.
*Strepſ.* What ſayeſt thou, thou?
Why this is worſe than t'other.
*Phid.* What if I
Prove by the ſecond language that I ought?
*Strepſ.* Why then you will have nothing more to do.
But prove that you, and your wiſe *Socrates*,
And wiſer language may hang all together.
O Clouds, all this I ſuffer through your means,
For I in you wholly repos'd my truſt.
*Chor.* 'Thy ſelf art Author of this miſery,
'Becauſe to ill thou didſt thy mind apply.
*Strepſ.* Why did you then give me no warning of it?
You know I was a rude and aged Man.
*Chor.* 'This is our cuſtom, whenſoere we find
'Any to malice or deceit enclin'd,
'Into ſome dreadful miſchief ſuch we thruſt,
'That they may fear the Gods, and learn what's 'juſt.
*Strepſ.* Alas, this is a miſchief, and a juſt one,
For I ought not, when I had borrow'd Mony,
To ſeek out ways t'avoid reſtoring it.
Come then my Son, let us be reveng'd
Upon that wicked *Socrates* and *Cherephon*,
Who have abus'd us both.
*Phid.* I will not wrong
My Maſters.
*Strepſ.* Reverence Celeſtial *Jove*.
*Phid.* Celeſtial *Jove*, ſee how you rave now Father:
There's no ſuch thing as *Jove*.
*Strepſ.* There is.
*Phid.* * A whirle-wind * Act III.
Hath blown *Jove* quite away, and rules all Heaven.
*Strepſ.* No, Son, he's not expell'd, I was but fool'd
To worſhip in his room a fictile deity.
*Phid.* Nay if you will needs be mad, be mad alone.

## SCENE III.

*Strepſiades.*

*Strepſ.* MAD that I was to truſt in *Socrates*, And caſt off all our Gods; good *Mercury*,
Be not diſpleas'd, or puniſh, but forgive me,
That took ſuch pains, and ſtudied to talk idly,
And tell me what I'de beſt do with theſe fellows,
Sue them or puniſh 'm, ſome other way——
Th'art in the right, I will not ſue them then,
But if thou bidſt me ſet their Neſt on fire;
Come *Xanthias*, come, a fork and ladder quickly.
Get up and pluck the Houſe about their Ears,
Quick if thou loveſt thy Maſter; one of you
Go light a Torch, and bring it hither ſtrait:
Proud as they are I mean to bring 'em lower.

## SCENE IV.

*Scholar, Strepſiades, Socrates, Cherephon.*

*Schol.* OH, oh!
*Strepſ.* Torch to thy work, ſet fire apace.
*Schol.* What art thou doing, Man?
*Strepſ.* That which I am doing;
Diſputing ſomewhat hotly with your School here.
*Schol.* Alas, who's this that ſets our Houſe on fire?
*Strepſ.* He whom you couſen'd of his Cloak.
*Schol.* Thou kill'ſt us, Man.
*Strepſ.* That is the thing I mean,
If my fork hold, and ladder do not fail me.
*Socr.* How now, what do you make on our Houſe-ridge.
*Strepſ.* † I walk I'th Air and gaze upon the Sun. † Act II. Scene III.
*Socr.* Alas I'm choak'd.
*Strepſ.* Why doſt thou ſcorn the Gods then?
*Cher.* Oh me I burn;
*Strepſ.* Now you may calculate
The motions of the Moon; tear, pluck, beat, burn 'em.
For many reaſons they deſerve the flame,
But moſt becauſe they did the Gods diſclaim.

XENOPHON.

## CHAP. I.

### Xenophon, *his Country, Parents, and following of* Socrates.

*Laert.* XEnophon was an *Athenian*, Son of *Cryllus*, of the *Erchian* Tribe: the time of his birth is
* *Laert.* no where expreſly delivered: * *Steſiclides* affirms *he died the firſt year of the one hundred and*
† *de Longæv.* *fifth Olympiad.* † Lucian *that he outlived ninety years:* whence it is evident that he was born at or before the firſt year of the eighty ſecond Olympiad, which if the learned *Cauſabone* had obſerved, he had not * alter'd *Athenæus* upon ſuppoſition, that he was but ten years old, the fourth year of the eighty ninth Olympiad (the time of his *Sympoſium*) whereas he was then no leſs than thirty ſix years of age. *Laertius* ſaith, *He flouriſhed the fourth year of the ninety fourth Olympiad.* (*Suidas* reads, *of the ninety eight*) Or, according to others, that *he flouriſhed in the eighty ninth Olympiad with the reſt of the* Socratick *Philoſophers*; of whom he became one upon this accident.

* *Animad.* 5. 12.

* Meeting

† Laert. † Meeting *Socrates* in a narrow lane, he ſtopt him with his ſtaff, and asked him where all kind of meats were to be ſold; to which *Socrates* made a ſerious anſwer: and then demanded of him, where it was that Men were made good and virtuous? whereat *Xenophon* pauſing, *follow me then*, ſaith he, *and learn*; from thence forward he became a Diſciple of *Socrates*.

In the time of that great War betwixt the *Lacedæmonians* and *Athenians*, called *the Peloponneſian War* (the natural forwardneſs of his Spirit being perhaps excited by the example of his Maſter *Socrates*) he was perſonally engaged in the fight before *Delium*, the firſt year of the 89. Olympiad, wherein the *Bœotians* overcame the *Athenians*; in which defeat * *Xenophon* in the flight unhorſed and thrown down, *Socrates* (who, his horſe being likewiſe ſlain under him, fought on foot) took him upon his ſhoulders and carried him many furlongs, until the Enemy gave over the purſuit. This was the firſt eſſay of his military profeſſion, which he afterward reſum'd upon this occaſion.

* Strab. 9. Laert.

## CHAP. II.

*Upon what occaſion he followed* Cyrus *into* Aſia.

† Xenoph. expedit. Cyr. lib. 1. † ARtaxerxes ſucceeded *Darius* his Father in the Kingdom of *Perſia*, *Cyrus* his younger brother having been ſent for out of his Government of *Lydia* upon his fathers ſickneſs, which is that firſt ἀνάστασις placed by the *Arundelian* ſtone in the ſecond year of the 93. Olympiad, (confounded by * a learned perſon with the latter, ſix years after) was impriſon'd by his brother upon the accuſation of *Triſſaphernes*, but releaſed by the mediation of his Mother *Paryſatis*. Being returned to his Government, he uſed all ſecret means to ſtrengthen himſelf. The *Ionian* Cities were delivered to *Triſſaphernes* by *Artaxerxes*, but revolted to him, all except *Myletus*. His pretences for levying forces were, the Garriſoning of thoſe Cities, and his oppoſing *Triſſaphernes*: *Clearchus* likewiſe raiſed for him many in *Cherſoneſus*, upon pretence of warring againſt the *Thracians*. He privately alſo kept an Army on foot in *Theſſaly* under *Ariſtippus*: and *Proxenus* of *Bœotia* brought him forces as againſt the *Piſidians*; this *Proxenus* (who had † Xen. lib. 3. been Scholar to *Gorgias* the *Leontine*, and † gueſt to *Xenophon*) ſent to invite him to *Cyrus*, aſſuring him he ſhould be of more eſteem with him than of his own Country: *Xenophon* conſulted with *Socrates* about this letter, who doubting that if he took part with *Cyrus*, the *Athenians* ſhould be diſpleas'd with him (*Cyrus* having before aided the *Lacedæmonians* againſt them) counſell'd him to ask the advice of the *Delphian* Oracle. *Xenophon* went thither, and demanded of *Apollo* to which of the Gods he ſhould addreſs his vows and ſacrifice for the good ſucceſs of his intended journey. He was anſwer'd, that he ſhould ſacrifice to thoſe Gods to whom it was due: Returning to *Athens*, he imparted this Oracle to *Socrates*, who blam'd him, becauſe he had not demanded whether it was beſt to ſtay or no, but (as already determined to go) how he might beſt perform his journey; Nevertheleſs (ſaith he) ſince you have ſo propoſed your demand, you muſt do as the Gods command: *Xenophon* having ſacrificed according to the Oracles direction, took ſhipping, and at *Sardis* found *Proxenus* and *Cyrus* ready for their expedition into *Aſia*, and was immediately recommended to *Cyrus*, being by both earneſtly intreated to ſtay: he continued with him * not * Xen. lib. 3. in any command, but as a Voluntier. † In which † Chio. Epiſt. ad Metrid. condition he did not any thing misbeſeeming a Souldier, whereupon he was in the number of thoſe whom *Cyrus* eſteem'd moſt.

* *Cyrus* having drawn all his forces together, * Xenoph. lib. 1. marched up and gave battle to *Artaxerxes* (in the beginning of the fourth year of the ninety Laert. fourth Olympiad, when *Xenenetus* was *Archon*) at *Cunaxa*, five hundred Stadia from *Babylon*, by the River *Euphrates*. Whilſt he was viewing both Armies, he told *Xenophon*, who rode up to him, that the Sacrifices were auſpicious; then *Xenophon* gave him the *Grecians* word, *Jupiter the preſerver*. The Greeks prevailed againſt *Triſſaphernes*; but *Cyrus* aſſaulting, the King was through his too much forwardneſs, ſlain; the *Grecians* thinking themſelves Maſters of the field, and *Cyrus* to be alive, returned to their Camp, which they found rifled by the Enemy. * The next day the King ſending *Phalinus* to * Xenoph. lib. 2. them, to deliver their arms, *Xenophon* anſwered, "That they had nothing left but their arms "and valour; as long as they kept their arms, "they might uſe their valour, ſurrendring them, "they were not Maſters of themſelves: It were "indiſcretion (ſaith he) to ſurrender what we "have left, ſince thereby perhaps we may make "our ſelves Maſters of what you have. *Phalinus* ſmiling, replyed; "Young Man, you "look and ſpeak like a Philoſopher; but aſſure "your ſelf, your valour will not over-maſter the Kings power. *Clearchus* returned this anſwer for the whole Army, "If we be eſteemed friends, "it will be better for him that we are armed, if "Enemies, better for our ſelves. *Triſſaphernes* having made a Truce with *Clearchus*, perfidiouſly got him with four other Commanders, *Proxenus*, *Menon*, († with whom *Xenophon* had particular † Laert. enmity) *Agias*, and *Socrates*, twenty Captains of Cohorts, and two hundred common Souldiers into his power; and delivering them up to the King, they were beheaded. The Greeks being ſummoned to lay down their arms, pretending that *Clearchus* was executed for treaſon diſcovered by *Menon* and *Proxenus*, who were very highly rewarded. *Xenophon* required to have them ſent, who were fitteſt to direct them, being friends to both; whereto the *Perſians* not able to anſwer, departed.

## CHAP. III.

*How he brought off the* Grecians *Army.*

* THe Greeks finding themſelves in ſuch a * Xenoph. lib. 3. ſtrait, were in deſpair ever to ſee their Country again. *Xenophon* calling together the Officers of *Proxenus*, told them, "They "were not to expect any mercy from the King, "who had ſhewen none to the body of his dead "brother, having faſtned his head and hand to "a Gib-

"a Gibbet, and that they must resolve to put "their safety in their arms. *Apollonides* a *Bœotian* alledg'd, that there was no means of safety but in the Kings favour, and began to reckon the dangers wherewith they were surrounded. *Xenophon* answered, "That when upon the death "of *Cyrus*, they marched up to the Kings "armies, he laboured for a cessation, but when "their Captains went to him unarmed, he abu-"sed them; and that *Apollonides* deserved to be "cashier'd, as the dishonour of his Nation, *Agasthias* replied, (which words *Laertius* ascribes to *Xenophon*) "he was an inconside-"rable fellow, whose ears were bored as the "slaves of *Lydia*: So they turned him out. Having called together all the Commanders, *Xenophon* advised them to chuse new in the room of those that were lost, of whom he was elected in the place of *Proxenus*: Hereupon he put on his richest habit, as fittest either for death or victory, for † his greatest delight was in fair polished arms affirming, that if he overcame, he deserved such; if he were overcome and died in the field, they would decently express his quality, and were the fittest Sepulchral ornaments of a valiant Man. His shield was of *Argos*, his breastplate of *Attica*, his helmet of *Bœotia*, his Horse of *Epidaurium*; whereby *Ælian* argued the elegance of the person, in choosing such things as were fair, and esteeming him worthy of such. Thus adorned, he made an oration to the Army, advising them (from the examples of their late Commanders) not to trust the Enemy, but in order to their return, to burn their Carriages, and Tents: this advice was put in execution; *Cherisophus* a *Lacedæmonian* had charge of the Van, *Xenophon* of the Reer, chosen (saith *Chio*) as well for his courage as wisdom, being in both excellent: betwixt these two there grew so great a friendship, that in all the time of the retreat they never had but one difference; their march was directed towards the heads of those great Rivers which lay in their way, that they might pass them where they were fordable; having crost the river *Zathe*, *Mithridates* came up to them, and galled the Reer with shot, which the Greeks not able to requite, *Xenophon* provided two hundred slings, and finding fifty Horses fit for service, imployed among the Carriages, mounted Men upon them, whereby having frustrated the second attempt of *Mithridates*, they marched to *Larissa*, seated upon *Tigris*, thence to *Mespila*; in their march from thence, *Tissaphernes* overtook them with a great Army, but was twice worsted; whereupon (as the securest course) he seized on a Mountain, under which they must of necessity pass; *Xenophon* with a party gained by another way the top of that Mountain, not without much difficulty of passage and trouble; and to animate his Souldiers, one of them, named *Soteridas*, murmured that he was on Horse-back, whereas himself marched on foot, oppress with the weight of his shield; which *Xenophon* hearing, alighted, took his shield from him, and thrusting him out of his rank, marched (notwithstanding he had also a Horse-man Cuirasse) in his room: But the Souldiers beat and reviled *Soteridas*, till they constrained him to take again his shield and place. When they had gained the top, the Enemy, being prevented, fled, and set fire on the villages. † The *Grecians* (intercepted by the River *Tigris*) marched over the Mountains into the Country of the *Carduchi*, a people Enemy to the *Persians*, rough and Warlike, from whom they found such opposition, that in seven days march through their Country, they were put to continual fights, and suffered more distresses than the *Persian* had put them to. Fording the River *Kentrites*, which bounds that Country, they passed into *Armenia*, where having put to flight some troops of Horse raised by the Kings deputies in these parts to oppose their passage, they marched without disturbance to the heads of *Tigris*, which they passed; thence to the River of *Teleboa* in West *Armenia*, molested with extream Snows, losing many by extremity of cold, till they came to the River *Phasis*, near which lived the *Phasiani*, *Tacchi*, and the *Chalybes*; the *Tacchi*, into whose Country they first came, conveying their provision into strong holds, reduced the Greeks to great want, until with much pains they forced one of them, where they took as much Cattle as maintained them in their passage through the Country of the *Chalybes*, a stout Nation, of whom they could get nothing but blows: thence they marched to the River *Harpasus*, so to the *Scythidi*, where the Lord of *Gymnias*, a town in those parts, led them through the Enemies country (which he willed them to burn as they went) to the Mountain *Theches*, from whence they might behold the Sea, to the great joy of the Souldiers. Passing friendly through the Country of the *Macrones*, to the *Colchian* Mountains, discomfiting the *Colchi*, who opposed them, they arrived at *Trapezond*, a City upon the *Euxine* Sea, where was a Greek *Colony*; here they sacrificed and celebrated games: * *Cherisophus* they sent to *Anaxibius*, The *Lacedæmonian* Admiral, (with whom he was intimate) to procure Ships for their transportation home. Whilst they stayed in expectation of his return, they maintained themselves by incursions upon the *Colchi*, and *Drylani*; but he not coming, and their provision failing, *Xenophon* perswaded the Cities adjoyning to clear them a passage by Land, which they took to *Cerasus* a Greek City, where mustering their Men, they found but eight thousand six hundred left of ten thousand that went up with *Cyrus*; the rest consumed by Enemies, Snow, sickness: They shared the Mony that had been made by the sale of Captives, reserving a tenth for an offering to *Apollo* and *Diana*: *Xenophon* reserved his to be disposed at *Delphi* and *Ephesus*. From *Cerasus* they passed through the Country of the *Mosynœci*, a barbarous people, divided into factions; the stronger part despising their friendship, they joyned with the weaker, whom they left Masters of all: Then they marched to the *Chalybes*, thence to the *Tibarenes*, passing quietly through their Country to *Cotiora*, a Greek Town and *Colony* of the *Sonopians*. Thus far the Army marched on foot; the distance of the place where they fought with *Artaxerxes* to *Cotyora*, being one hundred twenty two encampings, six hundred twenty parasangs, ten thousand

† *Ælian. var. hist.* 3. 24.

* *Xenophon. lib.* 4.

† *Xenophon lib.* 5.

thousand eight hundred twenty furlongs, the time eight Months.

Those of *Cotyora* refusing to afford them a Market or entertainment for their sick, they entered the Town by force, and took provision, partly out of *Paphlagonia*, partly out of the Territory of the *Cotionytes*; whereupon the City of *Sinope* to which *Cotyora* was tributary, sent Ambassadours to them, complaining of this dealing, and threatning to joyn with *Corylas* and the *Paphlagonians*; whereto *Xenophon* answered, "that they feared not, if need were, to War a-"gainst them both, but could, if they pleased, "gain the friendship of *Corylas* and the *Paphla-"gonians* as well as they. Upon which answer, the Ambassadours growing calm, promised them all friendship from the State of *Sinope*, and to assist them with Shipping for the whole Army, it being impossible to go by Land, by reason of the Rivers *Thermodon*, *Halys*, *Iris* and *Parthenius*.

*Xenophon* had designed to plant a *Colony* there, but his intention being divulg'd by *Silanus*, a Sooth-sayer, those of *Sinope* and *Heraclea* sent to the *Grecians*, promising them not only a sufficient Fleet, but desiring under hand *Timasion* a Greek Commander to promise the Army a good Sum of Mony to convey them to *Troas*; which offers *Xenophon* (who only desired the common good) perswaded them to accept, and to engage mutually, not to forsake one another till they were all in safety: Those of *Heraclea* sent Shipping, but not the Mony; whereupon *Timasion* and other Commanders fearing the Souldiers, desired *Xenophon* the Army might go to *Phasis*, which he refused, but thereby was occasion'd a suspition that he should plot to deceive the Army, and to bring them back to *Phasis*, whereof he acquitted himself. Here a general inquisition was made of all offences since the death of *Cyrus*, and they were punished; some accused *Xenophon* for beating them, all which proved for just causes, one for offering to bury his sick companion alive; some for forsaking their ranks; others for laying on the ground in the Snow, or lingring behind. Thus were all things quietly setled.

## CHAP. IV.

### *End of the Retreat.*

Xenoph. lib. 6. THe Greeks, assoon as their Fleet was ready, set sail for *Harmond*, the Port of *Sinope*, when *Chirisophus* met them with some Galleys from *Anaxibius*, who promised them pay as soon as they should come into *Greece*. The Army desirous of a General, intreated *Xenophon* (with extraordinary testimony of affection) to accept that command: *Xenophon* refused, either disswaded by inauspicious sacrifice, or unwilling to displease the *Lacedæmonians*, in putting by *Chirisophus*, who was thereupon chosen, but soon after deposed, for refusing to extort a great sum from *Heraclea*, a Greek City their friends: *Xenophon* also denying to be employed therein, the Army thereupon became divided; they chose ten Captains out of themselves, with *Chirisophus* remained two thousand one hundred, with *Xenophon* two thousand foot and forty Horse; *Chirisophus* went by land to meet *Cleander* Governour of *Byzantium*, at the mouth of the River *Calphas*, leaving such Shipping as he had to *Xenophon*, who landing in the confines of *Thrace*, and of the *Heraclean* Country, marched quietly through the midst of the land: the Mutineers landing at *Calphas*, surprised and spoiled the Country thereabout; the *Thracians* rising up against them, cut off two Regiments, and besieged the Hill where the rest encamped. *Xenophon* on the way being informed of the desperate condition of these Greeks, went directly to the place, setting on fire as he went all that was combustible; the Enemy fearing to be set upon in the night, stole away, as did the Greeks also, whom *Xenophon* overtaking in the way to the Port of *Calphas*, they embraced him with great joy, and arriving at the Haven, made a decree, that it should be death for any Man to propound to divide the Army, and that they should depart the Country in their first order. The former Commanders being restored in the room of *Chirisophus* who died, they substituted *Neon*, who going forth with two thousand Men to pillage the Country, was discomfited by *Pharnabazus* Lieutenant to the King of *Persia*, and lost five hundred Men; the rest rescued by *Xenophon*, the Army by his encouragement marched through a large Forrest defeating *Pharnabazus*, who opposed their passage there. *Cleander* came over to them, and having expressed much kindness to *Xenophon*, and contracted hospitality with him, departed. The Army marched through *Bythinia* to *Chrysopolis* in the territories of *Chalcedon*. * Thence *Anaxibius* the *Lacedæmonian* Admiral transported them to *Byzantium*, where he had promised they should as soon as they arrived receive pay, without which he sent them out of the City, whereat the Souldiers incensed, returned and entred the City by force, intending to spoil it: but *Xenophon* thrusting himself amongst the croud, disswaded them, and appeased the tumult, as is particularly attested by † *Chio* an eye-witness. By this means they were brought to depart the City quietly, which as soon as they had done, *Xenophon* desirous to go home, took leave of the Army, and returned to *Byzantium* with *Cleander*. *Anaxibius* being put out of the Admiralship, and thereupon slighted by *Pharnabazus* (at whose instigation he had treated the Greeks so hardly) desired *Xenophon* to return to the Army to lead them to *Perinthus*, whence they should be transported into *Asia*; The Army received him with much joy: when they came to *Perinthus*, *Aristarchus* the Governour would not suffer them to be transported: *Seuthes* King of *Thrace* had invited them to aid him against *Medocus*, Usurper of his Kingdom, with large offers of Mony to every Souldier, of his Daughter to *Xenophon*: to him therefore not knowing where to winter they went. At supper every one (according to the custom) drunk to the King, and made him a Present: *Xenophon*, who sate next him, rising up, and taking the cup, told "him he gave him himself and all his Com-"panions to be his faithful friends, and ready

* *Xenoph. lib. 7.*

† *In Epistola ad Metridem.*

"Servants in the recovery of his Kingdom: "Herein their assistance did much advantage *Seuthes*: the Army wanting pay, *Xenophon* reproved *Heraclides* for not taking order about it; who thereupon endeavoured to work him out of favour with *Seuthes*, to whom he brought the rest of the Commanders, counselling them to say, that if need were, they could lead the Army upon service as well as *Xenophon*; but they jointly protested unto *Seuthes*, they would not serve at all without him: So he sent for *Xenophon* also, and being agreed to proceed, they march'd towards the Country of the *Melinophagi* as far as *Salmydesson*: which places having reduced, they returned to the Plains of *Selybria*, thither came *Charinus* a *Lacedæmonian*, *Polinicus* sent from *Thymbro*, who told them that the *Lacedæmonians* had designed War against *Tissaphernes*, the charge thereof was committed to *Thymbro*, who desir'd this Army of Greeks to assist them, promising them good pay. *Seuthes* willingly yielded the Army into their hands; they sent *Xenophon* to demand their arrears, which not without much importunity he obtained. Thence they sailed to *Lampsacus*, where *Euclides* a soothsayer of *Xenophon*'s acquaintance asked him, how much Gold he had brought? *Xenophon* protested he had not enough to carry him home, but that he sold his Horse and other things which he had about him. The next day they marched to *Ophrynium*, whither came *Brito* and *Euelides* to pay the Army; they being *Xenophon*'s friends, restored (refusing the price of redemption) his Horse which he much loved, and had pawned at *Lampsacus*. Then marching forward by *Atramyttium*, and *Kerchinium*, not far from *Atarna* to the Plain of *Caicus*, they reached *Pergamus* a City of *Lydia*. Here *Hellus* Wife of *Gongylus* an *Eretrian*, Mother of *Gorgion*, and *Gongylus* entertained *Xenophon*: By her information *Xenophon* surprised *Asidates* a rich *Persian*, with his Wife and Children, and all his goods: Returning to *Pergamus*, the *Lacedæmonians*, Captains and Souldiers, by agreement gave him also an extraordinary share of Horses, oxen, and other things; then came *Thymbro*, and taking the Army, joyn'd it to the rest of the Grecian forces, wherewith he made War against *Tissaphernes*.

Of the Kings Provinces, through which they passed, the Governours were these; *Artimas* of *Lydia*, *Artacamus* of *Phrygia*, *Mithridates* of *Lycaonia*, and *Cappodocia*; of *Cilicia*, † *Syennesis*: of *Phœnicia* and *Arabia*, *Dernes*; of *Syria* and *Assyria*, *Belesis*: of *Babylonia*, *Roparas*: of *Media*, *Arbacas*, of the *Phasiani* and *Hesperita*, *Tenibazus*, the *Carduchi*, *Chalybes*, *Chaldæans*, *Macrones*, *Colchi*, *Mosynœchi*, *Cœti*, and *Tibareni* are free Nations; *Paphlagonia*, governed by *Corylas*; the *Bithynians* by *Pharnabazus*, the *European Thracians* by *Seuthes*: The total number of the Ascent and Descent is two hundred and fifteen encampings, one thousand one hundred and fifty parasangs, thirty four thousand two hundred fifty five furlongs; the time of the Ascent and Descent one year and three months.

† Which perhaps was a common name to the Kings of that Country, as *Ptolomy* to those of *Ægypt*. see *Thalis* Chap.

## CHAP. V.

*His following of* Agesilaus, *and banishment.*

* *After this expedition the defeat in* Pontus, *and breach of promise of* Senthes *King of the* Odrysians; Xenophon *went into* Asia *with* Agesilaus *King of the* Lacedæmonians, *to whom he delivered for a Sum of Mony the Souldiers of* Cyrus, *and beloved infinitely, ἐις ὑπερβολὴν*: Æmilius Probus saith, *he conversed intimately with him*: Cicero, that *he instructed him*. Plutarch affirms, that *by his advice* Agesilaus *sent his Sons to be educated at* Sparta, *to learn and art them, which none was more excellent, how to obey and command*. *Agesilaus* passed into *Asia* the first year of the 96. Olympiad; He Warred successfully with the *Persian*, but the year following was called home by the *Lacedæmonians* to help his Country invaded by the *Thebans*, and their Allies, whom the *Persian* had corrupted, thereby to withdraw the War out of his Country. *Xenophon* in his returning with *Agesilaus* out of *Asia* into *Bœotia*, apprehending the danger of the War they were entring into, when he came to *Ephesus* left one half of the Gold † which he had reserved for an offering out of his share (of the Mony which the Army divided at *Cerasunt* in their return from the expedition of *Cyrus*) with *Megabyzus Diana*'s Priest, willing that if he escaped the danger of that War, it should be restored to him, if he miscarried, consecrated to *Diana*, and either made into an Image dedicated to the Goddess, or disposed some way that he should conceive most acceptable to her: the other half he sent an offering to the *Athenian* treasury at *Delphi*, * inscribing thereon both his own name, and that of *Proxenus*, his Predecessor in the command of that Regiment. *Agesilaus* returning, wasted *Bœotia*, and overcame the *Thebans* and their Allies in a great Battel at *Coronea* † particularly described by *Xenophon*, who was there present.

* *Lamp.*

† *Supr. Chap.*

* *Xenophon.*

† *Agesil.*

During the absence of *Xenophon* out of his own Country, the *Athenians* (because he took part against the King of *Persia* their friend, and followed *Cyrus*, who had assisted the *Lacedæmonians* against them, * supplying *Lysander* their General with Mony for a Navy) proclaimed a decree of banishment against him: † *After* saith, he was banished by the decree of *Eubulus*, and called home by the same; *Laertius*, that he was banish'd for *Laconism*, upon his going to *Agesilaus*; Some place this Decree in the third year of the 96. Olympiad, but the writer of the History of *Cyrus* his expedition implieth, that it was before his first return out of *Asia*, affirming that before the delivery of the Army to *Thymbro*, *Xenophon* ignorant of this Decree, intended to have gone home.

* *Paus.*

† *Lamp.*

## CHAP. VI.

*How he lived at* Scillus, *and at* Corinth.

THe *Lacedæmonians* to requite him for suffering in their cause, maintained him at the publick charge, and chasing *Scillus* of the *Eleans*, built a Town there, and bestowed

ſtowed a fair houſe and land upon *Xenophon*, whereupon he left *Agaſilaus* and went thither, carrying with him his Wife named *Phileſia*, and his two Sons which he had by* her, *Diodorus* and *Gryllus*, called the Dioſcury. † Thither *Pelopidas* a Spartan, ſent him Captives for ſlaves from *Dardanus* for a Preſent, to diſpoſe of them as ſhould pleaſe him.

* *Suid.* † *Laert.*

*Xenoph. de exped. Cyr. 5. Laert.* *Scilluns* was near *Olympia*, eminent for celebration of the Games, which *Megabyzus* coming to ſee, reſtored to *Xenophon* the Mony which he had left in his cuſtody, wherewith * by advice of the Oracle he purchaſed a portion of land, and conſecrated it to *Diana* in a place deſigned by *Apollo*, through which ran the River *Selinus*, of the ſame name with that at *Epheſus*, running by *Diana's* Temple; the River was ſtored as well with ſhell-fiſh as others, the land with all kind of beaſts for game; he built alſo a Temple, and after with the conſecrated Mony offering the tiths of the fruits of the land to *Diana*, all the Citizens and Neighbours, Men and Women, were invited to the feaſt, where they had from the Goddeſſes allowance, Bread, Wine, and part of the Fleſh of ſuch beaſts as was either taken out of the conſecrated ground, and ſacrificed, or killed in hunting with the Sons of *Xenophon* and others Citizens, exerciſed againſt the time of the feaſt out of the ſacred ground, and out of *Phaloe* were taken wild Boars, Goats, and Staggs; the place lies in the way betwixt *Lacedæmonia* and *Olympia*, twenty *Stadia* from the Temple of *Olympian Jupiter*. In the ſacred ground were Woods and Hills, ſtored with Trees ſufficient to maintain Swine, Goats and Sheep, whereby the beaſts of carriage of ſuch Merchants as come to the feaſt are maintained plentifully: about the Temple a Grove of Fruit-trees of all ſorts. The Temple was an imitation in little of that at *Epheſus*: an image of Cypreſs here reſembling that of Gold there: A Pillar near the Temple bare this inſcription, *GROUND SACRED TO* DIANA. *HE WHO POSSESSETH IT LET HIM PAY THE TITH OF HIS YEARLY ENCREASE, AND WITH THE SURPLUSAGE MAINTAIN THE TEMPLE, IF HE NEGLECT, THE GODDESS WILL TAKE ORDER FOR IT.* † At this place of retirement *Xenophon* employed his time in hunting, and writing Hiſtories, inviting his friends thither, * of whom amongſt others came *Phædo* and *Ariſtippus*, much delighted with the ſituation, building, and Trees planted by the hand of the owner.

*Strab. 8.* *Laert.* *Epiſt. Socrat. 18.* *Laert.*

† At length a War ariſing betwixt the *Eleans* and *Lacedæmonians*, the *Elians* invaded *Scilluns* with a great Army, and before the *Lacedemonians* came to their relief, ſeized on the houſe and lands of *Xenophon*; His Sons with ſome few ſervants got away privately to *Lepreum*; *Xenophon* firſt to *Elis*, then to *Lepreum* to his Sons, and laſtly with them to *Corinth*, where he took a houſe and continued the reſt of his life. During this time the *Argives*, *Arcadians*, and *Thebans*, jointly oppoſed the *Lacedæmonians*, and had almoſt oppreſt them, when the *Athenians* made a publick decree (* mentioned by *Xenophon*) to ſuccour them; *Xenophon* ſent his Sons upon the expedition to *Athens* to fight for the *Lacedæmonians*; for (as *Diocles* affirms) they had been educated at *Sparta* in the diſcipline of that place.

*Grec. Hiſt. lib.*

This enmity ended in a great battle at *Mantinea* in the ſecond year of the hundredth and fourth Olympiad: *Diodorus* without acting any thing memorable, gave off ſafe, and had afterwards a Son of his brothers name. *Gryllus* was ranked oppoſite to the *Theban* Horſe-men: the *Thebans* having by the valour of their General *Epaminondas* got the better of the day, a reſolute company of *Spartan* Horſe-men broke in upon him, of whom was *Gryllus*, who ſlew *Epaminondas* with his own hand, as *Pauſanias* affirms to have been atteſted both by the *Athenians*, and the *Thebans*, adding, that he had ſeen at *Athens* a picture of the battle at *Mantinea*, confirming the ſame; and that at *Mantinea* was erected a Pillar with the ſtature of *Gryllus* on horſe back. In this noble action *Gryllus* loſt his life, the news of whoſe death came to *Xenophon* at *Corinth*, as he was ſacrificing, Crowned with a Garland; as ſoon as he heard his Son was ſlain, he took off his Garland, and laid it aſide; then demanding after what manner he died, it was anſwered, fighting ſtoutly in the midſt of his enemies, of whom having ſlain many, he fell at laſt himſelf: Hereupon *Xenophon* took again his Garland, and putting it upon his head, proceeded to ſacrifice, not ſo much as ſhedding one tear, only ſaying, *I knew that I had begot a mortal*; † and calling the Gods to whom he ſacrificed to witneſs, that the vertue of his Son gave him more content, than his death ſorrow. * Innumerable were the Epitaphs and Encomiums that were written upon *Gryllus*, to pleaſe *Xenophon*, whence may be collected in how great eſteem he was.

*Laert. Ælian. var. hiſt. 3. 2. Diodorus Epitom. Polyb. Plutarch Iulian. Cæſ. Sext. 106.*

† *Val. Max. 5. 10.*

* *Laert.* citing *Ariſtotle.*

That he made a viſit to *Dionyſius* Tyrant of *Sicily* (but at what time is uncertain) is implied by † *Athenæus*, who relateth, that being at a feaſt of his, compelled by the Cup-bearer to drink, he called the Tyrant by name: "What "is the matter *Dionyſius*, (ſaith he) your Cook, "though excellent in that art, doth not enforce "us to eat againſt our inclination?

† *Deipnoſ. lib. 10.*

## CHAP. VII.

### *His Death, Perſon, Vertues.*

XENOPHON being * *full of years* (which according to † *Lucian* exceeded ninety (died at *Corinth*, in the firſt of the hundredth and fifth Olympiad, *Callidemus* or *Callimedes* being *Archon*, at what time *Philip* Son of *Amintas* began his reign in *Macedonia*. He had an ingenious modeſt look, long, thick hair, handſome (to uſe the words of *Laertius*) beyond expreſſion, *Adroit in every thing, particularly addicted to Horſes and hunting, skilfull in Tactlicks, as his writings atteſt; devout, a great lover of ſacrifices, skilful in interpreting them; an exact imitatour of* Socrates, *temperate, as* appears from his ſaying, that *It is pleaſant hungry, to eat Herbs; thirſty, to drink water.* So candid and ingenious, that * when he might have ſtollen the writings of *Thucydides* which lay concealed, he choſe rather to publiſh them with honour.

* *Laert.* † *De long ev.*

* *Athen. deipn. 4.*

† *Laert.*

In a word, he was a perſon every way abſolute, as well for action, as contemplation. Xenophon (ſaith * *Eunapius*) *was the only Man of all the Philoſophers who adorned Philoſophy with his words and actions; he deſcribes Moral vertue in his diſcourſes and writings: in his actions he was ſingular; as to his conduct, a moſt excellent General.* Alexander *had not been great, if* Xenophon *had not ſaid, even the perfunctory actions of valiant perſons ought to be recorded.*

* *Proœm.*

† He was the firſt that committed the diſputes of *Socrates* his Maſter to writing, and that with much fidelity, not inſerting excurſions of his own, as *Plato* did, whom for that reaſon, as * *A. Gellius* obſerves, he argueth of falſhood; that there was a great enmity betwixt theſe two is affirmed by the ſame Author, who, as a proof thereof alledgeth, that neither of them names the other in any of their writings: † *Voſſius* only obſerves, that *Xenophon* mentions *Plato* once in his * ἀπομνημονεύμασι, overſeen by *A. Gellius*. This enmity is further acknowledged by † *Athenæus* and *Laertius*, confirmed by the Epiſtle of *Xenophon* to *Æſchines*, wherein he condemns *Plato*, that not being ſatisfied with the Doctrine of *Socrates*, he went to the *Pythagoreans* in *Italy*, and to the *Ægyptian* Prieſts; arguments of a mind not conſtant to *Socrates*. That he was at difference with * *Ariſtippus* alſo, argued from his writings.

† *Laert.*

* *Lib.* 14.

† *De Hiſtor. Græc.* 1. 5.

* *Lib.* 3.

† *Dipnoſ.* 11.

* *Laert. vit. Ariſtipp.*

*Laertius* hath two Epigrams concerning him, the firſt upon his going with *Cyrus* into upper *Aſia*.

*Great* Xenophon *at once made two aſcents,*
*To* Aſia *in perſon, and to Heaven by fame:*
*His ſtile and action (laſting Monuments)*
*Lay to* Socratick *wiſdom equal claim.*

The other upon his baniſhment.

*Thee the* Cecropians, *noble* Xenophon,
*Baniſh'd their Land, cauſe* Cyrus *thou didſt aid;*
*But ſtrangers prov'd far kinder than thy own:*
*What* Athens *ow'd thee, was by* Corinth *paid.*

*Laertius* reckons ſeven *Xenophons*, this the firſt, the ſecond an *Athenian*, Brother to *Nicoſtratus*, Author of the *Theſes*; beſides many other things, he writ the lives of *Pelopidas* and *Epaminondas*; the third, a Phyſician of *Coos*; the fourth, writer of the Hiſtory of *Hannibal*: the fifth, writer of fabulous Monſters: the ſixth, of *Paros* a Statuary: the ſeventh, an old Comick Poet: *Suidas* reckons three more; one of *Antioch*, the ſecond of *Epheſus*, the third of *Cyprus*: Hiſtorians, or rather writers of Romances; that of the firſt called *Babylonica*, of the ſecond *Epheſiaca* in ten Books; of the third *Cypriaca*: the Story of *Cynaras*, *Myrrha*, and *Adonis*.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *His Writings.*

*Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* ſaith, that *Xenophon* was a ſtudious Æmulatour of *Herodotus*, both in words and language: His ſtile (according to *Cicero*) * *ſoft and* † *ſweet* (melle dulcior) *far differing from the noiſe of Orators in the* Forum: *in his voice,* * *the Muſes ſeem to ſpeak*, whence he was ſirnamed *the Attick Muſe*; or according to others, *the Attick Bee*, a Title formerly conferr'd on † *Sophocles*. His ſtile and manner of writing is at large diſcourſed upon by *Ariſtides*, *Adrianenſis* in an expreſs Tract, erroneouſly aſcribed to *Hermogenes*.

* *Brut. & de oratore. lib.* 2.

† *Orator.*

* *Cic. Orat.*

† *Vit. Soph.*

The Books of *Xenophon* (which * *Scipio Africanus* had always in his hand, and † *Cicero* adviſeth to read, as very profitable in many things) were (as reckoned by *Laertius*) forty, which ſeveral preſons diſtinguiſh ſeverally; the general titles theſe.

* *Cicer. Tuſ. quæſt.* 3.

† *De ſenect.*

Κύρου παιδεία; *the life and diſcipline of* Cyrus (as *Cicero* renders it) in eight Books, written *non ad hiſtoria fidem* (though * *Diodorus Siculus* ſeems to take it in that quality) *ſed ad effigiem juſti imperii; not as a faithful Hiſtory, but the deſcription of an exact Prince:* Whence † *Auſonius* ſaith, *in relating the vertues of* Cyrus, *he hath given rather a wiſh than a Hiſtory, deſcribing, not what he was, but what he ought to have been.*

* *Lib.* 15.

† *Grat. act.*

Κύρου ἀνάβασις; *the going up of* Cyrus *the younger into* Aſia, in ſeven Books; each of which (as *Laertius* obſerves) hath a Proœm, the whole none: *Maſius* ſuſpects that *Xenophon* was not the Author of this Book; the Biſhop of * *Armach* aſcribes it to *Themiſtogenes*, though owned as *Xenophon* by *Plutarch*, *Cicero*, *Dionyſius*, *Halicarnaſſus*, *Hermogenes*, *Laertius*, *Athenæus*, and others.

* *Annal.*

Ἑλλήνικα; *the Greek Hiſtory*, in ſeven Books, continuing where *Thucydides* left; the ſame was done by *Theopompus*, but he went no further than ſixteen years, *Xenophon* to forty eight.

*Ageſilaus*, of which piece *Cicero* ſaith, that *Ageſilaus would not ſuffer his Picture or Statue to be made, this Book alone ſurpaſſeth all Pictures or Images in his praiſe.*

*The Republick of the* Lacedæmonians, and *the Republick of the* Athenians, which † *Demetrius* denieth to be *Xenophon*'s.

† *Laert.*

*The defence of* Socrates, and *the memorials of* Socrates, which perhaps is that *Hiſtory of Philoſophers* mentioned by *Suidas*.

*Oeconomicks*, the laſt Book of the memorable diſcourſes, wherewith * *Cicero* was ſo much delighted, that in his younger years he tranſlated it.

* *Offic.* 2.

*Sympoſium*, accommodated to the fourth year of the eighty ninth Olympiad, for which reaſon reprehended by *Athenæus*, as erroneous in Chronology; vindicated by the learned *Caſaubon*.

*Hiero*, Or, *of a Kingdom.*
*The accounts of Revenues.*
*Of Horſes.*
*Of Horſemanſhip.*
*Of Hunting.*
*Epiſtles.*

Beſides theſe which are extant, *Xenophon* ſeems to have written other things; * *Valerius Maximus* and † *Pliny* cite his *Periplus*.

* 8. 13.

† 7. 48.

There is a Treatiſe of *Æquivokes* under *Xenophon*'s name, but made and impoſed upon the World by *Annius*.

XENO-

# XENOPHON's EPISTLES TO †ÆSCHINES.

† Stob. ſerm.

## EPIST. I.

MEeting with *Hermogenes*, amongſt other things I asked him what Philoſophy you followed, he anſwered, the ſame as *Socrates*. For this inclination I admired you, when you lived at *Athens*, and now continue the ſame admiration for your conſtancy above other ſtudents of wiſdom; the greateſt argument to me of your virtue is your being taken with that Man, if we may call the life of *Socrates* mortal. That there are divine Beings over us all know: we worſhip them as exceeding us in power; what they are is neither eaſie to find, nor lawful to enquire. It concerns not ſervants to examine the Nature and actions of their Maſters, their duty is only to obey them; and which is moſt conſiderable, the more admiration they deſerve who buſie themſelves in thoſe things which belong to Man; the more trouble this brings them, who affect glory in vain unſeaſonable objects: For when (*Æſchines*) did any Man hear *Socrates* diſcourſe of the Heavens, or adviſe his Scholars to Mathematical Demonſtrations? we know he underſtood Muſick no further than the Ear: But was always diſcourſing to his friends of ſome thing excellent; what is Fortitude and Juſtice and other Virtues. Theſe he called the proper good of Mankind; other things he ſaid Men could not arrive at; or they were of kin to Fables, ſuch ridiculous things as are taught by the ſupercilious Profeſſours of Wiſdom. Nor did he only teach this; his practice was anſwerable; of which I have written at large elſewhere, what I hope will not be unpleaſing to you, (though you know it already) to peruſe. Let * thoſe who are not ſatisfied with what *Socrates* delivered, give over upon this conviction, or confine themſelves to what is probable. Living, he was atteſted wiſe by the Deity; Dead, his Murtherers could find no expiation by repentance: But theſe extraordinary perſons affect *Ægypt* and the prodigious Learning of *Pythagoras*, which unneceſſary ſtudy argueth them of inconſtancy towards *Socrates*, as doth alſo their love of Tyrants, and preferring the luxury of a *Sicilian* Table before a frugal life.

* Meaning *Plato*, who added much of his own to the diſcourſes of *Socrates*, and went to *Ægypt*, *Italy*, and *Sicily*.

*To* Crito.

*Epiſt.* II.

SOcrates often told us, that they who provide much wealth for their Children, but neglect to improve them by vertue, do like thoſe who feed their Horſes high, and never train them to the manage: by this means their Horſes are the better in caſe, but the worſe for ſervice, whereas the commendations of a Horſe conſiſts not in his being fat, but ſerviceable in War. In the ſame kind err they who purchaſe Lands for their Children, but neglect their perſons; their poſſeſſions will be of great value, themſelves of none, whereas the owner ought to be more honourable than his Eſtate. Whoſoever therefore breeds his Son well, though he leave him little, gives him much: It is the mind which makes him great or ſmall: whatſoever they have, to the good ſeems ſufficient, to the rude too little. You leave your Children no more than neceſſity requires, which they being well educated, will eſteem plentiful. The ignorant though free from preſent trouble, have nothing the leſs fear for the future. *Stob. ſerm.* 201.

*To* Sotira.

*Epiſt.* III.

† DEath in my opinion is neither good nor ill, but the end of the life, not alike to all, for as ſtronger or weaker from their birth, their years are unequal; ſometimes death is haſtned by good or evil cauſes: *and again:* * neither is it fitting to grieve ſo much for death, knowing that birth is the beginning of Man's Pilgrimage, death the end. He died, as all Men (though never ſo unwilling) muſt do: but to die well, is the part of a willing and well educated perſon. Happy was *Gryllus*, and whoſoever elſe chooſeth not the longeſt life, but the moſt virtuous; though his (it pleaſed God) was ſhort. † *Stob. ſerm.* 892. * *Stob. ſerm.* 278.

To

To Lamprocles.

*Epist.* IV.

Stob. YOU must first approve the excellent assertion of *Socrates*, that *Riches are to be measured by their use*. He called not large possessions riches, but so much only as is necessary; in the judgement whereof he advised us not to be deceived, these he called truly rich, the rest poor, labouring under an incurable poverty of mind, not Estate.

* *Epist.* V.

* *Epist. Socratic.* 18.
† *Allatius* otherwise. THEY who † write in praise of my Son *Gryllus*, did as they ought; and you likewise do well in writing to us the actions of *Socrates*; we ought not only to endeavour to be good our selves, but to praise him who lived chastly, piously, and justly; and to blame fortune, and those who plotted against him, who ere long will receive the punishment thereof. The *Lacedemonians* are much incensed at it, (for the ill news is come hither already) and reproach our People, saying, They are mad again, in that they could be wrought upon to put him to death whom *Pythia* declared the wisest of Men. If any of *Socrates*'s friends want those things which I sent, give me notice, and I will help them, for it is just and honest; you do well in keeping *Æschines* with you, as you send me word. I have a design to collect the sayings and Actions of *Socrates*, which will be his best Apology, both now and for the future, not in the Court where the *Athenians* are Judges, but to all who consider the virtue of the Man. If we should not write this freely, it were a sin against friendship and the truth. Even now there fell into my hands a piece of *Plato*'s to that effect, wherein is the name of *Socrates*, and some discourses of his not unpleasant. But we must profess that we heard not, nor can commit to writing any in that kind, for we are not Poets as he is, though he renounce Poetry; for amidst his entertainments with beautiful persons, he affirmed that there was not any Poem of his extant, but one of *Socrates*, young and handsome. Farewell, both, dearest to me.

* *Epist.* VI.

* *Epist. Socratic.* 21. INtending to celebrate the Feast of *Diana*, to whom we have erected a Temple, we sent to invite you hither; if all of you would come, it were much the best, otherwise if you send such as you can conveniently spare to assist at our sacrifice, you will do us a favour. *Aristippus* was here, (and before him) *Phædo*, who were much pleased with the situation and structure, but above all, with the Plantation which I have made with my own hands. The place is stored with Beasts convenient for hunting, which the Goddess affects; let us rejoice and give thanks to her who preserved me from the King of the *Barbarians*, and afterwards in *Pontus* and *Thrace* from greater evils, even when we thought we were out of the Enemies reach. Though you come not, yet am I obliged to write to you. I have composed some memorials of *Socrates*, when they are Perfect you shall have them. *Aristippus* and *Phædo* did not disapprove of them; salute in my name *Simon* the Leather dresser, and commend him that he continueth *Socratick* discourses, not diverted by want, or his trade from Philosophy, as some others, who decline to know and admire such discourses and their effects.

* *Epist.* VII.

* *Epist. Socratic.* 19. COme to us dear friend, for we have now finished the Temple of *Diana*, a magnificent structure, the place set with Trees and consecrated, what remains will be sufficient to maintain us; for as *Socrates* said, if they are not fit for us, we will fit our selves to them; I write to *Gryllus* my Son and your friend to supply your occasions; I write to *Gryllus*, because of a little one you have profest a kindness for him.

To Xantippe.

† *Epist.* VIII.

† *Epist. Socratic.* 21. TO *Euphron* of *Megara* I delivered six measures of Meal, eight Drachms, and a new Rayment for your use this Winter: accept them and know that *Euclid* and *Terpsion* are exceeding good, honest persons, very affectionate to you and *Socrates*; if your Sons have a desire to come to me, hinder them not, for the journey to *Megara* is neither long nor incommodious: Pray forbear to weep any more, it may do hurt, but cannot help. Remember what *Socrates* said, follow his Practice and Precepts; in grieving you will but wrong your self and Children; they are the young ones of *Socrates*, whom we are obliged not only to maintain, but to preserve our selves for their sakes: lest if you or I, or any other, who after the death of *Socrates* ought to look to his Children, should fail, they might want a Guardian to maintain and protect them. I study to live for them, which you will not do unless you cherish your self. Grief is one of those things which are opposite to life, for by it the living are prejudiced. *Apollodorus* † sirnamed *the soft*, and *Dion* praise you, that you will accept nothing from any, professing you are rich; it is well done; for as long as I and other friends are able to maintain you, you shall need none else. Be of good courage, *Xantippe*, lose nothing of *Socrates*, knowing how great that Man was; think upon his life, not upon his death; yet that to those who consider it will appear noble and excellent. Farewel.

† The reason manifest from *Xenophon* and *Laertius*, who describe him such: *Xenophon* calls him *Socratic.* in all things but his affection to *Socrates*. *Allatius* is much perplext concerning this appellation.

* To Cebes *and* Simmias.

*Epist.* IX.

* *Epist. Socratic.* 22. IT is commonly said, nothing is richer than a poor Man, this I find true in my self, who have not so much, but whilst you my friends take care of me, seem to possess much: and it is well done of you to supply me as often as I write:

write: As concerning my Commentaries, there is none of them but I fear ſhould be ſeen by any in my abſence, as I profeſt in your hearing at the houſe where *Euclid* lay. I know dear friends a writing once communicated to many is irrecoverable. *Plato*, though abſent, is much admired hroughout *Italy* and *Sicily* for his Treatiſes; but we cannot be perſwaded they deſerve any ſtudy; I am not only careful of loſing the honour due to learning, but tender alſo of *Socrates*, leſt his virtue ſhould incur any prejudice by my ill relation of it. I conceive it the ſame thing to caluminate, or not praiſe to the full thoſe of whom we write; This is my fear (*Cebes* and *Simmias*) at preſent, until my judgment ſhall be otherwiſe inform'd. Fare ye well.

* *Epiſt. Socratic.* 19.

# ÆSCHINES.

## CHAP. I.

### *His Life.*

* *Laert.* * *Lucanicarum ſartoris.*

ÆSCHINES was Son of *Charinus* ἀλλαντοπῶλ, or as *Plato* and others, of *Lyſanias*, an *Athenian*, of the *Sphettian* Tribe: He was from his childhood very induſtrious; addreſſing himſelf to *Socrates*, he ſaid to him, I am poor, and have nothing to give you but my ſelf: Do you not know, anſwered *Socrates*, that you have made me a rich Preſent? He was the moſt diligent of all his Scholars, and never quitted him; whereupon *Socrates* ſaid, that he only, ὁ ἀλλαντοπῶλ valued him: He was not beloved of *Plato*, nor *Ariſtippus*: *Idomeneus* ſaith, it was he who counſelled *Socrates* to eſcape out of Priſon, which *Plato* aſcribes to *Crito*. Being very poor, *Socrates* bad him take ſome of his Dialogues and make Mony of them, which *Ariſtippus* ſuſpecting when he read them at *Megara*, derided him, ſaying, how came you by theſe, Plagiary? Another time † *Ariſtippus falling out with him, was queſtion'd what became of his friendſhip, he anſwered, it is aſleep, but I will wake it*; *and meeting* Æſchines, *do I ſeem ſo inconſiderable to you, ſaith he, and unfortunate, as not to deſerve correction? It is no wonder, anſwers* Æſchines, *if your nature exceeding mine in every thing, find out firſt what is expedient.* *Inſtigated by poverty, he went to *Sicily*, to *Dionyſius* the Tyrant, at what time *Plato*, and *Ariſtippus* were there: *Plato* being out of favour with the Tyrant, took occaſion, by preſenting *Æſchines*, to ingratiate himſelf: † *He deſired he might be admitted to ſpeak with him, which the Tyrant granted, ſuppoſing he would alledge ſomething in defence of himſelf; as ſoon as he came into his preſence, he began thus: If you knew,* Dionyſius, *of any that came with a hoſtile intent to do you hurt, though he fail'd of the occaſion, would you ſuffer him to depart unpuniſhed? Nothing leſs, anſwered* Dionyſius; *for not only the ill actions, but deſigns of enemies deſerve to be chaſtized. Then* (*replies* Plato) *if any Man ſhould come hither out of an intent to do you a good office, and you not give him leave, ought you to neglect and deſpiſe him?* Dionyſius *demanded whom he meant:* Æſchines (*ſaid he*) *a perſon of as great integrity as any of* Socrates *his friends, able to reform thoſe with whom he converſeth, who having undertaken a great voyage by ſea to come hither, and diſcourſe Philoſophically with you, is neglected.* Dionyſius *was ſo pleaſed at this, that he embraced* Plato, *admiring his candor and greatneſs of Spirit, and entertained* Æſchines *bountifully and magnificently.* Thus *Plutarch*; but *Laertius* ſaith, that *Æſchines* coming thither, was deſpiſed by *Plato*, and recommended by *Ariſtippus*, the latter, the *Socratic* Epiſtle confirms: to *Dionyſius* he imparted ſome Dialogues, and was gratified by him, with whom he lived until he was depoſed, and *Dion* brought into the Kingdom; then returned to *Athens*, where not daring to profeſs his Philoſophy, becauſe the names of *Plato* and *Ariſtippus* were ſo great, he taught and * took mony privately, at laſt applyed himſelf to framing Orations for the *Forum*, in which *Timon* ſaith, he was very perſwaſive: *Lyſias* wrote one Oration in anſwer to him, intituled περὶ συκοφαντίας, or according to *Athenæus* πρὸς Αἰσχύλῳ τὸν Σωκρατικὸν χρέως, wherein he aſperſeth him for many things, which are not any way probable, as (beſides patronizing an unjuſt cauſe, and borrowing without intent to reſtore) for pretending to ſell Unguents, contrary to the laws of *Solon*, and precepts of *Socrates*, and for injuring *Hermæus*, his Wife and Children; ſee *Athenæus*. *Ariſtotle* ſirnamed ὁ Μῦθος was his intimate friend. *Laertius* reckons eight of this name; the firſt, this *Æſchines* the Philoſopher; the ſecond wrote of Rhetorick; the third an Orator, contemporary with *Demoſthenes*; the fourth an *Arcadian*, Scholar to *Iſocrates*; the fifth of *Mitelene*, ſirnamed *Rhetoromaſtix*; the ſixth a *Neopolitan*, an *Academick* Philoſopher, Diſciple to *Melanthius* a *Rhodian*; the ſeventh a *Mileſian*, who wrote *Politicks*, friend to *Cicero*; the eighth a ſtatuary.

* *Laert. Heſych. Illuſtr.*

† *Epiſt. Socratic.* 21.

† *Plut. de ira cohib.*

* *Laert. Philoſtrat. vit. Apollon. and from him* Suidas.

† *Plutarch. de adulat. & amici diſcrim.*

† The reaſon manifeſt from *Xenophon* and *Laertius*, who deſcribe him ſuch: *Xenophon* calls him εὐθύς, *Apolog. Socrat.* in all things but his affection to *Socrates*. *Leo Allatius* is much perplext concerning this appellation.

* *Epiſt. Socratic.* 22.

## CHAP. II.

### *His Writings.*

HE wrote *Dialogues*, *Orations*, and *Epiſtles*; by the firſt *Athenæus* affirms, he gained a great eſteem of Temperance, Humanity, and Integrity:

Integrity: *Menedemus* accuſeth him of owning many Dialogues of *Socrates*, which he had of *Xantippe*; *Panætius* believes them to be his own, not counterfeit: thoſe (ſaith *Lartius*) which expreſs the *Socratic* habit, are ſeven; the firſt, *Miltiades*, written in a lower ſtile: the ſecond, *Callias*, wherein he is blamed by *Athenæus* for treating of the Enmity betwixt *Callias* and his Fathers, and for deriding *Anaxagoras* and *Prodicus* in their Scholars *Theramenes*, *Philoxenus*, and *Ariphrades*. The third, *Rhinon*; the fourth, *Aſpaſia*, cited by *Athenæus* and *Harpocration*: the fifth *Alcibiades*, cited alſo by * *Athenæus*: The ſixth *Axiochus*, wherein (ſaith † *Athenæus*) *he traduceth* Alcibiades *as given to Wine and Women*; which particular not being to be found in that *Axiochus* extant amongſt the ſpurious *Platonick* Dialogues, argues (contrary to the opinion of *Voſſius*) that it is not the ſame. The laſt, *Telauges*, the ſcope whereof was a Satyrical deriſion of the vices of that perſon, as appeareth from *Demetrius Phalereus*, and * *Athenæus*.

*Laert. Athen.*

* *Lib.* 14.

† *Lib.* 5.

* *Lib.* 5. *upon which ſee Caſaubon, cap.* 20.

† There were ſeven other Dialogues, ſtiled ἀναφαλοὶ, which went under the name of *Æſchines*, very looſe, and not expreſſing enough the *Socratick* ſeverity; whence *Piſiſtratus* the *Athenian* denyed that they were his; and *Perſeus* ſaith, the greateſt part were written by *Paſiphon* of *Eretria*, falſely mingled with the Dialogues of *Æſchines*: their names (according to *Suidas*) were *Phædon*, *Polyænus*, *Dracon*, *Erixias*, (perhaps that which is extant) *of Vertue*, *Eraſiſtratus*, the *Scythians*.

† *Laert.*

* His *Orations* gave full teſtimony of his perfection in *Rhetorick*, in confirmation whereof, *Laertius* inſtanceth, that *in defence of the Father of* Phæacus *the General*, and thoſe *wherein he chiefly imitated* Gorgias *the* Leontine; of which † *Philoſtratus* cites that *concerning Thargelia*.

* *Laert.*

† *Epiſt. ad Jul. Auguſt.*

Of his *Epiſtles*, one to *Dionyſius* the Tyrant is mentioned by *Laertius*, as extant in his time: another there is under his name amongſt the * *Socratick Epiſtles* in theſe words;

* *Epiſt.* 23.

*As ſoon as I arrived at* Syracuſe, Ariſtippus *met me in the* Forum, *and taking me by the hand, carried me immediately to* Dionyſius, *to whom he ſaid,* Dionyſius, *if a Man ſhould come hither to inſinuate folly into you, did he not aim at your hurt? to which* Dionyſius *conſenting, what then, continues* Ariſtippus, *would you do to him? the worſt, anſwers* Dionyſius, *that could be: But if any one, ſaith he, ſhould come to improve you in wiſdom, did he not aim at your good? which* Dionyſius *acknowledging: Behold then (continues he)* Æſchines, *one of* Socrates *his Diſciples, come hither to inſtruct you; he aimes at your good, therefore on him confer the benefits you confeſs due to ſuch.* Dionyſius (*ſaid I, interrupting him*) Ariſtippus, *expreſſeth an admirable friendſhip in this addreſs; but we are owners only of ſo much wiſdom, as reſtrains us from abuſing thoſe with whom we converſe.* Dionyſius *hereat pleaſed, commended* Ariſtippus, *and promiſed to make good what he had confeſt due to me: He heard our* Alcibiades, *and delighted it ſeems therewith, deſired if we had any other Dialogues, that we would ſend them to him, which we promiſed to do, and therefore dear friends we intend to be ſhortly with you. Whilſt I read,* Plato *was preſent (which I had almoſt forgot to tell you) and whiſpered ſomething in my behalf privately to* Dionyſius, *by reaſon of* Ariſtippus; *for as ſoon as he was gone out, he told me that he never ſpoke freely when that Man (naming* Ariſtippus) *was preſent; but for what I ſaid to* Dionyſius *concerning you, I refer my ſelf to him: The next day,* Dionyſius *in the Garden confirmed his ſpeech as ſaid of me, with many ſportive ſayings (for they were no better) I adviſed* Ariſtippus *and* Plato *to ceaſe their emulation, becauſe of their general fame; for we ſhall be moſt ridiculous, if our actions correſpond not with our profeſſion.*

## CRITO.

CRITO was an *Athenian* † Scholar to *Socrates*: whom he loved ſo entirely that he never ſuffered him to want neceſſaries, of which more hath been already ſaid in the life of *Socrates*: * Being much troubled and ſued by thoſe who had not received any injury from him, but abus'd the quietneſs of his diſpoſition, which would ſooner part with Mony upon no ground than go to law, *Socrates* adviſed him to entertain one of the ſame buſie, troubleſome humour, to keep off the reſt; *Crito* in purſuit of this counſell made choice of *Archidemus*, an excellent Lawyer, but poor, who being obliged by his gifts and kindneſs, perſecuted eagerly all ſuch as moleſted not him only, but any of his friends: *Crito* wrote ſeventeen Dialogues compriſed in one volume, thus reckon'd by *Laertius*. *That the good are not made ſuch by learning. Of having moſt. What is expedient, or the Politician. Of Honeſty, of Wickedneſs, of Security, of Law, of Divinity, of Arts, of Converſation, of Wiſdom*; Protagoras *or the Politick. Of Letters, Of Poetry, of what is honeſt, of Learning, of Knowing or Science, what it is to know.* He writ alſo *an Apology for* Socrates.

† *Suid.*

* *Xen.*

† He had four ſons, *Critobulus*, *Hermogenes*, *Epigenes*, and *Cteſippus*, all Auditors of *Socrates*; of whom already.

† *Suid.*

* *Suidas* reckons three more of this name: One wrote *Getic* ſtories; the ſecond was of *Pieria* a City in *Macedonia*; the third of *Naxus*, both Hiſtorians.

* *Lant.*

## SIMON.

† SIMON was an *Athenian*, a leather-dreſſer. *Socrates* coming to his ſhop, and diſputing there, he committed to writing all that he remembred thereof; whence his Dialogues were called σκυτικοὶ. They were three and thirty, all in one volume: of Gods, of Good, of Honeſt, what is Honeſt. Of Juſt, the firſt; the ſecond Of Virtue, that it cannot be taught. Of Fortitude, the firſt, ſecond, third, Of Law, of Popularity, of Honour, of Poetry, of Health, of Love, of Philoſophy, of Knowledge, of Muſick, of Poetry; what is Honeſt. Of Doctrine, of Diſputation, of Judgment, of that which is, of Number, of Diligence, of Labour, of Avarice, of Boaſting, of Honeſty, or according to others, of Counſel, of Diſcourſe, of Expedients, of doing ill. He is reported the firſt that uſed the *Socratick* Diſcourſes. *Pericles* promiſing that if he would come to him, he ſhould want nothing, he anſwered, that he would

† *Laert.*

would not ſell his freedom of ſpeech. There is extant amongſt the *Socratick* Epiſtles, this under his name, as in anſwer to *Ariſtippus*.

* Perhaps ταυδαζειν rather θαυμαζειν.

*I hear that you* deride our learning to* Dionyſius; *I confeſs I am a Leather dreſſer, and work upon that trade to the † reproof of indiſcreet perſons, who think to follow* Socrates, *yet live luxuriouſly. As for your Children,* Antiſthenes *will correct them, to whom you write ſcoffing at my manner of life; But of this mirth enough; only be mindful of me and of thirſt; Theſe conduce much to the wiſe.*

† ευδαιειαν, which Allatius renders inſtructionem.

## GLAUCO.

* Laert. * GLAUCO was an *Athenian*: he writ nine Dialogues, compriſed in one Book; *Phidylus*, *Euripides*, *Amyntichus*, *Euthias*, *Lyſithides*, *Ariſtophanes*, *Ephalus*, *Anaxiphemus*, *Menexenus*. There are two and thirty more falſly aſcribed to him.

## SIMMIAS.

† Laert. † SIMMIAS was a *Theban*; he writ three and twenty Dialogues in one Book: of Wiſdom, of Ratiocination, of Muſick, of Verſe, of Fortitude, of Philoſophy, of Truth, of Letters, of Doctrine, of Art, of Conduct, of Decency, of what is to be choſen, and what to be ſhunned; of Friendſhip, of Knowledge, of the Soul, of well-living, of Poſſibility, of Wealth, of Life, what is Honeſt, of Induſtry, of Love.

## CEBES.

* Laert. * CEBES was of *Thebes*, a Philoſopher, Diſciple to *Socrates*: he writ three Dialogues; The Tablet (which is extant) the ſeventh. *Phrynichus*, he writ alſo *an infernal narrative*, and other things. Theſe are the Philophers who did not diſtract the Doctrine of their Maſter into Sects, in which reſpect they may more properly be termed *Socratick*, though the reſt alſo aſſume that title.

R A

# A CHRONOLOGY.

| Olympiads. | Archontes. | |
|---|---|---|
| xxxv | | *Thales* born. *Laert.* |
| 2 | Damasias 1. *Halyc.* | *Solon* born about this time: by compute from his death. |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | *Phryno* victor in all the Olympick Exercises, *Euseb.* probably the same with whom *Pittacus* fought. |
| xxxvi | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| xxxvii | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | *Periander* begun to Reign at *Corinth.* |
| xxxviii | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| xxxix | Draco *Tatian. Clem. Suid.* | *Draco* makes Laws at *Athens.* |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| xl | | |
| 2 | | *Arion's* Story. *Euseb.* |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| xli | Heniochides *Hal.* | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| xlii | | *Pittacus* flourished. *Laert.* |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | Aristocles *Marm.* | *Alyattes* King of *Lydia* begun to Reign. *Anaximander* born. *Laert.* |
| 4 | | |
| xliii | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| xliv | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| xlv | | |
| 2 | Critias 1. *Marm.* | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| xlvi | | *Epimenides* lustrates the City of *Athens*: *Laert.* *Epimenides* born. *Suid.* |
| 2 | Philombratus. *Plat. Sol.* | |
| 3 | Solon. *Laert.* | *Solon* made Archon. His Laws. |
| 4 | Dropides. *Phil. in Critia.* | |
| xlvii | Eucrates. *Laert.* | *Anacharsis* came to *Athens*, to visit *Solon.* *Laert.* |
| 2 | Simon. *Marm.* | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |

| | | Æra Philoſ. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| xlviii | Philippus. *Clem.* | | |
| 2 | | | |
| 3 | | | |
| 4 | | | *Periander* died having Reigned 40 years, *Ariſtot. Polit.* 5. *Laert.* |
| xlix | | | |
| 2 | | | |
| 3 | Damaſias. *Marm* | 1 | The Attribute of *Wiſe* conferred on *Thales*, and the other ſix. |
| 4 | | 2 | |
| l | | 3 | About this time *Theſpis* began to preſent his Tragedies. *Anaximander* found out the obliquity of the Zodiack. *Plin.* |
| 2 | | 4 | |
| 3 | Archeſtratides. *Hal.* 4. | 5 | |
| 4 | | 6 | |
| li | | 7 | |
| 2 | | 8 | |
| 3 | | 9 | |
| 4 | | 10 | |
| lii | | 11 | |
| 2 | | 12 | |
| 3 | Ariſtomenes. *Laert.* | 13 | *Pittacus* died. *Laert.* |
| 4 | | 14 | |
| liii | | 15 | |
| 2 | | 16 | |
| 3 | | 17 | |
| 4 | | 18 | |
| liv | | 19 | |
| 2 | | 20 | *Pythagoras* viſits *Thales*. *Collected from* Jamblic. |
| 3 | | 21 | |
| 4 | Conias *Plut. Sol.* | 22 | |
| lv | Hegeſtratus. *Plut.* | 23 | |
| 2 | | 24 | |
| 3 | | 25 | |
| 4 | | 26 | |
| lvi | Euthydemus. *Laert.* | 27 | *Chilon* was *Ephorus*. *Laert.* |
| 2 | | 28 | *Anaximenes* flouriſhed. |
| 3 | | 29 | *Euſeb.* |
| 4 | | 30 | |
| lvii | | 31 | |
| 2 | | 32 | |
| 3 | | 33 | |
| 4 | | 34 | |
| lviii | Eixyclides. *Pauſ.* | 35 | *Thales* died. *Laert.* |
| 2 | | 36 | |
| 3 | | 37 | |
| 4 | | 38 | *Cyrus* takes *Sardys* and *Cræſus*. |
| lix | | 39 | |
| 2 | | 40 | |
| 3 | | 41 | |
| 4 | | 42 | |
| lx | | 43 | |
| 2 | | 44 | |
| 3 | | 45 | |
| 4 | | 46 | |
| lxi | | 47 | |
| 2 | | 48 | |
| 3 | | 49 | |
| 4 | Heracles. *Hal.* 4. | 50 | |
| lxii | | 51 | |
| 2 | | 52 | |
| 3 | | 53 | |
| 4 | | 54 | *Piſiſtratus* died, having Reigned 17 years; *Ariſt. Polit.* 5. |
| lxiii | | 55 | |
| 2 | | 56 | |
| 3 | | 57 | |
| 4 | | 58 | |
| lxiv | Miltiades. *Hal.* 7. | 59 | |
| 2 | | 60 | |
| 3 | | 61 | |
| 4 | | 62 | |
| lxv | | 63 | *Darius* begun his Reign. |
| 2 | | 64 | |

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|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | | 65 | |
| 4 | | 66 | |
| lxvi | | 67 | |
| 2 | | 68 | |
| 3 | | 69 | |
| 4 | | 70 | |
| lxvii | | 71 | |
| 2 | | 72 | |
| 3 | | 73 | |
| 4 | | 74 | |
| lxviii | Lyſagoras *Marm.* | 75 | |
| 2 | | 76 | |
| 3 | | 77 | |
| 4 | | 78 | |
| lxix | Aceſtorides 11. *Hal.* 5. | 79 | |
| 2 | | 80 | |
| 3 | | 81 | |
| 4 | | 82 | |
| lxx | *Myrus Hal.* 5. | 83 | *Anaxagoras* born. *Laert* by compute. |
| 2 | | 84 | |
| 3 | | 85 | |
| 4 | | 86 | *Pythagoras* died. *Euſeb.* |
| lxxi | Hipparchus *Hal.* 6. | 87 | |
| 2 | Pithocritus. *Marm.* | 88 | |
| 3 | | 89 | |
| 4 | | 90 | |
| lxxii | Diognetus. *Hal.* 6. | 91 | The *Marathonian* fight. |
| 2 | Hybrilides. *Hal.* 7. *Pauſ.* | 92 | |
| 3 | Phanippus. *Plut. Ariſt.* | 93 | |
| 4 | | 94 | |
| lxxiii | Archiſes. *Hal.* 8. | 95 | |
| 2 | | 96 | |
| 3 | Ariſtides. *Marm.* | 97 | *Darius* died. *Xerxes* ſucceeded. |
| 4 | Philocrates. *Marm.* | 98 | |
| lxxiv | Leoſtratus. *Hal.* 8. | 99 | |
| 2 | Nicodemus. *Hal.* 8. | 100 | |
| 3 | | 101 | |
| 4 | | 102 | |
| lxxv | Calliades. *Marm.* | 103 | *Xerxes* croſt the Helleſpont: the fight at *Salamis*. |
| 2 | Xantippus *Marm.* | 104 | *Anaxagoras* went to *Athens*. |
| 3 | Timoſthenes *Marm.* | 105 | |
| 4 | Adimantus *Marm.* | 106 | |
| lxxvi | Phædon. *Diod. Sic.* | 107 | |
| 2 | Dromoclides | 108 | |
| 3 | Aceſtorides | 109 | |
| 4 | Menon | 110 | |
| lxxvii | Chares | 111 | |
| 2 | Praxiergus | 112 | |
| 3 | Demotion | 113 | |
| 4 | Apſephion | 114 | *Socrates* born. |
| lxxviii | Theagenides | 115 | A Stone fell down from Heaven at *Ægos Potamus*; |
| 2 | Lyſiſtratus | 116 | foretold by *Anaxagoras*. |
| 3 | Lyſanias | 117 | |
| 4 | Lyſitheus | 118 | |
| lxxix | Archedemides | 119 | |
| 2 | Tlepolemus | 120 | |
| 3 | Conon | 121 | |
| 4 | Euippus | 122 | |
| lxxx | Phraſiclides | 123 | |
| 2 | Philocles | 124 | |
| 3 | Bion | 125 | |
| 4 | Mneſithides | 126 | |
| lxxxi | Callias 1. | 127 | |
| 2 | Soſiſtratus | 128 | |
| 3 | Ariſton | 129 | |
| 4 | Lyſicrates | 130 | |
| lxxxii | Chærephanes *Hal.* | 131 | *Xenophon* born about this time. |
| 2 | Antidotus | 132 | |
| 3 | Euthidemus | 133 | *Anaxagoras* (having profeſt Philoſophy 30 years at *Athens*) con- |
| 4 | Pedicus | 134 | demn'd and baniſh'd; collected from *Laert.* |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| lxxxiii | Philiſcus *Hal.* | 135 | |
| 2 | Timarchides | 136 | |
| 3 | Callimachus | 137 | |
| 4 | Lyſimachides | 138 | |
| lxxxiv | Praxiteles | 139 | |
| 2 | Lyſanias | 140 | |
| 3 | Diphilus | 141 | |
| 4 | Timocles | 142 | |
| lxxxv | Murichides | 143 | |
| 2 | Glaucides | 144 | |
| 3 | Theodorus | 145 | |
| 4 | Euthemenes | 146 | |
| lxxxvi | Nauſimachus | 147 | |
| 2 | Antilochides | 148 | |
| 3 | Achares | 149 | |
| 4 | Apſeudas *Ptol.* | 150 | |
| lxxxvii | Pythodorus *Thuc.* | 151 | |
| 2 | Euthidemus *Athen. 5.* | 152 | 1 Year of the *Peloponneſian* War: *Thucyd. lib. 2.* |
| 3 | Apollodorus. *Athen. 5.* | 153 | 2 |
| 4 | Epaminondas | 154 | 3 |
| lxxxviii | Diotimus | 155 | 4 *Anaxagoras* died, by compute from *Laert.* |
| 2 | Euclides | 156 | 5 |
| 3 | Euthydemus | 157 | 6 |
| 4 | Stratocles | 158 | 7 |
| lxxxix | Iſarchus | 159 | 8 The fight at *Delium*, wherein *Socrates* and *Xenophon* fought. The Clouds of *Ariſtophanes* Acted. |
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| 3 | Ithicles | 185 | by the *Lacedæmonians*; and of *Xenophon*'s retreat. |
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| 4 | 365 | *Lacydes* resigns the School to *Evander* and *Telecles*. |
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| 3 | 372 | *Carneades* born. |
| 4 | | |

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

## The Fourth Part,

Containing the *Cyrenaick, Megarick, Eleack, Eretriack* Sects.

ARISTIPPVS.

## THE *CYRENAICK* SECT.

### CHAP. I.

Ariſtippus, *his Country and Parents.*

THE eſtimation which Philoſophers had daily gain'd among the Grecians about this time cauſed it exceedingly to multiply, whilſt every Profeſſour ambitious to be held

wiser than his Master, and teaching something new, desired to have the honour to be Author of a Sect.

The Succession of the *Ionick* Philosophy, which before *Socrates* was single; after him was divided into many Schools, whereof some were but of short continuance, others had longer succession. Of the less durable were the

*Cyrenaick*, *Megarick*, *Eleack*, *Eretriack*,

so called from the places where the Professors flourished. Others of longer succession, the

*Academick*, *Cynick*, out of which came the *Peripatetick*, *Stoick*,

We shall first dispatch those which were of shortest continuance, whether that they were founded upon less reason, and *were in short time broken, as* * Cicero saith, *and quite extinct by the strength and Arguments of the others*; or that being instituted and founded in more obscure parts; they were not so lasting as those which were profess'd in the most flourishing City of *Athens*.

* *De Oratore lib.* 3.

*Aristippus* a Disciple of *Socrates*, after his death, returned home into his Country at *Cyrene* in *Africa*, from whence the Doctrine which his Scholars retained had the name of *Cyrenaick*. † He was Son of *Aretades*, * of *Cyrene*.

† *Suid.* * *Laert.*

## CHAP. II.

*How he went to* Athens, *and heard* Socrates.

FRom *Cyrene* *Aristippus* went first to *Athens*, invited by the fame of † *Socrates*, *concerning whom he fell into discourse with* Ischomachus, *meeting him casually at the* Olympick *Games, and enquiring what manner of disputes they were wherewith* Socrates *prevail'd so much upon the young Men, he received from him some little seeds and scatterings thereof, wherewith he was so passionately affected, that he grew pale and lean, until to assuage his fervent thirst, he took a voyage to* Athens, *and there drunk at the Fountain, satisfying himself with the Person, his discourse and Philosophy, the end whereof was to know our own evils, and to acquit our selves of them.* But as * *Aristo* said, *Philosophy doth harm to those who misunderstand things well said.*

† *Plut. de curiosit.*

* *Cic. de Nat. Deor.*

Aristippus † *chiefly delighted with the more voluptuous disputes of Socrates*, asserted Pleasure to be the ultimate end wherein all happiness doth consist. * *His life was agreeable to the opinion, which he employed in Luxury, sweet Unguents, rich Garments, Wine and Women*; maintained by a course as different from the precepts and practice of *Socrates* as the things themselves were. For, notwithstanding he had a good Estate (and three Country-Seats) † he first of the *Socratick* Disciples, took Mony for teaching. Which *Socrates* observing, asked him *how he came to have so much?* he replyed, *how came you to have so little;*

† *Cic. de Orat.* 3.

* *Athen. deipn.* 12.

† *Laert.*

A further dislike of this course *Socrates* express'd, when *Aristippus* sending him twenty *mine*, he return'd it, saying, *his* Dæmon *would not suffer him to take it.*

## CHAP. III.

*How he went to* Ægina.

LEaving *Socrates*, * he went to *Ægina*, where he lived with more freedom and luxury than before: *Socrates* sent exhortations to reclaim him, frequent but fruitless, and to the same end published that discourse which we find in *Xenophon*. Here he became acquainted with *Lais* the famous *Corinthian* Curtezan, † who came thither yearly at the Feast of *Neptune*, and was as constantly frequented by *Aristippus*, for whose sake * *Hermesianax* saith, he took a voyage to *Corinth* (mention'd among his *Apothegms*)

* *Athen. deipn.* 12.

† *Athen. deipn.* 12.

* *Athen. deipn.* 13.

*To* Corinth *Love the* Cyrenean *lead,*
*Where he enjoy'd* Thessalian Lais *bed*;

*No art the subtle* Aristippus *knew*
*By which the power of Love he might eschew.*

† Whilst he was upon his voyage to *Corinth*, a great Tempest arose, whereat he was much troubled: one of the Passengers saying unto him, *we ordinary people are not afraid, but you Philosophers fear* (or as * *Ælian*, *are you afraid like other people?*) † *our Souls*, answered he, *are not of equal value*, * *you hazard a wicked and unhappy life, I Felicity and Beatitude.*

† *Laert.* * *Val. Max.* 20. † *A. Gel.* 19. * *Ælian. var.*

† To those who blamed him for frequenting *Lais*, *I possess her*, saith he, *not she me.* * *Lais* in emulation of *Phryne* gave admittance to all sorts of people, rich and poor, whereupon *Aristippus* reprehended by his servant for bestowing so much on her, who entertained *Diogenes* the *Cynick gratis*, *I give her Mony*, saith he, *that I may enjoy her, not that others may not.* * *Diogenes* reproached him for frequenting the company of *Lais*, saying, *Aristippus, you and I converse with the same Woman, either give over, or be like me a Cynic; do you think it absurd*, saith he, *to dwell in a house, wherein others lived before, or to sail in a Ship that hath carried other Passengers*; *It is no more absurd to affect a Woman whom others have enjoyed.*

† *Laert.* * *Athen. deipn.* 13. † *Athen. deipn.* 13.

At *Ægina* he continued till the death of *Socrates*, as (besides the testimony of † *Plato*) appeareth by this * Epistle of his written upon that occasion.

* *Is Phæin.* † *Socratic. Epist.* 16.

*Of the death of* Socrates *I* and Cleombrotus *have received information, and that when he might have escaped from the eleven Officers, he said he would not, unless he was acquitted by Law; for that were, as much as in him lay to betray his Country. My opinion is, that being unjustly committed, he might have got his Liberty any way, conceiving that all which he could do ill or inconsiderately must be just. From whence again I blame him not, as if he had done ill even in this. You write me word that all the friends and Disciples of* Socrates *have left* Athens, *out of fear the like should befall any of you; it is well done; and we being at present at* Ægina *will*

*will continue here a while, then come to you, and wherein we are able, ſerve you.*

## CHAP. IV.

### *His Inſtitution of a Sect.*

*Ariſtippus* returning at length to his own Country, *Cyrene*, profeſſed Philoſophy there, and inſtituted a Sect called * *Cyrenaick* from the Place, by ſome † *Hedonick*, or voluptuous from the Doctrine. * They who followed the inſtitution of *Ariſtippus*, and were called *Cyrenaick*, held thus.

* Larrt.
† Galen. Hiſt. Phil.
* Larrt.

They rejected *Phyſick* and natural diſquiſitions from the ſeeming incomprehenſibility thereof. *Logick* they handled becauſe of its great uſefulneſs. But *Meleager* and *Clitomachus* affirm they deſpiſed both Phyſick and Dialectick alike, as unuſeful, for that without theſe, a Man who hath learned what things are good, what evil, and able to diſcourſe well, and to ſhake off ſuperſtition and the fear of death.

### Sect. 1. *Of Judgment and Judicatories.*

† Larrt.
* Cicer. Acad. Queſt. lib. 4.

† THey held that *the Senſes inform not always truly*, * *that nothing extrinſecal can be perceived, thoſe things only can be perceived, which are felt by inward touch, as grief and pleaſure, neither know we what colour any thing is, nor what ſound it makes, but only that we feel our ſelves affected after ſuch a manner*; that † *paſſions are comprehenſive*; *that objects not comprehenſive.* That * *nothing judgeth but by interiour permotion, and the judgment of true and falſe conſiſteth in inward touch.*

† Larrt.
* Cic.

† *Sextus Empericus* more fully. They aſſert that paſſions or affections are the Judges and the only things that may comprehend, and not *fallacious*; but of thoſe things which cauſe paſſions, there is nothing which is comprehenſible, or that may not deceive us. For, that we are made white, or affected with ſweet, may be ſaid expreſsly and firmly, but that the thing which cauſeth this affection is white or ſweet, cannot in like manner be aſſerted. For it is poſſible that we be affected with whiteneſs from a thing that is not white and with ſweetneſs from a thing that is not ſweet; as to him who is dim-ſighted or hath the yellow jaundice, all things ſeem yellow to one, duskiſh to the other, and he who pincheth his eye, thinketh he ſees things double, he who is mad fancies two *Thebes*'s, two Suns; in all theſe, they that are ſo affected, to wit, with yellowneſs or duskiſhneſs, or duplicity, is true, but that the thing which moveth them is yellow or duskiſh, or double, is conceived to be falſe: So it is moſt conſonant to reaſon, that we comprehend nothing more than our own paſſions. For we muſt hold that the things ſeen are either the paſſions themſelves, or the cauſes of thoſe paſſions; if we ſay our paſſions are the things ſeen, we muſt likewiſe affirm all things ſeen, to be true and comprehenſive; if we ſay the things ſeen are the cauſes of thoſe paſſions, we muſt confeſs all things ſeen to be falſe and incomprehenſible. For that paſſion which happeneth to us, ſhoweth us its ſelf and nothing more, ſo that to ſpeak truly, the paſſion or affection it ſelf is the only thing that is apparent to us, and for that reaſon, in their proper affections none err, but in the external object, all. The firſt are comprehenſive, the ſecond incomprehenſive, the Soul being weak in the diſcernment thereof, by reaſon of places, intervals, motions, mutations, and many other cauſes.

† *adverſ. Mathem.*

Hence they aſſert, that there is not in man any one common thing which judgeth, but they impoſe common names on the judgments; all commonly name white and ſweet, but ſomething common that is white and ſweet they have not, for every Man apprehends his own affection. Now whether the ſame affection happeneth to any one, and to him that is next him from white, neither is he able to ſay, as not receiving the affection of the other, neither can the other that is next him ſay, as not receiving his affection. There being therefore no common affection in us, it were a raſh thing to aſſert, that whatſoever ſeemeth ſuch to me, ſeemeth alſo ſuch to him that is next me; for perhaps my conſtitution is ſuch as to be whitened from that which externally incurreth, another hath his ſenſe ſo ordered, as that he is affected otherwiſe. That therefore which is ſeen and appeareth is not common.

That by reaſon of the differing conſtitutions of the ſenſe we are not moved alike nor in the ſame manner, is manifeſt from thoſe who have the *Jaundice*, and thoſe that are *purblind*, and thoſe that are *affected according to Nature*. For as from the ſame object, ſome are ſo affected as to be *Black*, others *Red*, others *White*; ſo is it likewiſe conſonant to reaſon, that they who are affected according to nature, by reaſon of the different conſtitution of ſenſes, are not moved alike by the ſame things, but one way the white, another way the black, another way he whoſe eyes are blue, another way he whoſe eyes are black, whence we impoſe common names on things, having our ſelves proper and particular affections.

### Sect. 2. *Of the End, or chief Good.*

TO theſe aſſertions (continueth *Sextus Empericus*) concerning the Judicatories, agreeth what they aſſert concerning Ends.

Of affections, ſome are *pleaſant*, ſome *harſh* and troubleſome, ſome *mean*; the harſh and troubleſome are *ill*, whoſe end is *grief*; the *pleaſant*, *good*, whoſe end, which cannot be deceived, is *pleaſure*: The mean are neither good nor ill, whoſe end is neither good nor ill, which is an affection between pleaſure and grief. Affections therefore are the judges and ends of all things, and we live, ſay they, obſerving evidence and liking, evidence in the reſt of the affections, liking, in pleaſure.

*Laertius* ſaith, they aſſert two paſſions or affections, *Grief* and *Pleaſure*; pleaſure, a ſoft ſmooth motion; grief, a harſh motion. One pleaſure differeth not from another pleaſure, nor is one pleaſure ſweeter than another pleaſure; this pleaſure is coveted by all living creatures, the other ſhunned.

They aſſert corporeal pleaſure to be our ultimate end, as *Panatius* ſaith in his book of *Sects*, not cataſtematick permanent pleaſure, which conſiſteth in privation of grief, and a quiet void of all diſturbance, which *Epicurus* held.

The

The *End* differeth from *Beatitude*; for the End is ſome *particular* pleaſure; Beatitude is that which conſiſteth of *all* particular pleaſures, wherein are included both the *paſt* and *future*. Again, particular pleaſure is expetible *in it ſelf*, felicity, *not* in it ſelf, but for particular pleaſures.

That pleaſure is our chief end is manifeſt, in that from our firſt infancy, without any inſtruction of others, we naturally aim thereat, and having obtain'd it, ſeek nothing elſe. Moreover, we avoid not any thing ſo much as its contrary, grief.

Pleaſure is good, though proceeding from the moſt ſordid diſhoneſt thing, as *Hippobotus* in his Book of *Sects*; for, although the action be diſhoneſt, yet the pleaſure thereof is expetible in it ſelf, and good.

*Indolence*, which *Epicurus* held, they eſteem not pleaſure, nor want of pleaſure, grief, for both theſe conſiſt in motion; but Indolence and want of pleaſure conſiſts not in motion, for Indolence is like the ſtate of a ſleeping Man.

They hold, that ſome Men may not deſire pleaſure, through perverſity of mind.

All ſpiritual pleaſures and pains ariſe not from corporeal pleaſures and pains; for from the ſimple proſperity of our Country or our ſelf, we are affected with joy.

But neither the remembrance of paſt goods, nor expectation of future compleat pleaſure, as *Epicurus* thought; for by time and expectation the motion of the Soul is diſſolved.

† *Athen. deipn.* 12. † Pleaſure, according to *Ariſtippus*, is μονοχρονον, *conſiſteth only in one part of time*, the preſent; for the remembrance of paſt pleaſures, or expectation of the future, is vain and frivolous; and nothing appertaineth to Beatitude; but that only is good which is preſent. With thoſe pleaſures which he received heretofore, or ſhall receive hereafter, *Ariſtippus* ſaid, he was nothing at all moved, the firſt being gone, the other not yet come, and what it will prove when it is come, is uncertain. Hence

* *Æl. var. Hiſt. lib.* 14. 6. * he argued, that Men ought not to be ſolicitous either about things paſt or future, and that not to be troubled at ſuch things is a ſign of a conſtant clear Spirit. He alſo adviſed to take care only for the preſent day, and in that day, only of the preſent part thereof, wherein ſomething was done or thought; for he ſaid, the preſent is only in our power, not the paſt or future, the one being gone, the other uncertain whether ever it will come.

Neither do pleaſures conſiſt meerly in ſimple ſight or hearing, for we hear with delight thoſe who counterfeit lamentation; and thoſe who lament truely, we hear with diſpleaſure. This privation of pleaſure and grief they called *mean ſtates*.

The pleaſures of the Body are much better than thoſe of the Soul, and the pains or griefs thereof much worſe; for which reaſon thoſe who offend actually, are moſt grievouſly puniſhed.

To grieve, is more unnatural to us, to delight, more natural; for which reaſon, much more care is requiſite for the ordering of one than of the other; yet, many times we reject things which effect pleaſure, as being grievous; ſo that the concurrence of pleaſures which effecteth Beatitude, is very difficult.

Moreover they hold, that every wiſe Man doth not live pleaſantly, nor every wicked Man unpleaſantly, but ſo for the moſt part; for it is enough that a Man be affected and reduced by incidence of one ſingle pleaſure.

They held, that † grief is the greateſt ill; that grief is not effected by every ill, but by the unexpected and unforeſeen; that one Man is more grieved than another. † *Cic. Tuſc. Queſt.* 4.

They aſſert, that Riches are efficient cauſes of pleaſure; yet, not expetible in themſelves.

### Sect. 3. *Of Virtue.*

* ALL good conſiſteth in *Pleaſure*, Virtue it ſelf is only laudable, as being an efficient cauſe of pleaſure. * *Cic. de Off.* 3.

† Nothing is juſt, honeſt, or diſhoneſt by *Nature*, but by *Law* and *Cuſtom*; yet a good Man will do nothing that is evil, becauſe of the cenſure or eſteem which would fall upon his actions, and * that ſuch a one is wiſe. † *Lært.*

*Prudence* is a Good, yet not expetible in it ſelf, but for the ſake of thoſe things which proceed from it. * So *Cafaubon* reads, but doubtleſs there is a defect in the Text.

A friend is to be embraced for the uſe we may have of him, as the Body cheriſheth every part thereof as long as it remaineth ſound.

Of Virtues, ſome are in the *unwiſe*.

Corporeal exerciſe conduceth to the acquiſition of Virtue.

A *wiſe Man* is not ſubject to *Envy*, *Love*, or *Superſtition*, for all theſe proceed from the vanity of *Opinion*; but, he is ſubject to *Grief* or *Fear*, as being *Natural* accidents.

## CHAP. V.

### *How he went to* Dionyſius *his Court.*

ABout this time *Dionyſius*, the *Sicilian* Tyrant, flouriſhed, * to whom reſorted many Philoſophers, amongſt the reſt *Ariſtippus*, invited by his ſumptuous magnificence. * *Philoſtr. in Apoll.*

† *Dionyſius* asked him the reaſon of his coming; he anſwered, *To give what I have, and to receive what I have not*; or, as others, *when I wanted wiſdom, I went to* Socrates, *now I want Mony, I come to you.* He ſoon inſinuated into the favour of *Dionyſius*; for he could conform himſelf to every place, time, and perſon; act any part, conſtrue whatſoever happened to the beſt: and thus enjoying preſent pleaſure, never troubled himſelf for the abſent, as *Horace*. † *Lært.*

*Every condition, habit, and event*
*With* Ariſtippus *ſuits with all content.*

Of his compliance with *Dionyſius*'s humour, there are theſe inſtances. † *Dionyſius* at a Feaſt commanded, that all ſhould put on purple Robes: *Plato* refuſed, ſaying, † *Lært.*

*I will*

*I will not with a female Robe disgrace*
*My self, who am a Man of manly race.*

But *Aristippus* took it, and beginning to dance, said,

*If it come pure, a mirthful Feast*
*Never corrupts a modest Breast.*

* *Laert.* * Another time suing to *Dionysius* in the behalf of his friend, he would not hear him; at last he threw himself at his Feet, and his Petition was granted; for which being reprehended, *Blame not me*, saith he, *but* Dionysius, *whose ears are in his feet.*

† *Laert.* † *Dionysius* shewed him three Curtezans, bidding him take his choice; he leading them all three away, said, Paris *was punish'd for preferring one before the other two.* But, having brought them to the door, he dismist them, as ready to contemn as accept: whereupon *Strato* (or as others *Plato*) told him, *You only can wear old Garments and Raggs*; for which likewise they admired him that he would wear a thread-bare, and a rich *Milesian* Cloak with equal decorum, accommodating himself to both.

When *Dionysius* did spit upon him, he took it patiently; for which being reproved, *Fishermen*, said he, *suffer themselves to be wet all over that they may catch* [κώβιον] *a Gudgeon, and shall I be troubled at a little spittle, who mean to take* * βλέννον ?

* Which being pronounced is equivocal: for, βλέννος signifieth a Fish like a Gudgeon, and βλέννος a Tyrant: as I find in a *MS. Lexicon.* communicated by my learned friend Mr. *John Pearson*, βλέννος ὁ τύραννος, βλέννος ὁ ἰχθύς: and again, Βαιωνιχθῦς ὁ ἢ κλίνος (read βλέννος) ἀσπασίως καλεῖν, confirmed by *Athenæus*, *deipn.* 7. 10.

† *Laert.* † He begged Mony of *Dionysius*, who said to him, You told me a wise Man wanted nothing; give me, and we will talk of this afterward. When *Dionysius* had given it him; *Now*, saith he, *you see I do not want.*

By this complaisance, he gained so much upon *Dionysius*, that he had a greater esteem for him, than all the rest of the Philosophers, though sometimes he spoke so freely to *Dionysius*, that he incurred his displeasure.

* *Laert.* * To *Dionysius* asking, why Philosophers haunted the Gates of rich Men; but rich Men not those of Philosophers: Because, saith he, the one knows what he wants, the other not.

† *Laert.* † To *Dionysius*, urging him to treat of Philosophy: *It is ridiculous*, saith he, *if you learn of me what it is, to teach me when it should be said.* Whereat *Dionysius* displeased, bad him take the lowest place, which he did quietly, saying, *You have a mind to make this seat more honourable.*

* *Athen. deipn.* 12. citing *Hegesander.* * The next day the Tyrant asked him what he thought of that place wherein he then sat, in respect of that wherein he sat the night before: He answered, they were alike to him; to day, saith he, because I left it, it is contemn'd, what yesterday was esteem'd the most honourable; that where I sit to day esteemed most honourable, which yesterday, without me, was accounted the lowest.

† *Laert.* † Being asked why *Dionysius* fell out with him, he answered, for the same reason he falleth out with others.

* *Laert.* * *Dionysius* saying, (out of *Sophocles* as *Plutarch* affirms, who ascribes this to *Zeno*)

*Who ere goes to a Tyrant, he*
*A servant is, though he came free.*

He immediately answered,

*No servant is if he came free.*

*Dionysius* offering *Plato* a great summ of Mony, which he refused; *Aristippus* being at the same time in the Court of *Dionysius*, said, *Dionysius* bestows his liberality upon sure grounds, to us who ask much, he giveth little; to *Plato*, who requireth nothing, he offereth much.

† *Plut. vit. Dion.* † Another time *Helicon* of *Cyzicus*, one of *Plato*'s Friends, having foretold an Eclipse of the Sun, which when it fell out accordingly, he was much honoured for it: *Aristippus* jesting with other Philosophers, said, he could foretel a stranger thing; they demanding what it was: I Prognosticate, saith he, that *Plato* and *Dionysius* will ere long be at variance, and so it happened.

## CHAP. VI.

### *His Æmulators.*

THIS favour which he found with *Dionysius*, was perhaps the occasion, for which he was maligned by the rest of the Philosophers, amongst whom was

* *Laert.* * *Xenophon*, who out of ill will to him, published the † discourse between him and *Socrates* about Pleasure.

† *Memorab. lib.* 2.

* *Laert.* †. *Plato* likewise, through the same disaffection tacitely reprehends him, in *Phædone*; for being in *Ægina* at the time of *Socrates*'s death.

† *Laert.* † *Plato* being in *Dionysius*'s Court, when he was there, reproved his sumptuous life: Whereupon *Aristippus* asked him, whether he thought *Dionysius* a good Man or not: *Plato* affirmed, he thought him good: Yet he, replyed *Aristippus*, liveth much more sumptuously; therefore it is not incompetible with goodness.

† *Laert.* † *Phædo* likewise seemed to deride him, demanding who it was that smelt so strong of Unguents: It is I, unhappy Man that I am, answered *Aristippus*, and the *Persian* King, who is more unhappy than I? but, as other things are not the worse for this, neither is a Man.

* *Senec. de benef. Clem. Alex.* * A curse on those effeminate persons, who brought a scandal upon so good a thing.

† *Laert.* † *Æschines* also and he were sometimes at difference: Once, after some falling out betwixt them, *Aristippus* said to him, Shall we not be friends, shall we not give over fooling? Or, do you expect some body should kick us into kindness? Willingly, answered *Æschines*. Now, saith *Aristippus*, remember, that though I am the elder, yet I yielded first. *Æschines* replyed, and justly, for you are better than I; I begun the enmity, you the reconcilement.

* *Plutarch*

* *De ira cohib.* * *Plutarch* relates it thus; Being fallen out with *Æschines* he met one who asked him, *Where is now your old friendship*, Aristippus? *It is asleep*, saith he; *but I will awake it*: and going straight to *Æschines*, *Am I so unhappy*, saith he, *and so inconsiderable in your esteem, as not to deserve correction.* *Æschines* answered, *It is nothing strange, that exceeding by nature in all things, you should first know what is fit to be done.*

*Antisthenes* is to be numbered also amongst those, who were displeased at his manner of life, as appeareth by an Epistle of his to that effect, extant amongst the Socratick Epistles, to which *Aristippus* returned this answer.

† *Socratic. Epist.* 9.
* Ironically answering a former letter of *Antisthenes.*

### † Aristippus *to* Antisthenes.

WE are, Aristippus, *unhappy beyond measure; how can we be otherwise, living with a Tyrant, daily eating and drinking deliciously, perfumed with choicest Unguents, attired in rich loose Garments brought from* Tarentum: *and none will deliver me from the cruelty of* Dionysius, *who detains me, not as a rude person, but one that is verst in* Socratick *learning; supplying me (as I said) with Meat, Unguents, Garments, and the like; fearing neither the judgments of Gods nor Men. And now the misfortune is much encreased; He hath bestowed on me three* Sicilian *Virgins of extraordinary beauty, and many Utensils of Silver; and when this Man will give over doing such things I know not, you do well therefore to be concern'd for the miseries of others; in requital whereof I rejoice in your happiness, and return you thanks; Farewell.*

† For χρέματος reading χρήματος instead of χρήματος, ας χρῆμα the last word of the following Epistle, ἀντὶ χρημάτων, *Scepticè.*

*The Figs which you have, lay up against Winter, and the Cretan meal; for these things seem to be better than* † *riches; wash and drink of the Fountain of* Enneacrunus; *wear the same garment in Winter as in Summer, and that sordid, as becomes a free person living under the* Athenian Democracy: *As for me, I knew as soon as I came into a City and Island govern'd by a Monarch, I should suffer those ills of which you write to me; Now the* Syracusians, Agrigentines, Geloans, *and the rest of the* Sicilians * *compassionately admire me; But* † *for my madness in coming inconsiderately to these unseemly things, I wish this curse to fall upon me, that I may never be quit of these evils; * because being of years of discretion, and pretending to wisdom, I would not undergo hunger and cold, nor contemn glory, nor wear a long Beard; I will send you some great white Lupines to eat, after you have acted* Hercules *to the Boys; of which things it is reported you esteem it not absurd to discourse and write: but if any Man should speak of Lupines to* Dionysius, *I think it were against the rules of Tyranny: of the rest go and discourse with* Simon *the Leather-dresser, than whom you esteem nothing more wise; for I am not allowed familiarity with Artificers, because I live under obedience to others.*

*make a point at γνάφεις, and read νῦν δὲ ἐλεοῶντες μὲ περιβλέπουσι, *Dorice*; a ridiculous and acute irony; for περιβλέπειν signifieth to look on a thing with admiration, which is not proper to compassion.
† *Read* τῆς δὲ μανίας πέρι, ἃς ἀμάρτω.
* *Perhaps,* ὃν δὴ.

Notwithstanding, this jarring betwixt them, *Aristippus* was nothing backward in employing the Interest he had at Court, for some friends of *Antisthenes*, to preserve them from death; as this Letter of his to *Antisthenes* doth manifest.

† *Socratic. Epist.* 11.
† *The* Locrian *young Men of whom you write to me, will be set at liberty, neither put to death, nor fined, though they were very near death.* * *Let not* Antisthenes *know I have saved his friends, for he loves not to converse with Tyrants, but with Meal-Men, and Victualers, such as sell meat and drink at* Athens *without fraud, and such as sell thick cloaths in cold weather, and such as serve* † Simon, *these are not Riches.*

* The Letter seems to be written to Antisthenes; and this means ironically.
† The Leather-dresser.

*Diogenes* followed the example of his Master *Antisthenes* in deriding *Aristippus*, * calling him *the Court-Spaniel.* As *Aristippus* passed by, *Diogenes* busied about washing Herbs, called to him, saying, *If you had learned to do thus, you needed not have followed the Courts of Princes; and you,* said he, *if you had known how to converse with Men, needed not to have washed Herbs*; thus expressed by † *Horace.*

* *Laert.*
† Epist. 1. 17.

Diog. *On Herbs if* Aristippus *could have din'd,*
*The company of Kings, he had declin'd.*

Arist. *He who derides me, had he wit to use*
*The company of Kings, would Herbs refuse.*

*I mine own Jester; thou the People's art,*
*My choice is of the better, nobler part,*
*I by a King maintain'd, on horseback ride,*
*Thou by the meanest people art supply'd,*
*Than those that do maintain thee thou art less;*
*Yet to want nothing vainly dost profess.*

* *Theodorus* in his Book of Sects, reproached *Aristippus*; and *Alexis* the Comick Poet, in his *Galatea* bringeth in a Servant speaking thus of one of his Disciples;

* *Laert.*
† *Athen. Deipn.* 12.

*My Master young on Rhetorick first intent,*
*Next to Philosophy his study bent:*
*A* Cyrenæan *liv'd at* Athens *then,*
*Nam'd* Aristippus, *justly first of Men,*
*Esteem'd for subtlety and Luxury,*
*A Talent him my Master gave to be*
*His Scholar, but of Arts he none was taught,*
*Save only Cookery; that away he brought.*

## CHAP. VI.

### *His Apothegms.*

OF *Apothegms*, (in * which kind he was conceived to have an acuteness beyond all the other Philosophers,) these are remembred.

* *Said.*
† *Laert.*

† He once gave fifty drachms for a Partridge, for which being reproved by another; *you would have given a penny for it,* saith he, which the other granting; *so much,* saith he, *are fifty drachms to me.*

Being demanded what was the greatest benefit he had received by Philosophy; he answered, *To converse freely with all Men.*

Being reproached for living high; if *Magnificence were a sin,* saith he, *it would not be practised upon days of Festival to the Gods.*

To one who asked wherein Philosophers excelled other Men; *Though all Laws were abolished,* saith he, *we should lead the same lives.*

Being demanded how the Learned differ from the unlearned, he answered, *as Horses unback'd from such as are well manag'd.*

Going into the House of a Courtezan, a young Man of the Company blushed, to whom he said,

ſaid, *It is not ill to go in, but not to be able to come out.*

To one who deſired him to reſolve a Riddle, Thou fool, ſaith he, *why wouldſt thou have me reſolve that which unreſolved finds us ſuch entertainment?*

He ſaid, *It is better to be a Beggar than unlearned, for one wants only Riches, the other Humanity.*

Being reviled, he went aloof off; he that reviled, asked why he fled; *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *to ſpeak ill is in your power, not to hear is not in mine.*

One ſaying he ſaw Philoſophers at the gates of rich Men, *and Phyſicians* ſaith he, *at the gates of the ſick; but no Man would for that reaſon chooſe to be ſick rather than a Phyſician.*

To one who boaſted he learned much; *As they*, ſaith he, *who eat and exerciſe much, are not better than thoſe who eat only to ſatisfie Nature, neither are they learned who make large but profitable collections.*

An Oratour pleading for him, and gaining the Cauſe, asked him, *What are you the better for* Socrates? *So much*, ſaith he, *as that I make good thoſe things which you alledged in my defence.*

He inſtructed his Daughter *Arete to contemn all that is too much.*

To one who demanded what his Son would be the better for Learning; *If in nothing elſe, in this*, ſaith he, *that in the Theater one ſtone ſhall not ſit upon another.*

Of one who would have preferr'd his Son to him, he demanded 500. Drachms, *For ſo much*, ſaith the other, *I can buy a ſlave*; *Do ſo*, anſwered he, *and then you will have two* (* *your Son, and him you buy.*)

He ſaid he took money of his friends, not to make uſe of it himſelf, but to let them know the right uſe of it.

Being reproached for entertaining an Oratour to plead his Cauſe; *and when I would feaſt*, ſaith he, *I hire a Cook.*

To one who boaſted of his ſwimming, *Are you not aſhamed*, ſaid he, *to glory in the property of a Dolphin.*

Being demanded wherein the learned differed from the unlearned; *Send them naked to ſtrangers*, ſaith he, *and you ſhall ſee.*

To one who boaſted he could drink much without being drunk; *So*, ſaith he, *can a Mule.*

Being blamed that he took money being the Diſciple of *Socrates*: *and juſtly*, ſaith he, *For* Socrates *when they ſent him Wheat and Wine, took a little for his preſent uſe, and ſent back the reſt, the chief of all the* Athenians *were his Purveyors, mine* Eutichydes, *a mercenary Servant.*

Being reproved by *Plato* for buying a great quantity of Fiſh; *They coſt me*, ſaith he, *but an obolus, would not you have given ſo much for them?* to which *Plato* aſſenting, *It is not that I am profuſe then*, ſaith he, *but that you are covetous.*

*Simon* Pantler to *Dionyſius*, a Phrygian, a Man of ill conditions, brought him to his houſe paved curiouſly with marble; *Ariſtippus* ſpits in his face, whereat the other growing angry, *I could not find*, ſaith he, *a fitter place.*

Being demanded how *Socrates* dyed; *As I would wiſh to do*, ſaith he.

*Polyxenus* the Sophiſt coming to his houſe, and ſeeing there Women and a great feaſt, reproved him. *Ariſtippus* gave him way; and after a little pauſe, *will you dine with me*, ſaith he? whereto he conſenting: *Why then*, continues he, *do you reprove me? 'tis not the feaſt but the coſt which you condemn.*

His Servant being upon a journey, weary with carrying of mony; *Throw away*, ſaith he, *what is too much, and carry as much as you can.*

† *He bad his ſlaves away his Mony throw,*
*Becauſe ore-charg'd with weight they went too ſlow.* † *Horat. ſat. 2. 3.*

* Being at Sea, and underſtanding the owners of the Veſſel were Pirats, he took his Mony and counted it, then let it fall into the Sea, as unwillingly, and ſighed: ſome affirm, that he ſaid, *It is better theſe periſh for* Ariſtippus, *than* Ariſtippus *for them.* * *Laert. Cic. de invent.*

He reproved Men for *looking upon goods expoſed to ſale, and taking no care to furniſh their minds.* Others aſcribe this to *Diogenes.*

Living in *Aſia*, he was ſeized by *Antaphernes*, the King's Lieutenant, whereupon one ſaying to him, And where is now your confidence? When, ſaid he, you fool, ſhould I be confident, if not now, when I ſhall meet with *Antaphernes.*

Thoſe who forſook Philoſophy, to apply themſelves to *Mechanical* Sciences, he compared to *the Suitors of* Penelope; *they could get the good wills of* Melantho, Polydora, *and others of the Servants, but could not obtain the Miſtreſs in Marriage.* Not unlike is that of *Ariſto*, who ſaid, that *Ulyſſes*, when he went to Hell, ſaw all the dead, and ſpoke to them, but could not come ſo much as to the ſight of the Queen.

Being demanded what Boyes ought to learn; *That*, ſaith he, *which they ought to practiſe when they are men.*

To one who accuſed him for going from *Socrates* to *Dionyſius*: To *Socrates*, ſaith he, I went for παιδεία, *education*; to *Dionyſius* for παιδιὰ, *recreation.*

To a Courtezan, who told him ſhe was with Child by him: *You know that no more*, ſaid he, *than if paſſing through a buſh, you ſhould ſay this thorn pricked you.*

To one, who blamed him, that he took Mony of *Dionyſius*, *Plato* a Book; he anſwered, *I want Mony*, Plato *Books.*

† Having loſt a great Farm, he ſaid to one, who ſeemed exceſſively to compaſſionate his loſs, *You have but one field, I have three left; why ſhould not I rather grieve for you.* It is madneſs (adds *Plutarch*) to lament for what is loſt, and not rejoice for what is left. † *Plut. de tranq. anim.*

* When one told him the land is loſt for your ſake; *Better*, ſaith he, *is it, that the Land be loſt for me, than I for the land.* * *Stob. Eth. 46.*

† Seeing one angry vent his paſſion in words; *Let us not*, ſaith he, *ſuit words to our anger, but appeaſe our anger with words.* † *Stob. Eth. 99.*

* Seeing a little Woman exceeding fair; *This*, ſaith he, *is a little evil, but a great beauty.* They who invert theſe words, and read, a little fair one, but great evil, miſtake the meaning of *Ariſtippus*, who plays upon that ordinary ſaying, applying the inverſion to his own luxurious humour. * *Stob. Eth. 128.*

† To one, who demanded his advice whether he ſhould marry or no: he ſaid no, *if you take a fair Wife*, ſaith he, *ſhe will be common, if foul, a fury.* † *Stob. Eth. 86.*

* Stob. Eth. 210. * He used to advise young Men to *carry such provision, as in a shipwrack they might swim away withal.*

† Stob. Eth. 229. † *As a shoo that is too big is unfit for use, so is a great estate; the bigness of the shoe troubles the wearer; wealth may be used upon occasion, either wholly or in part.*

## CHAP. VIII.

*His writings.*

* Laert. * SOme affirm (of whom is *Sosicrates*) that he wrote nothing at all: others that he wrote. *The Libyan History*, three Books dedicated to *Dionysius*.

*Dialogues* twenty five (or rather twenty three; for the number seems corrupt) in one Book; some in the Attick dialect, others in the Dorick: their Titles these: 1. *Artabazus.* 2. *To the shipwrackt.* 3. *To Exiles.* 4. *To a poor Man.* 5. *To Lais.* 6. *To Porus.* 7. *To Lais concerning a Looking-glass.* 8. *Hermias* 9. *The Dream.* 10. *To the Cup-bearer.* 11. *Philomelus.* 12. *To servants.* 13. *To those who reproved him for using old Wine and common Women.* 14. *To those who reproved him for feasting.* 15. *An Epistle to* Arete. 16. *To the Olympick exerciser.* 17. *An Interrogation.* 18. *Another Interrogation.* 19. † *A Chria to* Dionysius. 20. *Another on an image.* 21. *Another on* Dionysius *his Daughter.* 22. *To one who conceived himself dishonoured.* 23. *To one who endeavoured to give advice.*

† A *Chria* is a short commemoration, aptly relating the speech or action of some person. The third of these (*viz.* to *Dionysius* his Daughter) *Vossius* inserts amongst the *Greek* Histories; if that were Historical, it is likely this to *Dionysius* was of the same Nature.

*Exercitations* six Books.

* Laert. * *Of pleasure* mention'd by *Laertius* in the life of *Epicurus*.

*Of Physiology*, out of which *Laertius* cites, that *Pythagoras was so named, because he spake no less truth than* Pythius.

*Of the luxury of the Antients*, four Books, containing examples of those who indulged to love and pleasure; as, the love of † *Empedocles* to *Pausanias*, in the first Book; of *Cratea* to her Son *Periander*, of *Aristotle* to the Concubine of *Hermias* in the fourth, of *Socrates* to *Alcibiades*, *Xenophon* to *Clinias*, *Plato* to *Aster*, *Xenocrates* to *Polemo*. But, these latter instances show, that these Books were not writ by this *Aristippus*.

† Laert. in vit. Emped. Periand. Aristot. &c.

*Epistles*, four are extant under his name, in the Socratick collection, put forth by *Leo Allatius*.

* Laert. * *Socion* and *Panætius* reckon his treatises thus,

*Of discipline.*
*Of vertue*, an Exhortation.
*Artabazus.*
*The shipwrackt.*
*The banish'd.*
*Exercitations* six.
*Chria* three.
*To Lais.*
*To Porus.*
*To Socrates.*
*Of Fortune.*

## CHAP. IX.

*His death.*

HAving lived long with *Dionysius*, at last his Daughter *Arete* sent to him, to desire him that he would come to *Cyrene* to her, to order her affairs; for, that she was in danger of oppression by the Magistrates. *Aristippus* hereupon took leave of *Dionysius*, and being on his voyage, fell sick by the way, and was forced to put in at *Lipara*, an *Æolian* Island, where he dyed, as may be gathered from this Epistle, which he then sent to his Daughter.

† Aristippus *to* * Arete.

† Socr. Epist. 27.
* Sospatra by Leo Allatius.

*I Received your Letter by* Teleus, *wherein you desire me to make all possible haste to* Cyrene, *because your business with the Præfects goeth not to your mind, and your Husband is unfit to manage your domestick affairs, by reason of his bashfulness, and being accustomed to a retired life, remote from the publick. Wherefore as soon as I got leave of* Dionysius, *I sailed towards you, and being upon my journey, fell sick by the way at* Lipara, *where the friends of* Sonicus *provide carefully for me, with such humanity, as is needful for one near death. As for your demand, what respect you should give those whom I manumised, who profess they will never desert* Aristippus *whilst they have strength; but, ever serve him and you; trust them in all things, they have learned from me not to be false. For your self, I advise you to apply your self to the Magistrates, which counsel will profit you, if you affect not rather to have much: You will live most at ease, if you contemn excess; for, they cannot be so unjust as to leave you in want. You have two Orchards left sufficient to maintain you plentifully: and that possession in* Bernicia, *if alone left you, were sufficient to supply you fully. I do not counsel you to neglect small things; but, not to be troubled for small things, since vexation is not good even for great. If when I am dead, you want my advice for the education of young* Aristippus, *go to* Athens, *and above all, esteem* Xantippe *and* Myrto, *who have often spoke to me to bring you to the* Eleusinian *Festivals. Whilst you lead this pleasant life with these, let the* Cyrenæan *Præfects be as unjust as they please, in your natural* † *end they cannot prejudice you. Endeavour to live with* Xantippe *and* Myrto, *as I did heretofore with* Socrates, *composing your self to their conversation; for, pride is not proper in that place. If* * Tyrocles, *the Son of* Socrates, *who lived with me at* Megara, *come to* Cyrene, *it will be well done to supply him, and to respect as your own Son. If you will not nurse a Daughter, because of the great trouble it gives you, send for the Daughter of* Eubois, *to whom you have heretofore expressed so much kindness, and named after my Mother, and I also have often called her my friend. Above all, take care of little* Aristippus, *that he may be worthy of us and of Philosophy: For this I leave him as his true inheritance, the rest of his estate finds the* Cyrenæan *Magistrates adversaries. But, you writ me not word that any offered to take that away from you. Rejoyce, dear Daughter, in the possession of those riches which are in your power, and make your Son possess them likewise: I wish he were my Son; but, being disappointed of that hope, I depart with this assurance,*

† Pleasure.

* Leo Allatius reads Lysicles; but that cannot be; for Lysicles was dead long before; see Socratic. Ep. 16.

*assurance, that you will lead him in the paths trodden by good Men. Fare well, and grieve not for us.*

* Stob. Eth. 95. * Of his Children, besides this *Arete* his Daughter, whom he educated in Philosophy, is remembred also a Son, whom for his stupidity he disinherited, and turned out of doors; for which, being reproved by his Wife, who alledged, that he came from himself; He, spitting, said, *This comes from me too, but profiteth me nothing.* Or, as *Laertius. We cast* τὸ φλέγμα ἐκ τῆς φθιείρεως, *all unnecessary things as far as we can from us.*

*Arete* had a Son named from his Grandfather *Aristippus*, and from his Mothers instructing him in Philosophy, surnamed μητροδίδακτος.

Besides these two (*Aristippus* the Grandfather and the Grandson) *Laertius* reckons two more of the same name: *One* writ the History of *Arcadia*: the *Other* was of the new Academy.

## CHAP. IX.

*His Disciples and Successors.*

OF the Auditors of *Aristippus*, besides his Daughter *Arete*, (whom he taught with much care, and brought up to great perfection in Philosophy (are remembred *Æthiops* of *Ptolemais*, and *Antipater* of *Cyrene*.

*Arete* communicated the Philosophy she received from her Father, to her Son *Aristippus the younger*: *Aristippus* transmitted it to *Theodorus the Atheist*, who instituted a Sect, called *Theodorean*.

*Antipater* communicated the Philosophy of *Aristippus* to *Epitimides* his Disciple; *Epitimides* to *Parabates*; *Parabates* to *Hegesias* and *Anniceris*; These two last improving it by some additions of their own, obtained the honour each of them, to have a Sect named after them, *Hegesiack* and *Annicerick*.

# HEGESIAS.

## CHAP. I.

*His Life.*

HEGESIAS, Disciple to *Parabates*, was surnamed πεισιθάνατος, *Death's Orator*, from a † book he writ, entituled Ἀποκαρτερῶν, upon occasion of one who had famish'd himself nigh to death, but was called back to life by his friends, in answer to whom, he in this Book demonstrated that death takes us away from ill things, not from good, and reckon'd up the incommodities of Life, and represented the evils thereof * with so much Rhetorick, that the sad impression thereof penetrated so far into the breasts of many hearers, that it begot in them a desire of dying voluntarily, and many laid violent hands upon themselves. Whereupon he was prohibited by *Ptolomy* the King to discourse any more upon this Subject in the Schools.

† Cic. Tusc. q. 1.

* Val. Max. l. 9.

## CHAP. II.

*His Philosophy.*

HIS Disciples were from him called *Hegesians*. They held the same chief good and Evil with the *Cyreneans*; further asserting,

That *Kindness, Friendship, and Benevolence are in themselves nothing; not expetible, but in respect of those benefits which cannot consist without those persons.*

That *Perfect Felicity is absolutely impossible, because the body is disordered by many troubles, in which the Soul shares, and most of those things which we hope are prevented by chance.*

That *Life and Death are in our choice.*

That *nothing is by nature pleasant or unpleasant, but by the rarity and unusuallness of things, or satiety, some are delighted therewith, others not.*

That *Poverty and Wealth confer nothing to Pleasure, neither are the rich poor affected with Pleasure several ways. Servitude and Liberty, Nobility and Meanness, Glory and ignominy differ nothing in this respect.*

That *to live is advantageous for a Fool, indifferent to a wise Man.*

That *a wise Man ought to do all things in consideration of himself, and prefer none before himself, for though possibly, he may receive benefits from others very great in outward appearance; yet are they nothing in comparison of those which he dispenseth.*

That *Sense confers nothing to certain knowledge for all act by the rules of their own reason.*

That *offences ought to be pardon'd, for no Man offends willingly, but compelled by some affection.*

That *we should hate no man, but instruct him better.*

That *a wise man should not insist so much upon choice of good things, as upon evil, making it his scope and end to live neither in Labour nor Grief; which they do, who are inclined neither way to the objects of Pleasure.*

# ANNICERIS.

## CHAP. I.

### His Life.

*Laert. † ANNICERIS was of *Cyrene*, Diſciple to *Parebates*, *Suidas* ſaith, he was an Epicurean, and that he lived in the time of *Alexander*.

† *Æl. var. hiſt.* 2. 27. † He was excellent in Chariot-racing, of which one day he gave a teſtimony before *Plato*, and drove many Courſes round the Academy, ſo exactly, that his Wheels never went out of the track, to the admiration of all that were preſent, except *Plato*, who reprehended his too much induſtry, ſaying, It was not poſſible but that he, who employed ſo much pains about things of no value, muſt neglect thoſe of greater concernment, which are truly worth admiration.

* *Laert. vit. Plat.* * When *Plato*, by the command of *Dionyſius*, was ſold as a Slave in *Ægina*, *Anniceris* fortuned to be preſent, who redeemed him for twenty, or according to others thirty, *minæ*, and ſent him to *Athens* to his Friends, who preſently returned the Mony to *Anniceris*, but he refuſed it, ſaying, They were not the only perſons that deſerved to take care of *Plato*.

† *Suid.* † He had a Brother named *Nicoteles*, a Philoſopher; he had likewiſe the famous *Poſidonius* to be his Diſciple.

## CHAP. II.

### His Philoſophy.

HIS Diſciples were called *Annicerians*; † they as the reſt placed all good in Pleaſure, and conceived virtue to be only commendable as far as it produced Pleaſure. * They agreed in all things with the *Hegeſians*, but they aboliſhed not friendſhip, good will, duty to Parents, and actions done for our Country. They held,

† *Cic. de fi* 3.

* *Laert.*

That *although a wiſe Man ſuffer trouble for thoſe things, yet he will lead a life nothing the leſs happy, though he enjoy but few Pleaſures.*

That *the Felicity of a Friend is not expetible in it ſelf; for to agree in judgement with another, or to be raiſed above and fortified againſt the general opinion, is not enough to ſatisfie reaſon, but we muſt accuſtom our ſelves to the beſt things; becauſe of our innate vicious inclinations.*

That *a Friend is not to be entertained only out of uſeful or neceſſary Ends, nor when ſuch fail, is to be caſt off, but out of an intimate good will, for which we muſt alſo undergo trouble. For though they placed (as the reſt) the chief end and good in pleaſure, and profeſſed to be grieved at the loſs thereof, yet they affirm that we ought to undergo voluntarily labours, out of love to a Friend.*

# THEODORUS.

## CHAP. I.

### His Life.

* *Laert.* † *Suid.* * THEODORUS heard *Anniceris*, *Dionyſius* the Logician, *Zeno* the † Cittiean, and *Pyrrho* the Ephectick. He was called *the Atheiſt*, becauſe * he held there was no God, and wrote a Treatiſe (*Suidas* ſaith many) wherein he endeavoured to refel all Arguments to the contrary, out of which *Epicurus* borrow'd much. Afterwards he was abuſively called θεὸς, upon occaſion of a diſpute with *Stilpo* to this effect. *Do you believe*, ſaith *Stilpo*, *you are whatſoever you affirm your ſelf to be?* *Theodorus* granting; *then*, continues *Stilpo*, *if you ſhould ſay you were a God, were you ſo?* To which *Theodorus* aſſenting, *Stilpo* replyed; *Then impious Man you are a Bird, or any thing elſe by the ſame reaſon.*

* *Plut. plac. Phil.* 17. *Cic. de nat. deor.* 1.

He was ejected out of *Cyrene* by the Citizens, whereupon he ſaid pleaſantly; *You do not well*, Cyreneans, *to thruſt me out of* Lybia *into* Greece. Thence he went to *Athens*, where he ſhould have been cited to the Court of *Areopagus*, and loſt his life, but that he was freed by *Demetrius Phalereus*. Being likewiſe baniſhed

baniſhed thence, he went to *Ptolomy* the Son of *Lagus*, with whom he lived, and was by him ſent on Embaſſy to *Lyſimachus*, to whom ſpeaking Atheſtically; *Lyſimachus* ſaid, *Are not you that* Theodorus *that was baniſhed* Athens? He anſwered, *It is true, the* Athenians *when they could bear me no longer, as* Semele Bacchus, *caſt me out.* *Lyſimachus* reply'd, See that you come no more to me. No, anſwered he, *unleſs* Ptolomy *ſend me.* *Mythro* Son of *Lyſimachus* being preſent, ſaid, *You ſeem not only ignorant of the Gods but of Kings. How,* ſaith he, *am I ignorant of the Gods, who believe you an Enemy to them? Lyſimachus* threatned him with Death; * *You glory,* ſaith he, *in a great matter, a* Cantharides *can do as much.* Or as *Stobæus*, *I knew not that you had not the power of a King but of Poiſon.* Hereat incenſed, he commanded he ſhould be crucified. *Threaten,* ſaith he, *thoſe things I pray to your purple Nobles; it is all one to* Theodorus *whether he rot above or under ground.*

* Sen. de tranq. anim. 6. Cic. Tuſc. qu. 1. Plut. an vitioſ. ad inſel. ſuff.

Finally he went to *Cyrene*, and lived with *Marins* in much repute, in that City out of which he was firſt ejected.

Diſputing with *Euryclides* a Prieſt, he asked, what perſons thoſe were who defile myſteries: *Euryclides* anſwered, *Thoſe who communicate them to perſons not initiated. Then,* replyed he, *you do impiouſly, in declaring them to ſuch.*

What others aſcribe to *Ariſtippus* and *Diogenes*, ſome attribute to *Theodorus* and *Metrocles*, a *Cynick*, who ſaying, *You would not want Diſciples if you waſhed Herbs: Theodorus* anſwer'd, *Neither would you waſh Herbs, if you knew how to converſe with Men.*

He ſaid of *Hipparchia* the Wife of *Crates*; *This is ſhe who hath given over the Shuttle to put on a Cloak.*

## CHAP. II.

### *His Philoſophy.*

HE taught all manner of Learning, and inſtituted a Sect, called *Theodorean.*

† Suid. in Socrat. † He aſſerted *Indifference, that there is no difference of things.*

* Laert. * That *our end, or chief good and greateſt ill, are joy and ſorrow; one conſiſting in Prudence, the other in Imprudence.*

That *Prudence and Juſtice are good things, the contrary habits ill, the mean, pleaſure and grief.*

*He took away Friendſhip, becauſe it is neither in fools nor wiſe Men; thoſe being uncapable to make uſe of it, the thing it ſelf vaniſheth; theſe not needing it, as being ſufficient to themſelves.*

That *it is reaſonable that a wiſe Man expoſe not himſelf to danger for his Country; Wiſdom ought not to be loſt for the preſervation of fools.*

That *the World is our Country.*

That *a Man upon occaſion may commit Theft, Adultery, and Sacriledge, there being nothing in theſe naturally evil, if that opinion were taken away which is built upon the agreement of fools.*

That *a wiſe Man may publickly without ſhame* ἐρωμένοις χρηοῖσθαι.

He uſed ſuch Inductions as theſe: *Is not a Woman that is skilful in Grammar, profitable in that reſpect as a Grammarian? Yea. Is not the ſame of a youth? Yes. Is not a beautiful Woman then profitable, as being handſome? Yes: Then ſhe who makes right uſe of it doth not amiſs.* In theſe kinds of Queſtions he was very ſubtle.

## CHAP. III.

### *His Death, Writings, &c.*

AMphicrates ſaith, that he was condemned by the Law for Atheiſm, and drunk Hemlock. Laert.

He wrote, beſides that which appertained to his Sect, many other things.

*Laertius* reckons twenty of this name: The *firſt* a *Samian*, Son of *Rhœcus*, who adviſed to lay the foundation of the Temple at *Epheſus* upon Embers: For, the place being wet, he ſaid, that Coals, when they forſake the nature of Wood, acquire a ſolidity not to be violated by moiſture.

The *ſecond* of *Cyrene*, a *Geometrician*, whoſe Diſciple *Plato* was.

The *third* this Philoſopher.

The *fourth* writ of exerciſing the voice, a famous Book.

The *fifth* writ of Law-givers, beginning with *Terpander.*

The *ſixth* a *Stoick.*

The *ſeventh* writ the Roman Hiſtory.

The *eight* a *Syracuſian*, writ Tacticks.

The *ninth* a *Byzantine*, a Sophiſt, * eminent for civil Pleas. * Suid.

The *tenth* of the ſame Country, mention'd by *Ariſtotle* in his Epitome of Oratours.

The *eleventh* of *Thebes*, a Statuary.

The *twelfth* a Painter, mention'd by *Polemon.*

The *thirteenth* of *Athens*, a Painter, of whom writes *Menodotus.*

The *fourteenth* of *Epheſus*, a Painter, of whom *Theophanes* in his Treatiſe of Painting.

The *fifteenth* a Poet, who wrote Epigrams.

The *ſixteenth* wrote of Poets.

The *ſeventeenth* a Phyſician, Diſciple to *Athenæus.*

The *eighteenth* of *Chios*, a Stoick.

The *nineteenth* of *Miletus*, a Stoick.

The *twentieth* a Tragick Poet.

BION.

# BION.

## CHAP. I.

### Bion *his Life.*

*Laert.

OF the *Theodorean* Sect was *BION*, a *Boriſthenite*. What his Parents were, and what his employments, he diverted himſelf to Philoſophy, he related to *Antigonus*, King of *Macedonia*, in this manner. *Antigonus* asked *Whence art thou? Who thy Parents? What thy Town? Bion* perceiving himſelf to be reproached, anſwered thus, My Father was a Freeman, τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἀπομυσόμενος, implying, he was a ſeller of Salt-Fiſh, a *Boriſthenite*; he had not a Face, but inſtead thereof a brand-mark, which declared the ill diſpoſition of the owner: My Mother he married out of a common Brothel-

† *Athen. deipn.* House; [† *a* Lacedæmonian *Curtezan, named* Olympia,] being ſuch a Woman as ſuch a Man could get. My Father, for couzening the State, was ſold, and all our Family for Slaves. I being a young likely Youth, was bought by an Oratour, who dyed, and left me all he had. I tore and burnt his Papers, went to *Athens*, and there applyed my ſelf to Philoſophy.

*This is the Blood and Race I boaſt to own.* Thus much concerning my ſelf: Let *Perſeus* therefore, and *Philonides* forbear to enquire after theſe things, and look you upon me, as I am in my ſelf. You do not uſe, O King, when you ſend for Archers, to enquire of what Parentage they are; but, ſet them up a mark to ſhoot at: Even ſo of Friends, you ſhould not examine whence, but what they are.

*Bion* indeed, ſetting this aſide, was of a verſatile wit, a ſubtle Sophiſt, and gave many furtherances to the exerciſers of Philoſophy: in ſome things he was———

He firſt heard *Crates* the Academick; but, deſpiſing that Sect, took a ſordid Cloak and Scrip, and became a *Cynick*: to which *Laertius* aſcribes his conſtancy, expert of perturbation. Then he followed *Theodorus* the Atheiſt, who profeſt all manner of learning; to whoſe opinions he addicted himſelf, and was called a *Theodorean*: Afterwards he heard *Theophraſtus* the *Peripatetick*.

## CHAP. II.

### *His Apophthegms.*

HE left many memorials, and profitable Apophthegms; as, being reproved for not endeavouring to catch a young Man; New Cheeſe, ſaith he, will not ſtick to the hook.

Being demanded what Man is moſt perplexed? He ſaith, He who aims at the higheſt Content.

To one who asked his advice whether he ſhould marry or not, (for this ſome aſcribe to *Bion*, which *A. Gellius* to *Bias*, the miſtake perhaps grounded upon the nearneſs of their Names) he anſwered, If you take a foul Wife, ſhe will be a Torment; if a fair, Common.

He ſaid, That *Age is the Haven to which all ills have recourſe*; that *Glory is the Mother of Jears*; that *Beauty is a good which concerns others, not our ſelves*; that *Riches are the Sinews of Things.*

To one who had conſumed his Patrimony, *Earth*, ſaith he, *devoured* Amphiaraus, *but you devour Earth.*

He ſaid, *It is a great ill, not to be able to bear ill.*

He reproved thoſe who burn Men, as having no Senſe, and again burn them as having Senſe.

He uſed to ſay, It is better to yield our own Youth and Beauty to others, than to attempt anothers; for he that doth ſo, injures both his Body and Soul.

He vilified *Socrates*, ſaying, If he could enjoy *Alcibiades*, and did not, he was a fool; if he could not, he did no great matter.

He ſaid, The way to the next World is eaſie, for we find it blindfold.

He condemned *Alcibiades*, ſaying, When he was a Boy, he drew away Husbands from their Wives, when a Man, Wives from their Husbands.

At *Rhodes*, whilſt the *Athenians* exerciſed Rhetorick, he taught Philoſophy; for which being reproved, I bought Wheat, ſaith he, and ſhall I ſell Barley?

He ſaid, they who are puniſhed below would be more tormented if they carried Water in whole Veſſels, than in Veſſels full of holes.

One that was extreamly talkative, deſiring his aſſiſtance in a buſineſs, I will do what I can for you, ſaith he, if you ſend a Meſſenger to me, and come not your ſelf.

Travelling with very ill Company, they fell amongſt Thieves; We ſhall be undone, ſaith he, unleſs we be known.

He ſaid, Arrogance is the obſtruction of Virtue.

Of a rich Man Covetous, he hath not Mony, ſaith he, but Mony him.

He ſaid, Covetous perſons keep their Wealth ſo ſtrictly, that they have no more uſe of their own than of anothers.

He ſaid, When we are young, we uſe Courage, when old, Wiſdom. Wiſdom excels other Vertues as the Sight the other Senſes.

He ſaid, No Man ſhould be reproached for old age, that being a Condition all pray they may arrive at.

To

To an envious Man ſad, I know not, ſaith he, whether ſome ill hath befaln you, or ſome good another.

He ſaid, Impiety is an ill companion to bold language;

*For though his Speech be free,*
*To Bondage yield muſt he.*

That friends whatſoever they prove ought to be retained: leſt we ſeem to have converſed with wicked perſons, or to ſhun good.

Being demanded if there were any Gods, he ſaid, *Old Man, wilt thou not drive this Croud away.*

He conceived that he might make a Field fertile ſooner by praiſing than by manuring it.

He ſaid, They who love to be flattered, are like Pots carried by the ear.

To one who asked him what folly is, he ſaid, the Obſtruction of Knowledge.

He ſaid, Good Men, though Slaves, are free, but wicked Men though free are ſlaves to many Pleaſures.

He ſaid, Grammarians whilſt they enquire after the Errors of *Ulyſſes*, mind not their own, nor ſee that they themſelves go aſtray as well as he, in taking pains about uſeleſs things.

He ſaid, Avarice is the *Metropolis* of all Evil.

* *Athen.* * Seeing a Statue of *Perſaus*, under which was written, ΠΕΡΣΑΙΟΣ ΖΗΝΩΝΟΣ Ο ΚΙΤΤΕΥΣ, *Perſaus, of* Zeno a *Cittiean*, he ſaid, the writer miſtook; for it ſhould be, ὀικέτης, *Zeno's Servant*; as indeed he was.

## CHAP. III.

### *His Death.*

*Laert.* AT laſt falling ſick (as thoſe of *Chalcis* ſay, for he died there) he was perſwaded to ſuffer ligatures (by way of charm) he recanted and profeſt repentance for all he had ſaid offenſive to the Gods. He was reduced to extream want of ſuch things as are moſt neceſſary to ſick perſons, until *Antigonus* ſent to him two Servants; and himſelf followed in a litter, as *Phavorinus* affirms in his various Hiſtory, of that ſickneſs he dyed; on whoſe death thus *Laertius*;

Bion *the Boriſthenite,*
*By his Birth to* Scythia *known,*
*Did religious duties ſlight,*
*Gods affirming there were none.*

*If to what he then profeſt,*
*Firm he had continued ſtill,*
*Then his tongue had ſpoke his breaſt,*
*And been conſtant though in ill.*

*But the ſame who Gods deni'd,*
*He who ſacred fanes deſpis'd,*
*He who mortals did deride,*
*When to gods they ſacrific'd;*

*Tortur'd by a long diſeaſe,*
*And of deaths purſuit afraid,*
*Gifts their anger to appeaſe*
*On their hearts and Altars laid.*

*Thus with ſmoak and incenſe tries*
*To delight their ſacred ſcent;*
*I have ſinn'd, not only cries,*
*And what I profeſt repent:*

*But unto an old Wives charms*
*Did his willing neck ſubmit,*
*And about his feeble armes*
*Caus'd them leather thongs to knit.*

*And a youthful ſprig of bayes*
*Did ſet up before his gate:*
*Every means and way eſſaies*
*To divert approaching fate.*

*Fool to think the Gods might be*
*Brib'd with gifts, their favours bought,*
*Or the ſacred Deitie*
*Were, and were, not as he thought.*

*But his wiſdoms titles (now*
*Turn'd to aſhes) not avail*
*With ſtretched arms, I know not how,*
*Hail he cried, great* Pluto *Hail.*

Of this name *Laertius* reckons ten; The *firſt* contemporary with *Pherecydes* the *Syrian*, of *Proconneſus*; who writ two Books extant in his time.

The *ſecond* a *Syracuſian* wrote of the Art of Rhetorick

The *third* this Philoſopher.

The *fourth* an Abderite of the Family of *Democritus*; a Mathematician: he wrote in the *Attick* and *Ionick* Dialect: He firſt ſaid there were ſome habitable parts of the earth, where it was ſix months day and ſix months night.

The *fifth* of *Soleis*; he wrote the *Æthiopick Hiſtory*.

The *ſixth*, an Oratour, who wrote nine Books entitled by the names of the Muſes.

The *ſeventh* a Lyrick Poet.

The *eighth* a *Mileſian* Statuary; mention'd by *Polemon*.

The *ninth* a Tragick Poet, one of thoſe who were called *Tarſici*.

The *tenth* a Statuary of *Clazomene* or *Chios*, mentioned by *Hipponax*.

THE

# THE MEGARICK SECT.

# EUCLID.

## CHAP. I.

*His Country and Masters.*

* Laert. * EUCLID (institutor of the Megarick Sect) was born at *Megara*, a Town adjacent upon the Isthmus; though others say at *Geta* a City of *Sicilie*.

He first studied the writings of *Parmenides*, then went to *Athens* to hear *Socrates*: Af-

† A.Gel. 6.10. terwards the † *Athenians* made an order, that *if any Citizen of* Megara *came into the City of* Athens, *he should be put to death*: So great was the hatred the *Athenians* bore to the *Megarenses*.

* Lib. 1. * *Thucydides* mentions this Decree, whereby the *Megarenses* were prohibited *to make use of any Laws within the* Athenian *jurisdiction, or the* Attick *Forum*: Which Order the *Lacedemonians* requiring to be repealed, and not prevailing, the *Peloponnesian* War ensued thereupon, the cruelest and longest that ever was amongst the *Grecians*.

† A. Gel. 6.10. *Euclid*, who was of *Megara*, and before that Decree used to go to *Athens*, and hear *Socrates*, after it was promulgated, came by night in a long Womans Gown, and Cloak of several colours, his head attired in a Womans Vail (so *Varro* expounds *Rica*) from his house in *Megara* to *Athens*, to *Socrates*, that he might be in that time partaker of his counsel and instructions, and went back again before that day in the same habit, above twenty thousand paces.

* Laert. * Upon the death of *Socrates*, *Plato* and the rest of the Philosophers, fearing the cruelty of the Tyrants, went to *Megara* to him, who entertained them kindly.

## CHAP. II.

*His institution of a Sect.*

† Laert. † HE affected litigious disputes, and * was

* Laert. vit. Socr. therefore told by *Socrates*, that *he knew how to contend with Sophists, but not with Men*: Suitable to his contentious humour, he instituted a Sect, † first called *Megarick* from the

† Laert. place; afterwards *Eristick*, from the litigious

* Laert. vit. Diog. sophistical nature thereof: Whence * *Diogenes* said, it was not σχολὴ a *School*, but σχολὴ *anger*:

† Laert. † thus reproved by *Timon*,

*Of all these trifles, I not value ought,*
*Which* Phædo *nor litigious* Euclid *caught,*
*Who the Megareans mad contention taught.*

Lastly, it was called Dialectick; which name *Dionysius*, a *Carthaginian* first gave them, because their discourses consisted of question and answer.

He affirmed, that *there is but one good, which is called by several names; sometimes Prudence, sometimes God, sometimes the Mind, and the like*: He took away all things opposite to good, saying, *there was no such thing*.

He used arguments not by assumption, but by inference.

He took away disputation by similitude, saying, that it consisted either of like or unlike; if of like, it were better to examine the things themselves to which they are like: if of unlike, the comparison is to no purpose.

## CHAP. III.

*His Apothegms, Writings.*

HE was famous in the Schools (saith * *Plutarch*) for as much as hearing his Brother in a wild rage, say, *Let me perish, if I be not revenged*: he answered, *and I, unless I perswade you to lay aside your anger, and love me as at first*. If † *Hierocles* (who relates the same story) for τῷ Σωκρατικῷ writ not as *Plutarch* τῷ Σωκρατικῷ, that epithete occasion'd the mistake.

* De fratern. amor. † Stob. serm. 2.

* He said, *that there is one kind of sleep, a young pliant Deity, easie, to be driven away; the other gray and aged, chiefly frequenting old Men: Pertinacious and inexorable, from this God, if he once come, it is hard to get loose; words avail nothing, for he is deaf; nor can you shew him any thing that may move him, for he is blind.*

* Stob. Eth. 2.

† Being demanded what the Gods are, and wherein they delight: *Of all things else concerning them*, saith he, *I am ignorant but of this, I know they hate curious persons.*

† Stob. Eth. 2.

* He wrote (besides other things) six Dialogues († *Panætius* doubts whether they were genuine or spurious) their Titles these,

* Laert. † Laert. vit. Æschin.

*Lamprias.*
*Æschines.*
* *Phœnix*; or (as *Suidas*) *the Phœnixes.*
*Crito.*
*Alcibiades.*
*The Erotick.*

* In some Editions Phædrides.

Of the same names are numbred *Euclid the Mathematician*, a Megarean also, whence confounded by * *Valerius Maximus* with the Philosopher: Plato (saith he) *sent the undertakers*

† Lib. 8. cap. 13.

takers of the ſacred Altar (*who came to confer with him concerning the manner and form thereof*) to Euclid *the* Geometrician, *yielding to his skill and profeſſion*: That theſe undertakers came to *Plato*, is evident from the teſtimony of many others; but, that he remitted them to *Euclid* the *Geometrician*; or, that *Euclid* the Philoſopher own'd that profeſſion, is no where to be proved. On the contrary, * *Proclus* affirms, that *Euclid* the Mathematician was of the *Platonick* Sect; and that † *Ptolomy* King of *Ægypt* asking if there were any ſhorter way to Geometry, he anſwered, *Not any Kings-high-way*. From the death of *Socrates* to the firſt of the *Ptolomies* are 95. years. So that *Euclid* the Mathematician was much later than the Philoſopher.

* *In Euclid lib.* 1. *cap.* 4.

† *The Text is imperfect, read* καὶ μέν τοι φασίν ὅτι Πτολεμαῖος ἤρετο ποτὲ αὐτὸν εἴ τις ἐστὶ πρὸς γεωμετρίαν τῆς στοιχειώσεως βραχέων μέθοδος; ἀξιόμισα φησὶν ὦ βασιλεῦ πρὸς γεωμετρίαν βασιλικὴ ὁδὸς νεώτερος, &c. and (*ſo well nigh*) *Barocius.*

*Euclid the Archon* in the ſecond year of the 88th Olympiad, according to * *Diodorus Siculus*; but, † *Ariſtotle* names the *Archon* for that year *Enclees*, confirmed by his Commentators, and by * *Suidas*, who only erres a little in the diſtance of years betwixt him and *Euclid* the other *Archon*. † *Salmaſius* not knowing the name *Enclees* to be any where found amongſt the *Archontes*, and expreſly affirming the contrary, endeavours to corrupt the Text of *Suidas* reading *Diocles*.

* *Lib.*

† *Meteor.* 1. 6.

* Σαμίων ὁ δημὸς.

† *Inſcript. p.* 235.

*Euclid the Archon*, in the ſecond year of the 94th Olympiad,

*Euclid the Soothſayer*, friend to *Xenophon*, who * mentions him.

* *Expedit. Cyr. lib.* 7.

*Euclid the Stone-cutter*, named in † *Plato's* Will.

† *Laert. vit. Plat.*

# EUBULIDES.

† *Laert.*

† EUBULIDES a *Mileſian* ſucceeded *Euclid*. Some affirm, that *Demoſthenes* the Orator was his Scholar, and that *Demoſthenes* not being able to pronounce the Letter *R*, he taught him by continual exerciſe to do it. He was a great Enemy to *Ariſtotle*, and much aſperſed him.

In *Dialectick* he invented many kinds of Interrogation or argument, ψεῦδόμενον *the Lying*; διαλανθάνουσα, *the occult*; ἠλέκτρα, *Electra*; ἐγκεκαλυμμένον, *the Vailed*; Σωρείτης, *Sorites*; κερατίνη, *the horned*; φαλακρὸν, *the bald*: Of which thus *Demoſthenes*,

*The Orators ſharp* Eubulides *knows*
*With ſubtle forked queſtions how to poſe,*
*Speech from* Demoſthenes *not ſweeter flows.*

* *Defratum amore.*

† *Stob. ſerm.*

* *Stob. Eth.*

These are ſeveral kinds of Sophiſms, which * *Ariſtotle* in general defines *Eriſtick Syllogiſmes*; from this School borrowed and enlarged afterwards by the *Stoicks*.

* *Top.* 8. 4.

† *Diſput.* 8.

* *Divinat.* 2.

ψεῦδόμενος, termed by † *Athenæus* ψευδόλογος, by * *Cicero mentiens*, is a captious reaſoning not to be diſſolved; named, as moſt of the reſt, not from the form, but matter; the ordinary example being this: *If you ſay that you lye when you ſpeak truth, you lye: But, you ſay that you lye when you ſpeak truth; therefore you lye.* Such is that in † Africanus, *A Man having four hundred* (*Crowns*) *diſpoſeth in Legacies three hundred; next he bequeaths to you a piece of ground worth one hundred Crowns: provided, his Will be not lyable to the* Falcidian *Law*, [by which all Legacies are made void, if the ſurpluſage remaining for the Heirs, amount not at the leaſt to the fourth part of the Goods] *The Queſtion is what right you have. If ſay, the queſtion is not to be reſolved, being of that kind which the* Dialecticks *call* ψευδόμενος, *what part ſoever we take for true will prove falſe. If we ſay the Legacies are valid, the Will comes within compaſs of the* Falcidian *Law, whereby the condition being defective, the Legacy is invalid. Again, if becauſe the condition is defective, the Legacies are not valid, it is not liable to the* Falcidian *Law; and if the Law take not place upon the condition, you are not to have what was bequeathed you.* So much was this *Sophiſme* eſteemed, that * *Seneca* affirms, many Books to have been written upon it: † *Laertius* reckons ſix diſtinct Treatiſes of *Chryſippus*. * *Athenæus* and *Suidas* averr, that *Philetus* a *Coan* dyed of a Conſumption, occaſion'd by exceſſive ſtudy upon this Queſtion only.

† *Cic. Lucul.*

* *Laert.*

† *Laert. in Æſchin.*

* *Lib.* 3. *quæſt.*

* *Epiſt.* 6. 45.

† *Vit Chryſip.*

* *Deipn.* 8.

*Electra*, named (likewiſe) from the chief Examples; of which thus *Lucian*: Electra *the illuſtrious Daughter of* Agamemnon, *knew and knew not the ſame thing.* Oreſtes *unknown ſtanding by her, ſhe knew that* Oreſtes *was her Brother, but ſhe knew not that he was* Oreſtes.

Ἐγκεκαλυμμένος, *the vailed*; named alſo from the matter, thus inſtanc'd by *Lucian*. CHR. *Anſwer me, Do you know your Father?* MERC. *Yes.* CHR. *What if I ſhould bring one unto you vailed, what would you ſay, that you knew him or not?* MERC. *That I did not know him.* CHR. *And yet that Man proves to be your Father, therefore if you knew not the Man, you knew not your Father.* MERC. *No truly; but, pull off his vail, and I ſhall diſcover the truth.* Of the ſame kind is that of the *Sophiſts*, which † *Ariſtotle* affirms, *Socrates* (in *Plato's Meno*) vainly labours to reſolve; *Do you know all Pairs are even or not? The other anſwering he knew it. The Sophiſt brings forth a pair of ſome thing which he had held hidden under his Cloak, and asks, Did you know that I had this Even pair or not? the other confeſſing he knew not, Then ſaith he, you know and know not the ſame thing.*

† *Anal. poſter.* 1. 1.

*Sorites*, By *Cicero* termed * a *Cervalis*, who defines it to be † *when any thing by degrees is added or taken away: as a Heap* (Σωρὸς) *is made by adding a grain*, or rather as * *Julianus*, *when from things evidently true, by very ſhort Mutations the*

* *Divin.* 2.

† *Cic. Lucul.*

* *Digeſt. lib.* 1 3.

*Dispute is led to such things as are evidently false*; the same, † *Ulpian*, The Common example mentioned by * *Cicero*, † *Laertius*, * *Sextus Empiricus*, and others in this: *Are not two a few? Are not three so likewise? Are not four the same? So on to ten. But two are a few, and therefore ten.*

† *Lib. 48. ad Sabin. in tit de verb. & rer. signific.*
* *In Lucullo.*
† *In Chrysip.*
* *Adv. Logic.*

Κερατινὴ *the horned*; Denominated as the rest from the Example, *What you lost not you have, you lost not* Horns, *therefore you have Horns.* Repeated by *Seneca*, *A. Gellius* and others. Of this kind * S. *Hierome* observes that to be which the Pharisees objected to our Saviour. *He came* (saith he) *from* Galilee *to* Judea, *wherefore the faction of Scribes and Pharisees asked him whether it were lawful for a Man to put away his Wife for any cause, that they might entrap him by a Horned* Syllogisme, *whatsoever he would answer being liable to exception: if he should say, a Wife might be put away for any cause, and another taken; he being a Professor of modesty should contradict himself; but if he should answer, a Wife ought not to be put away for any cause, he should be accounted guilty of Sacriledge, and judged to do contrary to the Doctrine of* Moses, *and by* Moses *of God. Our Lord therefore so tempers his answer, that he passeth by their trap, alledging for Testimony the sacred Scripture and Natural Law, opposing the first Sentence of God to the second, which was granted not from the will of God, but Necessity of Sin.* The same Father instanceth another of the same kind proposed to him, * *I was assaulted at* Rome * *Epist. 83.* *by a very Eloquent person, with that which they call a Horned* Syllogism, *so as which way soever I turned I was more entangled. To marry a Wife, saith he, is it a sin or not? I plainly, not thinking to avoid his ambush, said, it is not a sin; He then propounded another Question, in Baptism. Are good works remitted or Evil? I with the like simplicity answered, Sins are remitted: when I thought my self secure, Horns began to bud out on each side on me, and the hidden forces to discover themselves. If, saith he, to marry a Wife be not a sin, and that Baptism remitteth Sins, whatsoever is not remitted is reserved.*

† *Lib. 5 in Mat.*

# ALEXINUS.

† *Laert.*

† AMongst the many Disciples of *Eubulides* was *Alexinus* an *Elean*; a great lover of Contention, and therefore called Ἐλέγξινος from redarguing; He most opposed *Zeno.*

*Hermippus* saith, he went to *Olympia*, and there profest Philosophy; his Disciples questioning why he lived there, he answered, he meant to institute a Sect, and call it *Olympick*, but his Disciples wanting subsistence, and disliking the Air, departed, he continued there solitary with one Servant only, and swimming in the River *Alphæus*, was hurt with a Reed, whereof he dyed.

He wrote against other Philosophers besides *Zeno.* And against *Ephorus* the Historian.

# EUPHANTUS.

* *Laert.*

* FRom *Alexinus* came *Euphantus* an *Olinthian*, Master to King *Antigonus*, Father of *Demetrius*, Grandfather of *Antigonus Gonatus*; He died of Age; He writ

*The History of that time.*

*Tragedies* many, which upon their publick representations were much applauded.

*An Oration upon a Kingdom*, to *Antigonus*, very celebrious.

# APOLLONIUS CRONUS.

* *Laert.*
† *Lib. 14.*

* OF the Disciples of *Eubulides*, was *Apollonius Cronus*; † *Strabo* saith, he was a *Cyrenean* by birth, and calls him *Cronus Apollonius*, implying the latter to be a surname from *Apollonia* a Town of *Cyrene.*

# DIODORUS.

## CHAP. I.

*His Life.*

* *Laert.* * Diodorus was of *Jassus* a City of *Caria*; Son of *Ameinias*; *Laertius* saith, he heard *Eubulides*; † *Strabo* that he heard *Apollonius Cronus*, after whom he was called *Cronus*; *the name of the Master being transmitted to the Disciple, by reason of the obscurity of the true* Cronus; * of *Diodorus* thus *Callimachus*;

† *Lib. 14. & 17.*

* *Laert.*

——*ev'n* Momus *writ*
*Upon the Wall:*, Cronus *hath wit.*

He lived with *Ptolomeus Soter*, in whose presence being questioned by *Stilpo*, in such things as upon the sudden he could not answer; he was not only punished by the King, but reproached with the name of *Cronus*: whereupon he went from the Feast, and having written an Oration upon that question, died of grief.

## CHAP. II.

*His Philosophy.*

* *Lib.* † *Lucul.* * *Strabo* and *Laertius* affirm he was a *Dialectick*; *The* Dialecticks (saith † *Cicero*) *teach in their Elements to judge whether a connex* (a proposition which hath the conjunction *if*) *be true or false*; *as this, If it be day, it is light, how much is it controverted*; Diodorus *is of one opinion*, Philo *of another*, Chrysippus *of a third*; That *Diodorus* laboured much herein, appears from an Epigram of *Callimachus*, cited and explained by * *Sextus Empiricus*.

* *Adverſ. Gram.*

Concerning these propositions, the Disagreement of *Diodorus* from *Philo* and *Chrysippus* (already mentioned by *Cicero*) is thus explained by † *Sextus Empiricus*; *But when, saith he, or how it followeth they disagree among themselves, and those things whereby they determine a consequence to be judged, oppugn one another: as* Philo *said, It is a true* Connex, *when it beginneth not from true, and endeth in false. So that according to his opinion, a true* Connex *may be true several ways, a false only one way. For when it beginneth from true, and endeth in true, it is true; as this, If it be day, it is light. Again, when it beginneth from false and endeth in false, it is true: as this, If the Earth flies, the Earth hath wings. Likewise that which beginneth from false, and endeth in true is true; as this, If the Earth flies it is Earth: that only is true which beginneth from true, and endeth in false. Such is this, if it be day it is night. For if it be day, that it is day is true, which is the Antecedent. But that it is night is false, which was the Consequent.* Diodorus *saith, that is a true* Connex *which is not contingent, beginning from true, and ending in false. This is contrary to the opinion of* Philo, *for such a* Connex *as this, if it be day I discourse, and if at present it be day, and I discourse, is according to* Philo's *opinion a true Connex: for it begins from true, it is day, and ends in true, I discourse. But according to the opinion of* Diodorus *it is false: for it may so happen, that though it begin from true, to wit, it is day; yet it may end in false, to wit, that I discourse when I am silent. Thus by Contingency it may begin in true, and end in false; for before I began to discourse it began from true, to wit, it is day: but ended in false to wit, I discourse.*

† *Pyrrh. Hyp. 2.*

And again, * *for that we examine not many opinions concerning a* Connex, *let us say that* Connex *is in it self right, which beginneth not from true, and endeth in false. This, if there be motion, there is Vacuity according to* Epicurus's *Opinion, beginning from true, to wit, there is motion, and ending in true, will be true. According to the* Peripateticks, *beginning from true, to wit, there is motion, and ending in false, to wit, there is Vacuity, will be false; according to* Diodorus, *beginning from false; to wit, there is motion, and ending in false, to wit, there is vacuity, will be true, for the assumption, to wit, there is motion, he denies as false.*

* *Cap. eodem.*

† Some affirm, he invented *the vailed and horned* arguments (of which already in the life of *Eubulides*) * *Alexander Aphrodiseus*, saith he, *used* Κυριεύοντα λόγον, *the dominative argument:* Of whose original and efficacy thus † *Epictetus*; *The Dominative argument seems to have been interrogated and collected upon such like occasions as these: for, there being a common fight amongst these three propositions to one another: The first, that every thing past is necessarily true. The second, that possibility follows not impossibility. The third, that what is not possible, neither is nor shall be true. This fight* Diodorus *observing, made use of the two first, to prove, that nothing is possible, which is not, nor shall be. And* * *Alexander, for that I be at* Corinth *is possible, if that I have been, or ever shall be there; but if neither, it is not possible. It is possible, that a Child be made a Grammarian, if he be made such, in confirmation hereof* Diodorus *interrogated by the Dominative argument.*

† *Laert.* * *In lib. 1. Prior.* † *Lib. 2. cap. 19.* * *In lib. 1. Prior.*

He held, that nothing is moved, † arguing thus: *If a thing be moved, it is neither moved in the place wherein it is, or in the place wherein it is not: but not in that wherein it is; for it resteth in the place wherein it is: nor in that wherein it is not; for where a thing is not, there it can neither act nor suffer. Therefore nothing is moved:* and * consequently nothing is corrupted or perisheth.

† *Sext. Empir. Pyrrhon. hyp. 3 8.* * *Sext. Empir. adverſ. Gram.*

† He asserted, that the principles of things are least indivisible bodies, * in number infinite, in magnitude finite.

† *Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 4.* * *Stob. Eclog. phyſ. 13.*

# ICHTHYAS.

* Laert. * ICHTHYAS Son of *Metallus*, an eminent perſon, is remembred amongſt theſe Philoſophers that are derived from *Euclid*: To him *Diogenes* the *Cynick* dedicated a Dialogue.

# CLINOMACHUS

† Laert. † AMongſt theſe deſcended from *Euclid*, was likewiſe *CLINOMACHUS*, a *Thurian*: He firſt wrote concerning *Anaxiomes*, [ Propoſitions ] *Categorems*, [ that part of a Propoſition which is prædicated of the other ] and the like.

# STILPO.

## CHAP. I.

### Stilpo *his Life.*

* Laert. * STILPO was of *Megara* in *Hellas*; he lived in the time of the firſt *Ptolomy*: Of the Maſters which he heard are reckoned

*Euclid* the founder of this School: but this agrees not with his time, as was before obſerved.

Some followers of *Euclid*,

*Thraſymachus* of *Corinth*, friend to *Ichthyas*: So *Heraclides* atteſteth.

† Laert. vit. Diogenis. † *Diogenes* the *Cynick*,

*Paſicles*, a *Theban*, who heard *Crates* the *Cynick*, his own Brother.

*Dioclides* of *Megara*.

*Cicero* ſaith, he was very acute, much approved by thoſe times: his friends (ſaith he) writ, he was much inclined to Wine and Women, yet relate not this in his diſpraiſe; but, rather in his commendations, that he by Learning ſo ſubdued and repreſt his vicious nature, that none ever ſaw him drunk, none ever diſcovered any laſciviouſneſs in him. *Plutarch* magnifies his height of courage, mixed with meekneſs and temperance. lib. 4.

He was much addicted to civil affairs. Beſides his Wife, he kept company with *Nicareta*, a Courtezan: He had a Daughter of ill fame, whom *Simmias*, a *Syracuſian*, his intimate friend, Married; ſhe living incontinently, one told *Stilpo* ſhe was a diſhonour to him: *No more*, ſaith he, *than I am an honour to her.*

*Ptolemtus Soter* much eſteemed him, and when he took poſſeſſion of *Megara* by conqueſt, gave him mony, and invited him along with him to *Egypt*: Of the mony he took a little, but abſolutely refuſed the journey: Going to *Ægina*, he ſtayed there, till *Ptolomy's* return. *Demetrius* Son of *Antigonus*, upon the taking of *Megara*, gave order, that his houſe might be preſerved, and whatſoever belong'd to him reſtored; and bidding him give them an inventory of ſuch things as he had loſt, he ſaid, that he had loſt nothing that belonged to him, for none had taken away his learning; his learning and knowledge were both left.

With *Demetrius* he diſputed of Humanity ſo efficaciouſly, that he became a ſtudious Auditor of him.

Concerning *Minerva's* Statue, carved by *Phidias*, he asked a Man, whether *Minerva* Daughter of *Jove* were a God; He affirmed ſhe was: But this, ſaith he, is not of *Jove*, but of *Phidias*; to which the other aſſented: Then, ſaith he, ſhe is not a God. Hereupon being cited to the Court of *Areopagus*, he denyed it not, but juſtified it, averring ſhe was not a God, but a Goddeſs: But, the *Areopagites* nothing ſatisfied with this evaſion, ordered that he ſhould depart the City. Hereupon *Theodorus* ſirnamed θεὸς, ſaid in deriſion, How came *Stilpo* to know this, did he put aſide

ſide her vail, and look upon her breaſt? *Theodorus* was bold of ſpeech; but *Stilpo* reſerved, in ſo much, as being demanded by *Crates*, whether the Gods delighted in bent knees and prayers: Thou fool, ſaith he, do not queſtion me in publick, but when we are alone together.

He was ſincere and plain, void of all artifice. *Crates*, the *Cynick*, not anſwering him, but ἀναισχυντοτατος, I knew, ſaith he, you would ſpeak any thing rather than that which is decent.

*Crates* in propounding a queſtion delivered a fig to him, which he took and eat: *Crates* preſently cryed out, that he had loſt his fig: Yes, ſaith he, and your queſtion alſo, of which that was in earneſt.

Seeing *Crates* half frozen in cold weather, *Crates*, ſaith he, *methinks you want* ἱματιον καινον, (which one way implies *a new garment*, another way *both a garment and wit*) *Crates* aſhamed, anſwered thus.

Stilpo *at* Megara *I ſaw oppreſt,*
*Where vaſt* Typhœus *lies with weight oppreſt.*
*To hear him wrangle, many Scholars came;*
*Fair truth to chace away was all their aim.*

At *Athens* he wrought ſo much upon the people, that they would run out of their ſhops to ſee him: *They wonder at thee* Stilpo (ſaid one to him) *as a Monſter*: *No*, ſaith he, *but as a true Man.*

As he was ſpeaking with *Crates*, in the midſt of their diſcourſe he went away to buy Fiſh; *Crates* purſued him, crying out, that he gave over the diſcourſe: *No*, ſaith he, *I carry along the diſcourſe with me; but, I leave you, the diſcourſe will ſtay, the Fiſh muſt be bought.*

Stob. Being asked, what is harder than a ſtone, he anſwered, *a Fool.*

## CHAP. II.

### *His Philoſophy.*

* Laert. * HE was Maſter of the *Megarick* School, excellent in *Eriſtick* Diſputes, by his ſubtle Tenents and Diſcourſes beautifying himſelf, his Country and friends.

He took away all Species (Univerſals) affirming, that he who ſaith, a Man, denotes not any Man, the Term being not proper to this or that perſon, for why to one rather than to another, therefore not to this; and again, that which we ſee is not an Herb, for an Herb was many years ago, Therefore this was not an Herb.

† Plut. † He likewiſe denyed one thing to be prædicated of another, arguing thus; *If running be prædicated of an Horſe, the ſubject is not the ſame with the prædicate; the definition of Man is one thing, that of good another, ſo an horſe is a differing thing from running, for upon Demand, we give ſeveral Definitions of each; for if a Man, and good, or a Horſe, and running were the ſame, how could good be prædicated of Food or Phyſick, and running of a horſe, which are things ſo different.* Thus he admitted no conjunction with the ſubject, in things which are in a ſubject, or prædicated of a ſubject, but conceived that both theſe, unleſs they be the very ſame with the ſubject, cannot be prædicated of it, even not as an Accident. This, though it were one of thoſe little ſayings which *Stilpo* ſportively uſed to caſt out amongſt the Sophiſters, *Colotes* the Epicurean oppoſed ſo eagerly, that he framed a large diſcourſe againſt *Stilpo*, grounded only upon this aſſertion, (which yet he neither refelled nor reſolved) affirming that by holding one thing is not prædicated of another, he takes away good life; *But* that *Stilpo* (ſaith *Plutarch*) *was offended only at ſome words, and oppoſed the manner of ſpeaking, but took not away the courſe of Life, or aboliſhed things, is moſt evident.*

* He aſſerted the chief good to be a mind not ſubject to paſſion. * *Senec. Epiſt. 9.*

## CHAP. III.

### *His Diſciples.*

† Laert. † HE ſo far exceeded others in fluent diſcourſe and learning, that he converted almoſt all *Greece* to the *Megarick* Sect. *Philippus* of *Megara* ſaith, he drew

*Metrodorus* ſirnamed the *Theoretick*, and *Timagoras* the *Geloan*, from *Theophraſtus.*

*Clitarchus* and *Simmias* from *Ariſtotle* the *Cyrenaan.*

Of Dialecticks, *Peonius*, from *Ariſtides.*

*Diphilus* Son of *Euphantus*, and *Myrmex* Son of *Exenetus* coming to diſpute againſt him, became both followers of him: Thus far *Philippus*: he likewiſe attracted

*Phæſidemus* the *Peripatetick*, excellent in Natural Philoſophy.

*Alcimus*, the moſt eminent Oratour at that time in *Greece.*

*Zeno* the *Phœnician*, an Epicurean Philoſopher.

*Crates*, and others; in a word, whomſoever he would himſelf.

*Heraclides* ſaith, that *Zeno* the *Citiean* founder of the Stoical Sect was his Diſciple.

## CHAP. IV.

### *His Death, Writings.*

*Hermippus* affirmeth that he died of age; but drank a draught of Wine to haſten his end.

*Suidas* ſaith, he wrote 20. Dialogues; *Laertius* but nine; and thoſe not very efficacious; their Titles theſe

*Moſchus,*
*Ariſtippus* or *Callias,*
*Ptolemæus,*
*Cherecrates,*
*Mitrocles,*
*Anaximenes,*
*Epigenes,*
*To his Daughter,*
*Ariſtotle.*

He had a Son named *Dryſo*, a Philoſopher alſo.

THE

# THE ELEACK & ERETRIACK SECTS.

## PHÆDO.

* Laert. * THE *Eleack* Sect was instituted by *Phædo*, an *Elean* of a noble Family; It chanced that he was taken by Thieves or *Pirates*, and sold to a House of common dishoneſt resort; where being forced to sit at the door, he was observed by *Socrates* in passing, who noting the ingenuity of his countenance (which was extraordinary) perswaded (as *Laertius* saith) *Alcibiades* or *Plato*, or (as *A. Gellius*,) *Cebes* to buy him, from which time he addicted himself diligently to Philosophy, and was a constant Disciple of *Socrates*; so much affected by *Plato*, that he called that most excellent discourse of the immortality of the Soul, after him, *Phædo*.

He instituted a Sect called from him *Eleack*; The Dialogues ascribed to him were

*Zopyrus*,
*Medus*,
*Simon*,
*Antimachus*, or *the old Man*,
*Nicias*,
*Simmias*,
*Alcibiades*,
*Critolaus*.

† *Panætius* doubts whether any of these were written by *Phædo*; *Medus* is by some ascribed to *Æschines*, by others to *Polianus*; as are also *Antimachus* and the *Scythian* discourses. † Laert. in Æsch.

## PLISTHENES.

* Laert. * THE *Eleack* Sect was continued by *Plisthenes* an *Elean* successour to *Phædo*; *Plisthenes* was succeeded by *Menedemus* and *Asclepiades*.

## MENEDEMUS.

### CHAP. I.

*His Country, Parents, Teachers.*

† Laert. † *Menedemus* was one of those Philosophers that continued the School of *Phædo*, which hitherto was called *Eleack*, but from *Menedemus* was termed *Eretriack*: he was an *Eretrian*, Son of *Clisthenes*; *Clisthenes* was of the Family of the *Theopropidæ*; yet though noble by descent, *Mechanick* by profession and indigent; some affirm he was a maker of Tents (*Hesychius Illustris* terms him an Architect) adding that he taught both Arts to his Son *Menedemus*, so that when *Menedemus* wrote a decree, *an Alexinian* Philosopher reproved him, saying, *It becomes not a wise Man to frame both Tents and decrees.*

*Menedemus* being sent by the *Eretrians* with a command of Souldiers, to *Megara*, went from thence to *Athens* to hear *Plato* at the Academy, with whom he was so taken, that he gave over his Military employment.

By *Asclepiades* a *Phlyasian*, his intimate friend, he was carried to *Stilpo* at *Megara*, whom they both heard; Thence taking a journey to *Elis*, they met with *Anchypillus* and *Moschus*, who belonged to the School of *Phædo*.

Some

Some affirm he deſpiſed *Plato* and *Xenocrates*, and *Parabates* the *Cyrenæan*; but admired *Stilpo*, concerning whom being demanded his opinion, he only anſwered that *he was free.*

## CHAP. II.

### *His School and Philoſophy.*

* *Laert.*

* BEing returned home to *Eretria*, he ſet up a School, and taught Philoſophy there: the *Eliack* School being thus transfer'd to *Eretria*, was from thenceforward called *Eretriack.*

In his School there was no order of place, no ſeats round about it; but, as every Man chanced to be ſitting, or ſtanding, or walking, in the ſame poſtures they heard him.

He held, that *there was but one vertue and good*, reprehending thoſe who aſſerted more; whence of one who held there were many Gods, he demanded ironically *how many?* and *whether he thought there were more than a hundred?*

He was of a verſatile wit, and in compoſure of his ſpeech a difficult adverſary; he turned himſelf every way, and found ſomething to ſay for every thing: He was very litigious, as *Antiſthenes* in his ſucceſſions affirms, and uſed this queſtion, *What is not the ſame, is different from that with which it is not the ſame?* Yes. *To benefit is not the ſame with good, therefore good doth not benefit.* He took away *negative propoſitions*, leaving only the *affirmative*; and of theſe he admitted the ſimple only; but rejected thoſe which were *not ſimple*, calling them *conjoyned* and *complex.*

*Heraclides* ſaith, he was a *Platonick*, and derided *Dialectick. Hexinus* asking, whether he had given over beating his Father; *I neither did beat him*, ſaith he, *nor have given over.* The other replyed, *Either ſay yes or no, to diſſolve the ambiguity. It is ridiculous*, ſaith he, *to follow your Laws, when a Man may withſtand them in the very entrance.*

He writ not, or compoſed any thing, becauſe (ſaith *Antigonus Caryſtius*) he was of no certain opinion; yet, in diſpute he was ſo vehement, that he many times went away with black and blue eyes.

## CHAP. III.

### *His manner of living*

† *Laert.*

† HE contracted a ſtrict friendſhip with *Aſclepiades*, nothing inferiour to that of *Pilades* to *Oreſtes*: *Aſclepiades* was the elder, whence there went a common ſaying, that he was the Poet, *Menedemus* the Player.

* *Athen. Deip.*

* When they were yet both young Philoſophers, and indigent, they were cited to the Court of *Areopagus*, to give account († according to *Solon*'s Law) by what means (ſpending the whole day amongſt Philoſophers without any labour, and having no eſtate) they ſubſiſted, and were in ſo good a condition: They deſired, that one of the Maſters of the common Priſon might be ſent for; who, when he came, atteſted, that they went down every night into the Priſon, where the common malefactors ground, and did their grind, and in pay of their labour, received two drachms: at which the *Areopagites* much wondering, beſtowed as an honourable reward upon them two hundred drachms.

† *See life of Solon.*

They had other Patrons that beſtowed gifts upon them; *Archepolides* gave them three thouſand pieces of Silver; they both contended which ſhould receive laſt, and in concluſion, neither accepted it. The chief perſons that received them were *Hipponicus* a *Macedonian*, and *Ægetor* a *Lamiean*: *Ægetor* gave each of them thirty *Minæ. Hipponicus* gave *Menedemus* two thouſand drachms towards the marriage of his Daughters, which, as *Heraclides* ſaith, were three, by his Wife *Oropia.*

For *Aſclepiades* and *Menedemus* took each of them a Wife; *Aſclepiades* married the Daughter, *Menedemus* the Mother: *Aſclepiades*, his Wife dying, took the Wife of *Mendemus*: *Menedemus* being made a chief Magiſtrate, married a rich Wife; notwithſtanding, he allowed his firſt Wife an equal intereſt in the government of the Houſe. *Aſclepiades* having lived with *Menedemus* in great plenty; yet, with great temperance, died old at *Eretria.* At that time, one, whom *Aſclepiades* much loved, coming late at night, intending to have feaſted with him, the ſervants ſhut him out of doors: but, *Menedemus* bad them let him in, ſaying, *Aſclepiades* would admit him even under ground.

*Menedemus* was much given to entertainments, and, becauſe the Country was unwholeſome, made many Feaſts: what order he obſerved therein is thus delivered by *Antigonus Caryſtius*, and out of him (though not cited) by *Laertius.* He dined but with one or two companions at the moſt; if any came to him, they were admitted after dinner was ended; if they came ſooner than the ſet time, they walked ſhort turns before the door, and demanded of the Servants what courſe was carried in; if they told them fiſh-broth (with which they begun their dinner) they went away; if any fleſh, they went into a room prepared for that purpoſe. In Summer time, *Menedemus* had the Couches or Beds of his Dining room covered with Flags and Ruſhes, in Winter with Sheep-skins. Every gueſt brought a Cuſhion; the Cup they had was no bigger than a large Spoon: inſtead of Sweet-meats they had *Lupines* and Beans: ſometimes ſuch fruit as the ſeaſon afforded; in Summer, Pomgranates, in Spring, Pulſe, in Winter, Figgs. This *Lycophron* the *Chalcidian* confirms in his ſatyrical Comedy upon *Menedemus*, where *Silenus* ſpeaks thus to the Satyres.

*Sons impious of a pious Father, I*
*(You ſee) with your delights and ſports comply:*
*But never by the Gods at ſuch a Feaſt*
*In* Caria, Rhodes, *or* Lydia *was a gueſt.*
*How plentiful!*

And not long after,

*A little pot half full of Water clear,*
*Rated at farthings five a boy did bear*

*To every gueſt; about vile Lupines went,*
*With which the beggars's table's ſcarce content.*

Whilſt they drank (after the feaſt) *Menedemus* propoſed queſtions, and inſtead of a deſert gave them diſcourſe, which excited all to temperance and continence: theſe continued ſometimes till the crowing of the Cock broke them off, much againſt the will of his gueſts, who never thought they had enough of them.

## CHAP. IV.

### *His civil Employments.*

* *Laert.* * HE was firſt contemned by his Countrymen, and called Dog and fool; but at laſt ſo much honoured by them, that they committed the government of the Common-wealth
† *Laert.* to his charge, † and paid him yearly two hundred Talents, whereof he ſent back fifty.

After he applyed himſelf to civil buſineſs, he was ſo thoughtful, that going to put incenſe into a Cenſer, he put it beſides. *Crates* reproaching him for undertaking publick employments, he ſent him to Priſon; whereupon as he chanced to paſs by, *Crates* roſe up and ſaluted him with the title of *Agamemnonian, leader of the City.*

He was ſent Ambaſſadour from the *Eretrians* to *Ptolomy*, and to *Lyſimachus* (much honoured whereſoever he came) and to *Demetrius*,
* *Euſeb.* *all three Kings of *Macedonia*, of whom, *Demetrius* firſt raigned, then *Lyſimachus*, and after him (*Pyrrhus* intervening) *Ptolomy*.

Some accuſed him to *Demetrius*, that he would betray his City to *Ptolomy*, of which charge he acquitted himſelf by an Epiſtle, beginning thus, *Menedemus to King* Demetrius, *health. I hear that you are informed many things concerning us.* &c. adviſing him to take heed of one of thoſe that were his enemies, named *Æſchylus*. When he was on Embaſſy to *Demetrius*, he ſpoke very earneſtly and effectually concerning *Oropus*.

*Antigonus* alſo, King of *Macedonia*, loved him exceedingly, and profeſt himſelf his Diſciple: In his behalf he made a Decree, clear and void of aſſentation, beginning thus; *Foraſmuch as King* Antigonus, *having overcome the Barbarians in fight, returneth into his own Country, having good ſucceſs in all his undertakings: The Senate and people have thought good*, &c.

## CHAP. V.

### *His Vertues and* Apothegms.

MENEDEMUS was of exceeding gravity, for which *Crates* deriding him, ſaid, *Aſclepiad* the *Phliaſian*, and the proud *Eretrian*, and *Timon*.

His ſupercilious bumbaſt ſpeech begins. In ſeverity he was ſo awful, that *Emylocus* being invited by *Antigonus*, together with *Clippides*, a youth of *Cyzicum*, refuſed to go, fearing *Menedemus* ſhould know it.

In reproof he was bitter and bold, of which *Laertius* inſtanceth his ſayings to a young Man over-confident, to *Hierocles*, &c. to an Adulterer boaſting, &c. to a young Man crying, &c.

*Antigonus* asking his advice, whether he ſhould go to a luxurious banquet; not ſpeaking whether he ſhould go or not, he bad him ſend them word, that he was a King's Son.

One who intruded himſelf upon him, and diſcourſed very abſurdly, he asked, if he had a Farm; he anſwered, many: Go then, ſaith he, and look after them, leſt in loſing your ruſticity you loſe them alſo.

To one asking, whether a good Man may take a Wife, he ſaid, Do you think I am good or not? The other aſſenting; but, I (ſaith he) have taken one.

Not able to limit the prodigality of one who invited him to ſupper, he ſilently reproved him, eating nothing but Olives.

This freedom brought him into danger when he was in *Cyprus* with *Nicocreon*, together with his friend *Aſclepiades*; for, the King having invited him with the reſt of the Philoſophers to a Monthly feaſt, *Menedemus* ſaid, this convention if it be good, ought to be every day; if otherwiſe, this day is too much: The Tyrant anſwered, that he had ſet apart that day to converſe with Philoſophers. *Menedemus* perſiſting in his aſſertion, demonſtrated from what he had ſaid of the ſacrifice, that Philoſophers ought to be heard at all times. Whereupon if one of the Muſicians had not helped them to eſcape, they had been put to death, whence the Ship being endangered by a ſtorm, *Aſclepiades* ſaid, that the humanity of the Muſician preſerved them, the roughneſs of *Menedemus* had undone them.

He was negligent, and (as we ſaid) careleſs in every thing that concerned the order of his School; likewiſe high-minded, and covetous of glory: inſomuch that when he and *Aſclepiades* firſt exerciſed the trade of building, *Aſclepiades* was ſeen upon the houſe top carrying clay; but *Menedemus*, if he eſpied any Man paſſing by, hid himſelf.

He was ſomewhat enclined to ſuperſtition; having eaten in a Cooks ſhop the fleſh of ſomething that had died of it ſelf ignorantly with *Aſclepiades*, as ſoon as he knew it, he grew ſick, and looked pale, till *Aſclepiades* reproved him, ſaying, *He was not ſick of the meat, but of phancy.*

In all other reſpects he was a perſon of a great and free Soul, in ſtrength even in his old age equal to thoſe who wraſtled in exerciſe, ſtrong made, ſwarthy of complexion, fat and corpulent; but of indifferent ſtature, as appears (ſaith *Laertius*) by his ſtatue in *Eretria*, in the old Stadium, ſo exactly carved, that it expreſſeth the naked proportion of his limbs.

He loved *Aratus* and *Lycophron* the Tragick Poet, and *Antagoras* the *Rhodian*, but above all he was ſtudious of *Homer*; next of the *Lyricks*; then of *Sophocles*: In *Satyres* he aſſigned the ſecond place to *Achæus*; the firſt to *Æſchylus*, whence to thoſe in the ſtate who defended the contrary part, he ſaid, thus,

*The*

*The ſwift in time outſtript are by the ſlow,*
*A Tortoiſe thus an Eagle may outgo.*

Theſe are verſes of *Achæus:* they therefore are miſtaken, who ſay he read nothing but the *Medea* of *Euripides*, which is put among the Poems of *Neophron* the *Sicyonian.*

Of *Bion*, who ſpoke with much diligence againſt Prophets, he ſaid, *he murdered the dead.*

To one who ſaid, the greateſt good is to enjoy thoſe things which we deſire; *it is a much greater*, ſaith he, *to deſire thoſe things which are fitting.*

He was violent (as we ſaid) in controverſie, but moſt affable in converſation and action: *Alexinus*, whom in diſpute he had often circumvented and bitterly derided, he gratified in deed; taking care for the ſafe conduct of his Wife from *Delphi* to *Chalcis*, the way being much infeſted with Thieves.

He was an excellent friend, as is manifeſt from his affection to *Aſclepiades*, of which we have already ſpoken, only to *Perſæus*, he was conſtantly a profeſt enemy; for it was known that when *Antigonus* for *Menedemus* his ſake would have reſtored the *Eretrians* to their firſt liberty, *Perſæus* withſtood it: whereupon at a Feaſt *Menedemus* openly inveigh'd againſt him, uſing amongſt many others this expreſſion; *He is indeed a Philoſopher, but of all Men that are, were, or ever ſhall be, the moſt wicked.*

## CHAP. VI.

*His departure from* Eretria, *and Death.*

THe friendſhip he held with *Antigonus*, made him ſuſpected by his own Countrymen, as if he meant to betray the City to him; of which being accuſed by *Ariſtodemus*, he fled, and lived a while at *Oropus* in the Temple of *Amphiaraus*: thence ſome golden Cups chancing to be ſtoln, he was by a publick decree of the Beotians forbidden to ſtay there any longer, whereupon he returned privately into his Country, and taking his Wife and Children along with him, went from thence to *Antigonus*, where he died of grief.

But *Heraclides* on the contrary affirmeth, that whilſt he was Præfect of the *Eretrians*, he often defended his Country againſt thoſe who would have made *Demetrius* Tyrant thereof; Neither would he therefore have betray'd it to *Antigonus*; but that was falſly laid to his charge; he afterwards went to *Antigonus*, petitioning that he would reſtore his Country to their liberties; which *Antigonus* denying, he out of grief faſted ſeven days, and ſo died. The ſame relation is delivered by *Antigonus Caryſtius. Heraclides* ſaith, he lived 84. years.

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

## The Fifth Part,

Containing the *Academick* Philoſophers.

PLATO.

### CHAP. I.

*The Country, Parents, and Time of* PLATO.

THE moſt eminent of all the Sects derived from *Socrates* was the *Academick*, ſo called from the *Academy*, a place in *Athens*; where the Profeſſors thereof taught: This Sect was inſtituted by *Plato*, continued by *Speuſippus*, *Xenocrates*, *Polemon*, *Crates*, *Crantor*, thus far called

called the *first or old Academy*. *Arceſilaus*, ſucceeding *Crantor*, inſtituted *the middle Academy*, continued by *Lacydes*, *Telecles*, *Evander*, and *Hegeſinus*. *Carneades* founded the *new Academy*, of which was alſo *Clitomachus*: Some reckon a *fourth Academy*, inſtituted by *Philo* and *Charmidas*: a *fifth* by *Antiochus*.

* *Laert.* * *Plato* was out of doubt an *Athenian*, nor are they to be credited who relate him † a *Theban*, born at *Cynocephalus*; * *Antileon* affirms his Parents to be of *Collyttus*. † He was *born* (according to *Phavorinus*) *in the Iſland* Ægina, *in the Houſe of* Phidiades, *Son of* Thales; *his Father ſent with others thither at the diviſion of the Land* (upon their defection from, and ſubjection by the *Athenians*, at the beginning of the *Peloponneſian* War) *and returned to* Athens, *at what time thoſe* Athenians *were ejected by the* Lacedæmonians, *in aid of the* Æginetæ.

† *Tzetz. Chiliad.* 11. 390. * *Laert.* † *Laert. Suid.*

* *Laert. Apul. Suid.* * He was of an eminent Family; his Father *Ariſto* (Son of *Ariſtoteles*) of the Race of *Codrus*, Son of *Melanthus*, who (as *Thraſylus* affirms) derived themſelves from *Neptune*. *Melanthus* flying *Meſſena*, came to *Athens*, where afterwards by a Stratagem killing *Xanthus*, he was made King after *Thymoetes*, the laſt of the *Theſeidæ*. His Mother *Perictione*, by ſome called *Potone*, whoſe Kindred with *Solon* is thus deſcribed by *Laertius* and † *Proclus*. *Execeſtides* had two Sons, *Solon* and *Dropides*: *Dropides* had *Critias*, mentioned by *Solon* in his Poems.

† *In Timæum.*

*Bid fair-hair'd* Critias *his Sire obſerve*,
*A wandring mind will from his leader ſwerve.*

*Critias* had *Calleſchrus*, *Calleſchrus* had *Critias*, one of the thirty Tyrants, and *Glaucon* (whom *Apuleius* calls *Glaucus*) *Glaucon* had *Charmides* and *Perictione*; *Perictione* by *Ariſto* had *Plato*, the ſixth from *Solon*; *Solon* was deſcended from *Neptune* and *Neleus*, [Father of *Neſtor*.] Thus *Laertius*, from whom *Proclus* diſſents only in that, that he makes *Glaucon* Son of the firſt *Critias*, Brother to *Calleſchrus*, which *Critias* manifeſtly (ſaith he) in *Plat. Charmides* confirms, calling *Glauco* (Father of *Charmides*) his Unkle. Thus was *Plato* deſcended both ways from *Neptune*.

* *Dogm. Pl*

*There are* (ſaith * *Apuleius*) *who aſſert* Plato *of a more ſublime Race*: Ariſtander, *followed by many* Platoniſts, *thinks, he was begotten on his Mother by ſome* Spectrum *in the ſhape of* Apollo: † *Speuſippus* in his Treatiſe, entitl'd *Plato*, or *περὶ δείπνου*, *Clearchus* in his Eulogy of *Plato*; *Anaxilides* in his ſecond Book of Philoſophers; * *Plutarch*, *Suidas*, and others, affirm it to have been commonly reported at *Athens*, that he was the Son of *Apollo*, who appearing in Viſion to her (being a Woman of extraordinary Beauty) * *Perictione ſe miſcuit*, ſhe thereupon conceived: *Ariſto* (her Husband) having often attempted to enjoy her, but in vain; at laſt *Apollo* appearing to him in a Viſion or Dream, and a voice commanding him to refrain the company of his Wife for ten Months, until her delivery were paſt, he forbore; whence *Tyndarus*,

† *Laert.* τῷ δείπνῳ *Anaxilides* φησὶν Πλά *Speuſippus* mentioned Πλάτωνος ἐγκώμιον. * *Sympſ.* † *Apul.* *Plat.*

*He did not iſſue from a mortal Bed*;
*A God his Sire*; *a God-like life he led.*

Some thereupon (as * Saint *Hierom* ſaith) affirmed, he was born of a Virgin, and † it was a common Speech among the *Athenians*, that Phœbus *begat* Æſculapius *and* Plato, *one to cure Bodies, the other Souls.*

* *Adverſ.* † *Laert.*

* *Ariſto* had afterwards by *Perictione*, two Sons, *Adimaretus* and *Glauco*, and a Daughter *Potone*, Mother to *Speuſippus*: Theſe Relations of *Plato* will be more conſpicuous in this Genealogical Table.

* *Laert. Sp*

*Neptune.*




* Apollodor. lib. 3. Schol. Pind.

† Pausan.

* Laert. Proclus.

For the Year of his birth, (to omit the mistakes of *Eusebius*, who placeth it in the fourth Year of the eighty eight Olympiad, in the Archonship of *Stratocles*, and of the *Chronicon Alexandrinum*, that placeth it the year following) *Laertius* saith, *He was born, according to the Chronology of* Apollodorus, *in the eighty eight Olympiad*, which seems to be towards the beginning of the first year, whilst *Aminias* was yet Archon. For *Laertius* elsewhere saith, That *he was six years younger than* Isocrates; for *Isocrates* (saith he) *was born, when* Lysimachus, Plato, *when* Aminias *was Archon, under whom* Pericles *dyed*: in the third year of the *Peloponnesian* War. This *Aminias* is by the* *Scholiast* of *Euripides* called *Ameinon*, by † *Athenæus*, *Epameinon*, by * *Diodorus Siculus*, *Epaminondas*. The various reading occasion'd either by addition or detraction of the Preposition ἐπὶ, but by which of these two cannot easily be evinc'd. † *Salmasius* endeavouring to prove the name to be Ἀμείνων, positively affirms, that the *Greeks* never name an Archon without the Preposition ἐπὶ, but that error * *Petavius* confutes, whose opinion is confirmed by the antient Marble at *Arundell-House*, which addeth not the Preposition to the names of the Archons.

* Agum. Hippol. † Deipn. 5. * Lib.

† Plin. Exercit. p. 157.

* Doctr. temp.

† Deipn. 5.

Neither is the opinion of † *Athenæus* much different, who affirms, *Plato* was *born* (the year before) Apollodorus *being Archon, who succeeded* Euthydemus, who was Archon the third year of the eighty seventh Olympiad, and that *under* Euphemus, *in the fourth year of the ninetieth Olympiad, he was fourteen years old.* For both *Laertius* and *Athenæus* agree in the year of his death, *viz.* the first of the hundred and eight Olympiad, when *Theophilus*, the successor of *Callimachus*, was Archon; *Athenæus* only differeth in this, that, computing eighty two Archons, he attributes so many years to *Plato*'s Life, whereas it is certain, that he lived but exactly eighty one.

The day of his birth, * according to *Apollodorus*, was *the seventh of* Thargelion, *at which time the* Delians *did celebrate the Feast of* Apollo. So likewise *Florus*, cited by † *Plutarch*, who adds, that *the Priests and Prophets call* Apollo ἑβδομαγέτης, *as being born upon this seventh day*; whence perhaps was occasion'd the fiction, that he was Son of *Apollo*, which *Plutarch* esteems no disparagement to his Deity. In the first year of the eighty eight Olympiad, the Neomenia of Hecatombæon fell upon the second of *August*, and (upon those Hypotheses which we laid down formerly in the * Life of *Socrates*) the Dominical Letter for that year being *E.* the seventh of Thargelion will (according to the *Julian* account taken proleptically)

* Laert.

† Sympos. 8. 1.

* Cap. 1.

proleptically) fall upon *Friday*, the thirtieth of *May*; according to the *Gregorian*, upon *Friday* the ninth of *June*, in the year of the *Julian* period, 4286.

This is according to the Faith of the Historians, with whom the Astrologers do not agree; for * *Julius Firmicus* hath erected the Scheme of his Nativity after this manner. * Astron.



*If the Ascendent*, saith he, *shall be* ♒; ♂ ☿ *and* ♀ *therein posited*; *and if* ♆ *then be placed in the seventh, having* ♌ *for his sign, and in the second the* ☉ *in* ♓ *and the* ☾ *in* ♊ *in the fifth House beholding the Ascendent with a* △ *aspect, and* ♄ *in the ninth from the Ascendent in* ♎. *This Geniture renders a Man Interpreter of Divine and heavenly Institutions, who endued with instructive speech, and the power of Divine Wit, and formed in a manner by a celestial Institution, by the true License of disputations shall arrive at all the secrets of Divinity.* Thus *Firmicus*, whose Scheme agreeth not with the other Calculation, as being betwixt the midst of *February* and of *March*, during which time the ☉ is in ♓.

Hence will appear the great Anachronism of those, who affirm, that *Plato* went to *Ægypt*, in the time of the Prophet *Hieremie* (whom *Eusebius* placeth in the thirty sixth Olympiad) and heard him there. *Hieremie* at the captivity of the *Jews* into *Babylon*, was carried by *Johanan* Son of *Caree* into *Ægypt*: The *Jews* were carried away by *Nebuchadnezzar*, at what time *Tarquinius Priscus* Reign'd at *Rome*, *Vaphres* in *Ægypt*, to whom the rest of the *Jews* fled, which was in the forty seventh Olympiad, 160 years before *Plato* was born. This opinion * once held, was afterwards retracted by Saint *Augustine*, in his Book of Retractations, and confuted, *de Civit. Dei*, 8. 11. * De Doctr. Christ. 2. 28.

## CHAP. II.

*His first Education, Exercises, and Studies.*

† Ælian. var. hist. 10. 21. † WHilst *Plato* was yet an Infant carried in the Arms of his Mother *Perictione*, *Ariston* his Father went to *Hymettus* (a Mountain in *Attica* eminent for abundance of Bees and Hony) to sacrifice to the Muses or Nymphs taking his Wife and Child along with him; as they were busied in the Divine Rights, she laid the Child in a Thicket of Myrtles hard by; to whom, as he slept (* *in cunis dormienti*) came a swarm of Bees, Artists of Hymettian Hony, flying and buzzing about him, and (as it is reported) made a Hony-Comb in his Mouth. This was taken for a presage of the singular sweetness of his discourse; his future eloquence foreseen in his Infancy. * Cic. divin. lib. 1.

His Parents (saith † *Alexander*) named him *after his Grand-father*, Aristocles: * Speusippus (*instituted in his Domestick Documents*) *extolleth his sharpness of apprehension, whilst yet a Child, and the admirable modesty of his disposition* († which was such, that he was never, even all those years, seen to laugh immoderately) *affirming, that the beginnings of his youth were season'd with labour and love of Study; which Vertues encreased and met with all the rest; when he came to Man's estate.* † Lart. * Apul. de Plat.

† Of *Dionysius* the Grammarian (mentioned in his ἀντιγραφῇ) he received the first rudiments of Learning. Of *Ariston*, an Argive, he learned the Art of Wrestling (at that time much in esteem, as being one of the Olympick Exercises) whereing he became so great a Proficient, that some affirm, he wrastled at the *Isthmus* in the *Pythian* Games. † Lart.

* As in Years and Vertue, so likewise he encreased extraordinarily in outward proportion and shape, insomuch, that *Ariston* named him *Plato* (which implyeth Latitude) in allusion to the largeness of his person: others say, to the wideness of his Shoulders; *Neanthes* of his Forehead: some, to his large Eloquence. Whatsoever the occasion were, this name wore out and displaced the other. That he was called also *Sarapis*, is affirmed by (*a*) *Hesychius*. There was not any imperfection throughout his person, except a gibbosity in the hinder part of his Head, and (as *Timotheus* affirms) a kind of (*b*) Hesitation in his Speech. * Lart.

(*a*) In voce Σαραπις.

(*b*) Lart. ἰχνοφωνία, which (hesitation) λεπτοφωνία smalness of voice, in which sence it is here taken by the Interpreters and Fiction signifieth an imperfection of speech by stammering: *Arist. Frob.* 11. unless there and here we should read ἰχνοφωνίαν.

He

* Laert. Suid. * He learned alſo (as *Dicearchus* relates) to Paint: he addicted himſelf much to Poetry, and wrote many Poems: Firſt, *Dithyrambs*; then Epick Poetry, which comparing with *Homer*, and finding far ſhort of him, he burned. Then he betook himſelf to writing Tragedies; He made a compleat Tetralogie (four Drama's, as the manner was, when they conteſted, to be preſented at four ſeveral Feſtivals, *Lenæan*, *Panathenæan*, *Chytræan*, the fourth Satyrical) and gave it to the Players to be acted, intending to conteſt for the Palm upon the Olympick Theater: but the day before it ſhould have been preſented, chancing to hear *Socrates* diſcourſe at the Olympick Theater († before the Bacchanals) he was ſo taken with that *Syren*, that he not only forbore to conteſt at that time, but wholly gave over all Tragick Poeſy, and burned all his Poems, ſaying that of *Homer*,

† Ælian. var. Hiſt. 2. 20.

Vulcan *come hither*, Plato *needs thy aid.*

From that time (the twentieth year of his age, which falls about the 4th of the 92 Olympiad) he became a follower of *Socrates*, and ſtudied Philoſophy.

Some affirm (of the truth of which report, *Ælian* juſtly doubts) *he was driven by poverty to betake himſelf to the Wars, but intercepted by* Socrates, *and inſtructed in that which concerns Mankind, he ſold his arms, and through his perſwaſion, addicted himſelf to Philoſophy.*

* Cic. diuin. lib. 1. Var. Hiſt.

That he fought for his Country is certain, expreſs'd in his anſwer to † *Crobylus* the Sycophant: * *Ariſtoxenus* and *Ælian* affirm, he was engaged thrice: *Firſt*, *at* Tanagara; *the ſecond time at* Corinth; *and laſtly at* Delium, *where he fought beſt of all the Souldiers.* Thus *Ariſtoxenus*. But that this is falſe, may be eaſily evinced by computation of times. The firſt fight of the *Athenians* at *Tanagra*, was in the 4th year of the 80th Olympiad, 17 years before *Plato* was born: The ſecond, in the firſt of the 89th when he was but ſix years old. The fight at *Delium*, was in the firſt of the 89th, at what time he was but four years old; from the laſt words of *Ariſtoxenus*, ἵνθα καὶ ἀειστῶσι (implying, that *at* Delium *he had the prize for fighting beſt*) may be conjectured, that this was meant of *Socrates*, who was thrice perſonally engag'd and at * *Delium* ſhould have had the prize for fighting beſt, but that his modeſty procured it to be conferr'd upon *Alcibiades*.

† Laert. Afterwards, p. 11. * Laert. Plat. Var. Hiſt.

* See Socrates life, cap.

## CHAP. III.

*His Maſters in Philoſophy, and his Travels to that end.*

* Apul. dogm. Plat. Laert. Suid. * *Socrates*, the night before *Plato* was recommended to him, dreamed, that a young Swan fled from *Cupid*'s Altar in the Academy, and ſat in his lap, thence flying up to heaven, it delighted both Gods and Men with its Muſick. As *Socrates* [the next day] was relating this to ſome of his Auditors, *Ariſto* came at the ſame time, and preſented his Son *Plato* to him, to be his Diſciple. As ſoon as *Socrates* ſaw him, reading in his looks his ingenuity; Friends, ſaith he, this is the Swan of *Cupid*'s Academy.

Eight years he lived with *Socrates*, in which time, he committed (as others of his Diſciples) the effect of his Maſters diſcourſe to writing: hereof he compoſed Dialogues, but with ſo great additions of his own, that † *Socrates* hearing him recite his *Lyſis*, cry'd out, Oh! *Hercules*, how many things doth this young Man feign of me? For not a few things (adds *Laertius*) of thoſe which he writ, *Socrates* never ſpoke. † Laert.

At the time of *Socrates*'s arraignment, the firſt year of the 95th Olympiad, he was one of the Senate, the youngeſt of that Convention. That he was a Senator, implies he was full thirty years old at that time, according to *Solon*'s Law. This argues * *Hermodorus* of a miſtake, who ſaith, he was twenty eight years old when he fled to *Megara*, upon the death of *Socrates*; and ſubverts the accounts of thoſe who under-reckon his birth. † The Judges being much diſpleas'd at *Socrates*, *Plato* went up into the Oratours Chair, intending to plead in his defence, and began thus; *Though I* (Athenians) *am the youngeſt of thoſe who come up into this place.* But all the Senate crying out *of thoſe who go down*, he was thereupon conſtrained to do ſo. *Socrates* being condemned, *Plato* offer'd him to procure ſo much money as might purchaſe his liberty, but *Socrates* refuſed the offer. * About that time, Socrates *his friends being met together to condole his death*, Plato *encourag'd them, and bid them not deſpair, for that himſelf was capable to govern the School: and in ſo ſaying, drunk to* Apollodorus, *who anſwer'd, he would ſooner take up the cup of poyſon from the hand of* Socrates, *than pledge him upon that condition.* Upon the death of *Socrates*, *Plato* (whoſe exceſſive grief upon that occaſion is obſerved by † *Plutarch* (with others of his Diſciples, fearing the Tyranny of thoſe perſons, who put their Maſter to death, * fled to *Euclid* at *Megara*, who friendly entertained them, till the ſtorm was blown over. * Laert. † Laert. vit. Socr. * Athen. deipn. lib. † De virtute moral. * Laert.

† *Apuleius* ſaith, that before he came to *Socrates*, *he was initiated in the Sect of* Heraclitus. But more likely is that which is affirmed by *Laertius*, that after *Socrates*'s death, he applyed himſelf to *Cratylus*, a follower of *Heraclitus*, and to *Hermogenes*. *He conceived*, ſaith * Saint *Auguſtine*, *that his own invention, and* Socrates's *inſtructions came ſhort of the true aim of Philoſophy: He conſidered with himſelf what courſe he ſhould take to benefit himſelf moſt, for this purpoſe he determined to travel to any place, where report told him he might drink of the ſpring of Learning, even to the fartheſt parts of the Earth, ſaith* † Cicero: * *Firſt*, *to Italy*, where he addicted himſelf to the diſcipline of *Pythagoras*, which, though he ſaw repleniſhed with curious and high reaſon, yet, he chiefly affected to imitate the continence and chaſtity thereof; though the † *Pythagoreans* themſelves affirm he had all his natural Philoſophy from thence. † Dogm. Plat. * De civ. dei. lib. 8. cap. † De finib. 5. * Apul. dogm. Plat. † Porphyr. vit. Pythag.

* Perceiving the knowledge of the *Pythagoreans* to be aſſiſted with other diſciplines, he went to *Cyrene*, to learn Geometry of *Theodorus* the * Apul.

the Mathematician: thence to *Ægypt* (which was then under the Empire of *Artaxerxes Mnemon*) * under pretence of selling Oyl, but the scope of his journey was to fetch Astrology from thence: *To learn Arithmetick and Celestial Speculations of the Barbarians*, (saith † *Cicero*) * and to be instructed in the rites of the Prophets. † *He travelled over the Country, informing himself all the way by their Priests, of the multiplicious proportions of Geometry, and the observation of Celestial motions. At what time the young Students at* Athens *were enquiring for* Plato *to instruct them, he was busied in surveying the inexplicable banks of* Nilus, *the vast extent of a barbarous Country, and the winding compass of their trenches, a Disciple to the* Ægyptian *old Men.* * Having taken a full survey of all the Country; he at last setled himself in the Province of *Sais*, *Learning of the Wise Men there, what they held concerning the Universe, whether it had a beginning, and whether it is moved at present, wholly, or in part, according to Reason.* From these, † *Pausanias* affirms, he learn'd the Immortality of the Soul, which that they held, as likewise the transmigration thereof into several bodies, is affirmed by * *Herodotus*. † Some say, that *Euripides* followed him to *Ægypt*, and falling sick, was cured by the Priests with Sea-water, whereupon he said,

*The Sea doth wash away all ills of Man.*

But this agrees not with the time of his death, which was before that of *Socrates*, *viz.* in the 93th Olympiad.

From *Ægypt* *Plato* returned to *Tarentum* in *Italy*, at what time *L. Camillus* and *P. Claudius* were Consuls at *Rome*, as * *Cicero* affirmeth. What *Fasti* he used, I know not, for in those which are now with us received as authentick, there are no such Consuls during the whole life of *Plato*. And indeed, in those times, *Rome* was, for the most part, govern'd by Tribunes. † Here he conversed with *Eurytus* of *Tarentum*, the Elder; *Archytas* the Elder (at whose discourse concerning Pleasure he was present) and with the rest of the *Pythagoreans*, *Echecrates*, *Timæus*, *Acrio* (corruptly in * *Valerius Maximus*, *Ario*) and *Coetus Locrians*. Thus to the learning of *Socrates* he added that of *Pythagoras*, and informed himself in those things which *Socrates* neglected: He would have gone also to the *Indians*, and to the Magi, but that the Wars which at that time were in *Asia* hindred him.

* *Plut. in Solon.*
† *De finib.* 5.
* *Apul.*
† *Val. Max.* 8. 7.
* *Epist. Socratic.* 26.
† *Messen.*
* *Lib.* 2.
† *Laert.*
† *Cic. Apul.*
* 8. 7.

## CHAP. IV.

*What Authors he follow'd.*

† *Perer. Philos.* 1. 27. & 5. 2.

† Eugubinus affirms, that *Plato* borrow'd the mystick part of his Philosophy from *Hermes Trismegistus*; particularly, that concerning the Divine Goodness: which, I suppose, he rather asserts from his own conjecture, in regard *Plato* had been long in *Ægypt*, than from any good Authority. He was induced thereunto by those Books, which are now commonly, but falsely, vented under the name of *Hermes Trismegistus*; whereas, the learned *Casaubon*, in his * Exercitations upon *Baronius*, hath sufficiently taught us the forgery of those Books, which seem by some Impostor, to have been compiled out of the works of *Plato*, and the Divine Scripture.

That *Plato* received some light from *Moses*, is affirmed with much greater Authorities of several Nations and Religions: Of *Jews* by † *Aristobulus*, Plato (saith he) *followed our Law in many things, his various allegations evince him a curious observer thereof: for the Volumes of* Moses *were translated before* Alexander's *time.* And * *Josephus*, Plato *chiefly followed our Law-giver.* Of *Philosophers*, by † Numenius, *What is* Plato, (saith he) *but* Moses *speaking Greek?* Of *Fathers*, by † *Justine Martyr*, * *Clement* Alexandrinus, * Eusebius, Theodoret, † Saint *Augustine*, &c.

* When *Plato* went to *Sicily*, he bought the Books of *Philolaus*, a *Pythagorean*, which were three, *of Natural Philosophy*, the first that ever were published out of that School: Some say, he had them of *Dionysius*'s friends, for four *Alexandrian Mina*: Others, that *Dionysius* had them of a young Man, one of *Philolaus*'s Disciples, and gave them to *Plato*. Others, that he sent to *Dion* at *Syracuse* to buy them for him, which he did for 100 *Mina*: * *A. Gellius* saith, ten thousand Denaries: For, having received of *Dionysius* above eighty Talents, he was very full of Mony, Out of these, he is said (as *A. Gellius* and *Laertius* affirm) to have taken a great part of his *Timæus*; for which derided by *Timon*, (*in Sillis*) thus:

*You* (Plato) *with the same affections caught,*
*With a great Summ a little Treatise bought,*
*Where all the knowledge, which you own, was taught.*

† *Alcimus* in his four Books to *Amintas*, affirms, that *Plato* borrow'd much from the writings of *Epicharmus*, the Comick Poet, in the first Book he hath these words: *In Sensibles* (saith *Plato*) *neither magnitude nor quality is permanent, but in continual fluxion and mutation; as if we should substract number from them, which are neither equal, nor certain, nor quantitative, nor qualitative; these are they where generation is always, their essence never. To Insensibles nothing can be added, nothing taken away. This is the nature of Eternal Beings, the like and same ever.* Thus *Plato* cited by *Alcimus*. Indeed, he teacheth this in many places, particularly in *Timæo*, where he at large explaineth what is that which never is, and never had beginning, and that which hath beginning but no being. He concludes the first comprehensible, by the Intellect with Reason, the other by sence and opinion. But the citation of *Alcimus* seems to refer to *Plato*'s *Theætetus*, the subject of which Dialogue is *Science*: there he examines some Definitions of Science by the Antients, amongst the rest, the assertion of *Protagoras*, that *Science is sence*; against which he disputes largely, the sum this: That the Soul apprehends some things by mediation of the Body, others without; of the first kind are things *warm, light, dry, sweet*, &c. of the other, *Essence and not being, similitude and dissimilitude, identity and diversity, unite and number*:

* *Exercit. num.* 18.
† *Euseb. præp. Evang.*
* *Contra Apion. lib.* 2.
† *Clem. Alex. Strom.* 1.
* *Paræn.*
† *Strom.*
* *Præpar. Evan. lib.*
† *Cic. De.* 8. 11.
* *Lact.* gain in *Philolao.*
* 3. 17.
† *Lact.*

ber: Hence it follows, that Sence apprehends not Essences, and consequently not Truths, for Essence and Truth are convertible. This assertion of *Plato* * *Alcimus* deduceth from *Epicharmus*, who (saith he) *hath plainly spoken of things subject to Sence and Reason, in these words:*

* Laert.

*Gods always were, to be, desisted never,*
*Like them Eternal, still the same persever.*
*Chaos the first begotten Deitie*
*Is stil'd: of something how can nothing be?*
*Thence nor the first nor second nothings are,*
*How we esteem of those we thus declare:*
*If we an even or uneven summ*
*Alter, by adding or substracting one,*
*Seems it to you the same? to me not so;*
*If a continu'd measure shrink or grow,*
*It is not the same measure: such the lives*
*Of Men are, one decayes, another thrives;*
*That Nature, which new being ever takes*
*Is different from the being it forsakes,*
*Not yesterday the same were I and you,*
*Nor shall to morrow be what we are now.*

† Laert. † Again, *Alcimus, The wise say, that the Soul apprehends some things by mediation of the body, as when she hears or sees; others, she conceiveth within her self, without using the body, whence of beings, some are subject to sence, others, comprehensible by the Intellect. Therefore* Plato *saith, that they who desire to know the principles of the Universe, must first distinguish the Ideas in themselves,* as similitude, unity, multitude, magnitude, restauration. *Secondly, add in it self,* honest, good, just, and the like; *thirdly, examines what Idea's cohere mutually with one another, as Science, Magnitude, Power: and withal, to think that those who are amongst us, because they participate of them, should be called by the same name, as for instance, just things are those which participate of Just, Honest, which of honest: one of every Species is eternal, perceptible by the mind, and consequently free from perturbation. Wherefore, he asserts Idea's in nature as Exemplars, after whose likeness other things are made.* Thus *Alcimus*; the first part whereof seems to be taken out of *Plato's Theetetus*, the latter out of his *Parmenides*. The words of *Epicharmus* concerning Gods and Idea's, to which *Alcimus* refers this of *Plato*, are these:

*Is Musick then a thing? It is; the Man*
*Musick? no: what then? a Musician*
*A Man or not? he is the same of good,*
*Good from the thing a part is understood:*
*Whoever learns good by that art is made,*
*Who Musick a Musitian: of each trade,*
*As dancing, weaving, and the like the same,*
*The Art and Artist have a different name.*

* Laert. * Again, *Alcimus: Plato in his opinion of Idea's saith thus; if there is memory, there must be also Idea's; for memory is of a quiet permanent thing, but nothing is permanent except Idea's, for how,* saith he, *could living creatures be preserved unless by their Idea and receiving a natural mind? Now they remember Similitude and their nourishment: showing that all Creatures have an innate understanding of their own similitude, and therefore perceive things belonging to their kind.* Thus *Alcimus*: What place of *Plato* he means I know not, † *Scaliger* reads, Πλάτων ἐν τῇ περὶ ἰδεῶν ὑποτίθεται φησὶν ἔτι δεῖ, τὰς ἰδέας, &c. omitting μήμη, as if he made a doubt whether that both of the opinions of Idea's were *Plato's*; but I rather think *Alcimus* meant not the title of any Book, having named none in the rest of his citations, but what himself abstracts out of *Plato's* opinion concerning Idea's. *Plato in Phiedo*, teacheth this concerning memory, that sence is a motion common to the Soul and Body; this suffering from external Senses, the other acting and dijudicating; that memory is a conservatory or repository of the Senses. For the Soul, as oft as she in her self, or by assistance of the Body, calls to mind what she hath suffer'd, she is said to remember. To *Plato's* assertion, *Alcimus* applyeth this of *Epicharmus*:

† *In Arist. de animal.*

Eumæus *Wisdome's not to one confin'd;*
*Various in every living knowing mind.*
*The Hen first doth not living things beget,*
*But sits and hatcheth with enliv'ning heat:*
*This Wisdom only Nature's friend discerns,*
*Of whom (her Mistress) she this lesson learns.*

And again,

*This is not strange, for every thing we find*
*Is to its proper species most enclin'd;*
*To Dogs a Bitch seems fairest, and to kine*
*A Bull, an Ass to Asses, Swine to Swine.*

These things *Laertius* cites out of *Alcimus*, adding that *there are more of the same kind in those four Books, whereby he intimates the help that* Plato *receiv'd by the writings of* Epicharmus; *neither was* Epicharmus *himself ignorant of his own Wisdom, as may be collected from these Verses, predicting that he should have a follower:*

*This I assert, and what I now maintain,*
*Shall Monuments to future times remain,*
*Some one hereafter will my verse review,*
*And cloathing it in language rich and new*
*Invincible himself, others subdue.*

* Laert. * Moreover *Phavorinus* alledgeth the whole form of *Plato's* Common-wealth in *Protagoras's* Antilogicks, others say, he borrowed his Politicks from *Socrates*.

† Laert. † Lastly, it is related, that much of *Plato's* morality was in the Books of *Sophron* the Minograph, which having been long neglected, were by him first brought to *Athens*, and were found lying under his head, when he was dead.

## CHAP. V.

### *His School.*

* Laert. * BEing return'd to *Athens* from his Journey to *Ægypt*, he setled himself in the Academy, a *Gymnasium* or place of Exercise in the Suburbs of that City, beset with woods, taking name from *Ecademus* one of the Hero's, as *Eupolis*.

*In sacred* Hecademus *shady walks.*

And *Timon*,

*The fluent sweet-tongu'd Sage first led the way,*
*Who writes as smoothly as from some green spray*
*Of* Hecademe, *Grashoppers chirp their lay.*

Hence it was first called Ecademy, the occasion of his living here, was, that he was poor and had nothing but one Orchard in or adjoyning to the Academy, which was the least part of his Successours. This Orchard at first yielded but three *aurei nummi* of yearly rent to the Owners, afterwards the whole Revenue amounted to a thousand or more. It was in process of time much enlarged by well-willers, and studious persons, who dying, bequeathed by will something to the Professours of Philosophy, their riches to maintain the quiet and tranquillity of a Philosophical life. *Plato* (the Academy being said to be a sickly place, and Physicians advising him to transfer his School to the *Lyceum*) would not be perswaded, but answered, I would not live on the top of *Athos* to linger my life. The unwholesomeness of the place brought him to a Quartan Ague, which lasted eighteen months, but at length by sobriety and care he master'd it, and recover'd his strength more perfect than before.

First, he taught Philosophy in the Academy, and after in the Gardens of *Colonus*. At the entrance of his School in the Academy was written, LET NONE IGNORANT OF GEOMETRY ENTER HERE, meant, not only of the measure and proportion of lines, but also of the inward Affections.

## CHAP. VI.

*How he instituted a Sect.*

HAving thus setled himself in the Academy, he began out of the Collection he had made from others, and his own invention to institute a Sect, called from the place where he taught, *Academick*. * He mixed the *Heraclitian* discourses, with the *Socratick* and *Pythagorick*, following in Sensibles *Heraclitus*, in Intelligibles *Pythagoras*, in Politicks *Socrates*. *Whereas Philosophy*, saith. † S. Augustine, *concerns either action or contemplation* (*thence assuming two names, Contemplative and Active*) *the Active consisting in practice of moral Actions, the Contemplative, in penetration of abstruse Physical causes, and the nature of the Divinity*; Socrates *excelled in the Active*, Pythagoras *in the Contemplative. But* Plato *joyn'd them into one perfect kind, which he subdivided into three several parts*; *Moral, consisting chiefly in Action, Natural in Contemplation, Rational in Distinction of true and false, which though useful in both the other, yet belongeth more particularly to Contemplation. So that this* Trichotomy *contradicts not the other* Dichotomy, *which includeth all within Action and Contemplation.* * And as of old in a Tragedy, the *Chorus* acted alone, then *Thespis* making some intermissions of the *Chorus* introduc'd one Actor, *Æschylus* a second, *Sophocles* a Third: in like manner Philosophy was at first but of one kind, Physick, then *Socrates* added *Ethick*, thirdly, *Plato* inventing *Dialectick*, made it perfect.

* *Laert.*

† *De Civit. dei. lib.* 8.

* *Laert.*

Of these three parts as they were held by *Plato*, and the rest of the old Academy, we cannot have a general better accompt than this of † *Cicero*.

† *Acad. qu.* l.

### Sect. 1. *Ethick.*

*The first, concerning well living they sought in Nature, affirming that she ought to be obeyed: and that in nothing else but Nature was to be had that chief good whereto all things should be referr'd, that the ultimate being of desirable things, and end of all good in the mind, body and life were acquir'd by Nature. Those of the body they placed in the whole, and in the parts: Health, Strength, Beauty in the whole, in the parts, sound Sense, and a certain Excellence of particular parts, as in the feet swiftness, strength in the hands, clearness in the voice; in the Tongue, plainness of expression. Of the mind were those which are proper to comprehend the power of wit, which they divided into Nature and Manners. To Nature they ascribed quickness of apprehension, and memory both proper to the mind and wit; To manners belonged study and a kind of wisdom formed partly by continual exercise, partly by reason, in which consisted Philosophy it self, wherein that is begun and not perfected, is called progression to vertue, what is perfected, Virtue; perfection of Nature of all things in the mind, the most excellent. Thus of Minds: The Adjuncts of life, that was the third, they asserted such things as conduced to the practice of Vertue.*

### Sect. 2. *Physick.*

*Of Nature* (*for that was next*) *they so treated as to divide it into two things: One the efficient, the other giving it self to this, that, thereof might be made something. In that they conceived to be a power, in this a certain matter to be effected: in both, matter could not cohere, unless contained by some power, nor the power without some matter, for there is nothing which is not enforced to be some where: That which consists of both, they called Body and Quality: Of Qualities, some are primary, others arising from these: the primary are uniform and simple; those which arise from these are various, and as it were multiform. Air, Fire, Water, and Earth are Primary, of these arise forms of living Creatures, and of those, things which are made of the Earth. These principles are called Elements, of which Air and Fire have a faculty to move and effect; the other parts, Water and Earth to suffer. To all these there is subjected a certain matter without form, destitute of quality, out of which all things are expressed and formed: It is capable of admitting all; and of changing all manner of ways, in the whole, and in every part: This resolves nothing to nothing, but into its own parts, which are divisible into infinite, there being in nature no least which cannot be divided. Those which are moved, are all moved by intervals, which intervals likewise may be divided infinitely, and that power which we call quality, being moved and agitated every way, they conceive the whole matter to be throughly changed, and by that means those things, which they call qualitative,*

to

*to be produced, of which, in all coherent nature continued with all its parts, was effected the World, beyond which there is not any part of matter or body: The parts of the World are all things therein, kept together by a Senſitive nature, wherein is likewiſe perfect reaſon; It is alſo ſempiternal, for there is nothing more ſtrong whereby it may be diſſolved: This power they call the Soul of the World, God, a certain providence over all things ſubjected to him, regarding in the firſt place heavenly things, next on the Earth thoſe things which appertain to Man. The ſame they ſometimes call Neceſſity, becauſe nothing can be otherwiſe than is by him ordained; a fatal immutable continuation of eternal order; ſometimes Fortune, as producing many things not foreſeen or expected by us, by reaſon of the obſcurity and our ignorance of the Cauſes.*

### Sect. 3. *Dialectick.*

*Of the third part of Philoſophy, conſiſting in reaſon and diſſertation, they treated thus. Though Judgment ariſe from the Senſe, yet the Judgment of truth is not in the Senſes. The mind they affirmed to be Judge of things, conceiving her only fit to be credited, becauſe ſhe alone ſeeth that which is ſimple, and uniform, and certain; This they called Idea. All ſenſe they conceived to be obtuſe and ſlow, and no way able to perceive thoſe things which ſeem ſubject to ſenſe, which are ſo little, as that they cannot fall under ſenſe, ſo moveable and various, that nothing is one, conſtant, nor the ſame, becauſe all things are in continual alteration and fluxion. All this part of things, they called Opinative; Science they affirmed to be no where but in the Reaſons and Notions of mind, whence they approved definitions of things, and applyed them to all whereon they diſcourſed. They approved likewiſe explications of words by Etymologies: They uſed Arguments and marks for things, to prove and conclude what they meant to explain; In this conſiſted all the diſcipline of Dialectick, that is, of Speech concluded by Reaſon.*

This accompt in general *Cicero* gives of the old Academy; *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, *Apuleius*, and others have made collections more particular; we ſhall make choice of that of *Alcinous*, as moſt full and perfect, which by reaſon of the length is referred as an Appendix to *Plato's* life.

## CHAP. VII.

### *His Inventions.*

HE added much to learning and language by many inventions, as well of things as of words. To omit *Dialectick*, of which we treated laſt, * *Phavorinus* attributes to his invention, *diſcourſing by way of a Queſtion*; but *Ariſtotle* aſcribes it to *Alexamenus*, *a Styrian* or *Teian*, and it appears by the Dialogues of *Plato*, that *Socrates* alſo uſed that form of arguing. *Laertius* informs us, that *Zeno Eleates was the firſt compoſer of Dialogues; yet in my opinion*, ſaith he, *Plato hath ſo much refined the form thereof, that he deſerves to be preferr'd before all others, as well for invention as reformation.*

More properly may be attributed to him the invention of † *Analytical Method, which reduceth the thing ſought unto its principle, the beſt of Methods.* He taught it to *Leodamas*, and by it found out many things in Geometry: *Analyſis*, as defined by the * Scholiaſt upon *Euclid*, is *a ſumption of the thing ſought, by the conſequents, (as if it were already known) to find out the truth.* Examples thereof we find in the five firſt propoſitions of the 13th Book of *Euclid*, beſides ſeveral others, that occurr in *Apollonius Pergæus*, and *Pappus Alexandrinus*.

Amongſt his Geometrical Inventions alſo muſt be remembred *the duplication of a Cube*, the occaſion and manner whereof is related by † *Plutarch* and * *Philoponus*. The *Delians* afflicted with the Peſtilence, conſulted the Oracle of *Apollo*; he anſwer'd, the Plague would ceaſe if they doubled their Altar, which was of a Cubick figure. *Plutarch* ſaith, that hereupon the Overſeers of the Altar, made all the four ſides double to what they were before, and ſo inſtead of doubling the Altar, they made it octuple to what it was. *Philoponus* ſaith, they cauſed another Cube of the ſame bigneſs with the former to be ſet upon it, whereby they changed the figure of the Altar, which was no longer a Cube, but Δόκις, *a quadrilateral Pillar.* The firſt way it was Cubical, but not double; the ſecond way double, but not Cubical. The Plague not ceaſing, they conſulted the Oracle again. *Apollo* anſwer'd, they had not fulfilled his Command, which was to build a Cubical Altar as big again as the former. Hereupon they went to *Plato*, as moſt skilful in Geometry, to learn of him the Oracle's meaning, and how they ſhould find out the way of doubling a Cube, retaining the Cubick figure. *Plato* anſwered, that the God mocked the *Grecians* for their neglect of Philoſophy and Learning, inſulting over their ignorance, that he commanded them ſeriouſly to addict themſelves to Geometry, that this could not be done any other way, than by finding out two mean proportionals between two right lines in a Duple proportion (*Plato's* particular method is delivered by *Eutochius* in his comment upon the firſt propoſition of the ſecond Book of *Archimedes de Sphæra & Cylindro.*) He added that *Exodxus* the *Gnidian*, or *Helico* the *Cizycene* would do it for them, That the God needed not this duplication of his Altar, but commanded all the *Grecians*, that avoiding War and the miſeries wherewith it is attended, they ſhould apply themſelves to the Muſes; and having ſetled the turbulent commotions of their minds, converſe harmleſsly and beneficially with one another. *Philoponus* adds, that *Plato expounded this Problem to his Diſciples, who writ much upon this ſubject, though nothing thereof be extant.* Of the Antients, labour'd in this Problem beſides *Plato*, *Archytas* the *Tarentine*, *Menechmus*, *Eratoſthenes*, *Philo* of *Byzantium*, *Hero*, *Apollonius Pergæus*; *Nicomedes*, *Diocles* and *Sporus*: † *Valerius Maximus* ſaith, that *Plato remitted the Overſeers of the ſacred Altar to* Euclid *the Geometrician, as ſubmitting to his Science and Profeſſion*; but this is an Errour, becauſe *Euclid* the Geometrician was much later than *Plato*, and the other *Euclid*, *Plato's* contemporary, nothing eminent in Mathematicks, as

† *Acad. quæſt.* 1.

* *Laert.*

† *Laert. Procl. in Euclid. lib.* 3.

* *Lib.* 13.

† *de ei delph.*

* *In Anal. poſt. lib.* 1. *cap.* 7.

† 8. 13.

hath been before me obſerved by * Sir *Henry Savile*.

That *Plato* invented many other things in the Mathematicks, (more than appears from thoſe writings of his that are extant) and was moſt eminent therein, may be argued from the three Books of *Theon Smyrnæus*, the firſt *Arithmetick*, the ſecond *Harmonicks*, the laſt, (not yet publiſh'd) *Aſtronomy*. Thoſe Books contained many things, ſingular and choice, not to be met elſewhere. The deſign is acknowledg'd by the Author, to be as an introduction neceſſary to the underſtanding of *Plato*'s writings.

There are alſo divers words of which he is eſteemed to be the firſt Author, as † *Antipodes*, a word by him firſt introduced into Philoſophy, to ſignifie thoſe People whoſe feet are diametrically oppoſite.

* Στοιχεῖον, *Element*, until his time was confounded with ἀρχὴ, *Principle*, by all Philoſophers from *Thales*. *Plato* diſtinguiſh'd them thus, Ἀρχὴ, *Principle*, is that which hath nothing before it whereof it might be generated; στοιχεῖα, *Elements*, are compounded.

† The word *Poem* alſo, though ſince very trivial, was not uſed by any before him.

* He firſt uſed this term, τὸ ἑτερομηκὲς ἢ προμηκὲς, *oblong number*, [*in Theæteto*] thereby ſignifying the product of a greater number multiplyed by a leſſer.

† He alſo firſt introduced the word Ἐπιφάνεια, Superficies, for which before was uſed ἐπίπεδον a *Plane*. Thus *Laertius*, though * *Proclus* implies, that neither *Plato* nor *Ariſtotle* uſe the word, but for it ἐπίπεδον. Divine *Plato*, ſaith he, *calls Geometry, the Contemplatrix of Planes, oppoſing it to Stereometry, as if Plane and Superficies were the ſame. So likewiſe doth* Ariſtotle. *But* Euclid *and thoſe who ſucceed him, make Superficies the genus, Plane a ſpecies thereof.*

† θεῖα πρόνοια, *Divine Providence*, a word ſince much uſed by Chriſtians, was firſt the expreſſion of *Plato*.

* He firſt of Philoſophers wrote againſt *Lyſias*, Son of *Cephalus*, in *Phædro*.

† He firſt conſidered the force and efficacy of Grammar.

* He firſt wrote againſt all that were before him, whence it is wondred at, that he never mentions *Democritus*.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *His Diſtinctions.*

OF his Diſtinctions *Ariſtotle* made this Collection in ſome piece not extant, cited by *Laertius*.

*Good* is threefold.
- *In the Soul*, as Juſtice, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and the like.
- *In the Body*, as Beauty, good Habit, Strength.
- *External*, as Friends; Proſperity of our Country; Wealth.

*Friendſhip* is threefold.
- *Natural* which Parents bear to their Children, and Kindred to one another; which kind is alſo amongſt Beaſts.
- *Sociable*, begotten by converſation, without any relation of Kindred; ſuch as was that betwixt *Pylades* and *Oreſtes*.
- *Hoſpitable*, towards Gueſts, or wherewith we affect ſtrangers even upon Letters of Recommendation.
- Some add a fourth kind, *amatory*.

*Government* is of five kinds.
- *Democratical*; a Democracy is that wherein the People rules and hath power to make Magiſtrates and Laws.
- *Ariſtocratical*; an *Ariſtocracy* is that wherein neither rich nor poor nor Nobles govern, but the beſt perſons of the whole City.
- *Oligarchical*; an Oligarchy is when Governours are elected by the Votes of Magiſtrates, for they are fewer than the poor.
- *Regal*:
  - *Elective* by Law; as that of the *Carthaginians*; for it is Civil.
  - *Succeſſive* in a Family; as that of the *Lacedæmonians* and *Macedonians*, who confine themſelves to a certain race.
- *Tyrannical*, Tyranny is that wherein Men are brought to ſubjection either by fraud or force.

*Juſtice* is threefold.
- *Towards the Gods*; they who ſacrifice as the Law requires, and perform the Divine Rites, are juſt towards the Gods.
- *Towards Men*: They who reſtore what was lent or committed to their truſt, are juſt towards Men.
- *Towards the Dead*: They who take care of Sepulchres are juſt toward the Dead.

*Science* is threefold.
- *Practice*, as playing on the Flute, Lute, and the like; which affect nothing viſible.
- *Mechanick*, as architecture of Houſes, Ships, or the like; which produceth a viſible effect.
- *Theoretick*, as Geometry, Harmonick, Aſtronomy, which act not, neither produce any thing. The Geometrician conſiders the proportion of Lines to one another; Harmonick ſounds: Aſtronomy, Stars, and the World.

*Medicine*

*Medicine* is of five kinds.
- *Pharmaceutick*, cureth diſeaſes by application of Medicine.
- *Chirurgick*, by inciſion or cauteriſing.
- *Dietetick*, by diet.
- *Noſognomonick*, diſcerns diſeaſes.
- *Boethetick*, removeth diſeaſes.

*Law* is twofold.
- *Written*; ſuch are thoſe by which States are governed.
- *Not written*, grounded upon cuſtom; as that no Man ſhall go naked into the *Forum*, or habited like a Woman, is not forbidden by any written Law, but forborn becauſe of the unwritten.

*Speech* is of five kinds.
- *Political*, uſed in Orations by ſuch as govern States.
- *Rhetorical*, uſed by Lawyers in pleading either to confirm, praiſe, diſpraiſe or accuſe.
- *Vulgar*, uſed by People in common diſcourſe.
- *Dialectical*, uſed by ſuch as diſcourſe in ſhort queſtions and anſwers.
- *Artificial*, uſed by Tradeſmen in their ſeveral profeſſions.

*Muſick* is threefold.
- Of the Voice only.
- Of the Voice and hands, as ſinging to the Lute.
- Of the Hand only, as the Harp.

*Nobility* is of four kinds.
- If the Predeceſſors were upright, juſt, and honeſt.
- If the Predeceſſors were rulers of Princes.
- If the Predeceſſors acquired honours, as the command of an Army, or were crown'd in publick Games: thoſe who are deſcended from ſuch we call Noble.
- If a Man be endued with a generous mind; this is the beſt kind of Nobility.

*Beauty* is threefold.
- *Commendable*, as a fair form.
- *Uſeful*, as an Inſtrument, Houſe, or the like.
- *Beneficial*, as all that belongs to inſtitution of Laws.

*The Soul* hath three *parts*, the
- *Rational*, the principle whereby we judge, diſcourſe, and the like.
- *Concupiſcible*, whereby we deſire meat, coition, and the like.
- *Iraſcible*, whereby we are emboldned, joyed, grieved, enraged.

*Perfect Virtue* hath four kinds.
- Wiſdom, the principle of doing things aright.
- Juſtice, the Principle of doing things equally in private converſation and publick affairs.
- Fortitude, the principle of not flying danger throught fear, but meeting it.
- Temperance, the principle of ſubduing deſires, and yielding to no pleaſures, but living moderately.

*Government* is of five kinds.
- *By Law*: Thoſe who are choſen Magiſtrates in a City governed by Law.
- *By Nature*: the Males not only of mankind, but of moſt other creatures are predominant over the Females by nature.
- *By Cuſtom*, as that which Maſters have over their Diſciples.
- *By Deſcent*, as the *Lacedæmonian* Kings, who ſucceed out of one Family: and in *Macedonia* they uſe the ſame cuſtom.
- *By Force*, as thoſe who rule a Kingdom againſt the will of the People.

*Of Rhetorick* are ſix kinds.
- *Adhortation*, as when we perſwade to War againſt any.
- *Dehortation*, as when we diſſwade from War.
- *Accuſation*, when we declare that we have been injured by one whom we prove cauſe of our misfortune.
- *Defence*, when a Man proves he did not an injury or offence.
- *Encomium*, when we ſpeak well of another.
- *Vituperation*, when we declare a Man to be wicked.

Of *Right ſpeaking* are four kinds; when we ſpeak
- *What is requiſite*; thoſe things which will benefit both the hearer and ſpeaker.
- *As much as is requiſite*; if we ſpeak neither more nor leſs than concerns the buſineſs.
- *To thoſe to whom it is requiſite*; as when we ſpeak to old Men that have done amiſs in ſuch terms as are fit for old Men, or to young as becomes young.
- *When it is requiſite*; neither too ſoon nor too late; for if that be not obſerved, nothing can be ſpoken aright.

*Beneficence* is of four kinds.
- *In Wealth*, when we relieve the wants of any according to our Means.
- *In Body*, when we ſuccour thoſe who are beaten.
- *In Knowledge*, when we inſtruct, cure, teach any good.
- *In Speech*, he, who pleadeth in defence of another, helpeth him in words.

The *end* of things is of four kinds.
- *Legal*, impoſing an end to things by decree.
- *Natural*, ſuch as days, years, and hours have.
- *Artificial*, as the building of a Houſe.
- *Accidental*, by chance unexpected.

Of *powers* are four kinds.
- One *in the mind*, to think and conjecture.
- Another *of the Body*, to walk, give, receive, and the like.
- A third, conſiſting in a multitude of Souldiers, and ſtore of wealth, in which reſpect, Princes are called Powerful.
- The fourth, as to ſuffer good or evil to be done to us; as to be capable of Sickneſs, Learning, Health, or the like.

Of *Humanity* are three kinds.
- *In calling*, as thoſe who call all they meet, and ſalute them, taking them by the hand.
- *In relieving*, in relieving the misfortunes of another willingly.
- *In feaſting and converſation.*

*Felicity* is divided into five parts.
- *Prudent Counſel*, acquired by learning and experience.
- *Soundneſs of ſenſes*, conſiſting in the parts of the Body, as to ſee with the eyes, to hear with the ears, to ſmell and taſte.
- *Proſperity of affairs*, when thoſe things which a Man intendeth, he performeth fully.
- *Good reputation*, among Men, when a Man is well ſpoken of.
- *Plenty* of riches, and things neceſſary to life, ſo as to be able to ſupply friends, and perform works of publick magnificence: He who hath all theſe five kinds is perfectly happy.

*Arts* are of three kinds.
- The firſt diggeth out Metals, and fells Wood.
- The ſecond gives variety of ſhape to things, as Wood-work and Iron-work.
- The third maketh uſe of theſe, as Horſemanſhip of Bridles, Soldiery of Arms, Muſick of Inſtruments.

*Good* is of four kinds.
- One, as when we call a Man good from his proper goodneſs.
- A ſecond, as we call Virtue and Juſtice it ſelf good.
- A third, as we ſay, food, exerciſe, and medicines are beneficial.
- The fourth good we call the act of playing on Muſick, or acting in a Play.

Of *things* ſome are
- *Ill*, always capable to do hurt, as ignorance, inprudence, injuſtice, and the like.
- *Good*, the contrary to the former.
- *Indifferent*, which ſometimes may benefit, ſometimes hurt, as walking, ſitting, eating; or cannot do hurt at all, being neither good nor bad.

*Good Government* is threefold.
- If the Laws be good.
- If the Laws be well kept.
- If without Laws the People live orderly by cuſtom.

*Ill Government* is threefold.
- If the Laws be bad for Natives and Foreingers.
- If the Laws in being are not obſerved.
- If there are no Laws at all.

*Contraries* are of three kinds.
- *Good to ill*, as juſtice to injuſtice, wiſdom to imprudence, and the like.
- *Ill to ill*, as prodigality to avarice, unjuſt torments to juſt.
- *Neither to neither*, as heavy to light, ſwift to ſlow, black to white.

*Good* is of three kinds.
- Some we *have*, as Juſtice and Health.
- Of ſome we *participate*, as good it ſelf cannot be had; but may be participated.
- Some are *fixt*, which we can neither have, nor participate, as to be virtuous and juſt.

*Conſultation*

*Consultation* is threefold.
- *From the Past*, by example; as what befel the *Lacedæmonians* through overmuch confidence.
- *From the Present*, as considering the timorousness of Men, weakness of Walls, scarcity of provision, and the like.
- *From the Future*, as that Ambassadours should not be injured upon suspicion, lest it cast infamy upon all *Greece*.

*Voice* is
- *Animate*, of living creatures.
  - *Articulate*, of Men.
  - *Inarticulate*, of Beasts.
- *Inanimate*, sounds and noise.

*Things* are
- *Divisible*, compounded as Syllables, Symphonies, living creatures, Water, Gold.
  - *Homogeneous*, consist of similar parts; differing from the whole only in number, as Water, Gold, and all liquid things.
  - *Heterogeneous*, consist of dissimilar parts.
- *Indivisible*, compounded of nothing, as a point, sound.

Things are
- *Absolute*, requiring nothing else to express them, as a Man, a Horse, and other creatures.
- *Relatives*, which imply another thing, as greater, (than others) swifter, fairer, and the like; for what is greater relates to something lesser, and the like.

These according to *Aristotle* were *Plato*'s divisions of first things

## CHAP. IX.

### *His three Voyages to* Sicily.

*Lart. Apul.* * PLato made three Voyages to *Sicily*; the first to see the fiery ebullitions of *Ætna*, *Plat. Epist.* † and to improve the knowledge of States, and Philosophy, which he got by his other Travels; *Lart.* This was about the 40th year of his age, *at what time *Dionysius* the elder, Son of *Hermocrates*, reigned in *Syracuse*; *In Dione.* † *Plutarch* saith, he was led thither by providence, not fortune, and that some good Genius, designing afar off the liberty of the People of *Syracuse*, brought him acquainted with *Dion* then very young, who entertained him as his † Guest: *Plat. Epist.* 3 & 7. He much disliked the luxury of that place, feasting, nocturnal lucubrations and the like; * Conversed frequently with *Dion*, discoursed with him of those things which were best in Man, and with his best arguments exhorted him thereto; by which he seemed to lay grounds for the subversion of that *Plat. in Dion.* Tyranny, which afterwards hapned; * *Dion* though young, was the most ingenious of all *Plato*'s followers, and most eager in pursuit of Virtue, as appears as well by the testimony of *Plato*, as his own actions. Though he had been brought up by the King in an effeminate luxurious kind of life; yet as soon as he tasted of Philosophy the guide to Virtue, his Soul was inflamed with love thereof, and from his own candour and ingenuity was perswaded that *Dionysius* would be no less effected therewith: And therefore desired him when he was at leisure, to admit and hear *Plato*: Hereupon the Tyrant sent for him; at that meeting all their discourse was concerning fortitude; *Plato* affirmed none was further from that Virtue than a Tyrant, and, proceeding to speak of Justice, asserted the life of the Just to be happy, of the unjust, miserable. *Dionysius* was displeased at this discourse (as reflecting upon himself) and with the standers by for approving it, at last much exasperated, he asked *Plato why he came into* Sicily? *Plato* answered, *to seek a good man: it seems*, replyed *Dionysius*, *you have not yet found him*. *Laertius* saith, *Plato* disputed with him concerning Tyranny, affirming, that is not best which benefits our selves, unless it be excellent also in Virtue; whereat *Dionysius* incensed, said to him, your discourse savours of old age; and yours, answered *Plato*, of Tyranny. *Dionysius*, enraged, commanded him to be put to death; I will have, saith he, your head taken off; at which words *Xenocrates* being present, answered, *He that doth it must begin with mine*: but *Dion* and *Aristomenes* wrought with him to revoke that sentence. *Dion* thinking his anger would have proceeded no further, sent *Plato* away at his own request in a Ship which carried *Pollis* (whom *Laertius* calls *Polis*, *Ælian Pôlis*,) a *Lacedæmonian* Captain (who at that time had been sent Embassador to *Dionysius*) back to *Greece*: *Dionysius* secretly desired *Pollis* to kill him whilst he was on Shipboard; or if not, by all means to sell him, alledging, it would be no injury to *Plato*, for he would be as happy in bondage as at liberty, as being a just Man. Some affirm the occasion of *Dionysius* his anger was, because, that when he asked what was the best Brass, *Plato* answered, that whereof the Statues of * *Aristogiton* and *Harmodius* were made. Others, that it was because he was over-mastered in learning. But *Tzetzes* rejecting these, as idle fictions of Philosophers, and falsifiers, affirms the true reason to have been, that he perceived, he advised *Dion* to possess himself of the Kingdom: *Pollis* transported him to *Ægina*; there *Charmander*, Son of *Charmandrites*, accused him, as meriting death by a Law they had made, that the first *Athenian* that should come to that Island, should, without being suffered to speak for himself, be put to death: Which Law, as *Phavorinus* affirms, he himself made. One that was present, saying in sport, he is a Philosopher, they set him at liberty: Some say, they brought him to the publick assembly, to plead for himself, where he would not speak a word, but underwent all with a great courage. Then they altered their intent

* Who slew *Hipparchus*, Brother of *Hippias* the Tyrant of *Athens*; upon which the *Pisistratidæ* were expelled.

intent of putting him to death, and agreed to ſell him for a Slave. *Plutarch* ſaith, that upon a decree of the *Æginetæ*, that all the *Athenians* taken in that Iſland, ſhould be ſold for Slaves: *Pollis* ſold him there: *Anniceris*, a *Cyrenaick* Philoſopher, being accidentally preſent, redeemed him for twenty, or as others, thirty *Minæ*, and ſent him to *Athens* to his Friends; they immediately returned the Mony to *Anniceris*, but he refuſed it, ſaying, they were not the only perſons concerned in *Plato*'s welfare: ſome ſay, *Dion* ſent the Mony, which he would not accept, but bought therewith a little Orchard in the Academy. *Pollis* was defeated by *Chabrias*, and afterwards drowned in *Elice*. The report goes, that an apparition told him, he ſuffered thoſe things for the Philoſophers ſake. *Dionyſius* underſtanding what had happened, writ to *Plato*, to deſire him not to ſpeak ill of him; *Plato* returned anſwer, that he had not ſo much time vacant from philoſophy, as to remember *Dionyſius*. To ſome detractours who upbraided him, ſaying, *Dionyſius* hath caſt off *Plato*; no, ſaith he, but *Plato Dionyſius*.

*Dion* continued to live, not according to the ordinary luxury of the *Sicilians* and *Italians*, but in vertue, until *Dionyſius* died, for which maligned by thoſe who lived after Tyrannical inſtitutions. Then conſidering, that theſe documents were not practiſed by himſelf alone, but by ſome others, though few, he entertained a hope, that *Dionyſius* the younger, who ſucceeded his Father in the Government, might become one of thoſe, to the extraordinary happineſs of himſelf, and the reſt of the *Sicilians*: To this end he uſed many exhortations to invite him to virtue, intermixed with ſome ſentences of *Plato*, with whom *Dionyſius*, upon this occaſion, became extreamly deſirous to be acquainted: To that effect, many Letters were ſent to *Athens* to him, ſome from *Dionyſius*, others from *Pythagoreans* in *Italy*, deſiring *Plato* to go to *Syracuſe*, who, by prudent Counſel, might govern the young Man, tranſported by his own power to luxury. *Plato*, as himſelf affirmeth, fearing to be thought a perſon only of words, and not willing to engage in action, and withal hoping, by purging one principal part, to cure the diſeaſe of all *Sicily*, yielded; *Laertius* ſaith, upon a promiſe made to him by *Dionyſius*, of a place and People that ſhould live according to the rules of his Common-wealth; which he made not good. Hence *Athenæus* accuſed *Plato* of Ambition. In the mean time, the enemies of *Dion*, fearing a change in *Dionyſius*, perſwaded him to call home from baniſhment *Philiſtus* (a perſon very rational, but educated in Tyrannical principles) as an Antidote againſt *Plato*'s Philoſophy; but *Dion* hoped, the coming of *Plato* would regulate the licentious Tyranny of *Dionyſius*.

*Plato* at his arrival in *Sicily* placed by *A. Gellius*, betwixt the beginning of *Philip*'s Reign, four hundred years from the building of *Rome*, and the *Chæronean* fight) was received by *Dionyſius* with much reſpect: One of the Kings magnificent Chariots ſtood ready to receive him as ſoon as he landed, and carried him to the Court. The King offered Sacrifice to the Gods for his coming, as a great bleſſing upon his government. The temperance of their Feaſts, alteration of the Court, meekneſs of the King, gave the *Syracuſians* great hopes of reformation: The Courtiers addicted themſelves to Philoſophy ſo much, that the Palace was full of Sand (wherein they drew Geometrical figures) Not long after *Plato*'s coming, at a Sacrifice in the Caſtle, the Herauld, according to the uſual manner, made a ſolemn Prayer, that the Gods would long preſerve the Kingly Government: *Dion* ſtanding by, ſaid, *Will you never give over praying againſt me?* This troubled *Philiſtus* and his friends, who feared *Plato* would inſinuate into the favour of *Dionyſius* ſo much, as that they ſhould not be able to oppoſe him, ſince in ſo ſhort time, he had effected ſo great an alteration in him: Hereupon they all joyntly accuſed *Dion*, that he wrought upon *Dionyſius*, by the eloquence of *Plato*, to reſign his Government, that it might be tranſferred to the Children of his Siſter, to quit his command for the Academy, where he ſhould be made happy by Geometry, reſigning his preſent happineſs to *Dion* and his Nephews. With theſe and the like inſtigations, *Dionyſius* was ſo incenſed, that he cauſed *Dion* to be unexpectedly carried on Ship-board in a little Bark, giving the Marriners order to land him in *Italy*. This happened four Months after *Plato*'s coming. * *Plato*, and the reſt of *Dion*'s friends, feared to be put to ſome puniſhment, as partakers of his offence. A report was raiſed, that *Plato* was put to death by *Dionyſius*, as Author of all that happened: but, on the contrary, *Dionyſius*, doubting, leſt ſomething worſe might happen from their fear, treated them all kindly, comforted *Plato*, bid him be of good chear, and intreated him to ſtay with him: † He cauſed him to be lodged in his Caſtle, * in the Orchards adjoyning to his Palace, where not the Porter himſelf could go out without *Dionyſius* his leave; thus cunningly, under pretence of kindneſs, he watched him, that he might not return into *Greece*, to give *Dion* notice of the wrong done to him. *Dionyſius* by frequent converſation with *Plato* (as wild Beaſts are tamed by uſe) fell into ſo great liking of his diſcourſe, that he became in love with him; but, it was a Tyrannical affection, for, he would not that *Plato* ſhould love any but him, offering to put the power of the Kingdom into his hands, if he would value him above *Dion*. With this paſſion, troubleſome to *Plato*, *Dionyſius* was ſometimes ſo far tranſported, as Men jealous of their Miſtriſſes, that he would upon the ſuddain fall out with him, and as ſuddainly be reconciled, and ask him pardon. He had indeed a great deſire of *Plato*'s Philoſophy, but a great reſpect likewiſe on the other ſide for thoſe who diſſwaded him from it, telling him, that it would ruine him to be too far ingaged therein. * In the mean time, there happening a War, he ſent *Plato* home, promiſing, that the next Spring (as ſoon as there was Peace) he would ſend back for him and *Dion* to *Syracuſe*: But he kept not his promiſe, for which he deſired *Plato* to excuſe him, proteſting the War to be the occaſion thereof, and that as ſoon as it were ended, he would ſend for *Dion*, whom he deſired in the mean time to reſt ſatisfied, and not attempt any thing againſt him, nor to ſpeak ill of him to the *Grecians*. This

* *Plat. Ep.*

† *Plutarch.*

* *Plat. Ep.* 7.

* *Plat. Ep.*

*Plato*

*Plato* endeavoured to effect; he inſtructed *Dion* in Philoſophy, in the Academy: *Dion* lay in the City at the houſe of *Calippus*, with whom he had been long acquainted. He purchaſed a Country houſe for pleaſure, whither he ſometimes went; this he beſtowed afterward, at his return to *Sicily*, upon *Speuſippus*, with whom he converſed moſt intimately, as being ſo adviſed by *Plato*, who knew the cheerful humour of *Speuſippus* to be a fit divertiſement for the reſerved diſpoſition of *Dion*. *Plato* had undertaken the expence of ſome Playes and Dances by ſome youths; *Dion* took the pains to teach them, and paid the whole charge: By this liberality which *Plato* ſuffered him to confer upon the *Athenians*, he gained more love than *Plato* honour.

In the mean time, *Dionyſius*, to acquit himſelf of the diſeſteem he had gained amongſt Philoſophers in *Plato*'s cauſe, invited many learned Men, and in a vain oſtentation of Wiſdome, applyed improperly the ſentences he had learned of *Plato*: Hereupon he began to wiſh for *Plato* again, and to blame himſelf, for not knowing how to uſe him well when he had him, and that he had not learned ſo much of him as he might: and being like a Tyrant tranſported with uncertain paſſions and changes, a ſuddain vehement deſire came upon him of ſeeing *Plato* again. The peace being now concluded, he ſent to *Plato* to come to him (but not (as he had promiſed) to *Dion*) writing to him, that he would have him to come immediately, and that afterwards he would ſend for *Dion*. Hereupon *Plato* refuſed to go, notwithſtanding the intreaties of *Dion*; alledging for excuſe his old age, and that nothing was done according to their agreement. In the mean time, *Archytas*, whom, with others of *Tarentum*, *Plato*, before his departure, had brought into the acquaintance of *Dionyſius*, came to *Dionyſius*; there were alſo others there, Auditors of *Dion*. *Dionyſius* being refuſed upon a ſecond invitation, thought his honour deeply concerned, and thereupon ſent the third time a Galley of three banks of *Oars* († trimmed with Fillets) and other Ships, and with them *Archidemus*, whom he conceived *Plato* moſt affected of all his friends in *Sicily*, and ſome *Sicilian* Noblemen: * He had by all means obliged *Archytas* the *Pythagorean*, to let *Plato* know, he might come without danger, and that he would engage his word on it. † As ſoon as they came to *Plato*, they all proteſted, that *Dionyſius* was much inclined to Philoſophy, and delivered an Epiſtle from him to this effect:

*Plat. Epiſt. 3.*

† *Plin.*

* *Plat.*

† *Plat. Epiſt. 7.*

*Dionyſius* to *Plato*.

(After the accuſtomed way of Preface) *nothing* (ſaith he) *ſhould you do ſooner, than come* Sicily *at my requeſt. Firſt, as concerning* Dion, *all ſhall be done as you will; for I think you will only moderate things, and I will condeſcend: But, unleſs you come, you ſhall not obtain any thing which you deſire for* Dion, *nor in any thing elſe, not in thoſe which chiefly concern your own particular.*

* *Plat. Epiſt.* * Other Epiſtles were ſent from *Archytas*, and other Italians and Tarentines, praiſing *Dionyſius* for his love of learning; adding, that if *Plato* came not, it would reflect upon his friends, as well as on himſelf. † Many Letters and intreaties were ſent to *Dion*, from his Wife and Siſter: * to theſe were joyned the importunities of ſome friends of *Plato*'s at *Athens*, † inſomuch that *Dion* brought it to paſs, that *Plato* (* leſt he ſhould deſert him and the Tarentines,) yielded to *Dionyſius*, without any excuſe; and, as he writeth himſelf, was driven the third time to the Sicilian Straits,

† *Plutarch.* * *Plat. Epiſt.* † *Plut.* * *Plat.*

*Once more Charybdis dangers to eſſay.*

At his arrival in *Sicily*, *Dionyſius* met him with a Chariot, drawn by four white Horſes, † whereinto he took him, and made him ſit, whilſt himſelf plaid the Coachman: whereupon a facete *Syracuſian*, well vers'd in *Homer*, pleaſed with the ſight, ſpoke theſe verſes out of the Iliads, with a little alteration:

† *Ælian. var. Hiſt. 4. 18.*

*The Chariot groan'd beneath its weight,*
*Proud that the beſt of Men there ſat.*

And as *Dionyſius* was much joy'd at his coming, ſo were the *Sicilians* put in great hopes, being all deſirous, and endeavouring, that *Plato* might ſupplant *Philiſtus*, and ſubvert Tyranny by Philoſophy: The Ladies of the Court entertained *Plato* with all civility; but above all, *Dionyſius* ſeemed to repoſe more confidence in him, than in any of his friends; for, whereas he was jealous of all others, he had ſo great reſpect for *Plato*, that he ſuffered him only to come to him unſearched (* though he knew him to be *Dion*'s intimate friend) and offered him great ſumms of Mony, but *Plato* would not accept any: (yet † *Onetor* ſaith, he received eighty Talents of him, wherewith enriched, he purchaſed the Books of *Philolaus*) whence *Ariſtippus* the *Cyrenean*, who was at the ſame time in the Court, ſaid, Dionyſius *beſtowed his bounty on ſure grounds; he gives little to us who require much, and much to* Plato *who requireth nothing.* And being blamed, that he received Mony of *Dionyſius*, *Plato* books, *I want Mony*, ſaith he, Plato *Books*. So untrue it is, as * *Xenophon* aſperſeth him, that he went thither to ſhare in the Sicilian luxury: or as † *Tzetzes*, that *he ſtudied the art of Cookery, and lived with* Dionyſius *as his penſioner and paraſite.* So far was he from any ſordid compliance, that at a Feaſt, * *Dionyſius* commanding every one to put on a purple Gown, and dance, he refuſed, ſaying,

* *Ælian. var. Hiſt. 4. 18.* † *Laert. Epiſt. ad Æſchin.* † *Chiliad.* * *Laert. vit. Ariſtip.*

*I will not with a female robe diſgrace*
*My ſelf, who am a Man of manly race.*

Some likewiſe aſcribe this to him, which others to *Ariſtippus*, that *Dionyſius* ſaying,

*Who ere comes to a Tyrant, he*
*A Servant is, though he came free.*

He anſwered immediately,

*No Servant is, if he came free.*

† *Plat. Epiſt. Plat.* † *Plato*, after a while, began to put *Dionyſius* in mind of the City he had promiſed him to be governed by his rules; but *Dionyſius* retracted his promiſe: He moved him alſo in the behalf of *Dion*; *Dionyſius* at the firſt delay'd him, afterwards fell out with him, but ſo ſecretly, that none ſaw it, for he continued to confer as much honour on him, as he could poſſibly, thereby to make him forſake his friendſhip to *Dion*. *Plato* from the beginning perceived there was no truſt to be repoſed in what he ſaid or did, but that all was deceit; yet concealed that thought, and patiently ſuffered all; pretending to believe him. Thus they diſſembled with each other, thinking they deceived the eyes of all Men beſides; *Helicon* of *Cyzicum*, a friend of *Plato*, foretold an Eclipſe of the Sun, which falling out according to his prediction, the Tyrant much honoured him, and gave him a Talent of Silver: then *Ariſtippus* jeſting with other Philoſophers, ſaid, he could tell them of a ſtranger thing that would happen; they deſiring to know what that was. I foretel, ſaith he, *Plato and* Dionyſius *will be at difference ere long*; and it came to paſs. * *Dionyſius* detain'd *Dion*'s Rent which he uſed to ſend yearly to him to *Peloponneſus*, pretending he kept it for his Nephew, *Dion*'s Son. *Plato* diſcontented hereat, deſired he might go home, ſaying, he could not ſtay, *Dion* being uſed ſo ignominiouſly: *Dionyſius* ſpoke kindly to him, deſiring him to ſtay: He thought it not convenient to let *Plato* go ſo ſoonto divulge his actions; but being not able to prevail with him, he told him, he would provide a means for his Paſſage; *Plato* had deſigned to go with the Paſſage-boats; *Dionyſius* ſeeing him bent upon his voyage, the next ſpoke thus kindly to him; that *the differences betwixt* Dion *and me may be compoſed, I will for your ſake condeſcend thus far*, Dion *ſhall receive his revenews living in* Peloponneſus *not as a baniſhed perſon, but as one that may come hither when he and I, and you his friends ſhall think convenient. The Truſtees for this buſineſs ſhall be your ſelf, and your and his friends who live here*; Dion *ſhall receive his Rents, but through your hands, otherwiſe I ſhall not dare to truſt him; in you and yours I have more confidence; ſtay for this reaſon a year here, and then you ſhall carry along with you his Mony, wherein you will do* Dion *a great courteſie.* To this *Plato* after a days deliberation conſented; and writ to that effect to *Dion*; but as ſoon as the Ships were gone, that *Dionyſius* ſaw he had no means to get away, forgetting his promiſe, he made ſale of *Dion*'s Eſtate.

*Plat. Epiſt. 7.* † At this time hapned a mutiny amongſt the Souldiers of *Dionyſius*, of which *Heraclides* a friend of *Plato's* was reported the Author: *Dionyſius* laid out to take him, but could not light on him: Walking in his Garden he called *Theodotes* to him; *Plato* being accidentally walking there at the ſame time; after ſome private diſcourſe with *Dionyſius*, *Theodotes*, turning to *Plato*, *Plato*, ſaith he, *I perſwade* Dionyſius *that I may bring* Heraclides *to him to anſwer the crimes wherewith he is charged, and then if* Dionyſius *will not ſuffer him to live in* Sicily, *that he at leaſt permit him to take his Wife and Children along with him to* Peloponneſus, *and live there, and whilſt he ſhall not plot any thing againſt* Dionyſius, *that he may there enjoy his Revenews. With this aſſurance I have ſent to* Heraclides, *and will ſend again to him to come hither; but if he come either upon the firſt or ſecond notice, I have made an agreement with* Dionyſius, *and obtained a promiſe from him that he ſhall receive no harm, either in or without the City; but, if he be ſo reſolved, that he ſend him away beyond the confines of this Country untill he ſhall be better ſatisfied with him: Do not you* Dionyſius *conſent hereto*, ſaith he: *I do*, anſwered *Dionyſius, neither if he be in your houſe ſhall he receive any prejudice*; The next day (about 20. days before *Plato* left *Sicily*) came *Eurybius* and *Theodotes* to *Plato* in much haſt and trouble; *Plato*, ſaid *Theodotes*, *you were yeſterday preſent at the agreement betwixt* Dionyſius *and me, concerning* Heraclides. *I was ſo*, anſwered *Plato*, but ſince, continues *Theodotes, he hath ſent out Officers to apprehend him, and I fear he is ſomewhere very nigh; therefore go along with us to* Dionyſius, *and let us uſe our utmoſt endeavour with him*: They went, when they came before him, *Plato* (the reſt ſtanding ſilent by, and weeping) began thus, *Theſe Men*, Dionyſius, *are afraid leſt you ſhould do ſomething againſt* Heraclides *contrary to the agreement you made yeſterday, for I ſuppoſe he is come near here abouts. Dionyſius* at this grew angry, his colour often changed with rage; *Theodotes* fell at his feet, and taking him by the hand, beſought him not to do any ſuch thing: *Plato* continuing his ſpeech; *Be of good chear*, ſaith he, Theodotes, *for* Dionyſius *will not do any thing contrary to the promiſe he made yeſterday. Dionyſius* looking ſeverely upon *Plato*, *to you*, ſaith he, *I made no promiſe; yes by the Gods* anſwered *Plato, you promiſed not to do thoſe things which* Theodotes *now beſeecheth you not to do. Archedemus* and *Ariſtocritus* being preſent; he told *Plato* (as he had done once before, when he interceded for *Heraclides*,) That he cared for *Heraclides* and others more than for him: and asked him before them, whether he remembred that when he came firſt to *Syracuſe*, he counſelled him to reſtore the *Gracian* Cities: *Plato* anſwered, he did remember it, and that he ſtill thought it his beſt courſe, and withal asked *Dionyſius* whether that were the only counſel he had given him. *Dionyſius* returned an angry contumelious reply, and asked him, laughing ſcornfully, whether he taught him thoſe things as a School boy; to which *Plato* anſwered, *you well remember*: *what*, replies he, *as a Maſter in Geometry, or how? Plato* forbore to reply, fearing it might occaſion a ſtop of his Voyage; But immediately went away; *Dionyſius* reſolved to lay wait for *Heraclides*; but he eſcaped to the *Carthaginian* Territories.

From this diſpleaſure againſt *Plato*, *Dionyſius* took occaſion to forbear to ſend to *Dion* his Mony; and firſt ſent *Plato* out of his Caſtle, where, till then, he had lain next the Palace, pretending that the Women were to celebrate a Feaſt ten days in the Gardens where he dwelt; For that time he commanded *Plato* to live without the Caſtle with *Archedemus*; during which time *Theodotes* ſent for him, and complained to him of *Dionyſius* his proceedings. *Dionyſius* receiving information that *Plato* had gone

gone to *Theodotes*, took a new occaſion of diſpleaſure againſt him, and ſent one to him, who asked him whether he had gone to *Theodotes*. *Plato* acknowledged that he had, then, ſaith the Meſſenger, *Dionyſius* bad me tell you, you do not well to prefer *Dion* and his friends before him. Never from that time did he ſend for *Plato* to the Court, looking upon him as a profeſt friend to *Theodotes* and *Heraclides*, and his profeſt enemy: * *Plato* lived without the Caſtle amongſt the Souldiers of the Guard: who, as *Dionyſius* well knew, had born him ill will long, and ſought to murder him, becauſe he counſel'd *Dionyſius* to give over the Tyranny, and live without a Guard. † Some, who came to viſit him, gave him notice that calumnies were ſpread againſt him amongſt the Souldiers, * as if he excited *Dion* and *Theondas* to reſtore the Iſland to liberty, and that ſome of them threatned, when they could light upon him to kill him. Hereupon *Plato* began to think of ſome means of Eſcape, which he effected in this manner; He ſent to *Archytas* at *Tarentum*, and to other friends advertiſing them of the danger wherein he was; They, under pretence of an Embaſſy in the name of the Country, ſent *Lamaſcus* (whom *Laertius* calls *Lamiſcus*) one of their party with a Galley of three banks of Oars to redemand *Plato*, declaring that his coming to *Syracuſe* upon the engagement of *Archytas*: His letter was to this effect.

* *Plat.*

† *Plat. Epiſt.*

* *Laert.*

*Archytas* to *Dionyſius*, health.

WE *all* Plato's *friends have ſent* Lamiſcus *and* Photides *to redemand the Man according to your agreement with us: You will do well to conſider with what importunity you prevail'd with us to invite* Plato *to you, promiſing to yield to all things, and to give him liberty to go and come at his pleaſure; remember how much you prized his coming, and preferred him before all others: if there hath hapned any difference betwixt you, it will befit you to treat him courteouſly, and reſtore him ſafe to us. This if you do, you will do juſtly, and oblige us.*

† *Plutarch. vit. Dion.*

† *Dionyſius* to excuſe himſelf, and to ſhew he was not angry with *Plato*, feaſted him magnificently, and then ſent him home with great teſtimonies of affection: One day amongſt the reſt he ſaid to him, *I am afraid*, Plato, *you will ſpeak ill of me when you are amongſt your friends. The Gods forbid*, anſwered *Plato*, ſmiling, *they ſhould have ſuch ſcarcity of matter in the Academy, as to be conſtrained to diſcourſe of you.* *Dionyſius* at his departure, deſired him to find out whether *Dion* would be much diſpleaſed if he ſhould diſpoſe of his Wife to another, there being at that time a report that he did not like his match, and could not live quietly with his Wife. *Plato* in his return, came to *Peloponneſus* at what time the Olympick games were celebrated; where the eyes of all the *Grecians* were taken off from the ſports and fixed upon him as the more worthy object: Here he found *Dion* beholding the exerciſes, To whom he related what had happened. *Dion* proteſted to revenge the diſcourteſie of *Dionyſius* towards *Plato*, from which *Plato* earneſtly diſſwaded him: Being come home to *Athens*, he wrote to *Dionyſius*, and gave him a plain accompt of every thing, but that concerning *Dion*'s Wife, he ſet it down ſo darkly, that he alone to whom the letter was directed could underſtand him; letting him know that he had ſpoken with *Dion* about the buſineſs which he knew, and that he would be very much diſpleaſed if *Dionyſius* did it: ſo that at that time, becauſe there was great hopes of reconciliation between them, the Tyrant forbore a while to diſpoſe of his Siſter *Arete*, *Dion*'s Wife, as ſoon after, when he ſaw the breach irreconcileable, he did, marrying her againſt her will to one of his friends named *Timocrates*. *Dion* thence forward prepared for War againſt *Plato*'s advice, who endeavoured to diſſwade him from it, as well for reſpect of *Dionyſius* his good reception of him, as for that *Dion* was well in years; though *Ælian* ſaith, he put *Dion* upon that War; which *Plutarch* imputes to the inſtigations of *Speuſippus*.

## CHAP. X.

*His Authority in Civil Affairs.*

AT home he lived quietly in the Academy, * not engaging himſelf in publick Affairs; (though he were a perſon very knowing therein as his writings manifeſt,) becauſe the *Athenians* were accuſtomed to Laws different from his ſenſe. * *Laert.*

† His fame ſpreading to the *Arcadians*, and *Thebans*, they ſent Embaſſadours earneſtly to requeſt him to come over to them, not only to inſtruct their young Men in Philoſophy, but which was of higher concernment, to ordain Laws for *Megalopolis* a City then newly built by the *Arcadians*, upon occaſion of the great defeat given them by the *Lacedæmonians*, in the firſt year of the 103. Olympiad. *Plato* was not a little pleaſed at this invitation, but asking the Ambaſſadours how they ſtood affected to a parity of Eſtates, and finding them ſo averſe from it, as not to be by any means induced thereto, he refuſed to go: but ſent *Ariſtonimus* his familiar friend. † *Ælian. var. hiſt.* 2. 41.

The *Cyrenæans* likewiſe ſent to him, deſiring him to ſend them Laws for their City, but he refuſed, ſaying, it was difficult to preſcribe Laws to Men in proſperity. *Plutarch. ad princip. inſtruct.*

Yet to ſeveral people upon their importunities he condeſcended.

To the *Syracuſians* he gave Laws upon the ejection of their King.

To the *Cretans* upon their building of *Magneſia*, he ſent Laws digeſted into twelve Books.

To the *Ilians* he ſent *Phormio*; to the *Pyrrheans*, *Mededimus* (his familiar friends) upon the ſame deſign.

This is enough to juſtifie him againſt thoſe who * accuſe, him, of having written a form of Government, which he could not perſwade any to practiſe, becauſe it was ſo ſevere: and that the *Athenians*, who accepted the Laws of *Draco* and *Solon*, derided his. * *Athen.*

## CHAP. XI.

### *His Vertues and Moral Sentences.*

* *Laert.* † *Suid.* * HE lived ſingle, yet ſoberly and † chaſtly, inſomuch as in his old age (in compliance with the vulgar opinion) he ſacrificed to Nature, to expiate the crime of his continence. So conſtant in his compoſure and gravity, that a Youth brought up under him, returning to his Parents, and hearing his Father ſpeak aloud, ſaid, *I never found this in* Plato. He ate but once a day, or, if the ſecond time, very ſparingly; he ſlept alone, and much diſcommended the contrary manner of living. Of his Prudence, Patience, Magnanimity, and other Vertues, there are theſe inſtances.

*Plut.* * *Antimachus* a *Colophonian*, and *Niceratus* a *Heracleot*, contending in a Poetick Panegyrick of *Lyſander*, the prize was beſtowed upon *Niceratus*: *Antimachus* in anger tore his Poem; *Plato*, who at that time was young, and much eſteemed *Antimachus* for his Poetry, comforted him, ſaying, *Ignorance is a diſeaſe proper to the ignorant, as blindneſs to the blind.*

† *Senec. de ira.* 3. 12. † His ſervant having offended him, he bad him put off his coat, and expoſe his ſhoulders to be beaten, intending to have corrected him with his own hand; but perceiving himſelf to be angry, he ſtopt his hand, and ſtood fixt in that poſture; a friend coming in, asked him what he was doing, *Puniſhing an angry Man*, ſaith he.

* *Senec. de ira.* 3. 12. * Another time, being diſpleaſed at his ſervant for ſome offence, *do you* (ſaith he to *Speuſippus* (or as *Laertius* to *Xenocrates*) accidentally coming in) *beat this fellow, for I am angry.* And another time to his ſervant he ſaid, *I would beat*

† *Val. Max.* *thee, if I were not angry.* † Fearing to exceed the limits of correction, and thinking it unfit the Maſter and Servant ſhould be alike faulty.

* *Laert.* * *Chabrias* the general being arraigned for his life, he alone ſhewed himſelf on his ſide, not one of the Citizens elſe appearing for him. *Crobulus* the Sycophant met him, accompanying *Chabrias* to the Tower, and ſaid unto him, *Do you come to help others, you know not that the poyſon of* Socrates *is reſerved for you? Plato* anſwered, *When I fought for my Country I hazarded my life, and will now in duty to my friend.*

† *Ælian. var. hiſt.* 4. † At the Olympick Games, he fell into company with ſome ſtrangers, who knew him not, upon whoſe affections, he gained much by his affable converſation, Dining and ſpending the whole day with them, not mentioning either the Academy or *Socrates*, only ſaying, his Name was *Plato*. When they came to *Athens*, he entertained them courteouſly. *Come*, Plato, ſaid the ſtrangers, *ſhew us your nameſake*, Socrates *his Diſciple; bring us to the Academy; recommend us to him, that we may know him.* He ſmiling a little, as he uſed, ſaid, *I am the Man*: Whereat they were much amazed, having converſed ſo familiarly with a perſon of that eminence, who uſed no boaſting or oſtentation; and ſhewed, that beſides his Philoſophical diſcourſe, his ordinary converſation was extreamly winning.

When he went out of the School, he always ſaid, *See (Youths) that you employ your idle hours uſefully.*

At a Feaſt he blamed thoſe that brought in Muſicians to hinder diſcourſe.

Seeing a young Man play at Dice, he reproved him; he anſwered, *What, for ſo ſmall a matter? Cuſtome* (replies *Plato*) *is no ſmall thing.* *Laert.*

Being demanded, whether there ſhould be any record to poſterity of his actions or ſayings, as of others before him: *Firſt*, ſaith he, *we muſt get a Name, then many things will follow.* *Laert.*

Getting on Horſe-back, he immediately lighted again, ſaying, He feared leſt he ſhould be carried away ἱππικῶς by a high willful conceit, a metaphor taken from a Horſe. *Laert.*

He adviſed drunken and angry Men to look in a Glaſs, and it would make them refrain from thoſe vices. *Laert.*

He affirmed, that to drink to the exceſs of drunkenneſs was not allowable at any time, unleſs upon the feſtival of that God who gives Wine. *Laert.*

Sleep alſo much diſpleaſed him, whence he ſaith in his Laws, *No Man ſleeping is worth any thing.* *Laert.*

That truth is more pleaſing to all, than any feign'd ſtory, ſo of truth he ſaith, *de legibus*: *Truth, O gueſt, is an excellent thing, and durable, but to this we are not eaſily perſwaded.* *Laert.*

Being told, that *Xenocrates* had ſpoken many unjuſt things againſt him, he preſently rejected the accuſation; the informer perſiſting, asked, why he would not believe him? He added, it was not probable, that he whom he loved ſo much, ſhould not love him again. Finally, the other ſwearing it was thus; he, not to argue him of perjury, affirmed, that *Xenocrates* would never have ſaid ſo, but that there was reaſon for it. *Val. Max.* 4.

He ſaid, *No wiſe Man puniſheth in reſpect of the fault paſt, but in prevention of the future.* *Senec. de ira.* 1. 16.

Seeing the *Agrigentines* magnificent in Building, luxurious in Feaſting, *Theſe people* (ſaith he) *build, as if they were to live for ever, and eat, as if they were to die inſtantly.* *Ælian.*

Hearing a wicked perſon ſpeak in the defence of another, *This Man*, ſaith he, *carries his heart in his tongue.* *Stob.*

Being told, that ſome ſpoke ill of him, he anſwer'd, *'Tis no matter, I will live ſo that none ſhall belive them.* *Stob.*

Seeing a young Man of a good family, who had waſted all his means, ſitting at the door of an Inn, feeding upon bread and water, he told him, *If you had dined ſo temperately, you would never have needed to ſup ſo.* *Stob.*

To *Antiſthenes*, making a long oration, *You know not*, ſaith he, *that diſcourſe is to be meaſured by the hearer, not the ſpeaker.* *Stob.*

Seeing a youth over-bold with his Father, *Young Man*, ſaith he, *will you under-value him, who is the cauſe you over-value your ſelf?* *Stob.*

To one of his Diſciples, who took too much care of his body, he ſaid, *Why do you labour ſo much in building your own priſon?*

Of a priſoner fettered, he ſaid, *That Man is dead in his own body, he lives in another.*

He

He ſaid, that *whoſoever neglected himſelf for another, was the moſt happy of all perſons, for he enjoyed neither.*

One *Leo*, an eminent Citizen, being blamed for loud and immoderate clamour in the Senate, *That it*, ſaith he, *to be a Lyon indeed.*

His Diſciples wondring, that *Xenocrates*, ſevere all his life time, had ſaid ſomething that was pleaſant, *Do you wonder* (ſaith he) *that Roſes and Lillies grow among thorns?*

Laert. vit. Xen. *Xenocrates* by reaſon of his ſevere converſation, he adviſed to ſacrifice to the Graces.

He uſed to ſay, Prefer labour before idleneſs, unleſs you eſteem ruſt above brightneſs.

He exhorted the young Men to good life, thus; Obſerve the different nature of vertue and pleaſure; the momentany ſweetneſs of the World is immediately followed by eternal ſorrow and repentance, the ſhort pain of the other by eternal pleaſure.

He ſaid, that it was a great matter in the education of youth, to accuſtome them to take delight in good things; otherways, he affirmed pleaſure to be the bait of evil.

He affirmeth Philoſophy to be the true help of the Soul, the reſt ornaments; that nothing is more pleaſing to a ſound mind, than to ſpeak and hear truth, than which nothing is better or more laſting.

To ſome, who demanded what kind of poſſeſſions were beſt to be provided for Children: Thoſe (ſaith he) which fear neither ſtorms, nor violence of Men, nor *Jove* himſelf.

To *Demonicus*, asking his advice concerning the education of his Son: The ſame care (ſaith he) that we have of Plants, we muſt take of our Children; The one is Labour, the other Pleaſure. But we muſt take heed that in this we be not too ſecure, in that too vigilant.

To *Philedonus*, who blamed him that he was as Studious to learn as to teach, and asked him *how long he meant to be a Diſciple, as long*, ſaith he, *as I am not aſhamed of growing better and wiſer.*

Being demanded what difference there is between a learned Man and an unlearned, *the ſame*, ſaith he, *as betwixt a Phyſitian and a Patient.*

He ſaid, *Princes had no better Poſſeſſions than the familiarities of ſuch Men who could not flatter, that Wiſdome is as neceſſary to a Prince, as the Soul to the Body.* That *Kingdoms would be moſt happy, if either Philoſophers rule, or the Rulers were inſpired with Philoſophy, for nothing is more pernicious than power and arrogance accompanied with ignorance.* That *Subjects ought to be ſuch as Princes ſeem to be.* That a *Magiſtrate is to be eſteemed a Publick not a private good. That not a part of the Common-wealth, but the whole ought to be principally regarded.*

Plut. Symoſ. 6. prolat. Ælian. var. hiſt. Being deſirous to take off *Timotheus* Son of *Conon*, General of the *Athenians*, from ſumptuous Military Feaſts; he invited him into the Academy to a plain moderate Supper, ſuch as quiet pleaſing ſleeps ſucceed with a good temper of body. The next day *Timotheus* obſerving the difference, ſaid, They who feaſted with *Plato* were the better for it the next day; and meeting *Plato* ſaid unto him; *Your Supper*, Plato, *is as pleaſant the next morning as overnight*, alluding to the excellent diſcourſe, that had paſt at that time.

Hence appears the truth of that Poet's ſaying, who being derided for acting a Tragedy, none being preſent but *Plato*, anſwered, *but this one perſon is more than all the* Athenians *beſides.*

## CHAP. XII.

### *His Will and Death.*

THus continuing a ſingle life to his end, not having any Heirs of his own, he bequeathed his Eſtate to young *Adimantus*, (probably the Son of *Adimantus*, his ſecond Brother) by his Will; thus recited by *Laertius.*

*Theſe things* Plato *hath Bequeathed and diſpoſed, The Eniphiſtidæan grounds bordering North, on the high way from the Cephiſian Temple, South on the Heracleum of the Eniphiſtiades, Eaſt on* Archeſtratus *the Phrearian, Weſt* Philip *the* Cholidian, *this let it not be lawful for any Man to ſell or alienate, but let young* Adimantus *be poſſeſſour thereof in as full and ample manner as is poſſible. And likewiſe the* Eneriſiadæan *Farm which I bought of* Callimachus, *adjoyning on the North to* Eurymedon *the* Myrrinuſian, *on the South to* Demoſtratus Xypeteron, *on the Eaſt to* Eurymedon *the* Myrrinuſian, *on the Weſt to* Cephiſſus; *Three Mina of Silver; a Golden Cup weighing 160. a ring of Gold, and an earring of Gold, both together weighing four drachms and three oboli*; Euclid *the Stone-Cutter oweth me three Minæ*, Diana *I remit freely, I leave Servants*, Ticho, Bictas Apolloniades, Dionyſius *Goods, whereof* Demetrius *keepeth an Inventory. I ow no Man any thing, Executors*, Soſthenes, Speuſippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurimedon, Callimachus, Thraſippus.

If this Will be not forged, that of *Apuleius* is falſe, who avers *the Patrimony he left was a little Orchard adjoyning to the Academy, two ſervants, and a Cup wherein he ſupplicated to the Gods; Gold no more than he wore in his ear when he was a boy, an Emblem of his Nobility.* Dogm. Plat.

He died in the 13th year of the Reign of *Philip* King of *Macedon*, in the firſt of the 108. Olympiad; the 81. (according to *Hermippus*, *Cicero*, *Seneca*, and others) of his age (not as *Athenæus* the 82.) which number he compleated exactly, dying that very day whereon he was born; For which reaſon the Magi at *Athens* ſacrificed to him, as conceiving him more than Man, who fulfilled the moſt perfect number, nine multiplyed into it ſelf. Laert.

He died only of age, which *Seneca* aſcribes to his temperance and diligence; *Hermippus* ſaith, at a Nuptial Feaſt; *Cicero* ſaith, as he was writing; they therefore who affirm he dyed (as *Pherecydes*) of lice, do him much injury; upon his Tomb theſe Epitaphs. Epiſt. 1. 58. Laert.

The firſt.

*Whoſe Temperance and Juſtice all envies,*
*The fam'd* Ariſtocles *here buried lies;*
*If Wiſdom any with renown indued,*
*Here was it moſt, by envy not purſued.*

The

The second.

*Earth in her bosom* Plato's *body hides,*
*His Soul amongst the deathless Gods resides*
Aristo's *Son; whose fame to strangers spread,*
*Made them admire the sacred life he lead.*

Another later.

*Eagle, why art thou pearcht upon this stone,*
*And gazest thence on some Gods starry throne?*
I Plato's *Soul to Heaven flown represent,*
*His body buried in this Monument.*

*Phavorinus* saith, that *Mithridates* the Persian set up *Plato's* statue in the Academy with this Inscription;

*MITHRIDATES* SON OF *RHODOBATES*, THE PERSIAN, DEDICATED THIS IMAGE OF *PLATO*, MADE BY *SILANION* TO THE MUSES.

## CHAP. XIII.

*His Disciples and Friends.*

THE Fame of this School attracted Disciples from all parts: of whom were

*Spensippus* an Athenian, *Plato's* Sisters Son, whom he said he reformed by the example of his own life.

*Xenocrates* a Chalcedonian, *Plato's* beloved Disciple, an imitatour of his gravity and magnanimity: *Athenæus* saith, he was first the only Disciple of *Æschines*, and relief of his poverty, seduced from him by *Plato*.

*Aristotle* a Stagirite, whom *Plato* used to call a Colt, foreseeing that he would ungratefully oppose him, as a Colt, having suckt, kicks at his Dam: *Xenocrates* was slow, *Aristotle* quick in extremity, whence *Plato* said of them, what an Ass have I, and what a horse to yoak together.

*Philippus* an *Opuntian*, who transcribed *Plato's* Laws in wax; to him some ascribe *Epinomis*.

*Hestiæus* a Perinthian.

*Dion* a Syracusian whom *Plato* exceedingly affected, as is evident from his Epigrams; seeing him in the height of honour, all mens eyes fixt upon his noble actions, he advised him to take heed of that vice, which makes Men care only to please themselves; a consequent of solitude.

*Amyclus* (or as *Ælian*, *Amyclas*) a Heracleote.
* *Erastus* and *Coriscus* Scepsians. * See also *Stob. lib. 13.*
*Temolaus* a Cyzicene.
*Enæmon* a Lampsacene.
*Pithon*, whom *Aristotle* calls *Paron*, and *Heraclides* Ænians.
*Hippothales* and *Callippus*, Athenians.
*Demetrius* of *Amphipolis*.
*Heraclides* of *Pontus*.

Two Women, *Lasthenia* a *Mantinean*, and *Axiothia* a *Phliasian*, who went habited like a Man.

*Theophrastus*, as some affirm.

Orators, *Hyperides*, *Lycurgus*, *Demosthenes*. *Lycurgus* (saith *Philistus*) was a person of great parts, and did many remarkable things, which none could perform, who had not been *Plato's* auditor. *Demosthenes*, when he fled from *Antipater*, said to *Archias*, who counsell'd him to put himself into his hands, upon promise to save his life; Far be it from me to choose rather to live ill, than to die well, having heard *Xenocrates* and *Plato* dispute of the Souls immortality.

*Mnesistratus* a *Thasian*.

To these reckoned by *Laertius*, add *Aristides* a Locrian.

*Eudoxus* a Gnidian, who at a great Feast made by *Plato*, first found out the manner of sitting in a circular form.

*Hermodorus*, of whom the Proverb, Hermodorus *traffiques in words*. *Zenob.*

*Heracleodorus*, to whom *Demosthenes* writing, reprehends him, that having heard *Plato*, he neglected good arts, and lived disorderly.

† *Euphrates*, who lived with *Perdiccas* King of *Macedonia* in so great favour, that he in a manner shared command with him. † *Athen. dipn. lib. 11.*

*Euagon* of *Lampsacum*. *Athen. Ibid.*
*Timæus* of *Cyzicum*. *Athen. Ibid.*
*Chæron* of *Pellene*. *Athen. Ibid.*

* *Isocrates* the Oratour, with whom *Plato* was very intimate: *Praxiphanes* published a discourse they had together, in a field of *Plato's* who at that time entertained *Isocrates* as a Guest. * *Laert.*

*Aster*, *Phædrus*, *Alexis*, *Agato*, young Men, whom *Plato* particularly affected, as appears by his Epigrams.

† *Aristonymus*, *Phormio*, *Mededimus*, his familiar friends, already mentioned. † *Cap. 10.*

## CHAP. XIV.

*His Æmulatours and Detractours.*

AS *Plato's* eminent learning gained on one side many Disciples and admirers, so on the other side, it procured him many emulators, especially amongst his fellow Disciples, the followers of *Socrates*; amongst these,

*Xenophon* was exceedingly disaffected towards him; they emulated each other, and writ both upon one subject, a Symposium; *Socrates* his Apologie, moral commentaries: One writ of a Common-wealth, the other, the Institution of *Cyrus*: which book * *Plato* notes as commentitious, affirming *Cyrus* not to have been such a person as is there expresst. Though both writ much concerning *Socrates*, yet neither makes mention of the other except *Xenophon* once of *Plato*, in the third of his Commentaries. * *In Legib.*

*Antisthenes* being about to recite something that he had written, desired *Plato* to be present; *Plato* demanding what he meant to recite, he answered, that to contradict is not lawful.

How

How come you, ſaith *Plato*, to write upon that ſubject? And thereupon demonſtrating that he contradicted himſelf, *Antiſthenes* writ a Dialogue againſt him, intituled *Satho*.

*Ariſtippus* was at difference with him, for which reaſon (in *Phædone*) he covertly reproves *Ariſtippus*, that being near at *Ægina* when *Socrates* died, he came not to him. He writ a book of the luxury of the Antients; ſome aſcribe the amatory Epigrams to his invention, his deſign in that treatiſe being to detract from eminent perſons, amongſt the reſt from *Socrates* his Maſter, and *Plato* and *Xenophon* his fellow-Diſciples.

*Æſchines* and *Plato* alſo diſagreed: ſome affirm, that when *Plato* was in favour with *Dionyſius*, *Æſchines* came thither very poor, and was deſpiſed by *Plato*, but kindly entertained by *Ariſtippus*: But the Epiſtle of *Æſchines* put forth by *Allatius* expreſſeth the contrary. The diſcourſe which *Plato* relates, betwixt *Crito* and *Socrates* in Priſon, *Idomeneus* ſaith, was betwixt *Socrates* and *Æſchines*; by *Plato*, out of ill will to *Æſchines*, attributed to *Crito*. But of *Æſchines* he makes not any mention in all his works, except twice ſlightly; once in *Phædone*, where he names him amongſt the perſons preſent at *Socrates* his death; and again in his Apology ſpeaking of *Lyſanias* his Father.

*Phædo*, if we credit the detractions of *Athenæus*, was ſo much maligned by *Plato*, as that he was about to frame an indictment againſt him, to reduce him to that condition of ſervitude, out of which, by the procurement of *Socrates*, he had been redeemed; but his deſign being diſcovered, he gave it over. Beſides his conditiſciples,

*Diogenes* the *Cynick* derided his Laws, and aſſertion of Ideas; concerning the firſt, he asked if he were writing Laws; *Plato* aſſented. Have you not written already a Common-wealth, ſaith *Diogenes*? Yes, anſwered *Plato*. Had that Common-wealth Laws, ſaith *Diogenes*? *Plato* affirmed it had. Then, replyed *Diogenes*, what need you write new? * Another time, *Diogenes* ſaying, he could ſee the things of the World, but not Ideas: *Plato* anſwered, that is no wonder, for you have, and uſe thoſe eyes, which behold ſuch things: but the mind, which only can ſee the other, you uſe not.

† *Molon*, in detraction from him, ſaid, *It was not ſtrange* Dionyſius *ſhould be at* Corinth, *but that* Plato *ſhould be at* Sicily.

From theſe private differences, aroſe many ſcandalous imputations, forged and ſpread abroad by ſuch as envyed or maligned him: as * That he profeſt one thing, and practiſed another: † that he loved inordinately *Aſter*, *Dion*, *Phædrus*, *Alexis*, *Agatho*, and *Archeanaſſa*, a Curteſan of *Colopho*: * That he was a calumniatour, envious, proud, a gluttonous lover of Figgs: † that he was the worſt of Philoſophers, a parаſite to Tyrants, and many other accuſations alike improbable: from theſe the Comick Poets and others took liberty to abuſe him; † *Theopompus* in *Autochare*.

——*for one is none,*
*And two* (*as* Plato *holds*) *is hardly one.*

Anaxandrides in *Theſeo*;

*When Olives he* (*like* Plato) *doth devour*;

Timon,

*As* Plato *feigns, in framing* † *wonders skill'd.* † *Sic.*

Alexis *in* Meropide,

*Aptly thou comeſt, I walking round could meet*
(*Like* Plato) *nothing wiſe*; *but tir'd my feet.*

*And in* Anchilione,

*Thou ſpeak'ſt of things thou underſtands not, go*
*To* Plato, *Thence Nile and onyons know.*

Amph. *in* Amphicrate,

*What good from hence you may expect to riſe,*
*I can no more than* Plato's *good compriſe*;

*And in* Dexidemide,

Plato, *thou nothing knowſt, but how*
*To look ſevere and knit the brow.*

Cratylus *in* Pſeudobolymæo,

*A Man thou art, and haſt a Soul, but this*
*With* Plato *not ſure, but opinion is.*

Alexis *in* Olympiodoro.

*My body mortal is grown dry,*
*My Soul turn'd air that cannot dy*;
*Taught* Plato *this Philoſophy?*

*And in* Paraſito.

*Or thou with* Plato *rav'ſt alone.*

† *Ephippus* in *Naufrago*, objects to *Plato* and ſome friends of his, *that corrupted with Mony they detracted from many perſons; that they went proudly habited, and they took more care of their outward beauty, than the moſt luxurious*: See *Athenæus, lib.* 11. * *Athen. lib.* 11.

## CHAP. XV.

### *His Writings.*

THE writings of *Plato* are by way of Dialogue; of the Invention of Dialogue we have * already ſpoken; now of the Nature † *Chap.* thereof.

A Dialogue is compoſed of queſtions and anſwers Philoſophical or Political, aptly expreſſing the Characters of thoſe perſons that are the ſpeakers in an elegant ſtile; Dialectick is the art of diſcourſe, whereby we confirm or confute any thing by queſtions and anſwers of the Diſputants.

Of

* *Laert. vit. Diog.*

† *Laert.*

* *Seneca.*

† *Laert.*

* *Athen.*

† *Tretz. Chiliad*

* *Laert.*

Of *Platonick* diſcourſe there are two kinds, *Hyphegetick* and *Exegetick*, ſubſcribed thus,

- *Hyphegetick*
  - *Theoretick*
    - *Logick*
    - *Phyſick*
  - *Practick*
    - *Ethick*
    - *Politick*
- *Exegetick*
  - *Gymnaſtick*
    - *Majeutick*
    - *Phyſick*
  - *Agoniſtick*
    - *Endeictick*
    - *Anatreptick*

We know where there are other diviſions of Dialogues; as into Dramatick Narrative mixt: but that diviſion is more proper to Tragedy than to Philoſophy.

Of *Plato*'s Dialogues are

- *Phyſick*
  - *Timæus.*
- *Logick*
  - The Politick.
  - *Cratylus.*
  - *Parmenides.*
  - The Sophiſt.
- *Ethick*
  - Apology of *Socrates.*
  - *Crito.*
  - *Phædo.*
  - *Phædrus.*
  - *Sympoſium.*
  - *Menexemus.*
  - *Clitophon.*
  - *Epiſtles.*
  - *Philebus.*
  - *Hipparchus.*
  - *The Rivals.*
- *Politick*
  - *The Common-wealth.*
  - *The Laws.*
  - *Minos.*
  - *Epinomis.*
  - *The Atlantick.*
- *Majeutick*
  - *Alcibiades.*
  - *Theages.*
  - *Lyſis.*
  - *Laches.*
- *Piraſtick*
  - *Euthyphron.*
  - *Menon.*
  - *Ion.*
  - *Charmides.*
  - *Theætetus.*
- *Endeictick*
  - *Protagoras.*
- *Anatreptick*
  - *Euthydemus.*
  - *Hippias* 1.
  - *Hippias* 2.
  - *Gorgias* 1.
  - *Gorgias* 2.

It being much controverted (continueth *Laertius*) whether *Plato* doth dogmatize, ſome affirming, others denying it, it will be neceſſary to ſay ſomething thereupon. Δογματίζειν to dogmatiſe is to impoſe a Doctrine, as νομοθετεῖν to impoſe a Law; a Doctrine is taken two ways, either for that which is Decreed, or the Decree it ſelf; That which is Decreed is a propoſition, the Decree it ſelf an impoſition. *Plato* expounds thoſe things which he conceiveth true: Confutes thoſe which are falſe, ſuſpends his opinion in thoſe which are doubtful. He aſſerts what he conceiveth true under one of theſe four perſons, *Socrates*, *Timæus* an *Athenian* Gueſt, an *Ælian* Gueſt; The Gueſts are not, as ſome conceive, *Plato* and *Parmenides*, but imagined nameleſs perſons, as what *Socrates*, *Timæus* ſpeak, are the Decrees of *Plato*. Thoſe whom he argueth of falſehood are *Thraſymachus*, *Callicles*, *Polus*, *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Hippias*, *Euthydemus*, and the like.

In Argument he often uſed induction of both ſorts. Induction is a diſcourſe, which from certain truths collects, and inferreth a truth like to thoſe: Of Induction there are two kinds, one from Contraries, another from Conſequents: From Contraries, as when he who is queſtioned, anſwereth in all things contrary to himſelf, as thus; My Father is either the ſame with yours, or not the ſame, if therefore thy Father be not the ſame with mine, he is not my Father: and again, if a Man be not a living creature, he is Stone, Wood, or the like; but he is neither Stone nor Wood, for he hath a Soul, and moveth himſelf, therefore he is a living creature; if a living creature, a Dog and an Ox. This kind of Induction by Contraries, ſerves not for aſſertion, but confutation: Inductions by Conſequents is two-fold; one, when a ſingular being ſought, is concluded from a ſingular, the firſt proper to Oratours, the ſecond to Logicians; as in the firſt, the queſtion is, Whether ſuch an one were a Murtherer, it is proved from his being Bloody at the ſame time. This Induction is Rhetorical, for Rhetorick is converſant in ſingulars, not in univerſals; it inquireth not after juſtice, but after the ſeveral parts thereof: the other is Dialectick, whereby Univerſals are concluded from Singulars, as in this queſtion; Whether the Soul be immortal, and whether the living are of the dead, which is demonſtrated in his Book of the Soul, by a general Maxime, that contraries proceed from contraries, this being general, is proved by ſingulars, as, waking ſucceeds ſleeping, the greater the leſſer, and ſo on the contrary. Thus he uſeth to confirm what he aſſerts.

*Thraſyllus* ſaith, he publiſhed his Dialogues according to the tragick Tetralogy: His genuine Dialogues are fifty ſix, his Common-wealth divided into ten, they make nine Tetralogies, reckoning his Common-wealth one Book, his Laws another. The firſt Tetralogy hath a common ſubject, declaring what is the proper Life of a Philoſopher: every Book hath a two-fold title; one from the principal perſon, the other from the ſubject.

The

The first
- *Euthyphron*, or of Piety: *Piraſtick.*
- *Socrates* his Apology: *Ethick.*
- *Crito*, or of that which is to be done: *Ethick.*
- *Phædo*, or of the Soul: *Ethick.*

The ſecond
- *Cratylus*, or, of right naming: *Logick.*
- *Theætetus*, or, of Science: *Piraſtick.*
- *The Sophiſt*, or, of Ens: *Logick.*
- *The Politick*, or of a Kingdom: *Logick.*

The third
- *Parmenides*, or, of Idea's: *Logick.*
- *Philebus*, or, of Pleaſure: *Ethick.*
- *The Sympoſium*, or, of Good: *Ethick.*
- *Phædrus*, or, of Love: *Ethick.*

The fourth
- *Alcibiades* 1. or, of humane Nature: *Majeutick.*
- *Alcibiades* 2. or, of Prayer: *Majeutick.*
- *Hipparchus*, or, the Covetous: *Ethick.*
- *The Rivals*, or, of Philoſophy: *Ethick.*

The fifth
- *Theages*, or, of Philoſophy: *Majeutick.*
- *Charmides*, or, of Temperance: *Piraſtick.*
- *Laches*, or, of Fortitude: *Majeutick.*
- *Lyſis*, or, of Friendſhip: *Majeutick.*

The ſixth
- *Euthydemus*, or, the Litigious: *Anatreptick.*
- *Protagoras*, or, the Sophiſt: *Endeictick.*
- *Gorgias*, or, of Rhetorick: *Anatreptick.*
- *Menon*, or, of Virtue: *Piraſtick.*

The ſeventh
- *Hippias* firſt, or, of Honeſt: *Anatreptick.*
- *Hippias* ſecond, or, of Falſe: *Anatreptick.*
- *Io*, or, of Ilias: *Piraſtick.*
- *Menexenus*, or, the Funeral Oration: *Ethick.*

The eighth
- *Clitophon*, or, the Exhortation: *Moral.*
- *The Common-wealth*, or, of Juſt: *Politick.*
- *Timæus*, or, of Nature: *Phyſick.*
- *Critias*, or, the Atlantick: *Ethick.*

The ninth
- *Minos*, or, of Law: *Politick.*
- *Laws*, or, of Legiſlation: *Politick.*
- *Epinomis*, or, the Nocturnal convention; or, the Philoſophers: *Politick.*
- *Epiſtles* thirteen, Ethick, in the Inſcriptions whereof he uſeth εὖ πράττειν. *Cleon.* χαίρειν. to *Ariſtodemus* one; to *Architas* two; to *Dionyſius* four; to *Hermias*, *Eraſtus*, and *Coriſcus* one; to *Leodamas* one; to *Dion* one; to *Dion*'s Friends two. Thus *Thraſilaus.*

Others, of whom is *Ariſtophanes* the Grammarian, reduce his Dialogues to Trilogies, placing in

The firſt
- *The Common-wealth.*
- *Timæus.*
- *Critias.*

The ſecond
- *The Sophiſter.*
- *The Politick.*
- *Cratylus.*

The third
- *Laws.*
- *Minos.*
- *Epinomis.*

The fourth
- *Theætetus.*
- *Euthyphron.*
- *Apology.*

The fifth
- *Crito.*
- *Phædo.*
- *Epiſtles.* The reſt ſingle without order.

Some, as we ſaid, begin with *Alcibiades Major*, others from *Theages*, others from *Euthyphron*, others from *Clitiphon*, others from *Timæus*, others from *Phædrus* (which they ſay was the firſt Dialogue he wrote, as the ſubject it ſelf ſeemeth to confirm, which ſavours of youth; and therefore *Dicearchus* condemns it as too light: to which cenſure * *Cicero* agreeth, as conceiving, he aſcribeth too great a power to Love) others begin with *Theætetus*, many with his Apology.

* *Cicer. Tuſc. quæſt.* 2.

He mentions not himſelf in all his writings, except once in his *Phædo*, and another time in his Apology for *Socrates*. At the recital of his *Phædo*, all but *Ariſtotle* roſe, and went away. The efficacy of that Dialogue which treats of the immortality of the Soul, is evident from *Cleombrotus* of *Ambracia*, who, as ſoon as he had read it, was ſo diſaffected to life, that he threw himſelf from a high Wall into the Sea; upon whom thus † *Callimachus*,

† *Epigr.*

Cleombrotus *cries out, farewel this light,*
*And headlong throws himſelf int'endleſs night:*
*Not that he ought had done, deſerving death,*
*But* Plato *read, and weary grew of breath.*

The Dialogues generally noted as ſpurious (not to ſay any thing of his *Epinomis*, though ſome aſcribe it to *Philippus* the *Opuntian*) are theſe,

*Midon*, or the Horſe-courſer.
*Erixias*, or *Eraſiſtratus*.
*Alcyon*.
*Acephali*, or the *Siſyphi*.
*Axiochus*.
*Phæaces*.
*Demodochus*.
*Chelidon*.
*The ſeventh*.
*Epimenides*.

Of theſe *Alcion* is aſcribed by *Phavorinus* to *Leon*.

His ſtile, *Ariſtotle* ſaith, is betwixt Proſe and Verſe. He uſeth variety of names, that his work may not eaſily be underſtood by the unlearned. He conceiveth wiſdom properly to be of intellectual things, Knowledge of real Beings converſant about God, and the Soul ſeparate from the Body. *Properly*, he calleth *Philoſophy Wiſdom*, being the appetition of Divine *Knowledge*; but, *commonly* he calleth all skill knowledge, as an Artificer, a wiſe Man. He likewiſe uſed the ſame names in divers ſignifications; φαῦλος, which properly ſignifies Evil, he uſeth for Simple; as *Euripides* in his *Lycimnius* of *Hercules*,

φαῦλον ἄχομψον ταμίαις ἄγαθον.

The ſame words *Plato* ſometimes takes for *honeſt*, ſometimes for *little*. He likewiſe uſeth divers names to ſignifie the ſame thing: *Idea* he uſeth both for ſpecies and genus; Exemplar, both principle and cauſe. Sometimes he uſeth contrary expreſſions to ſignifie the ſame thing; Senſible he calleth a being and no being; a being, as having been produced; no being, in reſpect of its continual mutation. Idea, neither moveable nor permanent, the ſame both one and many. The like he uſeth often in other things.

The method of his diſcourſe is three-fold: firſt, to declare what that is which is taught; then for what reaſon it is aſſerted, whether as a principal cauſe, or as a compariſon, and whether to defend the Tenent, or oppugn the contrary. Thirdly, whether it be rightly ſaid.

The marks, which he uſually affixed to his writings, are theſe.

denotes *Platonick* words and figures.

δόγμα, Doctrines and opinions proper to *Plato*.

ἐκλελεγμένον, Choice expreſſions.

δόγμα ἐκλελεγμένη, Corrections.

περιττὸν ἐκλελεγμένον, Things ſuperfluous.

ἀνάπαιγμα ἐκλελεγμένον, Double ſignification or uſe.

χαρακτήριον, philoſophical inſtitution.


ἀκόλουθον, Agreement of opinions.

ἄθετον, Improbation. Hitherto *Laertius*.

There are two Epiſtles under *Plato*'s name, beſides thoſe in his works, already mentioned, one in *Laertius* his life of *Architas*.

Plato *to* Architas, εὐπραξίαν.

THE *Commentaries which came from you, we received with extraordinary content, infinitely admiring the Writer, who appears to us a perſon worthy of thoſe ancient predeceſſors; for thoſe Men are ſaid to be* Myræans *of thoſe* Trojans, *which were baniſhed in the time of* Laomedon, *good Men, as Tradition ſpeaks them. Thoſe Commentaries of mine, concerning which you write, are not yet poliſhed; however as they are, I have ſent them to you, in the keeping of them we agree both, ſo as I need not give you any directions. Farewel.*

Another publiſhed by *Leo Allatius* amongſt the *Socratick* Epiſtles.

*I had not any of thoſe things to ſend to* Syracuſe *which* Architas *deſired to receive by you; as ſoon as poſſible I will ſend to you. Philoſophy hath wrought in me I know not whether good or bad, a hatred of converſing with many perſons, juſtly, I think, ſince they err in all kind of folly as well in private as publick affairs; but if unjuſtly, yet known I can hardly live and breath otherwiſe. For this reaſon I have fled out of the City, as out of a Den of wild Beaſts, living not far from the* Epheſtiades, *and the places thereabouts. I now ſee, that* Timon *hated not Men, he could not affect Beaſts, therefore lived he alone by himſelf, perhaps not without danger. Take this as you pleaſe; my reſolution is to live far from the City, now and for ever hereafter, as long as God ſhall grant me life.*

In

In Poesy he writ
*Dithyrambs.*
*An Epick Poem,*
*Four Tragedies,* all which (as we said) he burned.

*The Atlantick Story, of which thus* Plutarch; Solon *begun the Atlantick Story (which he had learnt of the Priests of* Sais, *very proper for the* Athenians) *but gave it over by reason of his old age, and the largeness of the work.* Plato *took the same argument, as a waste piece of fertile Ground fallen to him by hereditary right; He manured it, refined it, enclosed it with large Walls, Porches and Galleries, such as never any Fable, or Poem had before; but because he undertook it late, he was prevented by death. The more things written delight, the more their not being perfected is* For as the Athenian *City left the Temple of* Jupiter; *so* Plato's *Wisdom, amongst many excellent writings, left the Atlantick argument alone imperfect.*

*Epigrams,* of which these are extant in *Laertius,* and the Anthology.

Upon one named *Aster.*

* Laert. Anthol. 3. 6. 27. * *The Stars, my Star, thou viewest; Heav'n I would be,*
*That I with thousand eyes might gaze on thee.*

Upon his *Death.*

† Laert. † *A* Phosphor *'mongst the living late wert thou,*
*But shin'st among the dead a* Hesper *now.*

Epitaph on *Dion,* engrav'd on his Tomb at *Syracuse.*

* Laert. Anthol. 4. 33. 26. * *Old* Hecuba *the* Trojan *Matron's years*
*Were interwoven by the Fates with Tears;*
*But thee with blooming hopes my* Dion *deckt,*
*Gods did a Trophy of their pow'r erect.*
*Thy honour'd reliques in their Country rest,*
*Ah* Dion! *whose love rages in my breast.*

On *Alexis.*

† Laert. Anthol. 3. 33. 44. † *Fair is* Alexis, *I no sooner said,*
*When every one his eyes that way convey'd:*
*My Soul (as when some Dog a Bone we show,*
*Who snatcheth it) lost we not* Phædrus *so?*

On *Archeanassa.*

* Laert. * *To* Archæ'nassa, *on whose furrow'd brow*
*Love sits in triumph, I my service vow;*
*If her declining Graces shine so bright,*
*What flames felt you, who saw her noon of light?*

On *Agathon.*

*My Soul, when I kiss'd* Agathon, *did start*
*Up to my lip, just ready to depart.*

To *Xantippe.*

† Laert. † *An Apple I (Love's emblem) at thee throw,*
*Thou in exchange thy Virgin-zone bestow.*
*If thou refuse my sute, yet read in this,*
*How short thy years, how frail thy Beauty is.*
*I cast the Apple, loving those love thee,*
* Xantippe *yield, for soon both old will be.* * Anthol.

† On the *Eretrians* vanquish'd by the *Persians.* † Herod. lib. 6.

* *We in* Eubœa *born Eretrians are* * Laert.
*Buried in* Susa *from our Country far.*

*Venus* and the *Muses.*

† *Virgins (said* Venus *to the Muses) pay* † Laert.
*Homage to us, or, Love shall wound your Hearts:*
*The Muses answer'd, Take these Toyes away,*
*Our Breasts are proof against his childish darts.*

Fortune exchang'd.

* *One finding Gold, in change, the halter quits,* * Laert. Anthol.
*Missing his Gold, 'tother the halter knits.* 84. 1.

On *Sappho.*

† *He, who believes the Muses Nine, mistakes,* † Anth. 1. 67.
*For* Lesbian Sappho *ten their number makes.* 13.

Time.

* *Time all things brings to pass, a change creates* * Anth. 1. 19
*In Names, in Forms, in Nations and in States.*

Death.

† *That is a Plough-man's Grave, a Sailor's this;* † Anthol. 3.
*To Sea and Land alike Death common is.* 22. 3.

On one Shipwrack'd.

* *The cruel Sea, which took my life away,* * Anth. 3. 22. 6.
*Forbore to strip me of my last Array:*
*From this a covetous Man did not refrain,*
*Acting a crime so great for so small gain;*
*But let him wear it to the shades, and there*
*Before great* Pluto *in my Cloaths appear.*

Another.

† *Safely (O Sailors) press the Land, and wave,* † Anth. 3. 22. 7.
*Yet know, ye pass a Shipwrack'd person's Grave.*

On the Statue of *Venus.*

* Paphian Cythera, *swiming cross the Main,* * Anth. 4. 12. 8
*To* Guidas *came her Statue there to see,*
*And from on high, surveying round the Plain*
*Where could* Praxiteles *me spy? (saith she)*
*He saw not what's forbidden mortal Eyes,*
*'Twas* Mars's *Steel that* Venus *did incize.*

Another.

† *Not carv'd by Steel, or* Praxitele's *fam'd hand:* † Anth. 4. 12. 9.
*Thus nak'd before the Judges did'st thou stand.*

Love sleeping.

* *Within the Covert of a shady Grove* * Anth. 4. 12
*We saw the little red-cheek'd God of Love.* 19.
*He had nor Bow nor Quiver, those among*

*-The neighb'ring Trees upon a Bough were hung:*
*Upon a Bank of tender Roſe-buds laid*
*He, (ſmiling) ſlept; Bees with their noiſe invade*
*His reſt, and on his lips their Honey made.*

Pan *Piping.*

* *Anth.* 4. 12. 74. * *Dwell awful Silence on the ſhady Hills*
*Among the bleating Flocks, and purling rills,*
*When* Pan *the Reed doth to his lip apply,*
*Inſpiring it with ſacred Harmony,*
*Hydriads, and Hamadyrads at that ſound*
*In a well order'd meaſure beat the ground.*

On the Image of a *Satyre* in a Fountain, and *Love* ſleeping.

† *Anth.* 4. 12. 96. † *A skilful hand this Satyre made ſo near*
*To life, that only Breath is wanting here:*
*I am attendant to the Nymphs; before*
*I fill'd out purple Wine, now Water poure;*
*Who ere thou art com'ſt nigh, tread ſoftly, leſt*
*You waken Love out of his pleaſing reſt.*

Another.

* *On horn'd* Lyæus *I attend,* * *Anth.* 4. 12. 97.
*And pour the ſtreams theſe Nayads lend,*
*Whoſe noiſe Love's ſlumber doth befriend.*

Another.

† *This Satyre* Diodorus *did not make,* † *Anth.* 4. 12. 102.
*But charm aſleep; if prick'd he will awake.*

On a *Seal.*

* *Five Oxen gazing in a flow'ry Mead,* * *Anth.* 4. 12. 6.
*A Jaſper Seal done to the life doth hold,*
*The little herd away long ſince had fled,*
*We're not inclos'd within a pale of Gold.*

# THE DOCTRINE OF PLATO Delivered by ALCINOUS.

## CHAP. I.

*Of PHILOSOPHY, and how a Philoſopher muſt be qualified.*

SUCH a Summary as this may be given of the Doctrine of *Plato*. *Philoſophy* is the deſire of Wiſdom, or ſolution of the Soul from the Body, and a converſion to thoſe things, which are true and perceptible by Intellect. *Wiſdom*, σοφία, is the Science of things Divine and Humane. A *Philoſopher* is he who takes denomination from Philoſophy, as a Muſician from Muſick. He who is to be a Philoſopher, muſt be thus qualified; Firſt, he muſt have a natural capacity of all ſuch Learning as is able to fit and bring him to the knowledge of that eſſence which is perceptible by Intellect, not of that which is in continual fluxion or mutation. Then he muſt have a natural affection to Truth, and an averſion from receiving falſehood, and beſides this, temperate in a manner by Nature; for thoſe parts which uſe to be tranſported with paſſions, he muſt have reduced to obedience by Nature. For whoſoever hath once embraced thoſe diſciplines which are converſant in conſideration of ſuch things as truly exiſt, and hath addicted all his ſtudy thereunto, little valueth corporeal pleaſure. Moreover a Philoſopher muſt have a liberal mind, for the eſtimation of mean things is contrary to a Man who intended to contemplate the truth of things. Likewiſe he muſt naturally love Juſtice, for he muſt be ſtudious of Truth, Temperance, and Liberality. He muſt alſo have an acute apprehenſion, and a good memory, for theſe inform a Philoſopher, thoſe gifts of Nature, if improved by Diſcipline and Education, make a Man perfect in Vertue, but neglected are the cauſe of the worſt ills. Theſe *Plato* uſed to call by the ſame names with the Virtues, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, and *Juſtice*.

## CHAP. II.

*That Contemplation is to be preferred before Action.*

WHereas *Life* is twofold, *Contemplative* and *Active*, the chief Office of the Contemplative conſiſteth in the knowledge of truth, as of the Active, in the practice of thoſe things which are dictated by Reaſon. Hence the Contemplative life is firſt, after which as neceſſary followeth the Active. That it is ſo, may eaſily be proved thus. Contemplation is an Office of the intellect in the underſtanding of Intelligibles: Action is an operation of the rational Soul, performed by meditation and ſervice of the Body. For the Soul, when it contemplateth the Divinity and the notions thereof, is ſaid to be beſt affected. This affection is called φρόνησις *Wiſdom*, which is nothing elſe but an aſſimilation to the Deity. This therefore ought to be eſteemed the firſt and principal, as being moſt expetible and proper to Man; for there are no impediments that can hinder it from being within our power, and it is cauſe of our propoſed end. But Active Life, and the practiſe thereof, chiefly making uſe of the mediation of the Body, are many times obſtructed; Whereof thoſe things which the Contemplative life conſiders in order to the reformation of the manners of Men, a Philoſopher, as often as neceſſity requireth, ſhall transfer to Action. Then ſhall a good Man apply himſelf to the adminiſtration of Civil Affairs, when he ſeeth them ill managed by others. He muſt look upon the leading of an Army, adminiſtration of Juſtice and Embaſſies, as things neceſſary. The inſtitution of Laws, ordering the Common-wealth, the compreſſure of Seditions, education of youth in Diſcipline, are the chiefeſt, and, among thoſe things which relate to Action, of greateſt conſequence. Hence is it manifeſt, that a Philoſopher muſt not only be perſeverant in Contemplation, but alſo cheriſh and increaſe it, ſometimes giving himſelf to Action as an attendant upon Contemplation.

## CHAP. III.

*The three parts of Philoſophy.*

THE ſtudy of a Philoſopher ſeemeth according to *Plato* to be converſant chiefly in three things, in the *Contemplation* and knowledge of things, in the *Practice* of Vertue, and in *Diſputation*. The Science of things that are, is called *Theoretick* of thoſe which pertain to Action, *Practick*; the diſputative part *Dialectick*.

*Dialectick*; is divided into *Diviſion*, *Definition*, *Induction* and *Syllogiſm*; *Syllogiſm* into the *Apodeictick*, which concerneth neceſſary ratiocination; and *Rhetorical*, which concerneth *Enthymeme*, called an imperfect ratiocination; and laſtly into *Sophiſms*. This the Philoſopher muſt look upon, not as the chiefeſt but a neceſſary part.

Of *Practick* Philoſophy, one part is converſant about *Manners*, another orders *Families*, the laſt takes care of a *Common-wealth*. The firſt called *Ethick*, the ſecond, *Oeconomick*, the third, *Politick*.

Of *Theoretick* Philoſophy, one part enquires into things immutable and Divine, and the firſt cauſes of things; this is called *Theology*; another the motion of the Stars, the revolution and reſtitution of Celeſtial Bodies, and the conſtitution of the World. This is called *Phyſick*. That whereby we enquire Geometrically, and thoſe other Diſciplines which are called μαθήματα, is termed *Mathematick*.

*Philoſophy* being thus divided, we muſt firſt, according to *Plato*, ſpeak of the *Dialectick* part, and in that, firſt of the *Judiciary*.

## CHAP. IV.

### *DIALECTICK.*

*Of the Judiciary part.*

WHereas there is ſomthing that judgeth, ſomething which is judged, it is neceſſary alſo that there be ſomething which is made of both theſe, properly called *Judgment*. This Judgment may not unfitly be termed Judiciary, but more commonly that which judgeth. This is twofold; one, *from which*; another *by which* judgment is made. That is intellect; this the natural Organ accommodated for judgment; primarily of *true* things; ſecondarily of *falſe*; neither is it any thing but natural reaſon. To explain this more fully, of things which are, a Philoſopher who judgeth the things themſelves, may be called a *Judge*; reaſon likewiſe is a *Judge*, by which truth is judged, which even now we called an Organ.

*Reaſon* is twofold, one *incomprehenſible* and true; the other is *never deceived* in the knowledge of thoſe things which are. The firſt is in the power of God, not of Man, the ſecond in that of Man alſo. This likewiſe is twofold, the firſt *Science*, and ſcientifick reaſon; the ſecond *Opinion*. The firſt hath *certitude*, and *Stability*, as being converſant in things certain and ſtable. The ſecond, *ſimilitude of truth* and *opinion*, as being converſant in things ſubject to mutation. Of ſcience in Intelligibles, and opinion in ſenſibles, the principles are *Intellection* and *Senſe*.

*Senſe* is a paſſion of the Soul by the mediation of the Body, firſt, declaring a paſſive faculty; When through the Organs of ſenſe, the ſpecies of things are impreſs'd in the Soul, ſo, as they are not defac'd by time, but remain firm and laſting, the conſervation thereof is called *Memory*.

*Opinion* is the conjunction of memory and ſenſe; for, when ſome object occurreth, which can firſt move the ſenſe, thereby ſenſe is effected in us, and by ſenſe, memory. Then again is the ſame thing objected to our ſenſe, we joyn the precedent with the conſequent ſenſe. and now ſay within our ſelves, *Socrates*, a Horſe, Fire and the like: this is termed opinion, when we joyn the precedent memory with the late ſenſe; when theſe agree within themſelves, it is a *true opinion*, if they diſagree, a *falſe*; for, if a man, having the ſpecies of *Socrates* in his memory, meet with *Plato*, and think, by reaſon of ſome likeneſs betwixt

twixt them, he hath met *Socrates* again, and afterwards joyn the ſenſe of *Plato*, which he took, as it were, from *Socrates*, with the memory which he preſerved of *Socrates*, there will ariſe a falſe opinion.

That wherein ſenſe and memory are formed, *Plato* compareth to a *tablet of Wax*, but when the Soul by cogitation reforming theſe things, which are conceived in opinion by memory and ſenſe, looketh upon theſe as things from which the other are derived: *Plato* ſometimes calleth this *a picture and Phantaſie*. *Cogitation* he calleth the Souls diſcourſe within her ſelf: *Speech*, that which floweth from the Cogitation through the Mouth by voice. *Intellection* is an operation of the Intellect, contemplating firſt Intelligibles. It is two-fold, one of the Soul, beholding Intelligibles before ſhe cometh into the body; the other of the ſame, after ſhe is immers'd in the body: The firſt is properly called *Intellection*; the other, whilſt ſhe is in the body, is termed *natural knowledge*, which is nothing but an intellection of the Soul confined to the body. When we ſay, Intellection is the principle of Science, we mean not this latter, but the other, which is competible to the Soul in her ſeparate ſtate, and as we ſaid, is then called Intellection, now natural Knowledge. The ſame *Plato* termeth *ſimple Knowledge, the wing of the Soul*; ſometimes *Reminiſcence*.

Of theſe ſimple Sciences conſiſteth *Reaſon*, which is born with us, the efficient of natural Science; and as reaſon is two-fold, Scientifick, and opinionative, ſo Intellection and Senſe. It is likewiſe neceſſary that they have their objects, which are *Intelligibles* and *Senſibles*: And foraſmuch as of *Intelligibles*, ſome are *Primary*, as Idæas, others *Secondary*, as the Species, that are in matter, and cannot be ſeparated from it. *Intellection* likewiſe muſt be two-fold, one *of Primaries*, the other *of Secondaries*. Again, foraſmuch as in *Senſibles*, ſome are *Primary*, as qualities, colour, whiteneſs, others by *accident*, as white coloured, and that which is concrete, as fire: in the ſame manner is *Senſe*, firſt, *of Primaries*, ſecond, *of Secondaries*. Intellection judgeth primary Intelligibles, not without Scientifick knowledge, by a certain comprehenſion without diſcourſe. Secondaries the ſame Scientifick reaſon judgeth, but not without Intellection. Senſibles, as well Primary as Secondary ſenſe, judgeth, but not without opinionative reaſon. That which is concrete, the ſame reaſon judgeth, but not without ſenſe. And ſince the Intelligible World is the Primary Intelligible, the ſenſible ſomething concrete, the firſt Intellection judgeth with reaſon, that is, not without reaſon; The other opinionative reaſon not without ſenſe, whereas there is both contemplation and action; right reaſon diſcerneth not in the ſame manner thoſe which are ſubject to Contemplation, and thoſe which are ſubject to action: In contemplation, it conſidereth what is true, what falſe; in things that belong to action, what is proper, what improper, what that is which is done. For, having an innate knowledge of that which is good and honeſt, by uſing reaſon, and applying it to thoſe natural notions, as to certain rules, we judge whether every thing be good or bad.

## CHAP. V.

*The Elements and Office of Dialectick.*

OF Dialectick, the firſt and chiefeſt Element according to *Plato*, is, firſt, to conſider the *eſſence* of every thing; next the *accidents* thereof. *What a thing* is, it conſiders, either from its ſuperiors, by *diviſion* and *definition*, or contrarywiſe by *Analyſis*. *Accidents* which adhere to ſubſtances, are conſidered, either from thoſe things which are contained by *induction*, or from thoſe which do contain by *Syllogiſm*.

Hence the parts of *Dialectick* are theſe, *Diviſion, Definition, Analyſis, Induction, Syllogiſm*.

Of *Diviſions*, *one* is a diſtribution of the Genus into Species, and of the whole into parts; as when we divide the Soul into the rational part, and the irrational; and the latter, into the concupiſcible and the iraſcible. *Another* is of a word into divers ſignifications, when the ſame may be taken ſeveral ways. *A third* of accidents, according to their ſubjects; as when we ſay of good, ſome belong to the Soul, ſome to the body, ſome are external. The *fourth* of ſubjects, according to their accidents; as of Men, ſome are good, ſome ill, ſome indifferent. Diviſion of the Genus into its Species, is firſt to be uſed, when we examine the eſſence of a thing, this cannot be done but by definitions.

*Definition* is made by Diviſion in this manner, we muſt take the Genus of the thing to be defined, as that of Man, living creature; that we muſt divide by the next differences, deſcending to its ſpecies, as rational, and irrational, mortal, and immortal. Thus by adding the firſt difference to the Genus, is made the definition of Man.

Of *Analyſis* there are three kinds, *one* by which we aſcend from Senſibles to primary Intelligibles, *another* whereby we aſcend by demonſtrates and ſubdemonſtrates, to indemonſtrable immediate propoſitions. The *laſt*, which from ſuppoſition proceedeth to thoſe principles which are taken without ſuppoſition

The firſt kind is thus, as if from that Beauty which is in the body, we ſhould proceed to that of the mind, from that to another converſant in the offices of life, thence to that of Laws, and ſo at laſt to the vaſt ocean of Beauty, that by theſe ſteps, as it were, we may arrive at the ſight of the ſupream Beauty.

The ſecond kind of Analyſis is thus; We muſt ſuppoſe that which we ſeek, and conſider thoſe which are precedent, demonſtrating them by progreſſion, from inferiours to ſuperiours, until we arrive at that which is firſt and generally granted: From which, beginning anew, we return ſynthetically to that which was ſought. As for example, I enquire whether the Soul be immortal, and ſuppoſing it to be ſo, I enquire, whether it be always moved. This being demonſtrated, I again enquire, whether that which is always moved, is moved by it ſelf, which being again demonſtrated, we examine, whether that which is moved by its ſelf,

ſelf, be the principle of motion. Laſtly, whether a principle is ingenerate; this, as moſt certain, is admitted by all. That which is ingenerate, is alſo incorruptible; whence, as from a thing moſt certain, we collect this demonſtration. If a Principle be ingenerate and incorruptible, that which is moved by it ſelf, is the principle of motion; but the Soul is moved by it ſelf, therefore the Soul is incorruptible, ingenerate, and immortal.

The third kind of *Analyſis* upon ſuppoſition is this; He who enquireth after a thing, firſt, ſuppoſeth that thing, then obſerves what will follow upon that ſuppoſition. If a reaſon for the ſuppoſition be required, aſſuming another ſuppoſition, he enquireth, whether that which was firſt ſuppoſed, follow again upon another ſuppoſition: This he always obſerveth, until he come at laſt to that principle, which is not taken upon ſuppoſition.

*Induction* is every method by reaſon, which proceed...n either from like to like, or from Singulars to Univerſals: It is of great efficacy to excite natural notions.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of Propoſitions and Argumentations.*

OF that ſpeech which we call a *Propoſition*, there are two kinds, *Affirmation* and *Negation*; *Affirmation*, as *Socrates* walketh; *Negation*, as *Socrates* walketh not.

Of Affirmative and Negative Propoſitions, ſome are *Univerſal*, others *Particular*: A *particular Affirmative* is thus, Some pleaſure is good; a *particular Negative* is, Some pleaſure is not good An *Univerſal affirmative*, all diſhoneſt things are ill; an *Univerſal negative*, no diſhoneſt thing is good.

Of Propoſitions, ſome are *Categorical*, ſome *Hypothetical*: the Categorical are ſimple, as every juſt thing is good: Hypothetical import conſequence or repugnance.

*Syllogiſms* are uſed by *Plato*, either to *confute* or *demonſtrate*; to confute, what is falſe by interrogation, to demonſtrate, what is true by declaration. *Syllogiſm* is a ſpeech, wherein ſome things being laid down, another thing beſides thoſe which are laid down, is neceſſarily inferred from them.

Of Syllogiſms ſome are *Categorical*, ſome *Hypothetical*, ſome *Mixt*: *Categorical* are thoſe whoſe ſumptions and concluſions are ſimple propoſitions. *Hypothetical* are thoſe which conſiſt of *Hypothetical* Propoſitions: *Mixt*, which conclude both.

*Plato* uſeth *demonſtrative* arguments in thoſe Dialogues, wherein he explaineth his own doctrine; *Probable* againſt Sophiſts and young Men; *Litigious* againſt thoſe who are properly called Eriſtick, as *Euthydemus* and *Hippias*.

Of Categorical *Syllogiſms* there are three *figures*; the *firſt* is, that wherein the common extream is firſt the prædicate, then the ſubject. The *ſecond*, when the common extream is prædicate in both: the *third* wherein the common extream is ſubject in both. *Extreams* are the parts of a Propoſition, as in this, *A Man is a living creature*, *Man* and *living creature* are the extreams. *Plato* often argueth in the firſt, ſecond, and third figures; in the firſt, as *in Alcibiade*;

*Juſt things are honeſt,*
*Honeſt things are good,*
*Therefore juſt things are good.*

In the *ſecond*, as *in Parmenide*; as,

*That which hath no parts is neither ſtraight nor crooked,*
*But whatſoever hath figure is either ſtraight or crooked,*
*Therefore, whatſoever hath not parts, hath not figure.*

In the *third* thus, in the ſame book,

*Whatſoever hath figure is qualitative,*
*Whatſoever hath figure is finite,*
*Therefore whatſoever is qualitative is finite.*

Likewiſe by *Hypothetical* Syllogiſm *Plato* often diſputeth, chiefly *in Parmenide* thus,

*If one hath not parts, it hath neither beginning, end, nor middle,*
*But if it have neither beginning, end, nor middle, it hath no bound, and if no bound, no figure,*
*Therefore if one hath no parts, it hath no figure.*

In the *Second* Hypothetical figure, ordinarily called the third, wherein the common extream is ſubject in both, he argueth thus,

*If one hath not parts, it is neither ſtraight nor crooked,*
*If it hath a figure, it is either ſtraight or crooked,*
*Therefore if it hath no parts, it hath no figure.*

In the *Third* figure by ſome called the ſecond, wherein the common extream twice precedes the other two, he thus argues, in *Phædone*,

*If having the Knowledge of Equality we forget it not, we know, but if we forget it, we have recourſe to Reminiſcence*, &c.

*Mixt* Syllogiſms which conclude by conſequence, he uſeth thus;

*If one is whole and finite, that is, having beginning, middle and end; it hath figure alſo;*
*But the Antecedent is true,*
*Therefore the Conſequent.*

Of thoſe alſo which overthrow by conſequence, the differences may be gathered out of *Plato*.

Thus when a Man hath diligently underſtood the faculties of the mind, the various differences of Men, the ſeveral kinds of reaſoning which may be accommodated to this or that, and to what perſons ſuch and ſuch reaſons are to be uſed, he, meeting with an opportunity ſuiting with his purpoſe, will become a perfect Orator.

The

The reasons of *Sophisms* and captious arguments are, if we observe narrowly, expressed by *Plato* in *Euthydemo*, for there is declared which are in words, which in things, and how they are to be solved.

The ten *Prædicaments* are touched by *Plato in Parmenide*, and in his other Dialogues; the place of Etymologies is fully set down *in Cratylo*. To conclude, he was singularly admirable for division and definition, wherein the greatest force of Dialectick consisteth.

The Summ of that which he saith *in Cratylo*, is this; He enquireth whether *Names* are by the power and reason of *Nature*, or by *imposition*. He concludeth that the rectitude of names is by a certain imposition, not temerarious or casual, but seeming to follow the nature of the things themselves; for rectitude of names is nothing but an imposition consonant to the nature of the thing: Hence every imposition of names is not sufficient for rectitude, neither the nature nor first sound of the voice, but that which is composed of both; so as every name is conveniently and properly applyed to the thing. For any name applyed to any thing will not signifie rightly, as if we should impose the name of horse upon Man. To speak is a kind of Action: Not he that speaketh any way speaketh rightly, but he who speaketh so as the nature of the thing requireth. And for as much as expression of names is a part of speaking, as Noun is a part of Speech, to name rightly, or not rightly, cannot be done by any imposition of names, but by a natural affinity of the name with the thing it self. So that he is a right imposer of names who can express the Nature of the things in their names; for a name is an Instrument of the thing, not every inconsiderate name, but that which agreeth with its nature. By this benefit we communicate things to one another whence it followeth, that it is nothing else but an instrument accommodated to the teaching and discerning of a thing, as a weavers shuttle to his Webb. It belongeth therefore to a Dialectick to use names aright; for as a Weaver useth a shuttle rightly, knowing the proper use thereof after it hath been made by the Carpenter; so the Dialectick rightly useth that name which another hath made. And as to make a Helm, is the office of a Shipwright, but to use it rightly of a Pilot; so he who frameth names, shall impose them rightly, if he do it as if a Dialectick were present, who understandeth the nature of those things which are signified by the names. Thus much for Dialectick.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of THEORETICK Philosophy.*

WE come next to *Theoretick* Philosophy, whereof one part is *Theologick*, another *Physick*, a third *Metaphysick*. The *end* of *Theologie* is the knowledge of primary Causes: Of *Physick*, to understand the nature of the Universe, what kind of creature Man is, what place he holdeth in the World, whether there be a divine Providence over all things, to which there are other Gods subordinate, how Men are in respect of them. The end of *Mathematick* is, to know the nature of a superficies and a solid, and to consider the motion and revolution of Celestial bodies, the contemplation whereof must first be proposed in brief. Thus *Plato* useth to confirm the acuteness of the mind, for it sharpeneth the understanding, and rendreth it more ready towards the contemplation of divine things. That which considereth *Numbers*, being likewise a part of Mathematicks, conferreth not a little to the understanding of things that are; It frees us from the errour and ignorance which attend sensible things, and conduceth to the right knowledge of the essence of things: It likewise renders a Man expert in military affairs, especially towards the ordering of an Army by the science of *Tacticks*. *Geometry* also conferreth much towards the understanding of good it self, if a Man pursue it not only for mechanical dimension, but that he may by the help thereof ascend to things which are not, busying himself about those which are in continual generation and motion. *Stereometry* likewise is exceeding useful, for after the second accretion followeth this contemplation, which holdeth the third room. *Astronomy* also is useful as a fourth discipline, whereby we consider the motions of Heaven and the Stars, and the author of Night and Day, Months and Years. Thus by a familiar kind of way, finding out him who made all these, and by these disciplines, as from certain rudiments or elements proceeding to things more sublime. Likewise *Musick* is to be learnt, which relateth to hearing; for, as the eyes are created for Astronomy, so are the ears for Harmony: and as when we apply our selves to Astronomy, we are led from visible things, to the divine invisible essence; so when we receive the Harmony of voice in at our ears, from audible things, we ascend by degrees to those which are perceived by Intellect, unless we pursue Mathematical disciplines to this end, the contemplation thereof will be imperfect, unprofitable, and of no value. We must therefore presently proceed from those things which are perceived by the eyes and ears, to those which reason only discerneth; for, Mathematick is only a preface to divine things. They who addict themselves to Arithmetick and Geometry, desire to arrive at the knowledge of that which is, which knowledge they obtain no otherwise than as by a dream, but really they cannot attain it because they know not the principles themselves, nor those things which are compounded of the principles: nevertheless, they conduce to those things which we mentioned; wherefore *Plato* will not have such disciplines to be called Sciences. Dialectick method proceeds in such manner, that by Geometrical *Hypotheses*, it ascendeth to first principles, which are not taken upon *Hypotheses*. For this reason he calleth Dialectick a Science; but, Mathematick, neither opinion, because it is more perspicuous than sensible things; nor a Science, because it is more obscure than first Intelligibles: But, the opinion of Bodies, the science of Primaries, the contemplation of Mathematicks. He

He likewiſe aſſerteth *Faith* and *Imagination*: *Faith*, of things ſubject to ſenſe; *Imagination* of Images and Species.

Becauſe Dialectick is more efficacious than Mathematick, as being converſant about divine eternal things, therefore it is put before all Mathematicks, as a wall and fortification of the reſt.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of firſt matter.*

WE muſt next give a brief account of *Principles*, and thoſe things which belong to *Theologie*, beginning at the firſt, and from thence deſcending to the creation of the World, and contemplation thereof, whereby at laſt we come to the creation and nature of Man.

To begin with *matter*; this he calleth the *receptacle*, *Nurſe*, *Mother*, *place*, and *ſubject of all Images*, affirming that *it is touched without ſenſe, and comprehended by an adulterate kind of reaſon.* The property thereof is to undergo the generation of all things, and to cheriſh them like a Nurſe, and to admit all forms, being of her own nature expert of all form, quality and Species: Theſe things are imprinted and formed in her as in a Table, and ſhe admitteth their figures, not having of her ſelf any figure or quality. For, ſhe could not be fit to receive the impreſſions of ſeveral forms, unleſs ſhe were wholly void of all quality, and of thoſe forms which ſhe is about to receive. They who make ſweet Unguents of Oyl, make choice of that Oyl which hath the leaſt ſcent; they who would imprint any figures in Wax, firſt ſmooth and poliſh the matter, defacing all former figures. It is requiſite that matter capable of all things, if it muſt receive all forms, muſt not have the nature of any one of them, but muſt be ſubjected to all forms, without any quality or figure; and being ſuch, it is neither a body nor incorporeal, but a body potentially, as Braſs is potentially a Statue, becauſe then it becomes a Statue, when it puts on the form thereof.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Of* Ideas.

WHereas matter is a Principle, *Plato* likewiſe introduceth other principles beſides matter. One as an *Exemplar*, Ideas; another *Paternal*, God, the Father and Author of all things. *Idea*, as to God, is the *notion* of God, as to us, the *primary Intelligible*, as to matter, a *manner*, as to this ſenſible World an *Exemplar*, as to it ſelf, *Eſſence*. For whatſoever is made with underſtanding, muſt neceſſarily be referred to ſomething, as if ſomething be made from another, as my picture from me, the exemplar thereof muſt be preſuppoſed, and if there be nothing eternal, every Artiſt conceiveth it firſt within himſelf, then transferreth the forms thereof into matter.

They define *Idea* an eternal exemplar of things which are according to Nature; for, the greater part of Platoniſts will not allow an *Idea* to be of things that are made by Art, as of a Shield, or Lute, nor of things which are præternatural, as of a Feavour, or unnatural Choler; nor of ſingulars, as of *Socrates* or *Plato*; nor of vile abject things, as of filth or Straws; nor of relatives, as of greater and longer: For *Ideas* are the eternal notions of God, perfect in themſelves.

That there are *Ideas*, they prove thus: Whether God be Intellect or ſomething Intelligent, he muſt have his Intelligibles, and thoſe eternal and immoveable; if ſo, there are *Ideas*. For, if matter it ſelf be in it ſelf void of meaſure, it is neceſſary that it receive meaſure from ſome ſuperiour, that is wholly remote from matter: But the Antecedent is true, therefore the Conſequent; and if ſo, there are *Ideas*, certain meaſures void of matter. Again, if the World were not made by chance, it muſt only be made of ſomething, but by ſomething, and not only ſo, but after the likeneſs of ſomething; but, that after whoſe likeneſs it was made, what is it but an *Idea*? whence it followeth, that there are *Ideas*. Again, if intellect differ from true opinion, that which is intelligible differeth from that which is opinionable; and if ſo, there are intelligibles diſtinct from opinionables, wherefore there are firſt Intelligibles, as well as firſt Senſibles, whence we conclude there are *Ideas*.

## CHAP. X.

### *Of God.*

WE come next to ſpeak of the third principle, which *Plato*, though he think it almoſt ineffable, conceiveth may be expreſs'd in this manner. If there are intelligibles, and thoſe neither ſenſibles, nor coherent with ſenſibles; but adherent to firſt Intelligibles, then are there firſt ſimple Intelligibles, as there are firſt ſenſibles; the Antecedent is true, therefore the conſequent. But Men ſubject to perturbation of ſence, when they would contemplate ſomething intelligible, preſently fall upon the thought of ſomething ſenſible, whereby at the ſame time they imagine magnitude, or Figure, or Colour, and therefore cannot underſtand this ſincerely: But the Gods being void of corporeal mixtion underſtand purely and ſincerely. Now becauſe the Intellect is better than the Soul, and that Intellect which is always in act, and at once underſtandeth all things, is better than that Intellect which is in power, and of theſe, that is moſt excellent which is the cauſe of the other, and ſuperiour to all; This can be nothing elſe but God, whom we call the firſt, as being the Cauſe that the Intellect of the World always acteth. He, being himſelf immoveable, acteth upon the Intellect of the World, as the Sun upon the Eye, when it turneth towards him. And as that which is deſired moveth the Appetite it ſelf remaining immoveable; ſo doth this Intellect move the Intellect of all Heaven.

Now this first Intellect being most fair, must have the most fair Intelligible; but nothing is fairer than it self, therefore it always understandeth it self, and its own notions, which Act is called Operation.

Moreover, *God is first, eternal, ineffable, perfect in himself*; that is, needing none; *and ever perfect*, that is, absolute in all times, and *every way perfect*, that is, absolute in every part, *Divinity*, *Essence*, *Truth*, *Harmony*, *good*. Neither do we so name these, to distinguish one from the other, but rather by them all to understand one. He is said to be *Good*, because he bestoweth his benefits upon all according to their several capacities, and so is the cause of all good. *Fair*, because, he is in his essence both more and equal. *Truth* because, he is the principle of all truth, as the Son of all light. And *Father*, as being cause of all things, and adorning the mind of Heaven and Soul of the World after his own exemplar and notions. For according to his own will he filled all things with himself, exciting the Soul of the World, and converting it to himself, for he is cause of that Intellect, which being adorned by the Father, adorneth also the Nature of all this World. He is likewise *ineffable*, and as we said, can only be perceived by the mind, for he is neither genus nor species, nor difference, neither can any accident be applyed to him. He is *not ill*, for that it were impiety to affirm; *nor good*, for so he should be termed if he were meanly or highly participant of goodness. Nor *difference*, for that cannot be made according to the notion of him. Nor qualited, for he is not made that which he is by quality, nor perfected thereby. Nor *void of quality*, for he is not deprived of any quality that appertaineth to him. *Nor part* of any thing, *nor as a whole* constituted of parts; *nor as the form of divers*, for nothing can happen to him whereby he may be distinguished from others; Neither doth he *move*, or is he *moved*.

Hence the first apprehension of him is by *abstraction* from these things, as we understand a point by abstraction from sensibles, considering first a superficies, then a line, then a point. The second is by *Analogie* in this manner. As the Sun is to sight and visible things, himself not being sight, yet affording the one to see, the other to be seen, so is the first Intellect to that Intellect, which is in our Soul, and to those things which it understandeth. For, it self is not the Intellect, yet it perfecteth in these the Act of Intellection, to those it affordeth that they are understood, enlightning that truth which is in them. The third way to understand him is thus: when a Man beholdeth that Beauty which is in Bodies, he proceedeth to that which is in the Soul, then to that which is in Offices and Laws: Lastly, to the vast Ocean of Beauty, after which, he considereth that which is good it self, amiable it self, expetible it self, which shineth like a light, and meeteth the Soul, that which ascends unto it by these degrees. By this he comprehendeth God himself through reason of that excellence, which consisteth in adoration of him. He considereth God void of parts, for nothing was before him a part, and that of which something consisteth is precedent to that whereof it is a part, for a superficies is before a body, and a line before a superficies. Moreover God not having many parts, can neither be locally moved, nor altered by qualities. For if he be altered, it must be done by himself, or some other; if by some other, that other must be of greater power than he; if by himself, it must be either to better or to worse, both which are absurd.

From all these it followeth that *God is incorporeal*, which may likewise be proved thus. If God were a body, he should consist of matter and form; for every body consisteth of matter, and its form joyns to that matter, which is made like unto the *Idea's*, and in an ineffable manner participant of them; But that that should consist of matter and form is absurd; for then he could not be either simple or a Principle; therefore he is incorporeal. Again, if he be a body, he consisteth of matter, and consequently is either Fire or Air, or Earth, or Water, or something made out of these; but none of these is principle by it self; besides, he must then be later than matter, as consisting of it, which being absurd, it is necessary that God be incorporeal. Moreover, if he were a body, it would follow that he must be generable, corruptible, mutable, which to affirm of God were intolerable.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of Qualities.*

THat *Qualities* are *incorporeal*, may be proved thus: every body is a Subject, quality is not a Subject but an accident, therefore quality is not a body. Again, no body is in a subject; every quality is in a Subject, therefore quality is not a body. Again, quality is contrary to quality, but no body as no body is contrary to a body; therefore qualities are not bodies. To omit, that it is most agreeable to reason, that as matter is void of quality, so quality should be void of matter, and if quality, be void of matter, it must likewise be void of corporeity, for if qualities were bodies, two or three bodies might be together in the same place, which is absurd.

Qualities being incorporeal, the maker of them must be incorporeal also; moreover there can be no efficients, but in corporeals, for bodies naturally suffer and are in mutation, not continuing always in manner nor persevering in the same state. For whensoever they seem to effect any thing, we shall find that they suffer it long before. Whence as there is something which wholly suffereth, so must there be something which wholly acteth; but such only is incorporeal.

Thus much concerning principles as far as they relate to Theology; we proceed next to Physical Contemplations.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XII.

*Of the Cauſes, Generation, Elements, and Order of the World.*

FOraſmuch as of ſenſible and ſingular things there muſt of neceſſity be ſome exemplars, *viz.* Idea's, of which are Sciences and Definitions (for beſides all particular Men, we conceive a Man in our mind, and beſides all particular horſes a horſe, and likewiſe beſides all living creatures a living creature immortal and unbegotten: as from one ſeal are made many prints, and of one Man there may be many Pictures, of all which, the *Idea* it ſelf is cauſe that they are ſuch as it ſelf is) tis neceſſary that this Univerſe, the faireſt Fabrick of Gods making, be ſo made by God, that in the making thereof he look'd upon an *Idea* as its exemplar, whilſt by a wonderful providence and moſt excellent deſign God applyed himſelf to the building of this frame, becauſe he was good.

God therefore made it of all matter, which being before the generation of Heaven, diſorderly ſcattered; he from a deformed confuſion reduced to beautiful order, and adorned every way the parts thereof with fit numbers and figures, until at laſt he ſo diſtinguiſh'd them as now they are, Fire and Earth to Air and Water, of which there were then only the footſteps, and a certain aptitude to admit the power of Elements, and ſo without any reaſon or order, they juſtled matter, and were juſtled again by matter.

Thus God framed the World of four entire Elements, of whole Fire and Earth, Water, and Air, omitting no power or part of any of them. For he ſaith, it muſt be corporeal and generated, and ſubject to touch and ſight; but without Fire and Earth nothing can be touched or ſeen; Wherefore juſtly he framed it of *Fire and Earth*, and becauſe it was requiſite, there ſhould be ſome chain to unite theſe, there is a Divine chain, which according to the proportion of reaſon maketh one of it ſelf, and thoſe things which are united to it, and the World could not be plain (for then one medium would have ſerved) but ſphærical, therefore there was need of two mediums to the conſtitution thereof. Betwixt Fire and Earth by the preſcription of this reaſon is interpoſed *Air* and *Water*, that as Fire is to Air, ſo is Air to Water, and as Air is to Water, ſo is Water to Earth; and again, as Earth is to Water, ſo is Water to Air, and as Water is to Air, ſo is Air to Fire.

There being nothing remaining beyond the World, God made the World *one*, conformable to this *Idea*, which is one. He likewiſe made it ſuch, as that is *uncapable of ſickneſs or age*. For, beſides that nothing can befall it whereby it may be corrupted, it is ſo ſufficient to it ſelf, that it hath not need of any exterior thing. He beſtowed upon it a *Spherical* figure, as being the faireſt, the moſt capacious and apteſt to motion, and becauſe it needeth not hearing or ſight, or the reſt of the ſenſes, he gave it not any Organs of ſenſes. He denied all kinds of motion to be competible to it, except the circular, which is proper to the mind and to Wiſdom.

## CHAP. XIII.

*Of the convenience of Figures with the Elements and World.*

THe World thus conſiſteth of two parts, a *Soul* and a *Body*; this viſible and corruptible, that neither ſubject to ſight nor touch: The power and conſtitution of each is different, the body conſiſteth of Fire, Earth, Water, and Air; which four, the maker of the Univerſe (there being until then nothing more confuſed than the Elements) formed in a *Pyramid*, a *Cube*, an *Octaedron*, and an *Icoſaedron*; but chiefly in a *Dodecaedron*. Matter, as far as it put on the figure of a *Pyramid*, became *Fire*, and mounted upward: For, that figure is the moſt apt to cut and to divide, as conſiſting of feweſt triangles, and therefore is the rareſt of all figures. As far as it is an *Octaedron*, it took the quality of *Air*: Where it took that of an *Icoſaedron*, it became *Water*; The figure of a *Cube*, *Earth*, as being the moſt ſolid and ſtable of all the Elements. The figure of a *Dodecaedron*, he uſed in the fabrick of the *Univerſe*. *Superficies* come nigher the nature of Principles than all theſe, for they are before ſolids. Of its nature, the two Parents (as it were) are two *Triangles*, moſt fair and rectangular; one a *Scalenum*, the other an *Iſoſceles*; a *Scalenum* is a triangle having one right angle, the other of two thirds, the laſt of one third. A *Scalenum* therefore is the element of a *Pyramid*, and an *Octaedron*, and an *Icoſaedron*. A *Pyramid* conſiſteth of four triangles, having all ſides equal to one another, each whereof is divided as we ſaid, into ſix ſcalenous triangles. The *Octaedrons* conſiſt of eight like ſides, whereof each is divided into ſix *Scalenums*. The *Icoſaeders* of twenty in the ſame manner; but the Element of a *Cube* is an Iſoſceles triangle, for four ſuch triangles concurring make a ſquare, and ſix ſquares a *Cube*. God made uſe of a *Dodecaedron* in the conſtruction of the Univerſe, whence there are twelve figures of living creatures in the *Zodiack*, whereof each is divided into thirty parts. Likewiſe in a *Dodecaedron*, which conſiſteth of twelve *Pentagones*, if each be divided into five triangles, there are in every one ſix triangles, ſo that in the whole *Dodecaedron*, there will be 360 triangles, as many as there are degrees in the *Zodiack*.

When matter was put into thoſe figures by God, firſt it was moved rudely without order, until at laſt he reduced it to order, each being conjoyned to one another, and compoſed in due proportion: Neither are theſe diſtinct in place, but are in perpetual motion, which they give likewiſe into matter. For, being ſtraitned by the compaſs of the World, and agitated by mutual juſtlings, they are driven, the

rare always into the region of the ſolid, whence nothing is left vacuous, nothing void of body. The inequality which remaineth amongſt them cauſeth convulſion, for matter is agitated amongſt them, and they reciprocally by matter.

## CHAP. XIV.

*Of the Soul of the World, the Sphears and Stars.*

FRom Bodies he alloweth that we collect the powers of the *Soul*, for ſeeing that we diſcern all things by the Soul, he juſtly placed the principles of all things therein, that whatſoever ſhould occur, we might contemplate it by that which is of kin and neighbour unto it, and attribute an eſſence thereunto conſonant to the functions. Then therefore he called one ſubſtance intelligible and indiviſible; he placed another diviſible amongſt bodies, to ſignifie that the knowledge as well of the one as of the other may be had by Intellect. And knowing that in things intelligible and ſenſible, there is identity and diverſity, he fitly compoſed the Soul out of all theſe. For, either the like is known by the like, as the *Pythagoreans* hold, or, as *Heraclitus the Naturaliſt*, unlike always by unlike.

That he would that the World ſhould be *generate*, we muſt not ſo underſtand, as if there ſhall be any time wherein the World is not, but in as much as it always periſheth in generation, and declareth, that there is ſome more excellent and principal cauſe of its eſſence.

The Soul of the World which was from all eternity, was not made by God, but only adorned by him, in which reſpect he is ſometimes ſaid to have made it, for that he exciteth it, and converteth the mind thereof, as out of a profound ſleep unto himſelf, that beholding his intelligibles and affecting his notions, it ſhould from thence receive Species and form; whence it is manifeſt, that the World was endued by God, both with a Soul and mind. For, intending it to be the beſt, he muſt have made it animate and intelligent, ſince an animate thing is more excellent than an inanimate, and an intelligent than an unintelligent; perhaps the mind alſo could not ſubſiſt without a Soul.

This Soul, being diffuſed from the Centre of the World to the extreams, *comprehendeth* the whole body of the World, ſo as it is extended throughout the Univerſe, and in that manner joyneth and conſerveth the whole. The external preſide over the internal, for they are not divided, but theſe are divided into ſeven Circles; from the firſt diſtributed according to duple and triple Intervals. That which is comprehended by the indiviſible ſphear, is correſpondent to it, that which is divided to the other. For the motion of Heaven which comprehendeth all things, being not uncertain, is one and ordinate, but that of the things within it, is changeable, varied by riſing and ſetting, whence called Planetary. The outermoſt ſphear moveth to the right hand from *Eaſt* to *Weſt*, the innermoſt contrariwiſe, to the left hand from *Weſt* to *Eaſt*, meeting the World.

God framed alſo the Stars and Conſtellations; ſome *fixed* for the Ornament of Heaven and might, very many in number. The *Erratick* are ſeven, ſerving for number and time, and the illumination of all things; for time is an interval of the motion of the World, as an image of eternity, which is the meaſure of the ſtate of the eternal World. The Planets are not of equal power, the *Sun* is the leader of all, who illuminateth and ſheweth all things to the eye. Next the *Moon*, which in reſpect of her power hath the ſecond place. The reſt of the Planets, each according to their ſeveral proportions. The Moon maketh the meaſure of a *Month*, in that ſpace compleating its circle, and overtaking the Sun. The Sun meaſureth the *Year*, for running through the circle of the *Zodiack*, he compleateth the ſeaſons of the year. Of the other Stars each hath its proper revolution, with which all Men are not acquainted, but only the Learned. By all thoſe revolutions *the abſolute number of time* is compleated, when coming all to the ſame point, they are in ſuch order, as if we ſhould imagine a right line to be drawn from the ſphear of fixed ſtars to the Earth; the Centers of them all would be ſeen in that line.

There being ſeven Orbs in the Planetary ſphear, the maker of the World, framed in them ſeven conſpicuous bodies of matter for the moſt part fiery, and inſerted them into the ſphears belonging to the other *Erratick* Circle. The *Moon* he placed in that Circle which is next the Earth, the *Sun* in the ſecond, the *Morning ſtar*, and the Sacred Star of *Mercury*, in that *Orb* which is equal in ſwiftneſs with the Sun. The reſt higher, each in his proper ſphear. That of *Saturn* the ſloweſt of all, he placed in that *Orb* which is next to the fixed ſtars. Second to this is that which they call the ſphear of *Jupiter*, next that of *Mars*; the eighth which is the *Supream power* includeth all. Theſe are all living intelligent Creatures, and Gods endued with a ſpherical figure.

## CHAP. XV.

*Of* Dæmons *and Elements.*

THere are other *Dæmons* alſo which we may call Intelligent Gods, in each of the Elements partly viſible, partly inviſible, in the *æther*, Fire, Air and Water, that there be not any part of the World void of Soul, or of an animate creature more excellent than humane nature. Below theſe are all earthly ſublunary things; God is maker of the World, of all Gods and *Dæmons*. This Univerſe by his Divine Will ſhall not be diſſolved. Over the reſt his *Sons* preſide, who by his command and example order whatſoever they do. By theſe *lots, nocturnal viſions, dreams, Oracles, and whatſoever Men refer to divination*, is artificially wrought.

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The *Earth* is fixed in the midſt of all, round about the Axletree which paſſeth through the midſt of the World. It is the obſerver of Night and Day, the moſt ancient of all Gods in Heaven. Next the Soul of the World it affordeth us moſt nutriture; about it the Heavens move, and it ſelf is a kind of Star: It remaineth in its proper place, which by reaſon of its even weight is the Centre; the æther exteriour is divided into the ſphear of fixed Stars, and that of Planets. Next to theſe is the Air; in the midſt the Earth with its humidity.

## CHAP. XVI.

*Of the younger Gods makers of Men.*

AFter that all theſe were framed, there remained three kinds of living Creatures which were to be mortal, *Volatile*, *Aquatile*, and *Terreſtrial*; the generation whereof he committed to his Son, leſt if he himſelf had begotten them, they ſhould have been immortal as well as the reſt. They borrowing ſome little parts from firſt matter for a certain time, formed mortal living Creatures, and becauſe of Mankind, as being next to the Gods, both the Father of all things, and his Sons likewiſe have a particular care, the Maker of all things ſent down himſelf their Souls into the Earth equal in number to the Stars, and having impoſed each one his proper Star as a vehiculum, like a Law-giver, he pronounced decrees unto them, that he himſelf might be inculpable, which was that there ſhould ariſe mortal affections from the Body, firſt ſenſes, next pleaſure, then grief, and fear, and anger, which thoſe Souls that ſhould overcome, and not ſuffer themſelves to be tranſported by them, ſhould juſtly be accounted Victors, and at the laſt return to their proper Star, though they which ſhould be tranſported by injuſtice, ſhould in the ſecond generation undergo the lives of Women, wherein if they ceaſed not from their wickedneſs, they ſhould at laſt tranſmigrate into the Nature of brute Beaſts, the end of theſe Labours ſhall then be, when they have overcome the innate affections of the Body, and then return to their proper habit.

## CHAP. XVII.

*Of the Body, and parts of Man, and Powers of the Soul.*

THE Gods firſt formed Man of Earth, Fire, Air, and Water, borrowing ſome parts from matter, (to be reſtored in their due time) which they ſo connected to one another by ſecret ties, as that of all theſe they framed one Body. The moſt excellent part of the Soul that was ſent down from Heaven, they placed in the *Head*, for which as a manured Field they prepared the *Brain*. About the face they diſpoſed Organs proper for ſenſe; *Marrow* they made of ſmooth ſtraight triangles, of which the Elements were formed, that it ſhould be the Origine of prolifick ſeed. *Bones* they formed of Marrow and Earth, the Earth moiſtned, and often dipt in Water and Fire. *Fleſh* is compounded of Salt and ſharp, as of a kind of ferment. Marrow they encloſed with *Bones*, Bones with *Sinews* inſtead of Chains, that by theſe inflexions the knitting of the Joints might be plyant. Over theſe as a cover is extended the *Skin*, partly white, partly black, for beauty and uſe. Of theſe likewiſe conſiſt the internal *Bowels*, and the Belly, and the Inteſtines, every where rolled about it. And from the Mouth above the *aſpera Arteria*, and the *œſophagus*, of which one cometh down to the Stomack, the other to the Lungs. Meat is digeſted in the Belly by Spirit and Heat, and thence diſtributed to the whole Body according to their ſeveral conſtitutions. The two Veins paſſing along the Spine of the Back, meet and croſs at the Head, where they ſpread into many parts.

Thus when the Gods had made Man, and given him a Soul as the Miſtreſs of his Body, they placed the principal part of that Soul to which Reaſon appertaineth, in the head. Whence is derived Marrow and Sinews, and by the different affection of this, the mind likewiſe is altered. Moreover they gave him ſenſes, as the attendants of Reaſon, and the power of judging and contemplating with Reaſon. Thoſe parts of the Soul, which are moved by meaner affections, they ſeated in lower places; the iraſcible part in the Heart, the concupiſcible about the Belly, and the parts next to the Navel, of which hereafter.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*Of Sight.*

AFter that the Gods had placed the Eyes (Conduits of light) in the Face, they included in them a fiery light, which being ſmooth and in ſome manner thick, they conceived of kin to diurnal light. This breaketh forth every where at the Eyes, but chiefly through the Eye-balls, as being there moſt pure and clear. This agreeing with the external light, as like with like affordeth the ſenſe of ſight, whence in the night, when the light vaniſheth and is obſcured, this ray of ours no longer mingleth with the immediate Air; but, on the contrary, withdrawing it ſelf inward, ſmooths and diffuſes the motions that are in us, and ſo bringeth on ſleep, whereby the Eye-lids are ſhut. If it bring much reſt, the ſleep is little diſturb'd with Dreams, but if there remain any motions behind, we are troubled with many illuſions. In this manner phantaſies, whether true or falſe, ariſe. Of the ſame Nature are Images, which we ſee in Glaſſes, or other ſmooth pellucid Bodies, which exiſt only by reflection. For, as the Glaſs is concave or convex, or oblong, the object is differently repreſented to the beholder. The light being reflected to other parts, thoſe which are diſperſed in convex meet in the concave, for in ſome, the right and left ſides ſeem quite inverted, in others alike; in others, thoſe which are upwards ſeem downwards, and on the contrary, thoſe which are downwards, upwards.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XIX.

*Of the reſt of the Senſes.*

HEaring is given for the perception of voice, it ariſeth from a motion made about the head, and ſetteth in the Liver. Voice is that which paſſeth through the Ears, Brain and Blood to the Soul. A ſharp voice is that which is moved ſwiftly, deep which ſlowly, great which much, ſmall which little.

Next followeth the ſenſe proper to the Noſtrils, perceptible of odour. Odour is an affection which paſſeth from the Veins of the Noſtrils to the parts of the Navel. The Species thereof have no name, except the two that are moſt common, pleaſant, and unpleaſant, commonly called ſweet and ſtinking. All Odour is more thick than Air, more thin than Water; for Odour is properly ſaid to be of thoſe things which have not yet received perfect mutation, but conſiſt of a communion of Air and Water, as ſmoke and miſts. For, by the reſolution of theſe into one another, the ſenſe of ſmelling is made.

Taſte was made by the Gods to be the judge of different ſavours. Hence are Veins extended to the Heart, by which ſeveral ſavours are examined. Theſe Veins by dilating or contracting themſelves ſeverally according to the Sapors preſented to them, diſcern their differences. The differences of Sapors are ſeven; ſweet, ſharp, ſour, picquant, ſalt, acid, bitter; the Nature of ſweet Sapor is contrary to all the reſt, for by its power it ſootheth and pleaſeth the moiſture of the tongue, whereas of the reſt ſome diſturb and diſpel it, as acute Sapors; ſome heat, and fly upwards, as the hot; others being abſterſive, diſſolve it, as the bitter; others are by degrees purgative and abſterſive, as the ſalt. Of theſe, ſome contract the paſſages; they which do it more roughly, are called acid, they which more gently, auſtere.

The ſenſe of touching was formed by the Gods to diſcern hot and cold, ſoft and hard, light and heavy, ſmooth and rough, and to judge the differences of each of theſe; *Yielding* Bodies we call thoſe which yield to the touch, *reſiſting* thoſe which yield not; this proceedeth from the baſes of Bodies: thoſe which have large baſes are firm and ſolid, theſe which have narrow baſes are yielding, ſoft, and eaſily changed. Rough is that which is uneven and hard, ſmooth that which is plain and thick: As warm and cold qualities are moſt oppoſite, ſo they proceed from the moſt different cauſes. That which cutteth by the acuteneſs and roughneſs of its parts, begetteth a hotaffection, that which is more thick, in penetration, a cold, whilſt the more rare are expelled, and the more denſe compelled to penetrate into their room. Thence ariſeth a concuſſion and trepidation, and (an affection which is from hence begotten in Bodies,) rigor.

## CHAP. XX.

*Of Heavy and Light.*

HEavy and light ought not to be defined by higher or lower place, nothing is high or low; for Heaven being abſolutely round, and its convex extremity even, we cannot term any thing higher or lower; yet may we call that heavy, which is hardly drawn to a place different from its Nature, light which eaſily; or, heavy is that which conſiſteth of moſt parts, light of feweſt.

## CHAP. XXI.

*Of Reſpiration.*

WE breath after this manner. The external Air compaſſeth us round about, and paſſeth in at our Mouth, Noſtrils, and inviſible Pores of the Body, where being warmed, it floweth back again to the external Air, by that part out of which it flowed, it again thruſteth the external Air to the interiour. Thus there is an unintermitted ſucceſſion of inſpiration and expiration.

## CHAP. XXII.

*Of the Cauſes of Diſeaſes.*

OF Diſeaſes *Plato* alledgeth many cauſes. The firſt is defect or exceſs of the Elements, and a change into places which agree not with their Nature. The ſecond a prepoſterous generation of homogeneal parts, as when of Fleſh is made Blood, or Choler, or Flegme; for all theſe are nothing but colliquation, or putrefaction. Flegm is a new colliquation of fleſh; ſweat and tears are a kind of Serum of flegm. Flegm intercepted in the outward parts, begetteth Scurf and Leproſie, in the inward being mingled with Melancholy, it cauſeth the falling-ſickneſs. Sharp, and ſalt flegm engender thoſe affections which conſiſt in rigour, for all Bodies that are inflamed with choler muſt ſuffer that. A World of various Diſeaſes are engendred by Choler and Flegm. As concerning Feavours; *Plato* conceived that a continual Feaver proceedeth from exceſs of fire, a quotidian from exceſs of Air, a Tertain from exceſs of Water, a Quartan from exceſs of Earth. It remaineth that we here begin to ſpeak of the Soul, though not without ſome danger, of repeating the ſame things.

## CHAP. XXIII.

*Of the three principal powers of the Soul.*

THE Gods, the makers of Mortal Creatures, having received from the firſt God the Soul of Man immortal, added unto it two mortal parts; yet leſt the immortal Divine part might be infected with mortal extravagances, they ſeated as Prince of all in the Tower, as it were of the Body, the Head, in

in figure reſembling the Univerſe. The reſt of the body they appointed as a vehiculum to ſerve [illegible]s. To each mortal part they aſſigned its proper habitation, placing the iraſcible in the Heart, the concupiſciple in the midſt betwixt the Navel and the Diaphragma, binding it there as a furious ſavage Beaſt. They framed the Lungs in reſpect of the Heart, ſoft, bloodleſs, hollow and ſpungy, that the Heart being ſomething heated with anger, might thereby be refrigerated and aſſwaged; the Liver to excite and allay the concupiſcible part, having both ſweetneſs and bitterneſs, as likewiſe for the clearing of Divinations which are given by dreams: for as much as in it by reaſon of its ſmoothneſs, ſhining and brightneſs, the power which proceedeth from the mind doth ſhine forth. The Spleen was made for the benefit of the Liver, to purge and cleanſe it; ſo that thoſe corruptions, which by ſome diſeaſes, are contracted about the Liver, retire thither.

## CHAP. XXIV.

*Of the diſtinction of the parts of the Soul.*

THat the Soul and parts thereof according to their proper faculties are three-fold; every part appointed by reaſon their ſeveral places, is manifeſt from hence. Thoſe things which are ſeparated by Nature, are divers; paſſionate and reaſonable are ſeparate by Nature; this being converſant in Intelligibles, that in things ſad or joyful, to omit the paſſive part which is common likewiſe to brute Beaſts. Now theſe two being diſtinct by Nature, muſt likewiſe be diſtinguiſhed by place, becauſe for the moſt part they diſagree, and are repugnant to one another; but nothing can be repugnant to it ſelf, neither can thoſe things which are contrary to one another conſiſt together in the ſame. In *Medea* anger ſeemeth to conteſt thus with reaſon;

*I know what I intend is ill,*
*But anger over-rules my will.*

In *Laius*, when he raviſhed *Chryſippus*, Concupiſcence conteſted with Reaſon; for ſo he ſaith;

*Men to this crime the Gods confine,*
*To know the ill that they decline.*

That the rational power is different from the paſſive, is evident from this, that they are ordered by ſeveral means, one by diſcipline, the other by habitual practice.

## CHAP. XXV.

*Of the Immortality of the Soul.*

THat the Soul is immortal *Plato* proveth by theſe Arguments. The Soul to every thing, wherein it is, conferreth life, as being naturally innate in her ſelf, but that which conferreth life to others never admitteth death, but what is ſuch is immortal.

The Soul being immortal, is likewiſe incorruptible, for it is an incorporeal Eſſence which cannot be changed ſubſtantially, and is only perceptible by the Intellect, not by the Eyes, and is uniform. Hence it muſt be ſimple, neither can be at any time diſſolved or corrupted. The body is contrary, for it is ſubject to ſight and other ſenſes, and as it is compounded, ſo ſhall it again be diſſolved, and it is multiform. When the Soul adhereth to thoſe things which are perceptible by Intellect, it acquieſceth; Now to that by whoſe preſence ſhe is diſturbed, ſhe cannot poſſibly be like, wherefore ſhe is more like to thoſe things which are perceptible by Intellect; but what is ſuch is ſuch by Nature incorruptible and periſhable.

Again, the Soul doth naturally preſide over the Body, not the Body over the Soul, but that which by Nature ruleth and commandeth is of kin to Divinity, wherefore the Soul being next unto God, muſt be immortal, not ſubject to corruption.

Again, Contraries which have no *medium*, not by themſelves, but by ſome accident are ſo ordered by Nature, that they may be mutually made of one another. But that which men call Life is contrary to that which they call Death; as therefore Death is a ſeparation of the Soul from the Body; ſo is Life a conjunction of the Soul with the Body, pre-exiſtent to the Body. But if ſhe be pre-exiſtent, and ſhall ſubſiſt after the Body, it followeth that ſhe be ſempiternal, for there cannot any thing be imagined whereby ſhe may be corrupted.

Again, if Learning be Reminiſcence, the Soul muſt be immortal, but that it is Reminiſcence we prove thus: Learning cannot otherwiſe conſiſt than by remembrance of thoſe things we formerly knew. For, if from *Singulars* we underſtand *Univerſals*, how could we diſcourſe by Singulars which are infinite? or how from a few perceive Univerſals? We ſhould therefore neceſſarily be deceived, as if we judged that only to be a living Creature which breatheth; or how could the Notions themſelves have the reaſon of Principles. By Reminiſcence therefore, from ſome few which we have conceived in our mind, we underſtand the reſt, and from ſome occurrent particulars we remember thoſe which we knew long before, but were then given over to oblivion, when the Soul firſt deſcended into the Body.

Again, if the Soul be not corrupted by its own proper ill, neither can it be deſtroy'd by that or any other, nor ſimply by any ill, and being ſuch, ſhall remain uncorrupted.

Again, that which is moved in it ſelf, as being the principle of motion in thoſe things which are moved, is always moved; that which is ſuch is immortal; but the Soul is moved of it ſelf, that which is moved of it ſelf is the principle of all motion and generation; and a principle is expert of generation and corruption, wherefore the Souls of Men and of the Univerſe it ſelf are ſuch, for both partake of the ſame miſtion. He affirmeth the Soul to be moveable in her ſelf, becauſe it hath an innate life, always operating by its power.

That

That rational Souls are immortal, may clearly be asserted out of *Plato*; but whether the irrational be such seemeth doubtful; yet is it probable that being guided only by Phantasie, not endued with reason or judgment, neither do they contemplate any thing, or discern, or collect from it, nor can they discern ills, but generally understand nothing, nor are of the same nature with those Souls which have Intellect and Reason, but are capable of dying and being corrupted. For as much as they are immortal, it followeth that they are put into Bodies, being planted into the formed Nature of Embryo's, and transmigrate into several Bodies as well humane as others, either according to some certain numbers which they expect, or by the will of the Gods, or for intemperance of life, or for love of the Body. For the Body and Soul have a kind of affinity, as Fire and Brimstone.

Moreover the Souls of the Gods have a dijudicative faculty, called Gnostick, and impulsive to some action, called Parastatick, which faculties being likewise in humane Souls, become changed as soon as they come into the Body, the assistent into the concupiscible, the impulsive into the irascible.

## CHAP. XXVI.

### *Of Fate and Free will.*

COncerning *Fate Plato* held thus: All things are in Fate, yet all things are not decreed by Fate. For Fate, though it be like a Law, yet it useth not to speak in this manner, that this man shall do thus, and to that man, that shall befall (which were to proceed into infinite, there being an infinite generation of men, and infinite accidentts happening daily to them; besides that, this would take away our Free-will, our praise or dispraise, and whatsoever is of that kind) but rather thus; Whatsoever Soul chooseth such a life, and doth such things, these shall follow, the Soul therefore is free, and it is left within its power to do or not to do, without any compulsion or necessity. But that which followeth the Action is performed by Fate. As from *Paris*'s ravishing of *Helena*, (which it is within his power to do or not to do) shall follow that the *Grecians* contend with the *Trojans* about *Helena*. Thus *Apollo* foretold *Laius*;

*If thou beget a Son, that Son shall kill thee.*

In the Oracle are comprehended both *Laius* and the begetting of a Son, that which shall follow upon the begetting of the Son depends on *Plato*.

That which may be done is of a middle kind betwixt true and false, and being so indefinite by Nature: that which is in our power, is carried on as it were unto it. That which is done by our election, is presently either true or false; that which is in power, is different from that which is said to be in habit and act. That which is in power declareth an aptitude in that thing, wherein the habit is not yet perfect. So a Boy may be said to be a Grammarian, a Musician, a Carpenter in power. He is in habit of one or more of these when he hath acquired that habit. He is said to be in act, when he operateth according to that acquired habit. That which we call possible to be done is none of these. Indeterminate is that which is in our power, and to which part soever it inclineth, will be true or false.

## CHAP. XXVII.

### *ETHICK.*

### *Of the chief Good, and of Virtues.*

WE must next give a short account of *Plato*'s *Ethicks*. That which is worthy of all honour, and is the Supream Good, he conceived not easie to be found, and if found, not safe to be declared. For this reason, he communicated the contemplation of the chief good to very few, and those of his most intimate acquaintance, of whom his judgment made choice for this purpose. But our good, if we examine his Books diligently, we shall find he placed in the knowledge of the first good, which may rightly be called God, and the first mind. For all things which men call good, he conceiveth to be called good in this respect, for as much as they derive something from that good, as all sweet and hot things are termed such from some participation of the first sweet and first hot. Of those things which are in us, only the mind and reason have a similitude of the first good. Wherefore he calleth our good, Fair, Venerable, Amiable, Proportionate, and lastly Beatitude. Of those which are commonly called good, as Health, Beauty, Strength, there is none good, unless it be employed towards the practice of Vertue. For being separated from Vertue, they are like matter only, and to those who make ill use of them only ill. Yet these *Plato* sometimes calleth mortal goods. Beatitude he reckoneth not amongst humane goods, but amongst the divine and immortal. Whence he asserteth that the Souls of true Philosophers are repleniſh'd with vast admirable goods, and after the dissolution of their mortal body, are admitted to the table of the Gods, and with them walk over and survey the field of Truth, because they did see they used the utmost endeavours of their Souls to know it, and esteemed it the most precious of all things, by the benefit whereof they illustrated and excited their mind as a lost or blinded sight, preferring the conservation thereof before many corporeal Eyes. Foolish men are like those who lead all their life in some Cave under ground, where they never saw the light of the Sun, but only some empty thin shadows of such bodies as are with us upon the Earth, which seeing, they think they see true bodies. As these, if ever they should be brought out of darkness into the clear light, would questionless despise all things which they saw before, and themselves much more, as having been absolutely deceived; So they who rise up out of the darkness of this life

life to those things which are divine and fair, in all likelihood will contemn what before they most esteemed, and love more vehemently this contemplation. Thus it appeareth, that only what is good is honest, and that Vertue sufficeth to Felicity.

Moreover, that good and fair consist in knowledge of the first good, he declareth in whole Volumes. As concerning those which are good by participation, he speaketh thus in his first Book of Laws. Good is two-fold, Humane and Divine, *&c.* If any thing be disjoyned from the first good, and void of the essence thereof, that is called good by the foolish, which *in Euthydemo*, he affirmeth to be a greater ill to the Possessor.

That he conceiveth the Vertues to be eligible in themselves, is manifest, in as much as he affirmeth that only to be good which is honest, which he demonstrateth in many Dialogues, particularly in those of the Commonwealth.

Hence he conceiveth that man to be most happy and blessed, who hath attained the Science we mentioned; yet not in respect of the honours which attend such a person, nor of any other reward; for though he be unknown to all men, and such things, as are commonly accounted Ills, as, dishonour, banishment and death happen unto him; he is notwithstanding happy. On the contrary, a man who wants this knowledge, though he possess all things commonly esteemed good, Riches, Power, Health, Strength, and Beauty, he is nothing the more happy.

He asserteth an ultimate end, conformable to all these which is to be made like unto God, as far as Humanity is capable of being such. This he expounds variously, sometimes as *in Theæteto*, he affirms our resemblance to God to consist in being prudent, just, and holy; wherefore we must endeavour to fly with all possible celerity from hence to those. This flight is the resemblance to God, as much as is possible: The similitude consisteth in Prudence, Justice, and Sanctity; sometimes in Justice only, as in his last Book of the Common-wealth. For a man is never deserted by God, whilst he endeavoureth to be just, and by the very act of Vertue, as much as man is capable of, he is rendred like unto God. *In Phædone* he asserteth, that this resemblance to God is acquired by Temperance and Justice, thus. *Are not they blessed and happy, and from hence shall go into the best place, who have practised the popular civil Vertue which they call Temperance and Justice?* Again, sometimes he affirmed, that the end of life is to be like unto God, sometimes to follow God, as when he saith, God indeed according to the old saying, *containing the beginning, middle and end of all things*, &c. Sometimes he joyneth both together, as when he saith, *The Soul following God, and being rendred like unto him*, &c. The principle of Utility is good it self, but this is said of God, therefore the end conformable to the principle, is to become like unto God, to the Celestial, or rather supercelestial God, who hath not Vertue, but is more excellent than all Vertue. Wherefore it is rightly said, that κακοδαιμονία, misery, is a perversity of the Genius, εὐδαιμονία, Beatitude is a good habit of the Genius.

This similitude to God we shall obtain, if we enjoy convenient Nature, in our Manner, Education and Sense, according to Law, and chiefly by Reason, and Discipline, and institution of Wisdom, withdrawing our selves as much as possible from humane Affairs, and being conversant in those things only which are understood by Contemplation: the way to prepare, and, as it were, to cleanse the Demon that is in us, is to initiate our selves into higher Disciplines, which is done by Musick, Arithmetick, Astronomy and Geometry, not without some respect of the Body by Gymnastick, whereby it is made more ready for the actions both of War and Peace.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

*The definition and kinds of Vertue.*

VErtue being divine, is the perfect and best affection of the Soul, which adorneth a man, and rendreth him more excellent and ready, as well for Speech as Action, whether he do it alone or with others.

Of the Vertues, some are placed in the rational part, some in the irrational. For whereas the Nature of the rational part is one, that of the irascible another, that of the concupiscible another, the perfection of these must likewise be different. That of the rational is *Prudence*, of the irascible, *Fortitude*, of the concupiscible, *Temperance*.

*Prudence* is the Science of things, Good, Bad, and betwixt both.

*Temperance* is an apt moderation of Desires and Appetites; when we call Temperance a moderation and obedience, we mean only this, that it is a faculty causing all Appetites to be subjected unto it, in decent order, and submiss obedience to be commanded by Nature. This is the rational part.

*Fortitude* is a lawful observation of a command difficult, or not difficult, that is, it is a faculty which keepeth a lawful Precept.

*Justice* is an agreement amongst all these, which causeth that the three parts of the Soul agree with one another, and that each be worthily conversant in those things which are proper, and belong unto it.

Thus it is a common intire perfection of these three Vertues, *Prudence*, *Fortitude* and *Temperance*, in such manner that Reason commandeth, and the rest of the parts, each according to its several property, are restrained by Reason, and obey it.

Hence it followeth, that the Vertues are mutually consequent to one another; Fortitude being the conservation of a lawful Precept, is likewise conservative of right Reason. Right Reason proceedeth from Prudence; Prudence cohereth with Fortitude, for it is the knowledge of good things, but no man can discern that which is good, if he be distracted by fear, or involved in the like troubles. In like manner, neither can any man be wise, and intemperate, for then he is

overcome by Affections. If a man do ſomething contrary to Reaſon, *Plato* affirmeth he doth through ignorance and imprudence, ſo that none can be prudent that is intemperate or fearful. Whence it followeth, that the perfect Vertues cohere to one another, and are inſeparable.

## CHAP. XXIX.

*Of Vertues, Vices, and their differences.*

THe gifts of Nature and progreſs in them are called Vertues alſo, by reaſon of their ſimilitude with the perfect Vertues, aſſuming the ſame Name. In this ſence we call all Souldiers ſtout, and ſometimes call imprudent and raſh perſons ſtout, when we ſpeak not of the perfect Vertues, for the perfect neither increaſe nor decreaſe; but Vices are intended and remitted. One man is more imprudent and more unjuſt than another, neither do all the Vices follow one another, for they are certain contraries which are not competible to the ſame. Such is Fury to Cowardice, and Prodigality to Covetouſneſs, nor can there be any man at once poſſeſſed of all Vices, no more than a Body tormented by all Diſeaſes.

Moreover, there is a mean affection which inclineth not plainly either to Vice or Vertue, for it is not neceſſary that all men muſt be good or bad; they are ſuch, who have arrived at the height of theſe; for it is not eaſie to paſs ſuddenly from Vertue to Vice, becauſe betwixt extreams there is a great interval and diſtance.

Of Vertues ſome are principal, others concomitant; principal are thoſe which are in the rational part of the Soul, and by which the other Vertues are perfected. Concomitant are thoſe which are in the other part which are ſubject to Affections. Theſe act honeſt things according to Reaſon, not that which is in them, for they have none, but that which they receive from Prudence, which is confirmed in them by Cuſtom and Exerciſe.

Now for as much as neither Science nor Art conſiſteth in any part of the Soul, but in the rational, thoſe Vertues which are in the other part, that is ſubject to Affections, cannot be taught, becauſe they are neither Arts nor Sciences, neither have they a peculiar Doctrine. Prudence is a Science, which preſcribeth unto every one what is proper to him, as a Pilot, or Maſter of a Ship, to inferiour ignorant Sailors. The like in a common Souldier and a General.

For as much as Ills are intended and remitted, Offences cannot be equal, but ſome muſt be greater, others leſſer, for which reaſon, they, who make Laws, puniſh ſome more gently, other more ſeverely. And though Vertues are certain Heights, as being perfect, and like unto that which is right, yet in another reſpect they are called Mediocrities, becauſe all or the moſt of them are placed betwixt two Vices, whereof one ſinneth in exceſs, the other in defect; as on the one ſide of *Liberality* is *Covetouſneſs*, on the other *Prodigality*. For in Affections we recede from the mean, when we relinquiſh that which is placed in Vertue, either by exceſs or defect. But neither he, who beholding his Parents wronged is nothing moved thereat, nor he who is incens'd at the ſmalleſt matters void of paſſion or moderate, but the quite contrary. He who at the death of his Parents grieveth not, is void of paſſion; He who deſtroyeth himſelf with grieving, is over-paſſionate and immoderate; he who grieveth moderately, is moderately paſſionate. In like manner, he, who feareth upon all occaſions, and more than needs, is timorous; he who feareth nothing is raſh; He only is ſtout that can keep a mean betwixt fear and raſhneſs; the like in all the reſt. And for as much as that which is mean in Affections is likewiſe beſt, and Mediocrity is nothing but a mean betwixt exceſs and defect, there are theſe Vertues termed Mediocrities, becauſe in humane perturbations and paſſions they affect us a middle kind of way.

## CHAP. XXX.

*That Vertue is voluntary, Vice involuntary.*

VErtue being chiefly of thoſe things which are in our power, not compulſive (for it could not deſerve praiſe, if it came either by nature or divine decree) it followeth, that Vertue is voluntary, begotten by a fervent, generous, and firm impulſion.

From this, that Vertue is voluntary, it followeth that Vice is involuntary. For, who, in the moſt excellent part of himſelf, would ever voluntarily chooſe that which is the greateſt of all Ills? When a man is carried on to Vice, he firſt inclineth to it, not as if it were ill, but good, and if he fall into ill, doubtleſs, he is deceived with thinking, that this way by a leſſer ill, he may arrive at a greater good, and goeth in this manner unwillingly to it. For, it is not poſſible, a man ſhould purſue ill as it is ill, without any hope of good, or, fear of a greater ill. All ill things therefore, which an ill man doth, are involuntary, for, injuſtice being involuntary, to act unjuſtly is ſo much more involuntary, as the action of Vice is beyond the idle habit thereof. Yet, though wicked actions are involuntary, the wicked nevertheleſs ought to be puniſhed, and that not after one manner; but, according to the variety of hurt which they do to thoſe they wrong. That which is involuntary conſiſteth in ignorance of perturbations, all which may be diverted, either by Reaſon, or civil Cuſtom, or Diligence.

## CHAP. XXXI.

*Of* Love *and* Friendſhip.

FRierdſhip, properly ſo termed, is made by a mutual reciprocal benevolence. This is, when either is as much concerned for the happineſs of the other, as of his own, which equality

equality is preſerved only by ſimilitude of manners: For, the like is friend to its like, if they be both moderate; but, the intemperate cannot agree, either with themſelves, or the moderate.

There are other things which are thought friendſhips, but are not ſuch, in which there appeareth ſome ſhew of virtue. Of theſe, is the natural good will of Parents to their Children, and of Kindred one to another; as alſo that which is called civil and ſociable: Theſe are not alwaies accompanied with mutual benevolence. Likewiſe, the amatory art is a kind of friendſhip. That which is honeſt is proper to a generous Soul, diſhoneſt, to a perverſe; mean, to one meanly affected. For, as the habit of the rational Soul is threefold, right, diſhoneſt, and mean; ſo many different kinds are there of love, which appeareth moſt clearly in the difference of the ends they propoſe unto themſelves. The diſhoneſt aimes only at corporeal pleaſure, and therefore is abſolutely bruitiſh. The honeſt conſidereth the mind only, as far as vertue appeareth in it. The mean deſireth both the beauty of the Soul and of the Body; of which love, he who is worthy, is mean likewiſe; that is, neither abſolutely honeſt nor diſhoneſt. Hence that love which aimeth only at the Body, ought to be termed a *Demon* (rather than a Deity, which never deſcendeth to an humane Body) tranſmitting Divine things to Men, and humane to God.

Of the three kinds of love, that which is proper to a good Man, being remote from vicious affections, is artificial, whence it is placed in the rational part of the Soul. The contemplations thereof are theſe, to diſcern who is worthy of love, and to contract friendſhip with him, and enjoy it: This diſcernment is made from his aimes or deſires, whether they are generous, and directed to a good end, or violent and fervent. The contraction, or acquiſition of friendſhip, is made, not by wanton exceſſive praiſe, but rather by reprehenſion, ſhewing him, that it is not convenient he ſhould live in that manner he doth; when he enjoyeth the love of him whom he affects, he muſt alwaies exhort him to thoſe things, by exerciſe whereof, he may arrive at perfect habit. Their end is that of lover and beloved, they may at laſt become friends.

## CHAP. XXXII.

### *Of Paſſions.*

INjuſtice is ſo great an ill, that it is better to ſuffer wrong than to do wrong; for one belongeth to a wicked Man, the other to a weak Man: both are diſhoneſt, but to do wrong is worſe, by how much it is more diſhoneſt. It is as expedient that a wicked Man be puniſhed, as that a ſick Man ſhould be cured by a Phyſician; for all chaſtiſement is a kind of Medicine for an offending Soul.

Since the greater part of Virtues are converſant about paſſions, it is neceſſary that we define paſſion. Paſſion is an irrational motion of the Soul, ariſing out of ſome good or ill; it is called an irrational motion, becauſe neither judgments nor opinions are paſſions; but motions of the irrational parts of the Soul. For in the irrational part of the Soul, there are motions, which though they are done by us, are yet nothing the more in our power. They are often done therefore contrary to our inclination and will; for ſometimes it falleth out, that though we know things to be neither pleaſing nor unpleaſing, expetible nor avoidable, yet we are drawn by them, which could never be if ſuch paſſions were the ſame with Judgment. For we reject judgment when we diſapprove it whether it ought to be ſo or otherwiſe. In the definition is added, ariſing from ſome good or ſome ill, becauſe of that which is mean or indifferent betwixt theſe, no paſſion is ever excited in us. All paſſions ariſe from that which ſeemeth good or ill. If we ſee good preſent we rejoice, if future, we deſire. On the contrary, if ill be preſent, we grieve, if imminent, we fear.

The ſimple affections, and, as it were, Elements of the reſt are two; *Pleaſure* and *Grief*; the reſt conſiſt of theſe. Neither are fear and deſire to be numbred among the principal paſſions, for he who feareth, is not wholly deprived of pleaſure, nor can a Man live the leaſt moment, who deſpaireth to be freed or eaſed of ſome ill. But it is more converſant in grief and ſorrow, and therefore he, who feareth, ſorroweth. But he who deſireth, like all thoſe who deſire or expect ſomething, is delighted; inſomuch as he is not abſolutely confident; and hath not a firm hope he is grieved. And if deſire and fear are not principal paſſions, it will doubtleſs follow, that none of the other affections are ſimple; as anger, love, emulation and the like; for in theſe, Pleaſure and Grief are manifeſt, as conſiſting of them.

Moreover of Paſſions, ſome are rough, others mild, the mild are thoſe, which are naturally in Men, and if kept within their bounds, are neceſſary and proper to Man, if they exceed, vitious. Such are Pleaſure, Grief, Anger, Pity, Modeſty; for it is proper to Man to *delight* in thoſe things which are according to Nature, and to be grieved at their contraries. *Anger* is neceſſary to repel and puniſh an injury. *Mercy* agreeth with Humanity. *Modeſty* teacheth us to decline fordid things. Other paſſions are rough, and preternatural, ariſing from ſome depraved or perverſe cuſtom. Such are exceſſive laughter, joy in the misfortunes of others, hatred of Mankind. Theſe, whether intenſe or remiſs, after what manner ſoever they are, are alwaies erroneous, and admit not any laudable mediocrity.

As concerning Pleaſure and Grief, *Plato* writeth thus. Theſe paſſions are excited in us by Nature. Grief and ſorrow happen to thoſe who are moved contrary to Nature; Pleaſure to thoſe who are reſtored to the proper conſtitution of their Nature. For he conceiveth the natural ſtate of Man to con-

ſiſt in a mean betwixt Pleaſure and Grief, not moved by either, in which ſtate we live longeſt. He aſſerteth ſeveral kinds of Pleaſure, whereof ſome relate to the *Body*, others to the *Soul*. Again, of Pleaſures ſome are *mix'd* with grief, ſome are *pure*. Again, ſome proceed from the *remembrance* of things paſt, others from *hope* of things to come. Again, ſome are *diſhoneſt*, as being intemperate and unjuſt; other *moderate*, and joyned with good, as joy for good things, and the Pleaſure that followeth Vertue. Now becauſe moſt Pleaſures are naturally diſhoneſt, he thinks it not to be diſputed whether Pleaſure can be ſimply and abſolutely a good, that being to be accounted poor and of no value, which is raiſed out of another, and hath not a principal primary eſſence. For Pleaſure cohereth even with its contrary Grief, and is joyned with it, which could not be, if one were ſimply good, the other ſimply ill.

## CHAP. XXXIII.

### *Of the forms of Common-wealths.*

OF the forms of Common-wealth, ſome are ſuppoſed only, and conceived by abſtract from the reſt. Theſe he delivers in his Book of a Common-wealth, wherein he deſcribeth the firſt concordant, the ſecond diſcordant, enquiring which of theſe is the moſt excellent, and how they may be conſtituted. He alſo divideth a Common-wealth like the Soul into three parts, *Keepers*, *Defenders*, and *Artificers*. The office of the firſt is to Counſel, to adviſe, to command; of the ſecond, to defend the Common-wealth, upon occaſion, by Arms, which anſwereth to the iraſcible power; To the laſt belong Arts and other ſervices. He will have Princes to be Philoſophers, and to contemplate the firſt good, affirming that ſo only they ſhall govern rightly. For Mankind can never be freed from ill, unleſs either Philoſophers govern, or they who govern be inſpired with Philoſophy after a Divine manner. A Common-wealth is then governed beſt, and according to Juſtice, when each part of the City performeth its proper Office. So that the Princes give Laws to the People; the Defenders obey them, and fight for them, the reſt willingly ſubmit to their Superiours.

Of a Common-wealth he aſſerteth five kinds, the firſt, *Ariſtocracy*, when the beſt rule; the ſecond, *Timocracy*, when the ambitious; the third, *Democracy*, when the People; the fourth *Oligarchy*, when a few; the laſt, *Tyranny*, which is the worſt of all.

He deſcribeth likewiſe other ſuppoſed forms of Common-wealth, as that in his Book of Laws; and, that which reformeth others, in his Epiſtles, which he uſeth for thoſe Cities that in his Books of Laws he ſaith are ſick. Theſe have a diſtinct place, and ſelect Men out of every age, as according to the diverſity of their nature and place, they require different inſtitution, education and arms. The Maritime People are to ſtudy Navigation and Sea-fight; the Iſland fighting on foot; thoſe in mountainous Countries to uſe light Armour, thoſe on the ſhore heavy. Some of theſe to exerciſe fighting on Horſeback. In this City he alloweth not a Community of Women. Thus is Politick a Virtue converſant both in Action and Contemplation; the end whereof is to conſtitute a City, good, happy, and convenient to it ſelf. It conſiders a great many things, amongſt the reſt, whether War be to be waged or not.

## CHAP. XXXIV.

### *Of a Sophiſt.*

HItherto we have ſpoken of a *Philoſopher*, from whom a *Sophiſt* differeth; In *Manners*, becauſe he teacheth young Men for gain, and deſireth rather to *ſeem* than to *be* good. In *matter*, for a Philoſopher is converſant in thoſe things which alwaies are, and continually remain in the ſame manner; but a Sophiſt in that which is not, for which reaſon he ſeeketh darkneſs, that he may not be known to be what he is. To things that are, that which is not, is not oppoſed as contrary, for it neither exiſteth, nor is participant of any eſſence, nor can be underſtood. So that if any Man endeavour to expreſs it in words, or comprehend it by thought; he is deceived, becauſe he putteth together things contrary and repugnant. Yet that which is not, as far as it is ſpoken, is not a pure negation of that which is, but implyeth a relation to another, which in ſome manner is joined to *Ens*. So that unleſs we aſſume ſomething from that which is to that which is not, it cannot be diſtinguiſhed from other things, but thus, as many kinds as they are of *Ens*, ſo many are there of *Non-Ens*, becauſe that which is not an *Ens* is a *Non-Ens*.

Thus much may ſerve for an introduction into *Plato*'s Philoſophy: Some things perhaps are ſaid orderly; others diſperſedly, or confuſedly; yet is all ſo laid down, that by thoſe which we have delivered, the reſt of his Aſſertions may be found out and contemplated.

*After*

*After ſo ſerious a Diſcourſe, it will not be amiſs to give the Reader a Poetical entertainment upon the ſame Subject,*

Being A

# PLATONICK DISCOURSE

Written in *Italian*, by

## *JOHN PICUS* Earl of *MIRANDULA*,

In explication of a Sonnet by

## *HIERONIMO BENIVIENI.*

### The First PART.

### SECT I.

IT is a principle of the *Platoniſts*, That every created thing hath a threefold being; Cauſal, Formal, Participated. In the Sun there is no heat, that being but an elementary quality, not of Celeſtial nature: yet is the Sun the cauſe and Fountain of all heat. Fire is hot by nature, and its proper form: Wood is not hot of it ſelf, yet is capable of receiving that quality by Fire. Thus hath heat its Cauſal being in the Sun, its Formal in the Fire, its Participated in the Fuel. The moſt noble and perfect of theſe is the Cauſal: and therefore *Platoniſts* aſſert, That all excellencies are in God after this manner of being; That in God is nothing, but from him all things; That Intellect is not in him, but that he is the original ſpring of every Intellect. Such is *Plotinus*'s meaning when he affirms, * *God neither underſtands nor knows*; that is to ſay, after a formal way, As *Dionyſius Areopagita*, *God is neither an Intellectual nor Intelligent nature, but unſpeakably exalted above all Intellect and Knowledge.*

* *Enntad. 6. lib. 7. 37.*

### *Sect.* II.

*Platoniſts* diſtinguiſh Creatures into three degrees. The firſt comprehends the corporeal and viſible; as Heaven, Elements, and all compounded of them: The laſt the inviſible, incorporeal, abſolutely free from Bodies, which properly are called Intellectual (by Divines, Angelical) Natures. Betwixt theſe is a mid-nature, which though incorporeal, inviſible, immortal, yet moveth Bodies, as being obliged to that Office; called, the rational Soul; inferiour to Angels, ſuperiour to Bodies; ſubject to thoſe, regent of theſe: Above which is God himſelf, Author and principle of every Creature, in whom Divinity hath a caſual being; from whom, proceeding to Angels, it hath a formal being, and thence is derived into the rational Soul by participation of their luſtre: below which, no nature can aſſume the Title of Divine.

### *Sect.* III.

THAT the firſt of theſe three Natures cannot be multiplied, who is but one, the principle and cauſe of all other Divinity, is evidently proved by *Platoniſts*, *Peripateticks*, and our Divines. About the ſecond, (*viz.* The Angelick and Intellectual, *Platoniſts* diſagree. Some (as *Proclus*, *Hermias*, *Syrianus*, and many others) betwixt God and the rational Soul place a great number of creatures; part of theſe they call Νόητα, νόερα, Intelligible, part Intellectual; which terms, *Plato* ſometimes confoundeth, as in his *Phædo*. *Plotinus*, *Porphyrius*, and generally the moſt refined *Platoniſts*, betwixt God and the Soul of the World, aſſign only one Creature, which they call the Son of God, becauſe immediately produced by him. The firſt opinion complies moſt with *Dionyſius Areopagita*, and Chriſtian Divines, who aſſert the number of Angels to be in a manner infinite. The ſecond is the more Philoſophick, beſt ſuiting with *Ariſtotle* and *Plato*, whoſe ſenſe we only purpoſe to expreſs; and therefore will decline the firſt path (though that only be the right) to purſue the latter.

### *Sect.* IV.

WE therefore, according to the opinion of *Plotinus*, confirmed not only by the beſt *Platoniſts*, but, even by *Ariſtotle*, and all the *Arabians*, eſpecially *Avicenna*, affirm, That

That God from eternity produced a creature of incorporeal and intellectual nature, as perfect as is possible for a created being, beyond which, he produced nothing; for, of the most perfect cause, the effect must be most perfect, and the most perfect can be but one; for, of two or more, it is not possible but one should be more or less perfect than the rest, otherwise they would not be two, but the same. This reason for our opinion I rather choose, than that which *Avicen* alledges, founded upon this principle, That from one cause, as one, can proceed but one effect. We conclude therefore, that no creature but this first mind proceeds immediately from God: for, of all other effects issuing from this mind, and all other second causes, God is only the mediate efficient. This by *Plato*, *Hermes*, and *Zoroaster*, is called the *Daughter of God*, the *Mind*, *Wisdom*, *Divine Reason*, by some interpreted *the Word*; not meaning (with our Divines) the Son of God, he not being a creature, but one Essence co-equal with the Creator.

*Sect.* V.

ALL understanding Agents have in themselves the form of that which they design to effect: as an Architect hath in his mind a figure of the building he undertakes, which as his pattern he exactly strives to imitate: This *Platonists* call the Idea, or Exemplar, believing it more perfect, than that which is made after it: and this manner of Being, Ideal, or Intelligible, the other, Material and Sensible: So that when a Man builds a House, they affirm there are two, one Intellectual in the Workman's mind; the other sensible, which he makes in Stone, Wood, or the like; expressing in that matter the form he hath conceiv'd: to this *Dante* alludes.

——*None any work can frame*;
*Unless himself become the same.*

Hereupon they say, though God produced only one creature, yet he produced all, because in it he produced the Ideas and forms of all, and that in their most perfect being, that is the Ideal, for which reason they call this Mind, the Intelligible World.

*Sect.* VI.

AFter the pattern of that Mind they affirm this sensible World was made, and the exemplar being the most perfect of all created things, it must follow that this Image thereof be as perfect as its nature will bear. And since animate things are more perfect than the inanimate; and of those the rational than the irrational, we must grant, this World hath a Soul perfect above all others. This is the first rational Soul, which, though incorporeal, and immaterial, is destin'd to the function of governing and moving corporeal Nature: not free from the Body as that mind whence from Eternity it was deriv'd, as was the mind from God. Hence *Platonists* argue the World is eternal; its Soul being such, and not capable of being without a Body, that also must be from eternity; as likewise the motion of the Heavens, because the Soul cannot be without moving.

*Sect.* VII.

THE ancient Ethnick Theologians, who cast Poetical vails over the face of their mysteries, express these three natures by other names. *Cœlum* they call God himself; he produc'd the first Mind, *Saturn*: *Saturn* the Soul of the World, *Jupiter*. *Cœlum* implies Priority, and excellence, as in the Firmament, the first Heaven. *Saturn* signifies Intellectual nature, wholly imploy'd in contemplation; *Jupiter* active life, consisting in moving and governing all subordinate to it. The properties of the two latter agree with their Planets: *Saturn* makes Men Contemplative, *Jupiter* Imperious. The Speculative busied about things above them; the Practick beneath them.

*Sect.* VIII.

WHich three names are promiscuously used upon these grounds: In God we understand first his Excellence, which as Cause, he hath above all his effects; for this he is called *Cœlus*. Secondly, the production of those effects, which denotes conversion towards inferiours; in this respect he is sometimes called *Jupiter*, but with an addition, *Optimus*, *Maximus*. The first Angelick nature hath more names, as more diversity. Every creature consists of Power and Act: the first, *Plato* in *Philebo*, calls Infinite: the second, Finite: all imperfections in the mind are by reason of the first; all perfections, from the latter. Her operations are threefold. About Superiours, the contemplation of God; about the knowledge of her self; about inferiours, the production and care of this sensible World: these three proceed from Act. By Power she descends to make inferiour things; but in either respect is firm within her self. In the two first, because contemplative, she is called *Saturn*: in the third, *Jupiter*, a name principally applyed to her power, as that part from whence is derived the act of Production of things. For the same reason is the Soul of the World, as she contemplates her self or superiours, termed *Saturn*; as she is imployed in ordering worldly things, *Jupiter*: and since the government of the World belongs properly to her; the contemplation to the Mind; therefore is the one absolutely called *Jupiter*, the other *Saturn*.

*Sect.* IX.

THIS World therefore (as all other creatures) consisteth of a Soul and Body: the Body is all that we behold, compounded of the four Elements. These have their casual being in the Heavens, (which consist not of them, as sublunary things; for then it would follow that these inferiour parts were made before the Celestial, the Elements in themselves being simple, by concourse causing such things as are compounded of them:) Their former being from the

the Moon down to the Earth: Their participate and imperfect under the Earth, evident in the Fire, Air, and Water, experience daily finds there; evinc'd by natural Philosophers: to which the antient *Theologians enigmatically* allude by their four infernal Rivers, *Acheron*, *Cocytus*, *Styx*, and *Phlegeton*.

We may divide the body of the World into three parts: Celestial, Mundane, Infernal: The ground why the Poets feign the Kingdom of *Saturn* to be shar'd betwixt his three Sons, *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto*: implying only the three-fold variation of this corporeal World; which as long as it remains under *Saturn*, that is, in its Ideal Intellectual being, is one and undivided; and so more firm and potent: but falling into the hands of his Sons, that is, chang'd to this material Being, and by them divided into three parts, according to the triple existence of bodies, is more infirm and less potent, degenerating from a spiritual to a corporeal estate. The first part, the heavenly, they attribute to *Jupiter*; the last and lowest to *Pluto*; the middle to *Neptune*. And because in this principality is all generation and corruption, the *Theologians* express it by the Ocean, ebbing or flowing continually: by *Neptune* understanding the Power or deity that presides over Generation. Yet we must not imagine these to be different Souls, distinctly informing these three parts: the World her self being one, can have but one Soul; which as it animates the subterraneal parts, is called *Pluto*; the sublunary *Neptune*; the Celestial, *Jupiter*. Thus *Plato* in *Philebo* averrs *by* Jove *is understood a regal Soul*, meaning the principal part of the World which governs the other. This opinion, though only my own, I suppose is more true than the expositions of the *Grecians*.

*Sect.* X.

NExt that of the World, Platonists assign many other rational Souls. The eight principal are those of the heavenly Spheres; which according to their opinion exceeded not that number; consisting of the seven Planets, and the starry Orb. These are the nine Muses of the Poets: *Calliope* (the universal Soul of the World) is first, the other eight are distributed to their several Spheres.

*Sect.* XI.

PLato, asserts, * That *the Author of the World made the mundane, and all other rational Souls, in one Cup, and of the same Elements; the universal Soul being most perfect, ours least*: whose parts we may observe by this division: Man, the chain that ties the World together, is placed in the midst: and as all *mediums* participate of their extreams, his parts correspond with the whole World; thence called *Microcosmus*. In the World is first Corporeal Nature, eternal in the Heavens; corruptible in the Elements, and their compounds, as Stones, Metals, &c. Then Plants. The third degree is of Beasts. The fourth rational Souls. The fifth Angelical minds. Above these is God, their origine. In Man are likewise two bodies; one eternal, the Platonists *Vehiculum Cœleste*, immediately inform'd by the rational Soul: The other corruptible, subject to sight, consisting of the Elements: Then the vegetative faculty, by which generated and nourished. The third part is Sensitive and motive. The fourth Rational; by the Latine *Peripateticks* believ'd the last and most noble part of the Soul: yet, above that is the Intellectual and *Angelick*; the most excellent part whereof, we call the Souls Union, immediately joyning it to God, in a manner resembling him; as in the other Angels, Beasts, and Plants. About these Platonists differ, *Proclus* and *Porphyrius* only allow the rational part to be Immortal; *Zenocrates* and *Speusippus* the sensitive also; *Numenius* and *Plotinus* the whole Soul.

* In Timæo.

*Sect.* XII.

IDeas have their casual being in God, their formal in the first Mind, their participated in the rational Soul. In God they are not, but produced by him in the *Angelick* nature, through this communicated to the Soul, by whom illuminated, when she reflects on her intellectual parts, she receives the true forms of things, *Ideas*. Thus differ the Souls of Men from the Celestial: these in their bodily functions recede not from the Intellectual, at once contemplating and governing. Bodies ascend to them, they descend not. Those employ'd in corporeal office are depriv'd of contemplation, borrowing science from sence, to this wholly enclin'd, full of errors: Their only means of release from this bondage, is, the amatory life; which by sensible beauties, exciting in the Soul a remembrance of the Intellectual, raiseth her from this terrene life, to the eternal; by the flame of love refined into an Angel.

## The Second PART.

### SECT. I.

THE apprehensive faculties of the Soul are employ'd about truth and falshood; assenting to one, dissenting from the other. The first is affirmation, the second negation. The desiderative converse in good and ill, inclining to this, declining to that. The first is Love, the second Hate. Love is distinguish'd by its objects; if

if of riches, termed covetousness; of honour, ambition; of Heavenly things, piety; of equals, friendship: these we exclude, and admit no other signification, but, *the desire to possess what in it self, or, at least in our esteem, is fair*: of a different nature from the love of God to his Creatures, who comprehending all, cannot desire or want the beauty and perfections of another: and from that of friends which must be reciprocal. We therefore with *Plato* define it, ὄρεξις τῦ καλῦ *The desire of beauty.* Desire is an inclination to real or apparent good. As there are divers kinds of Good, so of desire. Love is a species of desire, Beauty of good. Desire is Natural or Knowing. All creatures have a particular perfection by participation of the divine goodness This is their end, including that degree of felicity whereof they are capable, to which center they tend. This desire we call Natural; a great testimony of Divine Providence, by which they are unwittingly (as an Arrow by the Archer) directed to their mark. With this all Creatures desire God, as being the Original good imprinted and participating in every particular. This is in every Nature, as more or less capable; addressed to ends more or less noble; yet, is the ultimate end of all the same, to enjoy God, as far as they may: Thus as the Psalmist, *Every thing worships and praiseth God*; like supppliants, *turning and offering themselves up to him*, saith *Theodoret.*

*Sect.* II.

THE other Species of Desire is employed only about things known, given by Nature, that to every apprehensive faculty, there might be a desiderative; to embrace what it judgeth good, to refuse what it esteemeth evil; in its own nature enclin'd to good: None ever desires to be miserable; but, the apprehensive Vertue many times mistaking Evil for Good, it oft falls out that the desiderative (in it self blind) desires evil. This in some sence may be said voluntary, for none can force it; in another sence, not voluntary, deceived by the judgment of its Companion. This is *Plato*'s meaning, when he saith, * *No Man sins willingly.*

* *In Timæo,* Κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ἑκὼν οὐδεὶς.

*Sect.* III.

IT is the Property of every desiderative Vertue, that He who desires, possesseth in part the thing he desires, in part not: for, if he were wholly deprived of its Possession, he would never desire it: this is verified two ways. First, nothing is desired unless it be known; and to know a thing is in some part to possess it. So *Aristotle*, † *The Soul is all, because it knows all.* And in the Psalmist God saith, *All things are mine, I know them.* Secondly, there is always some convenience and resemblance betwixt the desirer and desired: Every thing delights and preserves it self by that, which by natural affinity is most conformable to it; by its contrary is grieved and consum'd. Love is not betwixt things unlike; Repugnance of two opposite natures is natural hate. Hate is a repugnance with knowledge. Hence it followeth, that the nature of the desired, is in some manner in the desirer; otherwise, there would be no similitude betwixt them: yet imperfectly; else it were vain for it to seek what it entirely possesseth.

† *De Animâ,* 3. 9.

*Sect.* IV.

AS desire generally follows knowledge, so several knowing are annexed to several desiring Powers. We distinguish the knowing into three degrees; Sense, Reason, Intellect; attended by three desiderative Vertues, Appetite, Election, Will. Appetite is in Bruits, Election in Men, Will in Angels. The sense knows only corporeal things, the Appetite only desires such; the *Angelick* Intellect is wholly intent on Contemplation of spiritual Conceptions, not inclining to Material Things, but when divested of matter, and spiritualiz'd, their Will is only fed with intemporal spiritual Good. Rational Nature is the Mean betwixt these Extreams; sometimes descending to Sense, sometimes elevated to Intellect; by its own Election complying with the desires of which she pleaseth. Thus it appears, that corporeal Objects are desired, either by Sensual Appetite, or Election of Reason inclining to Sense: Incorporeal by Angelick Will, or, the Election of Reason, elevated to Intellectual Height.

*Sect.* V.

BEauty in general, is a *Harmony resulting from several things proportionably concurring to constitute a third*: In respect of which temperament, and mixture of various Natures, agreeing in the composition of one, every Creature is Fair; and in this sence no simple being is Beautiful, not God himself; this Beauty begins after him, arising from contrariety, without which is no composition; it being the union of contraries, a friendly enmity, a disagreeing concord; whence *Empedocles* makes discord and concord the principles of all things; by the first, understanding the variety of the Natures compounding; by the second, their Union: adding, that in God only there is no Discord, He not being the Union of several Natures; but, a pure uncompounded Unity. In these compositions the Union necessarily predominates over the contrariety, otherwise the Fabrick would be dissolved. Thus in the ficticos of Poets, *Venus* loves *Mars*: this Beauty annnot subsist without contrariety; she curbs and moderates him, this temperament allays the strife betwixt these contraries. And in Astrologie, *Venus* is plac'd next *Mars*, to check his destructive influence; as *Jupiter* next *Saturn*, to abate his malignancy. If *Mars* were always subject to *Venus* (the contrariety of principles to their due temper) nothing would ever be dissolved.

*Sect.*

*Sect.* VI.

THis is Beauty in the largeſt ſence, the ſame with Harmony; whence God is ſaid to have framed the World with muſical harmonious temperament. But Harmony properly implies a melodious agreement of Voices; and Beauty in a reſtrict acception relates to a proportionable concord in viſible things, as Harmony in audible. The deſire of this Beauty is love; ariſing only from one knowing faculty, the Sight; and that gave *Plotonius*, (*Ennead.* 3. *lib.* 5. 3.) occaſion to derive ἔρως *Love*, from ὄψις *Sight*. Here the Platoniſt may object; If Love be only of viſible things, how can it be applyed to *Ideas*, inviſible natures? We anſwer, Sight is two fold, corporeal and ſpiritual; the firſt is that of Senſe, the other the Intellectual faculty, by which we agree with Angels; this Platoniſts call Sight, the corporeal being only an Image of this. So *Ariſtotle*, *Intellect is that to the Soul which ſight is to the Body*. Hence is *Minerva* (Wiſdom) by *Homer* call'd γλαυκῶπις, *Bright-ey'd*. With this ſight *Moſes*, Saint *Paul*, and, other Saints, beheld the face of God; this Divines call Intellectual, intuitive cognition, the Beatifical viſion, the Reward of the Righteous.

*Sect.* VII.

AS Sight, ſo Beauty (its object) is twofold the (two *Venus*'s celebrated by *Plato*, [*Sympoſ.*] and our Poet) Senſible, called Vulgar *Venus*. Intellectual in *Ideas* (which are the object of the Intellect, as colour of ſight) nam'd Celeſtial *Venus*. Love alſo is twofold, Vulgar, and Celeſtial; for as *Plato* ſaith * *There muſt neceſſarily be as many Loves as Venus's.*

* *Sympoſ.*

*Sect.* VIII.

*Venus* then is Beauty, whereof Love is generated: properly his Mother, becauſe Beauty is the cauſe of Love, not as productive principle of this act, to Love, but as its object: the Soul being the efficient cauſe of it as of all his acts; Beauty the material: For in Philoſophy the efficient is aſſimilated to the Father, the material to the Mother.

*Sect.* IX.

CElestialLove is an Intellectual deſire of Ideal Beauty: *Ideas*, (as we ſaid before) are the Patterns of things in God, as in their Fountain; in the *Angelick* Mind, Eſſential; in the Soul by Participation, which with the Subſtance partakes of the *Ideas* and Beauty of the firſt Mind: Hence it follows, that Love of Celeſtial Beauty in the Soul, is not Celeſtial Love perfectly, but the neareſt Image of it. Its trueſt being is with the deſire of Ideal Beauty in the firſt Mind, which God immediately adorns with *Ideas*.

*Sect.* X.

LOve (ſaith *Plato*) was begot on *Penia*, by *Porus* (the Son of *Metis*) in *Jupiters* Orchard, being drunk with Nectar, when the Gods met to celebrate *Venus* Birth. Nature in it ſelf inform, when it receives form from God is the *Angelick* Mind; this form is *Ideas*, the firſt Beauty; which in this deſcent from their divine Fountain, mixing with a different nature, become imperfect. The firſt mind, by its opacouſneſs eclipſing their luſtre, deſires, that Beauty which they have loſt; this deſire is love; *begot when Porus* the affluence of *Ideas mixeth with Penia* the indigence of that inform nature we termed *Jupiter* (1. 8.) *in whoſe Garden* the *Ideas* are planted, with thoſe the firſt Mind adorned, was by the Antients named *Paradiſe*; to which contemplative life and eternal felicity *Zoroaſtres* inviting us, ſaith, *Seek*, ſeek *Paradiſe*: our Divines transfer it to the *Cœlum Empyræum*, the ſeat of the happy Souls, whoſe bleſſedneſs conſiſts in contemplation and perfection of the Intellect, according to *Plato*. This Love *begot on Venus Birthday*, that is, when the Ideal Beauty, though imperfectly, is infuſed into the *Angelick* Mind; *Venus* yet as a Child, not grown to perfection. *All the Gods aſſembled at this Feaſt*, that is their *Ideas*, (as by *Saturn* we underſtand both the Planet and his *Idea*) an expreſſion borrowed from *Parmenides*. Theſe Gods then are thoſe *Ideas* that precede *Venus* (She is the beauty and Grace reſulting from their variety.) *Invited to a Banquet of Nectar and Ambroſia*: thoſe whom God feaſts with Nectar and *Ambroſia* are eternal beings, the reſt not; Theſe *Idea's* of the *Angelick* Mind are the firſt eternals; *Porus was drunk with Nectar*, this Ideal affluence fill'd with Eternity; other *Id a's* were not admitted to the Feaſt, nor indued with Immortality.

*Orpheus* upon the ſame grounds ſaith, Love was born before all other Gods, in the boſom of *Chaos*: Becauſe Nature full of indiſtinct imperfect forms (the Mind repleniſhed with confuſed *Ideas*) deſires their perfection.

*Sect.* XI.

THE *Angelick* Mind deſires to make theſe *Idea's* perfect; which can only be done by means oppoſite to the cauſes of their imperfection, theſe are Receſſion from their Principle, and mixtion with a contrary Nature: Their Remedy, ſeparation from the unlike Nature, and return and conjunction (as far as poſſible) with God. Love, the deſire of this Beauty, excites the Mind to converſion and re-union with him. Every thing is more perfect as nearer its Principle; This is the firſt Circle. The *Angelick* Mind, proceeding from the Union of God, by revolution of intrinſecal knowledge returneth to him. Which with the Antients is *Venus adulta*, grown to perfection. Every Nature that may have this converſion, is a Circle; ſuch alone are the Intellect and Rational, and therefore only capable of felicity, the obtaining their firſt Principle, their ultimate end and higheſt good. This is peculiar to Immortal Subſtances, for the Material (as both Platoniſts and *Peripateticks* grant) have not this reflection upon themſelves, or their Principle. Theſe, (the *Angelick* Mind and

Rational Soul) are the two intelligible Circles; answerable to which in the corporeal World are two more; the tenth Heaven immoveable, image of the first Circle; the Celestial Bodies, that are moveable, image of the second: The first *Plato* mentions not, as wholly different and irrepresentable by corporeal Nature: of the second *in Timæo* he saith, That *all the Circles of this visible Heaven* (by him distinguished into the fixed sphere and seven Planets) *represent as many Circles in the Rational Soul.*

Some attribute the name of Circle to God; by the antient Theologists called *Cœlus*; being a Sphear which comprehends all; as the utmost Heaven includes the World.

In one respect this agrees with God, in another not; the property of beginning from a point and returning to it, is repugnant to him; who hath no beginning, but is himself that indivisible point from which all Circles begin, and to which they return: And in this sence it is likewise inconsistent with material things, they have a beginning, but cannot return to it.

In many other Properties it agrees with God; He is the most perfect of beings; this of figures; neither admit addition: The last Sphear is the place of all bodies, God of all Spirits: the Soul (say Platonists) is not in the Body, but the body is in the Soul, the Soul in the Mind, the Mind in God, the outmost *Place*; who is therefore named by the Cabalists סקיים.

## *Sect.* XII.

THE three Graces are Handmaids to *Venus*
*Thalia, Euphrosyne, Aglaia*; Viridity, Gladness, Splendour; properties attending Ideal Beauty. *Thalia*, is the permanence of every thing in its entire being; thus is Youth called green, Man being then in his perfect state; which decays as his years encrease, into his last dissolution. *Venus*, is proportion, uniting all things. Viridity, the duration of it; In the Ideal World, where is the first *Venus*, is also the first Viridity; for no Intelligible Nature recedes from its being by growing old. It communicates this property to sensible things as far as they are capable of this *Venus*, that is, as long as their due proportion continues. The two other properties of Ideal Beauty are Illustration of the Intellect, *Aglaia*, Repletion of the will with desire and joy, *Euphrosyne*.

Of the Graces one is painted looking toward us; The continuation of our being is no reflex act. The other two with their faces from us, seeming to return; the operations of the Intellect and Will are reflexive; *What comes from God to us, returns from us to God.*

## *Sect.* XIII.

*Venus* is said to be born of the Sea; Matter, the Inform Nature whereof every Creature is compounded, is represented by Water, continually flowing, easily receptable of any form. This being first in the Angelick Mind, Angels are many times expresst by Water, as in the Psalms, *The Waters above the Heavens praise God continually*, so interpreted by *Origen*; and some *Platonists* expound the Ocean (stil'd by *Homer* Father of Gods and Men) this Angelick Mind, Principle and Fountain of all other Creatures; *Gemistius*, *Neptune*; as Commander of all Waters, of all Minds Angelical and Humane. This is that living Fountain, whereof he that drinketh shall never thirst: These are the Waters whereon (*David* saith) God hath founded the World.

## *Sect.* XIV.

*Porus* (the Affluence of *Ideas* proceeding from God) is stiled by *Plato* the Son of *Metis* (Counsel,) in Imitation of the Scripture: whence our Saviour by *Dionysius Areop.* is termed the Angel of Counsel, that is, the Messenger of God the Father; so *Avicen* calls the first Cause conciliative, the mind not having *Ideas* from it self but from God, by whose Counsel she receiveth Knowledge and Art to frame this visible World.

## *Sect.* XV.

LOve, * according to *Plato*, is *Youngest and Oldest of the Gods*; They, as all other things, have a two-fold Being, Ideal and Natural. The first God in his natural Being was Love, who dispenc'd theirs to all the rest, the last in his Ideal. Love was born in the Descent of the *Ideas* into the Angelick Mind, which could not be perfect till they, its Essence, were made so, by loves conversion to God. The Angelick Mind owing its natural being to Love, the other Gods who succeeded this Mind, necessarily are younger than He in their natural Being, though they precede him in their Ideal, as not born till these *Ideas*, though imperfectly, were joyn'd to the inform'd Nature.

* Sympos.

## *Sect.* XVI.

*THE Kingdom of Necessity is said to be before that of Love.* Every Creature consists of two Natures, Material, the imperfect, (which we here understand by Necessity) and Formal, the occasion of Perfection. That whereof it most partakes is said to be predominant, and the Creature to be subject to it. Hence is Necessity (matter) suppos'd to raign when the *Ideas* were imperfect, and all imperfections to happen during that time: all perfections after Love began his reign; for, when the Mind was by him converted to God; that which before was imperfect in her, was perfected.

Plat. Sym.

## *Sect.* XVII.

† VEnus *is said to commend Fate.* The order and concatenation of Causes and effects in this sensible World, called Fate, depends on the order of the Intelligible World, Providence. Hence Platonists place Providence (the ordering of *Ideas*) in the first Mind, depending upon God, its ultimate end, to which it leads all other things. Thus *Venus*, being the order of those *Ideas*, whereon Fate, the Worlds order, depends, commands it.

† Plat. Sym.

Fate

Fate is divided into three parts, *Clotho*, *Lacheſis*, and *Atropos*: That which is one in Providence, indiviſible in Eternity, when it comes into Time and Fate, is diviſible into Paſt, Preſent, and Future. Others apply *Atropos* to the fixed Sphear, *Clotho* to the ſeven Planets, *Lacheſis* to ſublunary things.

Temporal corporeal things only are ſubjected to Fate; the Rational Soul being incorporeal, predominates over it; but is ſubjected to Providence, to ſerve which is true liberty. By whom the Will (obeying its Laws) is led to the Acquiſition of her deſired end. And as often as ſhe endeavours to looſe her ſelf from this Servitude, of Free ſhe becomes a Servant and Slave to Fate, of whom before ſhe was the Miſtreſs. To deviate from the Laws of Providence, is, to forſake Reaſon to follow Senſe and Irrational Appetite, which being corporeal, are under Fate; he that ſerves theſe, is much more a ſervant than thoſe he ſerves.

*Sect.* XVIII.

AS from God *Ideas* deſcend into the *Angelick* Mind, by which the Love of Intellectual Beauty is begot in her, called *Divine Love*; ſo the ſame Ideas deſcend from the Angelick Mind into the Rational Soul, ſo much the more imperfect in her, as ſhe wants of Angelical Perfection: From theſe ſprings *Human Love*. *Plato* diſcourſeth of the firſt, *Plotinus* of the latter: who by the ſame Argument, whereby he proves *Ideas* not accidental, but ſubſtantial in the *Angelick* Mind, evinceth likewiſe the ſpecifical Reaſons, the *Ideas* in the Soul, to be ſubſtantial, terming the Soul *Venus*, as having a ſpecious ſplendid Love, in reſpect of theſe ſpecifical Reaſons.

*Sect.* XIX.

VUlgar Love is the Appetite of ſenſible Beauty, through corporeal ſight. The cauſe of this Beauty is the viſible Heaven by its moving power. As our motive faculty conſiſts in Muſcles and Nerves (the Inſtruments of its Operation,) ſo the motive faculty of Heaven is fitted with a Body proper for circular ſempiternal motion: Through which Body the Soul (as a Painter with his Pencil) changeth this inferiour matter into various Forms. Thus vulgar *Venus* (the beauty of material forms) hath her caſual being from the moving power of the Heavens, her formal from colour, enlightned by the viſible Sun, as *Ideas* by the inviſible; her participate in the Figure and juſt order of parts communicated to ſight by mediation of light and colour, by whoſe Intereſt only it procures love.

*Sect.* XX.

AS when the *Ideas* deſcend into the Mind, there ariſeth a deſire of enjoying that from whence this Ideal Beauty comes; ſo when the ſpecies of ſenſible Beauty flow into the Eye, there ſprings a two fold Appetite of Union with that, whence this Beauty is derived: one Senſual, the other Rational; the principles of Beſtial and Human Love. If We follow Senſe, We judge the Body wherein We behold this Beauty, to be its Fountain; whence proceeds a deſire of Coition, the moſt intimate union with it: This is the Love of irrational Creatures. But Reaſon knows, that the Body is ſo far from being its Original, that it is deſtructive to it, and the more it is ſever'd from the Body, the more it enjoys its own Nature and Dignity: We muſt not fix with the ſpecies of Senſe in the Body, but refine that ſpecies from all reliques of corporeal infection.

And becauſe Man may be underſtood by the Rational Soul, either conſidered apart, or in its union to the Body; in the firſt ſence, Human Love is the Image of the Celeſtial; in the ſecond, Deſire of ſenſible Beauty; this being by the Soul abſtracted from matter, and (as much as its nature will allow) made Intellectual. The greater part of Men reach no higher than this; others more perfect, remembring that more perfect Beauty which the Soul (before immers'd in the Body) beheld, are inflam'd with an incredible deſire of reviewing it, in purſuit whereof, they ſeparate themſelves as much as poſſible from the Body, of which the Soul (returning to its firſt dignity) becomes abſolute Miſtreſs. This is the Image of Celeſtial Love, by which Man ariſeth from one perfection to another, till his Soul (wholly united to the Intellect) is made an Angel. Purged from material droſs, and transformed into ſpiritual flame by this Divine Power, he mounts up to the Intelligible Heaven, and happily reſts in his Fathers boſome.

*Sect.* XXI.

VUlgar Love is only in Souls immerſt in Matter, and overcome by it, or at leaſt hindred by perturbations and paſſions. *Angelick* Love is in the Intellect, eternal as it. Yet but inferr'd, the greater part turning from the Intellect to ſenſible things, and corporeal cares. But ſo perfect are theſe Celeſtial Souls, that they can diſcharge both Functions, rule the Body, yet not be taken off from Contemplation of Superiours: Theſe the Poets ſignifie by *Janus* with two faces, one looking forward upon Senſible things, the other on intelligible: leſs perfect Souls have but one face, and when they turn that to the Body, cannot ſee the Intellect, being depriv'd of their contemplation; when to the Intellect, cannot ſee the Body, neglecting the Care thereof. Hence thoſe Souls that muſt forſake the Intellect, to apply themſelves to Corporeal Government, are by Divine Providence confin'd to caduque, corruptible Bodies, looſed from which, they may in a ſhort time, if they fail not themſelves, return to their Intellectual felicity. Other Souls not hindred from Speculation, are tyed to eternal incorruptible Bodies.

Celeſtial Souls then (deſign'd by *Janus*, as the Principles of Time, motion intervening) behold the Ideal Beauty in the Intellect, to love it perpetually; and inferiour ſenſible things, not to deſire their Beauty; but to communicate this other to them. Our Souls before united to the Body, are in like manner double-fac'd; but, are then as it were, cleft aſunder,

retaining but one; which as they turn to either object, Sensual or Intellectual, is deprived of the other.

Thus is vulgar Love inconsistent with the Celestial; and many ravish'd at the sight of Intellectual Beauty, become blind to sensible; imply'd by *Callimachus*, *Hymn.* 5. in the Fable of *Tyresias*, who viewing *Pallas* naked, lost his sight; yet by her was made a Prophet, closing the Eyes of his Body, she open'd those of his Mind; by which he beheld both the Present and Future. The Ghost of *Achilles* which inspir'd *Homer* with all Intellectual Contemplations in Poetry, deprived him of corporeal sight.

Though Celestial Love liveth eternally in the Intellect of every Soul; yet, only those few make use of it, who declining the Care of the Body, can with Saint *Paul* say, *Whether in the Body, or out of the Body they know not.* To which state a Man sometimes arrives; but, continues there but a while, as we see in Ecstasies.

*Sect.* XXII.

THus in our Soul (naturally indifferent to sensible or intelligible Beauty) there may be three Loves; one in the Intellect, Angelical; the second Humane; the third Sensual: the two latter are conversant about the same object, Corporeal Beauty; the sensual fixeth its Intention wholly in it; the humane separates it from matter. The greater part of Mankind go no further than these two; but they whose Understandings are purified by Philosophy, knowing sensible Beauty to be but the Image of another more perfect, leave it, and desire to see the Celestial, of which they have already a Taste in their Remembrance, if they persevere in this Mental Elevation, they finally obtain it: and recover that, which though in them from the beginning, yet they were not sensible of, being directed by other Objects.

*The Sonnet.*

I.

*LOve, (whose hand guides my Hearts strict Reins,*
*Nor, though he govern it, disdains*
*To feed the fire with pious care*
*Which first himself enkindled there)*
*Commands my backward Soul to tell*
*What Flames within her Bosom dwell;*
*Fear would perswade her to decline*
*The charge of such a high design;*
*But all her weak reluctance fails,*
*'Gainst greater Force no Force avails.*
*Love to advance her flight will lend*
*Those wings by which he did descend*
*Into my Heart, where he to rest*
*For ever, long since built his Nest:*
*I what from thence he dictates write,*
*And draw him thus by his own Light.*

II.

*LOve, flowing from the sacred spring*
*Of uncreated Good, I sing:*
*When born; how Heaven he moves; the Soul*
*Informs; and doth the World controul;*
*How closely lurking in the heart,*
*With his sharp weapons subtle art*
*From heavy earth he Man unites,*
*Enforcing him to reach the skies.*
*How kindled, how he flames, how burns;*
*By what laws guided now he turns*
*To Heaven, now to the Earth descends,*
*Now rests 'twixt both, to neither bends.*
Apollo, *Thee I invocate,*
*Bowing beneath so great a weight.*
*Love, guide me through this dark design,*
*And imp my shorter wings with thine.*

III.

*WHen from true Heav'n the sacred Sun*
*Into th' Angelick Mind did run,*
*And with enliv'ned Leaves adorn,*
*Bestowing form on his first-born;*
*Enflaming by innate Desires,*
*She to her chiefest good aspires;*
*By which reversion her rich Breast*
*With various Figures is impress;*
*And by this love exalted, turns*
*Into the Sun for whom she burns.*
*This flame, rais'd by the Light that shin'd*
*From Heav'n into th' Angelick mind,*
*Is eldest Loves religious Ray,*
*By Wealth and Want begot that Day,*
*When Heav'n brought forth the Queen, whose Hand*
*The Cyprian Scepter doth Command.*

IV.

*THis born in amorous* Cypris *arms,*
*The Sun of her bright Beauty warms.*
*From this our first desire activates,*
*Which in new fetters caught, pursues*
*The honourable path that guides*
*Where our eternal good resides.*
*By this the fire, through whose fair beams*
*Life from above to Mankind streams,*
*Is kindled in our hearts, which glow*
*Dying, yet dying greater grow;*
*By this th' immortal Fountain flows,*
*Which all Heaven forms below, bestows;*
*By this descends that shower of light*
*Which upwards doth our minds invite;*
*By this th' Eternal Sun inspires*
*And Souls with sacred lustre fires.*

V.

*AS God doth to the Mind dispense*
*Its Being, Life, Intelligence,*
*So doth the Mind the Soul acquaint*
*How't understand, to move, to paint;*
*She thus prepar'd, the Sun that shines*
*In the Eternal Breast designs,*
*And here what she includes diffuses,*
*Exciting every thing that uses*
*Motion and sense (beneath her state)*
*To live, to know, to operate.*
*Inferiour* Venus *hence took Birth;*
*Who shines in Heav'n, but lives on Earth,*
*And o're the World her shadow spreads:*
*The elder in the Suns Glass reads*
*Her Face, through the confused skreen*
*Of a dark shade obscurely seen;*
*She Lustre from the Sun receives,*
*And to the Other Lustre gives;*

Celestial

*Celeſtial Love on this depends,*
*The younger, vulgar Love attends.*

VI.

*FOrm'd by th' eternal Look of God,*
*From the Suns moſt ſublime abode,*
*The Soul deſcends into Mans Heart,*
*Imprinting there with Wondrous Art*
*What worth ſhe borrowed of her Star,*
*And brought in her Celeſtial Carr;*
*As well as humane Matter yields,*
*She thus her curious Manſion builds;*
*Yet all thoſe fawes from the divine*
*Impreſſion differently decline:*
*The Sun, who's figur'd here, his Beams*
*Into another's Boſom ſtreams;*
*In whoſe agreeing Soul he ſtays,*
*And gilds it with his virtuous Rays,*
*The heart in which Affection's bred,*
*Is thus by pleaſing Error fed.*

VII.

*THe heart where pleaſing Error reigns,*
*This object as her Child maintains,*
*By the fair light that in her ſhines*
*(A rare Celeſtial Gift,) refines;*
*And by degrees at laſt doth bring,*
*To her firſt ſplendours ſacred ſpring,*
*From this divine Look, one Sun paſſes*
*Through three refulgent Burning-glaſſes,*
*Kindling all Beauty, which the Spirit,*
*The Body, and the Mind inherit.*
*Theſe rich ſpoils, by th' eye firſt caught,*
*Are to the Souls next Handmaid brought,*
*Who there reſides: She to the Breſt*
*Sends them; reform'd, but not expreſt:*
*The heart from Matter Beauty takes,*
*Of many one Conception makes;*
*And what were meant by Natures Laws,*
*Diſtinct, She in one Picture draws.*

VIII.

*THe heart by Love allur'd to ſee*
*Within her ſelf her Progeny;*
*This, like the Suns reflecting Rays*
*Upon the Waters face, ſurvays;*
*Yet ſome divine, though clouded light*
*Seems here to twinkle, and invite*
*The pious Soul, a Beauty more*
*Sublime, and perfect to adore.*
*Who ſees no longer his dim ſhade*
*Upon the Earths vaſt Globe diſplay'd,*
*But certain Luſtre, of the true*
*Suns trueſt Image, now in view.*
*The Soul thus entring in the Mind,*
*There ſuch uncertainty doth find,*
*That ſhe to clearer Light applies*
*Her aims, and near the firſt Sun flies:*
*She by his ſplendour beateous grows,*
*By loving whom all Beauty flows*
*Upon the Mind, Soul, World, and All*
*Included in this ſpacious Ball.*

IX.

*BUt hold! Love ſtops the forward Courſe*
*That me beyond my ſcope would force.*
*Great Power! if any Soul appears*
*Who not alone the bloſſoms wears,*
*But of the rich Fruit is poſſeſt,*
*Lend him thy Light, deny the reſt.*

## The Third PART.

TO treat of both Loves belongs to different Sciences; Vulgar Love to Natural or Moral Philoſophy; Divine, to Theology or Metaphyſicks. *Solomon* diſcourſeth excellently of the firſt in *Eccleſiaſtes*, as a Natural Philoſopher, in his *Proverbs* as a Moral: Of the ſecond in his *Canticles*, eſteemed the moſt Divine of all the Songs in Scripture.

*Stanza* I.

The chief order eſtabliſhed by Divine Wiſdom in created things, is, that every inferiour Nature be immediately governed by the ſuperiour; whom whilſt it obeys, it is guarded from all ill, and led without any obſtruction to its determinate felicity; but, if through too much affection to its own liberty, and deſire to preſer the licentious life before the profitable, it rebell from the ſuperiour Nature, it falls into a double inconvenience. Firſt, like a Ship, given over by the Pilot, it lights ſometimes on one Rock, ſometimes on another, without hope of reaching the Port. Secondly, it loſeth the command it had over the Natures ſubjected to it, as it hath deprived its ſuperiour of his. Irrational Nature is ruled by another, unfit for its Imperfection to rule any. God by his ineffable Excellence provides for every thing, himſelf needs not the providence of any other: Betwixt the two extreams, God and Bruits, are Angels and Rational Souls, governing others, and governed by others. The firſt Hierarchy of Angels immediately illuminated by God, enlighten the next under them; the laſt (by Platoniſts termed *Dæmons*, by the Hebrews ▭w, as Guardians of *Men*) are ſet over us as We over Irrationals. So *Pſal.* 8. Whileſt the Angels continued ſubject to the Divine Power, they retained their Authority over other Creatures; but when *Lucifer* and his Companions, through inordinate love of their own Excellence, aſpir'd to be equal with God, and to be conſerved, as He, by their own ſtrength, they fell from Glory to extream Miſery; and when they loſt the Priviledge they had over others, ſeeing us freed us from their Empire, enviouſly every hour inſidiate our good. The ſame order is in the leſſer World, our Soul: the inferiour faculties are directed by the ſuperiour, whom following they err not. The imaginative corrects the miſtakes of outward Senſe; Reaſon

is

is illuminated by the Intellect, nor do we at any time miscarry; but when the Imaginative will not give credit to Reason, or Reason confident of it self, resists the Intellect. In the Desiderative the Appetite is govern'd by the Rational, the Rational by the Intellectual, which our Poet implies saying,

[*Love whose hand guides my hearts strict reins.*]

The Cognoscitive powers are seated in the *Head*, the Desiderative in the *Heart*: In every well order'd Soul, the Appetite is govern'd by Intellectual Love; implyed by the Metaphor of *Reins*, borrowed from *Plato* in his *Phædrus*.

[*Love to advance my flight, will lend*
*The wings by which he did ascend*
*Into my heart———*]

When any superiour vertue is said to *descend*, we imply not, that it leaves its own height to come down to us, but draws us up to it self; its descending to us, is our ascending to it; otherwise such conjunction would be the imperfection of the virtue, not the perfection of him who receives it.

II.

[*Love flowing from the sacred Spring*
*Of uncreated good———*]

From the Fountain of Divine goodness into our Souls, in which that influx is terminated.

[*When born*, &c.]

The order, participation, conversion, of Ideas, see *Part* 2. Sect.

[*——how Heaven he moves, the Soul*
*Informs, and doth the World controul.*]

Of these three properties, Love is not the efficient: God produceth the Ideas in the Angelick Mind, the Mind illustrates the Soul with Ideal Beauty; Heaven is moved by its proper Soul: But, without Love, these principles do not operate: He is cause of the Minds conversion to God, and of the Souls to the Mind; without which, the Ideas would not descend into the one, nor the Specifick reasons into the other: the Soul not illuminated by these, could not elicite this sensible form out of matter, by the motion of Heaven.

III.

When the first emanation from God (the plenty of Ideas) descended into the Angelick Mind, she, desiring their perfection, reverts to God, obtaining of him what she covets; which the more fully she possesseth, the more fervently she loves. This desire, (Celestial Love,) born of the obscure Mind and Ideas, is explain'd in this *Stanza*:

[*——true Heaven——*]

God who includes all created beings, as Heaven all sensible, *lib.* 2. Sect. Only Spiritual things, according to *Platonists*, are *true* and real, the rest but shadows and images of these.

[*——the sacred Sun*]

The light of Ideas streaming from God.

[*——enlivened leaves——*]

The Metaphor of *Leaves* relates to the Orchard of *Jupiter*, where these Ideas were planted, 2. 10. *Enlivened*, as having in themselves the principle of their operation, Intellection, the noblest life, as the Psalmist, *Give me understanding, and I shall live.* So the *Cabalist* to the second *Sephirah*, which is *Wisdom*, attributes the name of *Life*.

[*--adorn bestowing form--*]

To *adorn* denotes no more than accidental perfection, but Ideas are the Substance of the Mind, and therefore he adds, *bestowing form*; which though they come to her from without, she receives not as accidents, but as her first intrinsecal act: which our Author implies, terming her *desires innate*.

[*And by this love exalted, turns*
*Into the Sun, for whom she burns.*]

Love transforms the Lover into the thing loved.

[*——Wealth and Want——*]

*Porus* and *Penia*, 2. 10.

IV.

The properties of Celestial Love are in this *Stanza* discovered.

[*——in new fetters caught——*]

The Soul being oppress't by the Body, her desire of Intellectual Beauty sleeps; but, awakened by Love, is by the sensible Beauty of the Body, led at last to their Fountain, God.

[*——which glow*
*Dying, yet glowing greater grow.*]

Motion and Operation are the signs of life, their privation of death: in him who applies himself to the Intellectual part, the rational and the sensitive fail; by the Rational he is Man, by the Intellectual communicates with Angels: As Man he dies, reviv'd an Angel. Thus the Heart *dies* in the flames of Intellectual Love; yet, consumes not, but by this death *grows greater*, receives a new and more sublime life. See in *Plato* the Fables of *Alcestes* and *Orpheus*.

V.

V.

This *Stanza* is a deſcription of ſenſible Beauty.

[ *The elder in the Suns glaſs reads*
*Her face, through the confuſed skreen*
*Of a dark ſhade obſcurely ſeen.* ]

Senſible light is the act and efficacy of Corporeal, ſpiritual light of Intelligible Beauty. Ideas in their deſcent into the inform Angelick Mind, were as colours and figures in the Night: As he who by Moon-light ſeeth ſome fair object, deſires to view and enjoy it more fully in the Day; ſo the Mind, weakly beholding in her ſelf the Ideal Beauty dim and opacous (which our Author calls *the skreen of a dark ſhade*) by reaſon of the Night of her imperfection, (turns like the Moon) to the eternal Sun, to perfect her Beauty by him; to whom addreſſing her ſelf, ſhe becomes Intelligible light; clearing the Beauty of Celeſtial *Venus*, and rendring it viſible to the eye of the firſt Mind.

In ſenſible Beauty we conſider firſt the object in it ſelf, the ſame at Midnight as at Noon: Secondly, the light, in a manner the Soul thereof: the Author ſuppoſeth, that as the firſt part of ſenſible Beauty (corporeal forms) proceeds from the firſt part of Intellectual Beauty (Ideal forms) ſo ſenſible light flows from the Inteligible, deſcending upon Ideas.

VI, VII, VIII.

Corporeal Beauty implies, firſt, the material diſpoſition of the Body, conſiſting of quantity in the proportion and diſtance of parts, of quality in figure and colour: Secondly, a certain quality which cannot be expreſt by any term better than Gracefulneſs, ſhining in all that is fair: This is properly *Venus*, Beauty, which kindles the fire of Love in Mankind: They who affirm it reſults from the diſpoſition of the Body, the ſight, figure, and colour of features, are eaſily confuted by experience. We ſee many perſons exact, and unaccuſtomable in every part, deſtitute of this grace and comlineſs; others leſs perfect in thoſe particular conditions, excellently graceful and comely; Thus *Catullus*,

*Many think* Quintia *beauteous, fair, and tall,*
*And ſtreight ſhe is, apart I grant her all:*
*But altogether beauteous I deny;*
*For, not one grace doth that large ſhape ſupply.*

He grants her perfection of quality figure, and quantity; yet not allows her handſome, as wanting this Grace. This then muſt by conſequence be aſcribed to the Soul, which when perfect and lucid, transfuſeth even into the Body ſome Beams of its Splendour. When *Moſes* came from the divine Viſion in the Mount, his face did ſhine ſo exceedingly, that the People could not behold it unleſs vail'd. *Porphyrius* relates, that when *Plotinus* his Soul was elevated by divine Contemplation, an extraordinary brightneſs appeared in his looks, *Plotinus* himſelf avers, that there was never any beautiful Perſon wicked, that this Gracefulneſs in the Body, is a certain ſign of perfection in the Soul, *Proverbs* 17. 24. *Wiſdom ſhineth in the countenance of the Wiſe.*

From material beauty we aſcend to the firſt Fountain by ſix Degrees: the Soul through the ſight repreſents to her ſelf the Beauty of ſome particular perſon, inclines to it, is pleaſed with it, and while ſhe reſts here, is in the firſt, the moſt imperfect material degree. 2. She reforms by her imagination the Image ſhe hath received, making it more perfect as more ſpiritual; and ſeparating it from Matter, brings it a little nearer Ideal Beauty. 3. By the light of the agent Intellect abſtracting this Form from all ſingularity, ſhe conſiders the univerſal Nature of Corporeal Beauty by it ſelf: This is the higheſt degree the Soul can reach whilſt ſhe goes no further than Senſe. 4. Reflecting upon her own Operation, the knowledge of univerſal Beauty, and conſidering that every thing founded in matter is particular, ſhe concludes this univerſality proceeds not from the outward Object, but her Intrinſecal Power, and reaſons thus: If in the dim Glaſs of Material Phantaſms this Beauty is repreſented by virtue of my Light, it follows, that beholding it in the clear Mirrour of my ſubſtance diveſted of thoſe Clouds, it will appear more perſpicuous: thus turning into her ſelf, ſhe finds the Image of Ideal Beauty communicated to her by the Intellect, the Object of Celeſtial Love. 5. She aſcends from this Idea in her ſelf, to the place where Celeſtial *Venus* is, in her proper form; who in fulneſs of her Beauty not being comprehenſible, by any particular Intellect, ſhe, as much as in her lies, endeavours to be united to the firſt Mind, the chiefeſt of Creatures, and general Habitation of Ideal Beauty, obtaining this, ſhe terminates, and fixeth her journey: this is the ſixth and laſt degree: They are all imply'd in the 6, 7, and 8 *Stanza's*.

[ *Form'd by th' Eternal look*, &c.

*Platoniſts* affirm ſome Souls are of the nature of *Saturn*, others of *Jupiter*, or ſome other Planet; meaning, one Soul hath more Conformity in its Nature with the Soul of the Heaven of *Saturn*, than with that of *Jupiter*, and ſo on the contrary; of which there can be no internal Cauſe aſſigned; the External is God, who (as *Plato* in his *Timæus*) *Soweth and ſcattereth Souls, ſome in the Moon, others in other Planets and Stars, the Inſtruments of Time.*

Many imagine the Rational Soul deſcending from her Star, in her *Vehiculum Cœleſte*, of her ſelf forms the Body, to which by that Medium ſhe is united: Our Author upon theſe grounds ſuppoſeth, that into the *Vehiculum* of the Soul, by her endued with Power to form the Body, is infuſed from her Star a particular formative vertue, diſtinct according to that Star; thus the Aſpect of one is Saturnine, of another Jovial,

Jovial, &c. in their looks were read the nature of their Souls.

But becauſe inferiour matter is not ever obedient to the Stamp, the vertue of the Soul is not alwaies equally expreſt in the viſible Effigies: hence it happens that two of the ſame Nature are unlike; the matter whereof the one conſiſts being leſs diſpoſed to receive that Figure than the other; what in that is compleat is in this imperfect; our Author infers, that the figures of two Bodies being formed by vertue of the ſame Star, this Conformity begets Love.

[*From the Suns moſt ſublime abode*]

The Tropick of *Cancer*; by which Souls according to the *Platoniſts* deſcend, aſcending by *Capricorn*. *Cancer* is the Houſe of the Moon, who predominates over the vital parts, *Capricorn* of *Saturn* preſiding over Contemplation.

[*The Heart in which affection's bred*
*Is thus by pleaſing Error fed.*]

Frequently, if not alwaies, the Lover believes that which he loves more beautious than it is, he beholds it in the Image his Soul hath formed of it; ſo much fairer as more ſeparate from Matter, the Principle of Deformity; beſides, the Soul is more Indulgent in her Affection to this Species, conſidering it is *her own Child* produc'd in her Imagination.

[*—one Sun paſſes*
*Through three refulgent Burning-glaſſes.*]

One Light flowing from God, beautifies the Angelick, the Rational Nature, and the Senſible World.

[*—the Souls next Hand-maid—*]

The Imaginative

[*—to the Breaſt*]

The *Breaſt* and *Heart* here taken for the Soul, becauſe her neareſt Lodging; the Fountain of Life and Heat.

[*—reform'd but not expreſt.*]

*Reform'd* by the Imagination from the deformity of Matter; yet not reduc'd to perfect immateriality, without which, true Beauty is not *Expreſt*.

## SPEUSIP.

SPUSIPPUS.

## CHAP. I.

### *His Life.*

*Laert.

*SPEUSIPPUS was an *Athenian*, born at *Myrrhinus* [ which belonged to the *Pandionian* Tribe ] his Father named *Eurymedon*, his Mother *Potone*, Sister to *Plato*.

(a) Apul. dogm. Plat.

(a) He was brought up in the domeſtick documents of his Unkle *Plato*, (b) who ( as he uſed to ſay ) *reformed* Speuſippus's *life, after the pattern of his own.*

(b) Plut. de adulat. & amidiſcrim.

(c) *Plato* had four Kinſ-women, Daughters of his Nieces; the eldeſt of theſe he married to *Speuſippus*, with a ſmall Portion, thirty *Minæ*, which *Dionyſius* had ſent him: To this ſumm *Chio*, glad of the occaſion, added a Talent, which *Speuſippus* earneſtly refuſed, until at laſt, he was overcome by the juſt importunities of the other to receive it, alledging that he gave it not as Mony, but as kindneſs; that ſuch gifts were to be entertained, for they encreaſed

(c) Chio. Epiſt. Madrid.

honour, the reſt were diſhonourable; that he ought to accept of the good will, though he diſpiſed the Mony. The reſt of thoſe Virgins were Married richly to *Athenians*, only *Speuſippus*, who beſt deſerved, was poor. With theſe arguments *Speuſippus* was induced to accept of *Chio*'s gift; whereat *Chio* much congratulated his own good fortune, as having laid hold of an occaſion, *ſuch, as perhaps*, ſaith he, *I ſhall not meet again in all my life.*

*Plut. vit. Dion.* When *Dion* came to *Athens*, *Speuſippus* was continually in company with him, more than any other friend there, by *Plato*'s advice, to ſoften and divert *Dion*'s humour, with a facile companion, ſuch as he knew *Speuſippus* to be; and that withal, he knew diſcreetly how to obſerve time and place in his mirth: whence *Timon* (*in Sillis*) calls him, *a good Jeſter.*

The laſt time that *Plato*, upon the importunity of *Dionyſius*, went to *Sicily*, *Speuſippus* accompany'd him. Whilſt they lived at *Syracuſe*, *Speuſippus* kept more company with the Citizens than *Plato* did, and inſinuating more into their minds, at firſt they were afraid to ſpeak freely to him, miſtruſting him to be one of *Dionyſius*'s ſpies: But within a while they began to confide in him, and all agreed in this, to pray *Dion* to come to them, and not to take care for Ships, Men, or Horſes, but to hire a Ship for his own paſſage; for the *Sicilians* deſired no more, than that he would lend them his name and perſon againſt the Tyrant.

*Speuſippus* at his return to *Athens*, perſwaded *Dion* to War againſt *Dionyſius*, and deliver *Sicily* from the bondage of Tyranny, aſſuring him the Country would receive him gladly. *Dion* upon this information received ſuch encouragement, that he began ſecretly to levy Men: The Philoſophers much advanced his deſign. When he went to *Sicily*, he beſtowed a Country-houſe, which he had purchaſed ſince his coming to *Athens*, upon *Speuſippus*.

## CHAP. II.

### *His profeſſion of Philoſophy*

* *Laert.* * *Plato* dying in the firſt year of the 108th Olympiad, *Theophilus* being Archon, *Speuſippus* ſucceeded him in the School of the Academy,

† *Laert.* † whom he followed alſo in his Doctrine.

He firſt, as *Theodorus* affirms, looked into the community and mutual aſſiſtance of Mathematical Diſciplines, as *Plato* did into that of the Philoſophical.

* *Laert.* * He firſt, according to *Cenæus*, declared thoſe things, which *Iſocrates* conceived not to

† *Epiſt. ad At.* 2. 1. be divulged, the ſame perhaps which † *Cicero* calls the μυεσθήκιον of *Iſocrates*.

* *Stob. Phyſ.* 1. 1. * He affirmed, that the mind was not the ſame, either with *Good* or *One*; but of a peculiar nature proper to it ſelf.

* *Laert.* * He ſet up in the School which *Plato* had built the Images of the Graces.

He exacted Mony of his Diſciples, contrary to the cuſtom of *Plato*.

The two Women who were *Plato*'s Auditors, *Laſthenia* the *Mantinean*, and *Axiothea* the *Phliaſian*, heard *Speuſippus* likewiſe.

Having continued *Maſter* of the School eight years, he at laſt, by reaſon of his infirm diſpoſition, much debilitated by the Palſie, ſent to *Xenocrates*, deſiring him to come and take from him the government of the School, which *Xenocrates* did.

## CHAP. III.

### *His Writings.*

HE wrote † many things, chiefly in Philoſophy, Commentaries and Dialogues, † *Laert.* of which were

Ariſtippus *the* Cyrenaick.
*Of Riches* 1.
*Of Pleaſure* 1.
*Of Juſtice* 1.
*Of Philoſophy* 1.
*Of Friendſhip* 1.
*Of the Gods* 1.
*The Philoſopher* 1.
*To Cephalus* 1.
*Cephalus* 1.
*Clinomachus, or Lyſias* 1
*The Citizen* 1.
*Of the Soul* 1.
*To Gryllus* 1.
*Ariſtippus* 1.
*The confutation of Arts* 1.
*Commentary Dialogues.*
*Artificial* 1.
*Dialogues of likeneſs in things* 10.
*Diviſions and Arguments to things like.*
*Of the genus's and ſpecies of Examples.*
*To Amartirus.*
*Encomium of Plato.*
*Epiſtles to Dion, Dionyſius, Philip.*
*Of Law.*
*The Mathematician.*
*Mandrobulus.*
*Lyſias.*
*Definitions*, of all theſe writings the only extant.
*Orders of Commentaries.*
*Verſes.*

* *Phavorinus*, in the ſecond of his Commentaries, ſaith, That *Ariſtotle* paid three Talents for his Books. * *Laert.*

## CHAP. IV.

### *His Death.*

HE was (as † *Timotheus* ſaith) very infirm of Body, * inſomuch that he was fain to be carried up and down the Academy in a kind of a running Chair: Riding in this manner, he one day met *Diogenes*, whom ſaluting, he ſaid, Joy be with you: But, not with you, anſwered *Diogenes*, who can endure to live being in that condition. At length he dyed willingly through grief, as *Laertius* affirms, who elſewhere citing *Plutarch in the lives of* Lyſander *and* Scylla, ſaith, He dyed of the *Phthiriaſis*; but there is no ſuch thing extant in *Plutarch*. † *Laert.* * *Laert.*

(c) Though

(c) Though he followed *Plato* in his Opinions; yet he did not imitate his Temper, for he was auſtere, cholerick, and had not ſo great command over his pleaſures. In anger he threw a Dog into a Well, and indulging to pleaſure, he went to the marriage of *Caſſander* in *Macedonia*: He was alſo ſo great a Lover of Money, that ſome Poems which he had written, not very good, he ſung publickly for gain: for which Vices, *Dionyſius* writing to him, thus derides him: *And we may learn Philoſophy from our* Arcadian *ſhe-Scholar.* Plato *took no Money of his Scholars, you exact it whether they are willing or not.* (d) *Athenæus* cites the ſame Epiſtle, after he had reproached him for Avarice and Voluptuouſneſs, he objects his Collections of Money from many perſons; his love to *Laſthenia*, the Sardian Curtezan; after all this adding, *Why do you accuſe us of avarice, who your ſelf omit not any ſordid way of gain? Did not you after* Hermias's *Debts was ſatisfied, make collections in his name amongſt his Friends, to your own uſe.*

To a rich man in love with a deformed perſon; *What need you her*, ſaith he, *for ten Talents you may have a handſomer.*

To him *Simonides* wrote Hiſtories, wherein he related the actions of *Dion* and *Bion.*

There was another *Speuſippus*, a Phyſician of *Alexandria.*

# XENOCRATES.

## CHAP. I.

*His Country, Parents, living with* Plato.

(a) *Xenocrates* was of *Chalcedon*, Son of *Agatho*, or *Agathenor.* From the years of his life 82. which in all probability ended when *Polemo* ſucceeded in the School, the firſt year of the 116. Olympiad, it may be gathered that he was born in the fourth year of the 95. Olympiad. He heard *Plato* from his Childhood. He was dull of apprehenſion, whence *Plato* comparing him with *Ariſtotle*, ſaid, *One needs a Spur, the other a Bridle; what an Aſs and what an Horſe have I to yoke together!* He was ſevere, and had a ſad look, for which reaſon *Plato* oft ſaid to him, *Xenocrates, ſacrifice to the Graces*, which was an uſual phraſe to melancholy people. (c) Another time *Plato* ſharply reprehended the roughneſs of his diſpoſition, which he took quietly and unmoved; ſaying to one that inſtigated him to reply in his own defence, *No, this is an advantage to me.*

(d) He accompanied *Plato* in his Voyage to *Sicily*, (e) where at a drinking Feaſt, with *Dionyſius*, being honoured with a Wreath of Gold, inſtead of a Garland of Flowers, which were beſtow'd upon the Gueſts upon ſuch occaſions, when he went away, he put it upon the Statue of *Mercury*, where they uſed to leave their ordinary Garments.

(f) When *Dionyſius* fell out with *Plato*, and threatned to find one that ſhould cut off his Head, *Xenocrates* made anſwer, *not before he hath cut off this*, ſhewing his own.

(g) *Ælian* ſaith, that *Xenocrates* having taken a journey into his own Country, *Ariſtotle* with his Diſciples came to *Plato*. *Speuſippus* was at that time ſick, and therefore could not be with *Plato*. *Plato* being fourſcore years old, (which falls upon the fourth year of the 107. Olympiad, the year before his death) his memory through age much decay'd, *Ariſtotle* fell upon him with ſubtle ſophiſtical queſtions, whereupon *Plato* gave over walking in publick, and retired with his Friends to his own Houſe. At the end of the three months *Xenocrates* returning from his travel, finds *Ariſtotle* walking where he had left *Plato*, and ſeeing that he and his Friends when they went out of the School went not to *Plato*, but to ſome other part of the City, he asked one there preſent, what was become of *Plato*, thinking he had been ſick, the other anſwered, he is not ſick, but *Ariſtotle* hath moleſted him, and driven him out of the School, ſo that now he teacheth Philoſophy in his own Garden. *Xenocrates* hearing this, went immediately to *Plato*, whom he found diſcourſing to his Diſciples, perſons of great worth and eminence. As ſoon as he had ended his Diſcourſe, he ſaluted *Xenocrates*, as he uſed, very kindly, and *Xenocrates* him. When the Company was diſmiſs'd. *Xenocrates*, without ſpeaking a word of it to *Plato*, getting his Friends together, after he had chid *Speuſippus* for permitting *Ariſtotle* to poſſeſs the School, made a Head againſt *Ariſtotle*, and oppoſed him with his utmoſt force, until at laſt he reinſtated him in the School. Thus *Ælian.* But this ſtory, which he acknowledgeth to have taken up on no better authority than vulgar report, diſagrees with many Circumſtances of *Ariſtotle*'s Life, ſupported by far more credible Teſtimonies.

## CHAP. II.

*His Profession of Philosophy.*

After *Speusippus* had held the School eight years, finding himself not able to continue that charge any longer, he sent to *Xenocrates* intreating him to take it upon him, which *Xenocrates* did, (*a*) in the second year of the 110. Olympiad, *Lisimachides* being Archon, not without emulation and dissension with the Peripateticks, for (*b*) *Aristotle*, at his return out of *Macedonia*, finding *Xenocrates* possess'd of the Academy, instituted a School, in opposition to him, in the Lycæum, saying,

(a) *Laert.*

(b) *Laert. vit. Arist.*

*Silent to be now most disgraceful were,*
*And see* Xenocrates *possess the Chair.*

(c) *Laert. vit. Arist.* (*c*) Some affirm, that *Alexander* falling out with *Aristotle*, to vex him, sent a Present to
(d) *Laert. vit. Xen.* *Xenocrates* (*d*) of 50. Talents, whereof *Xenocrates* took but 3000. Atticks, and sent back the rest, saying, that *he needed it most that*
(e) *Ethic. Serm.* 37. *was to maintain so many.* Or, as (*e*) *Stobæus* relates it, having entertained the Messenger after his usual fashion, Go and tell *Alexander*, saith he, that after the rate I live, I shall not
(f) *Stob. Eth. Serm.* 77. need 50. Talents in all my life. (*f*) The Money being brought back to *Alexander*, he asked, if *Xenocrates* had not any Friend, adding that as for his own Friends, the wealth of *Darius* was too little for them.

† *Stob. Ec. Phys.* 1. 3. † He asserted *Unity* and *Duality* to be *Gods*; the first as it were Masculine, in the nature of a Father, reigning in Heaven, whom he called also *Jupiter*, the *Odd*, and the *Mind*. The other, as it were Female, and the Mother, commanding all things under Heaven. This he called the Mind of the Universe. He likewise asserts Heaven to be divine, and the fiery Stars to be Olympian Gods, the rest sublunary invisible Deities, which permeate through the Elements of Matter, whereof that which passeth through the Air is called *Juno*, that which through the Water *Neptune*, that which through the Earth *Ceres*. This the *Stoicks* borrowed from him, as he the former from *Plato*.

* *Laert.* * He continued Master of the School twenty five years, until the first year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad; then his Disciple *Polemo* succeeded him. During that time, he lived very retired in the Academy; and if at any time he went into the City, all the Tradesmen and other people thronged to see him.

## CHAP. III.

*His Vertues and Apothegms.*

† *Laert. Val. Max.* 4. 3. † Amongst his other Vertues, he was very remarkable for his Continence, of which there is this instance: *Phryne*, a famous Athenian Curtezan, having laid a Wager with some young men his Disciples, that he could not resist her Enticements, stole privately into his Bed: The next morning being question'd and laught at by his Disciples, she said, The Wager they laid was of a man, not of a stone. To this end he used to mortifie himself by incision, and cauterising of his flesh.

† His Wisdom and Sanctity was much reverenced by *Athenians*; for being to give his testimony, and to swear, as the custom was, that he spoke nothing but truth, the Judges all rose up, and cried out, that he should not swear, indulging that to his sincerity, which they did not allow to one another. † *Val. Max.* 10. *Cic. Balbo. Laert.*

* *Laert.* * Being sent with others to *Philip* on an Embassy, the rest received Gifts from him, and went to treat in private with him; *Xenocrates* did neither, and for that part was not invited by him: The Ambassadours returning to *Athens*, said, that *Xenocrates* went along with them to no purpose: whereupon the Athenians were ready to impose a mulct upon him; but when they understood by him, that they were at that time to consider chiefly concerning the Common-wealth, *Philip* having corrupted the rest with Gifts, and that he would not accept any, they bestowed double Honours upon him. *Philip* said afterwards, that of those who came to him, only *Xenocrates* would not take any gifts.

Being sent in the time of the *Lamiack* War (which was about the second year of the 104th Olympiad) Ambassadour to *Antipater*, about the redemption of some *Athenian* Prisoners, *Antipater* invited him to sit down to Supper, whereto he answer'd in the words of *Ulysses* in *Homer*:

*O* Circe, *what man is there that is good,*
*Before his friends are freed can think of food.*

*Antipater* was so pleased with the ingenious application of these Verses, that he caused the Prisoners immediately to be set at Liberty.

† *Æl. var. hist.* 30. *Laert.* † His Clemency, saith *Ælian*, extended not only to men, but, often to irrational creatures, as once, when a Sparrow, pursued by a Hawk, flew to his bosom, he took it, much pleased, and hid it till the Enemy were out of sight; and when he thought it was out of fear and danger, opening his Bosom, he let it go, saying, that he had not betrayed a Suppliant.

* *Laert.* * *Bion* deriding him, he refused to make any answer in his own defence; for, a Tragedy, saith he, being mocked by a Comedy, needs not a Reply.

To one, who though he had neither learn'd Musick, Geometry, nor Astronomy; yet desired to be his Disciple: *Away*, saith he, *you have not the handles of Philosophy.* Some affirm he said, *I teach not to card Wooll.*

*Antipater* coming to *Athens* met and saluted him; which salute he returned not, until he had made an end of the Discourse he was about.

† *Laert. Stob. Eth.* † He was nothing proud; he assigned a particular Business to every part of the Day, a great part thereof to Meditation, one part to Silence.

* *Stob. Ser.* * Whensoever he pierc'd a Vessel of Wine, it was sower'd before he spent it, and the Broths that were made for him were often thrown

thrown away the next day; whence proverbially was used, *the Cheese of* Xenocrates, of things that last well, and are not easily consumed.

Val. Max. † Holding his peace at some detractive discourse; they asked him why he spoke not? Because, saith he, I have sometimes repented of speaking, but never of holding my peace.

Yet, this man, saith *Laertius*, because he could not pay the Fine imposed upon Aliens, the Athenians sold: *Demetrius Phalereus* bought him, contenting both parties, the Athenians with their Tribute, *Xenocrates* with his Liberty.

## CHAP. IV.

### *His Writings.*

Laert. †HE left many Writings, Verses, Exhortations, and Orations, their Titles these.

*Of Nature* 6 Books.
*Of Wisdom* 6
*Of Riches* 1.
*Arias* 1.
*Of Indefinite* 1.
*Of a Child* 1.
*Of Continence* 1.
*Of Profitable* 1.
*Of Free* 1.
*Of Death* 1. which some conceive to be the same with that which is extant amongst the spurious *Platonick* Dialogues, under the Title of *Axiochus*.
*Of Voluntary* 1.
*Of Friendship* 2.
*Of Equity* 1.
*Of Contrary* 2.
*Of Beatitude* 2.
*Of Writing* 1.
*Of Memory* 1.
*Of False* 1.
*Callicles* 1.
*Of Prudence* 2.
*Oeconomick* 1.
*Of Temperance* 1.
*Of the power of Law.* 1.
*Of a Common-wealth* 1.
*Of Sanctity* 1.
*That Vertue may be taught* 1.
*Of Ens* 1.
*Of Fate* 1.
*Of Passions* 1.
*Of Lives* 1.
*Of Concord* 1.
*Of Disciples* 2.
*Of Justice* 1.
*Of Vertue* 2
*Of Species* 1.
*Of Pleasure* 2.
*Of Life* 1.
*Of Fortitude* 1.
*Of One* 1.
*Of Ideas* 1.
*Of Art* 1.
*Of Gods* 2.
*Of the Soul* 2.
*Of Science* 1.
*Politick* 1.
*Of Scientificks* 1.
*Of Philosophy* 1.
*Of Parmenides opinions* 1.
*Archidemus, or of Justi e* 1.
*Of Good* 1.
*Of things which pertain to Intellect* 8.
*Solutions concerning Speech* 1.
*Physical auscultation* 6.
*A Summary* 1.
*Of Genus's and Species* 1.
*Pythogorean Assertions* 1.
*Solutions* 2.
*Divisions* 8.
*Positions* 3.
*Of Dialectick* 14, & 15, & 16.
*Of Disciplines, concerning distinctions* 9.
*Concerning Ratiocination* 9.
*Concerning Intelligence* 4.
*Of Disciplines* 6.
*Concerning Intelligence* 2.
*Of Geometry* 5.
*Commentaries* 1.
*Contraries* 1.
*Of Numbers* 1.
*Theory of Arithmetick* 1.
*Of Intervals* 1.
*Astrologick* 6.
*Elements, to* Alexander *concerning a Kingdom* 4.
*To Aribas.*
*To Hephastion.*
*Of Geometry* 2.
*Verses* 345.

## CHAP. V.

### *His Death.*

Laert. HE died in the 82 year of his age by a fall in the Night into a Basin (wherein he was drown'd) probably in the first year of the 116. Olympiad, for in that year *Polemo* his Successor took upon him the School.

*Laertius* saith, there were six more of his Name, but mentions only five. One, very ancient, skilful in *Tactick*; another of the same City and Family with this Philosopher, Author of the Oration upon the Death of *Arsinoe*; the fourth, saith he, a Philosopher, who writ in Elegiack Verse, but not happily, perhaps the same, who, *Suidas* saith, was nothing inferiour to this *Xenocrates* for Continence; the fifth, a Statuary, the sixth, a Writer of Songs, as *Aristoxenus* affirms.

POLEMO.

# POLEMO.

Laert. POLEMO was an *Athenian* of Oea [a Town belonging to the *Oenian* Tribe,] his Father *Philoſtratus* (who
† Laert. according to † *Antigonus Caryſtius*) was a Citizen of great account; and kept a Chariot and Horſes.

Laert. *Polemo* in his Youth was very intemperate and diſſolute; he frequently took a ſum of Money, and hid it in a private corner of ſome Street, to ſupply his extravagancies upon occaſion. Even in the Academy were found three *oboli*, which he had had hid under a Pillar, upon the ſame account. This Wildneſs cauſed diſcontent betwixt him and his Wife, who, thinking her ſelf not well uſed by him, accuſed him ὡς μετεχοίης συνουσίας.

* 6. 7. * Neither did he delight (ſaith *Valerius Maximus*,) in Luxury only, but even in the infamy thereof. On a time, coming from a Feaſt, not after the ſetting but riſing of the Sun; and ſeeing the door of *Xenocrates* the Philoſopher open, full of Wine, ſmelling ſweet of Unguents, crown'd with Garlands, richly attir'd, he ruſh'd into his School, which was filled with a croud of learned perſons. Nor contented with ſo rude an intruſion, he ſate down alſo, intending to make ſport at his excellent Eloquence and prudent Precepts. Hereupon all were offended as the Affront deſerved, only *Xenocrates*, continuing the ſame Countenance and Geſture, fell from the Diſcourſe in which he was, and began to ſpeak of Modeſty and Temperance, with the gravity of whoſe diſcourſe, *Polemo* being reduced to Repentance, firſt took his Garland off from his head, and flung it on the ground; ſoon after he withdrew his Arm within his Cloak; Next he laid aſide the cheerfulneſs of that look which he had formerly, when he affected Feaſting; laſtly, he wholly deveſted himſelf of Luxury, and being thus cured by the wholſom Medicine of one Diſcourſe, he, from an infamous Prodigal became a moſt excellent Philoſopher, being * from that time forward ſo addicted to ſtudy, that he ſurpaſs'd all the reſt, and ſucceeded *Xenocrates* in the government of the School, which he began in the firſt year of the 146. Olympiad.

* Laert. After he began to ſtudy Philoſophy, he had ſuch a conſtant Behaviour, that he retain'd always the ſame Countenance, and kept the ſame tone in all his ſpeech, whereby *Crantor* was taken with him. A mad Dog having bit him by the Knee, he alone of all the Company ſeem'd to be unconcern'd in it, and a Tumult happening thereupon in the City, he asked without any diſturbance, what was the matter? In the Theatres alſo, he was nothing moved. When *Nicoſtratus* the Poet, ſirnamed *Clytemneſtra*, recited ſomething to him and *Crates*, *Crates* was much taken therewith, but he made no more ſhow than as if he had heard nothing, and was altogether ſuch as *Melanthius* the Painter in his Books of Picture hath deſcrib'd him, for he ſaith in his actions was expreſſed a ſtubbornneſs and hardneſs.

*Polemo* uſed to ſay, we ought to exerciſe our ſelves in things, not in Dialectick Diſciplines, leſt, ſatisfying our ſelves with the taſte and meditation of the ſuperficial parts of Science, we become admired for ſubtilty in diſcourſe, but contradict our ſelves in the practice of our Life.

He was facete and ingenious, ſhunning that which *Ariſtophanes* imputes to *Euripides*, ſowerneſs and harſhneſs. He taught, not ſitting, but, walking. The *Athenians* much honour'd him for his great Integrity, he took great delight in Solitude, whence for the moſt part he dwelt in a Garden, about which his Diſciples built themſelves little Lodges, near to his School. He was a ſtudious imitator of *Xenocrates* (who, *Ariſtippus* ſaith, much loved him) always remembring his innocence, ſeverity and gavity, to which, like a Dorick Meaſure, he conformed his own ſteps.

*Antigonus Caryſtius* ſaith, that from the thirtieth year of his age to his death he drunk nothing but water. *Ath. Deip. lib. 2.*

He held that the World is God. *Stob. Phyſic.*

He much affected *Sophocles*, chiefly in thoſe places where (to uſe the phraſe of the Comick Poet) *a Moloſſian Dog ſeemeth to have written together with him.* And whereas *Phrynicus* ſaith, he was Laert.

*Not ſweet, nor flat, but gently ſmooth*; he ſaid, that *Homer* was an Epick *Sophocles*, *Sophocles* a Tragick *Homer*.

He died very old of a Conſumption, and left behind him many Writings. *Laertius* hath this Epigram upon him;

*Wert thou not told, that* Polemo *lies here,*
*On whom ſlow ſickneſs (man's worſt paſſion)*
*No, 'tis the robe of fleſh he us'd to wear, (prey'd?*
*Which ere to Heav'n he mounted down he laid.*

Of his Diſciples are remembred *Crates*, *Zeno* the Stoick, and *Arceſilaus*.

# CRATES.

# CRATES.

Laert.

CRATES was a *Thriasian*, Son of *Antigenes*; he was an Auditor of *Polemo*, and loved by him; He succeeded him in the government of his School. They both profited so much by one another, that living they not only follow'd the same institutes, but even to their last ends were alike, and being dead, were buried in the same Sepulchre. Upon which occasion *Antagoras* writ thus upon them both,

*Who ere thou art, say ere thou passest by,*
Crates *and* Polemo *here buried lie;*
*Both for their mutual love no less admir'd,*
*Than for their eloquence, by which inspir'd,*
*O th' wisdom they profess'd the age was proud,*
*Yet gladly to their sacred precepts bow'd.*

Hence *Arcesilaus*, when he went from *Theophrastus*, and apply'd himself to them, said, *they were Gods, or certain reliques of the golden age.*

They were nothing popular, but what *Dionysiodorus* an antient Musician was wont to say, may be apply'd to these, when he boasted; that none had ever heard him sing, as they had *Ismenius*, nor had ever seen him in a Ship, or at the Fountains.

*Antigonus* saith, that, he sojourn'd at *Crantor's*, when he and *Arcesilaus* lived most friendly, and that *Arcesilaus* dwelt with *Crantor*, *Polemo* with *Crates*, together with *Lysicles*, who was one of the Citizens, and truly, *Polemo*, as is before mention'd, loved *Crates*, *Crantor*, *Arcesilaus*. But *Crates* dying, as *Apollodorus* in the third of his Chronicle, left Books which he had written, partly of Philosophy, partly of Comedy; Orations suited for publick pleading, or Embassie.

He had many eminent disciples, of whom was *Arcesilaus*, and *Bion* the *Boristhenite*, afterwards called a *Theodorean* from that Sect.

There were ten of this name. The *First* an antient Comick Poet.

The *Second*, an Oratour of the Family of *Isocrates*.

The *Third*, an Ingeneer, that went along with *Alexander* in his expeditions.

The *Fourth*, a Cynick.
The *Fifth*, a Peripatetick.
The *Sixth*, this Academick.
The *Seventh*, a Grammarian.
The *Eighth*, writ of Geometry.
The *Ninth*, an Epigrammatick Poet.
The *Tenth*, of *Tarsis*, an Academick Philosopher.

# CRANTOR.

Arh. Dog. lib. 2.

Strab. Phys.

Laert.

CRantor was of *Soli*, much admired in his own Country. He came to *Athens* where he heard *Xenocrates*, and studied with *Polemo*.

He writ *Commentaries*, 3000. *Verses*, whereof some ascribe part to *Arcesilaus*.

Being asked how he came to be taken with *Polemo*, he answer'd, from the tone of his speech, never exalted nor depress'd.

Falling sick, he went to the Temple of *Æsculapius*, and walked there; where many resorted to him from several parts, not thinking he stai'd in respect of his sickness, but that he meant to erect a School in that place; amongst the rest came *Arcesilaus*, whom, though he lov'd him very much, he recommended to *Polemo*, whom he himself after his recovery heard also, and was extreamly taken with him.

He bequeath'd his estate, amounting to 12. Talents to *Arcesilaus*, who asking him where he would be buried, he answer'd,

*In Earth's kind bosom happy 'tis to lie.*

He is said to have written Poems, and to have deposited them, sealed up in his own Country, in the Temple of *Minerva*; of him thus *Theætetus*,

*Pleasing to Men, but to the Muses more.*
Crantor *too soon of life was dispossest,*
*Earth his cold body we to thee restore*
*That in thy arms he peacefully may rest.*

*Crantor* above all admired *Homer* and *Euripides*, saying, it was hard in proper language to speak at once tragically and passionately, and quoted this verse out of his *Bellerophon*.

*Alas, yet why alas,*
*Through such fate mortals pass.*

*Antagoras* the Poet alledgeth these verses, as written by him.

* *My Soul's in doubt, for doubtless is his race,*
*Whether I love first of all Gods shall place.*
*Which drew from* Erebus *their old descent,*
*And Night beyond the Oceans vast extent;*
*Or whether to bright* Venus, *or to Earth,*
*Thou owest thy double form and sacred birth.*

* *Read* Ἐν δοιῇ μοι θυμὸς, ὅπως, &c. *as* Callimachus hymn. 1. Ἐν δοιῇ μάλα θυμὸς, ἐπεὶ γένος ἀμφότερον. one doubtless imitating the other, which both the interpreters not observing, have strangely rendred this place.

He

He was very ingenious in impoſing apt names. He ſaid of an ill Poet, that his verſes were full of moths; and of *Theophraſtus*, that his Theſes were written in a ſhell.

He wrote a Treatiſe concerning Grief, which was generally much admired, as *Cicero* and *Laertius* atteſt.

He died before *Polemo* and *Crates* of the Dropſy.

# ARCESILAUS.

## CHAP. I.

*His* Country, Parents, Teachers.

*Arceſilaus* (whom *Cicero* calls *Arceſilas*) was a *Pitanean* of *Æolis*; his Father, according to *Apollodorus*, in the third of his Chronologicks, named *Seuthus*, or as others *Scythus*. He was the youngeſt of four brethren, two by the ſame Father, only the other by the ſame Mother; the eldeſt was named *Pylades*: of thoſe who had the ſame Father, the eldeſt was *Mæreas*, Guardian to his Brother *Arceſilaus*.

He was born by computation from his death (which was in the fourth year of the * hundred thirty and fourth Olympiad, the ſeventy fifth of his age) in the firſt year of the hundred and ſixteenth Olympiad.

* *Aldobrandinus* his edition reads the 130.

He firſt heard *Autolychus* the Mathematician, his Countryman, before he came to *Athens*, with whom he travelled to *Sardis*.

Next he heard *Xanthus* an *Athenian*, a Maſter of Muſick.

He heard alſo *Hipponicus* the Geometrician, who, excepting his skill in that Art, was otherwiſe a gaping dull fellow, for which *Arceſilaus* deriding him, ſaid, Geometry flew into his mouth as he gaped. Of *Hipponicus* falling mad, he took ſo great care, that he brought him to his own houſe, and kept him there until he was quite cured.

He likewiſe, by the compulſion of his Brother, ſtudied Rhetorick, and being by nature vehement in diſcourſe, and of indefatigable induſtry, he addicted himſelf likewiſe to Poetry. There is an Epigram of his extant upon *Attalus*, to this effect;

*For arms and horſes oft hath been the name*
*Of* Pergamus *through* Piſa *ſpread by fame:*
*But, now ſhall (if a mortal may divine)*
*To future times with greater glory ſhine.*

There is another Epigram of his *upon Menedorus*, Son of *Eudemus*.

*Far hence is* Thyatire, *far phrygian Earth,*
*Whence* Menodore *thou didſt derive thy birth.*
*but down to* Acheron *unpierc'd by day,*
*From any place thou knew'ſt the ready way.*
*To thee this Tomb* Eudemus *dedicates,*
*Whom Love hath wealthy made, though poor the Fates.*

Although his Brother *Mæreas* would have had him profeſſed Rhetorick, yet was he naturally more enclined to Philoſophy; to which end, he firſt became a hearer of *Theophraſtus*, in which time *Crantor* being much taken with him, ſpoke that verſe of *Euripides* to him, out of his *Andromeda*:

*Maid, if I ſave thee, wilt thou thankful be?*

He anſwer'd in the following verſe,

*Stranger, for Wife or ſlave except of me.*

From thence forward they lived in intimate friendſhip, whereat *Theophraſtus* troubled, ſaid *He had loſt a youth of extraordinary wit, and quickneſs of apprehenſion.*

He emulated *Pyrrho*, as ſome affirm, and ſtudied Dialectick, and the Eretriack Philoſophy, whence *Ariſto* ſaid of him,

Pyrrho *beyond*, Plato *before*,
*And in the middle* Diodore.

And *Timon*,

*Next leaden* Menedemus *he purſues,*
*And* Pyrrho *doth, or* Diodorus *chooſe.*

And ſoon after maketh him ſay thus;

*I'll ſwim to* Pyrrho, *and crook'd* Diodore.

He was a great admirer of *Plato*, whoſe Books he had.

## CHAP. II.

*Upon what occaſion he conſtituted* the middle Academy. † *Lam.*

† *Crates* dying, *Arceſilaus* took upon him the government of the School, which was yielded to him by *Socratides*. Being poſſeſſed of that place, he altered the Doctrine and manner of Teaching, which had been obſerved by *Plato* and his ſucceſſors, upon this occaſion.

*Plato*

*Plato* and his followers down to *Arceſilaus*, held, (as was ſaid) *That* there are two kinds of things, ſome perceptible by *Senſe*, others perceptible only by *Intellect*: *That* from the latter ariſeth *Science*, from the former *Opinion*: *That* the *Mind* only ſeeth that which always is ſimple, and in the ſame manner, and ſuch as it is; that is, *Ideas*. But, that the *Senſes* are all dull and ſlow, neither can they perceive thoſe things which ſeem ſubjected to Senſe, becauſe either they are ſo little, that they cannot fall beneath ſenſe, or ſo movable and tranſient, that not one of them is conſtant or the ſame; but, all are in continual lapſe and fluxion. Hence they called all this part of things *Opinionable*, affirming that Science is no where, but, in the notions and reaſons of the mind.

*Acad. queſt. l. 1.*

* Yet, did they profeſs againſt thoſe, who ſaid, the Academy took away all ſence; for, they affirmed not, that there was no ſuch thing as colour, or taſt, or ſapor, or ſound; but, only maintained, there was no proper mark of true and certain in the ſenſes, there being no ſuch any where.

* *Cic. Acad. queſt. 4.*

† Hence they allowed, that we make uſe of the Senſes in actions, from the reaſon that appeareth out of them; but, to truſt them as abſolutely true and infallible, they allowed not.

† *Plut. cont. Colot.*

Thus held the *Academicks* down to *Polemo*, * of whom *Arceſilaus* and *Zeno* were conſtant Auditors; but *Zeno* being older than *Arceſilaus*, and a very ſubtle diſputant, endeavoured to correct his doctrine, not that, as *Theophraſtus* ſaith, he did enervate vertue; but, on the contrary, he placed all things that are reckon'd among the good, in vertue only: and this he called *honeſt*, as being ſimple, ſole, one good: Of the reſt, though neither good nor evil, he held, that ſome were *according to Nature*, others *contrary to Nature*, others *mediate*: Thoſe which are according to Nature, he held to be *worthy eſtimation*, the contrary *contrary*; the neuter he left *betwixt both*, in which he placed no value. Of thoſe which were eligible, ſome were of more eſtimation, ſome of leſs; thoſe which were of more he called *preferred*, thoſe of leſs *rejected*. And as in theſe, he did not change ſo much the things themſelves as the words, ſo betwixt a *rectitude* and a *Sin*, an *office* and a *præteroffice*: he placed ſome things mediate, holding that Rectitudes conſiſted only in good actions, ſins in evil; but, offices either performed or omitted, he conceived mediate things. And whereas the Philoſophers of the *old Academy* did not hold all Vertue to conſiſt in Reaſon, but ſome vertues to be perfected by nature or cuſtome; *Zeno* on the contrary placed all Vertue in Reaſon; and whereas the *Academicks* held, as we ſaid [in the life of *Plato*,] that all thoſe vertues may be ſeparated, *Zeno* maintained that could not be, averring, that not only the uſe of vertue (as the *Academicks* held) but the habit thereof was excellent in it ſelf, neither had any one vertue, who did not always make uſe of it. And whereas the *Academicks* took not away paſſion from Man, affirming that we are ſubject to compaſſion, deſire, fear, and joy by nature; but, only contracted them, and reduced them within narrower limits; *Zeno* affirmed, that from all theſe, as from ſo many diſeaſes, a wiſe Man muſt be free. And whereas *they* held, that all paſſions were natural and irrational, and placed in one part of the Soul Concupiſcence, in the other Reaſon: Neither did *Zeno* herein agree with them, for he aſſerted, that paſſions are voluntary, that opinions are taken up by judgment, that immoderate intemperance is the Mother of all paſſion. Thus much for *Ethicks*.

* *Cic. Acad. queſt. 1.*

† As for *Phyſick*, *He* did not allow that fifth nature beſides the four Elements, of which the *Academicks* held Sence and Mind to be effected; for, *He* aſſerted Fire to be that nature which begetteth every thing, both Mind and Sence. *He* likewiſe diſſented from *them*, in that he held, nothing can be made by a thing which hath no body, (of which nature, *Xenocrates*, and the *old Academicks* thought the Soul to be) and that whatſoever made any thing, or was it ſelf made, muſt of neceſſity be a *Body*.

† *Cic. ibid.*

* *He* likewiſe aſſerted many things in the *third part of Philoſophy*, wherein *He* aſſerted ſome things new of the Senſes themſelves, which he conceived to be joyned by a certain extrinſecal impulſion, which he called *Phantaſie*. To theſe phantaſies received by the Senſes, *He* added *Aſſent* of the mind, which he held to be placed in us, and voluntary. *He* did not allow all phantaſies to be faithful and worthy credit; but, only thoſe which have a proper declaration of thoſe things which they ſeem, which phantaſie when it is ſeen, is called *comprehenſible*, when received and approved, he calleth it *comprehenſion*. That which was comprehended by ſence, he calleth *Senſe*, and, if it were ſo comprehended, that it could not be pulled away by reaſon, *Science*, if otherwiſe, *Ignorance*, of which kind was opinion, infirm, and common to falſe or unknown things. Betwixt Science and Ignorance he placed that comprehenſion we mentioned, not reckoning it among the good nor the bad; but affirming that only was to be credited, whence he likewiſe attributed faith to the Senſes, for as much as he conceived the comprehenſion made by the Senſes to be true and faithful, not that it comprehended all things that are in being; but that it omits nothing that can fall beneath it, as alſo, becauſe nature hath given it as a rule of Science and principle of it ſelf, whence notions are afterwards imprinted in the mind, from which not only principles, but certain larger ways towards the invention of reaſon, are found out. Errour, temerity, ignorance, opination, ſuſpicion, and in a word, whatſoever is not of firm and conſtant aſſent, he took away from Vertue and Wiſdom. In theſe things conſiſteth almoſt all the change and diſſention of *Zeno* from the *old Academicks*.

* *Cic. ibid.*

*Zeno* thus maintaining many things contrary to *Plato*, as that the Soul is mortal, and that there is no other World but this, which is ſubject to Senſe. *Arceſilaus* perceiving this Doctrine to ſpread and take much, prudently concealed the Doctrine of the Academy, leſt the myſteries

of *Plato* being divulg'd and made too common, ſhould become deſpicable; and *therefore* (ſaith † S. *Auguſtine*) *he thought it fitter to unteach the Man that was not well taught, than to teach thoſe, whom by experience he found not to be docile enough.*

† *Contra Academic. lib.*

* *Cic. Acad. quæſt.* 1.

* Hereupon *Arceſilaus* undertook to oppoſe and conteſt with *Zeno*, not out of any pertinacity or deſire of glory, but led thereunto by that obſcurity of things, which had brought *Socrates* to a confeſſion of his own ignorance; as likewiſe *Democritus*, *Anaxagoras*, *Empedocles*, and almoſt all the antient Philoſophers, who affirmed, *That* nothing could be underſtood, nothing perceived, nothing: known *That* the ſenſes are narrow, our minds weak, our lives ſhort, and *truth* (as *Democritus* ſaith) *drown'd in an abyſſe*. That all things are held by opinion and inſtitution, nothing left to Truth: and finally, *That* all things are involved in darkneſs.

† *Cic. ibid.*

† Thus *Arceſilaus* denyed there is any thing that can be known, not ſo much as that which *Socrates* reſerv'd, [*that he knew nothing*] conceiving all things to be hid in ſuch darkneſs, that there is nothing which can be ſeen or underſtood. For theſe reaſons we ought not to profeſs or affirm any thing, or to approve any thing by aſſent; but, always to reſtrain and withhold our haſtineſs from errour, which then proveth great, when it approveth a thing falſe or unknown. Neither is there any thing more vile, than by aſſent and approbation to prevent knowledge and perception.

* *Cic. ibid.*

* He did, as was agreeable to this tenent, diſpute againſt all aſſertions and Doctrines; and having found, that in the ſame thing the reaſons of two opinions directly oppoſite, were of equal weight, he thence inferr'd, that we ought to with-hold our aſſents († ἐπέχειν) from both: [This *Laertius* means, when he ſaith, that *he took away propoſitions, by reaſon of the repugnance of ſpeech, and was the first that taught to argue on both ſides.*] * And that neither the ſenſes nor reaſon are to be credited. He therefore praiſed that Apophthegm of *Heſiod*:

† *Euſeb.*

* *Euſeb. præpar. Evang.*

*The Gods all knowledge have conceal'd from Men.*

But this † Saint *Auguſtine* affirms was only done, to conceal myſteriouſly the meaning of *Plato*; but, they nevertheleſs had and held his Doctrines and decrees, which they uſed to unfold to thoſe who lived with them till they were old.

† *Contra Academ. lib.* 3.

He likewiſe, as *Laertius* ſaith, *firſt alter'd the manner of diſputing which* Plato *deliver'd, and made it more litigious by queſtion and anſwer*, of which, thus * *Cicero*: *Socrates* uſed to find out by queſtion and anſwer, the opinions of thoſe with whom he diſcourſed, that, if there were occaſion, he might ſay ſomething upon that which they anſwer'd: This cuſtome not retained by his ſucceſſors, was taken up by *Arceſilaus*, who inſtituted, that they who would learn of him ſhould not queſtion him; but, themſelves tell him what they thought, which when they had done, he diſputed againſt it; but, his Auditors were to maintain their own opinion as much as they could poſſibly. This courſe took *Arceſilaus*, contrary to all other Philoſophers, amongſt whom, he that would learn held his peace; which courſe, ſaith *Cicero*, is at this time held in the Academy, where he that will learn, ſpeaks in this manner, Pleaſure ſeems to be the chief good, whereupon in a long Oration it is diſputed againſt it, whereby may eaſily be underſtood, that they who ſay, a thing ſeemeth to me to be ſo, are not really of that opinion, but deſire to hear the contrary maintained.

* *De finib. l.* 2.

This School conſtituted by *Arceſilaus*, was called *the ſecond Academy*, in relation to its deſcent from *Plato*; or, *the middle Academy*, in reſpect of the *new* one which was afterwards ſet up by *Carneades*; though † *Cicero* ſeemeth to make no diſtinction between this and that, but calleth this the new Academy: But, though 'tis likely, that it was not at firſt ſo called; yet, upon the introduction of a newer, it was afterwards more generally known by the title of *the middle*, or, *ſecond Academy*.

† *Acad. qu. l.*

Theſe *Academicks* differ from the *Sceptick*s, in as much, as, though they affirmed that nothing can be comprehended; yet they took not away *true* or *falſe* from things. On the contrary, they held that ſome Phantaſies were true, others falſe; but the *Sceptick*s hold that they are both indifferent; alike defenſible by reaſon. The *Academick*s aſſert ſome things to be wholly improbable, ſome more probable than others, and that a wiſe Man, when any of theſe occur, * may anſwer *yes*, or *no*, following the probability, provided that he withhold from aſſenting. But the *Sceptick*s hold all things to be alike indifferent, not admitting Judgment, nor allowing that either our ſenſes or opinions can perceive true or falſe, and therefore no faith is to be given to them, but we ought to perſiſt firm and unmoveable without opinion, not ſaying of any thing that it is, any more than that it is not.

* *Euſeb. præpar. Evang. lib.*

## CHAP. III.

### *His* Vertues *and* Apophthegms.

† HE preferred *Homer* above all Writers, of whom he conſtantly read ſome piece before he went to bed, and as ſoon as he roſe in the morning. When he went to read any thing in him, he ſaid, he went to his *Miſtreſs*.

† *Laert.*

*Pindar* alſo he ſaid was proper to raiſe the voice, and give us ſupply of words.

He was ſententious and ſuccinct in ſpeech, often uſing expreſſions of doubtful meaning. He uſed to reprehend and chide ſharply, and freely, whence *Timon* ſaith of him,

* *Quam. diſc. dial. ab. am.*

*When thou chid'ſt young Men, think thou once wert young.*

In this kind, *Laertius* inſtances his ſayings to a young Man, ſpeaking confidently, *&c.* to an immodeſt young Man, *&c.*

*Emo* a *Chian*, who though very deformed, thought himſelf very handſom, asking him as he put on a rich Cloak, whether he thought a wiſe Man might not love, *Arceſilaus* anſwered, do you mean if he be as handſom and as fine as you?

To an effeminate perſon, upbraiding him as it were of pride, he ſpoke this verſe,

*Shall we demand, great Sir, or ſilent be?*

He immediately anſwered,

*Woman, why ſpeak'ſt thou theſe harſh words to me?*

Being troubled with the talk of an inconſiderable mean perſon, he ſaid,

*The Sons of ſlaves intemperately ſpeak.*

Of another, who talk'd impertinently, and loudly, he ſaid, he had a peeviſh nurſe. For ſome he would make no anſwer at all.

To an Uſurer, who ſaid there was ſomething he knew not, he anſwer'd in theſe verſes out of *Sophocles*'s *OEnomaus*,

*The courſe of ſtorms hid from the bird doth lie,*
*Until the time that ſhe muſt lay draw nigh.*

To a Dialectick Philoſopher of *Alexinus*'s School, who was not able to ſay any thing worthy *Alexinus*, he related what *Philoxenus* did to a maker of Bricks, who overhearing him ſing his verſes falſe, trod upon his bricks and broke them, ſaying, as you ſpoil mine, ſo I yours.

He was angry at thoſe who learned not the liberal Sciences in due time.

In diſpute, he uſed this word, *I ſay, and will not ſuch a one*, (naming the perſon) *aſſent to this?* which many of his Diſciples affected to imitate, as alſo his manner of ſpeaking and geſture.

He was moſt acute in anſwering appoſitely, and converting his diſcourſe to the preſent ſubject, and fitting it for every time.

He was very efficacious in perſwaſion? whence many Diſciples reſorted to him, though ſometimes he ſharply touched them, which they took patiently.

He was very good, and much excited hope in his Auditors.

As to the neceſſaries of life, he was liberal and communicative, ready to do good, and much endeavouring to conceal it, avoiding all that kind of vain-glory. Viſiting *Cteſibius*, who was ſick, and perceiving him to be poor, he privately put a purſe under his pillow, which when he found. This, ſaith he, is the ſport of *Arceſilaus*. Another time he ſent him 1000. drachms. * *Plutarch* relates this as done to *Apelles* the *Chian* Painter, whom *Arceſilaus* beſides many other teſtimonies of kindneſs coming to viſit as he lay ſick, and perceiving how poor he was, departed, and returning ſoon after, bringing twenty drachms with him, then ſitting cloſe to *Apelles*'s bed ſide, *Here is nothing*, ſays he, *beſides Empedocle*'s four Elements.

* *Quom. diſcern. ad. ab. amic.*

*Fire, Water, Earth, and Æther mounting high,*
*but methinks you lie not at your eaſe*, and with that taking occaſion to remove his pillow, he convey'd the purſe privately under it, which when the old Woman that tended him found, and wondring, ſhew'd to *Apelles*, he laughing, ſaid, *This is one of* Arceſilaus's *thefts.*

† He recommended *Archias*, an Arcadian to *Eumenes* King of *Pergamus*, by whom he was exalted to great dignity. † *Lart.*

He was very liberal and free from covetouſneſs, as appeared by his Utenſils of Silver, and vying with *Archecrates* and *Callicrates*. He had many veſſels of Gold, which he lent unto many upon occaſion of feaſting. Theſe Silver veſſels a certain Man borrowed to entertain his friends withal; *Arceſilaus* knowing him to be poor, would never ſend for them back: Others report he lent them to him on purpoſe, and when he brought them back, becauſe he was poor, he freely beſtowed them on him.

He had a fair eſtate at *Pitane*, from which *Pylades* his Brother continually ſupplyed him. *Eumenes* alſo, Son of *Phileterus*, gave him many large preſents, whence to him only of all Kings he applyed himſelf.

When *Antigonus* was much followed, and many perſons thronged to his houſe, he forbore, declining his acquaintance. He was intimate with *Hierocles*, the Governour of *Munichia* and *Pireum*, and conſtantly, on holidays, went thither to viſit him: *Hierocles* often entreated him to viſit *Antigonus*, but he refuſed, and went along with him as far as the door, and there parted with him. After *Antigonus*'s fight at Sea, many writing conſolatory Epiſtles to him, *Arceſilaus* was ſilent. Being ſent by his Country on an Embaſſy to *Antigonus* at *Demetrias*, he returned fruſtrate of his deſign.

He lived the greateſt part of his time in the Academy, avoiding to meddle with publick buſineſs; but ſometimes went to the *Pireum*, as we ſaid, out of love to *Hierocles*; for which ſome reproved him.

He was very magnificent (indeed a ſecond *Ariſtippus*) in the entertainment of his friends. He openly profeſſed love to *Theodote* and *Phileta*, Curtezans of *Elis*, for which being reprehended, he rehearſed the *Chrias* of *Ariſtippus*. He was very amorous, and much affected the company of young Men, whence *Ariſto* of *Chios*, a Stoick, called him a corrupter of youth, temerarious, and impudent. Of thoſe whom he affected are mentioned *Demetrius* and *Leochares*; *Demochares* Son of *Laches*, and *Pythocles* Son of *Bugerus*, much affected him.

For theſe things he was much inveighed againſt at the houſe of *Hieronymus* the *Peripatetick*, who had invited his friends to celebrate the birth day of *Alcyoneus*, Son of *Antigonus*, for the keeping of which Feaſt, *Antigonus* ſent yearly much mony. At this Feaſt *Arceſilaus* would not diſpute amidſt the cups; and when *Aridelus* propounded a queſtion to him, requiring that he would ſay ſomething to it, he anſwer'd, it is the beſt property of a Philoſopher to know the ſeaſons of all things.

But, he was so free from pride, that he counselled his Disciples to go and hear other Masters; and when a certain *Chian* youth of his School declared, that he was not pleased with what he said so much as with the discourses of *Hieronymus*, he took him by the hand and led him to the Philosopher, desiring him to cherish him according to his quality.

To one that asked why Men went from other Sects to the *Epicureans*, but never from the *Epicureans* to other Sects: Because, saith he, of Men, some are made Eunuchs, but of Eunuchs never any are made Men.

* *Stob. Ser.* 143. * He said, Where there are many Medicines, and many Physicians, there are most Diseases; and where there are many Laws, there is most iniquity.

† *Stob. Ser.* 212. † He advised to shun Dialectick, because it turneth all things upside down.

* *Stob. Ser.* 212. * He compared Logicians to Gamesters that play at Dice, who take delight whilst they are cosen'd.

† *Stob. Ser.* 235. † He affirmed, that poverty is rugged as *Ithaca*, but good to bring up a Child, in that it inureth to frugality and abstinence, and is generally a good School of vertue.

## CHAP. IV.

### *His Death.*

* *Laert.* * WHen he drew nigh the end of his life, he bequeathed all his Estate to his Brother *Pylades*; to which end, *Mœreas* not knowing it, he sent him first to *Chios*, and from thence sent for him back again to *Athens*. He sent three Copies of his Will, one to *Amphicritus* at *Eretria*, another to some Friends of his at *Athens*, the third to *Thaumasias* his near Kinsman, to be kept by them; with the last he sent this Letter.

*Arcesilaus* to *Thaumasias*, health.

I *Gave* Diogenes *my Will to bring to you, for being often sick and infirm of Body, I thought fit to make my Will, lest if any suddain accident should befal me, I should depart this life with some injury done to you, whom I have found so bountiful towards me. I desire that you, the most faithful of all my friends, will take it into your custody. Approve your self just to that extraordinary trust which I have reposed in you, that it may appear I have made a right choice.*

He died, as *Hermippus* saith, in a kind of phrenzy, after he had drunk much Wine, 75 years old, in the fourth year of the 134th Olympiad, as may be conjectured from the succession of *Lacydes*, in the School which began at that time. The *Athenians* buried him with such solemnity as never any was before.

He took not any Women into the House with him, neither had he any Children. He flourish'd according to *Apollodorus* in the 120. Olympiad.

There were three more of this name, one an ancient Comick Poet, the second an Elegiack Poet, the third a Statuary.

# LACYDES.

*Laert.* LACYDES succeeded *Arcesilaus*; he was a *Cyrenean*, (his Father named *Alexander*) a person of much gravity, and had many Æmulators. He was from his youth much given to study, poor, but pleasing to all company, and of a delightful conversation.

As concerning his managing his Houshold affairs, it is reported that when he took any thing out of the place where he kept his Provisions, he locked the Door, and threw the Key in at a hole that none might steal ought from him; which his servants observing, frequently took it, and, opening the Door, carried away what they thought good, and then put it in the same place again, in which fact they were never discover'd.

† *Euseb. præp. evang. lib.* 14. But the most pleasant part of the Story, is, that (as † *Numenius* affirms) he was thereby perswaded to be of the opinion of the middle Academicks; that nothing is comprehended by sense, arguing thus; Why should I think that sense can comprehend any thing certainly, when I know that my own senses are so often deceived; for when I go abroad, I think that I see with my eies those things which I leave in my storehouse; when I return I find none of them; which could not be unless our senses were fallible and uncertain.

*Lacydes* upon the death of *Arcesilaus*, being made Master of the School in the 4th year of the 134. Olympiad, taught in the Academy, in the Gardens which were made by *Attalus* the King, which from him were called the *Lacydean* Gardens. *Laertius*, and, from him, *Suidas*, make him Institutor of the new Academy; but erroneously. He continued this charge 26 years, at the end whereof he resigned it, whilst he was yet alive, to *Telecles* and *Euander*, *Phocians*, his Disciples, in the second year of the 141. Olympiad.

*Attalus* sending for him to come to him, he returned him answer, *That Pictures make the best shew at a distance.*

Studying Geometry in his old age, one said to him, Is it now time? he answered, when, if not now?

*Athenæus* ſaith, That *Lacydes* and *Timon* Philoſophers, being invited by one of their friends to an entertainment of two daies, and deſirous to ſuit themſelves to the company, drunk very freely. *Lacydes* went away firſt, half drunk, and perceiving *Timon* to ſteal away too, ſaid out of *Homer*, Il. χ.

*To our great glory* Hector *we have ſlain.*

The next day meeting *Timon* again at the ſame place, and ſeeing him, not able to take off his Cups at once, make a pauſe, when he put it to his mouth the ſecond time, he ſaid out of another place of *Homer*, Il. ξ.

*Thoſe are unhappy who conteſt with me.*

*Ælian* likewiſe numbers theſe two amongſt the great drinkers, and perhaps not unjuſtly; for by excеſs of Wine he fell into the Palſie, of which he died in the ſecond year of the one hundred forty firſt Olympiad. *Var. hiſt.*

He wrote Philoſophicks and of Nature.

In the School, he was ſucceeded, as is ſaid, by *EVANDER*, *Evander*, by his Diſciple, *EGESINUS*, whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* calleth *Hegeſilaus*, of *Pergamus*, *Egeſinus*, by *CARNEADES*.

CARNEADES.

## CHAP. I.

*His Country, Parents, Time, Maſters.*

* *Laert.* † *Acad. queſt.* 4.

CARNEADES (ſucceſſor of *Egeſinus*) was of * *Cyrene*, whence † *Cicero* ſaith, he was an acute perſon, as being an *African*. He was Son of *Epicomus*, or *Philocomus*. *Apollodorus*, as cited by *Laertius*, affirmeth he died in the 162. Olympiad; but there is a miſtake in the Text; for the words of *Apollodorus* relate doubtleſs to the time of his birth, which upon that Authority, we may affirm to have been in the firſt year of the 162. Olympiad. *Florus* (cited by * *Plutarch*) adds, he was born on the 7th day of *Thargelion*, at what time the *Carnean* Feſtivals were celebrated at *Cyrene*, whence perhaps he took his name.

* *Sympoſ.* 8. 1.

This time falling after the *Callippical* period, we ſhall compute it according to † *Petavius* his method, which although it be not exempt from queſtion, yet is better than that of *Scaliger*,

† *Doctr.* 1. 2.

*Scaliger*, whoſe method is not reconcileable to *Ptolomy*'s obſervations.

The fourth of the 164. Olympiad was

| | |
|---|---|
| Of the *Julian* period | 4585. |
| Epoche of the *Callippick* period | 4383. |
| Which ſubducted, there remains | 202. |
| Subduct two periods more | 152. |
| remains | 50. |

The year propounded therefore is the 50th of the third period. The *Neomenia* of *Hecatombæon*, *June* 26. which is the 177th day of the *Julian* year; the 7th of *Thargelion* (according to *Petavius*) at that time was the 302. of the Attick year.

| | |
|---|---|
| To | 177. |
| add | 302. |
| Summ | 479. |
| Subduct | 365. |
| Remains | 114. |

The 114th day of the *Julian* year is the 24th of *April*, on which fell the 7th of *Thargelion*; which, the *Dominical* Letter being *B.* fell on Sunday, Proleptically taken.

* *Laert.* † *Cic. Acad. queſt.* 4.

* He was Diſciple to *Egeſinus* the *Academick*, and † learned Logick of *Diogenes* the *Stoick*, whence in arguing he would many times ſay, *If I have concluded right, the cauſe is my own; if not right*, Diogenes *muſt return the* Mina *he had of me*; which was the price the Dialectick Philoſophers took.

## CHAP. II.

### *How he conſtituted the new Academy.*

HE ſucceeded *Egeſinus* in the School, and is by *Cicero* reckon'd the fourth from *Arceſilaus*, (who conſtituted the *middle Academy*, introducing a ſuſpenſion of Aſſent, grounded upon the uncertainty of things:) *Carneades*, conſtituted the *new Academy*, maintaining the ſame kind of ſuſpenſion, with no leſs eagerneſs; yet upon more moderate grounds: * for he held that the incomprehenſibility of things, proceeded not from the nature of the things themſelves, as *Arceſilaus* maintained; for as much as every thing really exiſteth in it ſelf, and if any thing be affirmed or denied of another, it is true or falſe, as to the thing it ſelf; but the things themſelves remaining firm, we derive from them a Phantaſie and ſimilitude, which for the moſt part like falſe meſſengers lie and deceive us. To all true things there are ſome falſe adjoined, and thoſe ſo like, that, there is no certain note of Judication and Aſſent, wherefore we cannot perceive any thing to be true.

* *Numen. apud Euſeb.*

But he was nothing leſs rigid as to the Academical ſuſpenſion, for † he denied that any thing could be perceived, not ſo much as that very maxime; *Nothing can be perceived*, arguing thus.

† *Cic. Acad. queſt.* 4.

All Phantaſms are of two kinds; the firſt included the perceptible, and imperceptible; the ſecond kind, the probable; and the improbable. Thoſe which are contrary to ſenſe and evidence, pertain to the former diviſion; againſt the latter we ought not to ſay any thing. Wherefore there is no Phantaſie followed by perception, but by approbation many; for it were contrary to nature that nothing ſhould be probable.

More fully * *Sextus Empiricus*. *Carneades*, ſaith he, did not only oppoſe the *Stoicks*, but all that went before him, as to *judgment*. His firſt and common argument againſt all, is, that, by which he ſhoweth abſolutely, that there is nothing from which truth can be judged; not *reaſon*, not *ſenſe*, not *phantaſie*, nor any thing, for all theſe in a word deceive us. His ſecond argument is that whereby he ſhews, that although there be ſomething that doth judge, yet it cannot exiſt without an affection from evidence. For an animal differeth from inanimate things by the ſenſitive faculty, it apprehendeth thereby both it ſelf and external things; but ſenſe remaining immovable impaſſible, and immutable, is not ſenſe, nor apprehendeth any thing, but being changed, and after ſome manner affected by incurſion of evidents, then it declareth things. In that affection therefore of the Soul which ariſeth from evidence, we are to ſeek that which judgeth. This affection is declared when that appeareth from which it proceedeth, which affection is nothing elſe but phantaſie. *Phantaſie* therefore is a certain affection in an animal, which ſheweth both it ſelf and ſome others, as when we ſee any thing, our ſight is affected in ſome manner, ſo, as it was not before that act of ſeeing. By this alteration we apprehend two things: Firſt, the alteration it ſelf, that is the phantaſie. Secondly, that from which this alteration proceeds, the thing viſible. The like in the reſt of the ſenſes. As therefore light manifeſteth it ſelf and all things in it, ſo phantaſie being the chief guide of knowledge in an animal, muſt like unto Light, manifeſt both it ſelf, and that evident object which effecteth it. But becauſe it doth not alwaies ſhew that which is true, but often erreth and differeth from the thing whence it proceedeth, like ill meſſengers, it neceſſarily followeth that all phantaſies cannot leave a judgment of truth, but only if it be true. Again, becauſe there is no phantaſie ſo true, but it may be falſe; and of all phantaſies that ſeem true there are ſome falſe, which differ little from them, that which judgeth muſt conſiſt in common phantaſie of true and falſe. But the common phantaſie of theſe comprehendeth not, and if it comprehendeth not, neither is there any thing that judgeth. And if phantaſie have not a judicative power, neither can reaſon judge, for that is derived from phantaſie, and juſtly: For, that whereof it judgeth, ought firſt to appear unto it; but nothing can appear but through ſenſe void of reaſon; therefore neither ſenſe void of reaſon, nor reaſon it ſelf is that which judgeth.

* *Adv. Mathem.*

Thus diſputeth *Carneades* againſt all other Philoſophers, to ſhew there is not any thing that judgeth. But, being demanded what judgeth,

judgeth, as to the leading of life and acquiſition of beatitude, he hath recourſe to *probable* phantaſy; and together with probable, *undiſtracted* and *circumcurrent*, their differences theſe. Phantaſy is the phantaſy of ſomething, *viz.* of that *of* which it is made, and of that *in* which it is made: That of which it is made is the external ſenſible *object*; that in which the *Man*. It hath two relations, one to the object phanſyed, the other to the phantaſm derived from that object. From the relation to the object it is either true or falſe; true, when it agreeth with the object; falſe, when it diſagreeth: From its relation to the phantaſm, there is one which ſeemeth true, another falſe. That which ſeemeth true is by the *Academicks* called *Emphaſis*, and *probability*, and *probable phantaſie*; that which ſeemeth not true is called *Apemphaſis*, *improbability*, and *not-probable* phantaſy. For, neither that which ſeemeth falſe, and is ſuch; nor that which is true, and ſeemeth not ſuch, have any thing in their nature perſwaſive. But, of theſe phantaſies, that which is manifeſtly falſe, and ſeemeth not true, limiteth the judicatory, but is not that which judgeth, as likewiſe produceth from that which is, but differs from it, ſuch as was that of the fury proceeding from *Electra* to *Oreſtes*. Of that which ſeemeth true, one kind is *tenuious*, as that which is in a thing ſo little, as that it is not viſible, either becauſe it takes not up room enough, or by reaſon of the weakneſs of ſight, which receiveth things confuſedly, and not diſtinctly. The other is that which hath this common property with the true, that it ſeemeth to be very true. Now of theſe, the tenuious, looſe, remiſs phantaſy cannot be that which judgeth; for that which cannot clearly manifeſt it ſelf, nor the thing that effected it, cannot attract us, nor invite aſſent; but that which ſeemeth true and is manifeſt enough, that, according to *Carneades*, is the judge of truth.

This being that which judgeth, it hath a great latitude, and being extended into another ſpecies, hath a more probable and vehemently effective phantaſy. Probable is taken three ways; firſt, for that which is true, and ſeemeth true; ſecondly, for that which is falſe, and ſeemeth true; thirdly for that which is true, common to both. Whence that which judgeth muſt be that phantaſy which ſeemeth true, which the Academicks call probable. Sometimes the falſe incurreth; ſo that it is neceſſary to uſe the common phantaſy of true and falſe; yet, not becauſe that more ſeldom incurreth, I mean that which imitateth the truth, we are not to give credit to that which is for the greater part true, whereby it happeneth our judgment and actions are for the moſt part directed.

That which firſt and commonly judgeth, *Carneades* held to be this. But forasmuch as phantaſy ſometimes is not of one kind, but like a chain, one dependeth on another, there muſt therefore be a ſecond judge, which is *probable* and *undiſtracted* phantaſy. As he who receiveth the phantaſy of a Man, neceſſarily receiveth the phantaſy of ſuch things as are about him, and without him; of the things about him, as colour, magnitude, figure, motion, ſpeech, cloathing, ſhooes; of things without him, as air, light, Day, Heaven, Earth, Companions, and the like. When therefore none of theſe phantaſies ſeems falſe, but all agree in ſeeming true, we credit it the more. That ſuch a one is *Socrates* we believe, becauſe he hath all thoſe things which *Socrates* uſeth to have, as colour, Magnitude, Figure, Geſture, Cloak, in none of theſe diſagreeing with it ſelf. And as ſome Phyſicians argue a Man to be in a feaver, not from one ſymptome, as from a high pulſe, or great heat, but from the concurrence of that heat with the pulſe, as alſo from ulcerous touch, redneſs, thirſt, and the like, all agreeing together. So the *Academick* maketh a judgment of truth, from a concurrence of phantaſies, and when none of all the phantaſies that joyn in the concurrence retract him as falſe, he ſaith, that which incurreth is true.

That there is a credible *undiſtracted* concurrence, is manifeſt from *Menelaus*: Having left in his ſhip an image of *Helene* which he had brought from *Troy*, as if it had been *Helene* her ſelf, landing at the iſland *Pharos*, he there met with the true *Helene*, and from her attracted a true phantaſy, but would not believe that phantaſy, being diſtracted by the other, which told him, that he had left *Helene* in the Ship. Such is undiſtracted phantaſy therefore, which likewiſe ſeemeth erroneous, for as much as there are ſome more undiſtracted than others. Of *undiſtracted* phantaſies, that is moſt credible and perfect which maketh a judgment.

Moreover, there is a *Circumcurrent* phantaſy, the form whereof is next to be declared. In the *undiſtracted* we only enquire whether none of thoſe phantaſies which joyn in concurrence, attract us as falſe, but that they all ſeem true, and not improbable. But in that which is made by concurſe, which uſeth *circumcurrence*, ſtrictly examines every phantaſy which is in that concurrence, as in Aſſemblies, when the people take account of every particular perſon that ſtands for the Magiſtracy, whether they deſerve that power and right of judging. In the place of Judgment, there is that which judgeth, and that by which the judgment is made, the diſtance and interval, figure, time, manner, affection, and operation, each of which we examine ſtrictly That which judgeth, whether the ſight be dim, for if it be, it is too weak for judgment; that which is judged, whether it be not too little; that through which, whether the Air be obſcure; the diſtance, whether it be too great; the *medium*, whether confuſed; the place, whether too wide and vaſt; the time, whether too ſuddain; the affection, whether not phrenetick; the operation, whether not unfit to be admitted. For if all theſe be in one, that which judgeth is *probable* phantaſy, and together, *probable*, *undiſtracted*, and *circumcurrent*. Wherefore as when in life we enquire concerning ſome little thing, we examine one witneſs; when we enquire into ſomething of greater conſequence, we examine more; but when of a thing moſt neceſſary, we examine each of the witneſſes by the joynt teſtimony of all. So ſaith *Carneades*, in light, incon-

inconsiderable matters, we make use of *probable* phantasy, only for judgment; in things of some moment, of *undistracted* phantasy; in things that concern well and happy living, *circumcurrent* phantasy.

And as in things of great moment they take diverse phantasies, so in different circumstances they never follow the same; for they say, they attend only probable phantasy in such things wherein the circumstance of time alloweth not a strict examination: As for instance: The Enemy pursues a Man; he coming to a Cave, takes a phantasy, that there are some Enemies there lying in wait: transported by this phantasy as probable, he shunneth and flyeth from the Cave, following the probability of that phantasy, before he accurately and diligently examine, whether there really be any enemies in ambush in that Cave or no. *Probable* phantasy is followed by *circumcurrent*, in those things in which time allows a curious examination of each particular, to use judgment upon the incurrent thing. As a Man coming into a dark room, and seeing a Rope rolled up, thinking it to be a serpent, he flies away; but afterwards returning, he examines the truth, and perceiving it not to stir, begins to think it is not a Serpent; but withal considering, that Serpents are sometimes frozen or nummed with the cold, he strikes it with his staff: and having thus by *circumcurrence* examined the phantasy which incurred to him, he assenteth that the phantasy he had taken of that body as a Serpent is false. And again, as I said, when we manifestly behold, we assent that this is true, having first over-run in our thoughts that our senses are all entire, and that we behold this waking, not in a dream; that the Air is perspicuous, and a convenient distance from the object. Hereby we receive a creditable phantasy, when we have time enough to examine the particulars concerning the thing seen. It is the same in *undistracted* phantasy, which they admit, when there is nothing that can retract us, as we said of *Menelaus*. Hitherto *Sextus*.

Yet, though nothing can be perceived, a wise Man may assent to that which is not perceived; that is, he may *opinionate*; but so as he knoweth himself to opinionate, and that there is nothing which can be comprehended and perceived. *Cic. Acad. quæst. 4.*

He asserted the ultimate end to be the enjoyment of natural principles, which, saith *Cicero*, he maintained, not that he really thought so, but in opposition to the *Stoicks*. *De fin. lib. 2.*

He read the Books of the *Stoicks* very diligently, and disputed against them with so good success, that it gave him occasion to say; *If* Chrysippus *had not been, I had not been.* *Laert.*

*Clitomachus* used to say of him, he could never understand what he really held; for he would sometimes argue on one side, sometimes on the other; and by the *Calumny* of his wit, saith *Cicero*, many times deride the best causes. Of the *Sorites* used by him, see *Sextus Empiricus*. *Cic. Acad. quæst. 4.*

## CHAP. III.

*Upon what occasion he was sent on an Embassy to* Rome.

* THE *Athenians* being fined by the *Romans* about 500. Talents, at the suit of the *Oropians* and *Sicyonians*, for destroying *Oropus* a City of *Beotia*, sent three Philosophers on an Embassie to the Roman Senate, to procure a mitigation of this fine, which had been imposed upon them without hearing their defence; *Carneades* the *Academick*, *Diogenes* the *Stoick*, and *Critolaus* the *Peripatetick*. About the time of this Embassy there is much disagreement amongst Authors. *A. Gellius* saith, they came after the second *Punick* War, and maketh *Ennius* later than their coming; which *Petavius* justly conceiveth to be false, for as much as *Ennius* died in the 585th year from the building of the City. But *Cicero* affirmeth this Embassy to have been when *P. Scipio* and *M. Marcellus* were Consuls, which was the 599th year. *Pausanias* reckoneth it upon the 603d year of the City, which *Casaubon* approveth. * *Plut. vit. Cat. A. Gel. 7. 14. Macr. Satur. 1. 5.*

Each of these Philosophers, to shew his learning, made choice of several eminent parts of the City, where they discoursed before great multitudes of people to the admiration of all. The Eloquence of *Carneades* was violent and rapid; that of *Critolaus*, neat and smooth, that of *Diogenes* modest and sober. *Carneades* one day disputed copiously concerning justice before *Galba* and *Cato*, the greatest Orators of that time. The next day he subverted all he had said before by contrary Arguments, and took away that Justice which he had so much commended. This he did, the better to confute those, that asserted any thing. That dispute whereby he overthrew Justice is recorded in *Cicero* by *L. Furius*. *Lactant. de Inst. lib. 5.*

To these three Philosophers resorted all the studious young Men, and frequently heard and praised them. Chiefly the sweetness of *Carneades*, which was of greatest power and no less fame than power, attracting eminent and benign hearers, filled the City with noise like a great wind; and it was reported that a *Grecian* person qualified to admiration, attracting all, had infused a serious affection into the young Men, whereby forgetting other divertisements and pleasures, they were carried on as it were with a kind of madness to Philosophy. This pleased all the *Romans*, who gladly beheld their Sons instructed in Greek learning by such excellent Men. Only *Cato* at the first noise of Admiration of the Greek Learning, was troubled, fearing the young Men should apply themselves that way, and so preferr the glory of eloquence before Action and Military discipline. The fame of Philosophers encreasing in the City, and *C. Acilius*, (whom *A. Gellius* and *Macrobius* call *Cæcilius*) an eminent person, having at his own request been the Interpreter of their first Oration to the Senate; *Cato* (who was then very old) under a fair pretence, moved, that these Philosophers might be sent out of the City, and coming *Plut.*

coming into the Senate house, blamed the Magistrates, that they had so long suffered such Ambassadors to contiuue amongst them without any answer, who were able to perswade them to any thing: wherefore he first desired that something might be determined concerning their Embassie, that they might be sent back again to their own Schools, and instruct the Sons of *Graciuns*, and that the *Roman* youth might, as they did before, apply themselves to the observance of their own Laws and Magistrates. This he did not out of anger to *Carneades*, as some thought, but out of an ambitious æmulation of the *Greek* humanity and Literature.

## CHAP. IV.

### *His Vertues and* Apophthegms.

*Lib. 8. c. 7.* HE was a person infinitely industrious, less conversant in Physick than Ethick, and so studious that he neglected to cut his Hair and Nails. *Valerius Maximus* saith, he was so studious, that when he lay down at Meals, his thoughts were so fixt, that he forgot to put his hand to the Table, and that *Melissa*, who lived with him as a Wife, was fain to put him in mind thereof, and help him.

He was so eminent for Philosophy, that the Oratours themselves would many times break up their Schools and come and hear him.

He had a great and loud voice, whereupon the Gymnasiarch sent to him not to speak so loud, whereto he answering, *send me the measure by which I should speak*; the other wisely and appositely repli'd, *you have a measure, your Hearers.*

He was sharply invective, and in argument almost invincible. He avoided feasting, out of the reason we mentioned, his great studiousness.

One named *Mentor* a *Bithynian*, as *Phavorinus* saith, who had endeavoured to seduce a Mistriss that he kept, coming into the School, he presently jested at him, in turning these words of *Homer*,

*Hitherto comes one oppes'd with hoary years,*
*Like* Mentor *in his voice and looks appears,*
*Who from the School I charge you turn away.*

The other rising up, reply'd,

*He thus proclaim'd, the rest did streight obey.*

Being to dispute with *Chrysippus*, he purg'd himself by white Hellbore to sharpen his wit, lest any corrupt humours in his stomach might oppress the vigour and constancy of his mind.

*Stob. Ser. 212.* He compared *Dialectick* to the Fish *Polypus*, which when its claws grow long, bites them off; so Logicians, growing subtle, confute their own assertions.

*Plut. de tranq. anim.* He advised Men in their greatest prosperity to be mindful of a change, for that which is unexpected is most grievous.

He said the Sons of rich Men and Kings learn nothing well but Riding, for their Masters flatter them; they who contest with them, willingly yield to them; but a Horse considers not whether a private Man or a Prince, a poor Man or a rich be on his back, but if he cannot rule him, he throws his Rider. *Plut. de cohib. & An. ed.*

He seemed to be extreamly averse from death, whence he often said, *The same Nature which hath put us together will dissolve us*; and hearing that *Antipater* dyed by drinking poison, he was a little animated by his constancy in death, and said, *Then give me too*, they asking what, *Wine*, saith he, *Lart.*

In the midst of the night he was struck blind, and knew not of it, but waking, bid his servant bring a light; the servant did so, telling him he had brought one, then, said he, read you. *Lart.*

## CHAP. V.

### *His Death and Writings.*

HE lived according to *Laertius* 85. years, or according to *Cicero*, 90. The words of * *Apollodorus* that he died in the fourth year of the 162 Olympiad, which falleth upon the 626th year from the building of *Rome*, may easily be evinced to be false, by the greatest part of the Circumstances of his life; particularly from this; that *Antonius* in *Cicero* saith, when he went Proconsul into *Asia*, he found *Carneades* the *Academick* at *Athens*, who opposed all in dispute, according to the manner of his Sect. The year of *Antonius*'s Proconsulship was the 652. year from the building of *Rome*. But this account as we said before, is to be applyed to the time of his birth, from which the 85th falleth upon the first year of the 184th Olympiad, the 90th upon the 2d of the 185th. * *Lart.*

*Laertius* saith, at his death there was a great Eclipse of the Moon, which some interpreted to proceed from a Sympathy with his loss. Upon this Eclipse I conceive *Petavius* grounded his computation of *Carneades*'s death, when he saith, † it was upon *the first year of the* 163. *Olympiad. May* 2. *fer.* 2. *hora* 5. 46. at *Athens*. But there being a mistake of the year, there is consequently a greater in the account of the *feria* and hour. † *Dod. tom.*

*Carneades*, as *Cicero* saith, wrote four Books *of Suspension of Assent*. He wrote likewise *Epistles* to *Ariarathes* King of *Cappadocia*, the only monument left behind him, extant in *Laertius*'s time. Whatsoever else went under his name, *Laertius* saith, was written by his Disciples, of whom he had many, the most eminent *Clitomachus*.

There are remembred two more of this name, one a Philosopher, Disciple to *Anaxagoras* mentioned by *Suidas*, the other an *Epigrammatick* Poet, mentioned by *Laertius*.

CLITO.

# CLITOMACHUS.

* Laert.

* CLITOMACHUS was a *Carthaginian*, Son of † *Diognetus*. He was first called *Asdrubal*, as *Plutarch* and *Laertius* affirm, * and profess'd Philosophy in his own Country, and native Language. Being forty years old he went to *Athens*, and heard *Carneades*, who being much taken with his industry, instructed and exercised him in Philosophy. With *Carneades*, *Cicero* saith, he lived until he was old, and succeeded him in the School, and chiefly illustrated his Doctrines by his writings, the number of which books being above four hundred, were a sufficient testimony of his † industry, and that he had no less of wit, than *Carneades* of eloquence. He was well vers'd in three Sects, the *Academick*, *Peripatetick*, and *Stoick*.

† Stephan. * Laert.

† Cic. Acad. Qu. l. 4. Laert.

Of his books are remembered by *Cicero*, one * *of Consolation* to his captive Countrymen, *Carthage* being then subdued by the *Romans*; another to † *Cajus Lucilius* the Poet, wherein he explained and defended the *Academick* suspension of Assent, having written before of the same things to *L. Censorinus*, who was Consul with *M. Manilius*, the summ of which discourse was this.

† Cic. Tusc. Qu. 4.

† Cic. Acad. Qu. 4.

* Cic. Acad. 4.

* The *Academicks* hold there are such dissimilitudes of things, that some seem probable, others on the contrary. But this is not ground enough to say that some things may be perceived, others cannot, because there are many false that are probable, but no false can be perceived and known. Those therefore extreamly err, who affirm the *Academicks* to take away sense; for they say not, there is no *colour*, *sapor*, or *sound*, but dispute, that there is not any proper inherent *note* in these of true and certain: (which having expounded, he adds) A wise Man suspends assent two ways; one, when [as we know] he absolutely refuseth to assent to any think; another, when he withholds from answering, either in approbation or improbation of something, so that he neither denyeth nor asserteth it. In the first way he assents to nothing, in the second he will follow probability, and according as he finds it or not, answers yes or no. He who withholdeth his assent from all things, is yet moved, and acteth something. He reserves therefore these phantasies by which we are excited to action, and those of which being question'd, we may answer on either part, only as of a thing that seemeth to us so, but without assent; neither are all such phantasies approved, but only those which are not obstructed by any thing.

† In asserting good, he joyned pleasure with honesty, as *Callipho* also did. † Cic. Tusc. quæst. 5.

* He was a great enemy to *Rhetorick*, as *Critolaus* the *Peripatetick*, and *Charmidas* were also. Arts they did not expel out of Cities, knowing them to be very profitable to life, no more than they would drive *Oeconomick* out of Houses, or Shepherds from their Flocks; but they all persecuted, and every where ejected the art of speaking, as a most dangerous enemy. * Sext. Empir. adv. Matth.

† He compared Dialectick to the Moon, which is in continual increase or decrease. † Stob. Ser. 212.

* Falling sick, he was taken with a fit of a Lethargie, out of which he no sooner came, but he said, *Love of life shall flatter me no longer*; and thereupon with his own hands ended his life. * Stob. Ser. 48.

# PHILO.

† Stob. Eclog. Ethic.

† PHILO was of *Larissa*, he heard *Clitomachus* many years, and is named by *Sextus Empericus*, as Constitutor of a *fourth Academy*; but *Cicero* affirms, he disallowed the distinction of Academies, and wrote expresly to prove the *first* and the *new* Academy to be both one. * Whilst he lived, the Academy wanted not a Patron. † The Romans admired him, as *Plutarch* affirms, above all *Clitomachus*'s Scholars, for his excellent discourse, and loved him for the sweetness of his disposition. *Cicero* no sooner went out of the first Schools and rudiments of learning, but he became an auditor of *Philo*, as he acknowledgeth himself.

* Cicer.

† Plut. vit. Cic.

Amongst other excellent things (saith * *Stobæus*) he gave this Division of *Philosophy*. He compared *Philosophy* to a *Physician*; As the office of a Physician is first to perswade the sick person to permit himself to be cured; next to confute the reasons of his adversary: So is it of a Philosopher, both which consist in exhortation. Exhortation is a discourse inciting to vertue; whereof one part explaineth its great use, the other refelleth adversaries, or such as any way caluminate Philosophy. The comparison holds in a second manner, thus: As the part of a Physician, after he hath perswaded the Patient to admit of cure, is, to apply the means thereof, as well to remove the causes of the disease, as

* Eclog. Ethic.

as to induce and ſettle health; ſo is it in this Science. After exhortation, he endeavoureth to apply the cure, by removing falſe opinions wherewith the Soul is infected, and by ſubſtituting true. In the ſecond place therefore it treats of good and evil, for the ſake of which the exhortation was made. Thirdly, the compariſon holds thus: As all Medicines refer to one end, health; ſo all Philoſophy to Beatitude. That part which treats of ends is joyned with another which treats of life. For as in Medicine, it is not ſufficient to reſtore health, unleſs it likewiſe deliver rules by which it may be preſerved; ſo in life, ſome precepts are required for conſervation of the end: And this part alſo is twofold; private, or common: One conſiders the affairs of particular perſons, as, whether a wiſe Man ſhould mannage a Common-wealth, whether he may live with Princes, whether he may marry: The other conſiders the buſineſs of all in general; as, what Common-wealth is beſt, how Magiſtrates are to be choſen. This common part is called *Politick*, and is treated of diſtinctly by it ſelf, as being of greateſt latitude. Now if all were wiſe Men, there would be no need of more places, for the more ſubtle diviſions would emerge from the precedent. But becauſe there muſt likewiſe be a care of the middle ſort of Men, who cannot apply themſelves to long diſputations, either through want of time, or diverſion of buſineſs, there muſt not be omitted a treating of precepts, which delivereth ſhort rules concerning the uſe of each.

As to the *Stoical* judicatory, *comprehenſive phantaſy*, he held all things to be incomprehenſible; as to the nature of the things themſelves, comprehenſible. Thus he took away the *comprehenſive phantaſy* aſſerted by *Zeno*. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 33.

He held that to be a good connex, which beginneth from true and endeth in falſe, as (if it be day, and I diſpute) this, *If it is day, I diſpute*: According to which tenet there may be true axioms three ways, a falſe only one way: For, when it beginneth from true, and endeth in true; it is true; as *If it is day, it is light*: And when it beginneth from falſe, and endeth in falſe, it is true; as, *If the Earth flies, the Earth hath Wings*. Likewiſe if it beginneth from falſe and endeth in true, it is true; as, *If the Earth flies, it is Earth*. That which is falſe, is that which beginneth from true and endeth in falſe; as, *If it is day, it is night*; for, the antecedent, *it is day*, is true; but the conſequent, *it is night*, is falſe. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 11.

He appointed, that the precepts of Oratours ſhould be delivered at one time, thoſe of Philoſophers at another. Tuſc. Qu. l. 2.

# ANTIOCHUS.

* Plut. vit. Cicer.
† Cic. Ac. qu. 1.
† Acad Qu. 4.
* Cic. de Leg. lib. 2.
† Vit. Cicer.
‡ Cic. acad. Quæſt. 4.
† Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hypot. 1. 33.

* ANTIOCHUS was an *Aſcalonite*, † Brother of *Ariſtus*, Diſciple of *Philo*. He lived with *L.* † *Lucullus*, the Quæſtor and General; he was alſo a great friend to * *Atticus*, whom he invited to the Academy. He is named by *Sextus Empericus*, as Conſtitutor of a *fifth Academy*: For, as † *Plutarch* ſaith, he fell off from the Sect of *Carneades*, either moved by the evidence of ſenſe, or, as ſome thought, by ambition, and diſſention with the Diſciples of *Clitomachus* and *Philo*. So that with ſome little alteration, he made uſe of the Doctrines of the *Stoicks*; and * though he were called an *Academick*, he had been, but for ſome alterations, an abſolute *Stoick*; † whence it was ſaid of him, *He taught the Stoical Philoſophy in the Academy*; for he manifeſted, that the Doctrines of the *Stoicks* were in *Plato*. In his old age, ſaith * *Cicero*, he betook himſelf to the *old Academicks*, forſaking the *new*, † and diligently enquiring into the opinion of the Antients, * endeavoured to follow *Ariſtotle* and *Xenocrates*, † profeſſing, that the *Stoicks* and *Peripateticks* agreed in the thing, and differed only in words. To which effect *Cicero* mentions a Book which he ſent to *Balbus*: He wrote alſo * another againſt his Maſter *Philo*, entituled *Soſus*. † *Cicero* being at *Athens* heard him, and was much taken with the eloquence and volubility of his diſcourſe, (* declaring him to be the moſt polite and acute of all Philoſophers in his time) † but not with the new Doctrine which he introduced.

* Acad. Qu. 4.
† Cic. de fin. lib. 5.
* Acad. Qu. 4.
† Cic. de nat. Deor. l. 1.
* Cic. Acad. Quæſt. 4.
† Plut. vit. Cicer.
* Cic. Acad. Quæſt. 4.
† Plut.

Thus far there is a continued ſeries of the *Academick* Philoſophers.

FINIS.

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

## The Sixth Part.

Containing the *PERIPATETICK* Philosophers.

ARISTOTELES.

## CHAP. I.

*His Countrey, Parents, and time of his Birth.*

UPon the death of *Plato*, his Disciples seperated themselves into two Sects. The first continued in the same school, where he taught, the *Academy*: the other possess'd the *Lyceum*. The first was known by the General name of *Academicks*, or (a) *Peripateticks of the Academy*; the other

(a) *Ammon. sub. finem. comment. in proœm. Porphyr.*

other by the general name of *Peripateticks*, or more particularly, *Peripateticks of the Lyceum*. Of the first we have discourſed already; we come now to the other, of which *Ariſtotle* was the Head.

(b) *Laert.* (c) *Polymn.* (d) *Lib.* 4. & 5. (e) *Eliac.*

(b) *Ariſtotle* was born at *Stagira*, a City of *Thrace*, according to (c) *Herodotus*, (d) *Thucydides*, (e) *Pauſanias* and *Suidas*, by others placed in *Macedonia*, to take from him the imputation of a Barbarian. It was ſeated upon *Strymon* a River which parts thoſe two Countries, having a Haven called Ἀμφίπολις, and a little Iſland of the ſame name belonging to it. This place, to which *Ariſtotle* ow'd his birth, he afterwards requited with extraordinary Gratitude.

(f) *Laert. Ammon.*

(f) His Father was named *Nicomachus*, deſcended from *Nicomachus*, Son of *Machaon* (whoſe skill in Medicine is celebrated by *Homer*) Son of *Æſculapius*, from whom *Nicomachus*, *Ariſtotle*'s Father, derived not only his Pedigree, but his art alſo, for he was a Phyſician. *Suidas* ſaith, he wrote ſix Books of Medicine, and one of Phyſick. (g) *Galen* alledgeth a Plaiſter of one *Nichomachus*, either this or the elder. This *Nicomachus* ((b) whom ſome affirm to have been grandſon to *Hippocrates* the Phyſician) lived in the time of *Amintas* King of *Macedonia*, (Father of *Philip*) a Prince (as *Juſtine* witneſſeth) eminent for all Royal Virtues. To him *Nicomachus* was not only Phyſician, but friend and favourite. (i) *Tzetzes* forgot theſe relations of *Ariſtotle* (as *Nunneſius* obſerves) when he affirmed that he was called *an Æſculapian* figuratively, in reſpect of his skill in Medicine, though it be true alſo that he did profeſs that Art.

(g) *De compoſ. medicam.* (b) *Baſſius.* (i) *Chiliad.*

His Mother, *Laertius* and *Suidas* name *Phæſtias*, (k) *Dioniſius Halicarnaſſæus*, and *Ammonius*, *Phæſtis*. (l) *Ammonius* ſaith, ſhe alſo was deſcended from *Æſculapius*, alledging in teſtimony thereof this Epigram,

(k) *Epiſt. ad Ammeum.* (l) *Vit. Ariſt. if he were the Author.*

*His Mother* Phæſis, *Sire* Nicomachus,
*Deſcended both from* Æſculapius.

But *Dioniſius Halicarnaſſæus* ſaith, ſhe was daughter of a *Chalcidian*, one of the Colony which was ſent from *Chalcis* to *Stagira*. Her Picture, *Ariſtotle*, in piety to her memory, cauſed to be made by *Protogenes* an eminent Painter of that time, which Picture (m) *Pliny* reckons amongſt the choiceſt pieces of that Maſter.

(m) *Lib.* 35. c. 9.

*Ariſtotle* (as *Suidas* affirms) had a Brother named *Arimneſtus*, and Siſter *Arimneſte*. His Brother died before him, without iſſue, as appears by his Will.

*Ariſtotle* was born, according to the teſtimonies of (n) *Apollodorus*, (o) *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* and others, in the firſt year of the 99*th* Olimpiad, at what time *Diotrephes* was Archon at *Athens*, 44. years after the Birth of *Plato*, as (p) *Athenæus* accounts, more juſtly than *Ammonius* and *Suidas*, who reckon but 42. before the birth of *Demoſthenes*, three years. (q) *Agellius* affirms, he was born the ſeventh year after the recovery of the City of *Rome* from the Gauls by *Camillus*; (r) but becauſe (as *Plutarch* ſaith) it is hard to find out on what year the City was taken, it will be hard alſo to find upon what year it was recovered. The recovery was ſeven months after its taking, but in the following year, for it was taken in *July*, recover'd in *February*. If therefore as *Valerius Flaccus*, *Agellius*, and *Caſſius Hemina* account, the taking of the City was in the 363*d* year from the building thereof, it was recover'd in the 364*th*. Thus *Ariſtotle* was born in the firſt year of the 99*th* Olympiad, the 370*th* from the building of *Rome*.

(n) *Laert.* (o) *Epiſt. ad Ammeum.* (p) *Deipn. lib.* (q) *Lib.* 17. *cap.* 21. (r) *Nunnes. in vit. Ariſtot. repeated by Schottus in vit. comparat. Ariſt. & Demoſth.*

But, if as *Livy* affirms, the taking of *Rome* was in the 365*th* year from the building thereof, and its recovery in the 366*th*, *Ariſtotle* according to that account muſt have been born in the third year of the 99*th* Olympiad, in the 372*d* year from the building of the City. Again, if the City were taken in the 364*th* year after the building thereof, and recover'd in the 365*th* year, as *Varro*, *Pliny*, *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* account, whom *Scaliger* followeth, *Ariſtotle* muſt have been born in the ſecond year of the 99*th* Olympiad, the 371. from the building of the City, reckoning always ten months for a year, and not caſting them off, as *Pliny* and others ſeem to do, and beginning immediately the next year, which months being reckoned, the account will agree with ours; hitherto *Nunneſius*.

## CHAP. II.

### *His firſt Education and Studies.*

(a) NIcomachus and *Phæſtis* the Parents of *Ariſtotle* being both dead, he was brought up by *Proxenus* an *Atarnean*, during which time being yet very young, he learned the Liberal Sciences, as appeareth, ſaith *Ammonius*, from thoſe writings of his which partly concern Poetry, partly the Poets themſelves, as likewiſe from his *Homerical queſtions*, and ſeverall Books of the Art of *Rhetoriek*.

(a) *Ammon.*

(b) In gratitude for this care taken by *Proxenus* in his education, *Ariſtotle* afterwards, not only bred up in like manner *Nicanor*, the Son of *Proxenus*, in all kinds of Learning, but adopted him his Son, and with his Eſtate bequeathed his Daughter to him. (c) He likewiſe cauſed the Statues of *Proxenus* and his wife, to be made and ſet up in honour of them, as is manifeſt by his Will.

(b) *Ammon.* (c) *Laert. in Teſtam.*

(d) *Athenæus* (citing an Epiſtle of *Epicure*) and (e) *Elian* relate, that having conſumed the inheritance left by his Father in prodigality and luxury; he betook himſelfe to the Warres, wherein having ill ſucceſs, he profeſs'd Medicine, and by chance coming into *Plato*'s School, and hearing their diſputes, being of a wit far beyond the reſt, he addicted himſelf to Philoſophy, and became famous therein. But this agrees not well with the circumſtances of his ſtory, as related by Authors of greater credit and leſs prejudice.

(d) *Deipn.* (e) *Var. hiſt.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. III.

### *How he heard* Plato.

(a) HAving attained the age of 17. years, he went (in obedience to the *Pythian* Oracle, which adviſed him to addict himſelf to Philoſophy) to *Athens*, *Laertius* ſaith (out of *Apollodorus*) that he was then but ſeventeen years old, in which year *Nauſigenes* was Archon; *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* ſaith, it was the year following, at what time *Polyzelus* was Archon, perhaps it was upon *Nauſigenes*'s going out of his Office, whom *Polyzelus* ſucceeded. But (b) *Eumenus* is much miſtaken, who ſaith, he was thirty years old when he came firſt to *Plato*, perhaps (as *Nunneſius* conjectures) becauſe he had read in *Plato*, that Dialectick ought not to be ſtudied till the thirtieth year. And no leſs err *Ammonius*, (if he be Author of that Life) and *Olympiodorus*, who affirm, that *Ariſtotle* coming to *Athens* in the ſeventeenth year of his age, heard *Socrates* three years, whereas *Socrates* was put to death when *Laches* was Archon, thirty two years before *Nauſigenes*, under whom *Ariſtotle* was ſeventeen years old.

(a) *Ammon.*

(b) *Laert.*

Being recommended to *Plato*, he became his Diſciple, and ſo continued twenty years, as an Epiſtle of his to *Philip* (cited by the old Interpreter of his life) did teſtifie.

*Plato* much loved him, and admired his acuteneſs of apprehenſion, and diligence in ſtudy; for which ((c) *Philoponus* ſaith) *Plato* uſed to call him the Mind of the School, and when (d) he was not at his Lectures, he would ſay, *The Intellect is not here*; or, as *Rhodiginus*, *The Philoſopher of truth is abſent*. And comparing his acuteneſs with the dulneſs of *Xenocrates*, *Plato* was wont to ſay, (e) *What an horſe, and what an aſſe have I to yoke together?* Xenocrates *needs a ſpur*, Ariſtotle *a bit*.

(c) *De mundi æternit.*

(d) *Vet. Interp.*

(e) *Laert.*

(f) Whilſt he lived with *Plato*, he was extreamly ſtudious, and given to reading, inſomuch that *Plato* called his houſe, *the houſe of the great Reader*, and would often ſay, (g) *Let us go to the great Readers houſe*. This may be confirmed by that great number of ancient Authors which are cited in his works. And though (h) *Laertius* (either in his own, or *Carneades*'s words) ſaith, that *Ariſtotle* hath thruſt in as many ſentences of old Authors in his writings, as both *Zeno* and *Chriſippus*'s, yet, every one that is acquainted with the writings of *Ariſtotle*, knoweth how judiciouſly and conciſely he giveth an account of their opinions, not for oſtentation, but diſquiſition.

(f) *Ammon.*

(g) *Interp.*

(h) *Vit. Epic.*

Some report there was a great enmity betwixt *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, (i) which firſt aroſe from *Plato*'s diſlike of his manner of habit: For, *Ariſtotle* wore rich garments, and rich ſhooes, and contrary to *Plato*'s rule, cut his hair ſhort, and wore rings. He had likewiſe (ſay they) a ſcornful deriſion in his look, and tenacious contradiction in his diſcourſe, which *Plato* not approving, preferred before him *Xenocrates*, *Speuſippus*, *Amyclas*, and others, to whom he communicated his Doctrine and many favours; but repudiated *Ariſtotle*, who thereupon, (k) whilſt *Plato* was yet alive, ſet up a School in oppoſition to him, in the *Lyceum*; at which ingratitude, *Plato* much troubled, ſaid, *Ariſtotle kicks at us as young Colts at the Damme that foaled them, when they have ſucked their fill*, and (l) for that reaſon, uſually called *Ariſtotle* the Colt.

(i) *Ælian.* 3. 19.

(k) *Laert.*

(l) *Ælian. var. hiſt.* 4. 9. *Heladius, apud photium, in biblioth.*

(m) They add, that *Xenocrates* being gone into his Countrey, and *Speuſippus* not well, *Ariſtotle* came into *Plato*'s School with ſome of his followers, and circumvented him with fallacious arguments, whereupon *Plato* retired to his own houſe, and there taught privately, leaving *Ariſtotle* in poſſeſſion of the School, which he kept, till *Xenocrates* returning, ejected him, and reinſtated *Plato*. The chief Author of this report ſeems to have been *Ariſtoxenus*, cited by (n) *Euſebius*, who as (o) *Suidas* obſerves, aſſoon as *Ariſtotle* was dead, caſt many aſperſions upon him, out of a malicious revenge, becauſe *Ariſtotle* preferred *Theophraſtus* before him in the ſucceſſion of the School, notwithſtanding that *Ariſtoxenus* had gained a great name and credit among the Diſciples.

(m) *Ælian.*

(n) *Præp. Evang. lib.* 15.

(o) *In Ariſtox.*

But as *Ammonius* argues, it is not likely that *Ariſtotle*, if he would, could have ejected *Plato* out of the School, or have obtained licenſe to erect a new one in oppoſition to him; for as much as at the ſame time *Chabrias* and *Timotheus*, *Plato*'s kinſmen, were in great power, and Generals of the Athenian Forces. Yet, ſome there are, who affirm this, grounding it only on *Ariſtotles* contradicting of *Plato* in many things; to which *Ammonius* anſwers, that *Ariſtotle* doth not ſimply contradict *Plato*, but thoſe who miſinterpret his writings. For if he do ſometimes contradict *Plato*, what wonder? ſeeing that therein he followeth *Plato* his Author, whoſe ſaying it was, that Truth ought to be preferred before all things; as alſo that ſaying, *Socrates* indeed is dear, but Truth moſt dear. And elſewhere, What *Socrates* ſaith, we muſt not ſo much regard, as we ought to be ſolicitous concerning Truth. The ſame courſe *Ariſtotle* took, if at any time he confuted *Plato*'s aſſertion, therein obeying him, by following the Truth; and it is obſerved by (p) ſome, that he is very ſparing in naming him, where he oppoſeth his doctrine, and that thrice he makes honourable mention of him in his (q) *Rhetorick*, his Book *of the world*, (if that be his) and his (r) *Problems*.

(p) *Licetus de piet. Ariſtot.*

(q) *Lib.* 1. c. 17.

(r) *Probl.* 1. 30.

True therefore it is, ((s) as *Apollodorus*, *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus*, but eſpecially *Ariſtotle* himſelf, in his (t) Epiſtle to *Philip*, affirm) that he was a conſtant, ſeduolus hearer of *Plato* twenty years, (u) unto the thirty ſeventh of his age, even until *Plato* died, and then was ſo great an houourer of his memory, that in teſtimony of his extraordinary affection, he erected an Altar to him, bearing this inſcription:

(s) *Laert.*

(t) *Vet. Interp.*

(u) *Vet. Interp.*

(x) *This Altar* Ariſtotle's *hand did raiſe*
*To* Plato, *whom the impious muſt not praiſe.*

(x) *Ammon.*

(y) Olympiodorus ſpeaking of the honour which *Ariſtotle* gave to his Maſter, confirmeth it by this argument, that he writ a whole Oration in commendation of *Plato*, wherein he firſt made a relation of his life, then praiſed him. He adds, that *Ariſtotle* in his Elegies to *Eudemus*, extols him thus:

(y) *Comment. in Corg. Plat.*

*And coming to the fam'd Cecropian Town,*
*In sign of friendship did an Altar raise*
*To him, whom impious persons must not praise:*
*Who straying man to virtue did restore*
*Much by his precept, by example more.*
*One to the Gods so pious, good to men,*
*No future age must think to see again.*

(z) *Athen. deipn.* 8. *Ælian.* 9. 22. & 5. 9. (a) *Euseb præ. par. Evang.*

(z) Some affirm, that whilst he lived with *Plato*, he profess'd Medicine, and kept a shop: but those (a) *Aristocles* confutes.

## CHAP. IV.

*How he lived with* Hermias.

(a) *Laert. Suid.*

(a) *Plato* dying in the first year of the 108*th* Olympiad, and *Speusippus* his Nephew succeeding in the School, *Aristotle* went to *Hermias* the Eunuch, King of *Atarna*, a City of *Mysia* in *Asia*, who heretofore had been his fellow Disciple under *Plato*, and had a particular kindness for him. *Hermias* received him with great testimonies of love and respect. With him he lived three years, [(b) instructing him in Philosophy] at the end whereof, *Hermias* was (as (c) *Strabo* saith) surprised by *Memnon*, a Rhodian, and sent to *Artaxerxes*, King of *Persia*, who put him to death. *Pythais* his sister, a woman of extraordinary virtue, (whom *Hermias*, having no children, had design'd his heir) being upon this accident reduced to great extremities and afflictions, *Aristotle*, in a pious gratitude to the memory of his friend, (as his own (d) Letter to *Antipater* attesteth) took her to wife, and (e) set up the statue of *Hermias* in the Temple at *Delphi*, with this Inscription.

(b) *Suid.*

(c) *Lib.* 13.

(d) *Euseb cont. Philos.*

(e) *Laert.*

*This man the Persian King against all right*
*A sacrifice to his fierce anger made;*
*Not like a Foe by Martial Arms in Fight;*
*But as a friend by show of love betray'd.*

He wrote likewise a Hymn to *Virtue*, in memory of his Friend, to this effect.

*Virtue, whom we all obtain*
*With much labour, but more gain,*
*For your sake to dye would please,*
*Toyl and torments were but ease.*
*You direct men in pursuit*
*Of immortal sacred fruit,*
*Richer far than Gold refin'd,*
*Soft as sleep, as Parents kind;*
*Great* Alcides *for your sake*
*Labours vast did undertake:*
Leda's *valiant twins made known*
*More your glories than their own;*
Ajax *and* Achilles *too*
*Only dy'd for love of you;*
*Ah! for you* Atarna's *pride,*
Hermias *untimely dy'd.*
*But his name we will revive;*
*That our Muse shall keep alive,*
*Paying hospitable* Jove
*Pious thanks for a friends love.*

There wanted not those who cast many aspersions and calumnies upon this Virtuous friendship: some affirm'd that *Hermias* lov'd *Aristotle* inordinately (an imputation not well suiting with an Eunuch) and that for this Reason he gave him *Pythais* to Wife, whom *Suidas* and the Greek *Etimologist* affirm to have been his Daughter either by Nature or Adoption, *Demetrius Magnesius* his Neece, *Aristippus* his Concubine, so little do they agree in their Relation: They add that *Aristotle* was so passionately in Love with her, that he sacrificed to her after the same manner as the Athenians to *Ceres* at *Eleusis*. This *Laertius* relates as done whilst she was alive; But *Lyco*, first Author of this calumny, that it was after her death. Moreover, that *Aristotle* in a thankful acknowledgement of his Bounty, wrote a Pæan in praise of *Hermias*, meaning the Hymn last mentioned, which (f) *Athenæus*, proveth against the calumniations of *Demophilus* not to be a sacred hymn or Pæan, but a *Scolion* or Festival Song. Hence *Theocritus* the Chian derides him in this Epigram.

(f) *Deipn. l.* 15.

*To the slave Eunuch who* Atarne *swai'd*
*An empty Tomb empty* Aristotle *made,*
*Who from the Academy did retire*
*To wallow in vain pleasures faithless mire.*

In answer to these calumnies (first raised by *Lyco*, dispersed further by *Aristippus*, and continued by those that malign the memory of *Aristotle*) *Apellico* writ certain Books, wherein he accurately confutes those who durst in this manner impudently blaspheme (such are his words) the name of *Aristotle*; so much prejudice and malice being in the accusation, as might easily argue the falseness thereof.

(g) Upon the death of *Hermias*, *Aristotle* (b) (and with *Xenocrates*) fled from *Atarna* to *Mitylene*, as *Apollodorus* and *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* affirm in the fourth year of the 108. Olympiad, *Eubulus* being Archon.

(g) *Laert.* (b) *Strab. l.*

## CHAP. V.

*How he lived with* Philip *and* Alexander.

About this time *Philip* King of *Macedonia*, Father of *Alexander*, taking care for the Education of his Son, now growing towards mans estate, and unwilling (saith (a) *Plutarch*) to commit his Education to Professors of Musick, or any other of the Liberal Sciences, as knowing him fit for higher designs, sent to *Aristotle* the most famous and learned of Philosophers, to come and Instruct him. (b) *Agellius* recites his Epistle, which was to this effect.

(a) *Vit. Alex.*

(b) *Lib.* 9. c. 3.

*Philip* to *Aristotle*, health

*KNow that I have a Son, I render the gods many thanks; not so much for his birth, as that he was born in your time, for I hope that being educated and instructed by you, he will become worthy both of us, and the Kingdom which he shall inherit.*

*Aristotle* at this request of *Philip*, went to *Macedonia* to him, in the 4*th* year of the 108. Olimpiad, as (c) *Apollodorus* and *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*

(c) *Laert.*

*nasſæus* affirm, at what time *Alexander* was fifteen years old.

(d) Ammon. (d) He lived there infinitely eſteem'd and beloved of *Philip* and *Olympia* his Wife, *Alexanders* Mother, (e) They cauſed his Statue to be made and ſet up in honour of him. *Philip* had a kindneſs ſo particular for him, that he allow'd him in manner an equal ſhare in the Government of the Kingdom; which intereſt, *Ammonius* ſaith, he employed to the advantage as well of private perſons, as of the publick, as appeareth (ſaith the Latin Interpreter of his life) by his Epiſtles to *Philip*. (f) *Plutarch* affirms, that *Philip* as a recompence to *Ariſtotle*, reedified the Town where he was born, *Stagira*, which he had before laid waſt. He likewiſe aſſign'd him a School and ſtudy, near *Mieza* a Town of *Macedonia* not far from thence, where, unto this day (ſaith *Plutarch*) they ſhew the ſtony ſeats and ſhady walks of *Ariſtotle*.

(e) Vet. Interp.

(f) Vit. Alex.

(g) Plut. (g) He inſtructed *Alexander* in the deepeſt parts of Learning, not only in Ethicks and Politicks, but his moſt reſerved and ſolid Doctrines, call'd *Acroatick* and *Epoptick*; never communicated to the Vulgar.

That he taught him likewiſe the Art of Medicine, *Plutarch* argueth, foraſmuch as *Alexander* was not only exceedingly delighted with the Theory thereof; but practiſed it ſucceſsfully upon many of his friends, to whom he preſcribed Receipts and Diets, as appeareth, ſaith he, by his Epiſtle.

(b) Plut. (b) Perceiving *Alexander* to be much taken with *Homer*'s Iliads, as conceiving, and calling it *the beſt inſtitution of military Virtue*, he took much pains in correcting and reſtoring the text, and then gave it to *Alexander*, which copy he infinitely prized.

He writ a Book to *Alexander*, intituled; *Of a Kingdom*, mentioned by *Laertius* and *Ammonius*, wherein he inſtructed him how to rule.

(i) Vet. Interp. (i) So much did he incline the mind of *Alexander* to do good, that he uſed to ſay, if any day paſs'd wherein he had not conferred ſome benefit, *I have not reign'd to day.*

(k) Plut. vit. Alex. (k) *Alexander* ſo much affected him, that he profeſſed he admired and loved him no leſs than his Father; becauſe his Father, he ſaid, only gave him being, but *Ariſtotle* well-being.

The love which *Philip* and *Alexander* bore him was ſo great, that *Theocritus* the Chian caſt the ſame aſperſion upon it, as he did on his friendſhip with *Hermias*.

In the firſt year of the 111*th* Olympiad, *Pythodorus* being Archon, *Philip* dyed, and was ſucceeded by his Son *Alexander*, whoſe active ſpirit, ſoon after his coming to the Crown, deſigned an expedition againſt the King of *Perſia*. Hereupon *Ariſtotle* having now lived with *Alexander* eight years, though *Juſtine* ſaith but five which ſome interpret of the time before *Philips* death, but not without ſome violence, for that was above ſeven) preferring the quiet of a Contemplative life before the troubles of War, took leave of him, returned to *Athens*, leaving in his room *Caliſthenes* an Olynthian, his Kinſman (Son of his Couſin *Hero*) and Diſciple; (l) whom before his departure obſerving to ſpeak with too much liberty and obſtinacy to the King, he reproved in theſe words,

(l) Laert.

*Son if thou thus employ thy tongue,*
*Thy thread of life cannot be long.*

And ſo it came to paſs not long after upon this occaſion. *Hermolaus* Son of *Sopolis*, a youth of a noble family that ſtudied Philoſophy under *Caliſthenes*, hunting the Wild Boar with *Alexander*, prevented the King by caſting his dart firſt at him, for which he was by the Kings command puniſhed with many ſtripes. Troubled at the ignominy thereof, he conſpired with *Soſtratus*, *Antipater*, and ſome other companions of his, to murther *Alexander*, which treaſon being diſcovered by *Epimenes* one of the Conſpirators, they were all put to death. *Ariſtobulus* and *Ptolemæus* Son of *Lagus* affirms, they accuſed *Caliſthenes*, as him who inſtigated them to this attempt. Hereupon *Caliſthenes* was put into an iron Cage, and ſo carried up and down in a miſerable ſordid condition, and at laſt, as *Laertius* relates (though others otherwiſe) thrown to Lions and devoured.

## CHAP. VI.

### *His School and manner of Teaching.*

THus *Ariſtotle* having lived eight years with *Alexander*, returned to *Athens*, as (a) *Apollodorus* and (b) *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* affirm, in the ſecond year of the hundred and eleventh Olympiad, *Pythodorus* being Archon, where he found *Xenocrates* teaching in the Academy, which place was reſigned unto him by *Speuſippus*, in the fourth year of the hundred and ninth Olympiad.

(a) Laert. (b) Epiſt. ad Amm.

Hence it appeareth, that (c) *Hermippus* erreth, in affirming, that *Xenocrates* took upon him the School of *Plato*, at what time *Ariſtotle* was ſent by the Athenians on an Embaſſy to *Philip*. For as (d) *Patricius* hath obſerved, it can no way agree in time, it being certain, as *Laertius* atteſts, that *Speuſippus* ſucceeded *Plato* in the School in the firſt year of the hundred and eight Olympiad, immediately upon *Plato's* death, and continued therein eight years, that is, to the end of the hundred and ninth Olympiad; in the ſecond year of which Olympiad, *Ariſtotle*, as we ſaid, went to *Philip*, not on an Embaſſy, but upon his invitation to educate *Alexander*.

(c) Laert.

(d) Diſcuſſ. Perip.

Neither is the Author of *Ariſtotles* life leſs miſtaken, who ſaith, that upon the death of *Speuſippus*, the Athenians ſent to *Ariſtotle*, and that both of them, *Ariſtotle* and *Xenocrates*, took upon them *Plato's* School, *Xenocrates* in the *Academy*, *Ariſtotle* in the *Lyceum*. But this errour is eaſily detected by the ſame computation; for at the time of *Speuſippus* death, *Ariſtotle* was with *Alexander*, nor did he leave him until ſix years after, all which time *Xenocrates* profeſs'd Philoſophy in the *Academy*.

(e) Laert. (f) Suid.

(c) The *Academy* being prepoſſeſs'd by *Xenocrates*, *Ariſtotle* made choice of the *Lyceum*, (f) a place in the ſuburbs of *Athens*, built by *Pericles* for the exerciſing of Soldiers.) Here he taught and diſcourſed of Philoſophy, to ſuch as came to him, *walking* conſtantly every day till the hour of anointing, which the Greeks uſually did before meals,

meals, whence he and his followers are called ἀπὸ τῦ περιπατεῖν, *from walking Peripateticks*. Others say, he was called *Peripatetick* from walking with *Alexander*, newly recovered of a sickness, in which manner he used to discourse of Philosophy with him.

(g) *Laert.* (g) The number of his auditors encreasing very much, he gave over walking, and taught sitting, saying,

*Now to be silent most disgraceful were,*
*And see* Xenocrates *possess the chair.*

Though *Cicero* and *Quintilian* affirm, he used this verse against *Isocrates*, in emulation of whom, he taught Rhetorick to his Disciples every morning. (b) So many Disciples resorted to him, that he made Laws in his School, as *Xenocrates* did in the *Academy*, creating *Archons* that ruled ten days.

(b) *Laert.*

(i) *Agel. lib. 21. cap. 5.* (i) The discourse and doctrine which he delivered to his Disciples was of two kinds One he called *Exoterick*, the other *Acroatick*. *Exoterick* were those which conduced to Rhetorick, meditation, nice disputes, and the knowledge of civil things. *Acroatick* those in which more remote and subtile Philosophy was handled, and such things as pertain to the cotemplation of nature, and Dialectick disceptations. *Acroatick* Discipline he taught in the *Lyceum* in the morning, not admitting every one to come and hear them, but those only, of whose wit and principles of Learning, and diligence in study, he had before made trial. His *Exoterick* Lectures were in the afternoon and evenings; these he communicated to all young men without any distinction, calling the latter his *evening walk* the former, his *morning walk*.

## CHAP. VII.

### His Philosophy.

(d) *Vit. Ar.* IN *Philosophy* (saith (a) *Ammonius*) he seemeth to have done more than Man, for there is not any part of Philosophy whereof he treated, but he doth it most accurately, and many things he himself (such was his Sagacity and Acuteness) finding out, compleated and finished.

(b) *Ammon. v. t. Ar.* (b) In *Logick* it was his Invention, that he separated the Precepts of Disputation from the things themselves of which we dispute, and taught the Manner and Reason of Disputation. For they who went before, tho they could Demonstrate, yet they knew not how to make a Demonstration; as they who cannot make Shooes, but only wear them. *Alexander Aphrodisæus* affirms, that he first reduced Syllogisms to *Mood* and *Figure*. *Philoponus*, that he invented all Dialectick *Method*, whence *Theodorus* calls him *both inventer and perfecter of Logick*, which he indeed in a manner challengeth (but modestly) to himself, in the last Chapter of his *Elenchs*, affirming nothing had been done in that kind before, but what the Eristicks and Sophists taught. As for the *Categories*, the Invention whereof some ascribe to the *Pythagoreans*, it is much more probable that they were wholly his own; for those Books entituled καθόλυ λόγοι, under the name of *Archytas*, from which some conceive *Aristotle* to have borrowed much, the particulars whereof are instanced by (c) *Patricius*, *Themistius* affirms to have been written, not by the *Pythagorean* (neither hath *Laertius* made mention of any writings of his, for the *Pythagoreans* at that time wrote but little, the first that wrote any thing being *Philolaus*) but by some *Peripatetick*, who thought his Work might pass with greater credit, if published in the name of so ancient a Philosopher.

(c) *Differ. Peripat.*

In *Physick* the *fifth Essence*, whereof celestial Bodies consist, distinct from the four Elements, is generally ascribed to his invention, only *Simplicius* citeth the Authority of *Xenocrates*, in his book of the Life of *Plato*, that *Plato* constituted five simple Bodies, Heaven and the four Elements, asserting they differ no less in Nature than in Figure; for which reason he assigned the Figure of a *Dodecadron* to Heaven, differing from the Figure of the four Elements. But these, as the learned *Nunnesius* observes, seem to be rather Symbolical, and Pythagorical, than the true meaning of *Plato*. For *Plato* in his *Timæus* expresly avers, that the Heavens are of their own Nature dissolute, but by the divine Will are kept together, as it were, by a tye from being dissolved. *Xenarchus*, a Philosopher, wrote against the fifth Essence, introduced by *Aristotle*; whom *Alexander Aphrodisæus* exactly answereth. *Theodorus* calleth *Aristotle*, *The Perfecter of Physick*, adding, that only his writings upon that Subject were approved by following Ages, who rejected whatsoever others had written in the same kind, as appeareth by their loss. What *Epicure* and others have objected against him as a fault, *That he enquired with such diligence into the minute, and meanest things of nature*, is a sufficient testimony of his excellence and exactness in this Study.

(d) In *Ethick*, whereas *Polyænus* placed Felicity in external Goods, *Plato* in those of the Soul only, *Aristotle* placed it chiefly in the Soul; but affirmed it to be *defiled* and *streightned* if it want exterior goods, properly using these terms. For those things which are *defiled*, have the same Beauty within, but their superficies only is hidden; and those which are streightned have the same real magnitude.

(d) *Vit. Ar.*

(e) In *Metaphysick*, which he calleth *First-Philosophy* and *Wisdom*, and (as the more ancient Philosophers before him) *Theologie* (f), tho there be not any invention of his extant, yet, he perfectly went through all the parts thereof. For he was not only acquainted, as some falsly imagine, with terrestrial Things, and those which belong to this World; but even with those things which are above this World, as may appear from the eight book of his *Physick*, where he saith, That *the first cause is not subject to motion, neither in it self, nor by accident*, in which words he declareth, that *God* is not a Body, nor any way passible. And in his 12*th* Book of *Wisdom*, or *Metaphysicks*, he discourseth accurately of *God* and *Intelligences*, in a rational clear way, not involv'd in Fables, or Pythagorical Symbols; but founding his Assertion upon Reason and Demonstration, as much as the Subject, and human Reason alloweth. (g) *Patricius* labours much to prove that whatsoever he had in this kind excellent, he borrow'd from *Hermes Trismegistus*. But ((h) as we have already said)

(e) *Amm.*

(f) *Amm.*

(g) *Differ. Peripat.*

(h) *In the Life of Plato.*

Mr.

Mr. *Casaubon* hath fully evinc'd that Book to have been imposed upon the World by some later writer.

What is added by the Ancient Latin Interpreter concerning *Aristotle*'s sentence of that *visual Hexagonal Pyramid*, (which (*i*) a learned Person hath observed to be chosen as a middle way betwixt the Sentence of those who made the optick Penicil a Pyramid of a quadratick base, and those who made it of a Conick Figure) is very obscure, and hardly admits of an Interpretation worthy so great an Author.

(i) Nunneus in Vit. Arist.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *His Correspondence with* Alexander.

WHilst *Aristole* taught Philosophy at *Athens*, his Disciple *Alexander* was employed in an Expedition to *Asia* against *Darius* King of *Persia*, incited thereunto by the Principles of Honour, which were infused into him by *Aristotle*, particularly from the Presidents of *Achilles*, *Ajax*, and other *Heroes* celebrated by *Homer*, whose Iliads *Aristotle* had so carefully recommended unto him. He began this Expedition in the third year of the 111*th* Olimpaid, at which time *Cteficles* was Archon at *Athens*, immediately after the departure of *Aristotle*, who (it is probable) came only for this reason from him, as preferring a quiet and studious Life, before the troubles of War.

The first thing that *Alexander* did, was to visit the Tomb of *Achilles* in the *Sigæum*, at the sight whereof he broke forth into these words; *O fortunate young man, that hadst a* Homer *to celebrate thy praise! for had it not been for his Iliads*, adds (*a*) *Cicero*, in the same Tomb where *Achilles*'s Body lay, his Name also would have been buried. He took with him the Iliads of *Homer*, corrected by *Aristotle*, and made it his constant companion, insomuch that he put it every night with his dagger, under his pillow. And in a Victory over *Darius*, having taken a Casket of Unguents of extraordinary value amongst the spoils of *Darius*, beset with Pearls and precious stones (as (*b*) *Pliny* describes it) his friends telling him how many uses it might be put to, because Unguents did not become a Soldier; Yes, saith he, it shall serve to keep the Books of *Homer*, that the most precious work may be kept in the richest case; hence was this correct copy called, as *Plutarch* saith, ἐν τῇ ῥαθήκῃ.

(a) In Licin.

(b) Lib. 29.

Whilst he was in *Asia*, engaged in the Wars against *Darius*, in the midst of his continual Victories and Business, hearing that *Aristotle* had published his *Acroacick* books of natural Philosophy, he sent this Letter to him;

(*d*) *Alexander* to *Aristoele*, Health.

YOU *have not done well in publishing your* Acroatick *discourses, for wherein shall we excel others, if this Learning, wherein we have been instituted, be made common to all? As for me, I had rather excel others in knowledg than in power.* Farewell.

(d) Agell. 20. Plut. vit. Alex.

To which *Aristotle* returned this answer.

(*e*) *Aristotle* to *Alexander*, Health. (e) Agell. 20. 5. Epist. Græc.

YOU *wrote to me concerning my* Acroatick *Discourses, that they ought not to have been communicated; but kept secret. Know, that they are made publick, and not publick, for none but they who have heard us can understand them.* Farewell.

Thus, notwithstanding *Alexander* was busied in the Wars, yet he forgot not his Master *Aristotle*, but kept a friendly correspondence with him. So constant was he in his love to Learning, and particularly so much enflam'd (as (*f*) *Pliny* saith) with a curious desire of understanding the natures of living Creatures, that he sent thousands of men, throughout all *Asia* and *Greece* to procure all kinds of living Creatures, Birds, Beasts and Fishes, at an excessive charge, (*g*) *Athenæus* saith, 800. Talents, which according to (*b*) *Budæus*'s account is 840000 crowns: these men he sent with what they took to *Aristotle*, that he might not be ignorant of any thing that any Nation afforded; by which information, he composed, as *Pliny* affirmeth, 50 excellent Volumes, *of Living Creatures*, of which ten are only left, unless we put into the same number, those Books of his which have some near relation to this subject; as *Of the going of living Creatures*, 1. *Of the parts of living Creatures and their causes.* 2. *Of the Generation of living Creatures.* If this were done by *Alexander*, as *Pliny* and *Athenæus* attest (tho *Ælian* ascribe it to *Philip*) it must necessarily have been whilst he was in his Asiatick expedition. For *Aristotle*, as hath been already proved, staid but a very short time with him after the death of his Father.

(f) Lib. 8. 16.

(g) Lib. 9.

(b) De asse. lib. 2. 19.

(i) Lib. 4. 19.

*Aristotle* made the same use of this correspondence with *Alexander*, as he had done of the Interest he before had with *Philip*, the advantage not only of particular persons, but of whole Cities.

This the City of *Stagira*, the place of his Birth, did acknowledg, which, at the suit of *Aristotle*, *Alexander* caused to be reedified, and repeopled and restored to its former state, having before by *Philip* been laid level with the ground. For, though *Plutarch* relate this as done in the time of *Philip*; *Laertius*, *Ammonius*, *Dion*, *Chrysostome*, *Ælian*, and others hold, that it was done by *Alexander*, to which *Valerius Maximus* adds, that it was not long before *Aristotles death*. In memory of which Benefit, the people of *Stagira* used to celebrate a yearly Festival, which they called the *Aristotelean Feast*, naming the month in which it fell, *Stagirites*.

(*k*) *Eresus* likewise, the Countrey of *Theophrastus*, which *Alexander* determined to punish very severely; by the mediation of *Aristotle* was pardoned.

(k) Ammon.

That he benefited many particular persons is evident, saith *Ammonius*, from his Epistles to the King, yet extant, wherein he recommends several persons to him.

Hence it is manifest, that the Author of his life is mistaken, when he affirms, that in *Alexanders Asiatick expedition*, Aristotle accompanied *him to the Brachmanes, where he writ that noble*

piece

piece of the Laws and Inſtitutions of 255 Cities. That likewiſe he travelled over all Perſia with Alexander, where during the war, Alexander died, and Ariſtotle returned into his own Countrey. This relation agrees not with the other circumſtances of *Ariſtotles* life. *Alexander* died in the fourth year of the hundred and thirteenth Olympiad, two years before *Ariſtotle's* departure from *Athens*.

But as it is apparent, that this miſtake proceeded only from ignorance (yet that ſo great, that (*l*) *Patricius* argues from thence neither *Ammonius* nor *Philoponus* to be the Authors of his life) ſo are there ſome other Errors, which no leſs manifeſtly appear to have proceeded from malice, raiſed, it is likely, by the Authors of the other Scandals and Imputations, wherewith they ſought to blaſt his Memory.

(*l*) *Diſſert. Peripat.* 1. 1.

(*m*) *Laert.* (*m*) Some affirm, That *Alexander* upon the Treaſon of *Calliſthenes*, took a great diſpleaſure againſt *Ariſtotle*, for having recommended him to him. For tho at firſt, writing to *Criterus*, *Attalus* and *Alcetas*, immediately upon this accident, he ſent them word, that the Youths had confeſſed the Plot proceeded only from themſelves, not by the Inſtigation of any other. (*n*) Yet afterwards, in an Epiſtle to *Antipater*, he imputes the ſame crime to *Calliſthenes*, not without this ſharp Reflection upon *Ariſtotle*: *The Youths*, ſaith he, *were ſtoned to Death by the* Macedonians; *but, as for the Sophiſt, I will puniſh him my ſelf, and thoſe who ſent him, and thoſe who entertain in their Cities ſuch as are Traytors to me.* Hereupon they interpret the bounty of *Alexander* to *Xenocrates*, and favour to *Anaximenes*, as not proceeding from the Magnificence of his Diſpoſition, (*o*) but from the Diſpleaſure he had conceived againſt *Ariſtotle*, whom he endeavoured to Vex, by obliging his Adverſaries and Æmulators.

(*n*) *Plut. vit. Alex.*

(*o*) *Laert.*

Upon this ſuppoſed diſpleaſure was grounded another report, that (*p*) *Ariſtotle* conſpiring with *Caſſander* againſt *Alexander*, ſent him, by *Antipater*, ſome of the Water of *Styx*, wherewith he poyſoned *Alexander*. But the Relators hereof differ not a little amongſt themſelves: *Diodorus Siculus* and *Suidas* affirm, that *Alexander* was poyſoned by *Caſſander* Son of *Antipater*; *Arianus* by *Jolla* his younger Son: *Porphyrius* ſaith, That nothing but the Horn of an Aſs, ſuch as the Aſſes of *Scythia* had, would contain the Poyſon: *Juſtine* and *Pauſanias*, the Hoof of a Horſe; *Pliny* and *Arrian*, of a Mule; *Plutarch* and *Zonaras*, of an Aſs. They differ no leſs about the place whence the Water was fetch'd. Neither indeed can it be expected there ſhould be a better harmony amongſt the Relators of this Fable, when there is ſo great diſſention, and variety of Relations concerning the occaſion and manner of his Death. But the moſt creditable is that of *Ephippus* ((*q*) cited by *Athenæus*) (*r*) *Oroſius*, (*ſ*) *Juſtine*, and others, who aver, that *Alexander* died of a Fever, cauſed by exceſs of Drinking.

(*p*) *Plut. Alex.*

(*q*) *Deip.* 10. 11.
(*r*) *Lib.* 3. *c.* 21.
(*ſ*) *Lib.* 12.

## CHAP. IX.

*Upon what occaſion he left* Athens, *and went to* Chalcis.

(*a*) TWelve years *Ariſtotle* profeſſed Philoſophy in the *Lyceum*, not moleſted by any; for tho his Eminence in Learning procured him many Æmulators and Enemies, yet the Favour he had with *Alexander*, while he lived, awed them ſo much, that they durſt not make any diſcovery of the ill will they bore him. No ſooner was *Alexander* dead (according to *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus*) but ſome of them conſpired againſt his Life. To which end, *Eurymedon*, a Prieſt, or (according to *Phavorinus*) *Demophilus*, accuſed him of Impiety; That *he introduced ſome Philoſophical aſſertions, contrary to the Religion of the* Athenians; *that he celebrated* Hermias *as a God, with a Hymn, and had cauſed his Statue to be ſet up in the* Delphian *Temple, with an honourable Inſcription.* Some affirm hereupon, he made an Oration in defence of himſelf, at the Court of *Areopagus*, wherein he openly pronounced this Verſe, made out of two in (*b*) *Homer*.

(*a*) *Laert.*

(*b*) *Odyſſ.* ι.

*Pears upon Pears, and Figs on Figs grow here*;

By συκον επ' συκῳ, (*Figs on Figs*) reflecting upon the multitude of *Sycophants* which ſprung up every day in the City. Hence *Phavorinus* ſaith, he was the firſt Philoſopher that pleaded for himſelf, and there was an Oration to that purpoſe went about many years after under his name. But, of the truth hereof, *Athenæus* maketh queſtion.

(*c*) Others affirm, that *Ariſtotle* perceiving the Conſpiracy that was againſt his Life, ſtole privately out of *Athens*, and went to *Chalcis*, where he ſpent the reſt of his days, returning to his Friends, who demanded the reaſon of his going, this anſwer, (*d*) *We left* Athens, *that we might not give the* Athenians *occaſion to commit again the ſame wickedneſs* (*e*) *they committed againſt* Socrates, *that they might not be guilty of a double crime againſt Philoſophy.* To *Antipater* he wrote the formentioned Verſe,

(*c*) *Laer.*

(*d*) *Ælian. hiſt.*

(*e*) *Origen. contr. Celſ. lib.* 1.

*Pears upon Pears, and Figs on Figs grow here*;

Giving him to underſtand how dangerous it was for him to live in *Athens*, ſince the *Athenians* were wholly addicted to Sycophantiſm and Calumny. This departure of *Ariſtotle* from *Athens*, *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* placeth in the ſecond year of the hundred and fourteenth Olympaid, *Apollodorus* a year latter, perhaps leſs rightly.

(*f*) Being near ſixty two years of Age, very Sickly, and without hope of living much longer, the whole company of his Followers came to him, and beſought him to make choice of a Succeſſor, whom after his Death they might look upon as the Perfecter of thoſe Studies whereinto he had brought them. There were at that time many excellent Scholars in his School, but eſpecially two, *Theophraſtus* and *Menedemus*, or rather as *Patricius* reads, *Eudemus*. Theſe excelled the reſt in Wit and Learning. The firſt was of *Lesbos*, *Eudemus* of *Rhodes*. *Ariſtotle* anſwered

(*f*) *Agellius*

ed them, he would do as they requeſted, when he ſaw it convenient. Soon after, the ſame Perſons being preſent who had made this requeſt to him, he complained, the Wine which he then drank, did not agree with his Health, but was unwholſome and harſh; and therefore deſired they would ſend for other ſorts, both *Rhodian* and *Lesbian*, ſaying, he would make uſe of that which he ſhould find beſt for him. They go, ſeek, find, bring. *Ariſtotle* firſt calls for the *Rhodian*, taſts it, A ſtrong Wine, ſaith he, and pleaſant; then calls for the *Lesbian*, which having taſted, *Both*, ſaith he, *are good, but ἡδίων ὁ Λέσβιος, the Lesbian is the ſweeter*; whereby every one underſtood that his choice was not of the wine, but of his ſucceſſor, which was *Theophraſtus* of *Lesbos*, a man of extraordinary ſweetneſs in diſcourſe and converſation: Whence not long after, as ſoon as *Ariſtotle* was dead, all his Diſciples applied themſelves to *Theophraſtus*.

(a) Laert.

## CHAP. X.

### *His Apophthegms.*

OF his *Apophthegms* are remembred theſe.

Being demanded what a man got by lying, he anſwered, *not to be believed when he ſpoke truth.*

Being reproved for giving mony to a wicked man, I, ſaith he, *gave it compaſſionating, not* τὸν πεπρωκότα, *the condition*; *but*, τὸν ἄνθρωπον, or as *Stobæus*, *not to the man, but to humanity.*

He uſed this ſaying frequently amongſt his diſciples and friends, *the eye receives light from the air, the ſoul from learning.*

Inveighing againſt the Athenians, he ſaid, *They had invented two things, Corn and Law; but made uſe only of one, the Corn:*

He ſaid, *The root of learning is bitter, the fruit ſweet.*

Being demanded what grows old ſooneſt, he anſwered, *a Benefit.*

Being demanded what is Hope, he anſwered *a waking Dream.*

*Diogenes* the Cynick offered him a fig: *Ariſtotle* perceiving that *Diogenes* had prepared ſome ſharp ſaying, in caſe he ſhould have refuſed it, took the fig, telling *Diogenes*, he had loſt both his fig and his conceit. Then throwing it up into the air, and catching it, as boys uſe to do, O *worthy Diogenes*, ſaid he, and reſtored it.

He ſaid, *To Learning three things are requiſite, Nature, Inſtitution, Exerciſe.*

Being told that one had reviled him: *when I am abſent*, ſaid he, *let him beat me too.*

He ſaid, *Beauty was a better recommendation than any Letter.* Others aſcribe this to *Diogenes*, adding, that *Ariſtotle* called beauty, *the gift of a ſpecious form.*

He called *Socrates* a ſhort-liv'd Tyranny: *Plato*, Natures Prerogative; *Theophraſtus*, ſilent fraud, *Theocritus*, ſpecious hurt; (b) *Carneades* a guardleſs Kingdom.

(b) Meant perhaps of that Carneades, who was Diſciple to Anaxagoras.

Being demanded what difference there is betwixt the learned and unlearned; he anſwered, *as much as between the living and the dead.*

He ſaid, *Learning in proſperity is an ornament, in adverſity a refuge.*

He ſaid, *they who educated children well, are more to be honoured than they who beget them; for theſe only gave them life, others well living.*

To one, boaſting of the greatneſs of his Country: *That*, ſaith he, *is not to be conſidered, but whether a man deſerve to be of a great Country.*

He ſaid, *Friends are one ſoul in two Bodies.*

He ſaid, *ſome men lived ſo ſparingly, as if they were to live always; others ſo prodigally, as if they were to die to morrow.*

To one that asked why we love the company of thoſe that are fair; *That*, ſaith he, *is a queſtion for a blind man to ask.*

Being asked what he had gotten by Philoſophy, he anſwer'd, *To do thoſe things volantarily, which others do for fear of the Law.*

Being demanded how Diſciples ſhould profit moſt; he anſwered, *if they follow thoſe that are before them, and ſtay not for thoſe behind them.*

To a fooliſh talker, who after a long Diſcourſe ſaid to him, *I am afraid I have been tedious to you*; *Not at all*, anſwer'd he, *for I did not mind you.*

Being asked how we ſhould behave our ſelves towards our Friends; he anſwer'd, as *we would have them do towards us.*

He ſaid, *Juſtice is the virtue of giving to every one according to his deſert.*

He ſaid, *Learning was the beſt proviſion againſt old age.*

He uſed, as *Phavorinus* relates in the ſecond of his Commentaries, to ſay frequently, *He who hath many friends hath none*; which is likewiſe extant in the ſeventh book of his *Ethicks.*

He ſaid, *When things happen not as we would, we muſt will as they happen.* Stob. Ser. 28.

Seeing a youth very ſelf-conceited, and withal ignorant; *Young man*, ſaith he, *I wiſh I were what you thenk your ſelf, and my enemies, what you are.* Ser. 45.

Seeing a young man proud of a fine Cloak, *Why boaſt you*, ſaith he, *of a Sheeps Fleece?* Ibid.

He ſaid, *They who demonſtrate plain things, light a candle to ſee the Sun.* Ser. 46.

Being reviled by an impudent perſon; *Thou*, ſaith he, *Who art vers'd to bear all things, ſpeakeſt them with delight; I who am not uſed to ſpeak them, take no delight in hearing them.* Ser. 101.

Being demanded why he who taught others to ſpeak, himſelf held his Tongue; *A whetſtone*, ſaith he, *cannot cut, yet it ſets an edg upon ſwords.* Ser. 128.

Being asked who can keep a ſecret; *He*, ſaith he, *that can hold a glowing coal in his mouth.* Ibid.

Seeing a young man very neatly dreſs'd, *Are you not aſham'd*, ſaith he, *when Nature hath made you a man, to make your ſelf a woman?* Ser. 161.

A handſome young man, much courted, ſaid to him, *If I were hated of the Citizens as you are, I would hang my ſelf*; *and I*, reply'd he, *would hang my ſelf if I were lov'd by them as you are.* Ibid.

Being demanded how a man ſhould come to be rich; he anſwer'd, *by being poor in deſire.* Serm.

It repented him of three things; that *he had ever committed a ſecret to a Woman*; that *he had rid when he might have gone a foot*; that *he had lived one day not having his Will made.* Serm. 305.

## CHAP. XI.

### His Will and Death.

FRom that ſpeech of *Ariſtotle* laſt mentioned, may be gathered how careful he was to make his Will, but more from the exact form thereof, which was thus:

(a) Laert.

(a) BE all well; but if it happen otherwiſe, thus Ariſtotle maketh his Will. Be Antipater my ſole Executor during the Minority of Nicanor. Let Ariſtomenes, Timarchus, Hipparchus, Dioteles, (and if he pleaſe, and have leiſure) Theophraſtus, be Guardians of the Children and of Herpylis, and all that I leave. I will that my Daughter, as ſoon as ſhe ſhall be Marriageable, be given Nicanor for Wife. If any thing happen otherwiſe (which God forbid) before ſhe be Married, or after ſhe be Married before ſhe hath any Children, let Nicanor have the ordering of my Son, and the diſpoſal of all other things, for his reputation and mine. Let therefore Nicanor take care of the Maid Pythais, and my Son Nicomachus, and order their Eſtates according to their condition, as a Father and a Brother. If in the mean time any thing ſhall happen to Nicanor (which God forbid) either before my Daughter be Married, or if Married, before ſhe hath any Children, if he make any Will, as he appointeth, ſo let it be. Otherwiſe, if Theophraſtus approve of it, let him Marry the Maid, and have the ſame power that Nicanor ſhould have had. Otherwiſe, let the Eſtates as well of the Maid as the Boy be diſpoſed with the joint conſent of the Guardians, and Antipater, as they ſhall think fit. Let likewiſe the Executors of Nicanor take care to remember us and Herpylis, ſince that ſhe hath been faithful to me, and if ſhe will take a Husband, that ſuch a one be given unto her as may be no diſparagement unto us. Let them give her out of my Eſtate, beſides what is already mentioned, a Talent of Silver, three Maid-ſervants, if ſhe ſo pleaſe, and the Handmaid which ſhe hath, and the Boy Pyrrhæus. And moreover, if ſhe will dwell at Chalcis, let her have that habitation which joyneth to the Garden; if at Stagira, our Patrimonial ſeat; which howſoever Herpylis ſhall chooſe, let the Executors furniſh it, as they ſhall think convenient and proper for Herpylis. Let likewiſe Nicanor take charge of the Boy Mirmax, that he may be reſtored honourably, as becometh us, unto his own, with all his goods which we dilivered to our Truſt. Let likewiſe Ambracis be a free woman, and have beſtowed upon her at her Marriage, fifty Drachmes, and the Girl which ſhe hath. I Will likewiſe, that to Thales be given, beſides the Handmaid he hath bought, a thouſand Drachmes, and another Handmaid. Likewiſe to Simo, beſides that money which he hath already received to buy a Servant, let another Servant be bought, or the like Sum be given again, wherewith he may purchaſe one. As ſoon as my Daughter ſhall be Married, let Tycho, Philo, Olympias and his Son be free-men. Of thoſe boys which ſerved me, let none be ſold, but let my Heirs make uſe of their ſervice, and when they come to Age, as they deſerve let them be manumitted. Let the Executors take care to thoſe Sratues of Nicanor, and his Mother, and Proxenus, which I gave order for to Gryllius, as ſoon as they are perfected, be ſet up. Let likewiſe the Statue of Arimneſtus be ſet up, that this Monument may remain of him, ſince he died without Children. I Will likewiſe that the Statue of my Mother be conſecrated to Ceres in the Nemæan Temple, or where elſe ſhall be thought fitting. Whereſoever my Body is Buried by the Executors, thither let the Bones of Pythais, according as ſhe deſired, be brought and laid with mine. Let likewiſe Nicanor, if he continue well in health, dedicate at Stagira, to Jupiter Soter, and Minerva Sotira, Statues of Beaſts, of ſtone of four cubits, in performance of the vow which we vowed for him.

He died at *Chalcis*, in the third year of the 114th Olympiad, *Philocles* being Archon, in the 63. the great Climacterical year of his age (not as (b) *Eumelus*, 70 years Old) as appeareth by the computation of *Apollodorus* and *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus*; thus,

(b) Laert.

| | years. |
|---|---|
| He came to *Athens* at | 18 |
| Heard *Plato* | 20 |
| Lived with *Hermias* | 3 |
| With *Philip* and *Alexander* | 8 |
| Taught in the *Lyceum* | 12 |
| Lived at *Chalcis* | 2 |
| In all | 63 |

The manner of his Life is variouſly related, (c) *Strabo*, *Heſychius Illuſtris*, and from him *Suidas*, relate that he drunk Hemlock, either being condemn'd thereunto by the *Athenians*, as *Socrates* was, or to prevent their Judgment.

(c) Lib. 13.

(d) *Juſtine Martyr*, (e) *Gregory Nazianzene*, (f) *Cælius Rhodoginus*, the Greek *Etymologiſt*, *Nonnus*, and others, follow the common report, that a Queſtion was propos'd to him of the wonderful Nature of *Euripus*, an Arm of the Sea, coming into *Chalcis* (as *Lucian* avers) which Ebbeth and Floweth ſeven times in 24. hours. Not being able to reſolve it, he died of Shame and Anxiety. Some affirm that as he ſate on the Bank, having conſidered long upon it, he at laſt threw himſelf headlong into the River, ſaying, *Since* Ariſtotle *could not take* Euripus, Euripus *take thou* Ariſtotle.

(d) Paræ. gent.
(e) Steian.
(f) Amiel. 19. 8.

But

But the Authors of greateſt Credit, (g) *Apollodorus*, (b) *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus*, (i) *Cenſorinus*, *Laertius* and others affirm, That he died of a Pain in his Stomach, cauſed by Over-watching, and exceſs of Study. For *Laertius* affirms he was a moſt indefatigable Student, and when he went to Bed, he held a brazen Ball in his Hand, that when he fell aſleep, the noiſe of it falling into a Baſin ſet under it for that purpoſe, might awake him, which *Alexander* his Diſciple imitated. To this Pain of his Stomach he was very ſubject, and ſometimes aſſwaged it by applying a bottle of hot Oyl to his Breaſt. *Notwithſtanding this natural Infirmity of his Stomach*, ſaith *Cenſorinus*, *and the frequent Indiſpoſition of a ſickly Conſtitution, he preſerved himſelf a long time through his Virtue and Temperance; for it was much more ſtrange that he attained the Age of 63. years*, than *that he lived no longer.*

The Author of the Book *de Pomo*, affirmeth, That when he was dying, he ſaid to his Diſciples ſtanding about him, it was not without Reaſon that *Homer* ſaid, the Gods came down to Earth to relieve Mankind. (k) *Coelius Rhodoginus* adds from the ſame Author, that when he felt the Pangs of Death to come upon him, weeping between Grief and Hope, he often repeated theſe words, *Thou Cauſe of Cauſes, have Mercy on me:* And his Diſciples, when they ſaw he was departing, ſaid, *He who receiveth the Souls of Philoſophers, may he take thine likewiſe, and lay it up in his own Treaſury, as the Soul of a right and perfect Man, as we have known thee to be.* Of this, there is no Teſtimony more ancient, then that of the Author of the Book *de Pomo*, who (as *Patricius* clearly obſerves from his Writings) was a Chriſtian.

(l) The *Stagirites* fetch'd his Body from *Chalcis* to *Stagira*, where they buried it with much Solemnity, building a Magnificent Tomb for him, and erecting an Altar to his Memory.

(g) *Laert.* (b) *Epiſt. ad Amm.* (i) *De die natali.* (k) *Antiq. lect.* 18. 31. (l) *Vet. Interp.*

## CHAP. XII.

### *His Perſon and Virtues.*

(a) AS concerning his Perſon, he was Slender, having little Eyes, and a ſmall Voice. When he was Young, *Laertius* and *Plutarch* affirm, he had a great Heſitation in his Speech. (b) He went in a rich Habit, and wore Rings; his Beard was ſhaven, his Hair cut ſhort; he had a high Noſe, if we credit the Head put up by *Fulvius Urſinus*, found at *Rome*, at the bottom of the *Quirinal* Hill. He was of a ſickly Conſtitution, troubled with a natural weakneſs of Stomach, and frequent Indiſpoſitions, which he over-maſtered by his Temperance.

Saint *Hierom* affirmeth, he was the Prince of Philoſophers, an abſolute Prodigy, and great Miracle in Nature, into whom ſeemeth to have been infuſed whatſoever Mankind is capable of.

He was extreamly pious towards God and Man, upon which Subject, *Fortunus Licetus* hath lately written two Books.

*Euſebius*, *Caſſiodorus*, and others affirm, that many Perſons, Eminent for Sanctity, eſpecially Followers of School-learning, have, through the means of *Ariſtotles* Philoſophy, been carried on to Inſpection into the higheſt Doctrines of true Faith; as, that there is one God, *&c.*

As concerning his Gratitude to Men, beſides thoſe Inſtances already mentioned, to *Proxenus* and his Son, to *Hermias* and his Siſter, to his Maſter *Plato*, to his own *Mother*, *Brother* and *Country*, and infinite others; many Philoſophers, whoſe Opinion he takes occaſion to alledg, he mentions with their due Praiſe; of which were his Maſter *Plato* (of whom we have already ſpoken) whom, as we have ſaid, he ſometimes mentioned honourably, and ſometimes concealeth his Name, where he preferreth his own Opinion. Amongſt others, of whom he maketh honourable mention, are obſerved *Democritus*, in his firſt Book *de Generatione*; *Diogenes Apollonates*, in the ſame Book, *Anaxegoras*, in the firſt of his Metaphyſicks.

For that he was very moderate, the Interpreter of his Life confirms, inſtancing in his Book of *Categorems*, where he ſaith, *We ought not to determine any thing haſtily; but to conſider often, and to doubt of every thing, is not unuſeful.* And again, in his Book of *Good, We muſt remember, being men, not only that we are happy, but that we ought to be able to prove it by firm reaſon.* And again, in his Ethicks to *Nicomachus*: *Man is our Friend, Truth our Friend; but above all, we ought to honour Truth.* And in his Meteorologicks: *As concerning theſe, we doubt of ſome of them, others we touch ſuperficially.* And in the ſame, not once or twice, but infinite times, *Men do happen upon the ſame Opinions, therefore we ought not to be proud of our own Wiſdom, in any thing whereof we conceive our ſelves to be the Inventors.*

The common report therefore (grounded upon no Authority) that he collected the Books of the Ancient Philoſophers, and having taken out of them what he intended to confute, burnt them, is manifeſtly falſe; for any one that reads *Cicero*, will find, they were moſt of them extant in his time.

(a) *Laert.* (b) *Ælian. ver. hiſt.*

## CHAP. XIII.

### *His Wives and Children.*

HE had two Wives, the firſt *Pythais*, Siſter to *Hermias*, the Eunuch, Tyrant of *Atarna*, and his adopted heir. Of the Scandals that were caſt upon him by this Marriage, *Ariſtotle* fully acquits himſelf in his Epiſtles to *Antipater*, where he profeſſeth, that he married her only out of the good will which he bore unto *Hermias*, and out of a compaſſion for the great miſfortunes that had happened to her Brother; adding, that ſhe was a Woman endowed with extraordinary Modeſty, and all other Vertues.

His ſecond Wife was named *Herpilis*, a Woman of *Stagira*, whom *Apellico* (cited by *Euſebius*) and (perhaps from him) *Suidas* affirm, he Married after the death of *Pythais*: With her he lived to his end, as *Hermippus*, cited by *Athenæus*, and *Timothæus*, by *Laertius* affirm. *Timæus*, a profeſs'd calumniator of *Ariſtotle* ſaith, ſhe was his Concubine, and that *Ariſtotle* lived with her, following the Counſel of *Heſiod* in his Georgicks; from which calumny, *Heſiod* is fully vindicated by *Proclus*.

By *Herpylis* he had one ſon, as (a) *Apellico* affirmeth, whom he named after his own Father *Nicomachus*: To him he dedicated his *great Morals*, which (b) *Cicero* thinks to have been written by *Nicomachus* himſelf: *For I ſee not*, ſaith he, *why the ſon might not be like the Father.*

(a) *Euſeb. præpar. Evang.*

(b) *De fin. l.* 5.

(c) *Euſeb.*

(c) This *Nicomachus* was a diſciple of *Theophraſtus*, and much beloved by him; under whom he profited exceedingly in Philoſophy, and arrived at much eminence therein. *Suidas* ſaith, he writ eight Books of Phyſick, four of Ethick. *Cicero* compares him both with his Tutor and Father. *Ariſtocles* cited by *Euſebius* affirmeth he was bred up an Orphan, by *Theophraſtus*, afterwards died young in the Wars, which relation agrees not with *Ariſtotle*'s Will, nor with *Suidas* or *Cicero*, who aver that he writ Books, out of which *Laertius* brings a citation, *in Eudoxo.*

He had a Daughter alſo called *Pythais*, who as *Sextus Empericus* affirms, was thrice married. Firſt to *Nicanor* the *Stagirite*, friend to *Ariſtotle*. Secondly, to *Procles*, who derived his pedigree from *Demaratus* King of *Lacedemonia*. By him ſhe had two Sons, *Procles*, and *Demaratus*, who ſtudied Philoſophy under *Theophraſtus*. Her laſt husband was *Metrodorus*, Diſciple of *Chryſippus* the Cnidian, Maſter of *Eraſtratus*. By him ſhe had a ſon named, after her Father, *Ariſtotle*. Of this *Ariſtotle* there is mention in the Will of *Theophraſtus*, where he is called the Son of *Midias*, not *Metrodorus*. *Suidas* affirmeth he died before his Grandfather.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *His Diſciples and Friends.*

THE Diſciples of *Ariſtotle* were ſo many and ſo eminent, that *Nicander* of *Alexandria* wrote an expreſs Book upon that ſubject, which had it been extant, would doubtleſs have given us an exact account of them, whereas now we muſt reſt ſatisfied with an imperfect Catalogue.

To omit the three Princes that were his Diſciples, *Hermias*, *Alexander* (of whom already) and *Antipater*, Succeſſor to *Alexander* in *Macedonia* (who amongſt other things wrote two books of *Epiſtles*, in one whereof he related the death of *Ariſtotle*) in the firſt place is mentioned,

*Theophraſtus* of *Ereſſus*, a City of *Lesbos*, the moſt eloquent of his Diſciples. Him he appointed to ſucceed him in the School.

*Phanias* of *Ereſſus* alſo. He wrote many Books often cited by *Athenæus*; amongſt the reſt, *Ammonius* cites his *Categories*, *Analyticks*, and *of Interpretation.*

*Eudemus* of *Rhodes*, eſteemed by *Ariſtotle* in the ſecond place next to *Theophraſtus*. His life was written by *Damias*, as *Simplicius* affirms, who often mentions him. He wrote *Analyticks*, and a *Geometrical Hiſtory* (both cited by *Simplicius*) and ſome other Hiſtories cited by *Laertius*, wherein he ſaid the *Magi* were of opinion, that men ſhould riſe again after death. He ſurvived *Ariſtotle.*

*Eudemus* of *Cyprus*, who died in *Sicily* where he took *Dion*'s part, as appeareth from *Plutarch*. *Ariſtotle* in honour of him, called his Dialogue *of the* Soul, after his name.

*Paſicrates*, Brother of *Eudemus* the Rhodian. To him ſome aſcribe the firſt leſſer Book of *Metaphyſicks*, as *Philoponus* affirmeth.

*Theodectes*; To him *Ariſtotle* dedicated ſome Books of Rhetorick, mentioned by *Valerius Maximus*, which he afterward retracted. *Patricius* conceives he was rather a companion than a Diſciple of *Ariſtotle*, becauſe he mentions him ſeven times in his Rhetorick, which he is never obſerved to have done of any Diſciple.

*Clearchus*, of *Soli*. He wrote many Books often cited by *Athenæus.*

*Dicæarchus*, Son of *Phidias* of *Meſſena* in *Sicily*, a Philoſopher, Orator and Geometrician, as *Suidas* affirmeth. He is cited by *Cicero*, mention'd often by *Plutarch* amongſt the beſt Philoſophers.

*Ariſtoxenus*, Son of *Mneſias* a Muſician of *Tarentum* in *Italy*, who going to *Mantinia*, there ſtudied Philoſophy and Muſick. He heard his Father; and *Lamprus* an Erythræan, and *Xenopholus* a Pythagorean, and laſt of all *Ariſtotle*, whom after his death he calumniated and wronged much, becauſe he had left *Theophraſtus* his ſucceſſor in the School, whereas himſelf was in great eſteem amongſt the Diſciples. Thus *Suidas.*

*Nicanor*, mentioned in his Will.

*Philo*, who wrote againſt one *Sophocles*, who cauſed the Philoſophers to be voted out of *Attica.*

*Plato* the younger, mentioned by *Laertius* and *Philoponus:* In Platone.

*Socrates* a *Bythinian*, mentioned by *Laertius.* In Socrate.

*Mnaſon*, a Phocian, mentioned by *Ælian* as one of thoſe who aſſiſted *Ariſtotle* in the ejection of *Plato* out of the Academy, *Galen* likewiſe mentions him as Author of ſome medicinal writings aſcribed to *Ariſtotle.*

*Phraſidemus*, a *Phocian*, mentioned by *Laertius*, as a Peripatetick Philoſopher. It is likely he was a Diſciple of *Ariſtotle*, for he was contemporary with *Theophraſtus.*

*Palæphatus*, of *Abidas*, an Hiſtorian much beloved of *Ariſtotle.*

*Calliſthenes* an *Olynthian*, *Ariſtotles* Siſters Son, of whom already.

*Hipparchus*, a *Stagyrite*; of kin to *Ariſtotle.* He wrote, as *Suidas* affirmeth, *of the diſtinctions of Sexes amongſt the Gods*, *of marriage*, and the like.

*Leon*, a *Byzantine*, a Peripatetick Philoſopher and Sophiſt. Some affirm he was a Diſciple of *Ariſtotles.* He was ſo exceſſively fat, that coming to *Athens*, upon an Embaſſy, the people laught at him; to whom he ſaid, Do you laugh to ſee me thus fat? I have a wife a great deal fatter; yet, when we agree, one bed will hold us both, but when we diſagree, not the whole houſe. The people ſuſpecting him of confederacy with *Philip*, upon a Letter of his, came in a tumult to his houſe, whereupon fearing to be ſtoned, he ſtrangled himſelf.

*Æſchiron* of *Mityline*, a heroick Poet, loved much by *Ariſtotle*, as *Suidas* ſaith.

*Callippus* an Athenian, who alſo heard *Plato.*

*Satyrus*, whoſe books *of lives and characters* are cited by *Athenæus.*

*Hieronimus* the *Rhodian*, eminent in Philoſophy. That he was *Ariſtotle*'s Diſciple is acknowledged by *Athenæus.*

*Hera-*

*Heraclides* of *Pontus*, a great *Philologist*.

To these add of less note, *Eubecratides* a *Methymnæan*, and *Adrastus* a *Macedonian*, both mentioned by *Stephanus*. *Euxithius*, mentioned by *Plutarch*. *Clitus* a *Milesian*: *Menon the* Historian; *Dioteles* and *Timarchus*.

## CHAP. XV.

### *His Detractors.*

AS the Friends and Followers of *Aristotle* were more in number than those of any other Philosopher, so were also his Detractors, of whom having already had occasion to make some mention, we shall not need to give any further account than this of *Aristotles*, alledged by (a) *Eusebius*.

(a) *Præpar. Evang. lib.* 15.

How then is it possible, that what *Epicure* relates of *Aristotle* can be true, that when he was a young Man, he wasted prodigally all the Means his Father left him, whereby he was necessitated to betake himself to the Wars; but therein being unfortunate, he set up an Apothecaries Shop, and *Plato* keeping open School, amongst the rest admitted him?

And who will credit *Timæus* the *Tauromenite*, who writes, that being come to riper years, he shut up his poor Shop, and gave over his mercenary Profession?

Who can be perswaded to believe what *Aristoxenus* the Musician saith in the Life of *Plato*, that when he was from home, some Strangers rose up, and set up a School in Opposition to him? which words some interpret of *Aristole*, but erroneously; for *Aristoxenus* always commendeth *Aristotle*; [yet *Suidas*, as we said, avers the contrary.]

Who does not esteem the Commentaries of *Alexinus* ridiculous? For he bringeth in *Alexander* as a Youth talking with his Father *Philip*, slighting the Instructions of *Aristotle*, but approving those of *Nicagoras*, surnamed *Hermes*.

*Eubulides* manifestly Falsifies in the Book he wrote against *Aristotle*. For first, he bringeth in some dull Poems as written by others, upon his Marriage and Affinity with *Hermias*; then he saith, that he injured *Philip*, that he was not present with *Plato* at his Death, and that he corrupted his Writings.

As for the Accusation of *Demochares* against Philosophers, it is not worth the mention; for he asperseth not only *Aristotle*, but all the rest; and whosoever looks upon his Calumnies, will say they are trivial; for he affirms, that some Letter of *Aristotle*'s, against the City of *Athens* were intercepted and discovered; that he betrayed his own Country *Stagira* to the *Macedonians*; that when *Olynthus* was taken, he informed *Philip* upon the Sale and Ransome of the Goods and Prisoners, which were the most Wealthy of the *Olynthians*.

No less foolishly doth *Cephisodorus*, Disciple of *Isocrates*, Calumniate him as an effeminate Person, and a Glutton, with many other Aspersions of the same kind.

But of all, the most foolish is that of *Lyco*, who professed himself a *Pythagorean*, for he saith, That *Aristotle* sacrificed to his Wife after She was dead, as the *Athenians* to *Ceres*; and that using to bathe himself in warm Oyl, he afterwards sold it; and that when he went to *Chalcis*, those who bought his Goods, found in one bark 75 brass Pots. Indeed near so many were the first Calumniators of *Aristotle*, from whom sprung up others, some in the same Age, others little after, all Sophists, Litigious Persons and Orators; of whose Names and Books no more remains than of their Bodies.

As for those who flourished after these, some repeat only what these had said before, and therefore we need not take any notice of them; much less of those, who not lighting upon those Books, have fram'd some Inventions of their own; such as they, who affirm, he had 300 Pots, for there was not any Author of that time who made mention thereof, but *Lyco*, and he saith, there were found only 75 Pots.

And not only from Computation of time, and from the Persons who Assert these Calumnies, may any man perceive all they say to be but false; but also from this, that not any two of them lay the same thing to his Charge, but every one hath a particular Calumny different from the rest. But, if any one of these had been true, *Aristotle* should have heard of it, not only once from them, but a thousand times.

It is manifest therefore, the same thing befel *Aristotle*, which happened to many others, that as well for the Respect and Friendship he had with Princes, as for the Excellency of his Dissertations, the Envy of the Sophists of that Age persecuted him. But such as are Ingenious ought not to mind Calumniators, but those who have praised and imitated him, whom they will find to fall nothing short of the others, either for number or worth. Hitherto *Aristocles*.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *His Writings.*

LAertius hath given a large Catalogue of his *Writings*, as a Testimony of his Excellency in all kinds of Learning. Their Titles, as reduced to their several Heads, by *Patricius*, are these.

### Logick.

*THe Sophist* 1.
*Of Sciences* 1.
*Sophistick distinctions* 4.
*Of Eristick* 2.
*Eristick solutions* 4.
*Of Genus and Species* 1.
*Of Proprium* 1.
*Epichirematick Commentaries* 1.
*Instances* 1.
*Of those which are said many ways, as according to the propositum* 1.
*For Science* 1.
*Distinctions* 17.
*Diæreticks* 1.
*Of interrogation and answer* 2.
*Propositions* 1.

*Eristick*

*Eriſtick Propoſitions* 4.
*Syllogiſms* 1.
*Firſt Analyticks* 9.
*Second Analyticks* 2.
*Of Problems* 1.
*Methodicks* 8.
*Terms Antetopical* 7.
*Syllogiſms* 2.
*Syllogiſtick and Terms* 1.
*Ante-Topicks* 1.
*Topicks to Terms* 1.
*Diæretick* 1.
*Definitions* 13.
*Argumentations* 2.
*Propoſitions* 1.
*Epichiretick Theſes* 25.
*Methodick* 1.
*Of Speech* 1
*Categories* 1.
*Of Interpretation* 1.

## Phyſick.

*Of the Soul* 1.
*Of ſuffering and being paſſive* 1.
*Of Elements* 3.
*Of motion* 1.
*Theſes of the Soul* 1.
*Of nature* 3.
*Phyſick* 1.
*Of Animals* 9.
*Anatomy* 7.
*Anatomick ſelections* 1.
*Of compound Animals* 1.
*Upon not Generating* 1.
*Of Plants* 2.
*Phyſiognomick* 1.
*Signs of Tempeſt* 1.
*Phyſicks by Elements* 38.
*Perſpective Problems* 2.
*Of Stone* 1.

In all, 75.

## Ethick.

*Of Juſtice* 4.
*Of Philoſophy* 3.
*Politick* 2.
*Of Riches* 1.
*Of Nobility* 1.
*Of Pleaſure* 1.
*Alexander*; or, *of Colonies* 1.
*Of a Kingdome* 1.
*Of Education* 1.
*Of Good* 3.
*Oeconomick* 1.
*Of friendſhip* 1.
*Propoſitions concerning Vertue* 3.
*Of the paſſions of anger* 1.
*Ethicks* 4.
*Of the Better* 1.
*Of Elegible and Accident* 1.
*Of Pleaſure* 1.
*Of Voluntary* 1.
*Of Fair* 1.
*Amicable Theſes*, 2.
*Politicks* 2.
*Laws* 4.
*Conſtitutive Law* 1.
*Politick Auſcultation* 8.
*Of Juſt* 2.
*Of Conſultation* 1.
*Juriſdictions* 1.
*Paſſions* 1.
*Governments of Cities* 158.
*Proper Democracies.*
*Oligarchicks.*
*Ariſtocraticks.*
*Tyrannicks.*

In all 217.

## Metaphyſick.

*Of Contraries* 1.
*Of Principle* 1.
*Of Idæa* 1.

In all 3.

## Mathematick.

*Mathematicks* 1.
*Of Magnitude* 1.
*Of Unity* 1.
*Aſtronomick* 1.
*Optick* 1.
*Of Muſick* 1.
*Mechanicks* 1.

In all 7.

## Phylologick.

*Of Poets* 3.
*Gryllus, of Rhetorick*
*Works of Rhetorical art* 2.
*Collection of the Theodectick art*; 1.
*Rhetorical Enthymemes* 1.
*Homerical Difficulties* 6.
*Poeticks* 1.
*Compariſons* 1.
*The Olympionicæ* 1.
*Pythionick Muſick.*
*Pythick* 1.
*Pythionick Elenchs* 1.
*The Dyonyſiack Victories* 11
*Of Tragedies* 1.
*Poems*, 3. *So Hermias, to Democritus*;
*Elegies.*

In all 27.

## Uncertain or Extraordinary.

*Nerinthus* 1.
*Menexenus* 1.
*Erotick* 1.
*Sympoſium* 1.
*Protreptick* 1.
*Of prayer* 1.
*Collection of arts* 12.
*Art* 1.
*Another art* 1.
*Collection* 2.
*Of fabulous living creatures* 1.
*Medicine* 2.
*Memorials* 1.
*Encyclicks* 2.
*Inordinate* 12.
*Expounded by their Genus* 14.
*Doctrines* 1.
*Proverbs* 1.

In all 46.

Epiſtles

### Epiſtles.

TO Philip *and* Alexander 4.
*To* Antipater 9.
*To* Mentor 1.
*To* Ariſto 1.
*To* Olympias 1.
*To* Hephæſtion 1.
*To* Themiſtagoras 1.
*To* Philoxenus 1.
In all 19.

### Againſt the Ancient Philoſophers.

OUT *of* Plato's *Laws* 2.
*Out of* Plato's *Commonwealth* 2.
*Out of* Timæus *and* Archytas *their writings* 1.
*Problems out of* Democritus 2.
*Againſt* Meliſſus 1.
*Againſt* Alcmæon 1.
*Againſt* Gorgias 1.
*Againſt* Xenophanes 1.
*Againſt* Zeno 1.
*Of the Philoſophy of* Archytas 3.
*Of the Philoſophy of* Speuſippus *and* Xenocrates 1.
In all 19.

The Sum of all theſe Books, excepting the Epiſtles, is 513. *Laertius* reckons them to be near 400. perhaps accounting the ſeveral Books that are upon the ſame ſubject for one. But of theſe the greateſt part is loſt, and of many that are extant, the Titles altered; of the extant there are only theſe:

### Logick.

CAtegories 1.
*Of Interpretation* 1.
*Firſt Analyticks* 2.
*Second Analyticks* 2.
*Topicks* 8.
*Elenchs* 1.

### Phyſick.

OF *Natural Auſcultation* 8.
*Of Heaven* 4.
*Of Generation and Corruption* 2.
*Of Meteors* 4.
*Of the World* 1. *ſuſpected.*
*Of the Soul* 3.
*Of Senſe and Senſibles* 1.
*Of Memory and Reminiſcence* 1.
*Of ſleep and waking* 1.
*Of Dream* 1.
*Divination by dreams* 1.
*Of the motion of living Creatures* 1.
*Of the length and ſhortneſs of life* 1.
*Of youth and age, life and death* 1.
*Of Reſpiration* 1.
*Of the going of Animals* 1.
*Of Breath* 1.
*Of the generation of Animals* 5.
*Of the parts of Animals* 4.
*The Hiſtory of Animals* 10.
*Of Colours* 1.
*Of Phyſiognomy* 1.
*Spurious* 2.

### Ethick.

ETbick, *to* Nicomachus 10.
*Great Ethick* 2.
*Ethick to* Eudemus 7.
*Of vertues* 1.
*Oeconomick* 2.
*Politick* 8.

### Metaphyſick.

METaphyſick 14.
*Of the abſtruſe part of Divine Wiſdom according to the* Ægyptians, Tranſlated out of Arabick; but ſuſpected to be ſpurious, 14.

### Mathematicks.

MAthematicks 2.
*Mechanick* 1.
*Of inſecable lines* 1.

### Phylologick.

RHetorick 3.
*Rhetorick to* Alexander 1.
*Poetick*, 1.

### Extraordinary.

PRoblems 38.
*Wonders* 1.
*Of* Zenophanes; Zeno *and* Gorgias 1.

Beſides theſe, there are many other Books cited for his, under theſe Titles.

*Magick*, Laert. Proæm.
*Epitome of Oratours*, Laert. Ariſtip.
*Of Beanes*, Laert. Pythag.
*Of Mixtion*, Ariſtot. de ſenſu. cap. 3.
*Of Sapors*, Ariſt. de ſenſu. cap. 4.
*Phyſical Hiſtory*, Ariſt. de inceſſ. Animal cap. 2.
*Of Nutriment*, Ariſt. de Somno, cap. 3.
*Selection of Contraries*, Ariſt. Metaph. lib. 3. cap. 2.
*Diviſion of Contraries*, Ariſt. Metaph. lib. 10. c. 3.
*Of Oppoſites*, Simplic. in cap. de Oppoſit. Comm. 8.
*Collection of Pythagorick Opinions*; Simplic. in lib. 2. de Cœlo. Com. 4.
*Of Idea's*, Alexand. in lib. 1. Metaphyſ. Comm. 59. where he cites the fourth Book, tho *Laertius*, but one, as if there were no more.
*Of Enunciation*, Alexand. in lib. 4. Metaphyſ. Com. 25. & 44.
*Homerical Difficulties* 6.
*Of Platonick aſſertions*, Plut. contra Colot.
*Eudemus*, Plut. Conſol. ad Apollon.
*Of Drunkenneſs*, Plut. Sympoſiac. 3. *Athenæus* cites the tenth Book hereof.
*Animal, or of Fiſhes*, Athen. Deipn. 7.
*Of living Creatures, and of things pertaining to living Creatures*, Athen.

*Of*

*Of the manners of living Creatures*, Athen.
*Of Pheasants*, Athen.
*Of Consanguinity*, Athen.
*Of wonderful luxury*, Athen.
*Apology*, Athen.
*Histories*, Athen.
*Barbarous Jurisdictions.*
*Of Audibles*, Porphyr. Comm. in Ptol. Mus. Proclus in Timæum Plat.
*The Cohabitant*, Proclus. Proæm. in Repub. Platon.
Θεολογουμένα, Macrob. Saturnal. lib. 1.
*Of Nature*, Clem. Alexandrin. Strom. lib 6.

We shall not add the *Peplus* cited by *Nicephoras*, and the *Chriæ* by *Stobæus*, under his Name, since it is manifest they belong not to the same *Aristotle*, as *Patricius* hath evinced.

These Books *Aristotle* gave to *Theophrastus*, when he made him his successor in the School, as *Strabo* affirmeth; adding that *Aristotle* was the first we know of, that made a Library, which the *Ægyptian* Kings learned of him to do. *Theophrastus* bequeathed all his Books to *Nelius* a Scepsian, who carried them to *Scepsis*, and dying, left them to his Heirs, men of no Learning, who only kept them confusedly locked up: And when they understood what care was taken by the Attalick Kings (in whose jurisdiction *Scepsis* was) to make a Library in *Pergamus*, they hid them in a hole under ground [where they continued about 130 years] by which means they received some injury by the wet and worms. At last, some that were descended from *Aristotle* and *Theophrastus*, sold them to *Apellico* a *Teian*, [who, according to *Athenæus*, was made free of the City of *Athens*, a person very rich, who, besides many other Libraries, bought this of *Aristotle*, being himself a lover of Peripatetick Philosophy] for a great sum of mony. This *Apellico* was more a lover of Books, than of Learning; so that because they had received some injury, he caused them to be Transcribed, supplying the defects not rightly, and by that means put them forth full of faults. The Ancient Peripateticks that succeeded *Theophrastus*, wanting Books, as having but very few, and those Exoterick, could not treat exactly upon any part of Philosophy. They that lived later, after that these books were published, had much greater helps to Philosophy, and the imitation of *Aristotle*, although by reason of the infinite faults, they were forced to say many things by guess. Hereunto *Rome* conduced not a little; for (soon after the death of *Apellico*, *Sylla* taking *Athens*, in the fourth year of the 173 Olympiad, seised upon his Library, and causing it to be carried to *Rome*, *Tyrannio*, a Grammarian, a person studious of *Aristotle*, obtained leave of the Library-Keeper to be permitted the use of them) the booksellers not having good writers, and not comparing well the Copies, it occasion'd many faults, as well in those books that were at *Rome*, as in those Transcribed and sold into *Alexandria*. *Plutarch* adds, that from this *Tyrannio*, *Andronicus* the *Rhodian* had them, who first made them publick, setting forth those volumes, which, saith he, we have.

Thus *Strabo* and *Plutarch*; *Athenæus* saith, that *Nelius* sold them to *Ptolemæus Philadelphius*, by whom they were Translated to *Alexandria*, where how long they lay hid is uncertain, which Library was afterwards burn'd by *Julius Cesar*.

## CHAP. XVII

### *His Commentators.*

NO sooner were the writings of *Aristotle* communicated to the world, but they were entertained with general approbation, which some expressed, by employing themselves in Commenting upon them, whose example was followed by many in all following ages. To omit *Pasicrates* the *Rhodian*, brother of *Eudemus*, who wrote, as *Galen* affirmeth, upon the book of *Categories*; we shall name in the first place,

*Andronicus* the *Rhodian*, who first published *Aristotles* writings, put forth a Paraphrase or Comment upon the greatest part of them.

Next, his Disciple *Boethus*, a *Sidonian*, took much pains in the exposition of *Aristotle*, whence he is often mentioned honourably by *Ammonius* and *Simplicius*:

*Ariston* a *Coan*, Disciple also to *Andronicus*, as (a) *Strabo* affirms, living in the time of *Nicias*, Tyrant of *Coos*, is reckoned by *Simplicius* amongst the old Commentators upon *Aristotles* Categories. (a) Geog. li. 14.

*Nicolaus Damascenus*, who lived in the time of *Augustus*, by whom much loved, is cited by *Simplicius* and *Averroes*, as an Expositor of *Aristotle*.

*Athenodorus* of *Tarsis*, a *Stoick*, who lived also under *Augustus*, as *Plutarch* affirms, is cited by *Simplicius*, as having written upon *Aristotles Categories*; but rather by way of confutation than interpretation, as did likewise *Alexander Ægeus*, *Nero*'s Tutor, mention'd by *Simplicius*; *Cornutus*, who lived at the same time; cited by *Porphyrius* and *Simplicius*; *Lucius* and *Nicostratus* a *Macedonian*, who lived under *Antonius*.

*Sotion* of *Alexandria*, and *Achacius*, seem to have written upon the *Categories*, being often cited by *Simplicius* upon that Subject.

*Taurus* the *Berisian*, a *Platonick* Philosopher, living under *Antonius*, wrote first concerning the difference between the Doctrines of *Plato* and *Aristotle*.

*Adrastus* the *Aphrodisæan*, wrote a Comment on *Aristotle*'s *Categories*, and of his *Physick*, and a Book concerning the Method of his Philosophy.

*Aspasius* wrote a Comment on all *Aristotle*'s Works, taking particular care to restore the Text, to which end he is often quoted by *Simplicius* and *Boetius*. There is a Comment upon some Books of the *Ethicks* extant under his Name.

*Herminus* somewhat later, seems to have written upon all, or the greater part of *Aristotle*'s Works, cited by all the *Greek* Commentators that are extant, and by *Boetius*.

*Alexander* the *Aphrodisæan*, who lived under *Antonius* and *Severus*, wrote upon the *Analyticks*, *Topicks* and *Elenchs*, whence stiled by the later Interpreters, Ἐξηγητὴς *the Expositor*.

*Galen*, who lived at the same time, wrote three Books upon *Aristotle* of *Interpretation*, four Books upon the first of the first *Analytick*, four upon the second of the first, six upon the first of

of the ſecond *Analytick*, five upon the ſecond.

(b) Suid. (*b*) *Atticus* a *Platonick* Philoſopher, beſides ſeven Books, wherein he proved *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* to be of the ſame Sect, contrary to the Aſſertion of *Taurus*; he wrote alſo a Dialogue upon the *Categories* extant, ſeven Books upon the *Categories*, cited by *Simplicius*, a Comment upon the Book of *Interpretation*, cited by *Boetius*. Not to mention what he wrote upon *Ariſtotle de Anima*, ſince it appears from *Suidas*, that it was rather by way of Oppoſition than Expoſition, which (*c*) *Theoderet* likewiſe confirms.

(c) Græ. affec. l. 12. *Jamblicus* of *Calcis* in *Cæloſyria*, Maſter to *Julian* the Emperor, wrote in an abſtruſe way upon the Book of *Categories*.

*Dexippus*, by ſome thought to be Son of *Jamblicus*, wrote a Dialogue on the *Categories*, extant.

*Maximus* a *Byzantine*, Diſciple of *Jamblicus*, wrote Commentaries on the *Categories*, and other Books of *Ariſtotle*, as *Simplicius* and *Suidas* affirm.

*Plutarch* the younger ſon of *Neſtorius* flouriſhing under *Valentinian* the firſt, *Gratian* and *Theodoſius* the firſt, according to *Suidas* and *Philoponus*, wrote Commentaries upon ſome Books of *Ariſtotle*.

*Syrianus*, ſirnamed the *Great*, of *Alexandria*, a Philoſopher, who flouriſhed under *Arcadius*, *Honorius*, *Theodoſius* the ſecond, and *Valentinian* the ſecond, wrote Commentaries upon *Ariſtotle*'s Books of *Nature*, of *Motion*, of *Heaven*, and upon the *Categories*, cited by *Simplicius* and *Philoponus*. Likewiſe upon the 2*d*, 5*th* and 6*th*, Book of *Metaphyſicks*, which are extent.

*Olympiodorus* an *Alexandrian*, who derived himſelf from *Ammonius Saccus*, and was contemporary to *Plutarch* and *Syrianus*, wrote upon *Ariſtotle*'s Meteors, extant. He was later than that *Olympiodorus* who writ upon *Plato*.

*Themiſtius*, living, according to *Suidas*, under *Julian* and *Jovinian*, wrote a Paraphraſe upon *Ariſtotle*'s *Phyſick*, eight Books; a Paraphraſe on the *Analyticks*, two Books; upon his Books *of the Soul*, ſeven Books. Of the Scope and Title of the Book of *Categories*, one Book.

*Proclus*, Diſciple of *Syrianus*, wrote two Books concerning Motions, wherein he made an abſtract of *Ariſtotle*'s ſecond Book of *Motion*. That he wrote alſo upon his Book of *Heaven*, and the *Elements*, may be conjectured from the frequent Citations of *Simplicius*.

*Marinus*, who ſucceeded *Proclus* in the School, ſeemeth to have written ſomething upon *Ariſtotle*'s Book of the *Soul*, being often cited upon that Subject by *Philoponus*.

*Ammonius Hermæus* wrote upon *Ariſtotle*'s *Categories*, and upon his Book of *Interpretation*, both which are extant; as likewiſe upon his Books of the *Soul*, cited by *Philoponus*.

*Damaſcius*, a *Platonick* Philoſopher, Diſciple to *Ammonius*, beſides what he wrote in Confutation of *Ariſtotle* concerning Time, epitomiz'd the four firſt and the eight Book of his Phyſick, and the firſt Book of Heaven. To theſe add.

*Philoponus* and *Simplicius*, and *Aſclepius*, Diſciple to *Ammonius*.

*Johannes Damaſcenus*, whoſe Compendium of *Ariſtotles Logick* and *Phyſick* are extant; he lived about the year 770.

(d) Geog. lib. 14. *Euſtathius* wrote upon ſome of the *Nichomachian Ethicks*; and *Euſtratius* upon his Book concerning *Demonſtration*.

*Michael Pſellus*, about the year 800. and *Michael Epeſius*, upon the *parva naturalia*.

*Magentinus* upon the *Categories*, and the Book of *Interpretation*.

*Nicephorus Blemmydes* (under *Johannes duca*) upon the *Logick* and *Phyſick*.

*Georgius Plachymerius* and *Theodorus Metochita* lived about the year 1080. and wrote Epitoms extant.

Of *Arabick* Commentators were *Avicenna* and *Averroes*; about the year 1216.

The later Writers it will be unneceſſary to mention, there being a Catalogue of them annexed to *Ariſtotles* Works of the *Paris Edition*.

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## *ARISTOTLES* Epiſtles. *Epiſt. Græcan.*

### *To* Philip 1.

THey who undertake a Command for the Good of their Subjects, not preferred thereunto, either by Fortune or Nature, truſt not in their own Power, which they know ſubject to chance, but grow great in Virtue, whereby they order the Commonwealth wiſely, For there is nothing amongſt men ſo firm and ſolid, but the rapid Motion of the Sun changeth it ere the Evening. Nature, if we enquire into the truth, varieth all Lives, interweaving them like the Action of a Tragedy with Misfortunes. Men, like Flowers, have a ſet time wherein they Flouriſh and Excel others. Wherefore behave not your ſelf towards *Greece* Tyrannically or Looſely, for one argues Petulance, the other Temerity. Wiſe Princes ought not to be admired for their Government, but Governance; ſo that tho Fortune change, they ſhall have the ſame praiſe. As for the reſt, do all things well, preferring the Health of your Soul, by Philoſophy, that of your Body by Exerciſe.

### *To* Philip 2.

MOſt Philoſophers aſſert Beneficence to be ſomething equal to God. To ſpeak the truth, the whole Life of Mankind is compriſed in conferring and returning Benefits. So as ſome beſtow, others receive, others return. Hence it is juſt to commiſerate all that are in Adverſity, for pity is the ſign of a mild Soul, ſternneſs of a Rude, it being diſhoneſt and impious to neglect Virtue in Misfortunes. For this I commend our Diſciple *Theophraſtus*, who ſaith, we never repent of doing Good; it brings forth good Fruit, the Prayers and Praiſes of the obliged. Wiſe men therefore muſt ſtudy to oblige many, thinking that, beſides the Praiſe, there may ſome Advantage accrue from hence in the change of Affairs, and if not all, at leaſt ſome one of thoſe to whom he hath done good, may be in a Capacity to requite him. For this Reaſon, endeavour to be ready in doing Good, but give not way to your Paſſions, for that is kingly and civil, this barbarous

and odious. As you ſee occaſion, practiſe and neglect not this uſeful advice.

*To* Philip. 3.

THE moſt excellent Princes, whoſe honour toucheth the Stars, have conferred moſt benefits, and not accommodating their ſway only to the preſent, but conſidering the inſtability of Fortune, have treaſured up good deeds as uſeful in either condition. In proſperity it procures them Honour, for Honour is proper to Virtue; in adverſity Relief, for friends are much better tried in bad fortune, than in good. The ſight of benevolent perſons is like to that of Land to men in a ſtorm. All Fortune apt to deſert us, is the true ſcope which they propoſe to themſelves who war, or do unjuſtly, or comply diſhoneſtly, only the clearneſs of virtuous perſons is not unacquainted with the inſtability of Fortune, but, by reaſon, ſuſtaining all accidents, and being, as *Plato* ſaith, above them, they are never diſordered. Take heed therefore of the rapid motion of things; look upon them as a Circle which reverts into it ſelf; caſt up the accounts of life, for chance impoſeth many things upon life, and maketh our inclinations follow it. Pardon thoſe that offend ignorantly; be ready to acquit thoſe that do good. This, if you perform not once, but continually, your Court will be ſecure from all danger. This, conſidering the greatneſs of the things I have ſaid, is but little, but, conſidering the perſon to whom I write, All.

*To* Alexander. 4.

I Am in doubt how to begin, for upon whatſoever I reflect, all ſeems great and wonderful, not fit to be forgotten, but proper for remembrance, and exhortation, not to be defaced by Time. Good precepts and exhortations of Maſters have Eternity for their Spectator. Endeavour to make uſe of your power, not to oppreſs, but to oblige others, than which nothing can be greater in Mans life. Mortal Nature, which often yieldeth, and is overcome by Fate, obtaineth eternal memory by the greatneſs of ſuch works. Conſider this well; you are not unreaſonable as ſome are, who think good advice ridiculous. Your deſcent is honourable, your Kingdom hereditary, your Learning ſound, your glory admirable; and as much as you exceed others in the Goods of Fortune, ſo ought you to be excellent amongſt the good in Virtue. In fine, do that which is profitable, and finiſh what you deſign.

*To* Theophraſtus 5.

A Sudden Injury is better than a ſlow benefit, for the remembrance and harm of that laſts but a while, but this groweth old, as if it hated to build a work to perpetuity, and many times deferring what we intend to beſtow upon another, he meets with a calm elſe-where, which allays the tempeſt of his mind. Wherefore I ſay, mutual ſociety ought not only to do no wrong, but if any be received, to be ready to forgive it; for perhaps to do no wrong is above the power of Man. As for him who hath erred, to make uſe of reproof, is the property of a good well-ſeated Judgment.

THE

# THE DOCTRINE OF ARISTOTLE.

## The First Part.

### CHAP. I.

### *Of Philosophy in general, and particularly of* DIALECTICK.

THE Philosophy of *Aristotle* is well known, many abstracts thereof have been published, many are read daily in Universities by publick Professors: yet will it be requisite to our design, to give a short account thereof, that it may appear wherein the doctrine and method of the *Peripateticks* is different from that of the *Academicks* and *Stoicks*.

(a) Laert. (a) *Philosophy, according to* Aristotle, *is twofold, Practick and Theoretick. To the Practick belongs Ethick and Politick: this, concerning the well ordering of a City: that, of a House. To the Theoretick belongs Physick and Logick; but Logick is not properly a part thereof, but a most expedient instrument.*

*Of Logick he asserted two ends, probable, and true; for each he makes use of two faculties, Dialectick and Rhetorick for the probable; Analytick and Philosophy for the true, omitting nothing towards Invention, Judgment, and Use. For Invention, his Topicks and Methodicks afford a plentiful supply, out of which may be taken problems for probable arguments. For Judgment, his first and second Analyticks: in the first, propositions are examined; in the second, he treats exactly of their composition, and the form of Syllogism. To use, belongs his Agonisticks, and his Books concerning interrogation, and his Eristicks, and his Sophistick Elenchs, and of Syllogisms, and the like.* Hitherto *Laertius*.

Of his Logick we have only these books remaining, *Of Categories, of Interrogation, Analyticks, Topicks, and Sophistick Elenchs.* The first considers *simple Terms*: the second *Propositions*: The rest *Syllogisms, Demonstrative, Dialectick, and Sophistick.* The *Categories* are placed first by the general consent of all Interpreters: neither is it to be doubted, but that the rest are disposed according to the genuine method of *Aristotle*: For, in the beginning of his (b) *Analyticks*, he saith, *We must speak of Syllogism before we come to speak of Demonstration, because Syllogism is the more general.* And in his (c) *Elenchs*, *Of Didascalick and demonstrative Syllogisms, we have spoken already in the Analyticks: of the Dialectick and Piraslick, in the book immediately preceding these: We come now to speak of the Agonistick and Eristick*

(b) Lib. 1. c. 2.

(c) Cap. 2.

### CHAP. II.

#### *Of Terms.*

(a) TErms are of three kinds, *Homonymous, Synonymous*, and *Paronymous. Homonymous*, whose name only is common, their essence divers: *Synonymous*, whose name and definition are common to either: *Paronymous* have denomination from the same thing, but differ in case or termination. (a) Categ. c. 1.

*Synonymous*, (or *Univocal*) terms, are reduced to ten general heads, called *Categories.*

1. (b) *Substance*, of two kinds: *First*, which is most properly substance, is neither prædicated of, nor inherent in a subject. *Second substances* are species and genus's, which subsist in the first. The properties of first-substances are, 1. Neither to be in, nor prædicated of a subject. 2. To be all substances equally. 3. To signifie this particular thing. 4. To have no contrary. 5. To admit no degrees of more or less. 6. To be susceptible of contraries. (b) Cap. 5.

2. (c) *Quantity*, of two kinds; *Discrete*, as Number; *Continuous*, as a Line. Their properties, 1. To have no contraries. 2. To admit no degrees of more or less. 3. To denominate things equal or unequal. (c) Cap. 6.

3. (d) *Relatives*, whose whole being is in some manner effected towards one another; their properties, 1. To have contraries, as Father and Son. 2. To admit degrees of more and less, as in (d) Cap. 7.

kindred. 3. To follow one another mutually. 4. To be naturally together.

(e) Cap. 8. (e) 4. *Quality*, from which things are denominated *Qualited*: It hath four kinds. 1. *Habit* and *Diſpoſition*. 2. *Natural power* and *Impotence*. 3. *Paſſible qualities* and *paſſions*. 4. *Form* and *Figure*. The properties, 1. To have contraries, as black and white. 2. To admit intenſion or remiſſion. 3. To denominate things, like or unlike.

(f) Cap. 9. (f) 5. *Action*. 6. *Paſſion*. Their properties are, to admit contraries, to admit degrees of intenſion and remiſſion.

7. *When*. 8. *Where*. 9. *Poſition*. 10. *Habit*. Theſe admit not contraries, nor degrees of intenſion or remiſſion.

Of thoſe which cannot be reduced to any certain Category, are 1. *Oppoſites*. 2. *Precedents*. 3. *Coæquals*. 4. *Motion*. 5. *Poſſeſſion*.

(g) Cap. 10. (g) Of *Oppoſites* there are four kinds, *Relatives*, *Contraries*, extreams in the ſame kind, as black and white. *Privatives*, as privation and habit, light and darkneſs: *Contradictories*, which affirm and deny, as learned, not learned.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of Propoſition.*

(a) De Interpret. cap. 1. (a) VOice is a ſign of the Notions of the mind; as in the mind are two kinds of Intellection, one ſimple, expert of truth and falſity, the other either true or falſe: So in voice, ſome is ſimple, ſome complex.

(b) Cap. 2. (b) A *noun* is a voice ſignifying according to inſtitution, whereof no part is ſignificant by it ſelf.

(c) Cap. 3. (c) A *verb* is a voice implying time, whereof no part is ſignificant by it ſelf.

(d) Cap. 4. (d) A *Speech*, λόγος, is a voice ſignifying according to inſtitution, whoſe parts are ſignificant ſeparate.

Of Speech, the enunciative only (called propoſition) belongs to Philoſophy, the precatory and imperative, to Rhetorick, Poetry, &c.

(e) Cap. 5. &c. (e) Propoſitions are divided four ways; into *ſimple* and *complex*, into *affirmative* and *negative*; into *univerſal*, *particular*, *indefinite* and *ſingular*; into *pure* and *modal*; the modal is either *neceſſary*, *poſſible*, *contingent*, or *impoſſible*.

(f) Cap. 12. (f) Propoſitions have three accidents, *oppoſition*, *conſectation*, *converſion*.

*Oppoſition* is either contradictory of a particular to an univerſal; or contrary, of an univerſal to an univerſal; or ſubcontrary, of a particular Negative to a particular Affirmative.

*Conſectation*, (ἀκολούθησις) or Æquipollence, is the Conſideration of thoſe Affections of a Propoſition, in reſpect whereof, two Propoſitions ſignify together the ſame thing, and are together true or falſe.

*Converſion* is a tranſpoſition of the Terms, preſerving the Affirmation, Negation, and verity of the Propoſition: It is either Abſolute, which reſerves the ſame quantity, but alters the quality; or Partial, which reſerves not the ſame quantity.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Of Syllogiſm.*

(a) SYllogiſm is a ſpeech, in which ſome things being laid down, another neceſſarily follows. *Perfect Syllogiſm* is that which requireth no other to ſhew its power, clearneſs, and efficacy. *Imperfect* requires another to that purpoſe, by Converſion, or tranſpoſition of the Propoſitions. (a) Anal. prior. lib. 1. cap. 1.

(b) The *Matter* of Syllogiſm is three Terms, the *Form* is the right Diſpoſition of the Matter, according to Figure and Mood. (b) Cap. 4.

*Figure* is an apt diſpoſition of the Medium with the Extreams, apt for concluding aright. *Mood* is a Diſpoſition of Propoſitions, according to quantity and quality. There are three Figures.

The firſt, when the *Medium* is firſt *Subject*, then *Prædicate*. It hath nine Moods. 4. Uſeful, 5. Uſeleſs and Illegitimate: Of the Uſeful, two are Univerſal, two Particular.

The firſt.
*Every* A *is* B.
*Every* C *is* A.
*Therefore every* C *is* B.

The ſecond.
*No* A *is* B.
*Every* C *is* A.
*Therefore no* C *is* B.

The third.
*Every* A *is* B.
*Some* C *is* A.
*Therefore ſome* C *is* B.

The fourth.
*No* A *is* B.
*Some* C *is* A.
*Therefore ſome* C *is* B.

(c) In the ſecond Figure, the Medium is Prædicated of both the Extreams. It hath 16 Moods, 4 true, 12 falſe and Illegitimate. Of the true, two are univerſal, two particular. (c) Cap.

The firſt.
*No* M *is* N.
*Every* O *is* N.
*Therefore no* O *is* M.

The ſecond.
*Every* M *is* N.
*No* O *is* N.
*Therefore no* O *is* M.

The third.
*No* M *is* N.
*Some* O *is* N.
*Therefore ſome* O *is not* M.

The fourth.
*Every* M *is* N.
*Some* O *is not* N.
*Therefore ſome* O *is not* M.

(d) In the third Figure, the Medium is Subjected to both Extreams. It hath 16 Moods, 10 falſe and Illegitimate; 6 Legitimate, which conclude particularly. (d) Cap.

The

The first. { *Every* P *is* R. / *Every* P *is* S. / *Therefore some* S *is* R.

The second. { *No* P *is* R. / *Every* P *is* S. / *Therefore some* S *is not* R.

The third. { *Some* P *is* R. / *Every* P *is* S. / *Therefore some* S *is* R.

The fourth. { *Every* P *is* R. / *Some* P *is* S. / *Therefore some* S *is* R.

The fift. { *Some* P *is not* R. / *Every* P *is S.* / *Therefore some* S *is not* R.

The sixt. { *No* P *is* R. / *Some* P *is* S. / *Therefore some* S *is not* R.

(b) *Cap.* 23. (e) Every Syllogism ought to be framed in one of these three Figures; but those of the second and third being imperfect, ought to be reduced to the first, which is the most absolute and perfect.

(f) *Annal. Prior. lib.* 2. *cap.* 22. *&c.* (f) There are six other forms of argument, *Conversion of Terms, Induction, Example, Abduction, Instance, Enthymem.* All these have their efficacy from the power of Syllogism, and are reducible to Syllogism.

As concerning the invention, power, and conversion of Syllogism, he is exact and curious to admiration.

## CHAP. V.

*Of Apodeictick ( or demonstrative ) Syllogism.*

(a) *Annalyt. poster. lib.* 1. *cap.* 1. (a) ALL *discursive* knowledg is made by a prænotion of the things themselves whereof we discourse; for ratiocination is not concerning things unknown. *Demonstration* is a discursive knowledg, and therefore requireth three prægnitions. First, that the subject is, and what it is in a rude confused manner. Secondly, what the prædicate is, and what it signifieth. Thirdly, that the principles are true.

(b) *Cap.* 2. (b) *To know*, is to understand that a thing is, that this is cause thereof, and that it cannot be otherwise. *Demonstration* is a scientifick Syllogism. *Demonstrative Science* is from true, first, immediate, more known causes of the conclusion. *First*, as having none precedent, and being adæquate to, and convertible with the effect. *Immediate* or consectaneous, as having no term betwixt to join them. *More known*, as being præmises to the conclusion, not to be demonstrated by any thing.

(c) *Cap.* 4. (c) *Demonstrative Science* is of a thing necessary, whence the demonstration it self consists of necessary propositions; which necessity requireth explication of that which is prædicated, *of all by it self*, and which is *universal:*

*Of all*, is that which is attributed to every one, and at all times, as a living creature to man:

*By it self*, as being of essence, proper, competible *per se*, and competible to it self, for it self.

*An universal attribute* is that which is in every one by it self, in as much as it is it self.

(d) *Cap.* 8. (d) *Demonstration* is of conclusions of *eternal truth*, for they are universal propositions; whence it followeth, that neither demonstration nor Science are of perishable things; neither are definitions of such, which are the principles of demonstration.

That there is demonstration, it is not necessary to have recourse to *Plato*'s Idea's, separate from singulars; it is enough that there are common natures which are in singulars, and are prædicated of them.

(e) *Cap.* 11. (e) It is one thing to know that a thing is so, another to know why it is so. Hence there are two kinds of demonstration, διότι, and ὅτι, the first is the true, and most perfect, of which hitherto.

(f) *Cap.* 13. (f) The other kind of demonstration, *viz.* ὅτι, is more imperfect; it is made two ways in the same Science: First, when the cause is demonstrated by the effect thus, *Stars which do not twinkle, are nearest to the earth; but, the Planets do not twinkle, therefore they are nearest to the earth.* Secondly, when the effect is proved by a cause remote, and not reciprocal, or by an effect of the remote cause, as this, *Every thing that breatheth is a living creature; but no Wall breaths, therefore no Wall is a living creature.*

To know διότι, is proper to subalternat principle Sciences, as Geometry and Arithmetick; which contemplate the first proper causes; to know ὅτι, is of the subalternat and inferior, as Optick and Musick.

(g) *Cap.* 14. (g) Of all figures, the first is most accommodate to knowledg, for that only concludes with an universal affirmative, and therefore in that only is a demonstrative διότι.

(b) *Cap.* 15. *&c.* (b) Thus far concerning Science; the opposite to Science is *Ignorance*, which is two-fold: One of *pure negation*, as when a boy or ignorant fellow knows not that the Sun is greater than the Earth, because he is ignorant of Astrology. The other, *of depraved disposition*, as when an Astrologer or ignorant Optick believes, that things are as they seem: this is error, which erroneous ignorance is in false propositions, or in a Syllogism through a false medium.

Defect of sense causeth ignorance of pure negation; for if any sense be wanting, it is necessary that some science of sensibles be likewise wanting; for we learn all things either by induction or demonstration. *Induction* is made of singulars perceived by sense. *Demonstration* is of Universals, which are declared by Induction; wherefore the begining of Science is from singulars, which are sensibles. Hence it is impossible for a man born blind to have the Science of Colours. Yet no Science is next and immediately from sense, for sense is of singulars, which are here, and now; but Science and Demonstration is of Universals, which are every where, and ever, not subject to sense. Yet, sense conduceth to science and demonstration, for as much as an universal is collected from particulars known by sense.

CHAP.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of Dialectick Syllogiſm.*

(a) *Topic. lib.* 1. *cap.* 1. (a) *Dialectick Syllogiſm* is that which concludes from Probables; Probables are thoſe things which appear ſuch to all, or to moſt, or only to the Wiſe and moſt Eminent.

(b) *Cap.* 3. (b) *Dialectick* is a Conjectural Art, as Rhetorick and Medicine; therefore (like thoſe) it attaineth not always its end; it is enough for a Dialectick, that he omit nothing of his Art for concluding probably.

(c) *Cap.* 4. (c) All diſputation is of things controverted, either by Problem or Propoſition. A *Problem* queſtions both parts, as *a living creature, is it the genus of man or not?* A Propoſition queſtions but one part, as, *is not living creature the genus of man?* Every Propoſition and Problem is either *genus*, (under which is contained the difference) *definition*, *proprium*, or *accident*.

(d) *Cap.* 5. *&c.* (d) *Definition* is a ſpeech, ſignifying what a thing is. *Proprium* is that which declareth, not what a thing is, but is in it only, and Reciprocal with it. *Genus* is that which is prædicated, *in quid*, of many that differ ſpecifically. *Accident* is that which is neither Definition, nor Genus, nor proprium, and may be, or not be, in its ſubject.

(e) *Cap.* 10. (e) *Dialectick propoſition* is a probable interrogation, received by all or many, or the moſt excellent, yet ſo as it is not wholly alienate from the common opinion.

(f) *Cap.* 11. (f) *Dialectick problem* is threefold; *practick* or Moral, pertaining to election or repulſe; *Theoretick*, pertaining to Science; *neutral*, which conduceth to the reſt, *viz.* Logick.

*Theſis* is a Paradoxal Sentence of ſome Eminent Philoſopher, contrary to the vulgar opinion.

(g) *Cap.* 12. (g) Dialectick Argument is twofold, *Induction* and *Syllogiſm*.

(h) *Cap.* 13. *&c.* (h) Arguments are gained by four *Inſtruments*, 1. *Choice of propoſitions.* 2. *Diſtinction of Æquivoques.* 3. *Invention of differences.* 4. *Conſideration of Similitudes.*

*Problems* are either univerſal or particular; the ſame places which confirm or confute one, confirm or confute the other. From *proprium*, *genus*, and *definition*, is immediately and ſimply made *Demonſtration*, but not from *Accident*, becauſe that is external, not neceſſarily and intimately inherent in the Subject. We ſhall not here ſay any thing of the multitude of places he hath invented, which are more neceſſary to thoſe that will learn the Art, than ſuitable to this abridgment.

The Diſputant muſt firſt find out a place (or medium) ſecondly, diſpoſe and queſtion it within himſelf; thirdly, propoſe it to his Adverſary.

In Diſputation againſt the Learned, Syllogiſm is to be uſed, againſt the Vulgar Induction.

(i) *Lib.* 8. *cap.* 4. (i) The Office of the *Opponent* is to compel his Reſpondent to this incredible and abſurd conſequent from his *Theſis*; of the *Reſpondent* to take care, that nothing abſurd be collected from his *Theſis*.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of Sophiſtick Syllogiſm.*

(a) AN *Elench* is a Syllogiſm which contradicts the concluſion aſſerted by the Reſpondent. Of *Elenchs* ſome are true, ſome falſe; that proper to a *Sophos*, whoſe office is to purſue and defend Truth, and to diſcover and confute Falſhood; this to a *Sophiſt*, who from ſeeming Wiſdom acquireth gain, and had rather ſeem than be. (a) *Sophiſt. Elench. cap.*

(b) A *Sophiſt* hath five ends, whereto he endeavoureth to reduce his adverſary; the firſt is *Elench*, or Redargution, (c) of which there are two kinds; one in the word, the other out of the word. (b) *Cap.* 2. (c) *Cap.* 3.

*Sophiſms in the word*, are ſix. 1. *By Homonymie*, as that ill is good, for τὰ δίκαια are good, but ills are τὰ δίκαια. The fallacy conſiſts in the word τὰ δίκαια, which ſignifies ſometimes neceſſarily inevitable, ſometimes beneficial.

2. By *Amphibolie*, as βέλτιόν ἐστι λαβεῖν με τοὺς πολεμίους; which ſignifies either that the Enemies would take me, or that I would take the Enemies.

3. *By compoſition*, as τὸ δύνασθαι καθήμενον βαδίζειν, that he who ſits can walk, which it true in a divided ſenſe, not in a compounded.

4. *By diviſion*; as five are two and three, therefore even and odd.

5. *By accent*, which is not ſo eaſily done in Logick as in Poetry.

6. *By figure of the word*, when things which are not the ſame, are interpreted in the ſame manner, as a Male for a Female.

(d) *Sophiſms out of the word* are ſeven. 1. *From accident*, when that which is demanded is equally competent to the thing, and to the accident; for whereas many things are competent to the ſame, it is not neceſſary that they be all in the Subject and Prædicate, as, *if* Coriſcus *differs from a man, he differs from himſelf, for he is a man.* (d) *Cap.*

2. *From that which is ſimply*, or κατὰ πάντα, when that which is ſaid in part is taken as of all, as, *if that which is not, is imaginative, that which is not, is.*

2. *From ignorance of the Elench*, when not underſtanding the true Nature of a contradiction, they think that to be an abſolute contradiction which is none, omiting either the ſame reſpect in the thing, or the ſame reſpect of the ſame thing, or the ſimplicity, or the time. To this all Sophiſms may be reduced.

4. *Of the conſequent*; when we allow thoſe to be true Reciprocal Conſequences which are not ſuch, as, *it is yellow, therefore it is Honey*; *and the contrary, it is not yellow, therefore it is not Honey.*

5. *Of petition of the principle*, neither by requiring that to be granted, which was to be proved, or proving the ſame by the ſame, the terms only changed; as *the ſoul is immortal becauſe it is not ſubject to death.*

6. *Of a not-cauſe as a Cauſe*, as when that is taken to be the cauſe of the thing or concluſion, which is cauſe of neither; as *Arms diſturb Peace, therefore they are to be taken away.*

7. *Of Plurality of Interrogations as one*, when many things are asked in one; as *Juſtice and Impiety, are they Virtues or not?*

Hitherto

Hitherto of Elenchs; the four other Ends whereto a Sophiſt endeavours to reduce his adverſary, are, *Falſity*, *Paradox*, *Solœciſm*, and *Tautologie*. Sophiſms are ſolved either by *diſtinction* or *negation*.

Thus much may ſerve for a ſlight view of his *Logick*, whereof we have but few Books left, in reſpect of the many which he wrote upon that part of Philoſophy.

# THE SECOND PART.

## CHAP. I.

### *Of PHYSICK.*

NOT to queſtion the Method of *Ariſtotle*'s Books of *Phyſick*, much leſs their Titles (as ſome, to make them better agree with *Laertius*'s Catalogue, have done) and leaſt of all their Authority, with *Patricius*; we ſhall take them in that order which is generally received; according to which, next *Logick*, is placed *Phyſick*.

(a) *Phyſick* is a Science concerning that ſubſtance which hath the principle of motion and reſt within it ſelf. (a) Metaphyſ. 3. 2.

The Phyſical Books of *Ariſtotle*, that are extant, treat of theſe nine general heads. *Of the principles of natural things: Of the common affections of natural things: Of Heaven: Of Elements: Of the action and paſſion of Elements: Of Exhalation: Of Plants: Of Animals: Of the Soul.*

## CHAP. II.

### *Of the Principles of Natural Bodies.*

(a) THE *Principles* of Natural Bodies are not *one*, as *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus* held; nor *Homoiomeria*'s, as *Anaxagoras*; nor *Atomes*, as *Leucippus* and *Democritus*; nor *ſenſible Elements*, as *Thales*, *Anaximander*, *Anaximenes*, *Empedocles*; nor *Numbers*, or *Figures*, as the *Pythagoreans*; nor *Idæa*'s, as *Plato*. (a) Phyſic. lib. 1. cap. 3. 4.

(b) That the Principles of things are *Contrary* (privately oppoſite) was the joint opinion of the Ancients, and is manifeſt in Reaſon. For Principles are thoſe which neither are mutually of one another, nor of others, but of them are all things. Such are, firſt, contraries; as being firſt, they are not of any other; as contrary, not of another. (b) Cap. 5.

(c) Hence it follows, that being contrary they muſt be *more than one*, but *not infinite*; for then natural things would not be comprehenſible by Reaſon: yet more than two; for of contraries only nothing would be produced, but that they would rather deſtroy one another. (c) Cap. 6.

(d) There are therefore *three* Principles of Natural Bodies; two contrary; *Privative* and *Form*; and one common ſubject of both, *Matter*. The conſtitutive Principles are matter and form; of privation, bodies conſiſt not, but accidentally, as it is competent to Matter. (d) Cap. 7.

(e) Things are made of that which is *Ens* potentially, *Materia prima*, not of that which is *Ens* actually, nor of that which is *Nonens* potentially, which is pure nothing. (f) Matter is neither generated nor corrupted. It is the firſt inſite ſubject of every thing, whereof it is framed primarily, in its ſelf and not by accident, and into which it at laſt reſolveth. To treat of Form in general, is proper to Metaphyſicks. (e) Cap. 8. (f) Cap. 9.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of Nature, and the Cauſes of Natural Bodies.*

(a) OF Being, ſome are by Nature, as Plants, others from other cauſes; thoſe have in themſelves the principle of their motion, theſe have not. *Nature* is a Principle and Cauſe of the motion and reſt of that thing wherein it is, primarily, by it ſelf, and not by accident. Material ſubſtances have Nature; Natural properties are according to Nature: Nature is twofold, Matter and Form; but Form is moſt Nature, becauſe it is in act. (a) Phyſ. lib. 2. cap 1.

(b) Of *Cauſes* are four kinds; the *Material*, of which a thing is made; the *Formal*, by which a thing is made, or reaſon of its eſſence; The *Efficient*, whence is the firſt principle of its mutation or reſt as a Father; the *Final*, for which end it is made; as health is to walking. Cauſes are *immediate* or *remote*, *principal* or *accidental*; *actual* or *potential*; *particular* or *univerſal*. (b) Cap. 3.

*Fortune* and *Chance* are Cauſes of many effects; *Fortune* is an accidental Cauſe in thoſe things which are done by election for ſome end; *Chance* is larger; an accidental cauſe in things which are done for ſome end, at leaſt that of Nature. They are both efficient. (c) Cap. 4 &c.

Nature

(d) Cap. 8. (d) Nature acts for ſome end: not temerariouſly, or caſualy; for thoſe things which are done by nature, are always or for the moſt part done in the ſame manner, yet ſometimes ſhe is fruſtrated of her end, as in monſters, which ſhe intends not.

(e) Cap. 9. (e) *Neceſſity* is twofold: *abſolute*, which is from matter, *Conditional*, which is from the end or form: both kinds are in natural things.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Of the affections of natural Bodies, Motion, Place, Time.*

(a) Phyſic. lib. 3. cap. 2. (a) MOtion is of a thing which is not ſuch, but may be ſuch, the way or act by which it becometh ſuch, as curing of a body which is not in health, but may be in health, is the way and act by which it is brought to health. Neither is it abſurd, that the ſame thing ſhould be both in act and power, as to different reſpects; for the thing moved, as water in warming is in act, as to the heat which it hath, in power, as to the greater heat which it is capable of.

(b) Cap. 7. (b) *Infinite* is that which is pertranſible without end, ſuch an *infinite in act* there is not: not amongſt ſimple bodies, for the elements are confined to certain number and place: neither amongſt mixt bodies, for they conſiſt of the elements which are finite. But, there are things *infinite potentially*; as, *in addition*; Number, which may be augmented infinitely, *in diviſion*; Magnitude, which may be divided infinitely; *in time*, and continued ſucceſſion of generation.

(c) Lib. 4. c. 3. (c) The properties of place are, *that* it contains the thing placed: *that* it is equal to, and ſeperable from the thing placed: *that* the place and thing placed are together: *that* it hath upwards or downwards, and the like differences: *that* every Phyſical body tends naturally to its proper place, and there reſteth.

*Place* is the immediate immovable ſuperficies of a continent body. Thoſe things which are contained by another body are in place: but thoſe which have not any other body above or beyond them, are not properly in place. Bodies reſt in their natural places, becauſe they tend thither as a part torn off from the whole.

(d) Cap. 8. (d) *Vacuum* is place void of body: ſuch a vacuum there is not in nature, for that would deſtroy all motion, ſeeing that in *vacuum* there is neither *upwards* nor *downwards*, *backwards* nor *forwards*. Nor would there be any reaſon, why motion ſhould be to one part more than to another. Moreover it would follow, that it were impoſſible for one body to make another to recede, if the triple dimenſion, which bodies divide, were vacuous. Neither is the motion of rare bodies upwards cauſed by vacuity, for that motion is as natural to light bodies, as to move downards is to heavy.

(e) Cap. 10. 11. (e) *Time* is the number of motioon by *before* and *after*. Thoſe two parts of time are conjoined by (τὸ νῦν) *the preſent*, as the parts of a line are by a point. Time is the meaſure of reſt as well as of motion: for the ſame meaſure which ſerves for the privation, ſerves for the habit. All motion and mutaion is in time: for in every motion there is ſwiftneſs or ſlowneſs, which is defined by time. The Heavens, Earth, Sea, and other ſenſibles, are in time, for they are movable.

(f) *Time* being a *numerate* number, exiſts not without a *numerant*, which is *the Soul*. The meaſure of time and other things, is that which meaſureth the firſt and moſt equal motion: this is the motion of the *Primum mobile*, for the firſt in every kind is the meaſure of the reſt. (f) Cap.

## CHAP. V.

### *Of the kinds and properties of Motion.*

(a) MOtion appertains to three Categories, to Quantity, *accretion* and *diminution*; to Quality, *alteration*; to Where, *local motion*. (a) Phyſ. l. cap. 2.

*Reſt* is a privation of motion in a body, when, where, and how it is apt for motion.

(b) As all Magnitude is primarily, and *per ſe*, continuous and diviſible into infinite, ſo is all motion, by reaſon of magnitude, and time it ſelf. For whatſoever is not compoſed of indiviſibles, is diviſible into infinite; but no continuous thing is compoſed of indiviſible things, for it is quantitative, whereas indiviſibles, having no extreams or parts, can neither be conjoyned by continuous nor contiguous motion. (b) Lib. 6.

(c) Yet it followeth not, that if there be infinite magnitude, there can be no motion; for it is not infinite in act, but in power, as are likewiſe time and motion. (c) Cap. 2.

(d) Neither is there any motion in the inſtant, τὸ νῦν for nothing is moved or reſteth, but in time. (d) Cap. 3.

(e) Motion therefore is diviſible, as well in reſpect to the time, wherein it is made, as in reſpect to the thing wherein it inheres; as both theſe are always indiviſible, ſo may motion it ſelf be divided according to theſe. (e) Cap. 4.

(f) Whatſoever is changed, as ſoon as it is changed, muſt neceſſarily be in the (next) term *to which*, for it leaveth the ſtate or form in which it was, and aſſumeth that to which it tendeth; yet though in motion, there is a firſt motion of perfection, wherein we may truly ſay, the mutation is made, yet there is no firſt motion of inception. (f) Cap.

(g) Whatſoever is moved in any whole time, is neceſſarily moved in every part of that time. (g) Cap.

(h) All motion is finite, for it is in time, which is finite. (h) Cap.

Whatſoever is thus proper to motion, is to be applied alſo to reſt and quieſcence.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of the firſt Mover.*

(a) WHatſoever is moved muſt neceſſarily be moved by another, either external or internal. But leſt this progreſſion be into infinite, we muſt of neceſſity at laſt come to one firſt mover, which is not moved by another. This firſt mover, the cauſe and origine of all motion, is *Immovable*, *one*, *eternal*, and *indiviſible*, *void of all quantity*. (a) Lib. 2, 5, 6, 7. (b) Im-

(b) *Immovable*, for whatſoever things are moved, are either immediately moved by a firſt immovable mover, or by ſome other which is likewiſe moved by another, until at laſt we come to ſome firſt mover, for nothing can move it ſelf, unleſs there be a firſt mover: but of infinites there is no firſt. *Lib.* 8. *c.* 6.

(c) *One*, for he is moſt perfect, as being Author of the moſt perfect and moſt ſimple motion, that of the *primum mobile*. Beſides, the beſt in every kind is one: for good is ſimple, ill multiplicious. *Cap.* 6.

(d) *Eternal*, for motion it ſelf is eternal, as appears thus: The mover and the moveable muſt either be from eternity, or have had beginning in ſome time: if they began at any time, it muſt have been by motion, and conſequently before the firſt motion there was another, by which the mover and moveable began, which were abſurd. Again, if they were eternal, yet without motion, it muſt be either by reaſon of the inaptitude of the moveable, or of its remoteneſs from the mover. But neither could the moveable be made more apt, or brought nigher to the mover except by motion, whence would follow that there was a motion before the firſt motion. Again, Time, the meaſure of motion, is eternal, therefore motion it ſelf is ſuch. That time is eternal (beſides that it is the general agreement of Philoſophers) is thus proved: it cannot be conceived without τὸ νῦν, the inſtant, which is intermediate betwixt the paſt and future, both the end of one, and the beginning of the other; but, if time had a beginning, this τὸ νῦν would have been only a beginning, not end; if time ſhould have an end, this inſtant would be only an end, not a beginning, both which are repugnant to the nature of a moment. *Cap.* 7.

(e) *Indiviſible*, *void of quantity*; the proof whereof is grounded upon three Theoremes. 1. That no finite mover can move in infinite time, therefore the firſt mover is infinite. 2. That there cannot be infinite power in finite quantity; therefore the firſt mover is incorporeal. 3. That there cannot be finite power in that which is infinite, therefore the firſt mover is infinite in power. Hence may be collected, that it is impoſſible the firſt mover ſhould be diviſible, corporeal, or affected with quantity: for if he had any, it would either be infinite, of which kind actual there is none: or finite, wherein could not conſiſt his infinite power. *Lib.* 8. *cap.*

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of HEAVEN.*

HAving treated of the principles, cauſes, and affections of natural bodies in general, he proceeds next to particulars.

(a) The World is perfect, becauſe it conſiſts of bodies which are perfect, and comprehendeth all perfection, it ſelf not being comprehended by any other. *De Cælo lib.* 1. *c.* 1.

(b) Of Bodies, ſome are *ſimple*, others *compounded of the ſimple*. All natural bodies are moveable locally *per ſe*. There is a twofold *local motion*, *ſimple*, which is competible to ſimple bodies: and *mixt*, which is to the mixt. Hence it followeth, that there are ſo many kinds of ſimple bodies, as variations of ſimple motion: for of one ſimple body, there is one proper motion. Simple local motion is twofold: *circular*, about the center, and *right*: the right is either upwards from the center, or downwards to the center, and both theſe either ſimply, or κατὰ τὶ. This fourfold variation of right motion, evinceth that there are *four* ſimple bodies called *Elements*: circular motion muſt be proper to ſome other fift eſſence, different from the conſtitutions of the other four ſimple bodies, more divine and precedent to all the reſt: This is *Heaven*. *Cap.* 2.

(c) Heaven *hath neither gravity nor levity*: this is manifeſt from its motion which is circular, not from the center which is proper to light things, nor to the center, as is proper to heavy, but about the center. (c) *Cap.* 3.

Heaven is *void of generation, and corruption*, and conſequently of accretion, diminution, and alteration, for it hath no contrary; it is therefore the firſt body, not to be conſumed by time and age.

(d) No body can be infinite, therefore the world it ſelf is not infinite, neither is there any body beyond it infinite, nor intelligible or mathematical. (d) *Cap.* 5. 7.

(e) There is but one world, for if there were more, the Earth of one would move to the Earth of the other (as being of one kind) and aſcend out of its proper place. (e) *Cap.* 2.

(f) The world is eternal; whatſoever is eternal is ingenerate and incorruptible. *Plato* therefore erred, in affirming the world to be generated, but incorruptible. If he meant that as it was generated, it is by nature corruptible, yet ſhall never be actually diſſolved, becauſe of the eternal cauſe of its conſervation, God; he erreth alſo, for then there would be ſomething that ſhould be always, and yet could not be always. (f) *Cap.* 12.

(g) Heaven is void of labour (ἄπονος) for it hath no contrary to retard its motion. (g) *Lib.* 2. *c.* 3.

(h) Heaven hath *the threefold difference of poſition*, upwards and downwards, backwards, right and left, for theſe are proper to all animate things which have the principle of motion within themſelves. The right ſide of Heaven is the *Eaſt*, for from thence begins its motion; the left ſide the *Weſt*; and conſequently the Artick pole is lowermoſt, the Antartick uppermoſt; forwards our Hemiſphear, backwards the other. (h) *Cap.* 2.

(i) Heaven *naturally moveth circularly*, but this circular motion is not uniform throughout all Heaven, for there are other Orbs which move contrary to the *primum mobile*; that there may be a viciſſitude in ſublunary things, and generation and corruption. (i) *Cap.* 3.

(k) Heaven is *Sphærical*, for to the firſt body the firſt figure is moſt proper. If it were quadrangular, triangular, or the like; the angles would ſometimes leave a ſpace without a body, and occupate another ſpace without a body. The motion of Heaven is circular, as being the meaſure of all others, therefore moſt compendious aud ſwifteſt. (k) *Cap.* 4.

(l) The motion of the *primum mobile* is æquable and uniform, for it hath neither beginning, middle nor end; the *primum mobile* and firſt mover being eternal both, and ſubject to no variation. (l) *Cap.* 6.

(m) Cap. 7. (m) *Stars* are of the ſame body with that wherein they are carried, but more thick and compact; they produce warmth aud light in inferior things through frication of the Air by their motion; for ſwift motion fires wood, and melts lead, yet the ſphears themſelves are not heated, but the Air only, and that chiefly by the ſphear of the Sun, which by his acceſſion towards us, increaſeth the heat, his beams falling more directly, and with double force upon us.

(n) Cap. 8. (n) The Stars beings infixed in the Heavens, are moved not by themſelves with a proper motion, as Fiſhes in the Water, and Birds in the Air, but according to the motion of their Orbs. Otherwiſe thoſe in the eighth Sphear would not be always æquidiſtant from one another; neither would the Stars have always the ſame ſide turned towards us, as we ſee the Moon hath.

(o) The *primum mobile* is carried about with the ſwifteſt motion; the ſeven Orbs of Planets under it, as they are nearer to it, are carried ſo much the more ſwiftly about by the motion thereof; and as they are further diſtant, more ſlowly. Whence by how much the nigher they are to the *primum mobile*, ſo much the ſlower is their proper motion, becauſe it is contrary to that of the *primum mobile*, as being from *Eaſt* to *Weſt*.

(p) Cap. 11. (p) The Stars are round, for that figure is moſt unapt for ſelf-motion: We ſee the Moon is round by her Orbicular Sections; therefore the other Stars are ſo likewiſe, for the reaſon is the ſame in all.

(q) Cap. 13, 14. (q) The Centre of Heaven is the *Earth*, round, ſeated immoveable in the midſt; which together with the Sea makes up one Globe.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of Elements.*

(a) De cœlo, lib. 3. cap. 3. (a) THE *Element* of Bodies is a ſimple Body, into which other Bodies are divided, in which it is either actually or potentially; as in fleſh, wood, and the like, there is fire and earth potentially, for into theſe they are ſegregated; but actually they are not; for then ſhould the fleſh and wood be ſegregated.

Whereas every natural Body hath a proper motion; motions are partly ſimple, partly mixt; the mixt proper to mixt Bodies, the ſimple to ſimple: It is manifeſt that there are ſimple Bodies, for there are ſimple motions; the circular proper to Heaven, the right to the Elements.

(b) Cap. 5. (b) The Elements are not Eternal; for they are diſſolved with reciprocal mutations, and periſh, and are mutually generated of one another.

(c) Lib. 4. cap. 1. (c) The motive qualities of the Elements are *Gravity* and *Levity*. *Heavy* is that which is apt to be carried downwards to the Center or midſt of Heaven; *Light* is that which is apt to be carried upwards towards the extremities of Heaven. Theſe are either ſimple or comparative. *Simply heavy* is that which is below all, as the Earth; *Simply light*, is that which is above all, as the fire; *Comparatively, heavy and light* are thoſe in which are both theſe; above ſome, below others, as Air and Water. From theſe have mixt things, gravity and levity; the heavy are carried downwards to a definite medium, the light upwards to a definite extream, for nothing tends to infinite. Whence it followeth, that two Elements are extreamly contrary, ſimply heavy, and ſimply light, Fire and Earth, which tend to contrary places. Betwixt theſe are two means, participating of the nature of each extream, Air and Water. Thoſe Elements which are higheſt and lighteſt, are moſt perfect, and have the nature of forms in reſpect of the inferior, becauſe theſe are contained by thoſe; to be contained, is the property of matter; to contain, of form.

(d) Cap. 5. (d) Hence it follows, that there are *four* kinds of particular ſecond matter, differing by the accidental differences of heat, cold, humidity, ficcity, levity and gravity, (ſimple and comparative) tho there be but one common matter of them all; for they are made mutually of one another. The mean Elements are heavy in their proper places; for Earth being taken away, Water tending downwards, ſucceeds in its room; Air deſcends into the place of Water, but not contrariwiſe; for Water aſcends not into its place of Air, unleſs by force. In the extream it is otherwiſe; for the Air being taken away, the Fire will not deſcend into its place, nor the Earth aſcend into the place of Water or Air; for Fire is not heavy, nor Earth light, in their natural place, becauſe they are extream Elements.

(e) Cap. 6. (e) Figure conduceth to the ſwiftneſs or ſlowneſs of motion either upwards or downwards, but is not ſimply, and in it ſelf the cauſe of motion; ſo an acute Figure cuts the medium ſwiftly, a broad obtuſe figure ſlowly. Hence a thin plate of Lead or Iron will ſwim on water, becauſe it comprehends much of the ſubjected body, which it cannot eaſily divide or penetrate.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of Generation, Corruption, Alteration, Augmentation, and Diminution.*

(a) De gen. & corrup. lib. 1. cap. (a) THere is a perpetual ſucceſſion of Generation, as well ſimple as accidental, which proceeds from two cauſes, *Efficient*, the firſt mover, and the Heavens, always moving, and always moved; and *Material*, the firſt matter, of which, being *non-ens* actually, *ens* potentially, all things generable and corruptible conſiſt. This is incorruptible in its ſelf, ſuſceptible of all forms, whereby the corruption of one natural ſubſtance, becometh the generation of another, whatſoever matter remaineth upon the corruption, being aſſumed towards the generation of another.

*Generation* and *Corruption* are twofold, *ſimple*, of a ſubſtance, κατὰ τὶ, of an accident; generation of the leſs noble ſubſtance is called generation κατὰ τὶ in reſpect of the more noble, as that of Earth in reſpect of Fire.

Corruption always ſucceedeth generation, becauſe the Term, *to which* of corruption (*viz. non-ens*) is the Term *from which* of Generation; and the Term, *to which* of Generation (*viz. ens* in act) is the Term *from which* of corruption. The matter of that which is Generated, and that which is corrupted is the ſame, for as much as they are, or may be made reciprocally of one another, as Air of Water, Water of Air; but differently diſpoſed.

*Alteration*

(b) Cap. 4. (b) *Alteration* and *Generation* are different mutations; in alteration the ſubject remaineth entire, the affections only are changed, as of ſick, ſound; in generation the whole is changed, not any ſenſible ſubject temaining. Alteration is a mutation according to quality, *augmentation* and *diminution*, according to quantity, *local motion* according to place.

(c) Cap. 5. (c) Augmentation and diminution differ from other mutations; firſt, in the object, generation and corruption concerns ſubſtances: Alteration, quality; lation, place; augmentation and diminution, quantity. Again, in the manner, that which is generated, or corrupted, or altered, not neceſſarily changeth place, but that which augments or diminiſheth, in ſome manner changeth place, for it is bigger or leſſer.

*Augmentation* is an addition to præexiſtent quantity; *diminution* a detraction. Whatſoever is augmented or decreaſed, is augmented or decreaſed according to every part thereof, by reception of ſometing throughout all parts; decretion on the contrary. The animate body encreaſeth, but not the aliment, for the living creature remaineth, the aliment is converted into the ſubſtance of the living creature. Hereupon that which is augmented is like unto that which is altered, for both of theſe remain. All parts of a living creature are augmented; the ſimilar firſt, as bones and fleſh; then the diſſimilar, as conſiſting of the others.

Augmentation is made by acceſſion, or ſomething according to form, not according to matter; for by it the whole is augmented and made more ſuch. Acceſſion of parts, according to matter, is not augmentation, for by materials only (deſtitute of that form, which the parts to be augmented have) the whole living creature cannot encreaſe. Aliment therefore, whereby the living creature is augmented, muſt be the ſame potentially which the thing augmented is in act. At firſt, it is contrary, and diſſimilar, being in power the part of a living creature, in act ſomething elſe: at laſt it becometh aſſimilate to the living creature, taking the form of a part (by aggeneration) through the digeſtive power of the animate body, which changeth the aliment into its own ſubſtance.

For this reaſon augmentation preſuppoſeth nutrition. *Nutrition* is, when the aliment as ſubſtance is converted into the ſame ſubſtance of the living creature. Augmentation, when the ſame aliment as quantitative, is added to the quantity of the living creature. Hence a living creature as long as it is ſound, is always nouriſhed, but not always augmented. As that which is added is potentially quantitative fleſh, ſo it can augment fleſh; as it is potentially fleſh only, ſo it nouriſheth; which when it can only do (as when ſo much wine is poured into water that it turns all into water) then there is a diminution of the quantity, but the form remaineth.

## CHAP. X.

### *Of Action and Paſſion.*

(a) De gener. & corrup. l. 1. (a) CONtact is of ſeveral kinds, *Mathematical*, by contiguity; *Phyſical*, when the extreams of ſeveral bodies meet, and mutually act and ſuffer; *virtual*, by power, and metaphorical.

(b) Cap. 7. (b) The mutual action and paſſion of Phyſical contact is betwixt things, partly unlike as to their form, partly like as to their genus (for they are contraries) matter; each endeavouring to reduce the patient to his own likeneſs, as fire, wood.

Every *Phyſical agent* in acting, ſuffers from the patient, for both the agent and patient are active, endued with forms elementary, ſuſceptible of contraries. But as the firſt mover is *immoveable*, ſo is the firſt agent *impaſſible*.

(c) Cap. 9. (c) Every thing acts, as it is ſuch, actually: ſuffers, as it is ſuch, potentially. The conditions of action and paſſion are five: 1. What the agent is in act, the patient is in power. 2. The patient is ſuch according to each part. 3. That which is more diſpoſed, ſuffers more, and ſo on the contrary. 4. Every patient is continuous, and not actually divided. 5. The agent muſt neceſſarily touch the patient, either immediately or mediately.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of Mixtion and Temperament.*

(a) De gener. & corrupt. lib. 1. c. 10. (a) MIXtion is not generation, for the matter is not mixt with the form; nor alteration, for the quality is not mixed with the ſubject; nor augmentation, for aliment, the matter of augmentation, is not mixed with, but converted into the animate body. Conjunction of ſmall bodies is not true mixtion, but coacervation, for thoſe bodies remain actually the ſame according to their forms, not compoſing one third according to every part. Things which have not the ſome matter, are not mixt, becauſe they cannot be active and paſſive reciprocally.

Thoſe things which are properly ſaid to be mixed muſt have one common matter; they muſt mutually act upon, and ſuffer one from another; they muſt be eaſily diviſible: yet ſo, as that one be not exceſſive in reſpect of the other, for then it is not mixtion, but mutation into the more predominant, as a drop of wine into a great quantity of water.

(b) De gener. & corrupt. lib. 2. cap. 2. (b) The principles and differences of Elements (ſenſible tactile bodies) are tactile qualities, in as much as by ſuch qualities, ſenſible bodies, as ſuch, are conſtituted and differ. Of tactile qualities there are ſeven orders, Hot, cold, moiſt, dry, heavy, light, hard, ſoft, viſcous, arid, rugged, ſmooth, thick, thin. From the two firſt orders are derived the differences of Elements, for by heat and cold, humidity and ſiccity, they act and ſuffer, and are mutually changed by alterative paſſions. Of theſe firſt qualities two are active, heat and cold; two paſſive, humidity and ſiccity. Heat is that which congregates homo-

neous things; cold, that which congregates heterogeneous things; humid, that which is not easily contained in its own bounds; dry, the contrary.

(c) Cap. 3. (c) As there are four Elements, there must be four conjunctions of the primary qualities, from each of which the Elements are severally collected. The first conjunction is of hot and dry, whence proceedeth fire; the second hot and moist, whence Air; the third of moist and cold, whence Water; the fourth of cold and dry, whence Earth. In each of these one quality is predominant: Earth is more dry than cold, Water more cold than moist, Air more moist than hot, Fire more hot than dry.

All these Elements may be mutually transmutated into one another; the Symbolical which agree in one primary quality, are more easily transmurated into one another than the asymbolical, because it is less difficult to change one than many. This transmutation is not a generation, but a kind of alteration, whence it is manifest one Element cannot be the principle of another.

(d) Cap. 7. (d) *Mixtion*, whereby the Elements concur to the composition of a mixt body, is made by coacervation, as *Empedocles* held; but after such a manner, that their contrary qualities remain in the mixt, not potentially only, nor simply actually in their height, but in a mean kind of way, their extremities being reduced to some temper. From this contemperation come mixt bodies, differing according to the various proportion of the temperament; and as they are compounded of the Elements, so they resolve into the same.

(e) Cap. 8. (e) All these mixt bodies consist of all the Elements; of Earth, for every thing participates of the nature of that thing wherein it is produced; of water, because every mixt thing must be concrete and terminated; which properties Water best affordeth to Earth; of Air and Fire, because every perfect mixt body is made by temperament of contraries, such is Air to Earth, Fire to Water. Again, the nature of all mixt bodies as well animate as inanimate, as to mixture, is the same, but that the animate consists of all the Elements, is manifest in that they are nourished by them.

(f) Cap. 9. (f) The causes and common principles of mixt bodies are three; material, formal, efficient. The *Material* is the power to be, and not to be, by which elementary things are generated and corrupted. The *formal* is the reason of the effence

(g) Cap. 10. of every thing; (g) the *universal efficient* is the circular motion of Heaven, not onely as being eternal, continual, and before generation, but chiefly because it bringeth nigh to us, and carrieth far from us that which hath the generative power of all things, that is, the Sun, and the other Stars, which by their accession and recession are the causes of generation and coruption.

(h) Cap. 11. (h) All these are so disposed according to the order of Nature, that because no natural being can be permanent in the same individual state, they may be at least preserved by a continual succession of many individuum's of the same species. Whence the natural cause of generation is onely conservation of the species.

## CHAP. XII.

### *Of imperfect mixt bodies.*

(a) MIxt bodies are twofold, *imperfect* and *perfect*: *Meteors* are imperfect mixt bodies produced according to Nature, but after a less orderly and constant manner. (b) The general matter thereof are the Elements; the efficient, the celestiall bodies which act upon inferiors by a kind of coherence. (c) Heaven is highest; next Heaven the Element of fire; next Fire, Air; under Air, Water and Earth. Clouds are not generated in the sphear of Fire, nor in the Region of the Air, partly by reason of the heat which is there, partly because of the motion of the Heavens which carrieth along with it the Element of Fire, and the upper Region of the Air, by which motion heat is produced in inferior bodies; for the Air being carried along by the Heaven, is heated by that motion, and by the proximity of the Sun and of the Element of Fire.

(a) Meteor. l. 1. cap. 1. (b) Cap. 2. (c) Cap. 3.

(d) *Flames* that appear in the upper part of the Air, are made thus; The Sun by his warmth extracteth a kind of breath out of the Earth, which, if hot and dry, is called *exhalation*, and if hot and moist, *Vapour*. Exhalation ascends higher, as being higher, and being got into the upper Region of the Air, is there enkindled by the motion of the Air, and proximity of the Fire. Hence come those they call *fire-brands*, *goats*, *falling-Stars* and the like. (e) Hence are also *Phasmes*, such as are called *gulfs*, *chasmes*, *bloody colours*, and the like; the exhalation being variously colour'd by reflection of the light, but chiefly seeming purple, which colour ariseth from the mixture of fire and white.

(d) Cap. 4. (e) Cap. 5.

(f) The efficient cause of Comets are the Sun and stars; the material, an exhalation, hot, dry, condensed, and combustible; so as it burns not much, nor is soon extinguished. It is called a *Comet*, or *airy star*, when it is alike on every side: a *pogoneia* or *bearded star*, when it hath a long train. That it consists of Fire, is manifest, because at the same time, there is commonly great wind and drought. It appears seldom, and then single, and beyond the Tropicks, because stars, especially the Sun, dissipate the matter whereof it consists.

(f) Cap. 6.

(g) The *Galaxie* is not the light of many stars together, as *Anaxagoras* held, but an exhalation hot and dry, kindled by the motion of many great stars, which are in that part where the Galaxie appeareth.

(g) Cap. 8.

(h) We come next to those meteors which are in the middle and lower region of the Air. When the Sun and other Stars draw up vapours out of wateriſh places, into the middle Region of the Air, they are there kept so long, until they are condensed by the cold of that place into drops of water, which if they come down very small, are called *misling*; if greater, *rain*. This thick vapour, which is seen suspended in the Air, and changeth from Air to water, is a Cloud. *Mist* is the superfluity of a cloud, condensed into water.

(h) Cap. 9.

(i) Vaponr attracted by a small heat not much above the Earth, and descending more condensed by the noctural cold, becometh either

(i) Cap. 10.

*Dew*,

*Dew* or *Froſt*: *Froſt*, when it congealeth before it reſolves into water; *Dew*, when it turns into water, ſo as the warmth cannot dry it up, nor the cold freeze it.

(k) Cap. 11. (k) *Snow* is a congealed cloud; *Rain*, *Dew*; *Froſt* and *Snow* differ almoſt only in bigneſs and ſmallneſs.

(l) Cap. 12. (l) *Hail*, tho' it be of the ſame nature as Ice, yet is ſeldom produced in Winter, as being cauſed by *Antiperiſtaſis*.

(m) Cap. 13. (m) As the Air above the Earth condenſed, bebometh vapour, and vapour by cold becometh water, ſo doth it alſo in the caverns and receptacles of the earth, by a continual mutation; firſt it turns into little drops, then thoſe little in to greater. Hence comes all Springs, and heads of Rivers, abundantly flowing out at one part of the Earth. Hence great Rivers and Fountains commonly flow from great Hills, which have greateſt caverns.

(n) Cap. 14. (n) The parts of the Earth are in continual mutation, ſometimes humid, ſometimes dry, ſometimes fertile, ſometimes deſert, by new eruptions or defections of Rivers, or acceſs or receſs of the Sea, according to certain periods of time. Thus have the parts of the Earth their youth and age, as well as Plants and living creatures, by the heat and converſion of the Sun. *Time* and the *World* are eternal; but *Nilus* and *Tanais* were not always, for thoſe places whence they firſt iſſued, were once dry grounds.

(o) Lib. 2. cap. 2. (o) The proper place of water is the concave ſuperficies of the Air: This place the Sea, compaſſing the Earth, poſſeſſeth; for the ſwift and more rare water is drawn upwards by the heat of the Sun; the Salt, more thick and terrene, ſetleth downwards. For this reaſon all waters tend to the Sea, as to their proper place: Yet, hereby the Sea is not enlarged, for the Sun draweth out of it, by reaſon of its expanſion, as great a quantity of water, as it receiveth from Rivers.

(p) Cap. 3. (p) The Sea is, as the World, eternal, the ſaltneſs thereof proceedeth from admixtion of ſome terrene, aduſt, exhalation. From the top of the Sea is drawn up a freſh vapour; from the bottom, heated by the Sun, an exhalation, which paſſeth through the Sea, and cometh up with the vapour; but falling back into the Sea, bringeth that ſaltneſs with it, as water paſſed often through aſhes.

(q) Cap. 4. (q) *Winds* are produced by the Sun and Stars, of a hot, dry exhalation, which aſcending, is driven down again by the coldneſs of the middle region of the Air, and by reaſon of the lightneſs of its nature, cannot go directly to the bottom, but is carried by the Air up and down. We call it a hot and dry exhalation, as being more dry than humid. Wind is weakeſt in the beginning, but gaineth ſtrength, by taking along with it other light exhalations, which it meets with by the way.

(r) Cap. 5. (r) Winds are laid by heat and cold, exceſſive heat conſumeth the exhalations, as ſoon as it cometh out of the Earth: exceſſive cold binds up the pores of the Earth, ſo as it cannot paſs.

(ſ) Cap. 8. (ſ) *Earthquake* is a trembling of the Earth, cauſed by an exhalation hot and dry, incloſed in the bowels of the earth, which ſtriving to get forth, as its nature requireth, and not able, by reaſon of the ſolidity of the earth, to paſs, maketh the Earth ſhake, forcing a way through it, and bearing down whatſoever oppoſeth it. The more hot this included ſpirit is, the more vehement.

Of the ſame nature is *lightning*, *thunder*, and the like. *Thunder* is, when an exhalation incloſed in a thick cold Cloud, rolleth it up and down, and at laſt breaketh through it with more or leſs noiſe, according to the thickneſs of the Cloud. By this eruption it acquireth a rare kind of heat and light, which is *lightning*, ſubſequent to the noiſe of the eruption; yet ſeen before the other is heard, by reaſon of the quickneſs of the ſight beyond the hearing.

(t) Cap. 9. (t) As of dry exhalations, the rare and diſperſed produce Thunder and Lightning; ſo of the great and condenſed is made ἐκπύρωσις, τύφων πρηστὴρ, and thunder bolts.

(u) Lib. 3. cap. 2. (u) Of *lucid Meteors* appearing in the Clouds, are *Haloes*, *Rainbows*, *Parelies*, and *Streaks*: All theſe are cauſed by refraction, but differ according to the objects from which they are reflected. A *Halo* appeareth about ſome ſtar, when there happeneth a cloud to be, the middle part whereof, by reaſon of its rarity, being diſſipated, the reſt of the parts about, by reflection, repreſent the colour of the Star. *Rainbow* is a refraction of the Suns beam upon a humid cloud, ready to diſſolve into Rain. In like manner are cauſed *Parelies* and *Streaks*.

(x) Cap. 7. (x) There are likewiſe imperfect mixt bodies, under, or within the Earth, and theſe alſo of two kinds; ſome cauſed by exhalation, called *Minerals*; others by vapour, called *Metals*, fuſile or ductile.

## CHAP. XIII.

### *Of perfect mixt Bodies.*

(a) Meteor. lib. 4. cap. 1. (a) THE common affections of perfect mixt bodies, are thoſe which proceed from the primary qualities of the Elements, whereof two are active, heat and cold; two paſſive, humidity and ſiccity. The natural effect of theſe is *Generation*, when heat and cold overcome the matter; otherwiſe it is *inquination* and *inconcoction*. The oppoſite to ſimple generation is *Putrefaction*; every thing, unleſs violently diſſolved, putrifieth. Hence thoſe things that putrifie, become firſt humid, then dry; for the external heat expelleth the internal, and at laſt conſumeth it. All things therefore putrifie except fire, for putrefaction is the corruption of the natural heat in every humid body, by the external. For this reaſon, things are leſs ſubject to putrifie in cold or in motion, and the hotter or greater they are; as a part of the Sea may putrifie, the whole cannot.

Out of putrid things are bred living creatures; for the natural heat, whilſt it is ſeparating, endeavoureth as much as poſſible, that what is taken aſunder and ſegregated by corruption, may gather together in ſome ſmall parts, which afterwards, by help of the Sun, receive life. Thus are Worms, Beetles, Gnats, and other inſects bred.

(b) Cap. 2. (b) *Concoction* is the effect of heat, inconcoction of cold. Concoction is a perfection cauſed

sed by natural heat of the opposite passive qualities, which are mixed with the matter, as being passive. The end of Concoction in some things is mutation of the essence, as when food is converted into flesh or blood; in others only a mutation according to quantity or quality, as in fruits that ripen. Inconcoction is an imperfection in the opposite passive qualities, proceeding from defect of heat.

Concoction is three-fold, πέπανσις, ἕψησις, ὄπησις. Inconcoction is also three-fold, ὠμότης, μόλυνσις, σάτυνσις.

(c) Cap. 3. (c) Πέπανσις is the concoction of that Element which is in fruits; it is perfect, when the seeds that are within the fruit are capable of producing their like, hereto is opposite ὠμότης, the Inconcoction of fruits not able through want of heat to overcome the humidity.

Ἕψησις is a concoction of an humid interminate by external humidity and heat; Hereto is opposite μόλυνσις, the inconcoction of a humid interminate, caused by defect of external humidity and heat.

Ὄπησις is a concoction by dry and external heat, yet not excessive, for then it were adustion: to this is opposed σάτυνσις, an inconcoction caused through defect of heat and fire, or excess of humidity in the subject.

(d) Cap. 4. (d) As concerning the two passive qualities; things are humid and dry, either actually, or potentially. Those things which are mixt of humid and dry, are terminate, for these qualities mutually terminate one another, whence bodies consist not without Earth and Water, this humid, that dry. And for this reason Animals can only live in Earth and Water, which are their matter.

The first affections of terminate bodies are hardness and softness; hard is that which yields not to the touch; soft, the contrary. Both these are such, either absolutely, or relatively. They are made such by concretion, which is a kind of exiccation.

(e) Cap. 6. (e) Exiccation is of things that are water, or of the nature of water, or have water in them, either naturally insite, or adventitious. It is done principally by heat, accidentally by cold. Humectation (its contrary) is the concretion of a vapour into water, or liquefaction of a solid body, as Metal. *Concretion* is, when the humidity being removed, the dry is reduced together and condensed, either by cold, as in generation of stones; or by heat, as in segregation of salt from water. To Concretion is opposite, Resolution, which is effected by its contraries. Those things which are condensed by heat only, are resolved by cold only, and so on the contrary.

(f) Cap. 8. (f) Besides these principal affections, there are others secondary, chiefly competent to homogeneous bodies, some passive, some active.

Of passive qualities in mixt bodies, there are Eighteen differences, *Concretile*, *Eliquabile*, *Mollificable*, *Humectable*, *Flexible*, *Frangible*, *Impressible*, *Formable*, *Compressible*, *Tractile*, *Ductile*, *Fissile*, *Sectile*, *Unctious*, *Friable*, *Condensable*, *Combustible*, *Exhalable*, and their contraries. From these are thus denominated, *Homœmericus* mixt Bodies, as Metals, Gold, Brass, Silver, Stone and the like; and whatsoever is made out of these; as likewise similar parts in Animals and in Plants, as flesh and bone, whereof some are more cold, which consist most of Water, others more hot, which consist most of Earth and Air.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *Of Plants and Animals.*

AT the end of his Meteors he proposeth to speak of *Similar parts*, as Blood, and the like; what they are, and to what end, their matter and reason, but especially whence they have their motion; next to proceed to *dissimilar parts*; and lastly to speak of *those which consist thereof*, as Men, Plants, and the like. Hence *Patricius* conjectures that his Books *of the parts of living Creatures*, did immediately succeed those *of the Meteors*, wherein he treateth (as he proposeth) *of Similar parts* unto the tenth Chapter of the second Book, and from thence *of the Dissimilar*. But to reduce his Books *of living Creatures* to this method, is the less certain, for as much as many of these (besides those which treated particularly of *Anatomy*) have been lost, of which perhaps were some which might better have cleared the series; for in the Books themselves *concerning Animals*, there is nothing to ground it upon.

For the same reason, it is uncertain where his Books *of Plants* ought to have been placed, which are lost. Perhaps they might precede those of *Animals*; for he asserts that Plants have Souls, (contrary to the *Stoicks*) endued with vegetative power; that they live even tho' cut asunder, as insects, whereby two or more are made of one; that the substance they receive by aliment and the ambient Air, is sufficient for the preservation of their natural heat.

As concerning Animals, we have, *Of their Going*, one Book. *Of their History*, ten Books. *Of their parts*, four Books. *Of their Generation*, five Books. So exquisitely hath he treated upon this subject, as cannot well be expressed by an abridgment, and therefore we shall omit it; the rather, because little or nothing was done herein by the *Academicks* or *Stoicks*, a collation with whom is the principal design of this summary.

## CHAP. XV.

### *Of the Soul.*

(a) THE knowledg of the *Soul* conduceth much to all Truth, and especially to Physick, for the Soul is as it were the principle of animate things. Animate things differ from inanimate chiefly by motion and sense. (a) De anim. lib. 1. cap.

(b) Whence the ancient Philosophers defined the Soul by these; *Democritus* the *Pythagoreans*, *Anaxagoras* by *motion*; *Empedocles* and *Plato* by *knowledg*; others by *both*; others by *incorporeity*, or a *rare body*; *Thales*, *something that moveth*; *Diogenes*, *Air*; *Heraclitus*, *Exhalation*, an *immortal substance*; *Hippo*, *Water*; *Critias*, *Blood*. (b) Cap.

(c) The Soul doth not move it self, as *Democritus* held; for whatsoever is moved, is moved by another. Again, if the Soul were moved *per se*, it would be in place, and it were capable of being (c) Cap.

being moved violently, and it would be of the ſame nature with the body, and might return into the body after the ſeparation. Neither is the ſoul moved by it ſelf, but from its objects; for if it were moved eſſentially, it might recede from its eſſence. The ſoul therefore is not moved *per ſe*, but by accident only, according to the motion of the body.

(d) Cap. 4. (d) The ſoul is not *Harmony*, (a proportionate mixture of contraries) for then there muſt be more ſouls in the ſame body, according to the different conſtitution of its parts. But tho we commonly ſay, the ſoul *grieveth*, *hopeth*, *feareth*, &c. we are not to underſtand that the ſoul is moved, but only that theſe are from the ſoul in the body that is moved; ſome by local motion of the Organs, others by alteration of them. To ſay, the ſoul is angry, is no more proper than to ſay ſhe builds; for it is the man that is angry by the ſoul, otherwiſe the ſoul were liable to *age*, *decay*, and *infirmity*, as well as the organs of the body.

(e) Cap. 5. (e) Neither is the ſoul *a rare body*, conſiſting of Elements, for then it would underſtand nothing more than the elements themſelves; neither is there a ſoul diffuſed through all things, as *Thales* held, for we ſee there are many things inanimate.

Some from the different functions of the ſoul argue, that there are more ſouls than one in man, or that the ſoul is diviſible, the ſupream intellectual part placed in the head, the iraſcible in the heart, concupiſcible in the liver: But this is falſe, for the Intellect is not confined to any part of the body, as not being corporeal, nor organical, but immaterial and immortal.

(f) Lib. 2. cap. 2. (f) The ſoul is the firſt *Intelechy* of a natural organical body, having life potentiallly. *Firſt, Entelechy.*] Entelechy is twofold, the firſt is the principle of operation, as Science; the ſecond, the Act it ſelf. *Of a Natural*, [(g) not of an artificial body, as a Tower or Ship. *Organical body*] that is, endued with inſtruments for operation, as the eye for ſeeing, the ear for hearing; even plants have ſimple Organs. *Having life potentially*] as it were in it ſelf, for potentially is leſs than actually; actually, as in him that wakes; potentially, as in him that is aſleep.

(g) Laert.

The ſoul is otherwiſe defined, that by which we firſt live, feel, and underſtand; whence appeareth, there are three faculties of the ſoul, *nutritive*, *ſenſitive*, *intellective*; the inferior comprehended by the ſuperior potentially, as a triangle by a quadrangle.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of the Nutritive faculty.*

(a) Cap. 4. (a) THE firſt and moſt common faculty of the Soul, is the *Nutritive*; by which life is in all things, the acts and operation thereof are to be generated, and to take nouriſhment.

Nutriment is received either towards Nutrition or augmentation. Nutrition is the operation of the Nutritive faculty conducing to the ſubſtance it ſelf of the animate being, Augmentation is the operation of the Nutritive faculty, whereby the animate body encreaſeth to perfect Magnitude. In nutrition are conſidered, the Soul nouriſhing, the body nouriſhed, and the food by which the nouriſhment is made; hereto is required a Natural heat, which is in all living creatures. The aliment is both contrary, or unlike, and like, to the body nouriſhed: as it is undigeſted, we ſay nouriſhment is by the contrary; as altered by digeſtion, like is nouriſhed by its like.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *Of the Senſitive Faculty.*

(a) Cap. 5. (a) THE *Senſitive* faculty of the Soul is that by which ſence is primarily in Animals. Senſe is a mutation in the Organ cauſed by ſome ſenſible Object. It is not ſenſible of it ſelf, nor of its Organ, nor of any interior thing. To reduce it to act is requiſite ſome external ſenſible object, for ſenſe cannot move it ſelf, being a paſſive power, as that which is combuſtible cannot burn it ſelf.

(b) Cap. 6. (b) Of ſenſible Objects there are three kinds: *proper*, which is perceived by one ſenſe, without error, as colour in reſpect of ſight. *Common*, which is not proper to any one, but perceived by all. *Accidental*, which, as ſuch, doth not affect the Senſe.

Senſe is either *External or Internal*, the External are five, *Seeing*, *Hearing*, *Smelling*, *Touching*, *Taſting*.

(c) Cap. 7. (c) The object of *Seeing* is Colour, and ſomething without a name that gliſters in the dark, as the Scales of fiſh, glow-worms and the like. Colour is the motive of that which is actually perſpicuous: nothing therefore is viſible, without light. Perſpicuous is that which is viſible, not by it ſelf, but by ſome other colour or light, as Air, Water, Glaſs. Light is the act of a perſpicuous thing, as it is perſpicuous. It is not fire, nor a body, for then two bodies would be in the ſame place.

To ſight and all other ſenſes is requiſite a *medium* and convenient diſtance. The object firſt effects the *medium*, then the organ.

(d) Cap. 8. (d) The object of *hearing* is ſound. Sound is made by colliſion of two bodies, hard, ſmooth, and hollow, in a *medium*, as Air or water, ſwiftly and vehemently before the medium be diſſipated.

*Eccho* is a reflex ſound, when the Air, gathered together and forced into a veſſel, or ſome place which hindereth its diffuſion and progreſs, reverts as a Baſe againſt a wall. Sound is always reflected, though not always perceptibly, as light alſo, otherwiſe all places would be dark, which were not directly oppoſite to the Sun, or ſome lucid body.

Sound is made by that which moveth the Air. and continually ſtirreth it, till it arive at the organ, wherein there is an inſite, connatural, animate, immovable air, which being moved by the external Air, yieldeth the ſenſe of hearing. Hence it cometh that we can hear under water, for the water cannot get into this Air, becauſe of the winding narrow paſſages of the ear: If it do get in, or the membrance which containeth

*Alteration*

this air be otherwiſe broken, it cauſeth deafneſs.

Voice is the impulſion of air attracted by reſpiration, and forced againſt the vocal attery by the ſoul, which is in the lungs, with ſome intent of ſignification. Voice therefore is not proper to all animals, but to ſuch only as have blood and breath. Fiſhes therefore have not voice.

(e) Cap. 9. (e) The object of *ſmelling* is Odor. This ſenſe is not ſo perfect in men as in other creatures, whence men perceive not odors, unleſs with delight or diſlike, when they are ſo ſtrong, as to excite one of theſe. This defect proceedeth from the organ of ſmelling, which in us is more obtuſe. The *medium* of ſmelling is air and water, for fiſhes ſmell. Hence all living creatures ſmell not after the ſame manner; they which breathe, ſmell by drawing in the air, the reſt not ſo, becauſe of the different accommodation of the Organ. Thoſe therefore which ſmell by drawing in the air, cannot ſmell under water. *Odor* conſiſts chiefly in dry, as *ſapor* in humid. The Organ of ſmelling is dry potentially, as the object is actually.

(f) Cap. 10. (f) The object of *Taſt* is ſapor. Whatſoever is guſtable, is tactible, and humid, either actually, or at leaſt potentially. Dry things are ſubject to taſt as they are potentially humid, and melt as ſalt. The taſt perceiveth that which is guſtable, and that which is inguſtable, as the ſight darkneſs, the hearing ſilence; for every ſence perceiveth the preſence and abſence of its object. That which is potable is perceived by the touch, as humid by the taſt, as having ſapor. The tongue taſts not that which is dry, becauſe the organ of taſt muſt be ſuch potentially, as the object is actually; but, without humidity nothing is guſtable. The kinds of ſapors are ſweet and bitter; to ſweet are referred unctious; to bitter, ſalt. The mean are ſharp, piccant, acid, acute; guſtable is that which moveth the taſt, and reduceth it to act.

(g) Cap. 11. (g) The objects of *Touch* are the primary qualities, the organ is that part which is potentially that which the object is in act; for that which is like, cannot ſuffer from its like. We feel not things of equal heat, cold, hardneſs, or ſoftneſs. The fleſh is the *mediom*; the firſt ſenſory is ſomething more internal. Herein touch and taſt differ from the other ſenſes, whoſe objects are at greater diſtance. Touch perceiveth things tactile and not tactile.

(h) Cap. 12. (h) All theſe ſenſes receive ſenſible ſpecies without matter, as wax the impreſſion of a ſeal without the gold. The organ or ſenſory is that in which the ſenſitive faculty primarily exiſts; a vehement object deſtroyeth the organ.

(i) Lib. 3. cap. 1. (i) That there are no more external ſenſes than theſe five, is manifeſt, in that there are no more in perfect animals; neither is there any need of a ſixt ſenſe to percieve common objects, which every ſenſe diſcerns by accident, as motion figure.

The act of the object, and the act of the ſenſe it ſelf, as Sonation and Audition, are really the ſame, differ only intentionally. This act is generally in the ſenſitive, not in the object.

(k) De ſenſu. cap. 6. (k) Senſible qualities are finite, as being bounded by extreams and their contraries, but diviſible by accident into infinite, acording to the diviſion of their continuous ſubject.

(l) Ibid. (l) In ſenſibles, ſome are potentially ſenſible, as a part joined to the whole; others actually, as the whole it ſelf, or a part ſeparated from the whole. But of ſeparate parts ſome are ſo little, that ſenſe cannot actually peceive them, by reaſon of their want of due magnitude.

(m) Sounds and odors are ſucceſſively generated in the *medium*, and by degrees deduced to the organ; but light is produced in an inſtant in the medium, not carried through it by local motion. (m) Ibid.

## CHAP. XVIII.

### *Of Common ſenſe.*

(a) EVery external ſenſe perceiveth the differences of its own object, as ſight judgeth of black and white; but the differences of divers objects cannot be perceived by the ſame ſenſe; there is therefore a *common ſenſe*, which judgeth the actions of external ſenſe, and the differences of ſenſible objects. The judgment being of a ſenſible object, muſt be done by ſenſe, and by one ſenſe only; For, if there were more, one would object one object apart, the other another, and conſequently could not judge between them. For, that which judgeth muſt have knowledge of all that whereof it judgeth, which no exterior ſenſe can afford, as being confined to its proper object. (a) Lib. 3. cap.

*Common ſenſe* judgeth contrary or different ſenſibles in the ſame inſtant, for it diſcerneth together ſweet and black, bitter and ſweet. Hence it is like the center of a circle, which in diverſe reſpects is called one, and many. It is one, as all the external ſenſes are united in it; many, as it is the fountain and judge of them.

(b) Senſe differs from Intellect; for ſenſe is in all living creatures; intellect in few. Senſe erreth not about its proper object, but is always true; intellect often erreth by falſe opinions and habits. (b) De anim. lib. 3. cap.

## CHAP. XIX.

### *Of Phantaſy and Cogitation.*

(a) FRom *Senſe* is derived *Phantaſy* and *Cogitation*. Phantaſy differs from Senſe and Intellect, tho' it exiſt not without a previous knowledg of ſenſe, as neither doth cogitation, which is in action of the Intellect, comprehending Science, Opinion, and Prudence. (a) Cap. 1.

The act of *Phantaſy* differs from *Cogitation*, for we fancy things falſe and at our own pleaſure; but we think only what is true, and like unto truth, and that not as we pleaſe our ſelves, but as the thing ſeemeth. Moreover, when we think that things are ill or good, we are moved with fear, joy, hope; but when we fancy only without application of judgment, we are not moved no more than we are frighted at a Picture.

Phantaſy is not properly *Senſe*; Phantaſy acteth in him that ſleepeth, Senſe doth not. Senſe was with us from our birth, phantaſy not. Senſe is in all Animals, phantaſy is not. Senſe is true, phantaſy often falſe. Senſe is only of things preſent, phantaſy of the abſent likewiſe.

Phantaſy is not *Science* or *Intellect*, for that is always

always of things true and real, phantasy often is of things false. Phantasy is not *opinion*, for opinion is followed by faith, phantasy is not.

Phantasy is a motion in Animals from sense in act, by which motion they are variously affected, and conceive things sometimes true, and sometimes false. The error of phantasy ariseth from the error of the senses: Phantasy therefore is of near affinity with sense; for tho' it be not sense, yet it exists not without sense, or in things that have no sense. It is derived ἀπὸ τῆς φάους from light; for sight, the most excellent of senses, cannot act without light.

Many things are done by Animals according to phantasy, either because they have not intellect as Beasts, or that intellect is obscured in them.

## CHAP. XX.

### *Of Memory and Reminiscence.*

(a) FRom *Phantasy* proceeds *Memory*, which is of things *past*, as Sense is of the *present*, Opinion of the *future*. Sense and Intellection are necessarily previous to memory. Hence those Animals only which have sense of time, remember, as Horses and Dogs; yet memory is not without phantasm, even not that memory which is of intelligible things; for he that remembreth, is sensible that he first saw, heard, or learn'd what he remembreth. Memory therefore is reducible *per se* to phantasy, as being of Phantasmes, to intellect only by accident. Hence in the same part of the Soul, wherein Phantasy exists, resideth likewise Memory; for if it were placed only in the intellectual faculty, it would not be competent to Beasts, which we see it is.

(a) Lib. de Memor. & Rem. cap. 1.

Memory is made by impression of some image by the sense upon the Soul. Hence they who retain not the image and figure of sense, either by continual motion, or excessive humidity, as children, or drought, as old men, remember not. To memory therefore is required a moderate temperature of the Brain; yet more inclined to dry.

(b) *Reminiscence* is not a resumption or assumption of memory, but differs specifically from both these, for Beasts have not Reminiscence tho' they have memory, Reminiscence being made by discourse and diligent disquisition, collecting one thing from another by a continued series and order, until at last we call that to mind which we had forgotten.

(b) Cap. 2.

## CHAP. XXI.

### *Of Sleep and Waking.*

(a) TO Sense belongeth *Sleep* and *Waking*; for those animate things which want sense, neither sleep nor wake, as Plants. Sleep is an immobility, and band as it were of sense; Waking is a solution and remission of sense.

(a) Lib. de Som. & Vigil. cap. 1.

(b) The chief seat of Sleep is the common sense, which being bound up by sleep, all the exterior senses, whereof this is the common Centre, are bound up likewise and restrained, for the rest and health of the Animal; which is the end of waking also.

(b) Cap. 2.

(c) Every impotence of sense is not sleep, but only that which is caused by evaporation of the Aliment. Hence we are most subject to sleep after meat; for then much humid vapour ascends, which first maketh the head heavy by consistence there, then descends and repels the heat, whereby is induced sleep. That sleep is made in this manner, is evident from all soporiferous things, as Poppy, which causeth heaviness in the head by sending up vapours. Labour produceth sleep, by dispersing the humours, whence produceth vapour. Drunken Men and Children are subject to sleep much, melancholly persons little, for they are so cold within, that the vapour exhaleth not, especially they being of a dry constitution. Sleep therefore is a recession of the heat inward, with a natural kind of circumobsistence.

(c) Cap. 3.

## CHAP. XXII.

### *Of Dreams.*

(a) DReaming is an affection of the sensory part, in as much as it is fantastick. A Dream is an Apparition or Phantasm seen in sleep.

(a) Lib. de insom.

After the functions of the external senses, there remain their motions and similitudes induced by their objects into their Organs. These occurring in sleep, cause Dreams, but not at all times, nor at every age, for their species show not themselves, but upon cessation of the humours. Hence Dreams are not immediately after sleep, nor in Infants soon after their birth, for then there is too great commotion by reason of the alimentary heat. As therefore in troubled water no image appeareth, or if any, much distorted; but when it is calm, the image is rendred clearly; so when there is a tumult and agitation of the humours, there are no images presented, or those dreadful, such as are the Dreams of melancholly and sick persons; but when the blood passeth smoothly, and the humours are setled, we have pure and pleasing Dreams; A Dream therefore is a phantasm caused by motion of sensibles already perceived by sense, occurring to Animals in sleep.

## CHAP. XXIII.

### *Of the Intellective Faculty.*

(a) THE third faculty of the Soul is the *Intellective*, proper to man. Intellect is that part of the Soul whereby it knoweth and understandeth. It is twofold, *Patient* and *Agent*. *Patient Intellect* is that by which Intellect becometh all things, for Intellection is like sense; Sense is by passion from a sensible object, Intellect from an intellectual. The properties of patient Intellect are these; it is void of corruptive passion; it is apt for reception of species; it is that species potentially; it is not mixt with the body; it hath no corporeal Organs; it is the place of species.

(a) De Anim. lib. 3. cap. 4.

(b) That there is also an agent Intellect, is ma-

(b) Cap. 5.

nifeſt; for in whatſoever kind, there is ſomething that is potentially all of that kind, there is ſomething likewiſe which is the efficient cauſe of all in that kind; this is the agent Intellect, a cognoſcitive power which enlightneth phantaſms and the patient Intellect. The properties thereof are, that it is ſeparable from the body, immortal and eternal; that it is not mixt with the body; that it is void of paſſion; that it is ever in act; but the patient Intellect is mortal, which is the cauſe of Forgetfulneſs.

(c) Cap. 6. (c) The action of the Intellect is twofold, one, *Intellection of indiviſibles*, in which is neither truth nor falſhood, as all *ſimple* apprehenſions; the other *complex*, when we compound and unite notions by affirmation or negation. This is always either true or falſe, the other neither. The ſimple is precedent to the complex.

(d) Cap. 8. (d) Intellect in act is either *Practick* or *Theoretick*. As a ſenſible object reduceth the ſenſible faculty from power to act, ſo doth an intellectual faculty; and as the operation of ſenſe is threefold, ſimple apprehenſion, judgment if it be good or ill, and laſtly, appetition or averſion according to that perception: So likewiſe is the operation of the *practick intellect* threefold: Firſt, it is moved by phantaſms, as ſenſe is by external ſenſibles. Secondly, it judgeth the object to be good or ill, by affirmation or negation. Thirdly, it moveth the will to purſue or ſhun it, whence it is called *practick*. This practick intellect is moved as well when the ſenſible object is abſent, as when it is preſent, only excited by the phantaſy. The object of the *Theoretick Intellect*, is, true or falſe; of the practick, good or ill.

(e) Ibid. (e) The rational ſoul in ſome manner is every thing; for that which actually knoweth, is in ſome manner the ſame with the thing known.

## CHAP. XXIV.

### *Of the motive faculty.*

(a) Cap. 9. (a) BEſides the *nutritive*, *ſenſitive*, and *intellective* faculties, there is alſo a *motive* faculty in animate creatures. That it is not the ſame with the *nutritive* is manifeſt, in as much as it proceeds from imagination and apprehenſion, which plants have not, neither have they organs fit for motion, which nature would have given them if they had this power. That it is not the ſame with the *ſenſitive*, appears, in that ſome animals which have ſenſe, have not the power, as *Zoophytes*, which have not the organs fit for this motion. Neither is it the ſame with the Theoretick *Intellect*, for that judgeth not as to action: but progreſſive motion is the action of an animal flying ill, or purſuing good.

(b) Cap. 10. (b) The principles of *local motion* in animals, are the *practick Intellect* (under which is comprehended phantaſy) and *appetite*. Theſe two direct and impell the motive faculty to action: intellect and phantaſy by directing what is to be ſhunned, what to be embraced; appetite by ſhunning or embracing it. Appetite is the chief principle thereof; for that may move without intellect, as in beaſts, and many times in men, who deſert their reaſon to follow their pleaſure: But intellect never moveth without appetite, that is, will: for appetite is the principle of all motion, honeſt and diſhoneſt; intellect only of honeſt motion

In man, appetite is twofold: *Will*, which followeth the judgment of reaſon; and *ſenſual appetite*, iraſcible or concupiſcible, which followeth ſenſe and phantaſy.

In the motion of animals, three things are conſidered. Firſt, that which moveth, and that is twofold; the *appetible object*, which moveth the appetite as a final cauſe, not as an efficient; and the *appetite* it ſelf, which being moved by the appetible object, moveth the animal. Secondly, by what it moves, which is the heart of the animal, by which inſtrument the appetible object moveth it. Thirdly, that which is moved, the animal it ſelf, perfect.

(c) *Inſects* are moved locally, as *perfect* animals are, and conſequently by the ſame principles, appetite and phantaſy; but this phantaſy is imperfect, diffuſed through the whole body, as appeareth by their uncertain motion, only towards preſent occurrent objects. That they have appetite is manifeſt, in as much as they are ſenſible of pain and pleaſure. (c) Cap. 11.

Beaſts have *ſenſitive* phantaſie only; rational creatures, *deliberative*, which compareth many things conducing to ſome foreknown end, and chooſeth the moſt expedient. Yet ſometimes the ſenſitive appetite in man overſwayeth the rational; but by the order of nature, the will, which is the rational, ought, as being the ſuperior to it, to overſway the ſenſitive. Thus there are three motions, one of the will commanding, another of the ſenſitive appetite reſiſting, and a third of the body obeying. But when the ſenſitive overruleth, there are only two motions, for the will reſiſts not, but is deceived.

## CHAP. XXV.

### *Of Life and Death.*

(a) *Generation* and *diſſolution* are common to all living Creatures, tho all are not produced and diſſolved in the ſame manner. (a) De vit. & Mort. cap. 1.

(b) The generation of a living Creature is the firſt conjunction of the nutritive Soul with the natural heat. (b) Cap. 24.

Life is the permanence of that Soul with the ſaid heat.

*Youth* is the encreaſe of the firſt refrigerative part, *Age* the decreaſe thereof, ἀκμη, the conſtant and perfect life which is betwixt both.

As long as an animate Creature liveth, it hath natural heat within it ſelf; and as ſoon as that faileth, dieth. The principle of this heat is in the heart. If it be extinguiſh'd in any other part, the Animal may live; but if in the heart, it cannot.

This heat is extinguiſh'd two ways; firſt by *conſumption*, when it faileth of it ſelf; ſecondly, by *extinction*, from ſome contrary, as in violent death; the cauſe is the ſame in both, defect of aliment, which in the living Creature is its vital moiſture, as fire wanting refrigeration, groweth more violent, and ſoon conſumeth the humidity, which being gone, it ſelf muſt of neceſſity go out.

Refrigeration

Refrigeration therefore is neceſſary to the conſervation of the natural heat. Plants are refrigerated by the ambient Air, and by aliment: their natural heat is extinguiſh'd by exceſſive cold, and dry'd up by exceſſive heat. Animals which live in the Air, or in the water, are refrigerated by the Air or Water, ſome by breathing, others without.

(c) Cap 23,24. (c) *Death*, according to the extinction of natural heat, is twofold, *violent* or *natural*; violent, when the cauſe is extrinſecal; natural, when the principle thereof is in the animate Creature. For that part whereon life dependeth (the Lungs) is ſo ordered by nature, that it cannot perform its office for ever. Death therefore cometh from defect of heat, when through want of refrigeration the radical humidity is conſumed and dry'd up. Refrigeration faileth naturally, when by progreſs of time the lungs in Creatures that have breath, the gills in fiſhes, grow ſo hard, that they are unapt for motion.

(d) Cap. 23. (d) Old men die eaſily, as having but little natural heat; and without pain, becauſe their diſſolution comes not from any violent affection.

(e) Lib. de lon. brevit. cap. 4. (e) The lives of living Creatures, as well of the ſame, as of divers ſpecies, differ in length; the longeſt life, moſt commonly, is that of ſome Plants, as the Palm and Cypreſs; that of Creatures which have blood, rather than the bloodleſs; that of terreſtrial creatures rather than the aquatile: that of thoſe which have great bodies, as of Elephants, rather than thoſe of little.

(f) The cauſes of long life are firſt the quantity and quality of the vital moiſture, if it be much and fat, not eaſily dry'd up nor congealed. Secondly, natural heat, which ſuffereth not that humour to be congealed. Thirdly, a due proportion betwixt this heat and that moiſture. Fourthly, fewneſs of excrements, for excrements are contrary to Nature, and ſometimes corrupt nature it ſelf, ſometimes a part. (f) Cap. 5.

*Salacious* creatures, or laborious, grow ſoon old by reaſon of exiccation. For the ſame reaſon men are ſhorter liv'd than women, but more active.

In hot Countries, animate creatures are larger and live longer than in cold: Thoſe animals which have little or no blood, either are not at all produced in the Northern parts, or ſoon dye.

Both Plants and Animals, if they take not aliment, dye; for the natural heat, when the aliment faileth, conſumeth the matter it ſelf, wherein it is, the vital moiſture.

Aquatile creatures are ſhorter liv'd than the terreſtrial, and the bloodleſs than thoſe that have blood, becauſe their humidity is more wateriſh, and conſequently more apt to be congealed and corrupted.

(g) Plants live long, as having leſs of wateriſh moiſture, which therefore is not ſo apt to be congealed. The largeneſs of the upper parts, as well in Plants as Animals, is a ſign of long life, becauſe it argues much natural heat. The upper part of a Plant is the Root, not the Boughs. (g) Cap. 6.

# THE THIRD PART.

## CHAP. I.

### *ETHICK.*

WE come next to the *Moral* part of Philoſophy, including *Ethick*, *Oeconomick*, and *Politick*. Of the firſt, we have ten Books of *Ariſtotles*, written to (his Son) *Nichomachus*, two Books called his *Great Ethick*; one *of Virtues: Of Oeconomick*, two Books: *of Politick* eight. We ſhall not have recourſe to theſe for an account of his Doctrine in this kind, being furniſhed by *Stobæus* with a ſummary of what he and the reſt of the Peripateticks aſſerted in Morality.

Eclog. Ethic. *Ethick* ((a) ſaith he) is ſo called ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους, from *Cuſtom*, for thoſe things, the principles and ſeeds whereof we receive from Nature, are to be perfected by Cuſtom and right inſtitution. Hence Ethick pertaineth only to living Creatures, and particulary to man; for the reſt acquire cuſtom, not by Reaſon, but Neceſſity, man by Reaſon.

Of the *Soul*, one part is *Rational*, the other *Irrational*; the rational part is *Judicative*, the irrational *Appetitive*; of the rational, that which is *Theoretick*, converſant in divine things, is called *Science*; that which is *Practick*, converſant in human Actions, is called *Council*. Of the latter, one part is *concupiſcible*, another *iraſcible*.

In like manner *Virtue* is twofold, rational and irrational, conſiſting in Theory and practiſe. Ethick Vertue conſiſteth not in Science, but in election of Goods.

Virtue is perfected by three things; *Nature*, *Cuſtom* and *Reaſon*. For man differing from other Creatures both in body and mind, as being

a ſpecies placed between divine eſſences and irrational Creatures, hath ſome affinity to both; in what is rational, and agrees with the Soul, he is ally'd to the Divinity; in what is irrational, proper to the body, he agrees with the irrational. Both theſe deſire perfection by Reaſon; and firſt, he deſireth to be, for this is naturally inſite in him. Hence he affecteth things that are according to his Nature, and is averſe from things contrary to his nature. He endeavoureth to preſerve *health*, *pleaſure*, *life*, theſe being according to nature, expetible in themſelves, and good. On the contrary, he ſhunneth *ſickneſs*, *pain*, and *death*, as being repugnant to nature, and therefore ill, and to be avoided. We love our own bodies, we love our own ſouls, their parts, their faculties, their acts: the principle of appetite, office, and virtue is a providential care of theſe. If error did not happen concerning things expetible and avoidable, but that we lived continually participant of good, and void of ill, we ſhould not enquire in theſe for a true election. But being in things expetible and avoidable, through ignorance often deceived, ſometimes rejecting the good, ſometimes admitting the ill for good, we neceſſarily have recourſe to *conſtancy of Judgment*, which having obtain'd convenient to nature, we call it, from the excellency of its function, *Virtue*, admiring and honouring it above all things. For actions, and thoſe which are called Offices, proceed from election of things according to nature, and rejection of things repugnant to nature. Herein conſiſt *right actions* and *ſins*; even on theſe dependeth almoſt the whole reaſon of *Election*, as we ſhall briefly demonſtrate.

That Children are *expetible* to parents, not only *for uſe* or benefit, but alſo in *themſelves*, is moſt evident. There is no man ſo cruel and ſavage, who doth not rather deſire his children after his death ſhould live happily and well, than otherwiſe: By this affection dying perſons make Wills, providing even for the unborn, chooſing Tutors and Guardians to aſſiſt them. And as *Children* are loved for themſelves, ſo likewiſe we love *Parents*, *Brethren*, *Wife*, *Kindred*, *Acquaintance*, *Country-men*, for themſelves, as having ſome intereſt in them by nature. For, man is a ſociable communicative creature; and though of Friendſhips, ſome are more remote than others, it is nothing to the purpoſe, for all friendſhip is for its own ſake, and not for uſe only. And if friendſhip with country men be expetible in it ſelf, it will likewiſe be expetible in it ſelf with all men; for all thoſe who benefit others, are ſo affected towards them, that they do moſt actions for the office ſake. Who will not free any man from a wild beaſt, if he be in his power? Who will not direct a man that is out of his way? Who will not relieve a man that is ready to ſtarve, or direct a man in a deſart to a ſpring? Who deſires not to be well ſpoken of after death? Who abhors not theſe ſpeeches as unnatural,

*When I am dead, let Earth be mix'd with fire,*
*I care not, ſo I now have my deſire.*

It is manifeſt therefore, that we have a natural good will and friendſhip towards all mankind, as being a thing expetible in it ſelf, and conſonant to reaſon.

*The race of Gods and Men is one,*
*From Nature both a like begun.*

Love of all mankind being thus common to us, much more evidently it is expetible in it ſelf towards thoſe whom converſation hath made our friends. A Friend, Friendſhip, and Goodwill, are expetible in themſelves.

In like manner *praiſe* is expetible *in it ſelf*; for we contract ſociety with thoſe who praiſe us: And if praiſe, *Glory* likewiſe, which is nothing but the praiſe of many perſons.

Now ſeeing that *external* Goods are expetible in themſelves, much more are the goods of the ſoul and body expetible in themſelves. For, if man be expetible in himſelf, the parts of man muſt likewiſe be expetible in themſelves. The parts of man in general are *Soul* and *Body*; the body therefore is expetible in it ſelf. Why ſhould the body of another perſon be dear to us, and not our own? Or, why ſhould our body be dear to us, and not the parts and functions thereof? *Health* therefore, *ſtrength*, *beauty*, *ſwiftneſs*, *ſound ſenſe*, and the reſt, are expetible in themſelves; for none of ordinary capacity would chooſe to be *deformed* or maimed, tho no inconvenience would happen thereupon; ſo that deformity, even without any inconvenience, ſeemeth juſtly avoidable. And if deformity be avoidable in it ſelf, beauty is expetible, not *for uſe* only, but in *it ſelf*. For, that beauty pleaſeth, is manifeſt, in as much as all have a natural inclination (beſides that of converſation) to ſuch as are beautiful, and endeavour to confer benefits on them, ſo as it ſeemeth to procure benevolence. In this reſpect therefore, beauty is judged expetible in it ſelf, deformity avoidable in it ſelf. It is the ſame in *health* and *ſickneſs*, *ſtrength* and *weakneſs*, *activity and heavineſs*, *ſenſe* and *privation* of ſenſe.

And if *Corporeal* goods are expetible in themſelves, and their contrary evils avoidable, the parts and vertues of the ſoul muſt neceſſarily be expetible alſo. For, virtue beginning, as we ſaid, from the body, and external goods, and reflecting upon it ſelf, and conſidering how much more near relation it hath to the ſoul, contracteth a nearer affinity with it. So that the virtues of the ſoul are much to be preferred before thoſe of the body, which is eaſily collected from what hath been ſaid. For, if corporeal health be expetible in it ſelf, much more is *Temperance*, which freeth us from the fury of the paſſions. And if corporeal *ſtrength* ought to be numbred amongſt goods, much more ought *magnanimity*, by which the ſoul is ſtrengthned. And if corporeal *Beauty* be expetible in it ſelf, much more is that of the ſoul, *Juſtice*.

In like manner is it with the virtues. For, there are three kinds of *Goods*, which though different, have ſome kind of analogie. That which in the body is called *Health*, in the ſoul is called *Temperance*, and in externals, *Riches*. What in the body is *Strength*, in the ſoul is *Magnanimity*, in externals, *Power*. What in the body is *Vigour of Senſe*, in the ſoul is *Prudence*, in externals, *Felicity*. What in the body is *Beauty*, in the ſoul is *Juſtice*, in externals, *Friendſhip*.

There are three kinds of Goods expetible in themſelves, thoſe concerning the *Soul*, thoſe concerning the *body*, and the *external*; but, eſpecially

ally those of the soul, for the soul is more excellent than the body.

Yet tho corporeal and external virtues be inferior to those of the soul, they are not to be neglected, partly, as being expetible in themselves; partly, as conducing to civil, sociable and contemplative life, for life is defined by civil, sociable, and contemplative actions; *Virtue* (according to this *Sect*) not being a lover of it self, but communicative and civil. For when we say, virtue is nearest ally'd to it self, the desire of the knowledg of truth necessarily followeth it, so as wise men may rightly part with their life, and fools rightly preserve theirs; since that to those who are perfect, it is an equal thing to depart this life or not.

The excellency of virtue is much encreased by corporeal and external goods; yet, the end cannot any way be compleated by them. The function therefore of virtue is *Beatitude*, by successful actions. Corporeal and external goods are said to be efficient of beatitude, for as much as they confer something thereto, not that they compleat it; for Beatitude is life. Life consists of actions, but those can neither be reckoned amongst actions nor functions.

Hereupon comes in *Benificence*, *Grace*, *Humanity*, *love of Children* and *Brethren*, of our *Country*, *Parents*, *Benevolence*, of *Kinsfolk*, *Friendship*, *Equality*, and the whole company of Virtues; which who neglect, manifestly sin, as to expetible goods, and avoidable evils; and also in the acquisition and use of Goods, they sin in election, by judgment; in acquisition, by the manner; in use, by ignorance. In election they sin, as desiring that which is not good, or preferring the lesser good, as most prefer *Pleasant* before *Profitable*, Profitable before *Honest*. *In acquisition*, as not considering whence, nor in what manner, nor how far it ought to be acquired. *In use*, for as much as all use being referred either to it self or some other, in the former they observe no *moderation*, in the latter no *decency*.

In these things, tho the wicked sin, yet do the just behave themselves uprightly, following virtue as their leader.

In all virtues, there is *Judgment*, *Election*, and *Action*; there is no Virtue without these; Prudence hath the first place, the rest follow.

Virtue is called the *best affection*, which may be collected from Induction. The Virtue of a shoemaker is that by which he knoweth how to make shoes; and of an Architect, that by which he knoweth how to build a handsom house. Virtue therefore is the best of Affections.

Of Virtue there are two principles as it were, *Reason* and *Passion*, which sometimes agree, sometimes disagree; for Pleasure or grief, when Reason gets the Mastery, it is called *Temperance*, when passion, *Intemperance*; The *Harmony* and Concord of both is *Virtue*, one rightly commanding, the other obeying.

Expetible is that which attracteth the *appetite* to it self, avoidable that which repelleth it, reason consenting thereto. Expetible and good were by the Ancients esteemed the same, for they affirmed Good to be that which all desire.

Of Goods, they say some are expetible *for themselves*, some *for others*; the first are either *honest* or *necessary*. Honest are the *Virtues* and their functions; necessary, *Life*, and those things which pertain unto it, as the body with its parts and uses; and those which are called external goods; as *riches*, *peace*, *glory*, *liberty*, *friendship*, for each of these conferreth to the use of Virtue.

*Beatitude* consisteth of Good and successful actions; wherefore it is wholly good, as playing upon pipes is wholly Artificial; for the use of the matter doth not take away the goodness from Beatitude; as the use of Instruments taketh not away from the Art of Medicine. Such things as are made use of towards this perfection, are not to be reckoned as parts; for they, without which the action cannot be, are not rightly parts thereof; for parts conduce to the whole, the rest conduce to the end.

Good is divided into *honest*, *profitable*, and *pleasant*; these are the scopes of all actions: Beatitude consists of all these. It is *the use of perfect Virtue, in perfect life, with prosperous success*; and the *function of perfect life according to Virtue*; *and the use of Virtue according to nature, without any impediment*.

Tho some assert, that the *End* is to be happy, and Beatitude the *Scope*, as, Riches are Good, and to be rich that which is behoveful; yet is it better to follow the Antients, who assert the End to be that for whose sake all things are, it self not being for the sake of any other; or the ultimate of things expetible; or Life according to Virtue, in corporeal and external goods, either in all or the most principal.

This being the greatest Good, useth the Ministry of the rest; for as those things which confer hereunto are to be esteemed Goods, so those things which resist it, are indifferents; for every good action doth not effect Beatitude.

They assert *Beatitude* to be the *use of perfect Virtue*, as holding some Virtues to be *perfect*, others *imperfect*. The perfect are *Justice* and *Integrity*; the imperfect are *Ingenuity* and *Progression*. The perfect agreeth with the perfect, so as the end thereof is the function of that Virtue, whereof no part is wanting.

They added *perfect life*, to shew that Beatitude is in men of full age, for a young man is imperfect, and so is his life. Beatitude therefore is in perfect time, the longest that is appointed for us by the Gods. As one Verse makes not a Poem; nor one step a dance, nor one swallow a Summer; so neither doth a short time confer Beatitude, for Beatitude is perfect, and requireth a perfect Man and Time.

They added *successful Function of Virtue*, because the Goods of Nature are necessarily requisite to Beatitude; for a good man may exercise Virtue in misery, but cannot be happy. For as *Virtue* is the only efficient of *honest* actions, so is *Beatitude* of *honest*, *good*, *and excellent*. Neither doth it abide amongst ill or unhappy things, but enjoyeth the Good, nor is deprived of the contemplation of good, or the conveniences of life.

Beatitude being the most pleasant and fairest of things, increaseth like an Art by the multitude of its Instruments. It is not the same in God and Man, neither is it equal amongst good men, for it may sometimes be taken away by oppression of miseries. Hence it is to be doubted whether a man may be termed happy as long as he is alive;

alive, conſidering the uncertainty of Fortune; whence *Solon* ſaid, *Conſider the end of a long life, whether it be happy.*

Thoſe who ſleep, are not participant of Beatitude, but after ſome manner, as the function of the Soul is capable of awaking.

Laſtly, they added *Nature*, becauſe every waking of good men is not the uſe of perfect Virtue, but only that which is according to Nature, that is free from madneſs; for madneſs as well as ſleep depriveth men of uſe, and of this Reaſon, and maketh them like Brutes.

As Beatitude is ſaid to be the uſe of Virtue, ſo is miſery of Vice; yet not ſo, that as this ſufficeth to miſery, ſo that doth to Beatitude.

Life is made ſour and unpleaſant to the Good by exceſſive adverſity, to the ill even in proſperity, becauſe they ſin more, nor can rightly be termed happy.

Having aſſerted Beatitude to be the chief Good, it followeth that we expound how many ways it is taken.

Good is underſtood *three* ways. Firſt, for that which is the cauſe of preſervation to all beings; next for that which is predicated of every good thing. Laſtly, for that which is expetible in it ſelf. The firſt is *God*; the ſecond the *Genus* of Goods; the third, the *end*, to which all are referred, Beatitude.

That which is expetible in it ſelf, is ſaid *three* ways, either that for which ſomething is done; or, for which all things are done; or, ſome part of theſe.

Again, of theſe, ſome are *final*, ſome *efficient*: final, are the actions proceeding according to virtue; efficient, the materials of expetible things.

Of goods, ſome are *honourable*, ſome *laudable*, ſome *faculties*, ſome *profitable*. Honourable, as *God*, our *Prince*, *Parent*: Laudable, as *Riches*, *Empire*, *Liberty*: Profitable, the efficient, as *Health*.

Again, of things good and expetible, ſome are expetible *in themſelves*, ſome for others; in themſelves, as the *honourable*, *laudable*, and faculties; for others, as the *Profitable*, which effect and conſerve other things.

Again, of things good in themſelves, ſome are *ends*, others, *not ends*; Ends, as *Juſtice*, *Virtue*, *Health*, and whatſoever conſiſteth of theſe; Not ends, as *Ingenuity*, *Memory*, *Learning*.

Again, of Goods, ſome are *wholly* perfect, others *not*; of the firſt are *Virtue* and *Prudence*, which benefit all; of the latter, *Riches* and *Power*, which require to be uſed by a good man. The ſame things whereof a good man maketh right uſe, a wicked man abuſeth, as the ſame which a good Muſician uſeth well, he who is ignorant of Muſick uſeth amiſs. Whoſoever maketh ill uſe of any thing, is hurt thereby; as, a good horſe, which is a help to him that knoweth how to ride, hurts the unskilful rider.

Again, of Goods, ſome are in the *ſoul*, ſome in the *body*, ſome *external*: In the ſoul are *ingenuity*, *art*, *virtue*, *wiſdom*, *prudence*, *pleaſure*; in the body, *health*, *ſoundneſs of ſenſe*, *beauty*, *ſtrength*, *ſoundneſs of limbs*, and all *parts*, with their *faculties* and *functions*. External are *riches*, *glory*, *nobility*, *power*, *friends*, *kindred*, *country*. The goods of the ſoul are either conferred by *nature*, as *Wit* and *Memory*; or acquired by *diligence*, as the *Liberal Sciences*; or fall into perfection, as *Prudence*, *Juſtice*, and laſtly, *Wiſdom*.

Again, of Goods, ſome may be both *obtained* and *loſt*, as *Riches*; ſome obtained, but not loſt, as *Felicity* and *Immortality*: ſome loſt, but not obtained, as *Senſe* and *Life*; ſome neither obtained nor loſt, as *Nobility*.

Again, of Goods, ſome are *only* expetible in themſelves, as Pleaſure and Indolence; ſome efficient *only*, as Riches: ſome *both* efficient and expetible in themſelves, as Virtue, Friends, Health.

Goods are divided more ways than theſe, as not belonging all to one *Genus*, but to all the ten Categories.

Theſe things laid down, we come next to ſpeak more accurately concerning Virtue, which they place in both parts of the ſoul: In the *rational* part, *Integrity*, *Prudence*, *Wiſdom*, *Memory*, and the like: In the *irrational* part, *Temperance*, *Juſtice*, *Fortitude*, and other virtues. Theſe (ſay they) may be extinguiſhed by exceſs, which they prove by teſtimony of the ſenſes, as things obſcure by manifeſt. For, as by exceſs or defect of exerciſe, *health* is corrupted, but by moderate exerciſe is preſerved: In like manner is it in *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, and other virtues. For, as we do call him who feareth the Thunder, mad, not valiant; ſo on the contrary, he who feareth ſhadows is a coward: but, he is valiant, who neither feareth all things, nor nothing. Theſe things encreaſe or entinguiſh virtue: being moderate, they encreaſe courage: being too great, or too little, they extinguiſh it.

In like manner are all other virtues extinguiſhed by *exceſs* or *defect*, increaſed by *mediocrity*.

Neither is virtue only limited by theſe, but by *pleaſure* and *grief* likewiſe, in as much as for pleaſure we commit wickedneſs, and for grief ſhun good. To explain this more fully, they unfold the nature of the ſoul, wherein are ſeen three things, *paſſions*, *faculties*, *habits*: *Paſſions*, as *anger*, *fear*, *hate*, *love*, *emulation*, *pity*, and the like: to which is ſubſequent *pleaſure*, or *grief*. *Faculties*, by which we make uſe of paſſions, and are angry, do emulate, and the like. *Habits* are thoſe from which the functions of theſe proceedeth rightly, or otherwiſe. If any man be ſo diſpoſed, that he is angry upon any occaſion, he hath the habit of *anger*; if ſo, as to be angry upon no occaſion, he hath the habit of *ſtupidity*, both which are blameable. The laudable habit is that of *meekneſs*, by which we are angry in due time and place. Virtues therefore are habits, by which the functions of paſſions become laudable.

All virtue conſiſteth in action; all action is continuous. Whatſoever things are continuous, like magnitude, have exceſs, defect, and mediocrity, either in relation to one another, or to us. The mean, relating to us, is in all the beſt, (this is not quantitative, but qualitative, and therefore is perfect; whereas the extreams, exceſs and defect, being contrary, are repugnant to one another, and to the mean. But, the mean is to both extreams as equality is to inequality, greater than the leaſt, leſs than the greateſt.) Virtue therefore is a deliberative habit, conſiſting in mediocrity, relating to our ſelves.

*Theophraſtus* having laid down ſome qualities, (following his Maſter) endeavoureth to conclude from each of them: The examples he alledgeth are theſe; Temperance, Intemperance, Stupidity, Meekneſs, Wrath, Indolence, Fortitude, Boldneſs, Timidity, Juſtice, Liberality, Prodigality, Avarice, Magnanimity, puſillanimity, Arrogance, Magnificence, Oſtentation. For of theſe habits, ſome are ill, through exceſs or defect. Others good through mediocrity. He is not *temperate* who deſireth nothing, nor he who deſireth all things; one like a ſtone, deſireth not even natural expetibles; the other, through exceſſive deſire, becometh intemperate. He only is temperate, who deſireth honeſt things with reaſon, in due time and meaſure. He is not *meek* who is angry upon all occaſions, nor he who is angry upon none; but he who is endued with the mean habit. He is not *valiant* who feareth nothing, not God himſelf; nor he who feareth all things, even his own ſhadow. Nor *Juſt*, who either aſſumeth or derogateth too much from himſelf, but who obſerveth equality. He is not *liberal* who giveth away all, nor he who giveth nothing; nor *magnanimous*, who eſteemeth himſelf worthy all great things, nor he who eſteemeth himſelf worthy none; but he who obſerveth a decorum. He is not *magnificent* who is ſplendid every where, nor he who no where; but who obſerves due time and place.

Thus the Genus of vertues is placed in *Mediocrity*, and mutually conſequent in it ſelf; yet, not alike in all, for prudence is conſequent to the reſt in its own proper nature; the reſt are conſequent to it by acceſſion; for he who is juſt, muſt neceſſarily be wiſe, but not on the contrary!

Of paſſions and appetites, ſome are *good*, ſome *bad*, ſome *mean*; the good are *friendſhip*, *benevolence*, *indignation*, *ſhame*, *confidence*, *compaſſion*; the bad, *envy*, *malevolence*, *contumely*; the mean, *grief*, *fear*, *anger*, *pleaſure*, *deſire*.

Every paſſion is converſant in pleaſure and grief, for which reaſon the vertues depend upon them; but, *love of mony*, *love of pleaſure*, *love-melancholy*, and the like, are habits diſtinct from vices.

Of *Love*, one kind is of *Friendſhip*, another of *Conjunction*, the third of *both*. The firſt is good, the ſecond bad, the third mean.

Of Friendſhip there are *four* kinds: *Sodality*, *Affinity*, *Hoſpitality*, *Erotick*: whether that of *Beneficence*. and that of *Admiration* be to be added to theſe, is doubtful. The firſt is derived from *converſation*; the ſecond from *nature*; the third from *cohabitation*; the fourth from *affection*; the fift from *good-will*; the laſt from ſome *faculty*. Of all theſe, there are in general three ends, honeſt, profitable, and pleaſant: All perſons that are ſtudious of friendſhip aim at one or more of theſe ends. The firſt friendſhip is that, which every man hath to himſelf; the next, to his parent; the reſt, to his friends and neighbours. Whence exceſs in the firſt, and defect in the reſt ought to be avoided; that being eſteemed *ſelf-love*, this *reſervedneſs*.

χάρις is taken three ways, for a profitable benefit, or for the profitable return of a benefit, or for the remembrance of a benefit. It is placed likewiſe in the face and ſpeech, whence a man is termed *gracious*, ἴυχαρις, εὐχαρις:

A good man muſt lead a life conjoined with virtue, whether according to the neceſſity of the times, he execute the office of a Magiſtrate, or cohabit with Princes, or impoſe Laws, or govern ſome other part of the Common-wealth. If he be not buſied in any of theſe, he muſt addict himſelf to a popular life, either by contemplation, or action, or (which is between both) Inſtruction. For though he ought to follow the action and contemplation of excellent things; yet if the time will not allow him to uſe both, he may make choice of one, and prefer the contemplative life, yet not neglecting the Common wealth. He ſhall therefore marry, to the end he may have iſſue, and addict himſelf to chaſt love, and as occaſion requireth, drink wine freely, and finally maintain his life by due obſervance of Vertue, and be ready to reſign it, if there be neceſſity, taking care to be buried in his own Country, according to the rites thereof.

Thus there are three kinds of life, the *Active*, and *Contemplative*, and that which conſiſts of *both*. As the voluptuous is eſteemed beneath the dignity of a man, ſo is the contemplative preferred before the reſt. A good man ſhall addict himſelf to the Government of the Common-wealth, by choice, not chance; for the active life is converſant in civil affairs. That life is beſt which is led according to Vertue and Nature; the next is that which is a mean condition, as to both; theſe are both expetible. But the life which is conjoyned with Vice is to be avoided. A *happy* life differs from a *Good* in this. The happy is always conſonant to Nature, the good ſometimes repugnant to Nature. To the firſt, Virtue onely is not requiſite; to the other, it is requiſite. A *mean* life is that which is placed in mediocrity, not deſtitute of offices. *Rectitudes* in life are according to Virtue, *ſins* according to Vice: *Offices* in the mean kind of life.

To theſe things thus declared we muſt add, that Virtue is a habit deſiring mean pleaſures and griefs, purſuing that which is honeſt, as it is honeſt: Vice is the oppoſite hereto.

*Wiſdom* is the Science of the firſt Cauſes.

*Prudence*, a habit examining and acting good things, as they are good.

*Fortitude*, a habit betwixt *boldneſs* and *Fear*.

*Meekneſs* is a mean betwixt wrath and *ſtupidity*.

*Liberality* is the mean betwixt *Prodigality* and *Penuriouſneſs*.

*Magnimity* is the mean betwixt *Arrogance* and *Puſillanimity*:

* *Magnificence* is the mean betwixt *oſtentation* and *ſordidneſs*.

*Indignation* is the mean betwixt *envy* and *malevolence*.

*Gravity* is the mean betwixt *aſſentation* and *contradiction*.

*Modeſty* is the mean betwixt *impudence* and *Baſhfulneſs*.

*Urbanity* is the mean betwixt *Scurrility* and *Ruſticity*.

† *Friendſhip* is the mean betwixt *dotage* and *enmity*.

*Truth* is the mean betwixt *detraction* and *boaſting*.

*Juſtice* is the mean betwixt *exceſs* and *defect*.

There are other Vertues, part ranked by themſelves, part under the former. As under Juſtice

* *For the text doubtleſs is defective, and thus to be ſupplyed,* μεγαλοπρέπειαν ὃ μεσότητα βαναυσίας καὶ μικροπρεπείας. Νέμεσιν δὲ μεσότητα φθονερείας καὶ ὀνοχαιρεκακίας. *See Ariſt. Nicom. 4. 2. and Mag. mor. 1. 28.*

† *But Ariſt. otherwiſe placing Friendſhip betwixt Arrogation and Derogation.*

Juſtice are, εὐσέβεια, ὁσιότης, χρηστότης, εὐκοινωνησία, εὐσυναλλαξία, under Temperance εὐκοσμία, εὐταξία, αὐτάρκεια, εὐτυχία, φιλοπονία, deſined thus.

Εὐσέβεια, is a habit of worſhipping the Gods and Demons, a mean betwixt *Atheiſm* and δεισιδαιμονία.

Ὁσιότης, a habit obſerving right towards the Gods and the dead, a mean betwixt ἀνοσιότης, and ſomething that wants a name.

Χρηστότης, a habit of doing well voluntarily for their own ſakes: a mean betwixt πονηρία, and ſomething that wants a name.

Εὐκοινωνησία, a habit, rendring men grateful in Society, a mean betwixt ἀκοινωνησία, and ſomething that wants a name.

Εὐσυναλλαξία, a habit avoiding injuſtice in Contracts: a mean betwixt ἀδικία, and ſomething that wants a name, which pertaineth to *extream right*.

Εὐκοσμία, a habit of obſerving order, a mean between Ἀταξία, and ſomething that wants a name.

Αὐτάρκεια, a habit liberally content with the preſent, a mean betwixt πενία and πολυτέλεια.

Εὐτυχία, a habit of ſuſtaining grievous things unconquered, a mean betwixt ἀτυχία, and ἀειμαχιότης.

Φιλοπονία, a habit performing excellent things indefatigably, a mean betwix μαλακία, and ματαιοπονία.

Laſtly, *Probity* is a virtue conſiſting of all the reſt; it is perfect, as well becauſe it rendreth good things honeſt and profitable, as for that it deſireth honeſt things for their own ſake.

## CHAP. II.

### *OECONOMICK.*

HAving thus explained the Virtues and the chief Heads of *Ethick*, it remaineth that we ſpeak of *Oeconomick* and *Politick*, for as much as Man is by Nature a *Civil Creature*. The firſt Common-wealth is the lawful congreſſion of man and woman, for procreation of children, and ſociety of life. This is called Οἶκος, a *Family*, it is the ground and beginning of a City. A Family ſeemeth to be a little City, for marriage being contracted, and children growing up one under another, and join'd one to another, there is deduced another family, and ſo a third, and a fourth. Of theſe is conſtituted Neighbourhood and a *City*, for many Neighbourhoods make us up a City. Thus as a Family hath in it the ſeeds of a City, ſo likewiſe of a Common-wealth, for in a Family there are the prints of *Monarchy*, an *Ariſtocracy*, and a *Democracy*. The Society between Parents and children repreſents a Monarchy; that betwixt man and woman an Ariſtocracy, as being contracted for iſſue, mutual comfort and aſſiſtance. To theſe is added a *ſervant*, appointed to be ſuch by nature, able for ſervice; but not to live of himſelf, requiring therefore a Maſter to govern him. Of all theſe reduced to a community is conſtituted a *Family*.

The government of a Family is by nature given to *Men*, for the counſel of *Women* is weaker, *Children* are not yet arrived to it, *Servants* never can. The whole ordering therefore of a family depends upon the Man; the whole Prudence of *Oeconomy* therefore is in Man: This is partly *Paternal*, partly *Nuptial*, partly *Herile*, partly *Acquiſitive*. For, as an Army requireth *Proviſion*, a City, *Merchandiſe*, Art, *Inſtruments*; ſo a Family *Neceſſaries*, as well for common life as convenience. Of theſe the Maſter of the Family takes the firſt care, how honeſtly to encreaſe his revenues, and moderate his expences. He, as being the head of the Family, ought to be skilful in many things, as in *Agriculture*, *Graſing*, *Metals*, whereby he may advantage himſelf without doing injury to others. Of Acquiſition there are two kinds, one better than the other; that by *Nature*, this by *Art*.

## CHAP. III.

### *POLITICK.*

THus much concerning *Oeconomick*; we come next to ſpeak in ſhort of *Politick*.

Firſt then, *Cities* are conſtituted as well for the natural propenſity of man to ſociety, as for utility. A City is the moſt perfect ſociety. A Citizen is he who is concern'd in the Magiſtracy. A City is a compleat number of ſuch perſons, which proceedeth ſo far, as that it be not a diſagreeing within it ſelf, not contemptible, but may conveniently provide for life, and defend it ſelf againſt enemies.

*Oeconomical* prudence is one kind, *Legiſlative* another, *Politick* a third, *Military* a fourth.

A City is govern'd either by one man, or ſome few, or all; and each of theſe either rightly, or unjuſtly: Rightly, when the Princes reſpect the common good; unjuſtly, when they conſider their own private intereſt. The right are *Monarchy*, *Ariſtocracy*, *Democracy*; the unjuſt, *Tyranny*, *Olygarchy*, *Ochlocracy*. There is alſo a mixt Government, conſiſting of the good kinds. And whereas a Commonwealth is often changed into better or worſe; that is beſt which is guided according to *Virtue*; that worſt, which according to *Vice*.

They who command, or adviſe, or judge in *Democracy*, are taken out of *all*, either by ſuffrage, or lot: In *Olygarchy*, out of the *Richer*; in *Ariſtocracy*, out of the *Beſt*.

Sedition in Cities is either according to *Reaſon* or *Intereſt*; the firſt, when equals are reduced to unequal extremities; the ſecond, for honour, power, or gain.

Commonwealths are overthrown either by *force* or *fraud*. They laſt longeſt which reſpect the publick utility.

Courts of *Judicature*, *Proceſſes*, *Pleas*, and *Magiſtracies*, are ordered according to the forms of every Commonwealth. The moſt general commands are *Prieſthood*, *Generalſhip*, *Admiralty*, ναυαρχία, ἀγορανομία, γυμνασιαρχία, γυναικονομία, παιδονομία, ἀστυνομία, ταμιεία, νομοφυλακία, περιπολεία, whereof ſome relate to Cities, others to Havens and Traffick.

The office of a Commonwealths-man is to reform a Commonwealth, which is much harder than to erect one; and to divide the common people into two parts, one for neceſſary offices, the other for convenient: *Mechanicks*, *Husbandmen*,

*men*, and *Merchants* are for the neceſſary ſort, continually ſerving the Commonwealth; but *Soldiers* and *Councellors*, who are ſervants for virtue, and perform noble things, are the more excellent.

Old men are moſt proper to be Councellors, and alſo Prieſts to perform the ſacred rites; young men for War. This order is exceeding ancient, firſt conſtituted by the *Ægyptians*, who, amongſt other things excellently diſpoſed, appointed the Temples of the Gods to be built in the higheſt places, and the lands of private perſons to be diſpoſed, partly at the confines of the Country, partly near the City, whereby both parts of the Country ſhould meet in Tribute and Tax. They likewiſe well ordered the inſtitution of *Sodalities*, and a publick care for the education of children, and that thoſe who are too young or too old, ſhould not marry, to prevent their having weak children. Likewiſe, that nothing mixt be taken away, nothing perfect expoſed, abortion not procured. Thus much of *Politick*.

# THE FOURTH PART.

## CHAP. I.

### *Of METAPHYSICK.*

THE *fourth* and laſt part of Philoſophy, which treateth of *Ens* in general, is by *Ariſtotle* termed ſometimes, *Firſt*, *Philoſophy*, ſometimes *Wiſdom*, ſometimes *Theology*, by his *followers* and *Interpreters* called *Metaphyſick*, from the order thereof, as *Alexander Aphrodiſæus* and *Philoponus* affirm; being placed after *Phyſick*, as treating of a leſs known, and more noble object.

Upon this ſubject, there are fourteen books of *Ariſtotle* extant, which, ſaith *Alexander Aphrodiſæus*, by the method of the diſcourſe and ſtile, are eaſily evinced to be his.

(a) *Metaphyſick* conſidereth *Ens* as it is *Ens*, and the primary cauſe thereof. (b) *Ens* is Analogous, prædicated primarily of ſubſtance, which is one eſſence; of Accidents, not ſimply, but in regard of their common attribution to ſubſtance. *Ens* thus being one analogically, the ſcience thereof is one likewiſe; but it treateth chiefly of ſubſtance, becauſe that is the firſt eſſence upon which the reſt depend, and from which they are denominated.

(a) *Metaphyſ. lib.* 6 *c.p.* 1.
(b) *Lib.* 4 *cap.* 2.

## CHAP. II.

### *Of the firſt Principle.*

THE firſt moſt common axiom, or complex principle, is this, *It is impoſſible that the ſame thing ſhould be, and not be, in the ſame, and according to the ſame reſpect.*

Cap. 3.

To this principle, all demonſtrations and opinions are reduced It is it ſelf indemonſtrable, as being the firſt; otherwiſe there would be an infinite progreſſion in demonſtration. There is nothing more known by which it may be proved, no greater abſurdity than the denyal of it, that an adverſary can be reduced to,

Cap. 4, 5.

With the firſt *negative* principle, the firſt *affirmative* hath a near affinity. *It is neceſſary that every thing be predicated affirmativily or negatively of another.* It is not true in matter of a future contingent determinately, but only indeterminately. This affirmative principle therefore is not abſolutely the firſt, yet it is true; neither can there be a medium betwixt contradictory propoſitions, no more than betwixt even and uneven numbers: Every propoſition either affirms or denies, therefore every propoſition is either true or falſe; between theſe there is no medium.

Cap. 7.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of Subſtance and Accident.*

(a) OF *Ens* in general there are three Diviſions, firſt, by *Accident* and *per ſe*; ſecondly, *Potential* and *Active*; thirdly, *Intentional* and *Real*.

(a) *Lib.* 6. *c.* 2.

Of *Ens by Accident*, there is no Science, for it is in a manner *Non-ens*, it hath no cauſe *per ſe*, it is not generated or corrupted *per ſe*; it is not always, nor for the moſt part, nor neceſſary, whereas Science is of things contrary to theſe.

(b) *Ens per ſe* is divided into ten *Categories*. The firſt is *Subſtance*, and the firſt *Ens*, and conſequently the firſt *Category*, for it is predicated *in quid* of the firſt Subject, whereas Accidents are predicated *in quale* or *quantum*. Again, Subſtance only is *Ens per ſe*, Accidents are *Ens*, as they are Affections of Subſtance. Subſtance is the firſt *Ens*, *by Reaſon* or *Definition*, becauſe Accidents are defined by Subſtance. *By Knowledg*, becauſe the Knowledg of Accidents depends on the Knowledg of Subſtance. *By Time*, for there is ſome Subſtance without Accident, as God and Intelligences, but there is no Accident without a Subſtance. Likewiſe material Subſtances are

(b) *Lib.* 7. *c.* 1.

precedent in Time, at leaſt to ſome Accidents, which arrive unto them after they have ſome time generated. And laſtly, *by Nature*, for the Subject is, by Nature, before that which inhereth in it. Hence this part of Phyſick treateth only of Subſtance.

(c) Subject or Subſtance is threefold; *Matter*, *Form*, *Compoſitum*. The two latter are more *Ens*, than matter, tho Matter be truly Subſtance, as being the firſt and laſt Subject which remaineth, tho all the Affections of a Body be taken away. This is firſt Matter, which in it ſelf is neither compleat Subſtance, nor Quantitative, nor in any other *Category*. Neither is it firſt Subſtance, for that is ſeparable, and may exiſt by its own power without others. That is likewiſe a determinate, perfect, ſingular Subſtance; but Matter cannot be ſeparated from Form, neither is it ſingular or determinable.

(d) Form is that which the thing it ſelf is ſaid to be, *per ſe*, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, *The being of a thing what it was*, the whole common Nature and Eſſence of a Thing, anſwerable to the Definition. Compound ſenſible Subſtances have a proper Definition; but *Ens by Accident*, conſiſting of Subject and Accident, hath not, tho it may be by Accident deſcribed and explained. Even *Categorical* Accidents being one *per ſe*, and of one Nature, have a *Quiddity* and Definition, not ſimply as Subſtances, but after their own manner.

(e) *Matter* and *Form* are not properly generated, but the whole *Compoſitum*, whereto *Idea*'s [ſeparate Subſtances] confer nothing, neither as efficient, nor exemplary Cauſes.

(f) The common ſubſtantial, or formal parts of the thing defined, are to be put into the Definition of the whole; but the material parts of the *Individuum* it ſelf, muſt not.

(c) Cap. 3.
(d) Cap. 4.
(e) Cap. 8.
(f) Cap. 10.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Of Power and Act.*

(a) NExt *Subſtance*, we come to *Power* and *Act*. Power is either *Active* or *Paſſive*: Active Power is *the Principle of changing other Things, or acting on another, in as much as it is another*. Paſſive Power is in a manner the ſame with Active, for the motion of Paſſion and Action is really the ſame, neither can one be without the other, tho ſimply they are diverſe, being in different Subjects, Paſſive in the Patient, Active in the Agent.

(b) Of Powers, ſome are *void of Reaſon*, as the Power of warming; ſome *Rational*, as Arts. The Rational are of Contraries, as Medicine is of Health and Sick; the Irrational of one only, as Heat produceth Heat.

(c) The Power (contrary to the *Megarick* Philoſophers, followers of *Zeno*) remains, altho not reduced to Act; for we call a man *Architect*, tho he be not actually employed in *Building*. Again, Animals have Senſe, even when they are not in Act. Thirdly, it were impoſſible any thing could be, which were not actually. *Poſſible* is that whoſe Power, if it were reduced to Act, would not imply any impoſſibility.

(a) Lib. 9. c. 9.
(b) Cap. 2.
(c) Cap. 3.

(d) They are miſtaken, who think there is any thing poſſible; which ſhall never actually be, or that there are Powers whoſe Acts are impoſſible; for hence it would follow, that all things ſhould be poſſible, nothing impoſſible. *Poſſible* is that which doth or may follow from ſome Power; if it never followeth, or cometh out of that Power, it is impoſſible. That which is poſſible therefore, muſt at ſome time or other be in Act.

(e) Of Powers there are three kinds, ſome *Natural*, as ſenſes; ſome *acquired* by *Cuſtom*, as playing on a Pipe; ſome by *Diſcipline*, as Arts. The two laſt require previous Operations, the natural do not. Natural and irrational Powers are neceſſarily reduced to Act, when the Agent and Patient are at a due diſtance, and there is nothing betwixt to hinder them. The rational Powers are not ſo, for they are free to Act or not to Act as they pleaſe.

(f) Act is, when the thing that was in Power is otherwiſe than when it was in Power.

(g) All Act is before Power, and before all Nature which is contained under Power, by *Reaſon*, *Eſſence* and *Time*. *By Reaſon*, becauſe Power is defined by Act. *By Time*, becauſe tho Power be temporal before Act in the ſame numerical Object; for a man may firſt be learned, before he actually be ſuch; yet, in different things of the ſame Species, Act is ever before Power in time; for nothing can be made or reduced from Power, unleſs by an agent actually exiſtent.

Laſtly, Act is before Power *in Eſſence*; firſt, becauſe it is later in Generation; for Generation beginneth from the imperfect State of a Thing, and proceedeth to the perfect. Now all Generation proceedeth from Power to Act. Secondly, Act is the end of Power; but the end, as it is later in Generation, ſo is it more perfect by Nature, and firſt in Intention.

(d) Cap. 6.
(e) Cap. 5.
(f) Cap. 6.
(g) Cap. 8.

## CHAP. V.

### *Of True and Falſe.*

(a) THe firſt Diviſion of *Ens* is into *Intentional* and *Real*. (b) The Intentional is either *true* or *falſe*. The intellect aſſerteth *truly*, if its judgment be conformable to the thing; *falſly*, if not conformable, for there is compoſition and diviſion in the things themſelves, as well as in the intellect. Whence if the intellect compound things by affirmation, as they are really compounded; or divide them by negation, as they are really divided, it aſſerteth truly, otherwiſe falſly. True and falſe are in the *ſimple* apprehenſion of things, but ſimply, not enunciatively, ſo as that truth is nothing, but a ſimple perception of the object: falſhood a non-perception or ignorance thereof, tho ignorance be not properly falſity. Whence ſimple apprehenſion may be true in it ſelf, falſe it cannot be, for falſity requireth compoſition.

*Complex* truth and falſhood may be of the ſame ſeparate ſubſtances.

He cannot be deceived in the knowledg of things *immoveable*, whoſoever hath once conceived them *immutable*; for either he will judg always truth, or always err, becauſe things

(a) Lib. 5. c. 14. cap. 6.
(b) Lib. 6. cap. 4.

things immoveable are always in the ſame manner. The viciſſitude and deception, and true and falſe judgment, is only in things contingent and mutable.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of One, the Same, and Diverſe.*

(a) Cap. 2. (*a*) ONE is an affection of *Ens*, not a *ſubſtance* as *Pythogoras* and *Plato* affirmed, but a *Categoreme*, prædicated of every thing as it is *Ens*. To *one* is oppoſite *many*, by *privative* oppoſition, and therefore one is manifeſted by many, as indiviſible by diviſible, the privation by the habit. For diviſible is more known to ſenſe than indiviſible, and multitude than unity. To *one* are referred *the ſame*, *equal*, *like*; to *many*, *divers*, *unequal*, *unlike*.

(b) Cap. 3. (*b*) Things are *diverſe* either by *Genus* or *Species*: by *Genus* thoſe which have not the ſame matter, or a mutual generation; or whereof one pertains to *corruptible* ſubſtance, the other to *incorruptible*. *By ſpecies*, thoſe which have the ſame *genus*. Genus is that wherein thoſe things that are diverſe are ſaid to be the ſame according to ſubſtance.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of Immortal, Eternal and Immoveable Subſtances.*

(a) Lib. 12. or 14. cap. 6. (*a*) SUbſtance is threefold, two kinds, *natural*, whereof one is *corruptible*, as *Animal*; the other *ſempiternal*, as Heaven. The third is *immoveable*.

That there is a perpetual immoveable ſubſtance, is proved thus. Subſtances are firſt *Ens*, therefore if all ſubſtances are corruptible, all things likewiſe muſt be corruptible; which is falſe, for there is an eternal local *motion*, circular, proper to Heaven, which it is not poſſible ſhould have had a beginning, or ſhall have a diſſolution, no more than time. If therefore *Time* be eternal, as motion, there muſt neceſſarily be ſome incorruptible and eternal ſubſtance, not only that wherein that eternal motion exiſts, the Heaven it ſelf; but one ſubſtance, which ſo moveth, that tho it remain its ſelf moveable, yet it moveth others from eternity to eternity, not having only the power of moving, but being continually in the act of motion. For *Plato* and the reſt, who conceived God to have done nothing for a great while, err, becauſe that power were fruſtraneous which were not reduced to act. Beſides, motion would not have been eternal, unleſs the moving ſubſtance were not only eternal, and in perpetual actual motion; but ſuch likewiſe, that it could not but it muſt move always, as being a pure act void of power.

Hence the ſubſtances which cauſe eternal motion, are void of matter, for they move from an eternal act, and are void of all power.

In things that ſometimes are, ſometimes are not, power is precedent to act, but ſimply and abſolutely act is precedent to power. For, neither things natural or artificial are reduced from power to act, but by ſomething that actually exiſts. Now if the ſame thing always return by a circular motion, it neceſſarily followeth, that there is ſomething eternal which remaineth ever the ſame, and operateth in the ſame manner. Such an eternal firſt moving ſubſtance is the firſt Heaven. The viciſſitude of *Generation* and *corruption* is not cauſed by the firſt Heaven, for that moveth always in the ſame manner, but by the inferior Orbs, eſpecially the Sun, which by his acceſſion bringeth life, by his receſſion death to all things mortal

Thus is the firſt Heaven *eternal*, for it is moved with eternal motion; beſides which there is ſomething which always moveth, and is never moved it ſelf, and is *eternal*, and *ſubſtance*, and *act*.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of Gods.*

(a) Cap. 7. THis *firſt mover*, moveth in the ſame manner as things appetible and intelligible, that is, it ſo moveth others, as it ſelf remaineth immoveable. The motion of the firſt Agent, as it is the firſt efficient cauſe, conſiſteth in that influence thereof, whereby it concurreth effectively with the inferior Intelligences in moving its own orb. Wherefore the efficience of the firſt mover is an application of the powers of the inferior movers to their proper works, wherein he concurreth with them actively, and independently. Thus the Intelligences move the Heavens, not for the generation of inferior things (for the end muſt be more noble than the means) but for that chief and amiable good, whereunto they endeavour to be like, as their ultimate end.

The firſt mover is void of *mutation*, an *ens*, wholly and ſimply neceſſary, and conſequently the principle of all. Upon this firſt principle depend Heaven and nature, becauſe without him, their ultimate end and firſt efficient, nothing can be, or be operated.

This firſt mover, *God*, enjoyeth the moſt perfect life, perpetual and moſt pleaſant, which abſolute felicity is proper to him; for as much as he underſtandeth and contemplateth himſelf with infinite delight. For, as we are happy in contemplation that laſts but a little while, ſo is God moſt happy, in the infinite and moſt perfect contemplation of himſelf, who is of all things moſt admirable.

God is *an eternal living being*, *the beſt of beings*, *an immovable ſubſtance*, *ſeparate from ſenſible things*, *void of corporeal quantity*, *without parts*, *and indiviſible*; for ſuch muſt that principle or ſubſtance be which moveth in infinite time. Nothing finite hath infinite power. All magnitude muſt be either *finite* or *infinite*. Finite magnitude cannot move in infinite time; infinite magnitude there is not, as we proved in the *Phyſick*.

God is *impaſſible*, *not ſubject to alteration*; the firſt local motion, which is the circular, not being competible to God, becauſe he is immovable, it followeth that other motions that induce paſſion or alteration, and are later than local motion, cannot likewiſe be competent to him.

## CHAP. IX.

*Of Intelligences.*

(a) Cap. 8. (a) BEsides this *first Substance* the mover of the first Heaven, there must likewise be other substances separate from matter, eternal and immovable; president over the motions of the inferior orbs; so that after what number and order those orbs are disposed, accordiug to the same are these external moving, and immovable substances ordered.

From the number of the *motions* may be collected the numberof the *Sphears*, and consequently of the substances moving, which according to *Aristotle* are 47.

Heaven is numerically *one*, because the first mover is one. It is an ancient Tradition that these first substances that move the Heavens are *Gods*. This opinion is truly divine; but what is added, that they had the shape of men, or some other Animal, was only invented for perswasion of the common people, for the use of Laws, and the convenience of Life. Thus much may serve for a short view of his *Metaphysicks*.

# THEOPHRASTUS.

## CHAP. I.

*His Country, Parents, Masters.*

THEOPHRASTUS succeeded *Aristotle*, he was Born at *Eresus*, (as * *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, and others affirm) a Sea-town of *Lesbos*, seated upon a Hill, as (a) *Strabo* describes it, distant from *Sigrium* 18 *Stadia*

* De exil.

(a) Lib. 13.

(b) Laert. (c) Suid.

His Father was named *Melantes*, as (b) *Athenodorus* affirmeth, according to (c) others, *Leo*, by profession a *Fuller*. *Theophrastus* was first called *Tyrtamus*. He heard *Leucippus* in his own Country, afterwards went to *Plato*, and lastly became an auditor of *Aristotle*, who changing the roughness of his Name, called him, as *Suidas* saith, first *Euphrastus*, afterwards *Theophrastus*, from the Divine Eloquence of his speech, wherein (as *Cicero*, (d) *Pliny*, *Laertius*, (e) *Strabo*, and others aver) he excelled all the rest of his Disciples.

(d) Præf. lib. 1. (e) Lib. 13. (f) Laert.

(f) He was likewise so quick of apprehension, that what *Plato* had said of *Aristotle* and *Xenocrates*, *Aristotle* apply'd to him and *Callisthenes*. *Theophrastus* was acute to admiration, ready to apprehend every thing that he taught; *Callisthenes* was dull: So that one needed a Bridle, the other a spur.

## CHAP. II.

*His Profession of Philosophy, and Disciples.*

(a) Laert. Suid.

ARistotle retiring to *Chalcis*, in the 2*d* year of the 114*th* Olympiad (a) being importuned by his Disciples to appoint a successor, made choice of *Theophrastus* (as hath been already related in the Life of *Aristotle*) who thereupon undertook the Government of the School, and *Aristotle* dying, lived in his Garden, *Demetrius Phalerius* cohabiting with him. This time wherein

(b) Lib. 15. c. 1.

*Theophrastus* flourished, is reckoned by (b) *Pliny* to be about the 440*th* year from the building of *Rome*; (c) 390 years, as (d) *Salmasius* rightly reads, before that time wherein *Pliny* wrote.

(c) Plin. (d) Exer. Plin.

(e) *Hermippus* saith, he went at certain hours to the School, neatly dressed, and there sitting down, discoursed in such manner, that he omitted no gesture suitable to the Argument whereupon he treated, so that once to express a Glutton, he licked his Lips.

(e) Athen.

(f) In the fourth year of the 118*th* Olympiad, *Xenippus* being Archon, *Sophocles*, son of *Amphiclides*, procured a Law to be made, forbidding all Philosophers to keep publick Schools, unless such only, as the Senate and People should think fit to License; if any did otherwise, he should be put to Death. By this decree, saith *Athenæus*, he banished all the Philosophers out of the City, amongst the rest *Theophrastus*, who the year following returned, when as *Philo*, a Disciple of *Aristotle*, accused *Sophocles* for having done contrary to Law: Whereupon the Athenians revers'd the decree, fined *Sophocles* five Talents, and called home the Philosophers; by which means, *Theophrastus* returning, was reinstated in the School.

(f) Laert. Athen. lib. 13.

*Laertius* saith, there came to hear him 2000 Disciples; *Suidas* saith (if there be no mistake in the Number) 4470. of whom were *Strato*, his Successor, *Demetrius*, *Phalereus*, *Nichomachus*, son of *Aristotle*, whom *Aristippus* saith, he much affected; *Erasistratus* the Physician, as some affirm, and *Menander* the Comick Poet.

## CHAP. III.

*His Vertues and Apophthegms.*

(a) HE was exceeding Learned and Studious, as *Pamphila* affirmeth.

(a) Laert.

(b) He was very liberal in conferring benefits; and a great cherisher of Learning.

(b) Laert.

(c) He

(c) *Athen. l.* 5. (c) He made Collections of Mony for the Conventions of Philoſophers, not for Luxury, but for temperance, and learned diſcourſes

(d) *Plut. adv. Colet.* (d) He twice freed his Country, being under the oppreſſion of Tyrants.

(e) *Laert.* (e) *Caſſander* ſon of *Antipater* much eſteemed him, and *Ptolomy* the firſt wrote Letters to him.

(f) *Laert.* (f) He was ſo much honoured by the *Athenians*, that *Agnonides* accuſing him of Impiety, very hardly eſcaped from being fined himſelf.

(a) *Laert.* (a) Of his Apophthegms are remembered theſe. He ſaid, It is more ſafe truſtiug to an unbridled horſe, than intemperate ſpeech.

(b) *Laert.* (b) To a young man at a Feaſt ſilent: If you hold your peace, ſaith he, becauſe you are fooliſh, then you are wiſe; but, if you are wiſe, you do fooliſhly in holding your peace.

(c) *Laert. Stob.* (c) He uſed to ſay, Of all things that are ſpent, time is the moſt precious.

(d) *Plut. vit. Demoſt.* (d) Being demanded, as *Ariſto* ſaith, what he thought of *Demoſthenes*; he anſwer'd, he is worthy of this City; of *Demades*; he is above the City.

(e) *Symp. l.* 2. (e) To *Philip* Son of *Caſſander* he ſaith, I wonder your eyes do not make muſick, the pipe of your noſe coming ſo directly upon them.

(f) *Plut. de Anar.* (f) To prove that riches are not to be lov'd and admir'd, he inſtanced *Callias*, a rich *Athenian*, and *Iſmenias* a *Theban*; theſe ſaith he, uſe the ſame things, as *Socrates* and *Epaminondas*.

(g) *Plut. de frat. amor.* (g) He ſaith we muſt not love ſtrangers, to the end we may make tryal of them, but make tryal of them to the end we may love them.

(h) *Plut. de ſanit. tuend.* (h) He ſaid the Soul paid a dear rent for her habitation in the body.

(i) *Stob.* (i) He ſaid Falſhood raiſed from Calumny and Envy, endureth a little while, but ſoon periſheth.

(k) *Stob. Ser.* 101. (k) Seeing a young man bluſh, Be of good comfort, ſaith he, that is the complexion of Virtue.

(l) *Ser.* 121. (l) He uſed to ſay, Stand in awe of thy ſelf, and thou ſhalt not be aſhamed before others.

(m) *Ser.* 136. (m) He ſaid, The good need but few Laws, for things are not accommodated to Laws, but Laws to things.

(n) *Ser.* 139. (n) The Envious are more unhappy than others in this reſpect, that they are troubled not only at their misfortunes, but alſo at the good fortunes of others.

(o) *Ser.* 141. (o) Being demanded what preſerved humane Life, he ſaid, beneficence, reward, and puniſhment.

(p) *Ser.* 162. (p) He ſaid, Honours are to be acquired, not by converſation and favour, but by action.

(q) *Ser.* 185. (q) Being demanded what Love is, he anſwered, The paſſion of an idle Soul.

(r) *Ser.* 193. (r) He ſaid a woman ought not to be ſeen her ſelf, nor behold others richly attired, for both are inticements to diſhoneſty.

(ſ) *Ser.* 297. (ſ) He ſaid, Love is an exceſſive deſire of ſomething irrational, the entrance thereof eaſy, the diſingagement difficult.

## CHAP. IV.

### *His Will and Death.*

(a) His Will is thus delivered by *Laertius*. (a) *Laert.*

*BE all well; but if any thing happen otherwiſe, thus we give Order. All thoſe Goods which belong to the Houſe, I bequeath to* Melantes *and* Pancreon *Sons of* Leo; *Thoſe which are ſet apart for* Hipparchus, *I will be thus diſpoſed. Firſt, That the Study and Ornaments belonging thereunto be perfected, and if any thing may be added more to Beautifie them, that it be done. Next, that the Statue of* Ariſtotle *be ſet up in the Temple, and the other Donaries which were before in the Temple. Moreover that the little Walk which is near the School be Built new, not worſe than it was before, and that the Maps of the World be placed in the lower Walk. That an Altar likewiſe be Built, wanting nothing of Perfection and Splendor. I will that the Statue of* Nicomachus *as big as the Life be finiſhed; it is in* Praxiteles's *hands; let him go on with it. Let it be placed whereſoever they ſhall think good, who have the diſpoſal of the reſt, and are named in my Will. Thus much for the Temple and Donaries. My Land at* Stagira *I bequeath to* Callinus, *all my Books to* Neleus. *The Garden and Walk, and all the Houſes belonging to the Garden, I bequeath to my Friends hereafter named, that they may Exerciſe themſelves, and Study Philoſophy therein; for Men cannot always be Abroad. But with Condition, that they do not Alienate it, nor pretend any Propriety thereto, but eſteem it a thing Sacred in common Poſſeſſions, making uſe of all things therein as becometh juſt and loving Friends. The Perſons to whom I Will that this be in Common, are,* Hipparchus, Neleus, Strato, Callinus, Demotimus, Demaratus, Calliſthenes, Melantes, Pancreon *and* Nicippus. *Let alſo* Ariſtotle, *Son of* Midias *and* Pythias, *if he deſire to Study Philoſophy, partake likewiſe of the ſame Priviledg; and let the moſt Ancient of the Overſeers take great care of him, that he be inſtructed as well as is poſſible in Philoſophy. Let us be buried in that part of the Garden, which they ſhall think moſt convenient, not erecting a Monument, or any thing that is Sumptuous over our Graves. Thus let all things be ordered according as is ſaid; the Temple, Monument, Garden, and Walk repaired; let* Pompylus, *who dwelleth in them, take charge of them, and of other things as he did heretofore, for whoſe pains therein, let the Poſſeſſors thereof conſider him. As for* Pompylus *and* Threpta, *who*

*who have been long ſince manumitted, and done us good Service, if there be any thing which we have beſtowed upon them, or they themſelves have required, as alſo the* 2000 *Drachms which I appointed to be given to them and* Hipparchus, *let them firmly poſſeſs it all, as I have often expreſſed to* Melantes *and* Pancreon, *who aſſented thereunto. Moreover I beſtow on them* Somatales *and the Girl. Of my Servants, I manumit* Molon *and* Cimon, *and* Parmenon; *as for* Manes *and* Callias, *when they ſhall have lived four years in the Gardens, diſcharging their Office unblameably, I will they be ſet at Liberty. Of the Domeſtick Utenſils, let the Overſeers beſtow on* Pompylus *as many as they think fit, and ſell the reſt. To* Demotimus *I give* Cario; *to* Neleus, Donax; *let* Eubius *be ſold. Let* Hipparchus *give to* Callinus 3000 *Drachms. And for* Melantes *and* Pancreon, *if we did not look upon* Hipparchus, *as having heretofore been very beneficial to us, and now quite Shipwrack'd in his Fortunes, we ſhould have appointed him a Joynt-eſtate with* Melantes *and* Pancreon. *But becauſe I conceive it were not eaſie for them to be joyned in the ordering of one Family with him, and that it would be more to their Advantage to receive ſomething certain from* Hipparchus, *for theſe Reaſons let* Hipparchus *give to each of them,* Melantes *and* Pancreon, *a Talent. Let him likewiſe duly furniſh the Overſeers with all Charges neceſſary for the performance of the forementioned Works; which done, let* Hipparchus *be free and diſcharged from all Debts and Covenants to me. If any Benefit come to* Hipparchus *from* Chalcis *on my behalf, let him wholly enjoy it as his own. Be theſe the Overſeers of thoſe things contained in my Will;* Hipparchus, Neleus, Strabo, Callinus, Demotimus, Calliſthenes, Cteſarchus.

*Copies of the Will of* Theophraſtus, *ſigned with his Ring, are kept; the firſt by* Hegeſias *Son of* Hipparchus. *Witneſſes,* Callipus *a* Pelanean; Philomelus, *an* Euonymean; Lyſander, *an* Hybæan; Philion, *an* Alopecian. *The ſecond* Olympiodorus *hath atteſted by the ſame Perſons. The third is in the hands of* Adimantus, *delivered to his Son* Androſthenes. *Witneſſes,* Aimneſtus *Son of* Cleobulus; Lyſiſtratus *Son of* Phidion, *a* Thaſian; Strato *Son of* Arceſilaus, *a* Lampſacene; Theſippus *Son of* Theſippus, *of the Potters ſtreet*; Dioſcorides, *Son of* Dionyſius, *an* Epicephiſian. Thus (ſaith *Laertius*) was his Will.

*Laert.* He died Old, having lived Eighty five years, his Spirits being waſted, as *Suidas* affirms, with continual Writing; and, upon the Marriage of one of his Diſciples, giving himſelf ſome Intermiſſion and Reſt, it occaſion'd his end.

* *Tuſcul. l.* 4. As he lay upon his death-bed, * *Cicero* ſaith, *He blamed Nature for giving Harts and Crows ſo long life that could do no good thereby, and to Man who could do moſt good, ſo ſhort; whereas if man had been allowed longer time, his life might have been adorned with the perfection of arts and learning.* Thus he complained, that as ſoon as he came within the view of theſe, he was taken away.

His Diſciples came to him, and asked him if he had any thing to ſay to them; *Nothing,* ſaith he, *but that the life of man loſeth many pleaſures only for glory. When we begin to live, then we dye: nothing is more unprofitable than the deſire of glory. But be happy, and either give over ſtudy, for it is very laborious, or go perſeverantly through it, for it is of great glory. The vanity of life is much greater than the benefit thereof. But, I have not time to adviſe you what to do; do you conſider at leiſure what is beſt for you:* In ſaying which words, he expired. The whole people of *Athens* followed his body on foot to the grave. *Laert.*

## CHAP. V.

### *His Writings.*

HE left many *Writings*, whereof, ſaith *Laertius*, becauſe they are full of all kind of learning, I thought good to give this Catalogue.

*Firſt Analyticks* 3.
*Latter Analyticks* 7.
*Of the Analyſts of Syllogiſms*, 1.
*Epitome of Analyticks* 1.
*Places of Deduction* 2.
*Agoniſticks*, concerning the Theory of *Eriſtick* arguments.
*Of the Senſes* 1.
*To Anaxagoras* 1.
*Of Anaxagoras* 1.
*Of Anaximenes* 1.
*Of Archelaus* 1.
*Of ſalt, nitre, allom* 1.
*Of Combuſtibles:* or, as the other Edition, of things that may be *petrified* 2.
*Of indiviſible lines* 1.
*Of Auſcultation* 2.
*Of Winds* 1.
*The differences of Virtue* 1.
*Of a Kingdom* 1.
*Of the Diſcipline of a King* 1.
*Of Lives* 3.
*Of old age* 1.
*Of the Aſtrology of Democritus* 1.
*Of ſublime things* 1.
*Of Apparitions* 1.
*Of humour, colour, fleſh* 1.
*Of the Deſcription of the world* 1.
*Of Man* 1.
*A collection of the Doctrines of* Diogenes 1.
*Of Definitions* 3.
*Erotick* 1.
*Another of Love* 1.
*Of Felicity* 1.
*Of Species* 2.
*Of the Epilepſie* 1.
*Of Divine inſpiration* 1.
*Of Empedocles* 1.
*Epichirems* 18.
*Inſtances* 3.
*Of Voluntary* 1.
*Epitome of* Plato's *Commonwealth* 2.

*Of*

Of the diverſity of voice in Creatures of the ſame kind 1.
Of Subitaneous apparitions 1.
Of biting and blows 1.
Of Animals that are ſaid to have wiſdom 7.
Of thoſe which dwell in dry places 1.
Of thoſe which change colour 1.
Of thoſe which dwell in caves 1.
Of Animals 7.
Of Pleaſure according to Ariſtotle 1.
Of Pleaſure, another, 1.
Theſes 24.
Of hot and cold 1.
Of dizzineſs and dimneſs 1.
Of ſweat 1.
Of Affirmation and Negation 1.
Calliſthenes, or of Grief 1.
Of Labours 1.
Of Motion 3.
Of Stones 1.
Of Peſtilence 1.
Of Fainting 1.
Megarick 1.
Of Melancholy 1.
Of Metals 1.
Of Honey 1.
Of the collections of Metrodorus 1.
Sublime diſcourſes 2.
Of Drunkenneſs 1.
Of Laws alphabetically 24.
Epitome of Laws 10.
To Definitions 1.
Of Odors 1.
Of Wine and Oyl.
Firſt propoſitions, 18.
Legiſlative 3.
Politick 6.
Politick according to ſeveral occaſions 4.
Politick Cuſtomes 4.
Of the beſt Commonwealth 1.
Collection of Problems 5.
Of Proverbs 1.
Of Congelation and Liquefaction 1.
Of Fire 2.
Of Winds 1.
Of the Palſey 1.
Of Suffocation 1.
Of Madneſs 1.
Of Paſſions 1.
Of Signes 1.
Sophiſms 2.
Of the ſolution of Syllogiſms 1.
Topicks 2.
Of Puniſhment 2.
Of Hair 1.
Of Tyranny 1.
Of Water 3.
Of ſleep and dreams 1.
Of Friendſhip 3.
Of Ambition 2.
Of Nature 3.
Of Phyſick 17.
Of the Epitome of Phyſicks 2.
Phyſicks 8.
To Natural Philoſophers 1.
Of Natural Hiſtories 10.
Of Natural Cauſes 8.
Of Chyles 5.
Of falſe Pleaſure 1.
Of the Soul 1. Theſis
Of undoubted Faith 1.
Of ſimple dubitations 1.
Harmonicks 1.
Of Virtue 1
Occaſions or Contradictions 1.
Of Sentence 1.
Of Ridiculous 1.
Meridians 2.
Diviſions 2.
Of Differnces 1.
Of Injuries 1.
Of Calumny 1.
Of Praiſe 1.
Of Experience 1.
Epiſtles 3.
Of caſual Animals 1.
Of Selection 1.
Encomiums of the Gods 1.
Of Feſtivals 1.
Of Proſperity 1.
Of Enthymemes 1.
Of Inventions 2.
Moral diſputes 1.
Moral deſcriptions 1.
Of Tumult 1.
Of Hiſtory 1.
Of the judgment of Syllogiſms 1.
Of flattery 1.
Of the Sea 1.
To Caſſander, of a Kingdom 1.
Of Comedy 1.
Of Meteors 1.
Of Speech 1.
Collection of words 1.
Solutions 1.
Of Muſick 3.
Of Meteors 1.
Megacles 1.
Of Laws 1.
Of things contrary to Law 1.
A Collection of the Doctrines of Xenocrates 1.
Confabulations 1.
Of an Oath 1.
Rhetorical Precepts 1.
Of Riches 1.
Of Poeſy 1.
Problems, Politick, Ethick, Phyſick, Erotick 1.
Proverbs 1.
Collection of Problems 1.
Of Phyſical Problems 1.
Of Example 1.
Of Propoſition and Narration 1.
Of Poeſy, another, 1.
Of the wiſe men 1.
Of Advice 1.
Of Solœciſms 1.
Of the Art of Rhetorick 1.
Of Rhetorical Arts, 71 kinds.
Of Hypocriſy 1.
Ariſtotelick, or Theophraſtick Commentaries 6.
Natural Sentences 16.
Epitome of Phyſicks 1.
Of Gratitude 1.
Ethick Characters.
Of Falſhood and Truth 1.
Of the Hiſtory of Divinity 6.
Of the Gods 3.

Geo-

*Geometrical Histories* 4.
*Epitome of* Aristotle, *concerning Animals* 6.
*Epichirems* 2.
*Theses* 3.
*Of a Kingdom* 2.
*Of Causes* 1.
*Of Democritus* 1.
*Of Calumny* 1.
*Of Generation* 1.
*Of the Prudence and Manners of Animals* 1.
*Of Motion* 2.
*Of Sight* 4.
*To definitions* 2.
*Of being Given* 1.
*Of Greater and Lesser* 1.
*Of Musick* 1.
*Of the divine Beatitude* 1.
*To those of the Academy* 1.
*Protreptick* 1.
*How a City may be best inhabited* 1.
*Commentaries* 1.
*Of the fiery ebullition in* Sicily 1.
*Of Things granted* 1.
*Of the ways of knowing* 1.
*Of the Lying Argument* 3.
*Ante-Topick* 1.
*To Æschilus* 1.
*Astrological History* 6.
*Arithmetical Histories of Increase* 1.
*Acicharus* 1.
*Of Judicial Orations* 1.
*Epistles concerning* Astycreon *to* Phanias *and* Nicanor.
*Of Piety* 1.
*Euias* 1.
*Of opportunites* 2.
*Of seasonable discourses* 1.
*Of the Institution of Children* 1.
*Another different* 1.
*Of Institution, or of Virtues, or of Temperance* 1.
*Protreptick* 1.
*Of numbers* 1.
*Definitions of Syllogistick speech* 1.
*Of Heaven* 1.
*Politick* 2.
*Of Nature* 1.
*Of Fruits and Animals.* All which, saith *Laertius*, amount to 1182 Divisions: These Books, as *Theophrastus* had ordered in his Will, were delivered to *Neleus*. What afterwards became of them, hath been related in the life of *Aristotle.*

# STRATO.

## CHAP. I.

### *His LIFE.*

(a) *Laert.*
(b) *Cicer. Laert. Suid.*
(c) *Laert. Suid.*
(d) *Suid.*
(e) *Laert.*

STRATO (a) was successor to *Theophrastus.* He was of (b) *Lampsacum*, his Father (c) *Arcesilaus*, or, as some, (d) *Arcesius*, mentioned in his Will. (e) *He was a person of great worth, eminent*, saith *Laertius, in all kinds of Philosophy, but especially, in that which is called Physick, the most ancient and solid part*, (f) wherein he introduced many things new, (g) dissenting not only from *Plato*, but from his Master *Aristotle.* (h) From his excellency herein he was called *the Natural Philosopher:* (i) He prescribed all divine power to Nature. (k) Ethick he touched but little, (l) He took upon him the government of the School, according to *Apollodorus*, in the [ third year of the ] 123 Olympiad, and continued therein 18. years. He instructed *Ptolomy* the son of *Philadelphus*, who bestowed 80 Talents upon him.

(f) *Cic. de finib.* 5.
(g) *Plut. adv. Nat. Colot.*
(h) *Cic. de Nat. deor.*
(i) *Cic. de Nat. deor.* 1. *Laert.*
(k) *Cic. de fin.* 5.
(l) *Laert.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. II.

### *His Will and Death.*

His Will, saith *Laertius*, was to this effect:

*THus I order, against the time that I shall die. All these things which are in my house, I bequeath to* Lampyrian *and* Arcesilaus. *Out of the money which I have at* Athens, *let my Executors first defray the charges of my Funeral, and the solemn rites after my enterment, doing nothing superfluously, nor niggardly. The Executors of these things I appoint in my Will be these*; Olympicus, Aristides, Mnesigenes, Hippocrates, Epicrates, Gorgylus, Diocles, Lyco, Athanes. *I leave the School to* Lyco, *for the rest are either too old, or otherwise employed. All the*

*rest*

*reſt ſhall do well if they confirm this choice that I have made. I bequeath likewiſe all my Books unto him, except thoſe which are written by our own hand, beſides all Utenſills, Carpets and Cups for Feaſting. Let the Executors give* 500. *Drachmes to* Epicrates *and one of the ſervants, which* Arceſilaus *ſhall think good. Let* Lampyrion *and* Arceſilaus *diſcharge all the debts, which* Daippus *undertook for* Hiræus. *Let nothing be owing either to* Lampyrion, *or to the heirs of* Lampyrion, *but let him be diſcharged of all, and the Executors beſtow on him* 500. *Drachmes, and one of the ſervants, as* Arceſilaus *ſhall think good; that having taken much pains with us, he may have ſufficient for food, and rayment. I manumit* Diophantus, *and* Diocles, *and* Abus. *I give* Simmias *to* Arceſilaus. *I manumit* Dromo. *When* Arceſilaus *ſhall come, let* Hiræus *with* Olympicus *and* Epicrates, *and the reſt of the Executors caſt up the Accounts of the charges of my Funeral and other things; whatſoever is over and above, let* Arceſilaus *take it of* Olympicus, *not preſſing him upon the day of payment. Let* Arceſilaus *diſcharge the Covenants which* Strato *made with* Olympicus, *and* Aminias, *which are in the hands of* Philocrates *Son of* Tiſamenus. *As for my Tomb, let it be ordered as* Arceſilaus *and Olympicus, and* Lyco *ſhall think good.*

This was his *Will*, preſerved by *Ariſto* the *Chian*. He was of ſo thin and low a conſtitution, that he felt not any pain at his death.

Of his name *Laertius* reckons eight.

The *firſt* a Diſciple of *Iſocrates*.

The *ſecond*, this Philoſopher.

The *third* a Phyſician, Diſciple of *Eraſiſtratus*.

The *Fourth* an Hiſtorian, who wrote the Wars of *Philip* and *Perſeus* with the *Romans*.

The *fifth*, is wanting.

The *ſixt*, an Epigrammatick Poet.

The *ſeventh*, an ancient Phyſician.

The *eighth*, a Peripatetick, who lived at *Alexandria*.

## CHAP. III.

### *His Writings.*

*Suidas* ſaith, he wrote many Books: *Laertius* gives this Catalogue of them.

*Of a Kingdom* 3.
*Of Juſtice* 3.
*Of Good* 3.
*Of God* 3.
*Of Principles* 3.
*Of Lives.*
*Of Felicity.*
*Of Phyloſophy.*
*Of Fortitude.*
*Of Vacuum.*
*Of Heaven.*
*Of Breath.*
*Of humane Nature.*
*Of the generation of Animals.*
*Of mixtions.*
*Of Sleep.*
*Of Dreams.*
*Of Sight.*
*Of ſenſe.*
*Of Pleaſure.*
*Of Colours.*
*Of Diſeaſes.*
*Of Judgments.*
*Of Faculties.*
*Of Metallick Matchines.*
*Of Hunger and Offuſcation.*
*Of Light and Heavy.*
*Of divine inſpiration.*
*Of Time.*
*Of Aliment and augmentation.*
*Of uncertain Animals.*
*Of fabulous Animals.*
*Of Cauſes.*
*Solutions of Queſtions.*
*Proems of Places.*
*Of Accident.*
*Of More and Leſs*
*Of Unjuſt.*
*Of Priority and Poſteriority.*
*Of Priority of Genus.*
*Of Proprium.*
*Of Future.*
*Confutations of Inventions.*
*Commentaries, which are ſuſpected.*
*Epiſtles*; beginning thus, *Strato to Arſinoe, Health:*

# LYCO.

## CHAP. I.

### *His LIFE.*

STRATO, saith *Laertius*, was succeeded by *Lyco*, Son of *Astyanax* of *Troas*, an eloquent person, and excellent for the education of Children. He heard also *Panthœdus* the Dialectick.

He said, that as Horses need both bridle and spur, so in Children there must be joined both modesty and ambition. Of his florid expression is alledged this instance. Of a poor Maid he said, Βαρὺ γὰρ φορτίον πατρὶ κόρη δίχα πάσης περικὸς ἐπιτέχουσα τὸν ἀκμαῖον τῆς ἡλικίας, *A maid is a heavy burden to her Parent when she outruns the flowry season of her youth for want of a dower.* Whence *Antigonus* said of him, That as the fragrancy and pleasantness of an excellent Apple will not admit Transplantation, so whatsoever he said was to be heard only from himself. For this sweetness of discourse some added the letter γ to his name, calling him Γλύκων, which implieth *sweetness*: so * *Plutarch.*

* *De exsulio.*

In stile he was very different from himself.

Upon those who were sorry they had not learned when time was, and wished it might be recalled, he jested thus; He said, that they who endeavoured to make amends by a late penitence for their past negligence, were conscious of the impossibility of their wishes. And of those that sought to bring it to pass, he said, they had lost all reason, in applying the nature of a straight line to a crooked ruler, or beholding their face in troubled water, or a confused mirrour.

He said, That to the wreath of publick games in the *Forum* many aspired, to the *Olympick*, few or none.

He many times by his Counsel much advantaged the *Athenians*.

In his garments he affected neatness so much, that, as *Hermippus* saith, he wore an upper garment very precious and fine.

He was very expert in all exercises, active and well made for a Wrestler, being thin ear'd and well set, as *Antigonus Carystius* affirmeth. Whence in his own Country he practised the *Elean* Games, and played at Ball.

He was intimate with *Eumenes* and *Attalus* beyond all men, who supply'd him with many things. *Antiochus* also would have had him lived with him, but could not get him.

He was so great an enemy to *Hieronymus* the *Peripatetick*, that upon a solemn day (of which already in the life of *Arcesilaus*) he only forbore to come to him.

He compared *Orators* to Frogs, these, saith he, croak in the water, those by the water of an hour-glass.

He was Master of the School forty years, succeeding *Strato* in the hundred twenty seventh Olympiad, as he had given order by his Will.

## CHAP. II.

### *His Will and Death.*

*Laertius* produceth a Will of his to this effect.

*THUS I dispose of my estate, if I shall not recover of this sickness. All that is in my house I bequeath to the Brethren,* Astyanax *and* Lyco, *out of which is to be paid whatsoever I owe at* Athens *to any man, as also the charges of my Funeral and Exequies. What is in the City, and* Ægina, *I bestow upon* Lyco, *because he is of our name, and hath lived long with us, to our great content, as one that deserved the place of a Son. The* Peripatum *I leave to those friends that will make use of it, as* Bulo, Callinus, Aristo, Amphio, Lyco, Pytho, Aristomachus, Heraclius, Lycomedes, Lyco *my Kinsman. Let them put him in that place who they conceive will persever in it, and discharge it best, which let the rest of my friends confirm for my sake, and the places. My Funeral and the burning of my Body be so ordered by* Bulo *and* Callinus, *that it be not prodigal nor niggardly. Out of my estate at* Ægina, *let* Lyco *after my death give to the young men as much Oyl as shall serve their turns, that hereby the memory of me and him that honours me, may be justly preserved. Let them set up my* * Statue, *and choose a fit place for the setting up of it, wherein let* Diophantus *and* Heraclides, *son of* Demetrius *assist them. Out of my Rents in the City, let* Lyco *pay all that I have named after his departure; in the next place let* Bulo *and* Callinus, *and the expenses of my Funeral be discharged. Let that houshold-stuff be taken away which I have left as common betwixt them. Let likewise the Physicians* Pasithemis *and* Midas *be honoured and rewarded for their care of me, and for their Skill.*

* For Wrestling and the Exercise.

To

*to the Son of* Callinus *I leavt a couple of* Thericlean *Pots; and to his Wife, a couple of Goblets, and a fine Carpet, and a ſhaggy Carpet, and a Coverlet, and two Couch-beds, the beſt that are left, that we may not ſeem unmindful of their due reſpect towards us. As for thoſe that ſerved me, I order thus;* Demetrius, *who hath been long a Free-man, I forgive the price of his redemption, and beſtow upon him five Minæ, and a Cloak and a Coat; and, as having undergone many labours with me, let him be decently ſupplied with neceſſaries.* Crito, *the Chelcidonian, I forgive the price of his redemption, and beſtow further on him four Minæ.* Micrus *alſo I manumit, whom let* Lyco *bring up, and fix years hence let him inſtruct him. In like manner I manumit* Chares, *whom let* Lyco *alſo bring up; I give him two Minæ, and my books that have been publiſhed: The reſt that have not been publiſhed, let them be given to* Callinus, *and let him take diligent care for the publiſhing of them. To* Syrus *the Free-man I give four Minæ, and* Menodora, *and if he owe me any thing, I forgive it him. To* Hilara *I give five Minæ, a ſhaggy Coverlet, two Couch-beds, a Carpet, and which bed he ſhall chooſe. I manumit likewiſe the Mother of* Micrus, *and* Noemones, *and* Dion, *and* Theon, *and* Euphranor, *and* Hermias; *as alſo* Agatho, *after he hath ſerved two years more; as alſo* Ophelio *and* Poſſidonius, *the bearers of my Litter, after they have ſerved four years more, I will that they be ſet at liberty. I give moreover, to* Demetrius, Crito, *and* Syrus, *to each a Bed and Coverlet, ſuch as* Lyco *ſhall think fit. This I beſtow on them, for as much as they have expreſs'd themſelves faithful in the performance of ſuch things as were committed to their Charge. As for my burial, whether* Lyco *will have it here or at home, let it be as he will; for I perſwade my ſelf, he will do what is fitting, no leſs than if I had done it my ſelf. When he ſhall have faithfully performed theſe things, let the bequeſts of my Will remain firm. Witneſſes,* Callinus, *an Hermionean,* Ariſto, *the Chian,* Euphronius *a Pæanean.*

Thus, ſaith *Laertius*, having wiſely managed all things appertaining to Learning and Humanity, his prudence and diligence extended even to the making of his Will; ſo that in that reſpect alſo he deſerveth ſtudiouſly to be imitated.

H died 74 years old of the Gout.

There were four of his name.

The *firſt*, a Pythagorean, mentioned in the life of *Ariſtotle*.

The *ſecond*, this Peripatetick:

The *third*, an Epick Poet.

The *fourth*, an Epigrammatick Poet.

# ARISTO.

ARISTO ſucceeded *Lyco*. He was of the Iſland (*a*) *Ceos*, famous for a Law, That whoſoever exceeded 60. years of age, ſhould be put to death, that there might be no want of Proviſion for thoſe that were more ſeviceable. In former time, ſaith *Strabo*, it had four Cities, now there remain but two, *Julis* and *Carthæa*, into which the reſt were transferr'd. *Pæceſſa* into *Carthæa*, *Careſſus* into *Julis*. In *Julis Ariſto* was born. He was an Auditor of *Lyco*, and ſucceeded him in the Government of the *Petipatetick* School as *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, and *Clemens Alexandrinus* affirm.

(a) *Strab. l.* 10.

He was a great imitator of *Bion* the *Boriſtenite*. *Cicero* ſaith, he was neat and elegant. He wrote a Treatiſe of *Nilus*, cited by *Strabo*, and *Amatory Similies*, frequently cited by *Athenæus*.

(b) *Athen. deip.* 10.

In the Second Book of his (*b*) *Amatory Similies*, he ſaith, that *Polemo* the *Academick* adviſed to provide ſuch entertainment at Feaſts, as ſhould be pleaſant not only at the preſent, but alſo on the morrow.

(c) *Athen. deip.* 12.

(*c*) In the ſame Book of his *Amatory Similes*, of an Athenian well in years, named *Dorus*, who would be thought handſom, he apyly'd the words of *Ulyſſes* to *Dolo*,

*Rich preſents ſure may lead away,*
*And thy too eaſie Soul betray.*

(*d*) In the ſecond of his *Amatory Similies*, he ſaith, the ancients firſt bound their heads, conceiving it good againſt the pain cauſed by the vapours of the Wine, afterwards for more ornament they uſed Garlands. (d) *Dipn. l.* 15.

*Laertius* upon the teſtimony of *Panætius* and *Soſicrates* affirmeth, that all the writings aſcribed to *Ariſto* of *Chios* the *Stoick* (except the Epiſtles) belong to *Ariſto* the *Peripatetick*; their Titles, theſe,

*Protrepticks* 2.
*Of* Zeno's *Doctrine: Scholaſtick Dialogues* 6.
*Of Wiſdom, Diſſertations* 7.
*Erotick Diſſertations.*
*Commentaries upon vain-glory.*
*Commentaries* 15.
*Memorials* 3.
*Chrya's* 11.
*Againſt Orators.*
*Againſt* Alexinus's *oppoſitions.*
*To the Dialecticks* 3.
*To* Cleanthes, *Epiſtles* 4.

# CRITOLAUS.

CRitolaus was, according to *Plutarch*, of *Phaselis*, an eminent Sea-Town of *Lycia*; described by (*a*) *Strabo* to have three havens, and a lake belonging to it. He was an Auditor of *Aristo*, and succeeded him in the School, as *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, and *Clemens Alexandrinus* affirm.

(*a*) *Lib.* 16.

He went to *Rome* on an Embassy from the *Athenians* in the 534*th* year, from the building of the City, which falleth upon the 2*d* year of the 140*th* Olympiad.

(*b*) He condemned *Rhetorick*, as being used rather as an *Artifice*, than an *Art*. (*b*) Sext. Emp.

# DIODORUS.

DIodorus was Disciple to *Critolaus*, and succeeded him in the School, as is manifest from *Clemens Alexaudrinus*, who adds, that in his assertion concerning our chief end, he joyned *Indolence* with *honesty*. He is mention'd by *Cicero*; how long he taught, or who succeeded him, is unknown. Thus far we have an unintermitted account of the *Peripatetick* School.

ANTISTHE-

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

## The Seventh Part.

Containing the *CYNICK* Philoſophers.

ANTISTHENES.

### CHAP. I.

*His LIFE.*

THE *Cynicks* are derived from *Antiſthenes*, Diſciple of *Socrates*, who, being moſt pleaſed with thoſe diſcourſes of his Maſter, which treated of Tolerance and Laborioufneſs, inſtituted this Sect. (a) He was born at *Athens*, his Father an Athenian named *Antiſthenes* alſo, his Mother (a) Laert.

Mother a *Thracian*, or, as *Plutarch*, a *Phrygian*, in whose defence, to those who reproached him that She was a Foreigner, he answer'd, *Cibele the Mother of the Gods was a* Phrygian. He likewise derided the *Athenians* for boasting of their being Natives, saying, they were nothing more noble than Snails and Locusts. (b) Neither did *Socrates* the less esteem him; but on the contrary, hearing that he had behav'd himself Valiantly at the Fight at *Tanagra*, he said of him, *I knew two Parents both* Athenians *could not beget so excellent a Person.* He first heard *Gorgias* the Orator, whence his Dialogues are written in a Rhetorical stile, consisting chiefly in Verity and Exhortation. *Hermippus* saith, at the *Isthmian* meeting, he used to make Orations in praise and dispraise of the *Athenians*, *Thebans* and *Lacedemonians*, before all the Assembly. But seeing many of the Citizens come thither, he refrained.

(b) Laert. vit. Socr.

Next he applied himself to *Socrates*, and profited so much under him, that he counselled his Scholars to become his Fellow Disciples under that Master. He lived in the *Piræum*, and went every day 40 *Stadia*, to hear *Socrates*.

He affected even whilst he was Disciple to *Socrates*, to go in poor Habit, and (c) once having turned the torn part of his Garment outermost, *Socrates* spying it, said, *I see vain-glory through a hole*; or, as *Ælian*, Do you use this Ostentation before us also?

(c) Laert., Ælian.

(d) Upon the Death of *Socrates* he was the occasion of Banishment to *Anytus*, and of Death to *Melitus*; for *Melitus* meeting with some young Men of *Pontus*, invited to *Athens* by the fame of *Socrates*, he brought them to *Anytus*, telling them he was wiser than *Socrates*; whereupon the standers by in Indignation, turned them both out of the City; of which already in the Life of *Socrates*.

(d) Laert.

## CHAP. II.

### *His Institution of a Sect.*

(a) *Socrates* being Dead, of whom he learned Tolerance and Apathy, he made choice of *Cynosarges*, a Gymnasium at *Athens* just without the Gates, as of the fittest place in which he might Discourse of Philosophy. (b) It was so called upon this occasion. *Didymus* the *Athenian* Sacrificing in his own House, a white Dog that was by, snatcht the Victim, and running away with it, laid it down in another place; *Didymus* much troubled thereat, consulted the Oracle, which enjoined him to erect a Temple in that place where the Dog had laid down the Victim, and to dedicate it to *Hercules*, which was called *Cynosarges*, ὁ κυνὸς ἀργυπτός, *The Temple of the white Dog.* (c) Hence *Antisthenes* and his Followers were called *Cynicks*, and by those that disapproved their Institution, *Dogs*; *Antisthenes* himself being termed Ἀπλοκύων, *the sincere Dog.*

(a) Laert.

(b) Suid.

(c) Laert.

He first doubled his old sordid Cloak, and wore it alone [without a Coat] as *Diocles* affirmeth; he carried likewise a Staff and Satchel. *Neanthes* saith he first used a single Cloak. *Sosicrates* in the third of his *Successions*, saith, *Diodorus* the *Aspendian* wore a long Beard, and carried a Staff and Wallet.

(d) His Assertions were these, *That Virtue may be acquired by teaching; that those Persons are Noble, who are Virtuous; That Virtue was Self-sufficient to Felicity, not needing any thing but a Socratick Courage.* That *Virtue consisteth in Actions, not requiring many Words nor much Learning, and is Self-sufficient to Wisdom; for all other things have a reference thereto.* That *infamy is good and equal to Labour, and that a wise man ought not to Govern the Commonwealth according to the Laws in force, but according to Virtue*; That *a wise Man, to have issue, may make choice of beautiful Women, and Love, for a wise Man only knoweth what ought to be loved.*

(d) Laert.

*Diocles* addeth these; That *nothing is new to a wise Man*; That *a good Man deserveth Love, That virtuous Persons are Friends*; That *we ought to get assistance in War, Valiant and Just*; That *Virtue is an Armor never can be taken from us*; That it is better *with some few good Men to oppose all the wicked, than with many wicked Men to contend with few good*; *Observe your Enemies, for they first find out your Faults*; *Esteem a just Man more than a Neighbour*; *The same Virtue belongeth to Man and to Woman*; *Those things are good which are honest, ill which are dishonest*; *All things esteem strange*; *Wisdom is the safest Fortification, for it will nieither fall away, nor can be betray'd*; *In these inexpugnable things we ought to build Forts, by Meditation.*

Laert.

(e) *Agellius* saith, He esteemed *Pleasure the greatest Ill*, whence he used to say, *I had rather be Mad, than be addicted to Pleasure.*

(e) Lib. 3. c. 5.

(f) As to the Opinion of the *Cynicks* in general (not esteeming them, saith *Laertius*, a meer Form and Institution of Life, but a true *Sect* of Philosophy) they were these.

(f) Laert. in Menedem.

They took away, with *Aristo* the *Chian*, *Dialectick* and *Physick*, and only admitted *Ethick*; whence, what some said of *Socrates*, *Diocles* applied to *Diogenes*, affirming he used the same Expressions, That we ought to enquire,

*What Good and Ill*
*Our Houses fill.*

They likewise rejected the Liberal Sciences; whence *Antisthenes* said, Those who have acquired Temperance, ought not to study any Learning, lest by other things they be diverted. *Geometry* likewise, *Musick*, and the like, they wholly took away. Whence *Diogenes*, to one that shew'd him a Watch, *It is an excellent Invention*, saith he, *against Supping too late.* And to one that entertain'd him with *Musick*,

*Wisdom the greatest Cities doth protect;*
*But Musick cannot one poor House direct.*

They likewise, as the *Stoicks*, affirmed to be happy to live according to *Virtue*, as *Antisthenes* in his *Hercules*; for there is a kind of affinity betwixt these two Sects, whence the *Stoicks* asserted *Cynism* to be the nearest way to Virtue, and so lived *Zeno* the *Cittiean.*

Laert. Stob.

Their Diet was slender, their Food only such as might satisfie Nature, their Cloaks sordid; they despised Riches, Glory and Nobility: Some of them fed only on Herbs and cold Water, living under such Shelters as they could find, or in Tubs,

as

as *Diogenes* did, who affirmed, it was proper to the Gods to want nothing, and that those who ſtand in need of feweſt things, come neareſt to the Gods.

They held alſo, according to *Antiſthenes* in his *Hercules*, that Virtue may be acquired by Learning, and that it cannot be loſt; that a wiſe Man deſerves to be loved, and never ſinneth, and is a Friend to ſuch as are like him, and truſteth nothing to Fortune.

They took away with *Ariſto* the *Chian*, all things between Virtue and Vice.

## CHAP. III.

### *His Apophthegms.*

Laert. OF his Apophthegms are remembred theſe. He proved Labour to be good, by the Examples of *Hercules* and *Cyrus*, one a *Grecian*, the other a *Barbarian*.

He firſt defined Speech thus, *Speech is that which declareth that which is or was.*

To a young Man of *Pontus* that came be to his Diſciple, and asked him what he muſt bring with him, he anſwered, Βιβλιαρίου καινοῦ, γραφείου καινοῦ, καὶ πινακιδίου καινοῦ, a new Book, a new Pen, and a new Tablet; where the word καινοῦ is equivocal, and ſignifieth (divided καὶ νοῦ) *Wit.*

To one, demanding what kind of Wife he ſhould take; *If a fair one*, ſaith he, *ſhe will be common*; *if foul*, *a torment.*

Hearing that *Plato* ſpoke ill of him; *it is Kinglike*, ſaith he, *to do well, and be ill ſpoken of.*

Being initiated into the *Orphick* Solemnities, the Prieſt telling him, that they who were initiated into thoſe Rights, were made partakers of many excellent things in the next World: *Why then*, ſaith he, *do you not die?*

To one that reproached him that both his Parents were not *free*; *Neither*, ſaith he, *were they both Wreſtlers, and yet I am a Wreſtler.*

Being demanded why he had few Diſciples, *I beat them away*, ſaith he, *with a ſilver Staff.*

Being demanded why he rebuked his Diſciples ſo ſharply; *So*, ſaith he, *do Phyſicians the Sick.*

Seeing an Adulterer running away, *Unhappy Man*, ſaith he, *how much danger might you have eſcaped for one half penny.*

He ſaid according to *Heaton*, *It is better to fall among Crows than Flatterers; for thoſe only devour the Dead, theſe the Living.*

Being demanded what was moſt happy for Man, he anſwered, *To die in Proſperity.*

To a Friend, complaing he had loſt his Notes; *You ſhould have writ them in your Mind*, ſaith he, *and not in your Book.*

*As Ruſt conſumeth Iron, ſo Envy*, ſaith he, *conſumeth the envious Man.*

*Thoſe who would never Die*, ſaith he, *muſt live Piouſly and Juſtly.*

He ſaid, *Cities were then periſhing, when they could not diſtinguiſh the Good from the Bad.*

Laert. Stob. Being commended by ſome wicked Men; *I am troubled*, ſaith he, *to think what ill I have done.*

He ſaid, *The Cohabitation of concording Brethren is firmer than any Wall.*

He ſaid, *We ought to carry ſuch Proviſion along with us, as if we ſhould happen to be Shipwrack'd, we might Swim away with.*

To thoſe who Reproached him for Converſing with wicked Perſons; *So do Phyſicians with the Sick*, ſaith he, *yet are not Sick themſelves.*

He ſaid, *It is abſurd to ſeparate Corn from the Weeds, and in War to reject the unſerviceable Perſon; yet, in a Commonwealth, not to extirpate the Wicked.*

Being demanded what he had gain'd by Philoſophy, he anſwered, *That I can converſe with my ſelf.*

At a Feaſt, to one that ſaid to him, *Sing*; he reply'd, *Do you then Pipe.*

*Diogenes* demanding a Coat, he bad him double his Cloak.

Being demanded what Learning is moſt neceſſary, *That*, ſaith he, *which unlearneth ill.*

He adviſed thoſe who were provoked by revilings, to bear it with greater Fortitude, than if Stones were caſt at them.

He derided *Plato*, as being proud; and ſeeing at a ſhow a Horſe going loftily, turning to *Plato*, *Me thinks*, ſaith he, *you would have acted the part of this Horſe very well.* This he ſaid, becauſe *Plato* at the ſame time had commended the Horſe.

Another time viſiting *Plato* as he lay Sick, and looking into the Baſin whereinto he had Vomited, *I ſee here*, ſaith he, *the Choler, but not the Pride.*

He adviſed the *Athenians* to love Aſſes as well as Horſes, which they conceiving abſurd; and yet, ſaith he, you chooſe thoſe for *Generals*, who know nothing, but how to ſtretch out the hand.

To one that ſaid to him, Many praiſe thee; *Why*, ſaith he, *what ill have I done?*

To one that demanded (as *Phanias* ſaith) what he ſhould do to be a good and an honeſt Man: *If you learn*, ſaith he, *of knowing Perſons, that the Vices which you have, are to be avoided.*

To one that praiſed a Life full of Delicacies; *Let the Sons of my Enemies*, ſaith he, *live delicately.*

To a young Man, who deſired his Statue might be made handſomer than himſelf; Tell me, ſaith he, if the Braſs it ſelf could ſpeak, what you think it would boaſt of? The other anſwer'd, of its handſome Figure: *Are you not aſhamed then*, replies he, *to be Proud of the ſame that an inanimate Creature would be?*

A young Man of *Pontus* promiſed to ſupply him, as ſoon as his Ship came home laden with Saltfiſh; hereupon he took him to a Meal-woman, and filling his Satchel, departed; She calling to him for Money, *This young Man*, ſaith he, *will pay you as ſoon as his Ship comes home.*

When at any time he ſaw a Woman richly dreſs'd, he went to her Houſe, and bad her Husband bring out his Horſe and Arms, that if he were ſo provided, he might allow her thoſe freedoms, being better able to juſtifie the injuries it occaſion'd; otherwiſe, that he ſhould take off her rich habit.

He ſaid, *Neither a Feaſt is pleaſant without company, nor Riches without Virtue.* Stob. Ser. 1.

He ſaid, *Thoſe Pleaſures which come not in at the Door, muſt not go out by the Door, but by Inciſion or Purging with Hellebor, or by* * *Starving,* Stob. Ser. 38. * Ser. 44.

ſo

*ſo to puniſh thoſe ſurfeits which we have incurred for a ſhort pleaſure.*

Ser. 50. He ſaid, *Whoſoever feareth others, is a ſlave, tho he know it not himſelf.*

Ser. 53. He ſaid, *No covetous man can be a good man, or a King, or a Freeman.*

Ser. 87. Being demanded what a Feaſt is, he anſwered, *The occaſion of ſurfeits.*

Ser. 117. He ſaid, *We ought to aim at ſuch pleaſures as follow labour, not at thoſe which go before labour.*

Ser. 148. He ſaid, *Common Executioners are better than Tyrants; thoſe put only guilty men to death, Tyrants, the innocent.*

Ser. 171. He ſaid, *We ought to wiſh our enemies all good things but Fortitude, for that they poſſeſs would fall into the hands of the Victor, not the owner.*

Ser. 212. *Him that contradicteth*, he ſaid, *we muſt not again contradict, but inſtruct; for a mad-man is not cured by anothers growing mad alſo.*

Plut rep Stoic. He ſaid, *A man ſhould always have in readineſs his wits or a rope.*

Plut. vit. Lyc. Seeing the *Thebans* much exalted with their ſucceſs at the Luctrian fight, he ſaid, *They were like boys that triumph when they have beaten their Maſters.*

Plut. vit. Per. To ſome that commended a Piper; *But*, ſaith he, *he is an ill man; for elſe he would never have been ſo good a Piper.*

## CHAP. IV.

### *His Writings.*

OF his Books, ſaith *Laertius*, there are *ten* Tomes.

The *firſt* containing theſe.

*Of ſpeech, or of Characters.*
Ajax, *of the ſpeech of* Ajax.
Ulyſſes, *or of* Ulyſſes.
*An apology for* Oreſtes.
*Of Lawyers.*
Iſographe, *or* Deſias, *or* Iſocrates.
*Againſt* Iſocrates's Ἀμάστυρον.

The *ſecond* Tome.

*Of the Nature of Animals.*
*Of Procreation of Children, or of Marriage, Erotick.*
*Of Sophiſts, Phyſiognomick.*
*Of Juſtice and Fortitude Protreptick* 1, 2, 3.
*Of Theognis.*

The *third* Tome.

*Of Good.*
*Of Fortitude.*
*Of Law, or of Policy.*
*Of Low, or of Fair and Juſt.*
*Of Freedom and Servitude.*
*Of Faith.*
*Of a Guardian, or of Truſting.*
*Of Victory, Oeconomick.*

The *fourth* Tome.

Cyrus.
Hercules *the greater, or of Strength.*

The *fifth* Tome.

Cyrus, *or of a Kingdom*
Aſpaſia.

The *ſixth* Tome.

*Truth.*
*Of Diſſertation, Anti-logick.*
*Sathon, of Contradiction* 3.
*Of Dialectick.*

The *ſeventh* Tome.

*Of Diſcipline, or of names,* 5.
*Of dying.*
*Of Life and Death.*
*Of things after death.*
*Of the uſe of names, or Eriſtick.*
*Of Interrogation and anſwer.*
*Of Opinion and Science* 4.
*Of Nature* 2.
*Interrogation concerning Nature* 2.
*Opinions, or the Eriſtick.*
*Problems concerning Learning.*

The *eighth* Tome.

*Of Muſick.*
*Of Interpreters.*
*Of* Homer.
*Of Injuſtice and impiety.*
*Of Chalcas.*
*Of the Spie.*
*Of Pleaſure.*

The *ninth* Tome.

*Of the Odyſſeis.*
*Of* Minerva's *wand, or of* Telemachus, Helena, *and* Penelope.
*Of* Proteus.
*The Cyclops, or of* Ulyſſes.
*Of the uſe of Wine, or of Drunkenneſs, or of the Cyclope.*
*Of* Circe.
*Of* Amphiaraus.
*Of* Ulyſſes *and* Penelope.
*Of the Dog.*

The *tenth* Tome.

Hercules, *or* Midas.
Hercules, *or of Prudence, or of Strength.*
*The Maſter, or Lover.*
*The Maſters, or ſpies.*
Menexenus, *or of Ruling.*
Alcibides.
Archelaus, *or of a Kingdom.*

Theſe, ſaith *Laertius*, were his writings, the great number whereof *Timon* derides, calling him an ingenious Trifler,

There

There is also among the *Socratick* Epistles one under his name to this effect.

Antisthenes *to* Aristippus.

*IT is not the part of a Philosopher to live with Tyrants, and to wast time at* Sicilian *Feasts, but rather to be content with a little in his own Country; but you esteem it the greatest excellence of a virtuous Person, to be able to acquire much wealth, and to have powerful friends. Riches are not good; neither if they were in themselves good, are they such, being thus obtained; nor can a multitude of unlearned persons, especially Tyrants, be true friends. Wherefore I would counsel you to leave* Syracuse *and* Sicily; *but if, as some report, you are in love with Pleasure, and aim at such things, as beseem not wise persons, go to* Anticyra *and cure your self by drinking Hellebore, for that is much better for you than the Wine of* Dionysius; *this causeth madness, that asswageth it. So that as health and discretion differ from sickness and folly, so much shall you be better than you are in these things which you now enjoy.* Farewel.

The Answer to this Epistle, see in the life of *Aristippus*.

## CHAP. V.

*His Death.*

HE died, saith *Laertius*, of sickness. As he lay on his death-bed, *Diogenes* came to him and asked him if he wanted a friend. Another time he came to him with a dagger; *Antisthenes* crying out, who will free me from this pain, he shewed him the dagger, saying, *This shall. Antisthenes* reply'd, I say from my pain; not from my life: for he bore his sickness somewhat impatiently through love of life.

*Theopompus* commends him above all the Disciples of *Socrates*, as being of such acute and sweet discourse, that he could lead any man to what he would,

There were three more of this name, one a Heraclitean Philosopher, the second of *Ephesus*, the third of *Rhodes* a Historian.

DIOGENES.

## CHAP. I.

*His Country, Parents, Time, Baniſhment.*

(a) DIOGENES was of *Sinopis*, a City of *Pontus*, his Father named *Iceſius*, or, as others, *Icetes*; by Profeſſion a Money-changer.

He was Born (as appears by Computation from his Death, which was in the 90*th* year of his Age, in the firſt year of the 114*th* Olympiad, *Hegeſias* being *Archon*) about the third year of the 91*ſt* Olympiad. *Suidas* ſaith, he was firſt called *Cleon*.

*Diocles* ſaith, his Father trading publickly in Exchange of Money, was ſurpriſed, coining falſe Money, and thereupon fled: But *Eubulides* ſaith, *Diogenes* himſelf did it, and fled together with his Father; even *Diogenes* in his *Podalus*, acknowledgeth as much. Some affirm, That being made Overſeer, he was perſwaded by the Workmen to go to *Delphi* or *Delus*, the Country of *Apollo*, to enquire of the Oracle if he ſhould do that whereto he was adviſed, παραχαράξει τὸ νόμισμα, which is of ambiguous Significa-

(a) Laert.

(b) Plut.

Signification, implying to alter the courſe of Life, and to coin falſe Money. The Oracle aſſented: *Diogenes* not underſtanding it in the *Civil* Senſe, betook himſelf to Coyning, and being taken in the Act, was Baniſhed, or, as others ſay, Fled for fear. Some affirm, he Adulterated the Money he received from his Father, for which the Father was caſt into Priſon, and there dyed; the Son fled, and coming to *Delphi*, enquired of the Oracle by what means he ſhould become Eminent, whereupon he received that anſwer.

(b) Ælian. var. Hiſt. 13. 28. (b) When he left his Country, one of his Servants followed him, named *Manes*, who not enduring his Converſation, ran away from him; ſome perſwaded *Diogenes* to enquire after him; who anſwer'd, Were it not a ſhame, ſince *Manes* doth not need *Diogenes*, that *Diogenes* ſhould need *Manes*? The Fellow wandring up and down, came at laſt to *Delphi*, where he was torn in pieces by Dogs.

## CHAP. II.

### *How he lived at* Athens.

COming to *Athens*, ſaith *Laertius*, he appli'd himſelf to *Antiſthenes*, following the Cynical Philoſophy inſtituted by him. (a) *Antiſthenes* having invited many to hear him, and but few coming, at laſt in anger would not ſuffer any to come to him, and therefore bad *Diogenes* be gone alſo. *Diogenes* continuing to come frequently, he chid and threatned him, and at laſt ſtruck him with his Staff: *Diogenes* would not go back, but perſiſting ſtill in his deſire of hearing him, ſaid, *Strike if you will, here is my head, you cannot find a Staff hard enough to drive me from you, until you have inſtructed me. Antiſthenes* overcome with his Perſeverance, admitted him, and made him his intimate Friend. From that time forward he heard him.

(a) Ælian. var. Hiſt. 10. 16.

Some affirm, ſaith *Laertius*, He firſt wore a double Cloak, upon which he uſed to lie [at Night:] He likewiſe carried a Wallet, wherein was his Meat. He made uſe of all places for all things, Dining, Sleeping and Diſcourſing in any Place, inſomuch that pointing to *Jupiter*'s Walk, and the *Pompæum*, two publick Places at *Athens*, he ſaid, The *Athenians* built them for his Dwelling. Falling once Sick, he walked with a Staff, which afterwards he continually uſed, as likewiſe a Wallet, not in the City, but when he Travelled. He wrote to one to Build him a little Houſe, which the other not doing ſo ſoon as he required, he made uſe of a *Tub* in the *Metroum* to live in, as he declareth in his *Epiſtles*. In Summer he uſed to roul in the burning Sand; in Winter, to embrace Statues covered with Snow, accuſtoming himſelf continually to Sufferance. (b) A *Lacedæmonian* ſeeing him in this Poſture in the depth of Winter, asked him if he were not a cold; *Diogenes* ſaid, he was not: What you do then, repli'd the other, is no great matter.

(b) Plut.

At firſt he uſed to beg, of which there are many inſtances: He one time begged of a man thus, *If you have given to others, give alſo to me. If to none, begin with me.*

(c) Another time he begged of a Statue, whereof being demanded the Reaſon, *That I may the better*, ſaith he, *bear a refuſal.* (c) Laert.

He requeſted ſomething of a covetous Perſon, who delaying to give; *Man*, ſaith he, *I ask you* εἰς τροφὴν, *not* εἰς ταφὴν, *food, not a grave.*

He requeſted ſomething of a Perſon very obdurate, who anſwered, Yes, if you can perſwade me to it; *Nay*, repli'd he, *if I were able to perſwade you to any thing, it ſhould have been to have hang'd your ſelf.*

Of a Prodigal he begged a *Mina*; the other asked why he begged a *Mina* of him, and of others but an *Obolus*: *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *I hope to receive of others again; but whether I ſhall ever have any more of you, the Gods know.*

Being reproach'd that *Plato* begged not, but he begged: *Yes*, ſaith he, *he beggeth too; but,*

*Cloſe in your Ear,*
*Leſt others hear.*

(d) Having received ſome little Money from *Dionyſius* the *Cariſian*, he ſaid, (d) Ælian var. Hiſt. 4. 27.

*The Gods afford thee thy deſire,*
*A Man and Houſe*——

Alluding to his Effeminacy.

(e) For this Reaſon he ſaid, the Imprecations of *Tragedians* concurred in him, for he was without any City, without a Houſe, depriv'd of his Country, a Beggar, a Vagabond, having his livelihood only from day to day. And yet, adds (f) *Ælian*, he was more pleaſed with this Condition, than *Alexander* with the command of the whole World, when having conquer'd the *Indians*, he returned to *Babylon*. (e) Laert. (f) Var. Hiſt. 3. 29.

(g) Seeing a Mouſe, as *Theophraſtus* ſaith, running up and down, he thence took occaſion of comfort, conſidering it a Creature that looked not for lodging, and was not diſpleaſed with Darkneſs, nor nice as to Diet. (g) Laert.

He walked in the Snow bare-foot, and tri'd to eat raw Fleſh, but could not.

He ſaid, he imitated Singing Maſters, who raiſe their Voice too high, thereby to teach others the juſt Tone:

The *Athenians* loved him much; for a Youth having bor'd holes in his Tub, they puniſh'd him, and gave *Diogenes* a new one.

He uſed to perform the Offices of *Ceres* and *Venus* in publick, arguing thus; *If it be not abſurd to dine, it is not abſurd to dine even in the Market-place; but, it is not abſurd to dine, therefore it is not abſurd to dine even in the Market-place.*

(h) χενάγων in the publick Forum; *I would*, ſaith he, *I could as eaſily ſatisfy my hunger.* (h) Laert. It is explained by Plutarch, de rep. Stoic.

(i) As he dined in the Forum, ſome that were preſent called him Dog; *Nay*, ſaith he, *you are Dogs that ſtand about me when I am at dinner.* (i) Laert.

Being reproached for feeding in the open Forum; *In the Forum*, ſaith he, *I grew hungry.*

Being reproached that he drunk in a Victualling-houſe; *And in a Barbers ſhop*, ſaith he, *I am ſhaved.*

He lived without any ſervant; Being demanded by one whether he would have a maid-ſervant, or a man, he ſaid neither; Who then, anſwer'd the other, ſhall carry you out to your

grave when you die? *Diogenes* reply'd, *he that wants a house?*

## CHAP. III.

### *How he lived at* Corinth.

(a) IN his old age he took a Voyage to *Ægina*, but was by the way taken by ſome Pirates, the Name of whoſe Captain was *Scirpalus*. They carried him to *Creet*, and there expoſed him to ſale; they asked him what he could do; he anſwered, *he could command men*; and to the Cryer, he ſaid, *if any man want a Maſter, let him buy me.* Offering to ſit down, they would not ſuffer him, (it being the cuſtom of ſuch as were to be ſold for ſlaves, to leap up and down) *'Tis no matter for that*, ſaith he, *Fiſhes are ſold which way ſoever they lie*; adding, he wondred that men being to buy a pot or veſſel, examine it curiouſly on the inſide; but if a man, they are ſatisfied with his look and outſide. Pointing to a *Corinthian* richly attir'd that paſſed by, named *Xeniades*, *Sell me*, ſaith he, *to that man, for he wants a Maſter.* To *Xeniades* as ſoon as he had bought him, he ſaid, *Be ſure you do as I command you*; he anſwer'd in the common Proverbial Verſe.

*The ſprings of Rivers upwards run.*

*Diogenes* reply'd, if being ſick you had bought a Phyſician, would you obey his advice, or would you ſay as before, *The ſprings of Rivers upwards run.*

His Friends, according to *Cleomenes*, offered to redeem him; but he told them they were fools, for Lyons were not ſlaves to their Keepers, but the Keepers to the Lyons, for the property of ſervitude is to fear, and men fear Beaſts.

(b) *Xeniades* having bought him, carried him to *Corinth*, (c) asking him what he could do; he anſwered, he knew how to command free perſons. *Xeniades* wondring at his anſwer, ſet him at Liberty, and delivered his Sons to his Charge, saying, *take then my Children, and command them.* (d) He put the Government of his Family alſo into his hands, which he acquitted himſelf of excellently well in every thing, in ſo much that *Xeniades* ſaid, *he had brought a* Good Genius *into his Houſe.*

He did not ſuffer the young men that were under his charge, to exerciſe themſelves as Wreſtlers, but only till they were warm, and for their health ſake. He taught them many ſayings of Poets by heart, and ſome of his own; and that they might more eaſily remember the full ſum of Learning, he made a brief Collection thereof. He taught them at home to Miniſter, uſing thin Diet, and drinking water, to go negligently in habit, ſhaven, without coats, without ſhooes, and ſilent, looking upon themſelves as they went. He brought them up likewiſe to Hunting. On the other ſide, they took great care of *Diogenes*, and recommended him to their Parents.

(e) When *Alexander* was upon expedition againſt the *Perſians*, many Philoſophers came to ſalute him, the ſame duty he expected from *Diogenes*, who was at that time at the *Craneum*, a *Gymnaſium* in *Corinth*, where he lived idly, not minding *Alexander*: *Alexander* therefore went and found him out ſitting in the Sun; he roſe a little to look upon the great crowd of People that came along with *Alexander*, who ſaluting him; asked *Diogenes* what he would deſire of him, he anſwer'd, *that you would ſtand aſide a little from betwixt me and the Sun.* Hereat *Alexander* was ſo ſurpris'd, and ſo much admir'd his high mind, that his Attendants in returning, laughing thereat; but I, ſaid he, were I not *Alexander*, would chooſe to be *Diogenes.*

a) Laert.

(b) Laert.
(c) Gell.

(d) Laert.

(e) Plut. vit. Alex.

## CHAP. IV.

### *His Philoſophy.*

(a) AND concerning *Opinions*, he ſaid, there is a twofold *Exercitation*, one *ſpiritual*, the other *corporeal*; If in the firſt of theſe we employ our ſelves conſtantly, frequent phantaſies will occur, which faciliate the performance of Virtue; the one cannot be without the other, a good habit and ſtrength being neceſſary both in reſpect of the Soul and the Body.

(a) Laert.

That Virtue is eaſily acquired by exercitation, he argued, in as much as in the Mechanick Arts and others, that Artiſts by practiſe quickly arrive at an extraordinary readineſs therein, and Wreſtlers and Muſicians excel one another according to the continual pains they take therein one more than another; and if they ſhould have taken the ſame pains about their Souls, it would not have been unprofitably and imperfectly employ'd.

He ſaid, Nothing in life can be rightly done without exercitation; and that exercitation could maſter any thing; for whereas men ſhould chooſe Natural Labours, whereby they might live happily; they on the contrary make choice of the unprofitable, and through their own folly are in continual miſery. For even the contempt of Pleaſure, if we accuſtom our ſelves thereto, will be moſt pleaſant; and as they, who inure themſelves to a voluptuous life cannot be taken off it without much trouble and grief; ſo they who exerciſe themſelves in a contrary manner, with as great eaſe contemn even the pleaſures themſelves.

He aſcribed not ſo much to Law as to Nature; he affirmed that he followed the ſame courſe of life with *Hercules*, preferring nothing before Liberty.

He aſſerted that all things belong to the Wiſe; arguing thus; *All things belong to the Gods, the Gods are friends to Wiſe perſons; all things are common amongſt Friends*; therefore *all things belong to the wiſe.*

(b) Stob. S 83.

As concerning Law, he held that without it a Commonwealth could not be ordered; for, ſaith he, *Without a City there cannot be any profit of Civil things; a City is a Civil thing; of Law without a City there is no profit, therefore Law is Civil.*

He derided *Nobility*, *Glory*, and the like, ſaying, they were the Ornaments, or Veils of Wickedneſs, and that only a right Commonwealth ought to be honour'd.

He held that there ought to be a Community of Women, conceiving Marriage to be nothing, and

and that every Man and Woman might enjoy one another as they pleaſed themſelves, and conſequently that all Children ſhould be in common.

He held that it was not unlawful to take any thing out of a Temple, or to feed upon living Creatures; neither was it impious to eat mans Fleſh, as appeared by the Practice of other Nations; adding that all things are in all and by all; in Bread there is Fleſh, in Fleſh Bread; the remainders of Fleſh and Bread being inſinuated by occult paſſages into other Bodies, and evaporating in like manner. This *Laertius* cites out of a Tragedy of his named *Thyeſtes*, if ſaith he, that Tragedy belong to him, and not rather to *Philiſcus* or *Paſiphon*.

*Muſick*, *Geometry*, *Aſtronomy*, and the like, he rejected as unprofitable and unneceſſary.

## CHAP. V.

### *His Apophthegms.*

(a) Laert. (a) HE was very acute, ſaith *Laertius* in deriding others. He ſaid *Euclides* School was not χολὴ, but χόλη, not a *School*, but *Anger*, for the Dialecticks affected *Litigious* diſpute. He ſaid *Plato*'s School was not διατριβὴ, but κατατριβὴ, not an Exercitation, but Conſumption.

He ſaid, when he look'd upon *Pilots*, *Phyſicians* and *Philoſophers*, Man was the wiſeſt of all Creatures; but when he looked upon *Interpreters* of Dreams, *Prophets* or Perſons puff'd up with Wealth or Honours, nothing is more fooliſh than Man.

He ſaid that he he often found it convenient in Life to have ready an Anſwer, or a Rope.

At a great Feaſt, ſeeing *Plato* eat Olives; Why, ſaith he, you being a wiſe Man, and going to *Sicily* for ſuch Entertainments, did you not enjoy them: He anſwered, by the Gods, *Diogenes*, I fed upon Olives there likewiſe, as well as upon other things. *Diogenes* replied, why then needed you to have gone to *Syracuſe*, were there no Olives at that time in *Attica*? This *Phavorinus* aſcribes to *Ariſtippus*, adding, that as he was eating Figs, he met him, and ſaid, Taſt; the other taking and eating; I bad you, ſaith he, taſt, and not devour.

In the preſence of ſome Friends of *Plato* ſent to him by *Dionyſius*, *Diogenes* trod under foot *Plato*'s Robe, ſaying, I tread under foot *Plato*'s Pride: But, *Diogenes*, anſwer'd *Plato*, how proud are you your ſelf, when you think you contemn Pride? *Sotion* relates this as ſaid to the *Cynick* by *Plato*.

(b) Stob. Ser. 33. (b) *Diogenes* ſent to *Plato* for Wine and Figs, he ſent him a large Veſſel of Wine and Figs; whereupon *Diogenes*, As you, ſaith he, being demanded how much 2 and 2. are, anſwer 20. ſo you neither grant what I requeſt, nor anſwer what I demand; thus cenſuring his Verboſity.

Being demanded in what part of *Greece* he had ſeen good Men; *Men*, ſaith he, *no where*, *but good boys at* Lacedæmon.

Making a ſerious Diſcourſe, and perceiving that no man came to hear him, he began to Sing, whereat a great many gather'd together, whom he reproached for coming to Trifles, being ſo backward to ſerious Things.

He ſaid, Men conteſted in undermining or kicking, but none about Goodneſs.

He wondered at *Grammarians*, who enquiring after the Misfortunes of *Ulyſſes*, forgot their own; and at *Muſicans*, who whilſt they *Tune* their Inſtruments, have *diſcordant* Affections in their Souls; and at the *Mathematicians*, that gazing upon the Sun and Moon, neglected what was juſt at their Feet; and at (c) *Orators*, who ſtudied to ſpeak Juſt things, and neglected to act them; and laſtly, at *covetous* Perſons, for diſpraiſing Money, which they loved above all things. (c) Stob. 296.

He reprehended thoſe, who tho they commended juſt Men for thinking themſelves to be above Money, yet eſteemed the Rich happy.

He was angry at thoſe, who when they ſacrificed to the Gods for their Health, feaſted at the ſame time contrary to their Health.

He wondered at Servants, who ſeeing their Maſters eat exceſſively, did not take away their Meat.

He praiſed thoſe, who being about to Marry, would not Marry; who being about to go to Sea, would not go to Sea; who being about to undertake ſome publick Office, would not undertake it; and who being about to bring up Children, forbore to bring them up; and who could compoſe themſelves to live with great Men, yet never went to them.

He ſaid, when we ſtretch out our hand to our Friend, we ſhould never clutch our fiſt.

One bringing him into a new houſe, and forbidding him to ſpit, he ſpat in his Face, ſaying, He could not find a worſe place. Some aſcribe this to *Ariſtippus*.

Crying out upon a time, *Men come hither*, a great many flocked about him, whom he fell upon with his Stick, and beat them, ſaying, *I called Men, not Varlets.* This *Hecaton* in his *Chriæ* relates.

*Alexander* ſaid, If he had not been born *Alexander*, he would have deſired to have been born *Diogenes*.

He ſaid, They were not Maimed who were Dumb and Blind, but they who had not a Wallet.

Going once half Shaven to a Feaſt of young Men, as *Metrocles* relates, they beat him, whereupon he took their Names, and ſetting them down in a Parchment Roll, he wore it at his Breaſt, whereby being known, they were reviled and beaten.

He ſaid, he was *the Dog of the praiſed, but none of the Praiſers durſt go a hunting with him.*

To one ſaying, at the *Pythian* Games, I overcame men; *No*, ſaith he, *I the Men, you the Slaves.*

To thoſe who ſaid to him, You are now old, take your eaſe; *What*, ſaith he, *if I were to run a race, ſhould I give over when I were almoſt at the end, or rather conteſt with greater courage?*

Finding *Demoſthenes* the Orator at Dinner in a common Victualling houſe, who aſhamed, would have ſtolen away; Nay, ſaith he, you are now the more *Popular*. *Ælian* relates it thus, *Diogenes* being at Dinner in a common Victualling-houſe, and ſeeing *Demoſthenes* paſs by, invited him in, *Demoſthenes* refuſing; Do you think it, ſaith

ſaith *Diogenes*, a diſparagement to dine here, when your Maſter dines here every day? meaning the common people, to whom Orators are but ſervants.

To ſome ſtrangers who were deſirous to ſee *Demoſthenes*, pointing to him with his middle finger; This, ſaith he, is he that leads the *Athenians*.

In reproof to one who had thrown away his bread, and was aſhamed to take it up again, he tied a ſtring about the neck of a bottle, and dragg'd it after him through the *Ceramick*.

He ſaid, Moſt men were mad *præter digitum*, all but the finger; if any man ſhould walk pointing with his middle finger, he will be thought mad; if his fore finger, not ſo.

He ſaid, The moſt precious things were ſold cheapeſt, and ſo on the contrary; for a Statue will coſt 3000 pieces of Silver, a peck of Wheat two pieces of braſs.

To one who came to him to ſtudy Philoſophy, he gave a Fiſh, and bid him follow him; the other aſhamed, threw it away and departed: not long after, meeting the ſame perſon, he laughing, ſaid, *The friendſhip betwixt you and me was broke off by a Fiſh. Diocles* relates it thus; One ſaying to him, Command me, *Diogenes*; he gave him a pennyworth of Cheeſe to bring after him; the other refuſing to carry it, Our friendſhip, ſaith he, a pennyworth of Cheeſe hath diſſolved.

Seeing a boy drink water in the hollow of his hand, he took his little cup out of his wallet and threw it away, ſaying, *The boy out-went him in frugality:* He threw away his diſh alſo, ſeeing a Boy that had broken his, ſupping up his Broth in the ſame manner.

Seeing a woman proſtrate her ſelf unhandſomely in Prayer, and deſirous to reprove her ſuperſtition, as *Zoilus* the *Pergæan* reports, came to her, and ſaid, Are you not aſhamed, woman, that God who ſtands behind you (for all things are full of him) ſhould ſee you in this undecent poſture?

He ſaid, ſuch as beat others, ought to be conſecrated to *Æſculapius*, the God of *Chirurgery*.

He ſaid, *Againſt Fortune we muſt oppoſe courage; againſt Nature, Law; againſt Paſſion, Reaſon.*

In the *Craneum*, *Alexander* ſtanding by him, as the Sun ſhone, ſaid to him, Ask of me what thou wilt; he anſwer'd, *Do not ſtand between me and the Sun.*

One reading a long tedious diſcourſe, and coming at laſt near a blank leaf at the end of the book, *Be of good courage friends*, ſaith he, *I ſee land.*

To one, proving by the *horned* Syllogiſm that he had horns, he feeling of his forehead, *But I*, ſaith he, *feel none.* In like manner another maintaining there was no ſuch thing as motion, he roſe up and walked. To one diſputing concerning Meteors, *How long is it*, ſaith he, *ſince you came from Heaven?*

A wicked man having written over the door of his houſe, Let no ill thing enter here: *Which way then*, ſaith he, *muſt the Maſter come in?*

He anointed his feet with ſweet Unguents, ſaying, the ſcent went from the crown of his head into the air, but from his feet to his noſtrils.

To ſome *Athenians*, that perſwaded him to be initiated into ſome Religious Myſteries, alledging that ſuch as were initiated had the chiefeſt places in the other World: It is ridiculous, ſaith he, if *Ageſilaus* and *Epaminondas* live there amongſt bogs, and the common people that are initiated, live in the bleſſed Iſlands. Or as *Plutarch*, hearing theſe verſes of *Socrates*:

> *——Thrice happy they*
> *Who do theſe myſteries ſurvey:*
> *They only after death are bleſt,*
> *All miſeries purſue the reſt.*

*VVhat*, ſaith he, *ſhall* Patœcion *the thief be in better condition* (becauſe he was initiated) *than* Epaminondas?

Mice coming to him as he was at dinner; *See* ſaith he, Diogenes *alſo maintaineth Paraſites.*

(*b*) *Diogenes* being preſent at a diſcourſe of *Plato's*, would not mind it; whereat *Plato* angry, ſaid, Thou dog, why mind'ſt thou not? *Diogenes* unmoved, anſwered, *Yet I never return to the place where I was ſold, as Dogs do*, alluding to *Plato's* voyage to *Sicily*. (d) Ælian. hiſt. 14.

Returniug from a Bath, one aſked him, if there were many men there? he ſaid, *no*: The other asking him, if there were much company; he ſaid, *there was.*

*Plato* defining Man *a two-footed Animal without wings*, and this definition being approved; *Diogenes* took a Cock, and plucking off all its feathers, turned it into *Plato's* School, ſaying, This is *Plato's* Man; whereupon to the definition was added, *having broad nails.*

To one demanding at what time he ſhould dine, *If thou art rich*, ſaith he, *when thou wilt*; *if poor, when thou canſt.*

At *Megara*, ſeeing their ſheep with thick fleeces, and their children almoſt naked; *It is better*, ſaith he, *to be the ſheep of a* Megaræan, *than his ſon.*

To one, who hitting him with the end of a long pole, bad him take heed, *Why*, ſaith he, *do you mean to hit me again?*

He ſaid, *the Orators were the ſervants of the multitude; Crowns, the boiles of glory.*

(*c*) He lighted a candle at noon, ſaying, *I look for a man.* (e) Stob. ſer.

He ſtood in the rain without any ſhelter; ſome that were preſent pitying him, *Plato*, who was there likewiſe, ſaid, *if you will ſhew your ſelves pitiful to him, go away*, reflecting upon his vain-glory.

One giving him a box on the ear, O *Hercules*, ſaith he, *I knew not that I ſhould have walked with a Helmet.*

*Medias* giving him many blows with his fiſt, ſaying, There are 3000 drachmes [alluding to the fines impoſed upon ſuch outrages] ready counted for you upon the table: The next day he got a *Cæſtus*, and beat him with it, ſaying, *There are three thouſand drachmes ready counted for you.*

*Lycias* an Apothecary asking him, if he thought there were many Gods: *How*, ſaith he, *can I think otherwiſe, when I take you to be their enemy?* Others aſcribe this to *Theodorus.*

Seeing one that had beſprinkled himſelf with water: O *unhappy man*, ſaith he, *doſt thou not know, that the errors of life are no more to be waſhed away by water, than errors in Grammar?*

He

He rebuked thoſe who complained of Fortune, ſaying, *They did not requeſt what was good, but that which ſeemed good to them.*

Of thoſe, who are terrified with dreams, he ſaid, *You never are concern'd for the things you do waking, but what you fancy in your ſleep you make your greateſt buſineſs.*

(f) Et Plut. de curioſitate. (f) At the Olympick Games the Cryer proclaiming, *Dioxippus* hath overcome men; he *ſlaves*, ſaith he, *but I men.*

*Alexander* ſending an Epiſtle to *Antipater* at *Athens*, by one whoſe name was *Athlias*, *Diogenes* being preſent ſaid, *Athlias* from *Athlias*, by *Athlias* to *Athlias*, alluding to the name, which implieth *miſery.*

*Perdiccas* threatning him with death unleſs he would come to him; *that is no great matter*, ſaith he, *for a* Cantharides *or* Spider *may do as much; you ſhould rather have threatned, that you would have liv'd well without me.*

He often ſaid the Gods had given to men an eaſy life, but that it was hidden from thoſe who uſed choice diet, unguents and the like; whence to one whoſe ſervant put on his cloaths, *you will not be truly happy*, ſaith he, *until he wipe your noſe alſo*, that is, *when you have loſt the uſe of your hands.*

Seeing ſome that had the charge of the things belonging to the Temple, leading a man to Priſon, who had ſtoln a Cup out of the Treaſury, *the great thieves*, ſaith he, *lead Priſoner the leſſer.*

To a young man that throwing ſtones at a Gibbet, *well done*, ſaith he, *you will be ſure to hit the mark.*

To ſome young men that coming about him, ſaid, Take heed you do not bite us: *fear not boyes*, ſaid he, Diogenes *eats not Beetes* [for ſo he termed effeminate perſons].

To one feaſting, cloath'd in a Lyons skin, *do not*, ſaith he, *defile virtues Livery.*

To one extolling the happineſs of *Calliſthenes*, in that living with *Alexander* he had plenty of all things; *nay*, ſaith he, *he is not happy, for he dines and ſups when* Alexander *pleaſes.*

When he wanted money, he ſaid, he went to redemand, not borrow it of his friends.

Seeing a young man going along with ſome great perſons to a Feaſt, he took him from them, and carried him to his own friends, bidding them to look to him better.

To one neatly dreſſed, who had asked him ſome queſtion, *I cannot anſwer you*, ſaid he, *unleſs I knew whether you were a man or a woman.*

Vit. Athenæ. (g) Of a young man playing at *Cattabus* in a Bath, *By how much the better*, ſaith he, *ſo much the worſe.*

At a Feaſt one threw a bone to him as to a dog, which he like a dog took up, and lifting his leg ἐπ' ὀυρεῖσιν ἀυτοῖς.

Orators, and all ſuch as ſought glory by ſpeaking, he called τρισανδρωνας, thrice men, inſtead of τρισαθλίους thrice wretched.

He called an unlearned rich man *a ſheep with a Golden Fleece.*

Seeing Written upon the Gates of a Prodigal's houſe, TO BE SOLD; *I knew*, ſaith he, *being ſo overcharg'd with Wine, it would vomit up the owner.*

To a young man profeſſing himſelf much diſpleaſed at the many perſons that courted him, *Let him ſee*, ſaith he, *that you are diſpleaſed, by caſting off your effeminacy.*

Of a foul Bath, *where*, ſaith he, *ſhall they be waſhed that waſh here?*

A big fellow that plaid on the harp, tho by all others diſcommended for playing ill, he praiſed; being asked why, *becauſe*, ſaith he, *being an able fellow, he chooſeth rather to play on the harp than to ſteal.*

A certain harper who plaid ſo ill, that the company always went away and left him, he ſaluted thus, *Good morrow Cock*; the other asking why, *becauſe*, ſaith he, *your Muſick maketh every one riſe.*

Seeing a young man doing ſomething, which tho it were ordinary, he conceived to be unſeemly, he filled his boſom with beans, and in that manner walked through the people, to whom gazing upon him, *I wonder*, ſaith he, *you look at me, and not at him.*

*Hegeſias* deſiring him to lend him ſome of his Writings, *You are a fool*, ſaith he, Hegeſias, *who eat figs not painted, but real; yet neglect true exercitation, and ſeek after the written.*

Seeing one that had won the Victory at the *Olympick* Exerciſes, feeding ſheep; *you have made haſt*, ſaith he, *good man, from the* Olympick *Exerciſes to the Nemæan*, the word alluding to feeding of ſheep.

Being demanded how it cometh to paſs that Wreſtlers are for the moſt part ſtupid fellows, he anſwer'd, *becauſe they are made chiefly of the skins of Oxen and Swine.*

To a Tyrant, demanding of him what Braſs was beſt, he anſwer'd *that whereof the Statues of* Harmodius *and* Ariſtogiton *were made.* This others aſcribe to *Plato.*

Being asked how *Dionyſius* uſeth his Friends, *as veſſels*, ſaith he, *emptying the full, and throwing away the empty.*

A young man newly Married, having written upon his houſe, *the Son of* Jupiter, Hercules, Callinicus *dwelleth here, let nothing ill enter*; he added, *Aſſiſtance after a defeat*, implying it was too late, he being already Married.

He ſaid Covetouſneſs is the Metropolis of all evil.

Seeing one that had waſted all his means, eating Olives, *If you had uſed to dine ſo*, ſaid he, *you would not have ſupp'd ſo.*

He ſaid, *Good men are the Images of the Gods, Love is the buſineſs of idle perſons.*

Being asked what is the moſt miſerable thing in Life, he ſaid, *an old man in want.*

(h) Et. Stob. ſer. 65. (h) Being demanded, the bitings of what beaſts were moſt dangerous; *of Wild Beaſts*, ſaith he, *a Detractor*; *of Tame, a Flatterer.*

Beholding a Picture of two Centaurs very ill painted, he ſaid, *Which of theſe is* Chiron? the Jeſt conſiſteth in the *Greek* word, which ſignifieth *worſe*, and was alſo the name of a Centaur, Tutor to *Achilles.*

He ſaid, *the diſcourſe of flatterers is a rope of honey. He called the belly, the Charybdis of Life.*

Hearing that *Didymo*, an Adulterer, was taken; *he deſerves*, ſaith he, *to be put out of his name* (meaning Emaſculated).

(i) Stob. ſer. 55. (i) Being asked why Gold looks pale; *becauſe* ſaith he, *many lye in wait for it.*

Seeing

Seeing a Woman carried in a Litter; *that is not*, ſaith he, *a fit cage for ſuch a Beaſt.*

Seeing a Servant that had run away from his Maſter, ſitting upon the brink of a well: *Young man*, ſaith he, *take heed you do not fall in*: alluding to the puniſhment of fugitive ſervants.

Seeing one that uſed to ſteal Garments in the Bath; he ſaid, ἐπ' ἀλειμμάτιον ἢ ἐπ' ἄλλο ἱμάτιον, *Do you come for unguents, or for another Garment?*

Seeing ſome women hang'd upon an Olive-tree; *I would*, ſaith he, *all Trees bore the ſame Fruit.*

Seeing a Thief that uſed to rob Tombes, he ſpoke to him in that Verſe of *Homer*,

*——What now of men the beſt,*
*Com'ſt thou to plunder the Deceas'd?*

Seeing a handſome youth all alone aſleep, he awaked him, ſaying in the words of *Homer*, *Awake.*

Μή τίς σοι εὐδοντι μεταφρενῷ ἐν δόρυ πήξῃ.

To one that Feaſted ſumptuouſly, he ſaid that Verſe of *Homer.*

*Son thou haſt but a little time to Live.*

*Plato* Diſcourſing concerning *Ideas*, and naming τραπεζότητα, and κυαθότητα, as if he ſhould ſay, *Tableity* and *Cuppeity*, he ſaid, *I ſee*, Plato, *the table and the cup, but not the tableity and cuppeity.* *Plato* anſwered, it is true indeed, you have eyes by which the *table* and *cup* are ſeen; but not an Intellect, by which *tableity* and *cuppeity* are ſeen.

Being demanded what he thought *Socrates*; he anſwered, *mad.* Being demanded at what time a man ſhould Marry; *a young man*, ſaith he, *not yet*; *an old man not at all.*

To one that asked, what he ſhould give him to let him ſtrike him, he anſwered, *a Helmet.*

(*l*) *Stob. Ser.* 161. (*l*) To a young man dreſſing himſelf neatly, *if this*, ſaith he, *be for the ſake of men, you are unhappy; if for women, you are unjuſt.*

Seeing a young man bluſh; *take courage*, ſaith he, *that is the colour of Vertue.*

Hearing two men plead againſt one another, he Condemned both, ſaying, *one had ſtolen, the other had not loſt.*

Being demanded what wine he thought moſt pleaſant, he anſwer'd, *that which is drunk at another's coſt.*

To one that ſaid, many deride thee; he anſwer'd, *but I am not derided:* As conceiving, ſaith *Plutarch*, (*m*) thoſe only to be derided, who are troubled at ſuch things.

(*m*) *Vit. Fab. Max.*

To one who ſaid, Life is an ill thing: *Life*, ſaith he, *is not an ill thing, but an ill life is an ill thing.*

(*n*) *Stob. Ser.* 39. (*n*) As he was Dining upon Olives, they cauſed Tart to be ſet before him, which he threw away, ſaying,

*Stranger, when Kings approach, withdraw.*

The words of *Laius*'s Officers to *Oedipus.*

Being asked what kind a Dog he was, he anſwer'd, *When he was hungry, a Spaniel; when his belly was full, a Maſtiff; one of thoſe which many commend, but dare not take abroad with them a hunting.*

Being demanded whether wiſe men might eat Dainties; *all things*, ſaith he, *as well as others.*

(*o*) Being demanded why men gave to Beggers, and not to Philoſophers; *becauſe*, ſaith he, *they are afraid they may be lame or blind, but are not afraid they may be Philoſophers.* (*o*) *Stob. Ser.*

To one that reproached him as having counterfeited Mony; *indeed*, ſaith he, *there was a time when I was ſuch a one as you are; but the time will never come that you will be as I am.*

Coming to *Mindus*, and ſeeing the Gates very large, the City ſmall; *Mindinians*, ſaith he, *ſhut your Gates, leſt your City run out at them.*

Seeing a Thief that was taken ſtealing Purple, he apply'd that verſe of *Homer* to him,

*The Purple death, and potent fate have ſeiz'd.*

To *Craterus*, who invited him to come to him, he returned anſwer, *I had rather lick ſalt at* Athens, *than enjoy the greateſt delicacies with* Craterus.

Meeting *Anaximenes* the Orator, who was very Fat; *Give us*, ſaith he, *ſome of your Fleſh, it will eaſe you, and help us.*

The ſame *Anaximenes* being in the midſt of a Diſcourſe, *Diogenes* ſhewing a piece of Salt-fiſh, diverted the Attention of his Auditors; whereat *Anaximenes* growing angry, *See*, ſaith he, *a hard Penny-worth of Salt-fiſh hath broke off* Anaximenes's *Diſcourſe.*

Some aſcribe this to him. *Plato* ſeeing him waſh herbs, came and whiſper'd thus to him, If you had followed *Dionyſius*, you would not have needed to waſh herbs; to whom he returned this anſwer in his Ear, *If you had waſhed herbs, you needed not to have followed* Dionyſius.

To one that ſaid to him, many Laugh at you; *And Aſſes perhaps at them*, ſaith he; *but they care not for Aſſes, nor I for them.*

Seeing a young Man ſtudying Philoſophy: Well done, ſaith he, you will teach thoſe, who love your outward Beauty, to admire your Soul.

To one that admired the multitude of votive Offerings in *Samothracia*, given by ſuch as had eſcaped Shipwrack: *There would have been far more*, ſaith he, *if thoſe who periſhed had preſented theirs.* Others aſcribe this to *Diagoras* the *Melian.*

To a young Man going to a Feaſt, he ſaid, You will come back *Chiron* (alluding to the word which implyeth *worſe*) The young Man came to him the next day, ſaying, I went and returned not *Chiron*: *No*, ſaith he, *not* Chiron, *but* Eurytion.

Returning from *Lacedæmon* to *Athens*, to one that asked him, from whence he came, and whither he went: *From Men*, ſaith he, *to Women.*

Returning from the Olympick Games, to one that asked if there were much People there; *Much People*, ſaith he, *but few Men.*

He compared Prodigals to Fig-trees growing on a Precipice, whoſe Fruit Men taſt not, but Crows and Vultures devour.

Phryne

*Phryne* the *Curtezan* having ſet up a golden Statue of *Venus* at *Delphi*, he wrote on it, *From the Intemperance of the* Grecians.

*Alexander* coming to him, and ſaying, I am *Alexander* the great King: *And I*, ſaith he, *am* Diogenes *the Dog.*

Being asked why he was called *Dog*: *I fawn on thoſe that give*, ſaith he, *I bark at thoſe that will not give, and I bite the wicked.*

As he was gathering Figs, the Keeper of the Orchard ſpying him, told him, it is not long ſince a Man was hang'd upon that Tree: *And for that Reaſon*, ſaith he, *I will cleanſe it.*

(p) Obſerving *Dioxippus* the Olympick Victor, to caſt many Glances upon the *Curtezan*: *See*, ſaith he, *a common Woman leads the martial Ram by the Neck.*

(p) Æl. 12. 58.

To two infamous Perſons ſtealing away from him: *Fear not*, ſaith he, *Dogs eat not Thiſtles.*

To one that asked him concerning a Youth taken in Adultery, whence he was; he anſwer'd, *of* Tegea; Tegea (*a City of* Arcadia) *whereto he alluded*, is a publick Brothel.

Seeing one, that in former times had been an ill Wreſtler, profeſs Medicine; *What is the matter*, ſaith he, *have you a deſign to caſt thoſe down that have thrown you?*

Seeing the Son of a common Woman throw Stones amongſt a Croud. *Take heed*, ſaith he, *you do not hit your Father.*

To a Youth ſhewing him a Sword, given him by one that loved him, he ſaid, ἢ μὲν μάχαιρα καλή, ἢ δὲ λαβὴ δύσχρ.

To ſome that extolled one who had beſtowed ſomething on him: *But you do not praiſe me*, ſaith he, *who deſerved to receive it.*

To one that redemanded an old Cloak of him, *If you give it me*, ſaith he, *I muſt keep it*; *if you lent it me, I muſt make uſe of it.*

To a ſuppoſititious Perſon that ſaid to him, You have Gold in your Cloak, *Yes*, ſaith he, *and for that Reaſon I lay it* (q) *under me when I go to Sleep.*

(q) The jeſt conſiſteth in the alluſion between thoſe two Greek words, ὑποβολιμαῖος and ὑποβαλλόμενος.

Being demanded what he had gained by Philoſophy, *If nothing elſe*, ſaith he, *at leaſt this, to be prepared for all Fortunes.*

Being demanded of what Country he was, he anſwered, *a Citizen of the World.*

To one that Sacrific'd, praying he might have a Child, *You pray for a Child*, ſaith he, *but never trouble your ſelf what kind of Child it may prove.*

At an Ordinary, being demanded Money, he anſwered the Maſter in that Verſe of *Homer*,

*Ask others, but from* Hector *hold thy hand.*

(r) He ſaid, The Miſtreſſes of Kings were Queens, for the Kings did whatſoever they would have them.

(r) Et Stob. ſer.

The *Athenians* having decreed to ſtile *Alexander*, *Bacchus*; *And make me*, ſaith he, *Serapis.*

To one reproaching him for living in filthy places, *The Sun*, ſaith he, *viſits Kennels, yet is not defiled.*

Being at Supper in the Temple, they brought him courſe Bread, he threw it away, ſaying, *Nothing but what is pure muſt come within a Temple.*

To one that ſaid, Why do you, who know nothing, profeſs Philoſophy? he anſwered, *Tho I ſhould but pretend to ſtudy Philoſophy, yet that were a Profeſſion thereof.*

To one that recommended his Son to him, ſaying, he was very Ingenious, and exceeding well Educated; he anſwered, *Why then doth he need me?*

Thoſe who ſpeak good things, but do them not, differ nothing from a Lute, for that neither hears, nor hath ſenſe.

He went to the Theatre; as all the People were going out, being asked why he did ſo, *This*, ſaith he, *is that I Study all my Life time.*

Seeing an effeminate young Man, *Are you not aſhamed*, ſaith he, *to uſe your ſelf worſe than Nature hath done? She hath made you a Man, but you will force your ſelf to be a Woman.*

(ſ) Seeing an ignorant Man tuning a Lute, *Are you not aſhamed*, ſaith he, *to try to make a Lute ſound harmoniouſly, and yet ſuffer your Life to be ſo full of diſcord?* (ſ) Stob. Ser. 104.

To one that ſaid he was unfit for Philoſophy, *Why do you live*, ſaith he, *if you care not for living honeſtly?*

To one who deſpiſed his own Father, *Are you not aſhamed*, ſaith he, *to deſpiſe him who is the cauſe you are ſo proud?*

Hearing a handſome Youth ſpeak fooliſhly, *Are you not aſhamed*, ſaith he, *to draw a Leaden Dagger out of an Ivory Sheath.*

Being reproached for accepting a Cloak from *Antipater*, he anſwered in thoſe words of *Homer*,

*The gifts of gods muſt not be thrown away.*

One that hit him with a Pole, and then bid him take heed, he ſtruck with his Staff, and ſaid, *and take you heed.*

To one that ſued to a Curtezan, *What mean you Wretch*, ſaith he, *to ſue for that which is much better to miſs.*

To one that ſmelled ſweet of Unguents, *Take heed*, ſaith he, *this perfume make not your Life ſtink.*

He ſaid, *Slaves ſerve their Maſters, but wicked Men their Paſſions.*

Being demanded why Slaves are called ἀνδράποδα *Footmen*, becauſe ſaith he, *They have Feet like Men, but ſuch Minds as you that ask the Queſtion.*

Seeing an unskilful Archer going to Shoot, he ſate down at the Mark, *Leſt*, ſaith he, *he ſhould hit me.*

He ſaid, Lovers are unhappy in pleaſure.

Being demanded whether Death be ill, *How*, ſaith he, *can that be ill, whereof when it cometh we have no ſenſe?*

*Alexander* coming to him, and ſaying, Do you not fear me? What ſaith he, are you Good or Ill? He anſwered Good: *Who*, replies *Diogenes*, *fears that which is Good?*

He ſaid, *Learning is a Regulation to young Men, a Comfort to old Men, Wealth to poor Men, and an Ornament to rich Men.*

To *Didymo* an Adulterer curing a Maids Eye, *Take heed*, ſaith he, *leſt in curing the Eye, you hurt not the Ball*, [the word κόρη, ſignifying both Eye-ball and Virginity.]

To one that ſaid his Friends lay in wait for him, *What then is to be done*, ſaith he, *if Friends and Enemies muſt be uſed alike?*

Being demanded what is beſt amongſt men; he anſwered, *freedom of Speech.*

Coming into a School, and ſeeing there many

Statues of the Muſes, but few Auditors, *By the help of the Gods, Maſter,* ſaith he, *you have many Auditors.*

*Stob. Eth. ſer. 1.* To one that asked him how he might order himſelf beſt, *By reprehending,* ſaith he, *thoſe things in your ſelf which you blame in others.*

*Ser.* He gave good Counſel to a Perſon very diſſolute; being demanded what he was doing, he anſwer'd, *Waſhing an Æthiop.*

*Ser. 32.* He went backwards into the School of the *Stoicks*, whereat ſome Laughing, *Are you not aſhamed,* ſaith he, *to do that in the whole courſe of your Life, for which you deride me in walking.*

*Ibid.* He ſaid, *Men provide for their Living, but not for their Well-living.*

*Ser. 37. & 84.* He ſaid, It was a ſhame to ſee Wreſtlers and Singing-Maſters obſerve temperate Diet, and moderate their Pleaſures, one for Exerciſe, the other for his Voice, and yet no man would do ſo much for Virtue's ſake.

*Ser. 45.* He ſaid, Pride, like a Shepherd, driveth men whither it pleaſeth.

*Ser. 48.* Seeing the high Walls of *Megara*, he ſaid, *Unhappy people, mind not the height of your Walls, but the height of their Courages, who are to ſtand on the Walls.*

*Ser. 53.* He compared covetous men to ſuch as have the dropſy, thoſe are full of Money, yet deſire more; theſe of Water, yet thirſt after more: Paſſions grow more intenſe by Enjoyment of what they deſire.

*Ser. 53.* Seeing a Man make Love to old rich Widows: *This Love,* ſaith he, *is not blind, but toothleſs.*

*Ser. 54.* Being demanded what Beaſts were the worſt: *In the Field,* ſaith he, *Bears and Lyons; in the City, Uſurers and Sycophants.*

*Ser. 64.* He compared Flattery to an empty Tomb, on which *Friendſhip* was inſcribed.

*Ser. 66.* Blaming *Antiſthenes* for being too remiſs in diſcourſe, in regard that when he ſpoke loudeſt he could hardly be heard, and calling himſelf the Trumpet of reproof: *Antiſthenes* reply'd, he was like a *Bee*, that makes no great noiſe, yet *ſtings* ſharply.

*Ibid.* He ſaid, Reproof is the good of others.

*Ibid.* A certain *Athenian* asking him why he lived not with the *Lacedemonians*, whom he praiſed ſo much: *Phyſicians,* ſaith he, *tho they ſtudy Health, converſe with the Sick.*

*Ibid.* He ſaid, other Dogs bark at their Enemies, I, my Friends, that I may preſerve them.

*Ibid.* He asked *Plato* if he were writing Laws: *Plato* affirmed he was. Did you not write a Commonwealth before, ſaith *Diogenes*? I did, anſwers *Plato*. And had not that Commonwealth Laws, ſaith he? The other anſwering it had; *To what end,* reply'd *Diogenes, do you write new Laws?*

*Ser. 68.* He ſaid, *To give Phyſick to a dead Body, or adviſe an old Man, is the ſame thing?*

*Ser. 71.* To a bald Man that reviled him, *I will not return your Reproaches,* ſaith he, *yet cannot but commend your Hair, for leaving ſo bad a Head.*

*Ibid.* To an Informer that fell out with him; *I am glad,* ſaith he, *of the enmity betwixt us, for you hurt not your Foes, but your Friends.*

*Ser. 72.* To one that reviled him; *No man,* ſaith he, *will believe you when you ſpeak ill of me, no more than they would me, if I ſhould ſpeak well of you.*

*Ser. 77.* *Alexander* ſent him a diſh full of Bones, with this Meſſage, It was meat for Dogs; he anſwer'd, *Yea, but not fit for a King to ſend.*

*Ibid.* He ſaid, It was the ſame fault to give to them that deſerved nothing, as not to give to them that do.

*Ser. 87.* He ſaid, *As Houſes, where there is plenty of Meat, are full of Mice, ſo the Bodies of ſuch as eat much, are full of Diſeaſes.*

*Ser. 88.* At a Feaſt, one giving him a great Cup full of Wine, he threw it away; for which being blamed, *If I had drunk it,* ſaith he, *not only the Wine would have been loſt, but I alſo.*

*Ser. 105.* Being demanded what was hardeſt, he anſwer'd, *To know our ſelves, for we conſtrue moſt things according to our own Partiality.*

*Ser. 119.* He ſaid, *Medea* was a wiſe Woman, not a Witch, who by Labour and Exerciſe corroborated the Bodies of effeminate Perſons, whence aroſe the Fable, that She could renew Age.

*Ser. 126.* To one that profeſt himſelf a *Philoſopher*, but argued litigiouſly, he ſaid, *Why do you ſpoil the beſt part of Philoſophy, yet would be thought a Philoſopher?*

*Ser. 133.* Queſtioning one of thoſe young Men that followed him, he was ſilent; whereupon *Diogenes, Do you not think,* ſaith he, *it belongs to the ſame Man to know when to ſpeak, and when to hold his peace?*

*Ser. 149. & 153.* Being demanded how a man ſhould live under the Authority of Superiors; as we do by Fire, ſaith he, not too near, leſt it burn; not too far off, leſt we freeze.

*Ser. 163.* Seeing ſome Women talking privately together: *Behold,* ſaith he, *the Aſp borrows poyſon from the Viper.*

*Ser. 210.* Being demanded what was the heavieſt burthen the Earth bears, he anſwered, *An ignorant Man.*

*Ser. 211.* An Aſtrologer in the *Forum* diſcourſing to the People, and ſhewing them in a Tablet the *Erratick* Stars: *No,* ſaith *Diogenes, it is not the Stars that err, but theſe,* pointing to the People.

*Ser. 216.* Being demanded what Men are the moſt noble: *They,* ſaith he, *who contemn Wealth, Glory and Pleaſure, and over-maſter the contraries to theſe, Poverty, Ignominy, Pain, Death.*

*Ser. 230.* Seeing the Servants of *Anaximenes*, carrying many Goods, he demanded to whom they belong'd; they anſwered, to *Anaximenes. Is he not aſhamed*, replied *Diogenes, to have ſo much Houſhold-Stuff, and yet not be Maſter of himſelf?*

*Ser. 233.* He ſaid, Virtue dwelleth neither in a rich City, nor a private Houſe.

*Ser. 235.* He ſaid, Poverty is a ſelf-taught help to Philoſophy; for what Philoſophy endeavours to perſwade by words, poverty enforceth in practiſe.

*Ibid.* To a wicked man reproaching him for his poverty; *I never knew,* ſaith he, *any man puniſhed for poverty, but many for wickedneſs.*

*Ibid.* He called Poverty a ſelf-inſtructing virtue.

*Ser. 237.* To one that reproached him with poverty: *What mean you,* ſaith he? *poverty never made a Tyrant, riches many.*

*Ser. 245.* *Alexander* ſeeing him aſleep in his Tub, ſaid, O Tub full of wiſdom: The Philoſopher riſing up, anſwer'd, *Great King,*

*One drop of Fortune's better far*
*Than Tubs replete with wiſdom are.*

To whom a ſtander by reply'd,

*One*

*One drop of Wiſdom Fortune's Seas excells;*
*In unwiſe ſouls misfortune ever dwells.*

Ser. 270. Seeing an old woman painted, *If this be for the living, you are deceived*, ſaith he; *if for the dead, make haſt to them.*

Ser. 271. To one bewailing his own misfortune, as that he ſhould not die in his own Country, *Be of comfort*, ſaith he, *the way to the next World is alike in every place.*

Æl. var. hiſt. 10, 11. Having a great pain in his ſhoulder which troubled him much, one ſaid to him in deriſion, Why doſt thou not die, *Diogenes*, and free thy ſelf from this miſery? He anſwer'd, *It is fit they ſhould live who know how to order their life; for you who know not what to do or ſay, it is a convenient time to die.*

Plut. de exul. He uſed to ſay, *Ariſtotle* dineth when *Philip* pleaſeth, but *Diogenes* when it pleaſeth *Diogenes.*

Plut. quom. ger. Reſp. At *Corinth*, ſeeing *Dioniſius* the younger, who was depoſed from the Kingdom of *Sicily*, *This is a life*, ſaith he, *you deſerve not, you merit rather not to live here freely and without fear, but at home in perpetual impriſonment.*

Pl. de vert. Moral. To ſome who commended *Plato*, he ſaid, *What hath he done worthy commendation, having profeſſed Philoſophy ſo long, yet never moved any to grief.*

Pl. de aud. Poet To one demanding how he might take the greateſt revenge upon his Enemy, he anſwered, *By being good and virtuous your ſelf.*

Macrob. Sat. 1. 3. In commending his Maſter *Antiſthenes*, he would ſay of him, *Of rich he made me poor; and inſtead of a fair houſe, made me live in a Tub.*

## CHAP. VI.

### *His Writings.*

OF the *Writings* aſcribed to him, are theſe.

*Dialogues.*
*Ichthyas.*
*The Geay.*
*The Leopard.*
*The Athenian people.*
*Policy.*
*Ethick art.*
*Of Riches.*
*Erotick.*
*Theodorus.*
*Hypſias. Ariſtarchus.*
*Of Death.*
*Epiſtles.*
*Tragedies 7.*

*Helena.*
*Thyeſtes.*
*Hercules.*
*Achilles*
*Medea.*
*Chryſippus.*
*OEdipus.*

*Soſicrates* and *Satyrus* affirm, that none of theſe were written by *Diogenes*; the Tragedies *Satyrus* aſcribes to *Philiſcus* of *Ægina*, *Socion* affirmeth theſe only to have been written by *Diogenes.*

*Of Vertue.*
*Of Good.*
*Erotick.*
*The Poor.*
*The Tolerant.*
*The Leopard.*
*Caſſander.*
*Cephalio.*
*Philiſcus.*
*Ariſtarchus.*
*Siſiphus.*
*Ganymede.*
*Chria's, &*
*Epiſtles.*

## CHAP. VII.

### *His Death.*

HE Died, as *Demetrius* ſaith, at *Corinth* about 90. years old, the ſame day that *Alexander* died at *Babylon*; which according to *Ælian* was the ſeventh of *Thargelion*, in the firſt year of the 114*th* Olympiad.

The manner of his death is variouſly related. *Eubulus* ſaith, he lived to his end with *Xeniades*, and was buried hy his Sons As he lay ſick, *Xeniades* asked him how he would be buried; he anſwer'd, with his Face downwards; *Xeniades* demanding the reaſon, *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *all things will be turned upſide down*; alluding, ſaith *Laertius*, to the greatneſs of the *Macedonians*, who not long before were a poor inconſiderable People. Some report, that being near Death, he gave order that his body ſhould be left unburied, that the wild Beaſts might partake of him, or be thrown into a Ditch, and a little duſt be caſt over it; or thrown upon a dung-hill, that he might benefit his Brethren.

*Ælian* ſaith, that being ſick to Death, he threw himſelf down from a Bridg which was near the Gymnaſium, and ordered the Keeper of the *Paleſtra* to take his body and throw it into the River *Iliſſus.* *Var. hiſt.* 8. 14.

Others affirm he died of a ſurfeit of raw fleſh; others, that he ſtopp'd his own breath; others, that cutting a Cuttle-fiſh in pieces to throw it to dogs, it bit aſunder a Nerve in his foot, whereof he died.

Others affirm he died as he was going to the Olympick Games: Being taken with a Fever, he lay down by the way, and would not ſuffer his friends to carry him; but ſitting under the ſhade of the next Tree, ſpoke thus to them; *This night I ſhall be a Victor, or vanquiſhed; if I overcome the Fever, I will come to the Games; if not, I muſt go to the other World, and drive it away by death.*

*Antiſthenes* ſaith, his Friends were of opinion he ſtopp'd his own breath; for coming, as they conſtantly uſed, to viſit him in the *Cranæum* where he lived, they found him covered; they did not imagine it was ſleep, by reaſon of his great wakefulneſs; but immediately putting back his Cloak, perceived he was dead. Hereupon there aroſe a contention amongſt them who ſhould bury him; they fell from words to blows; but the Magiſtrates and great ones of the City, came themſelves and buried him by the Gate, which leads to *Iſthmus.* Over the Sepulchre they placed a Column, and upon it a *Dog* cut out of *Parian* ſtone. Afterwards his own Countrymen honoured him with many brazen *Statues*, bearing this Inſcription;

*Time doth the ſtrongeſt Braſs decay;*
Diogenes, *thou ne're canſt dye,*
*Who to content the ready way*
*To following Ages didſt deſcry.*

*Laertius* reckons *five* of this name; the *firſt* of *Apollonia*, a natural Philoſopher.
The *ſecond* a Sicionian.
The *third* this.
The *fourth* a *Stoick* of *Seleucia*.
The *fifth* of *Tarſis*.

# MONIMUS.

(a) Laert.

(a) *Monimus* was a *Syracuſian*, Diſciple to *Diogenes*; he was firſt ſervant to a Money-changer, to whom *Xeniades* who bought *Diogenes*, often coming, he was ſo taken with the Worth and Virtue of the perſon, that he counterfeited himſelf mad, and threw all the Money from off the Table, whereupon his Maſter turning him away, he betook himſelf to *Diogenes*. He followed likewiſe *Crates* the Cynick, and others of that Sect, which confirm'd his Maſter in the opinion that he was mad. He was a perſon eloquent and learned, mention'd by *Menander* in his *Hippocomus*; of ſo great conſtancy, that he contemned all glory for virtues ſake: He wrote ſome things, which at firſt appearance ſeemed *Ludicrous*, but contained deep ſerious ſenſe: as of *Appetites* two Books, and a *Protreptick*.

# ONESICRITUS.

(a) Laert.

(a) *Oneſicritus* was of *Ægina*; or according to *Demetrius*, an *Aſtypalæan*; he had two Sons: he ſent the younger, named *Androſthenes*, to *Athens*, who hearing *Diogenes*, would not depart thence. Hereupon he ſent the elder, named *Philiſcus*, who ſtayed there likewiſe for the ſame reaſon. Laſtly, the Father himſelf went, and was ſo much taken with *Diogenes*, that he became a ſedulous Auditor of him, as his two ſons were.

He was eſteemed amongſt the moſt eminent Diſciples of *Diogenes*. *Laertius* compares him with *Xenophon*: one fought under *Cyrus*, the other under *Alexander*: One wrote the *inſtitution of Cyrus*, the other the *praiſe of Alexander*: Their ſtiles alſo were very like.

# CRATES.

*Crates* was a *Theban*, Son of *Aſcandas*: He was likewiſe reckon'd amongſt the moſt eminent of *Diogenes*'s Diſciples: yet *Hippobotus* ſaith, he was not a Diſciple of *Diogenes*, but of *Bryſo* the *Achæan*.

He flouriſhed about the 113*th* Olympiad: *Antiſthenes*, in his *ſucceſſions*, ſaith, that being at a Tragedy where *Telephus* was repreſented, carrying a Basket in a ſordid condition, he betook himſelf to the Cynical Philoſophy, and ſelling all his eſtate, (for he was very rich, having gotten together above two hundred talents) he diſtributed it amongſt the Citizens, and was ſo conſtant a Profeſſor of this Philoſophy, that *Philemon*, the Comick Poet, takes notice thereof in theſe words,

*By him in Summer a thick Coat was worn.*
*In winter-time* (ſo temperate) *a torn.*

*Diocles* ſaith, *Diogenes* perſwaded him to part with his eſtate, and to throw all the money he had left, into the Sea: and that the houſe of *Crates* was from *Alexander*, that of *Hipparchia* his Wife, from *Philip*. Some of his near friends that came to him to diſſwade him from this courſe of life, he beat away, for he was of a reſolute ſpirit. (a) Laert.

*Demetrius* the *Magneſian*, ſaith, he depoſited ſome money in the hands of a Banquier, with this condition, that if his ſons betook themſelves to any Civil employment, it ſhould be repaid again; but, if to Philoſophy, it ſhould be diſtributed amongſt the people, for as much as a Philoſopher ſtands in need of nothing: *Era-*

*Eratoſthenes* relates, that having a ſon named *Paſicles*, by his Wife *Hipparchia*, aſſoon as he arrived at mans eſtate, he brought him to the houſe of a young maid that was his ſlave, ſaying, This is a hereditary matrimony to you: but thoſe who commit adultery, are, according to the Tragedians, puniſhed with baniſhment or death; Thoſe who keep Concubines were according to the Comedians, by luxury and drunkenneſs, tranſported to madneſs.

*Paſicles*, the Diſciple to *Euclid*, was his brother.

He ſaid, 'tis not poſſible to find a man without a fault; for, in every Pomgranat there is at leaſt one grain corrupt.

Having diſpleaſed *Nicodromus* a Lutiniſt, he beat him black and blew; whereupon he paſted a piece of paper on his forehead, wherein was written, Nicodromus *did this.*

He was exceedingly invective againſt common women.

He reproved *Demetreus Phalerius* for ſending bread and wine to him, ſaying, *I wiſh the fountains alſo produc'd bread*; intimating that he lived with water.

The Athenian Magiſtrates blamed him for wearing a long robe; *I will ſhew you*, Theophraſtus, ſaith he, *in the ſame attire*; which they not believing, he brought them to a Barbers ſhop, where he was ſitting to be trimm'd.

At *Thebes*, being beaten by the Maſter of the *Gymnaſium*; or, as others, at *Corinth* by *Eutkicrates*, he laughed, ſaying,

*He by the foot him drew.*
*And o're the threſh old threw:*

*Zeno* in his *Chrias* ſaith, he ſowed a ſheep-skin upon his cloak, to appear the more deformed: He was of a very unhandſome look; and whilſt he diſcourſed, laughed.

He uſed to lift up his hands and ſay, *Be of good courage, Grecians, both for the eyes and all other parts, for you ſhall ſoon ſee theſe deriders ſurpriſed by ſickneſs, and proclaiming you happy, blame their own ſlothfulneſs.*

He ſaid, we ought ſo long to ſtudy Philoſophy, until the leaders of the Army ſeem to be Horſe-drivers.

He ſaid, they who lived with flatteres, were forſaken perſons, living like ſheep amidſt wolves, not with thoſe who wiſh'd them well.

Perceiving he drew nigh to death, he looked upon himſelf, ſaying,

——*And doſt thou go, old friend,*
*To the next world, thou whom old age doth bend?*

For he was crooked through age.

To *Alexander*, asking whether he would that his Country ſhould be reſtored, or not: *To what end*, ſaith he, *ſeeing there will come perhaps another* Alexander, *and depopulate it.* He ſaid, Contempt of glory and want, were his Country, which were not ſubject to Fortune; and that he was Countryman to *Diogenes*, not fearing any body.

Coming into the *Forum*, where he beheld ſome buying, others ſelling: *Theſe*, ſaith he, *think themſelves happy in employments contrary to one another; but I think my ſelf happy, in having nothing to do either way.* *Stob. Ser.* 37.

To a young man followed by a great many Paraſites: *Young man*, ſaith he, *I am ſorry to ſee you ſo much alone.* *Ser.* 62.

He ſaid, *We ought not to accept gifts from all men, for virtue ought not to be maintained by vice.* *Ser.* 77.

Seeing at *Delphi* a golden Image of *Phryne* the Curtezan, he cried out, *This is a Trophy of the Grecian Intemperance.* *Ser.* 87.

Seeing a young man highly fed and fat: *Unhappy youth*, ſaith he, *do not fortifie your priſon.* *Ibid.*

He ſaid, *He gained glory, not by his riches, but his poverty.* *Ser.* 237.

To one, demanding what he ſhould get by Philoſophy: *You will learn*, ſaith he, *to open your purſe eaſily, and to give readily, not as you do now, turning away, delaying and trembling, as if you had the palſey.* *Ibid.*

He ſaid, *Men know not how much a Wallet, a meaſure of Lupines, and ſecurity of mind, is worth.* *Ibid.*

The Epiſtles of *Crates* are extant, wherein, ſaith *Laertius*, he writes excellent Philoſophy, in ſtile reſembling *Plato*. He wrote *Tragedies* likewiſe, full of deep Philoſophy.

He died old, and was buried in *Beotia*.

# METROCLES.

(a) *Laert.*

(a) *METrocles* was Diſciple of *Crates*, Brother to *Hipparchia*. He firſt heard *Theophraſtus* the *Peripatetick*, &c. afterwards apply'd himſelf to *Crates*, and became an eminent Philoſopher.

He burnt, as *Hecaton* ſaith, his writings, ſaying,

*Theſe are the dreams of wild phantaſtick youth.*

He burnt likewiſe the dictates of his Maſter *Theophraſtus*.

Vulcan *come hither*, Venus *needs thy aid.*

He ſaid, *Of things, ſome are purchaſed by money, as Houſes; ſome by time and diligence, as Learning: Riches is hurtful, if not rightly applied.*

He died old, he ſtrangled himſelf.

Of his Diſciples are remembred *Theombrotus* and *Cleomenes*. *Demetrius* of *Alexandria* was Auditor of *Theombrotus*: *Timarchus* of *Alexandria*, and *Ethicles* of *Epheſus*, were Diſciples of *Cleomenes*. *Echicles* heard alſo *Theombrotus*, from whom came *Menedemus*, of whom hereafter. Amongſt theſe was alſo *Menippus*, of *Sinopis*.

# HIPPARCHIA.

HIpparchia was likewiſe taken with the Diſcourſes of thoſe *Cynicks*, She was Siſter to *Metrocles*; they were both *Maronites*. She fell in Love with *Crates*, as well for his Diſcourſe as manner of Life, from which none of her Suitors by their Wealth, Nobility or Beauty, could divert her, but that She would beſtow her ſelf upon *Crates*; threatning her Parents, if they would not ſuffer her to Marry him, She would kill her ſelf. Hereupon her Parents went to *Crates*, deſiring him to diſſwade her from this Reſolution; which he endeavoured, but not prevailing, went away, and brought all the little Furniture of his Houſe and ſhew'd her, *This*, ſaith he, *is your Husband, That the Furniture of your Houſe; conſider upon it, for you cannot be mine unleſs you follow the ſame courſe of Life.* She immediately took him, and went up and down with him, and in publick, συνεβίωτο, and went along with him to Feaſts.

At a Feaſt of *Lyſimachus*, She met *Theodorus* the *Atheiſt*, with whom She argued thus; If that, which if *Theodorus* do, be not unjuſtly done, neither is it unjuſtly done if *Hipparchia* do the ſame: But *Theodorus*, if he ſtrike himſelf, doth not unjuſtly; therefore *Hipparchia* doth not unjuſtly if She ſtrike *Theodorus*; *Theodorus* anſwer'd nothing, only pluck'd her by the Coat, which She wore not like a Woman, but after the manner of the *Cynicks*; whereat *Hipparchia* was nothing moved; whereupon he ſaid,

*Her Web and Loom*
*She left at Home.*

I did, ſaith ſhe, *Theodorus*, and I think have not erred in chooſing to beſtow that time which I ſhould have ſpent in weaving, on Philoſophy.

Much more ſaith *Laertius*, is aſcribed to her.

# MENIPPUS.

MEnippus was a *Cynick*, a *Phœnician* by birth, Servant by condition, as *Achaichus* affirms. *Diocles* ſaith, his Father was of *Pontus*, called *Bato*. *Menippus* for acquiſition of riches went to *Thebes*, and was made free of that City. He wrote nothing ſerious, all his books being full of mirth, not unlike the writings of *Meleager*. *Hermippus* ſaith, he was named *Hemerodaniſta*, the daily Uſurer, for he put out money to Merchants upon Intereſt, and took pawns; at laſt being cheated of all his goods, he hanged himſelf.

Some ſay the Books that are aſcribed to him, were writ by *Dionyſius* and *Zopyrus*, *Colophonians*, which being ludicrous, they gave to him as a perſon diſpoſed that way; they are reckoned, thirteen.

*Nœnia's.*
*Teſtaments.*
*Epiſtles*, in the perſons of the Gods.
*Two natural Philoſophers*, Mathematicians & Grammarians
*Of Epicure.*

*Laertius* reckons ſix of this name; the firſt wrote the *Lydian* ſtory, and epitomiz'd *Xanthus*.
The *ſecond* this.
The *third* a Sophiſt, of *Caria*.
The *faurth* a Graver.
The *fifth* and *ſixth* Painters, both mention'd by *Apollodorus*.

# MENEDEMUS.

MEnedemus was Diſciple of *Colotes*, of *Lampſacum*; he proceeded, as *Hippobotus* relates, to ſo great extravagance, that he went up and down in the habit of the Furies, declaring he was come from the World below to take notice of ſuch as offended, and that he was to return thither to give an account of them.

He went thus attir'd, *A dark Gown to his heels, girt with a purple girdle; upon his head an Arcadian hat, on which were woven the twelve ſigns; tragick buskins, a long beard, in his hand an aſhen ſtaff.* Hitherto of the *Cynicks*.

THE

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

## The Eighth Part.

### Containing the *STOICK* Philosophers.

ZENON.

## CHAP. I.

*His Country, Parents, First Studies.*

THE Sect of *Stoicks* had its original from the *Cynicks*, *Zeno* was the Author thereof, who having first been a Scholar of *Crates*, and afterwards a hearer of other Philosophers, at last instituted this new Sect. (a) He was born at *Citium*, a Greek Sea-town in the Isle of *Cyprus*, (b) with

(a) *Laert.*

(b) Strab. lib. (c) Suid. (b) with a lock'd Haven, inhabited by *Phœnicians*, (c) whence he ſometimes was termed the *Phœnician*. His Father was called *Mnaſeas*, by ſome *Demeas*, a Merchant, whence was objected to *Zeno*, the obſcurity of his Birth and Country, (d) Cit. defin. as being (d) a ſtranger, and of mean Parentage, whereof he was ſo far from being aſhamed, that (e) Plut. de rep. Stoic (e) he refuſed to be made a Citizen of *Athens*, as conceiving it an undervaluing of his own (f) Laert. Country; in ſo much as (f) when he contributed to a Bath in *Athens*, and his Name was inſcribed upon a Pillar with the Title of *Philoſopher*, he deſired they would add a *Cittiean*.

(g) Laert. (g) *Zeno* (as *Hecaton* and *Apollonius Tyrius* relate) enquiring of the Oracle what courſe he ſhould take to lead the beſt kind of Life, was anſwer'd, that he ſhould converſe with the dead; whereupon he addicted himſelf to the reading of ancient Authors.

(h) Laert. (h) Herein he was not a little furthered by his Father, who, as *Demetrius* ſaith, trading frequently to *Athens*, brought him as yet but very Young, many Socratical Books, which excited in him a great Affection to Learning.

(i) Laert. (i) Being now 17. (or as *Perſæus* 22.) years old, he took a Voyage to *Athens*, carried thither as well by his particular Inclination to Philoſophy, as by his buſineſs, which was to ſell ſome Purple that he had brought out of *Phœnicia*. He took along with him a hundred Talents, and having ſold his Merchandiſe, applied himſelf to Philoſophy, yet continued to lend his Money out to Merchants upon Intereſt, ſo to improve his Stock.

Some affirm his Ship was caſt away in the *Piræum*, which news being brought him to *Athens*, he ſeemed nothing at all moved, but only (k) Plut. de util. cap. ex inimic. ſaid, *Thou doſt well Fortune*, (k) *to drive me into a Gown*; or as *Seneca*, Fortune commands me to ſtudy Philoſophy more earneſtly.

(l) Laert. (l) Others ſay, That being troubled at the loſs of his Ship, he went up to the City of *Athens*, and ſitting in a Bookſellers ſhop, read a piece of *Xenophon*'s Commentaries, wherewith being much pleas'd, he asked the Bookſeller where ſuch men lived; *Crates* by chance paſſing by, the Bookſeller pointed to him, ſaying, *Follow that Man*; which he did, and from that time forward, became a Diſciple of *Crates*.

## CHAP. II.

### *Of his Maſters.*

(a) Laert. ZENO thus changing the courſe of his Life, applied himſelf to *Crates*, (a) being apt to Philoſophy, but more modeſt than ſuited with the Cynical Sect. Which *Crates* to remedy, gave him a pot full of Pottage to carry through the Ceramick; and perceiving him to hide it, as aſhamed, with his Coat, he ſtruck the pot with his Stick and broke it. *Zeno* running away, all wet, *What*, ſaid he, *Are you running away, little* Phœnician? *no body hurt you*. He made a little hollow cover of a Pot, in which he carried the Money of his Maſter *Crates*, that it might be in readineſs when he went to buy meat. Thus he lived a while with *Crates*, during which time he writ his Book of the *Commonwealth*, whence ſome jeſting, ſaid, it was written under the Dog's tail.

At laſt deſerting *Crates* he appli'd himſelf to (b) *Stilpo* the Megarick Philoſopher. *Apollonius Tyrius* ſaith, That taking hold of his Cloak to pluck him away from *Stilpo*, he ſaid, O Crates, *the handles by which the Philoſophers are to be taken hold of, are their Ears; Lead me by thoſe your way, or elſe, tho you conſtrain my Body to be with you, my mind will be with* Stilpo. With *Stilpo* he remained ten years. (b) Laert.

From *Stilpo* he went to *Xenocrates*, being ſo well ſatisfied with the Inſtruction of theſe two Maſters, that he ſaid, *He made a very good Voyage when he was Shipwrack'd*; tho others apply it to his living with *Crates*.

(c) He afterwards appli'd himſelf to *Diodorus Cronus*, as *Hippobotus* avers, under whom he ſtudied Dialectick, to which Science he was ſo much addicted, that (d) when a certain Philoſopher of that Sect had informed him of ſeven Species of Dialectick, in that fallacy which is called *the Mower*, he asked him what he was to give him for his reward? the Philoſopher demanded a hundred pieces of Silver; *Zeno* (ſo much was he affected to Learning) gave him two hundred. (c) Laert. (d) Laert.

(e) Laſtly, notwithſtanding that he had made a great Progreſs in Philoſophy, he heard *Polemon*, whoſe Doctrine was *againſt Pride*; whereupon *Polemon* told him, Zeno, *I am not ignorant, that you lie in Ambuſh, and come ſlily into my Garden* (as the *Phœnicians* uſe) *to ſteal away Learning*. (e) Laert. in

## CHAP. III.

### *His School, and Inſtitution of a Sect.*

HAving been long a hearer of others, he at laſt thought fit to communicate the Learning which he had received and improved. To this (a) end he made choice of the ποικίλη στοὰ, (a) Laert. *the painted Walk*, ſo named from the Pictures of *Polygnotus*, otherwiſe called *Piſianactia*. Here he conſtantly walked and diſcourſed, reſolving to ſettle there, and make the place as full of Tranquility, as it had been before of trouble: For, in the time of the thirty Tyrants, near 1400 Citizens were there put to Death.

Hither reſorted a great many Diſciples to him, who were at firſt called *Zenonians*, as *Epicure* affirmeth, from their Maſter; afterwards from the place where he taught, *Stoicks*; as *Eratoſthenes* in his eight Book of antient Comedy; adding, that not long before, ſome Poets that lived there, were called *Stoicks* alſo, upon which occaſion the name was very well known.

He was ſubtil in diſquiſition and diſpute.

He diſputed earneſtly with *Philo* the *Dialectick*, and exerciſed himſelf together with him: ſo that Zeno *the younger* admired him no leſs than his Maſter *Diodorus*.

He firſt ſeemeth (ſaith *Laertius*) to have ſet a bound to the looſeneſs and extravagance of Propoſitions: But, of this more, when we come to ſpeak of his Philoſophy, which by reaſon of its largeneſs, we remit to the end of his Life.

CHAP.

## CHAP. IV.

*What honours were conferr'd upon him.*

ZENO by the Philoſophy which he Taught, and the practiſe of his Life conformable to that Doctrine, gained ſo high an Eſtimation amongſt the *Athenians*, that (*a*) they depoſited the keys of the City in his hands, as the only perſon fit to be entruſted with their Liberties. His Name was likewiſe much Honoured by his own Country-men, as well thoſe at *Cyprus*, as thoſe who lived at *Sidon*.

(a) Laert.

Amongſt thoſe who Honoured and Favoured *Zeno*, was *Antigonus Gonatus* King of *Macedonia*, a Prince no leſs Eminent for his Virtue than his Greatneſs, much Eſteemed him, and as often as he went to *Athens*, heard him. He ſent many times to invite him to come to him, amongſt the reſt, one Letter to this effect, alledged by *Apollonius Tyrius*.

*King* Antigonus *to* Zeno *the Philoſopher, health.*

*I Think that I exceed you in Fortune and Glory; but, in Learning and Diſcipline, and that perfect felicity which you have attained, I am exceeded by you: Wherefore I thought it expedient to write to you, that you will come to me, aſſuring my ſelf you will not deny it. Uſe all means therefore to come to us, and know, you are not to inſtruct me only, but all the* Macedonians. *For, he who teacheth the King of* Macedonia, *and guideth him to Virtue, it is evident, that he doth likewiſe inſtruct all his Subjects in Virtue. For ſuch as is the Prince, ſuch for the moſt part are thoſe who live under his Government.*

Zeno *anſwered thus:*

*To King* Antigonus, Zeno, *health.*

*I Much eſteem your earneſt deſire of Learning, in that you aim at Philoſophy; not popular, which perverteth manners, but that true diſcipline which conferreth profit, avoiding that generally commended pleaſure which effeminates the ſouls of ſome young men. It is manifeſt, that you are enclined to Generoſity, not only by nature, but by choice. A generous nature, with indifferent exerciſe, aſſiſted by a Maſter, may eaſily attain to perfect Virtue. But, I am very infirm of body by reaſon of my age, for I am fourſcore years old, and therefore not able to come to you. Yet, I will ſend you ſome of my con-Diſciples, who, in thoſe things that concern the Soul, are nothing inferior to me; in thoſe of the Body, are much ſuperior to me; of whom, if you make uſe, you will want nothing conducing to perfect Beatitude.*

(b) Laert.

(c) Laert.

(d) Laert.

(e) Laert. Sidon.

(a) Laert.

Thus *Zeno* abſolutely refuſed to go to *Antigonus*, but ſent him his Diſciple *Perſæus* ſon of *Demetrius*, a *Cittiean* (who flouriſh'd in the 130*th* Olympiad, *Zeno* being then very old) and *Philonides* a *Theban*, both mentioned by *Epicurus* in his Epiſtle to *Ariſtobulus*, as having been with *Antigonus*.

## CHAP. V.

*His Apophthegms.*

OF his Apophthegms are remembred theſe: Of a man very finely dreſt, ſtepping lightly over a Kennel; *He doth not care for the dirt,* ſaith he, *becauſe he cannot ſee his face in it.* Laert.

A certain Cynick came to him to borrow Oyl, ſaying, he had none left: *Zeno* deni'd him, and as he was going away; *Now,* ſaith he, *conſider, which of us two are the more impudent.* Laert.

*Cremonides,* whom he much affected, and *Cleanthes* ſitting down beſide him, he aroſe; whereat *Cleanthes* wondring, *I have heard good Phyſicians ſay,* ſaith he, *that the beſt remedy for tumours is reſt.*

Two ſitting by him at a Feaſt, he that was next him hit the other with his Foot: *Zeno,* hit him that was next him with his Knee, and turning him to him, *What then think you,* ſaith he, *that you have done to him that ſits below you.*

To one that loved the company of Boys, *Neither have thoſe Maſters,* ſaith he, *any wit, who converſe always with the boys, nor the boys themſelves.*

He ſaid, That Elegant Speeches were like Alexandrian ſilver, fair to the Eye, and figured like money, but not a whit of the more value. Speeches which are otherwiſe, he likened to Attick Tetradrachmes, which had a rough ſtamp, but were of greater value.

*Ariſto* his Diſciple diſcourſing many things fooliſhly, ſome petulantly, others confidently, *It cannot be,* ſaith he, *but your Father was drunk when you were begot:* whereupon himſelf being very conciſe of ſpeech, he called him the *Talker.* Laert. Athen. deipn.

To a great Eater who left nothing for thoſe that eat with him, he cauſed a great fiſh to be ſet before him, and immediately to be taken away; the other looking upon him, *What,* ſaith he, *do you think your companions ſuffer every day, ſeeing that you cannot ſuffer my greedineſs once?* Laert.

A young man, who queſtion'd ſomething more curiouſly than ſuited with his age, he brought to him a Glaſs, and bad him look in it, and then asked him, *whether he thought that queſtion agreed with that face?*

To one that ſaid, he diſliked many things of *Antiſthenes* Writing, he brought his *Chria* of *Sophocles*, and asked him, if there were any thing therein excellent? The other anſwered, he knew not: *Are you not aſhamed then* (replied *Zeno*) *if* Antiſthenes *have ſaid any thing ill, you ſelect and remember that: but if any thing excellent, you are ſo far from remembring, as not to mind it?*

To one that ſaid, the ſpeeches of Philoſophers were ſhort: *You ſay very true,* ſaith he, *ſo ſhould their very ſyllables be, as much as is poſſible.*

One ſaying of *Polemon*, that he propoſed ſome things, and ſaid others: He frowning, ſaid, *What rate do you ſet upon things that are given?*

He ſaid, that *a Diſputant ſhould have the voice and lungs of a Comedian, but not the loudneſs.*

*To thoſe that ſpeak well* he ſaid, *we ſhould allow a place to hear, as to ſkilful Artificers to ſee; on the other ſide, the hearer muſt ſo attend to what is ſpoken, that he take no time to cenſure.*

To a young man that ſpoke much; *your ears,* ſaith he, *are fallen into your tongue.*

To a handsome youth who said, that he thought that in his opinion, a wise man ought not to love: *Nothing*, saith he, *will be more unhappy to you that are handsome.*

He said, that *most Philosophers are in many things fools, in trivial and vulgar things ignorant.*

He pronounced that of *Capecia*, who when one of his Disciples began to grow high, beating him, he said, *Right is not placed in great, but great in right.*

To a young man discoursing with much confidence; *Young man*, saith he, *I should be loath to tell you my thoughts.*

A youth of *Rhodes* handsome and rich, but refractory to him; not enduring, he bad him first sit in a dirty seat, that he might dirt his Gown; next placed him amongst the beggars, that he might converse with them and their rags, until at last the young man went away.

He said, *that nothing is more unseemly than pride, especially in young men.*

He said, that *we must not only commit to memory speeches and words, as those who make ready some dish of meat; but apply it, and make use of it in our minds.*

He said, that *young men must use all modesty in their walking, in their behaviour, and in their garments*; often repeating those verses of *Euripides* concerning *Capaneus*,

*He was not puft up with his Store,*
*Nor thought himself above the poor.*

He said, *nothing was more alienate from the comprehension of Sciences, than Poetry*: and, that *we need nothing more than Time.*

Being asked who is a friend? he answer'd, *My other self.*

Having taken his servant in a theft, he beat him; the fellow said, it was his destiny to steal; *and to be beaten*, said he.

He said, that *Beauty is the sweetness of the voice*; or, according to some, he called it, *the flower of Beauty.*

Seeing the servant of one of his companions black and blew with stripes; *I see*, saith he, *the fruits of your anger.*

To one that smelt sweet of Ointments; *Who is it*, saith he, *that smells so effeminately?*

To *Dionysius* firnamed μιαδίμενος *the retractor*, who asked him, why he corrected all but himself; *because*, saith he, *I do not believe you.*

To a young man who spoke too freely, *For this reason*, saith he, *we have two Ears and but one tongue, that we should hear much, and speak little.*

*Laert. Stob. serm. 126.* He was invited to a Feast with other Philosophers by the Ambassadors of *Antigonus* (according to *Laertius* of *Ptolomy*) and whilst of the rest every one amidst their cups made ostentation of their Learning, he alone sate silent; whereupon the Ambassadors asking him what they should say of him to *Antigonus*; *That which you see*, saith he; *for of all things, it is hardest to contain speech.*

Being demanded how he behaved himself when reviled, he said, *as an Ambassador dismiss'd without answer.*

He changed the Verses of *Hesiod*, thus,

*Who good advice obeys, of men is best*;
*Next, he who ponders all in his own breast.*

For that man (saith he) is better who can obey good advice, and make good use thereof, than he who finds out all things of himself; for the latter hath only understanding, but the other practise also.

Being demanded how it came to pass that being very austere, he notwithstanding was very cheerful, and merry at a Feast; he answer'd, *Lupins, tho in themselves bitter, being steep'd, grow sweet.* *Laer. Arian. Dispn.*

He said, it was *better to slip with the foot, than with the tongue.*

He said, *that to do well is no small matter; to begin well, depended on a small moment.*

This some ascribe to *Socrates.*

One of the young men in the Academy speaking of foolish studies, *If you do not dip your tongue in your mind*, saith *Zeno*, *you will speak many other foolish things.* *Stob. ser. 3.*

He accused many, saying, *when they might take pleasure in labour, they would rather go to the Cooks shop for it.* *Stob. ser. 3.*

He said, that *we should not affect delicacy of diet, not even in sickness.* *Stob. ser. 23. ting Mus.*

Being demanded by one of his friends, what course he should take to do no wrong; *Imagine*, reply'd he, *that I am always with you.* *Stob. ser. 3.*

Being demanded whether a man that doth wrong, may conceal it from God; *no*, saith he, *nor he who thinketh it.* *Stob. ser. 3.*

To some that excused their prodigality, saying, that they had plenty, out of which they did it; *will you excuse a Cook*, saith he, *that should oversalt his meat because he hath store of salt.* *Stob. ser. 1.*

He said that of his Disciples, *some were* φιλόλογοι *lovers of Knowledg*; *others*, λογοφίλοι, *lovers of speaking.* *Stob. ser. 11.*

He compared *the Arts of Dialectick, to just measures filled, not with Wheat or any thing of value, but with Chaff and Straw.* *Stob. ser. 12.*

He said, *we ought not to enquire, whether men belonged to great Cities, but whether they deserved a great City.* *Stob. ser. 12.*

Seeing a friend of his too much taken up with the business of his Land, *unless you lose your Land*, saith he, *it will lose you.* *Stob. ser. 12.*

He said, *a man must live not only to eat and drink, but to use this life for the obtaining of a happy life.* *Stob. ser. 2.*

*Antigonus* being full of Wine, went to visit him, and kissing and embracing him as a drunken man, bad him demand whatsoever he would, swearing that he would give it him; *Zeno* answered, ποδάβεὶς ἥμισυ, at once reproving his vice, and taking care of his health. *Ælian. var. hist. 9. 12.*

Stretching out the fingers of his Right hand, he said, *such is phantasie*; then contracting them a little, *such is assent*; then closing them quite, and shutting his fist, *such is comprehension*; then putting to it his left hand, and shutting it close and hard, *Such* (saith he) *is science, of which none is capable but a wise man.* *Cic. Acad. quæst. 4.*

## CHAP. VI.

### *His Death.*

ZENO having continued according to (a) *Apollonius*, Master of his School fifty eight years, and attained to the ninety eighth of his age, (a) *Laer.*

(b) Diogenes Laertius (for that he lived but seventy two years, as some affirm upon the testimony of (c) *Persæus*, seems to be a mistake, seeing that his Letter to *Antigonus* was written in his 80*th* year) (d) in all which time he was never molested by any sickness; died upon this occasion; Going out of the School, he fell and broke his finger, whereupon striking the Ground with his hand, he said, as *Niobe* in the Tragedy, *I come, why do you call me?* Or as others, *why do you drive me?* And going out, (e) some say, he immediately strangled himself; (f) others, that by little and little he famish'd himself.

(g) When the news of his death came to *Antigonus*, he broke forth into these words, *What a spectacle have I lost!* and being demanded why he so much admired him, *Because*, said he, *tho I bestowed many great things upon him, he was never therewith exalted nor dejected.* He sent immediately *Thraso* on Embassie to the *Athenians*, requesting, that they would build him a Tomb in the Ceramick, which the *Athenians* performed, honouring him with this Decree.

(b) Laert. numerical error in Suidas corrupt. (c) Laert. (d) Laert. (e) Laert. (f) Suid. (g) Laert.

## A DECREE.

ARrhenides *being Archon, the Tribe of* Acamantis *having the first place in the Phrytanæum, the tenth day of Maimacterion, the three and twentieth of the sitting of the Phrytanæum, the Congregation of Presidents decreed thus:* Hippo *Son of* Cratistoteles *a Xympetean, and the rest of the Presidents,* Thraso *Son of* Thraso, *an Anacæan, declared;*

*Whereas* Zeno *Son of* Mnaseas, *a Cittiean, hath professed Philosophy many years in this City, and in all other things performed the office of a good man, encouraging those young men, who applied themselves to him, to Virtue and Temperance, leading himself a life suitable to the Doctrine which he professed, a Pattern to the best to imitate; The People have thought fit (good Fortune go along with it) to do honour to* Zeno *Son of* Mnaseas *the Cittiean, and to crown him with a Crown of Gold according to the Law, in reward of his Virtue and Temperance, and to build a Tomb for him publickly in the Ceramick. For, the making of which Crown, and building of the Tomb, the People shall make choice of five men of the Athenians to take charge thereof. This Decree the Scribe of the People shall write upon two Pillars, one whereof shall be placed in the Academy, the other in the Lyceum. The charge of the Pillars, he who is Overseer of the Publick works shall undertake to defray, by way of rate, that all may know, the Athenian People honour good men both alive and dead. To take care of the building are appointed,* Thraso *an Anacæan;* Philocles, *a Pyrean;* Phædrus, *an Anaphistian;* Medon, *an Acarnean;* Micythus *a Sympalletean.*

The *Athenians* caused likewise his Statue in Brass to be set up, as did also the *Cittieans* his Countrymen. *Antipater* the Sidonian bestow'd this Epitaph upon him.

*Here* Zeno *lies, who tall* Olympus *scal'd,*
*Not heaping* Pelion *on* Ossa's *head,*
*Nor by* Herculean *labours so prevail'd,*
*But found out Virtue's path which thither led.*

Another Epigram was written upon him by *Xenodotus* the Stoick, disciple of *Diogenes.*

Zeno *thy years to hoary age were spent,*
*Not with vain riches, but with self-content:*
*A stout and constant Sect deriv'd from thee*
*The Mother of nought dreading liberty:*
Phœnicia, *whence thou issuedst, who can slight?*
*Thence* Cadmus *too, who first taught* Greece *to write.*

## CHAP. VII.

### *His Person and Virtues.*

AS concerning his Person, (a) *Timotheus* saith, he was wry-neck'd: *Apollonius Tyrius*, that he was lean, tall, and of a swarthy complexion, whence stil'd by some (as *Chrysippus*) the *Ægyptian sprig.* (b) His look was sad, grave, severe and frowning; his constitution not strong, for which reason *Persæus* saith, he forbore to feast much. His ordinary diet consisted in raw food, especially Figs, both new and dried, bread and honey, which he eat moderately, and a little sweet Wine.

(a) Laert. (b) Laert.

His continence was such, that when *Persæus*, who cohabited with him, brought a she-Minstrel him, he immediately sent her back. Laert.

Notwithstanding his severity, he was very complaisant, and often feasted with King *Antigonus*, and meeting him sometimes drunk, went along with him to *Aristocles* the Musician, to nightly Banquets and Plays. Laert.

Popular Ostentation he avoided, by sitting in the lowest place, whereby he freed himself from the troublesome importunity of the other part. Laert.

He never walked with more than two or three at once: *Cleanthes* saith, he many times gave Money to People that they would not trouble him, and throng about him. Being on a certain time encompassed by a great Croud, he showed them a wooden Ball on the top of the Cloyster, which formerly belonged to an Altar: This, saith he, was once placed in the middle; but, because it is troublesome, it is now laid aside: I desire you would in like manner withdraw your selves, that you may be less troublesome. Laert.

He was so free from being corrupted by Gifts, that *Democharis* Son of *Laches*, desiring him to let him know what business he would have to *Antigonus*, promising to write about it, and assuring him, that *Antigonus* would furnish him with whatsoever he desired; he turned away Laert.

from him, and would never after converſe with him.

Laert. He was ſo humble, that he converſed with mean and ragged Perſons; whence *Timon*,

*And for Companions gets of Servants ſtore,*
*Of all men the moſt empty, and moſt poor.*

He was moſt patient and frugal in his Houſhold-expences, ſomething inclining to the ſordidneſs of the *Barbarians*. *Laertius* mentions one Servant that he had; *Seneca* avers he had none.

Laert. Whenſoever he reprehended any, it was covertly and afar off, as may appear by many of his Apophthegms.

Laert. His Habit was mean, whence it was ſaid of him,

*Him nor the Winters ridgid Froſt or Rain,*
*The ſcorching Sun, or ſharp diſeaſe can Pain:*
*Not like the common ſort of People he;*
*But, Day and Night bent on Philoſophy.*

The Comick Poets unwittingly, intending to diſcommend him, praiſe him, as *Philemon*, in his Comedy of Philoſophers,

*He Water drinks, then Broth and Herbs doth eat,*
*To Live, his Scholars teaching, without meat.*

This ſome aſcribe to *Poſſidippus*.

His Virtues were ſo Eminent, that they grew at laſt into a Proverb, *More continent than* Zeno *the Philoſopher*; whence *Poſſidippus*,

——*He ere ten Daies were ſpent,*
Zeno *in Continence out-went.*

Indeed he excelled all men in this kind of Virtue, and in Gravity, and, by *Jove* (addeth *Laertius*) in Felicity likewiſe.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *His Writings.*

HE wrote many Books, wherein (ſaith *Laertius*) he ſo diſcourſed, as no *Stoick* after him: Their Titles are theſe:

Laert. * *De vit. Alex. Orat.* 1. Of *Commonwealth*, written whilſt he was an Auditor of *Crates*, and (as * *Plutarch* ſaith) much applauded; the Scope whereof was this, *That we ſhould not live in ſeveral Cities and Towns by diſtinct Laws; but, that we ſhould own all men as our Country-men and Fellow-citizens; that there ſhould be one manner of Life, and one Order, as of one Flock which grazeth by equal right in one Paſture.*

*Of Appetite*; or, *of humane Nature.*
*Of Paſſions.*
*Of Office.*
*Of Law.*
*Of the Diſcipline of the* Grecians.
*Of Sight.*
*Of the Univerſe.*
*Of Signs.*
Phythagoricks.
*Univerſals.*
*Of Words.*
*Homerical Problems* 5.
*Of hearing Poetry.*
*The Art.*
*Solutions.*
*Confutations.*
*Memorials.*
*The Morals of* Crates.

* Some, amongſt whom is *Caſius* a *Sceptian*, reprehended many things in the Writings of *Zeno*: Firſt, that in the beginning of his Commonwealth, he affirmeth, *The Liberal Sciences to be of no uſe.* * Laert.

Again, That *all wicked men are Enemies among themſelves, and Slaves and Strangers, as well Fathers to their Children, as Brethren to Brethren.* Again, That *only good men are Citizens, and Friends, and Kindred, and Children*, as he affirmeth in his Book of the *Commonwealth*. So that according to the *Stoicks*, Parents ſhould be Enemies to their Children, becauſe they are not wiſe.

That in his Commonwealth he would have *Women to be in common.*

That *no Temples, Courts of Judicature, nor publick Schools, ſhould be built in a Commonwealth.*

That *Money is not neceſſary, neither for exchange nor traffick.*

That *Women ſhould go in the ſame Habit as Men.*

## CHAP. IX.

### *His Diſciples.*

ZENO (ſaith *Laertius*) had many Diſciples; the moſt Eminent theſe;

*PERSÆUS* Son of *Demetrius*, a *Cittiean*; Laert. ſome affirm he was *Zeno*'s Scholar, others that he was one of the Servants which were ſent by *Antigonus* to *Zeno* to tranſcribe his Writings; * whence *Bion* ſeeing this Inſcription on his Statue, *PERSÆUS OF ZENO A CITTIEAN* ſaid, *The Graver miſtook, for inſtead of* ὑπηρέτης, *he ſhould have put* ἀνδράποδον, *a Servant.* * Athen.

Afterwards he returned to *Antigonus* King of *Macedonia*; *Antigonus* to make a tryal of him, cauſed a falſe Report to be brought him, that his Lands were ſpoiled by the Enemy; whereat appearing troubl'd, *Do you not ſee*, ſaith *Antigonus, that Riches are not to be reckon'd amongſt indifferent things?*

*Antigonus* ſo much favour'd him, that he preferr'd him to the Government of *Acrocorinthus*; on which Fort depended not only *Corinth*, but all *Peloponneſus*; in this charge he was unfortunate; for the Caſtle was taken by the cunning of *Aratus* a *Sicyonian* (* *Athenæus* ſaith, whilſt *Perſæus* was feaſting) who turned out *Perſæus*, whereupon afterwards to one that maintained *only a wiſe Man is a Governour*; *and I*, ſaith he, *was one of the ſame mind, being ſo taught by* Zeno, *but now am of another Opinion*; *The* Sicyonian *young man* (meaning *Aratus*) *hath taught me otherwiſe*; Thus *Plutarch*; But *Pauſanias* ſaith, that *Aratus* upon taking of the Fort, amongſt others put *Perſæus* the Governor to Death. * Dipn.

He

Cic. He ſaid, That *thoſe were eſteemed Gods who had invented ſome things very uſeful to humane Life.*

He wrote theſe Books; *Of a Kingdom*; *The* Lacedæmonian *Commonwealth*; *Of Marriage*; *Of Impiety*; Thyeſtes; *Of Love*, *Protrepticks*, *Exercitations*; Chrya's, 4. *Commentaries*, *againſt* Plato's *Laws* 7. * *Sympoſiack Dialogues.*

* Athen. Deip. Laert. *ARISTO* Son of *Miltiades*, a *Chian*, Sirnamed the *Siren*; when *Zeno* fell into a long Sickneſs, he left him, and went (as *Diocles* ſaith) to *Polemo*: He was alſo a Follower of *Perſæus*, whom he flatter'd much, becauſe of his favour with *Antigonus*; for he was much given to pleaſure, even unto his end. Thus revolting from his Maſter *Zeno*, he aſſerted,

That the end conſiſts in thoſe mean things which are betwixt Virtue and Vice; that is, in indifference; not to be moved on either ſide, not to imagine the leaſt difference to be in theſe things, but that they are all alike: For a wiſe Man is like a good Player, who whether he perſonate *Agamemnon* or *Therſides*, will act either part very well: Thus he took away the Dignity which *Zeno* held to be in theſe mean things betwixt Virtue and Vice; holding that there is no difference in them.

Cic. Acad. queſt. 4.

Cic. de finib. 4.

He took away *Phyſick* and *Logick*, affirming that one is above us, the other appertains nothing to us: *Ethick* only appertains to us; he compared Dialectick Reaſon to Cobwebs, which tho they ſeem artificial, yet are of no uſe.

He introduced not on any Virtues, as *Zeno*; nor one called by ſeveral Names, as the *Megarick* Philoſophers; but affirmed they have a Quodammodotative Relation to one another.

Profeſſing theſe Tenets, and diſputing in *Cynoſarges*, he came to be called Author of a Sect; whence *Milciades* and *Diphilus* were called *Ariſtonians.*

He was very perſwaſive, and wrought much upon the common People, whence *Timon in Sillis*,

*One of* Ariſto's *ſmooth perſwaſive Race.*

He defended eagerly this Paradox of the *Stoicks*, *That a wiſe Man doth not opinionate, but know*; which *Perſæus* oppoſing, cauſed of two like Twins, firſt, one to give a depoſitum to him, then the other to come and redemand it; and by his doubting, if it were the ſame Perſon, convinced him.

* Laert. vit. Arceſ. He inveigh'd againſt *Arceſilaus*, [* calling him a Corrupter of Youth] On a time, ſeeing a Monſter like a Bull, but of both Sexs, he ſaid, *Alas! here is an argument for* Arceſilaus *againſt Energy.* To an Academick who ſaid, he comprehended nothing, *Do you not ſee* (ſaith he) *him who ſitteth next you?* which he denying,

*Who ſtruck you blind*, ſaith he, *or took your light away?*

He wrote theſe Treatiſes, *Protrepticks* 2. *Of* Zeno's *Doctrine*: *Scholaſtick Dialogues* 6. *Of Wiſdom Diſſertations* 7. *Erotick Diſſertations*: *Commentaries upon Vain-glory*: *Commmentaries* 15. *Memorials* 3. *Chrias* 11. *Againſt Orators*: *Againſt* Alexinus *his Oppoſitions*; *To the Dialecticks* 3. *To* Cleanthes *Epiſtles* 4. But *Panætius* and *Soſicrates* affirm the *Epiſtles* only to be his, the reſt to be *Ariſto's* the Peripatetick.

The Sun ſtaking hot upon his head (which was bald) occaſion'd his Death. There was another of the ſame Name, a Juliite, a Peripatetick; another an Athenian, a Muſican; a Tragick Poet; a fift an Alæan, who writ *the Rhetorical Art*; a ſixt of *Alexandria*, a Peripatetick.

Laert. *ERILLUS* (or as *Cicero*, *Herillus*) was a *Carthagenian*; when he was a Boy, he was loved and courted by many; which *Zeno*, by cauſing him to be ſhaved, diverted.

He held, That the end is Science, which is to live ſo, as to refer all things to Science, joined with Life. That Science is a habit ſuſceptive of phantaſies, falling under Reaſon.

Yet, ſometimes he ſaid, there is no end; but, that the end it ſelf is changed by the things, and thoſe which are joined to the things, as Braſs, of which the Statues of *Alexander* or *Socrates* is made.

That τέλος the end, and τέλειος differ, one is objected to unwiſe Perſons as well as wiſe, the other to wiſe only.

Thoſe things which are betwixt Virtue and Vice, are indifferents.

His Books are written in a ſhort Stile, conſiſting of few Words, but very Efficacious, wherein is contain'd what he held contrary to *Zeno.*

His Writings theſe, *Of Exercitation*, *Of Paſſion*, *Of Suſpition*, *the Lawgiver*, *Majeutick*, *Antipheron*, *The Maſter*, *The Preparative*, *The Directive*, Hermes, Medea, *Dialogues*, *Moral* Theſes.

His Diſciples were called *Herillians*, named by *Cicero* as a particular Sect amongſt the *Socraticks.*

Laert. *DIONYSIUS*, Son of *Theophantus*, an Heracleot, from the change of his Opinion, ſirnamed ὁ μεταβάλλων, *the Retractor.* He was from the beginning ſtudiouſly addicted to Learning, and writ Poems of all kinds; then betook himſelf to *Aratus*, being much pleaſed with him. Of Philoſophers he firſt heard, as *Diocles* affirms, *Heraclides* his Country-man; then *Alexinus* and *Menedemus*; after theſe *Zeno.*

Revolting from *Zeno*, he addicted himſelf to the *Cyrenæans*; he went to common houſes, and addicted himſelf to other Pleaſures.

He aſſerted the end to be Pleaſure, and that by reaſon of his own Purblindneſs; for being much grieved thereat, he durſt not affirm Grief to be one of the indifferents.

He died eighty years old, ſtarved.

His Writings are thus intituled, *Of Apathy* 2. *Of Riches and Favour, and Puniſhment*; *Of the uſe of Men*; *Of good Fortune*; *Of the Kings of the Ancients*; *Of Things that are Praiſed*; *Of the Cuſtoms of the* Barbarians.

*SPHÆRUS* was of *Boſphorus*; he firſt heard *Zeno*, then *Cleanthes*, and having made a ſufficient Progreſs in Learning, went to *Alexandria* to *Ptolomy Philopater*, where there ariſing a diſpute, Whether a wiſe man doth opinionate, and *Sphærus* maintaining that he doth not, the King commanded ſome Quinces, *Athenæus* ſaith Birds, of Wax to be ſet before him, wherewith *Sphærus* being cozen'd, the King cried out, that he aſſented to a falſe Phantaſy; *Sphærus* preſently anſwered, That *he aſſented not that they were Quinces, but that it was probable they were Quinces; but comprehenſive phantaſie differs from probable*; * *for that is never falſe, but in probable matters ſometimes a thing falleth out otherwiſe than we imagined.* * *Mneſiſtratus* accuſing him, that he denied *Ptolomy* to be King, he anſwered,

* Athen.

* Laert.

ed, that *he thought* Ptolomy, *or such a one was King.*

His writings are these: *Of the world, of the seed of Elements, of fortune, of leasts, against atomes and apparitions, of the organs of sense, upon* Heraclitus *five dissertations; of moral description, of office, of appetite, of passions* 2. *dissertations of a Kingdome; of the Lacedemonian Commonwealth, of* Lycurgus *and* Socrates 3. *of Law, of Divination, Erotick Dialogues, of the Eretriack Philosophers, of things like, of definitions, of habit, of contraries* 3. *of reason, of riches, of glory, of death, of the art of Dialectick* 2. *of Categorems, of ambiguities, Epistles.*

*CLEANTHES*, whom *Zeno* compared to writing tables, that are so hard, they will not easily admit an impression, but having once received it, keep it long. He succeeded *Zeno*, of him therefore apart.

*Philon*, a *Theban.*

*Callippus*, a *Corinthian.*

*Possidonius*, an *Alexandrian*

*Athenodorus* of *Soli*; there were two more of the same name, Stoicks.

*Zeno*, a Sidonian.

Last in the Catologue of his Disciples must be remembred an Eretrian youth (mention'd by * Stobæus) who heard *Zeno* till he came to be a man: then returning to *Eretria*, his Father asked him what he had learn'd all that time; he answered, he would shortly let him see, and did so: for, not long after, his Father in anger did beat him, which he took quietly, saying, *This I have learn'd, To bear with the anger of a Father, and not to oppose it.* * Ethic. Sect. 198

In the life of *Zeno* (for as much as he is Author of that Sect) it will be requisite to give account of the Doctrine of the Stoicks in general; wherein, if the terms seem harshly rendred, it will easily be forgiven by those, who consider the Stoicks were no less particular in their words, than in their doctrines.

# THE DOCTRINE OF THE STOICKS.

## The FIRST PART.

### CHAP. I.

### *Of* PHILOSOPHY *in General, and Particularly of* DIALECTICK.

(a) Pl. de plac. Phil. 1.

(a) WIsdom is the Science of things divine and humane; *Philosophy* is the exercitation of convenient Art: *Convenient* is only and supream virtue. Of *Virtues* in the most general sense there are three kinds, *Natural*, *Moral*, *Rational*: for which cause Philosophy likewise hath three parts, *Physick*, *Ethick*, *Logick*: Physick, when we enquire concerning the World, and the things in the World: *Ethick* is employ'd about human life: *Logick* is that part which concerns reason, which is also called *Dialectick*. (b) Thus *Zeno* the Cittiean first divided it in his book *of Speech*; and *Chrysippus* in his first book *of Speech*, and in his first of *Physicks*; and *Apollodorus Ephillus* in his first book *of Introductions into Doctrines*; and *Eudromus* in his *moral Institutions*, and *Diogenes* the Babylonian, and *Possidonius*. These parts *Apollodorus* calleth *Places*; *Chrysippus* and *Eudromus*, *species*; others *genus's*.

(b) Laert.

That Logick is a part of Philosophy distinct from the rest, (wherein all the Stoicks agree) is proved by two arguments, the first this: (c) Every thing which useth another, if that which the thing using, useth, be neither part nor particle, nor part of part of any other, it must be part or particle of the thing using; as medi-

(c) Ammon. in Categ.

cine

cine uſeth the art of preſcribing diet, which art being neither part nor particle of any other, is conſequently a part or particle of Medicine; of part, as to the cure; of particle, as to the practice.

(a) *Philop. in lib. 1. Anal. prior.*

(d) Philoſophy is converſant about Logick, Logick therefore is either a part or particle of Philoſophy; but, a particle it is not, for it it not a part either of the Contemplative or the Active. That which is a particle of any thing, ought to have the ſame Matter and Scope, with that whereof it is a part. Logick hath neither of theſe common with Active Philoſophy, the matter whereof is humane things, and moderation of Appetite, the common Scope, what in them is to be embraced or ſhunned; but, the matter of Logick is Propoſitions; the Scope, to demonſtrate by a compoſure of Propoſitions, that which neceſſarily falls out upon the Collection. Neither is Logick a part of the Contemplative, the matter whereof is things Divine; the end, Contemplation of them: now, if it be not a part, either of the Contemplative or the Active, it is not a particle of Philoſophy, but equally ſeparate from both theſe, and conſequently it muſt be a part of it.

(e) The ſecond Argument is thus. No Art frameth its own Inſtruments; if therefore Philoſophy make Logick, it is not its Inſtrument, but part thereof.

(b) *Ammonius in Categor.*

(f) Philoſophy, is by ſome compared to a field which produceth all manner of fruit: Phyſick to the ſoil and tall trees, Ethick to the mature pleaſant fruit, Logick to the ſtrong fence. Others liken it to an Egg: Ethick to the yolk, which ſome affirm to be the Chicken: Phyſick to the white, which is the nouriſhment of the Chicken, Logick to the outſide or ſhell. *Poſſidonius*, (becauſe the parts of Philoſophy are inſeparable from one another, but plants are diſtinct from the fruits, as walls from hedges) chuſeth rather to compare Philoſophy to a living creature, Phyſick to blood and fleſh, Logick to bones and nerves, Ethick to the ſoul. (Thus *Sextus Empiricus*, by whom, perhaps, *Laertius* is to be corrected, who ſaith, *They likened Ethick to the Fleſh, Phyſick to the Soul*) Laſtly, they compare Philoſophy to a City well fortified and govern'd according to Reaſon.

(f) *Sext. Emp. adv. Log. 1.*

(g) Some affirm, that none of theſe parts are diſtinct from the reſt, but all intermingled with one another, for which reaſon they deliver them confuſedly. The greater part place Logick firſt, Ethick next, Phyſick laſt; becauſe the mind ought firſt to be fortified for the keeping thoſe things which are committed to it, ſo as it be not eaſily expugnable. The Dialectick place is a fortification for the mind. Secondly, to deſcribe the contemplation of manners, that they may be reformed, which is ſafely undertaken, when the Logical power is firſt laid down. Laſtly, to induce the contemplation of Nature, for that is more divine, and requireth a more profound attention. This method (b) *Plutarch* affirms to have been obſerved by *Chryſippus*, adding that *of Phyſick, the laſt part, is that which treateth of God; for which reaſon they call the precepts of Religion* τελετάς. It ſeems therefore, that there is ſome miſtake in *Laertius*, who of thoſe who place Logick firſt, Phyſick next, and Ethick laſt, cyteth *Zeno* in his Book *of Speech*, and *Chryſippus*, and *Archedemus*, and *Eudromus*.

(g) *Laert.*

(b) *De plac. Philoſ.*

But *Diogenes* the Ptolemæan (continueth he) begins with Ethick: *Apollodorus* puts Ethick in the ſecond place; *Panætius* and *Poſſidonius* begin with Phyſick, as *Phanias*, companion of *Poſſidonius* affirms, in his firſt of *Poſſidonius's diſſertations*.

(i) Of Logick, *Cleanthes* aſſigneth ſix parts, *Dialectick*, *Rhetorick*, *Ethick*, *Politick*, *Phyſick*, *Theologick*: Some affirm, theſe are not parts of Logick, but of Philoſophy it ſelf: ſo *Zeno* of *Tarſis*. The Logical part is by ſome divided into two Sciences, *Rhetorick* and *Dialectick*; ſome add *the definitive part*, ſome divide the definitive into that which concerns *invention* of truth (by which the differences of Phantaſies are directed) and that which concerns *knowledge* of truth; for things are comprehended by notions. (i) *Laert.*

(k) *Rhetorick* is the ſcience of well ſpeaking, by dilating upon the thing comprehended. *Dialectick* is the Science of well ſpeaking, (that is true and conſentaneous) or well diſputing by queſtion and anſwer. It is defined by *Poſſidonius*, *the ſcience of true, falſe, and neuter*. (k) *Laert.*

(l) *Rhetorick* is of three kinds, *Deliberative*, *Judicial*, *Demonſtrative*: The parts of Rhetorick are *Invention*, *Stile*, *Diſpoſition*, *Pronunciation*: *Rhetorical Speech* is divided into *Proem*, *Narration*, *Confutation*, *Epilogue*. (l) *Laert.*

(m) Dialectick is neceſſary, and a *virtue* within its ſpecies, containing other virtues, ἀπροπτωσία, a Science whereby we are taught when to aſſent, and when not; ἀνελεγξία, a firm reaſon, whereby we reſiſt appearances, and are not led away by them: ἀνελεγξία, a fortitude of reaſon, which keeps us from being tranſported with the adverſe opinion: ἀματαιότης, a habit directing phantaſies to right reaſon. (m) *Laert.*

(n) Dialectick is a Science or certain comprehenſion, or a habit, not erring by reaſon in reception of Phantaſies; but without Dialectick, a wiſe man cannot be infallible in reaſon; for by this, we diſcern the true, falſe, and probable, and diſtinguiſh the ambiguous. (n) *Laert.*

## CHAP. II.

### *Of the Inſtruments and Rules of Judgment.*

(a) IN the firſt place, they put the diſcourſe concerning phantaſies and ſence, as a Judicatory, whereby the truth of things is diſcerned. (a) *Laert.*

(b) The Senſes (according to *Zeno*, who made many alterations in Dialectick, and aſſerted many things of the Sences that were wholly new) are joyned by a certain kind of extrinſecal impulſion, termed Phantaſy. To theſe phantaſies received by the ſenſes, is added an aſſention of the mind, which is placed in us voluntary. The phantaſie, when ſeen, is comprehenſible, when received and approved, comprehenſion; and, if ſo comprehended, as that it cannot be plucked away by reaſon, Science. (b) *Cic. Acad. 1.*

(c) Judgment is a perſpection which diſcerneth a thing. (c) *Galen hiſt. phil.*

(d) That which judgeth is taken two ways: 1. By which we ſay, ſome things are, others are not, theſe are true, thoſe are falſe. 2. Of Eſſence only; and this is underſtood three ways, commonly, properly, and moſt properly. *Commonly*, for every meaſure of comprehenſion, in which ſenſe, (d) *Sen. Empir. adv. log.*

ſenſe, even thoſe things which judge naturally, have this appellation, as ſight, hearing, taſt. *Properly*, for every artificial meaſure of comprehenſion; thus a cubit, a ballance, a ruler, a pair of compaſſes, are called things that judg; but ſight, and hearing, and the other common inſtruments of ſenſe, are not. *Moſt properly*, for every meaſure of comprehenſion of a thing, uncertain, and not evident. In which ſence, thoſe things which belong to the actions of life, are not ſaid to be things judging, but the logical only, and thoſe which dogmatical Philoſophers alledge for the invention of truth.

The Logical is ſubdivided into that *from which*, that *by which*, and *application* or habitude. *From which*, the man; *by which*, the ſenſe: the third is the application of Phantaſie or ſight. For as in the Staticks, there are three things which judg, the weigher, the ballance, and poſition of the ballance: The weigher is the judge from which, the ballance the judge by which, the poſition of the ballance, as it were a habitude. And again, as to diſcern right or oblique things is required an Artificer, a Ruler, and the application thereof; in like manner in Philoſophy are required thoſe three things mentioned to the diſcernment of true and falſe; the man from whom the judgment is made, is like the weigher or artificer; to the ballance and ruler anſwer ſenſe and cogitation, by which the judgment is made: to the habitude of the forenamed inſtruments, the application of phantaſy, by which a man cometh to judge.

(e) *Laert.* (e) The *Judge* of truth, they affirm to be *comprehenſive Phantaſy*, that is, proceeding from that which is; ſo *Chryſippus* in the 12*th* of his Phyſicks, and *Antipater*, and *Apollodorus*. But *Boethus* holds many judicatories, the *mind*, and *ſenſe*, and *appetite*, and *ſcience*; from whom *Chryſippus* diſſenting in his firſt book of *Reaſon*, affirmeth the Judicatories to be *Senſe* and *Anticipation*. *Anticipation* is a natural notion of Univerſals. Others of the more ancient Stoicks (as *Poſſidonius* ſaith in his Book of *Judgments*) aſſert *right reaſon* to be the Judicatory.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of Senſe*

(a) *St. Aug. Civ. dei.* 8. 7. (a) Dialectick is derived from corporeal ſenſes; for, from thence, the ſoul conceiveth *notions* (ἔννοιαι) of thoſe things which are explained by definition, and from thence is propagated and connexed the whole reaſon of Learning and Teaching.

(b) *Laert.* (b) *Senſe* is a ſpirit, proceeding from the ſupream part of the Soul, and permeating to the Organs.

(c) *Orig. contra Celſ. lib.* 7. (c) Whatſoever things are comprehended, are manifeſtly comprehended by ſenſe; all conceptions of the mind depend upon ſenſe.

(d) *Sic. Acad. quæſt.* 1. (d) Comprehenſion made by the ſenſes is true and faithful, (according to *Zeno*) for as much as nature hath given it as a rule for ſcience, and principle of her ſelf.

(e) *Cic. Acad. quæſt.* 4. (e) Nothing is more clear than this ἐναργεία *evidence*, there cannot be any ſpeech more perſpicuous:

(f) Of Senſibles and Intelligibles, ſome are true, but, not directly ſenſible; but, by relation to thoſe things which are next, as falling under Intelligence. (f) *Sext. Empir. hyp.* 2. 6.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Of Phantaſie.*

IN the firſt place (ſaith (a) *Diocles* the Magneſian) they put the reaſon concerning Phantaſie and Senſe, as a judgment, whereby the truth of things is diſcerned. It is phantaſie as to its genus, and likewiſe in as much as the reaſon of aſſent, comprehenſion, and intelligence (which is more excellent than the reſt) conſiſts not without Phantaſie; for phantaſie goeth firſt, then the mind endued with elocution, declareth by words what it ſuffers from the Phantaſie. (a) *Laert.*

(b) *Phantaſie* is ſo called from φῶς light; for as light ſheweth it ſelf, and with it ſelf all thoſe things which are contained within it; ſo phantaſie ſheweth it ſelf, and that which maketh it. (b) *Plac. ph. Philoſ.* 4. 12.

(c) *Phantaſie* is an Impreſſion in the Soul: *Cleanthes* adds, an impreſſion by depreſſion and eminence, as that impreſſion which is made in Wax by a Seal. (c) *Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp.*

*Chryſippus* conceives this to be abſurd: for 1: ſaith he, When the ſoul firſt apprehends a triangle and a ſquare, it will follow, that the ſame body, at the ſame time, muſt have in it ſelf ſeveral figures, which is abſurd. Again, whereas many phantaſies are together conſiſtent in us, the Soul muſt have divers figures, which is worſe than the former. He therefore conceived, that *Zeno* uſed the word Impreſſion, for Alteration, meaning thus: Phantaſie is an alteration of the Soul, whereby it is no longer abſurd; that the ſame body (many ſeveral phantaſies being at the ſame time conſiſtent in us) ſhould receive ſeveral alterations. For, as the air receiving at once innumerable different percuſſions, hath preſently many alterations: ſo the ſupream part of the ſoul, receiving various phantaſies, doth ſomething which hath proportion and conformity thereto.

Some object, that this expoſition is not right: becauſe, though every phantaſie is an impreſſion and alteration in the Soul: yet, every impreſſion or alteration of the Soul is not phantaſie; as when the finger ſmarts or itches, and the hand is rubbed, there is then an impreſſion or alteration in the ſoul: but it is not phantaſie, becauſe it is not in the ſupream part of the ſoul.

They anſwer, That in ſaying, an impreſſion in the Soul, is implied as in the Soul as fully, as if we ſhould ſay, phantaſie is an impreſſion in the Soul as in the Soul: as when we ſay, the white in the eye, we imply, as in the eye, that is, the white is in a certain part of the eye, which all men have ſo by nature. So when we ſay, Phantaſie is an impreſſion in the Soul, we imply the impreſſion to be made in the ſupream part thereof.

Others more elegantly anſwer, that the word Soul is taken two ways, either for the whole, or for the princpal part; when we ſay, man conſiſts of ſoul and body; or, that death is a ſeparation of the ſoul from body; we mean properly the ſupream part, wherein properly conſiſts the motion and goods of the Soul. When *Zeno* therefore,

fore calleth Phantaſie an impreſſion in the Soul, he is not to be underſtood of the whole Soul, but of part thereof; as if he ſhould ſay, Phantaſie is an alteration of the ſupream part of the Soul.

To this interpretation, ſome object thus: Appetition, Aſſention, and Comprehenſion, are alterations in the ſupream part of the Soul; but, theſe differ from Phantaſie, that being a certain kind of perſwaſion and affection, whereas this is more operation than appetition, therefore the definition is not good, being competible to many other things.

They anſwer by recourſe to συνήμμασεις (*impliances*) that a definition is underſtood to be in all. As he who ſaith, Love is an application of the Soul towards procurement of Friendſhip, implieth amongſt young people; ſo when we ſay, that Phantaſie is an alteration in the ſupream part of the Soul, we imply by perſwaſion; for, alteration is not made by operation.

(d) Laert. (*d*) Of Phantaſies there are many kinds, ſome are *ſenſible*, others *not-ſenſible*. *Senſible* are thoſe which are received through one or more of the ſences: *Not-ſenſible* are thoſe which are received through the mind, as of incorporeals, and other things comprehended by reaſon. The ſenſible formed from things that are, are made with conceſſion and aſſent. There are alſo apparitions of Phantaſies, proceeding from things which are.

Again, ſome are *rational*, others *irrational*; *rational*, thoſe of reaſonable creatures; *irrational*, thoſe of unreaſonable. The rational are intelligence, the irrational have no name.

Again, ſome are *artificial*, others *in-artificial*; for, an Image is conſidered by an Artiſt one way; by him that is not an Artiſt, another way.

(c) Sext. Epir. Pyrrh. hyp. lib. (*c*) Again, ſome are *probable*, ſome *improbable*: The *probable* are thoſe which make an eaſy motion in the Soul; as, It is now day, I diſcourſe, and the like. The *Improbable* are of a contrary nature, averting us from aſſent; as, it is day, the Sun is not above the earth; if it is dark, it is day. *Both probable and improbable* are thoſe, which, by relation to other things, are ſometimes ſuch as in doubtful ſpeeches, neither probable nor improbable, are ſuch, as theſe, The ſtairs are even, the ſtairs are odd.

Of probable and improbable Phantaſies, ſome are *true*, ſome are *falſe*, ſome are *neither* true nor falſe. *True*, are thoſe, whoſe predication is true, as, It is day, 'tis light: *Falſe*, whoſe predication is falſe; *Both true and falſe*, as happened to *Oreſtes* in his madneſs, meeting *Electra*; that he met ſomething, it was ture, for it was *Electra*; but, that it was a Fury, was falſe. *Neither true nor falſe*, are thoſe which are taken from the Genus; for the Genus is not ſuch as the Species in all reſpects: As, of men, ſome are *Grecians*, ſome are Barbarous; but, man in general is not *Grecian*, for then all men muſt be *Grecians*; neither barbarous, for the ſame reaſon.

Of true Phantaſies, ſome are *comprehenſive*, others are *not-comprehenſive*. *Not-comprehenſive* are thoſe which happen through ſickneſs, or perturbation of mind; many being troubled with Frenzie or Melancholly, attract a true Phantaſie which is not comprehenſive, even from that which extrinſecally occurs caſually, for which reaſon, they neither aſſert it often, nor aſſent unto it. *Comprehenſive* Phantaſie is that which is impreſſed and ſigned by that which is, and conformable to that which is, ſo as it cannot be of that which is not.

To comprehenſive phantaſie three *conditions* are requiſite: 1. That it ariſe from that which is; for many phantaſies ariſe from that which is not, as in mad men 2. That it be conformable to that which is; for ſome phantaſies are from that which is, but repreſents the ſimilitude of that which is not: As *Oreſtes* derived a phantaſie from that which was, *viz.* from *Electra*, but not according to that which was; for he thought her to be one of the Furies. Comprehenſive phantaſie muſt be conformable to that which is, and ſo impreſſed and ſigned, as that it may imprint artificially all the properties of the thing fancied, as Gravers touch all the parts of thoſe things which they imitate, and the impreſſion made by a Seal on Wax exactly and perfectly, beareth all its characters. Laſtly, That it be without impediment; for ſometimes comprehenſive phantaſie is not creditable, by reaſon of outward circumſtances; as when *Hercules* brought *Alceſtis* taken out of the Earth, to *Admetus*, *Admetus* drew from *Alceſtis* a comprehenſive phantaſie, but did not credit it; for, he conſider'd, that ſhe was dead, and therefore could not riſe again, but, that ſometimes Spirits appear in the ſhape of the deceaſed.

(f) Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 12. (*f*) *Phantaſie*, *Phantaſton*, *Phantaſticon*, and *Phantaſm*, according to *Chryſippus*, differ thus: *Phantaſie* is a paſſion made in the Soul, which ſheweth it ſelf, and that which made it; as, when with our Eyes we ſee white, it is a paſſion engendred by ſight in the Soul, and we may call this a paſſion, becauſe the object thereof is a white thing which moveth us: The like of ſmelling and touching.

*Phantaſton* is that which maketh phantaſie; as the white and the cold, and whatſoever is able to move the Soul, that is Phantaſton.

*Phantaſticon* is a fruſtraneous attraction, a paſſion in the Soul proceeding from nothing; as in thoſe who fight with ſhadows, or extend their hands in vain: For, to Phantaſy is objected Phantaſton, but Phantaſticon hath no object.

*Phantaſme* is that, to which we are attracted by that fruſtraneous attraction, which happens in Melancholly, or Mad perſons; as *Oreſtes* in the Tragedy, when he ſaith,

*Bring hither, Mother, I implore,*
*Theſe ſnaky bloody Maids no more,*
*Whoſe very looks wound me all o're.*

This he ſaith in his madneſs, for he ſaw nothing: wherefore *Electra* anſwers him,

*Ah quiet in thy bed (unhappy) lie,*
*Thou ſeeſt not what thou thinkſt before thy eye.*

## CHAP. V.

### *Of True and Truth.*

(a) St. *Aug. contra Acad. lib.* 2.

(a) TRUE (according to *Zeno*) is that which is impreſſed in the mind from that whence it is, in ſuch manner, as it cannot be from that which is not: Or, as others; (b) *True* is that which is, and is oppoſed to ſomething: *Falſe* is that which is not; yet, is oppoſed to ſomething alſo.

(b) *Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp.* 2. 8.

*Truth* and *true* differ three ways, by *Eſſence*, by *Conſtitution*, by *Power*. By *Eſſence*, for *Truth* is a body; but, *True* is incorporeal, for it is a dicible λεκτὸν, and therefore incorporeal. On the contrary, *Truth* is a body, as being the enunciative Science of all true things. All Science is in ſome meaſure the ſupream part of the Soul, which ſupream part is a body: therefore *Truth* in general is corporeal.

By *Conſtitution*; *True* is conceived to be ſomething uniform and ſimple by nature; as, *It is day, I Diſcourſe*. *Truth*, as being a Science, conſiſteth of many things, by a kind of conſervation. Wherefore as a People is one thing, a Citizen another; a People is a multitude conſiſting of many Citizens; but, a Citizen is no more than one. In the ſame manner differeth *Truth* from *True*. *Truth* reſembleth a People, true a Citizen; for, *Truth* conſiſteth of many things collected, *True* is ſimple.

By *Power*; for *True* doth not abſolutely adhere to *Truth*: A fool, a child, a mad-man, may ſpeak ſomething *True*, but, cannot have the Science of that which is *True*. *Truth* conſiders things with Science, inſomuch that he who hath it, is wiſe; for, he hath the Science of *True* things, and is never deceived, nor lieth, altho he ſpeak falſe, becauſe it proceedeth not from an ill, but good affection.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of Comprehenſion.*

(a) *Cic. Acad. quæſt.* 1.

(b) *Cic. Acad. quæſt.* 4.

(a) COmprehenſion (κατάληψις) was firſt uſed in this ſence by *Zeno*, by a metaphor taken from things apprehended by the hand; (b) which alluſion he expreſt by action. For, ſhewing his hand with the fingers ſtretched forth, he ſaid, ſuch was Phantaſie; then bending them a little, ſaid, ſuch was Aſſent; then compreſſing them, and clutching his fiſt, ſuch was Comprehenſion.

(e) *Galen Hiſt. phil.*

(c) Comprehenſion is a firm and true knowledg, non-comprehenſion the contrary; for ſome things we only think that we ſee, hear, or feel, as in dreams and frenzies; other things we not only think, but truly do ſee, or hear, or feel. Theſe latter, all (but the Academicks and Scepticks) conceive to fall under firm knowledg; the other, which we imagine in dreams or frenzy, are falſe.

(d) *Sext. Empir. adv. Geom. cap.* 19.

(d) Whatſoever is underſtood, is comprehended by the mind, one of theſe two ways, either by *evident Incurſion* (which *Laertius* calls by Senſe) or by *Tranſition from evidence* (*Laertius*, Collection by Demonſtration) of which latter there are three kinds, by *Aſſimilation*, by *Compoſition*, by *Analogy*.

By *Incurent Evidence* is underſtood White and Black, Sweet and Sour.

By *Tranſition* from evidents: by *Aſſimilation* is underſtood *Socrates* by his Picture: by *Compoſition*, as of a Horſe and Man is made a Centaur; for putting together the limbs proper to both ſpecies, we comprehend by phantaſie that which was neither Horſe nor Man, but a Centaur compounded of both.

By *Analogy*, things are underſtood two ways; either by *Augmentation*; or, when from common ordinary men, we by augmentation phanſy a Cyclops, who not like

*Men that with* Ceres *gifts are fed,*
*But, ſome tall hill erects his head.*

Or by *Diminution*, as a Pigmy. (e) Likewiſe the Center of the earth is underſtood by analogy from leſſer Globes. (e) *Laert.*

To theſe kinds add, (f) Comprehenſion by *Tranſference*, as eyes in the breaſt; by *Contrariety*, as Death; by *Tranſference*, as dicibles and place; by *Privation*, as a man without hands; juſt and good are underſtood *Naturally*. (f) *Laert.*

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of Aſſent.*

(a) THeſe things being enough known, which we have already explained, let us now ſpeak a little of *Aſſent*, and approbation, termed συγκατάθεσις, not that, that is not a large place, but the grounds thereof have been already laid: For when we explained the power that was in the ſenſes, we likewiſe declared, that many things were comprehended and perceived by the ſenſes, which cannot be done without *Aſſent*. Moreover, ſeeing that betwixt an inanimate and an animate being, the greateſt difference is, that the inanimate doth nothing, the animate doth ſomething; we muſt either take away ſenſe from it, or allow it aſſent, which is within our power. When we will not have a thing either to perceive or aſſent, we in a manner take away the ſoul from it; for as it is neceſſary, that the ſcale of Ballance which is laden, ſhould tend downwards; ſo is it that the ſoul ſhould yield to things that are perſpicuous. (a) *Cic. Ac. queſt.* 4.

(b) Altho Aſſent cannot be made unleſs it be moved by Phantaſy, yet when that Phantaſy hath an immediate cauſe, it hath not (according to *Chryſippus*) this principal reaſon; not that it can be made without any extrinſecal excitation (for it is neceſſary that Aſſent be moved by Phantaſy) but it returns to its Cylinder and Cone, which move not by impulſion; then of their own nature the Cylinder ſeems to rowl, and the Cone to turn round. As therefore he who thruſt the Cylinder, gave it the beginning of motion, but did not give it volubility; ſo the objected Phantaſy imprinteth, and as it were ſealeth in the Soul its ſpecies, yet the aſſent is in our power, and that (as we ſaid in a Cylinder) extrinſecally impelled, the motion is continued by its own power and nature. (b) *Cic. de Fato.*

Phantaſie,

(c) Phantaſies, wherewith the mind of man is preſently affected, are not voluntary or in our own power, but infer themſelves by a kind of violence, approbations (συγκαταθέσεις) by which theſe Phantaſies are known and judged, are voluntary, and made according to our arbitrement. So as upon any dreadful noiſe from Heaven, or by the fall of any thing, or ſudden news of ſome danger, or the like; it is neceſſary that the mind of a wiſe man be a little moved, and contracted, and appalled, not through opinion perceived of any ill, but certain rapid and inconſiderate motions, which prævert the office of the mind and reaſon. But preſently the ſame wiſe man approveth not τας τοιαυτας φαντασιας, thoſe dreadful Phantaſies, that is, ἃ συγκατατίθεται ἀλλὰ προσαναιρεῖ δόξασιν, but rejects and refuſes them; nor is there any thing in theſe, which ſeemeth to him dreadful. Thus differ the Souls of wiſe and unwiſe men: The unwiſe, when Phantaſies appear cruel and difficult at the firſt impulſion of the mind, think them to be truly ſuch as they appear, and receiving them as if they were juſtly to be feared, approve them by their aſſent, ἢ προσανιδοξάζει, (this word the Stoicks uſe upon this occaſion): But a wiſe man ſuddenly changing colour and countenance, ἃ συγκατατίθεται aſſents not, but retaineth the ſtate and vigour of his judgment, which he always had of theſe Phantaſies, as nothing dreadful, but terrifying only with a falſe ſhew, and vain fear.

(b) Aſtell. 19. 9. and from him S. Auguſt. Civit. Dei. 9. 4.

(f) Laert.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of Notions.*

(a) FRom Senſe, the rule of Science, Notions are imprinted in the Soul, by which, not only principles, but larger ways to reaſon are found out.

(a) Cic. Acad. 1.

(b) A man when he is born, hath the ſupream part of his Soul, like unto clean paper, upon which every notion is inſcribed. The firſt manner of inſcription is by the Senſes; as for example: They who perceive a thing that is white, after it is taken away, retain the memory thereof; but, when they have conceived many remembrances of one ſpecies, then they ſay, they have experience, for experience is a multitude of ſimilitudes.

(b) Plut. de plac. phil. 4. 11.

Of *Notions*, ſome are *Natural*, which are in ſuch manner as we have ſaid, and without Art: Others *gained* by learning and induſtry: Theſe are properly called *Notions*, the other *Anticipations*. The reaſon for which we are called rational, is ſaid to be perfected by anticipations in the firſt ſeven years.

Intelligence is the Phantaſm of the intellect of a rational creature; for phantaſm, when it lighteth upon a rational Soul, is then called ἔννοημα, Intelligence, a word taken from the Intellect. For to other Creatures there happen not phantaſms; to the Gods only, and to us theſe are incident. Thoſe which belong to us, are Phantaſms, as to their genus; Notions, as to their ſpecies; as denaries and taters, when paid for tranſportation, are called *Naula*.

(c) Common Notions are planted in all men, (in which they all agree together) one is not repugnant to another; for, who holds not, that good is profitable, and ought to be choſen with utmoſt endeavours? Who holds not, that what is juſt, is fair and well-beſeeming? Whence then proceed contentions and differences? To wit, from the application of firſt notions to ſingular things.

Adrian. 1.

(d) Theſe Notions, and whatſoever is of this kind, which right reaſon conformeth in us, being long examined, are true, and ſuitable to the natures of things.

(d) *Simp. in Epic.*

## CHAP. IX.

### *Of Science and Opinion.*

(a) THat which is comprehended by Senſe, *Zeno* call'd *Senſe*; and if ſo comprehended, as not to be plucked away by reaſon, *Science*, otherwiſe *Ignorance*; from which proceedeth *Opinion*, which is weak and common, to the falſe and unknown.

(a) *Cicer. Acad. queſt.* 1.

(b) Theſe three are joyned together, Science, Opinion, and Comprehenſion, which borders upon the other two. Science is a firm, ſtable, immutable comprehenſion with reaſon: Opinion, an infirm, weak aſſent: Comprehenſion, which cometh between both, is an aſſent to comprehenſive Phantaſie. Comprehenſive phantaſie is true, in ſuch manner, that it cannot be falſe. Therefore Science is in wiſe men only, Opinion in fools, Comprehenſion is common to both, as being that by which truth is judged;

(b) *Sext. Emp. adv. Logic.*

(c) and is for this reaſon reckon'd by *Zeno*, neither amongſt the right (κατορθώματα) nor amongſt the bad (ἁμαρτήματα) but betwixt ſcience and ignorance, affirming, that this only is to be credited.

(c) *Cicer. Acad. queſt.* 1.

## CHAP. X.

### *Of Voice, Speech, and Words.*

(a) THeſe three are joined to one another; that which is ſignified, that which ſignifieth, and the contingent. *That which ſignifieth*, is the voice, as *Dion*; *That which is ſignified*, is the thing it ſelf declared by the voice; it is that which we apprehend, and is preſent in our cogitation. *The contingent* is the outward ſubject, as, *Dion* himſelf.

(a) *Sext. Emp. adv. Log. cap. de vero.*

(b) Dialectick being converſant about that which ſignifieth, and that which is ſignified, (c) is divided into two places: One, *of Significats*; the other *of Voice*. The place of ſignificats is divided into *Phantaſies, and ſubſiſtents on phantaſie, dicibles, axioms*, &c.

(b) *Laert.* (c) *Laert.*

In the other place, concerning *Voice*, is declared literal *Voice*, the *parts of ſpeech*, the nature of *Solæciſms* and *Barbariſms*, *Poems*, *Ambiguities*, *Song*, *Muſick*, and (according to ſome) *definitions* and *diviſions*.

(d) The Phantaſies of the Mind precede Speech, (*Of theſe therefore we have already treated*) then the Mind endued with the faculty of ſpeaking, declareth by Speech what it receiveth from the Phantaſy: For this Reaſon, (e) the conſide-

(d) *Laert.*

(e) *Laert.*

conſideration of Dialectick, by the joint conſent of all, ſeems as if it ought to be firſt taken from the place of Voice.

(f) Laert. (f) *Voice* is Air percuſſed, the proper ſenſible object of hearing, (as *Diogenes* the *Babylonian*, in his *Art of Voice.*) The Voice of a living ſenſitive Creature, is Air percuſſed with Appetite; the Voice of Man is Articulate, proceeding from the Mind: at his fourteenth year it is perfected.

(g) Laert. *Speech* (as (g) *Diogenes* ſaith) is a literate Voice; as, It is day. *Word* is a ſignificative Voice proceeding from the Mind. *Language* is a Speech according to the variety of Nations, whereof each uſeth its peculiar Dialect; as the *Attick* ſaith, θάλατ]α, the *Ionick* ἥμερη. Voice and Speech differ, in that Voice is a ſound, but Speech articulate only. Speech and Word differ; for word is always ſignificative; but, Speech ſometimes ſignifieth nothing, as *Blitri*, which is no word. To ſpeak and to pronounce differ; Voices are pronounced, but things only are ſpo-

(h) Sext. Emp. adv. Log. cap. de voce. ken: (h) for, to ſpeak, is to pronounce a ſignificant Voice of a thing that is ſaid.

(i) Varro de ling. lat. lib. 5. (i) Hence *Chryſippus* ſaith, That he who beginneth to ſpeak and pronounce Words, before he can put them in their right place, doth not ſpeak, but think that he ſpeaks; as the Image of a Man is not a Man: ſo in Crows, Daws and Children, when they firſt begin to ſpeak, the words which they ſay are not words. He only ſpeaketh, who knoweth to put a word in the right place.

(k) Cicero. (i) Dionyſ. Halic. (m) Hieronym. They (particularly (k) *Zeno*) (l) took much pains in the Invention and Explication of Words, (m) wherein they diſtinguiſhed very ſubtilly. Hence *Cicero* calleth the *Stoicks* Architects of Words. *Ammonius*, the *Grammarians*, followers of the *Stoicks*.

(n) Laert. (n) The *Elements* of Speech are the 24 Letters. *Letter* is taken three ways: Firſt, for the Character or Figure which is formed. Secondly, for the Element or Power. Thirdly, for the Name, as *A*. Of the Elements, ſeven are *Vowels* α ε η ο υ ι ω, ſix *Mutes*, β γ δ κ π τ.

(o) Laert. (p) Dionyſ. Halic. (o) Of Speech there are five parts, as *Diogenes* ſaith in his Book of *Voice*, and *Chryſippus* (p) at firſt they reckon'd but four, ſeparating the *Articles* from the *Conjunctions*, afterwards the latter *Stoicks* dividing the *Appellatives* from the *Nouns*, made them five) *Noun*, *Appellation*, *Verb*, *Conjunction*, *Article*. (*Antipater* in his Book of *Speech* added the *medium*.) *Appellation* (as *Diogenes* ſaith) is a part of Speech ſignifying a common quality; as, Man, Horſe. *Noun* a part of Speech denoting a proper quality; as *Diogenes*, *Socrates*. *Verb* (as *Diogenes* ſaith) a part of Speech ſignifying a thing, which is predicated of one or more things, incompoſed; or, as ſome ſay, an Element of Speech without caſes, whereby the parts of Speech are connected; as, I write, I ſpeak. *Conjunction* is a part of Speech without caſes, conjoining the parts of Speech. *Article* is an Element of Speech, having caſes; diſtinguiſhing the kinds and numbers of Nouns; as, ὁ, ἡ, τὸ, οἱ, αἱ, τά.

(q) S. Auguſt. de Dialect. cap. 6. (q) Every word, by reaſon of that which it ſignifieth, called four neceſſary things into Queſtion, its *Origin*, *Power*, *Declination*, *Ordination*.

As concerning the firſt, which the *Greeks* call Ετυμολογία, they conceived that Names are given by Nature: the firſt pronounced Voices, imitating the things themſelves, from which the Names were afterwards impoſed, by which reaſon, they derive Etymologies, conceiving that there is not any word, for which there cannot be given a certain Reaſon. They therefore ſtudiouſly enquired whence Words are deduced; much pains was taken, firſt by *Zeno*, then by *Cleanthes*, afterwards by *Chryſippus*, to give a reaſon of commentitious Fables, and to explain the cauſes of Words, why they are called ſo and ſo.

This beginning is to be ſought, until we arrive ſo far, as that the thing agree in ſome Similitude with the ſound of the word, as when we ſay, *tinkling* of Braſs, the *neighing* of Horſes, the *bleating* of Sheep, the *gingling* of Chains: Theſe words by their ſound, expreſs the things which are ſignified by them.

But, for as much as there are things which ſound not, in theſe the Similitude of Touching hath the ſame Power: As they touch the Senſe ſmoothly or harſhly, the ſmoothneſs or harſhneſs of Letters in like manner toucheth the hearing, and thereby occaſioneth their Names. As when we ſay *ſmooth*, it ſounds ſmoothly: ſo, who will not judg *harſhneſs* to be harſh by the very Word? It is ſmooth to the Ear, when we ſay *Pleaſure*; harſh, when we ſay *Crux*, *a Croſs*; the things themſelves make good the ſound of the words. *Honey*, as ſweetly as the thing it ſelf affects our taſt, ſo ſweetly doth the name touch our hearing: *Sour*, as harſh in both. *Wooll* and *Bryers*, as the Words are to the Hearing, the Things are to the Touch. Theſe are conceived to be the Infancy, as it were, of Words, when the Senſe of the thing concords with the Senſe of the ſound.

From hence proceeded the licence of Naming, according to the Similitude of the things among themſelves; as when, for example, *Crux*, *a Croſs*, is therefore ſo called, becauſe the harſhneſs of the word concords with the harſhneſs of the Pain which the Croſs affecteth. But, *Crura*, Thighs, are ſo called, not from harſhneſs of pain; but, becauſe in length and hardneſs, they are, in reſpect of other Limbs, like unto the Wood of a Croſs. Hence it comes to abuſe, that the Name is uſurped, not of a like thing, but as it were near; for what likeneſs is there between the Signification of *little* and *minute*, when as that may be *little*, which not only is nothing *minute*, but is ſomewhat grown; yet, by reaſon of a certain nearneſs, we ſay *minute* for *little*. But, this abuſe of the Word is in the Power of the Speaker; for he may uſe the word *little*, and not *minute*. This Example belongs to that which we will ſhew, when we call that a *Fiſh-pond* which hath no Fiſh in it, nor any thing like a Fiſh: It is denominated from Fiſhes, by reaſon of the Water wherein Fiſhes live. So the word is uſed by Tranſlation, not from Similitude, but a certain kind of Vicinity. And if any one ſhould ſay, That Men in Swimming reſemble Fiſhes, and that from thence a Fiſh-pond is ſo named, it were fooliſh to refuſe it, ſince that neither is repugnant to the nature of the thing, and both are occult. But, this is to the purpoſe, which

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we cannot dilucidate by one Example, how much the Origine of the Word, which is taken from Vicinity, differs from that which is derived from Similitude.

From hence there is a Progreſſion to the contrary. *Lucus* is thought to be ſo named, *Quod minime luceat*; and *bellum, quod res bella non ſit*; and *fœdus, quod res fœda non ſit*. But, if we derive *porcus*, as ſome do, *a fœditate*, it returns to that Vicinity, when that which is made, is named from that by which it is made.

For this Vicinity is very large, and divided into many parts; either by efficiency, as this word *porcus a fœditate*; from which likewiſe *fœdus*; or by effect, as *puteus*, ſo named, becauſe the effect thereof is *potatio*; or by that it containeth, as *urbs ab orbe*, becauſe in a place which they liked, they firſt made a track about it with a plough, as *Virgil* ſaith of *Æneas*,

——*Urbem deſignat Aratro.*

Or by that which is contained, as if *horreum* were derived from *hordeum*; or by abuſe, as *hordeum* for Wheat; or the whole from a part, as *mucro*, which is the point for the whole Sword; or a part from the whole, as *capillus quaſi capitis pilus*. What need we go any further? Whatſoever elſe can be reckoned, we may ſee the Origin of the word contained, either in the Similitude betwixt Things and Sounds, or in the Similitude betwixt Things themſelves, or in Vicinity, or Contrariety, which Origin we cannot purſue beyond Similitude.

But this we cannot do always; for there are innumerable Words, the Reaſon of which lie hid. To the Infancy, or rather Stock and Seed of ſuch Words, beyond which no Origin is to be ſought, neither if a man do enquire can he find any, they proceed in this manner. The Syllables, in which *v* hath the place of Conſonant, as in theſe Words, *venter, vafer, velum, vinum, vomis, vulnus*, have a thick, and as it were, a ſtrong ſound, which the very cuſtom of ſpeaking confirmeth, when from ſome Words we take them away, leſt they ſhould burden the Ear; for which reaſon we ſay *amaſti*, rather than *amaviſti*; and *abiit*, no *abivit*, and innumerable of the ſame kind. Therefore when we ſay *Vis*, the ſound of the word having, as we ſaid, a kind of force, ſuiteth. Now from this Vicinity, by that which they affect, that is, becauſe they are violent, *vincula* ſeem to be named, and *vimen, quod aliquid vinciatur*. Thence *vites*, becauſe they claſp about thoſe things by which they grow. Hence alſo by Similitude, *Terence* calls a crooked old man *vietum*. Hence the Earth, worn into winding Paths by the Feet of Paſſengers, is called *via*; but if *via* be ſo named, *quaſi vi pedum trita*, the Origin returns to the Vicinity: But let us ſuppoſe it derived from the Similitude it hath with *vitis* or *vimen*, that is, from its winding; one asketh me why it is called *via*? I anſwer, from the windings and crookedneſs thereof, which the Ancients called *vietum*; thence the Rounds of a Wheel *vietos*. He demands, how *vietum* comes to ſignifie winding? I anſwer, from the Similitude of *vitis*, a Vine: He requires whence *vitis* is ſo named? I ſay, becauſe it doth *vincire* thoſe things which it comprehends. He queſtions whence *vincire* is derived? We ſay, *a vi*. He asks, whence *vis*? We give this reaſon, becauſe the word in its robuſt and forcible ſound agreeth to the thing which it ſignifieth. He hath nothing more to demand.

(t) In like manner, in this word *Ego*, as *Chryſippus* obſerves, in pronouncing the firſt Syllable, we depreſs the under lip, as if it were to point to our ſelves; then by motion of the Beard we point to our own Breaſts; of which (u) *Nigidius* hath given more inſtances, in his Grammatical Commentaries. (t) *Galen. de decret. Hipp. & Plat. lib. 2.* (u) *Agel. 10.5.*

The ſecond Queſtion concerning Words, is of their Power, περὶ σημαινόντων, *of Significants*; whence (x) *Chryſippus* divided Dialectick into two parts, περὶ σημαινόντων καὶ σημαινομένων, *of Significants and Significats*. Here they enquire, how many ways every thing may be ſaid, and how many ways a thing ſaid may ſignifie? (x) *Laert.*

Here is examined the Ambiguity of Words. (y) *Ambiguity* (or Amphiboly) is a word ſignifying two or more things, naturally and properly, according to the Language of the Nation, in ſuch manner, that many Senſes may be collected from the ſame Words, as αὐλητρὶς πέπωκε, which one way ſignifies, *the Pot fell* thrice; another way, *the She-minſtrel fell*. (y) *Laert.*

(z) Every word (according to *Chryſippus*) is by nature ambiguous, for the ſame may be taken two or more ways: (y) Neither is that any thing to the purpoſe which *Hortenſius* Calumniates in *Cicero*, thus, They affirm that they hear Ambiguities acutely, explain them clearly. The ſame Perſons hold, That every Word is Ambiguous; how then can they explain the Ambiguous by the Ambiguous, that were to bring a Candle not lighted into the Dark? This is ingeniouſly and ſubtilly ſaid, but like that of *Scævola* to *Antonius*, You ſeem to the wiſe to ſpeak acutely, to Fools truly: For what elſe doth *Hortenſius* in that place, but by his Ingenuity and Facetiouſneſs, as an intoxicating Cup, bring Darkneſs upon the unlearned? For, when they ſay, Every Word is Ambiguous, it is underſtood of ſingle Words. Ambiguities are explain'd by Diſputation; no man diſputeth by ſingle Words, none therefore explaineth Ambiguous words by Ambiguous words. And yet ſeeing that every word is Ambiguous, no man can explain the Ambiguity of Words, except by words, but thoſe conjoined and not Ambiguous. As when we ſay, Every Soldier hath two Feet, it doth not follow, that a whole Regiment of Soldiers that have two Feet, ſhould have in all but two Feet. So when I ſay, Every word is Ambiguous; I do not ſay, a Sentence, nor a Diſputation, altho they are woven of Words. Every Ambiguous word therefore may be explained by inambiguous Diſputation. (z) *Agel. 9. 12.* (y) *D Auguſt. de Dialect.*

The third Queſtion is concerning *Declination*, ἀνωμαλία and ἀναλογία. (z) Some follow *Analogy*, others *Anomaly*. *Analogy* is a like Declination of like, in Latin *Proportio*. *Anomaly* is an inequality, following the cuſtoms of Declinations. (a) *Chryſippus* wrote ſix Books περὶ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας, ſhewing, that like things are noted with unlike words, and unlike things with like words. (z) *Agel. 2.25.* (a) *Varro. de ling. lat.*

The laſt Queſtion is concerning *Ordination*, σωτάξις. (b) Upon this Subject *Chryſippus* wrote two books (*Laertius* reckons more) whoſe ſcope is not Rhetorical, but Dialectick, as will eaſily appear (b) *Dionyſ. Halicarn. de compoſ. verb.*

appear to the Reader: *Of the Syntax of Axiomes: of true and false Axiomes: Of possible and impossible: Of contingent, and transient, and ambiguous*, and the like, which confer nothing to single speech or pleasure, or grace to elocution.

(c) Laert. (c) There are five *excellencies* of speech, *Propriety, Perspicuity, Succinctness, Decorum, Elegance. Propriety* is a proper phrase, according to Art, not after the common expression.

*Perspicuity* is, when that which is intended is delivered clearly.

*Succinctness* is, when that only is comprised, which is necessary to the thing.

*Decorum*, is a conformity to the thing.

*Elegance* is an avoiding of vulgar phrase.

(d) Laert. (d) Amongst the faults of speech is *Barbarism*, a phrase not in use with the best persons; and *Solæcism*, a speech incoherently framed.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of Definition and Division.*

(a) Laert. (a) DEfinition (according to *Antipater* in his book of *Definitions*) is speech by *Analysis* pronounced adæquately; or (as *Chrysippus* in his book of *Definitions*) an answer to this Question, What a thing is?

(b) Sext. Emp. adv. Log. (b) Those definitions are vicious which include any of those things which are not in the things defined, or not in all, or not in some; so as if we should say, *A man is a rational creature*, or, *a mortal grammatical creature*; seeing that no man is immortal, and some men are not Grammarians, the definition is faulty.

(c) Cicer. Topic. (c) We must therefore, when we take those things which are common to the things we would define, and others, prosecute them so far, until it becomes proper, so as not to be transferrible to any other thing; as this, *An inheritance is riches*, add, *which by the death of some person falleth to another*, it is not yet a definition, for riches may be held many other ways, as well as by Inheritance; add one word, *by right of Law*; now the thing will seem disjoyned from community: so that the definition is thus explained. *Inheritance is riches, which by the death of one person falleth to another by right of Law:* It is not yet enough, therefore add, *neither bequeathed by will, nor detained by possession*, and it is perfect.

(d) Cic. Topic. (d) Of definition there are two kinds: one of things *which are*: the other of things *which are understood*. Those *things which are*, we call such as may be seen or touched, as a field, house, a wall, and the like. On the other side, we say those things *are not*, which cannot be touched or shewn, as possession, guardianship, nation, kindred, which have not any body, yet there is some conformity in the understanding, which we call notional, whereby in argumentation they may be explained by definition This latter kind is rather called Description, a speech, which by the exterior figure of the things bringeth us to the things themselves, or a Definition simply expressing the power of a definition.

(e) Cic. Topic. (e) Again, of definitions, some are of *partitions*, others of *divisions*. *Of partitions*, when the thing proposed is torn (as it were) into pieces, as if we should say, the Civil Law is that which consisteth in Laws, Senators, things judged, the authority of Lawyers, Edicts of Magistrates, manners and Equity.

The definition *of divisions* comprehendeth all species which are under the genus defined, thus. *Abalianation* is of that thing which is in our power, or a deliverance of it into the power of another, or a concession by Law, amongst whom those things may be done by Civil right.

(f) Laert. (f) *Division* is a section of the genus into its immediate species; as, *of living creatures, some are rational, some irrational.* (g) This therefore is an ill division, *Of men some are Grecians, some Egyptians, some Persians, some Indians*; for the next species are not disparate, but opposite. We must therefore say thus; *Of men some are Grecians, some Barbarians*; and again, by subdivision *of Barbarians, some are Ægyptians, some Persians, some Indians*, which likewise is in the division of things that are. For those which are good and bad, are different to us; those who are intermediate betwixt good and bad, are indifferent to us. The division therefore ought not to be so, but rather thus: *Of things that are, some are indifferent, others different; of the different, some are good, some are ill*; For this division is like unto that which saith, Of men, some are Grecians, others Barbarians; of Barbarians, some are Ægyptians, some Persians, some Indians; the other is likewise; Of men, some Græcians, some Ægyptians, some Persians, some Indians.

(g) Sext. Empir. adv. Math. lo. 1.

Hence it followeth, that (*h*) perfect division hath an universal power; for he who divideth thus; Of men, some are Grecians, others Barbarians; saith as much as this, If there are any men, they are either Grecians or Barbarians; for if there be any man, who is neither Greek nor Barbarian, the division must necessarily be ill, the universal false. Wherefore when we say, Of things that are, some are good, some ill, some intermediate, it is as much (according to *Chrysippus*) as this universal; If there be any things that are, they are either good, or ill, or indifferent. But this universal is false, if any thing false be subjected to it: For, if two things be subjected, one good, the other ill; or, one good, the other indifferent, in this expression of those things which are, one kind is good, that is true; but this, these are good, is false, for they are not good; for one is good, the other ill. And again, These are ill, is false, for they are not ill, but only one of them. The like in indifferents; for, it is false that these are indifferents, as that these are good or ill.

(b) Sext. Emp. adv. Mor. lo.

(i) Laert. (i) There are three forms of division, *antidivision, sub-division, partition. Anti-division* is a distribution of the genus into species by the contrary; as for example, by negation, as of things that are, some are good, others not good.

*Sub-division* is division upon a division: as, of things that are, some are good, others not good; of the not-good, some are ill, others indifferent.

*Partition* is a distribution of the genus into places (according to *Crinis*) as of goods, some belong to the Soul, others to the Body.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XII.

### *Of Genus, Species, &c.*

(a) Laert. (a) GENUS is a comprehenſion of many Notions referred to one, as, *a living Creature*, for this includes all living creatures. Notion is a phantaſie of the mind, not any thing exiſtent or qualitative, but as it were, ſomething exiſtent, and qualitative; as the notion of a horſe, no horſe being preſent.

*Species* is that which is contained under the Genus; as, under living creature is contained man.

*Moſt general*, is that which is a Genus, but hath no Genus: Moſt ſpecial, that which is a Species, but hath no Species.

To this place of Voice belong likewiſe, as we ſaid, the conſideration of *Poem* and *Poeſy*. *Poem* (according to *Poſſidonius*, in his *introduction to Speech*) is a ſpeech in Metre or Rhime, not proſe, as γᾶῖα μιγίσῃ, and δῖὸς ἀἰδὴς. *Poeſy* is a ſignificant Poem, with deſign, containing the imitation of things divine and human.

## CHAP. XIII.

### *Of Things.*

NOtions, Words, and things, as we have ſaid, are conjoined together. From Notions we come to Words, from Words we come now to Things themſelves: By Notions Things are perceived. (a) Thoſe are ſaid to be *Things* which are dicible. (b) The Stoicks by a new name call things τυγχάνοντα, *Contingents*, becauſe we deſire that things might befal us, and that we might obtain them. (c) *Contingents* therefore is the ſubject it ſelf, beyond the notion or word, as *Dion*.

(a) Laert. (b) Philop. in Analyt. prior. (c) Sext. Empi. adv. Log.

(d) They comprehend all things under one common Genus. τί *ſomewhat*; (e) placing this Genus above all; the reaſon this: In nature ſomethings are, ſomethings are not. For, thoſe things which are not, but only incur in the mind, as Centaurs, Giants, and whatſoever elſe is formed by falſe cogitation, hath ſome image, although it hath no ſubſtance. Even Negatives are in being. *Somewhat* therefore is more general than *Ens*, which is underſtood only of Corporeals.

(d) Alex. Aphrod. in Top. 4. (e) Senec. Epiſt. 58.

(f) Things are ſubdivided into four Genus's, *Subjects*, and *Qualitatives*, & *Quodammodotatives in themſelves*, and *Quodammodotatives as to others*. (g) Thus the Stoicks treating more ſtrictly and ſubtilly of theſe things, contract the Predicaments into a leſſer number, taking ſome of thoſe things which they diminiſhed, but with ſome alteration.

(f) Simplic. in Categ. (g) Simplic. ibid.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *Of Subjects.*

(a) Simplic. in Categ. (a) THere is not any thing beſides τὸ ὑποκείμενον, *Subject*: The differences concerning this are nonſubſiſtent.

(b) Simplic. ibid. (b) *Subject* is two-fold; one which is called the *firſt* ſubject, ſuch is matter expert of all qualities, which *Ariſtotle* calleth a body potentially. The other, that which is *effected with quality*, as *Braſs*, and *Socrates*, with thoſe things which are in them, or prædicated by them.

## CHAP. XV.

### *Of Qualitatives.*

(a) Dexip. in Categ. 2, 22. (a) *Qualitatives* have a ſubſiſtence, and are ſeparate from their ſubjects. For qualities (as all other accidents) are bodies, ſeeing that according to *Zeno*, nothing can be effected by that which is incorporeal, nor can that which is incorporeal effect any thing; whatſoever effecteth is a body. Effective quality therefore is a body. Matter is expert of quality, but qualities are not expert of matter.

(b) Simplic. in Categ. (b) *Quality* is the habit of that which is qualitative. *Qualitative* is taken three ways: Firſt, for whatſoever hath difference, whether it be motion or habit, and whether hardly or eaſily ſeparable. In this ſence, not only he who is wiſe, but he who ſtretcheth out his hand are qualitative. The ſecond ſignification includes not motions, but habits only, which they define qualitative, that is, which hath a difference endued with habit, as a wiſe man, or an armed man. Of theſe, ſome are adæquate to the meaſure of their pronunciation and conſideration; others not adæquate. Theſe they omit; thoſe which are adæquate, equal, and permanent, they call qualitative; as, a Grammarian, and a wiſe man; neither of theſe exceeds, or falls ſhort of his quality. Likewiſe a lover of Meat, and a lover of Wine, being in act ſuch, as a glutton, and a drunkard, becauſe they make uſe of thoſe parts which ſerve to this end, are ſo called: So that if any man be a glutton, he is conſequently a lover of Meat; but, if he be a lover of meat, he is not therefore immediately a glutton; for, being deſtitute of thoſe parts which he uſeth in eating, he wanteth the act, but not the habit. Quality is adæquated to qualitative in this laſt ſence.

(c) Burſius in dialect. Cicer. 4. 3. (c) All qualities are either *cauſes*, and then they are called *forms*; or *effects*, and then they are generally called ἕξεις, *habituals*, which word *Antipater* extends as large as the common accident, both of things corporeal and incorporeal, τί ſomewhat. Of *habituals* there are four kinds, μετεξὰ, that is, ἐννοήματα, when they reſide in the mind; τετῦχθαι, that is, πλάσεις, when they fall from the mind into the voice; κατηγορήματα when by the motion of the mind, they are prædicated of any thing; συμβεβηκότα, or, συμβάμματα, when they happen to ſubjects.

(d) Simplic. in Categ. (b) Habits are only things united; but thoſe which are conjoined by contiguity, as a Ship, or by diſtance, as an Army; in theſe there can be no habit; nor one thing ſpiritual above all, nor one reaſon, whereby they may come to ſubſiſt within one habit.

Ibid. It is common to quality of corporeal things to be the difference of their ſubſtance, not taken ſeverally, but contracted into one notion and property of the mind, nor by time or ſtrength reduced to form, but by its own tality, according to which the generation of the qualitative ſubſiſts.

Ibid. *Power* (a ſpecies of quality) is that which hath and giveth the faculty of exerciſing many accidents,

dents, as prudence giveth the faculty of walking prudently, and diſcourſing prudently: or according to ſome, Power is that which giveth the faculty of exerciſing many Accidents, and which ruleth and governeth the Acts ſubjected unto it. What *Ariſtotle* called natural *Power*, they name *Aptitude*.

*Ibid.*

*Ibid.* Habits are intended and remitted, Diſpoſitions cannot be intended or remitted. Thus the ſtraitneſs of a Wand, altho it may eaſily be diſcompoſed and bent, is a Diſpoſition; for ſtraitneſs cannot be intended or remitted. Likewiſe the Virtues are Diſpoſitions, not in reſpect of their firmneſs and conſtancy, but becauſe they cannot admit of degrees of more and leſs: but, Arts muſt either have firmneſs, or not be Diſpoſitions. Thus *Habitude* is taken in the Latitude of the Species, *Diſpoſition* is the chief perfection of the Species, and in that which is the moſt it can be, whether it be eaſily alter'd (as the ſtraightneſs of a Wand) or not.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of Quodammodotatives.*

THe third kind of things are τὰ πῶς ἔχοντα, *Quodammodotatives*. (*a*) They differ from Qualitatives, becauſe matter is otherwiſe affected by Habits, otherwiſe by *Quodammodotatives*, in this or that manner. Moreover Qualitatives are *Quodammodotatives* as to matter, and converſant therein; but properly, *Quodammodotatives* are converſant in Qualitatives. (*b*) Again, as habituals may be ſaid to extend further than Habits, ſo *Quodammodotatives* are larger than Qualitatives; for *Quodammodotatives* extend even to thoſe things which are *Quodammodotatives* as to others, and include them; but Qualitatives conſiſt only in thoſe which make a difference.

(*a*) *Plotin.* 1. 30.

(*b*) *Simplic. in Categ.*

(*c*) This place *Boethius* conceives to have the power of Habit. Habit chiefly and univerſally is taken three ways: Firſt, to be to it ſelf, and according to it ſelf: Secondly, in reſpect to another: Thirdly, of another to it. That which is conſidered *as to it ſelf*, pertains to *Quodammodotatives*; as *armed*, for it is a habit of ones ſelf to ones ſelf. That which is *to another*, pertains to Relation; for, a Father, or a right Hand, are ſaid, according to a Habit, not of themſelves to themſelves, but of them to another. But that which is of another to us, as of an armed man, being the Habit of another to us, pertains to Habit.

(*c*) *Simplic. ibid.*

To this head they reduce *Quantitatives* and *Quantity*, and their Species, *Place*, *Time*, and ſome Species (according to *Ariſtotle*) of quality, *Figure* and *Form*; as alſo *Action*, *Paſſion*, *Site*, *Habit*.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *Of Quodammodotatives as to others.*

THe laſt genus of Things is πρὸς τί πῶς ἔχοντα, *Quodammodotatives as to others*. (*a*) Of theſe there are two kinds, *Relatives* and *Quodammodotative-Relatives*. The *Relatives* are oppoſed and diſtinguiſhed from thoſe which are by themſelves, and abſolute. The *Quodammodotative-Relatives* are oppoſed to thoſe which have a difference; as for Example, Sweet and Sowr, and whatſoever is of the like kind, are Relatives; but *Quodammodotative Relatives*, are as the right ſide, *Father*, and the like; for they have a difference, in that they are characteriz'd by differences, according to ſome Species. As therefore there is one notion of thoſe which are by themſelves, and abſolute, another of thoſe which are conſidered with difference: So ſome things are *Relatives*, others *Quodammodotative-Relatives*. The conſequence of Conjunctions in theſe is contrary; for, with thoſe which are by themſelves, co-exiſt thoſe which have a difference; for, thoſe which are by themſelves, have ſome differences, as white and black. But, thoſe which are by themſelves, co-exiſt not with thoſe which have a difference. Sweet and Bitter have differences, whereby they are characterized; yet, they are not abſolute, but *Relatives*. But, thoſe which are *Quodammotative-Relatives*, being contrary to thoſe which have differences, are likewiſe *Relatives*. For, the right ſide, and a *Father*, beſides that they are *Quodammodotative*, are likewiſe *Relatives*: But Sweet and Bitter being *Relatives*, have a difference, whereby they are contrary, being *Quodammodotative-Relatives*. Thoſe which are *Quodammodotative-Relatives*, it is impoſſible ſhould be by themſelves, and abſolute, or by difference; for they depend ſolely upon Relative habit. *Relatives* therefore are not by themſelves, for they are not abſolute; yet are they according to difference, becauſe they are diſtinguiſhed by ſome Character. To expreſs this more clearly, *Relatives* are thoſe, which by their proper Character reſpect another: *Quodammodotative-Relatives* are thoſe which uſe to happen to another, but not without Mutation and Alteration of thoſe things which are about them; yet, with reſpect of ſomething external. If therefore any thing with difference reſpect another, it is only *Relative*, as Habit, Science, and Sence: but if it reſpect another, not out of inherent difference, but in pure Habit, it is *Quodammodotative-Relative*. For, a *Father*, and right ſide, to their conſiſtence, require ſome external things, for as much as there being no Mutation made in them, he is no longer a *Father*, his Son being dead, and the right ſide is no longer ſo, after he is riſen, in reſpect of whom it was ſaid to be ſuch; but Sweet and Bitter will not alter, unleſs their power be likewiſe changed. If therefore *Quodammodotative* are changed in habit to another, altho they receive no Paſſion in themſelves, it is manifeſt they have their being in the habit alone, not in difference.

(*a*) *Simplic. in Categ.*

(*a*) This Genus was firſt introduced by *Ariſto*, (*b*) who defined *Quodammodotative-Relatives* to be thoſe, *whoſe being is the ſame with their* Quodammodotative *being to one another*: And ſo alſo *Andronicus* defines them.

(*a*) *Lamb. Ariſtotel.* (*b*) *Simplic. in Categ.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. XVIII.

### *Of Dicibles.*

TO the place concerning things and ſignificats, belongeth that concerning *Dicibles*, περὶ λεκτῶν, to which true and falſe is common. (a) *Dicible* is that which conſiſteth according to rational Phantaſy. (b) *Rational Phantaſy* is that, by which what is comprehended by Phantaſy, may be expreſſed by Speech. Every thing that may be ſaid, ought to be ſaid, for from thence is derived the Denomination.

(a) Laert. (b) Sext. Emp. adv. log.

(c) *Dicible* is a mean betwixt Notion and Thing. *Dicibles* are Notions, that is, νοήματα, but not meerly and ſimply Notions, (d) which in as much as they are the principles of Science, and are Intelligences, are called περιλήψεις, and ἔννοιαι, but inaſmuch as they reſide in the mind, are called ἐννοήματα, and are Genus's and Species; in which manner, being ready for Expreſſion, they are called *Dicibles*, and pertain to the Enunciative faculty of the Soul. For whatſoever is ſaid, if it be ſo conſidered as it is ſaid of ſomething, they are *Categorems*; if ſo, as it breaketh forth into Voice, and with Voice; they are Words, if retained in the mind, ready to break forth, they are *Dicibles*. *Dicible* therefore is a word, and yet ſignifies not a word, but that which is underſtood in the word, and is contained in the mind.

(c) Ammon. in proem. Ariſt. περὶ ἑρμ. (d) Burſ. in dial. Cic. 5. 1.

(e) Of *Dicibles* there are two kinds, the *Defective* and the *Perfect*. The *Defective* are thoſe which have an imperfect Enunciation, not compleating the Sentence, but requiring ſomething to follow; as *writeth*, for we ask, who? To this kind belong *Categorems*, which are prædicated of other things.

(e) Laert.

The *Perfect* are ſuch as have a perfect Enunciation: Of theſe there are two kinds: The firſt peculiarly called *Perfect*, which tho they compleat the Sentence, yet ſignifie neither true nor falſe. Of theſe there are many kinds, as *Interrogation*, *Percontation*, *Imperative*, *Adjurative*, *Optative*, *Imprecative*, or *Execrative*, *Subſtitutive*, *Hypothetical*, *Compellative*, *like* to, or *Tranſcending an Axiom*, and *Dubitative*.

*Interrogation* is that which is a perfect Sentence, but requireth an anſwer, as, *Is it day?* for this is neither true nor falſe; ſo that *it is day*, is an Axiom, *Is it day?* an Interrogation.

*Percontation* is a thing for which we cannot anſwer ſignificantly, as in Interrogation, *yes*: but as thus, *He dwelleth in ſuch a place.*

*Imperative* is a thing, in ſpeaking whereof, we command; as,

*Go thou to the* Inachian *Flood.*

(f) *Adjurative*, as *witneſs thou Earth.* Optative, which we ſpeak Wiſhing, as,

Ammon. in περὶ ἑρμ.

*Great Jove who doſt in* Ida *reign,*
*The Victory let* Ajax *gain.*

*Imprecative*, or Execrative, as,

*As on the Ground this Wine I pour,*
*So may the Earth his Blood devour.*

*Subſtitutive*, or Expoſitive, as, *Let this be a right Line.*

*Hypothetical*, as, *ſuppoſing the Earth to be the Center of the Globe of the Sun.*

*Compellative* is a thing in ſpeaking which we call another, as,

Laert.

Atrides, Agamemnon, *King of Men.*

*Like to*, or *Tranſcending an Axiom*, is that which hath an axiomatical manner of ſpeaking; but becauſe it Superabounds in ſome Particle or Affection, it is not ranked amongſt Axioms, as,

*How Beautious is thy Virgin Train!*
*How like to* Priam's *Son, that Swain!*

*Dubitative* is a thing different from an Axiom, which whoſoever ſpeaks, maketh a doubt, as, *Then are not Life and Grief of kin?* All theſe are neither true nor falſe.

The other kind of perfect Dicibles which compleat the Sentence, affirmeth or denieth, and is either true or falſe. It is called *Axiom.*

## CHAP. XIX.

### *Of Categorems.*

(a) *Categorem* is that which is prædicated of another, or a thing conſtrued with one or more, or (as *Apollodorus*) a defective *Dicible*, conſtrued with the right caſe, to make an Axiom.

(a) Laert.

(b) Whatſoever is prædicated of another, is prædicated of the name of the Caſe; and both theſe are either *perfect*, as that which is prædicated, and together with the ſubject ſufficient to make an Axiom. Or they are *defective*, and require ſome Addition to make thereof a perfect Prædicate.

(b) Ammon. in Ariſt. περὶ ἑρμ.

If that which is prædicated of a Name, make an Axiom, it is a *Categorem*, or σύμβαμα, a Congruity, as *walketh*, for Example, *Socrates walketh.*

But if it be prædicated of the Caſe, (whereby Tranſitions are made from one Perſon to another, wherein it is neceſſary that ſome oblique Caſe be likewiſe pronounced with the right, they are called παρασυμβάματα, as an Addition to the σύμβαμα, (or as (c) *Priſcian* renders it, *leſs than Congruities*) as, Cicero *ſaved his Country.*

(c) Lib. 3.

Again, if that which is prædicated of ſome Noun, require a caſe of ſome other Noun to be added to make up the Axiom, ſo as the Conſtruction be made of two oblique Caſes, they are ἀσυμβάματα, incongruities, or according to *Ammonius*, *leſs than*, συμβάματα, as *it pleaſes me to come to thee*; whether the Nouns only, or the words require it.

(d) Again, of *Categorems* there are four kinds, *Right*, *Supine*, *Neuter*, *and reciprocally Active and Paſſive*. *Right* are thoſe which have a motion tending to another, and are conſtrued with one of the oblique Caſes, for the making of a *Categorem*, as *Heareth*, *Seeth*, *Diſcourſeth.*

(d) Laert.

*Supine* are those which are consider'd from habit to an agent, and is construed with a passive particle, as, I am heard, I am seen.

*Neuter*, as those which are neither way, as, to be wise, to walk.

*Reciprocally, active and passive* are those, which seem Supines, but are not, for they are acts, as κείρεται, for therein is included ὀκειρόμενος.

The *right* (or Nominative) *case*, is so called by the Stoicks, whom the Grammarians follow, because it falleth directly from the notion which is in the mind. *Oblique cases* are the Genitive, Dative and Accusative.

## CHAP. XX.

### *Of Simple Axioms.*

(a) Laert. (a) AXiom is that which is either true or false, or a thing perfect by it self, negative, or affirmative, as far as it extends; or, (according to *Chrysippus*, in his dialectick definitions) Axiom is that which affirmeth or denieth as far as it extends; as *Dion* walketh. It is called Axiom ἀπὸ τῆς ἀξιώσεως καθ' ἑαυτό, because assent is either given to it or not: for he who saith, it is day, assenteth thereunto. If it be day, the axiom is true; if it be not, false.

(b) Laert. (b) Of axioms, the first and most proper difference is of the *simple*, and not *simple* (thus divided by *Chrysippus*, and *Archidemus*, and *Athenodorus*, and *Antipater*, and *Crinis*.)

(c) Laer. Sext. Empir. adv. Log. cap. de vero. (c) *Simple* axioms are those which consist neither of one axiom twice taken, nor of different axioms, neither by one or more conjunctions; as, *It is day*, *'tis at night*, Socrates *disputes*. (d) Of simple axioms there are many kinds, *Apophatick*, or negative, *arnetick*, or universally negative; *stheretick*, or privative; *categorick*, or prædicative; *categoreutick*, or Indicative; *indefinite* and *mediate*.

(d) Laert.

(e) Laert. Apud. ἐφεῖ ἑ μ. (e) *Negative* axioms are those, in which a negative particle is proposed; as, *If this is, that is not*. But if the negation be of the latter part of the axiom, the other part not being negative, then the axiom is not negative, but *prædicative*; as, *It happeneth to some pleasure not to be good*. This therefore declareth what happeneth to the thing, and therefore is prædicative. (f) A species of negative axiom, is the supernegative, when, between the parts connected and copulated by two affirmations, a præposition with a negation is interposed, and that very negation denied; as, *If it is day, it is not light*. Of the same kind are all those, wherein negation is proposed to negation; as, *It is not both day, and not light*.

(f) Boet. in Cic. Top.

(g) Laert. (g) *Universally negative* axioms are those, which consist of an universal negative particle, and a Categorem; as, *no man walketh:*

(h) Laert. (h) *Privative* are those which consist of a privative particle, and an axiom in power, as, *he is inhumane*.

( ) Laert. (i) *Prædicative* are those, which consist of a right case and a Categorem; as, *Dion walketh*.

(k) Laert. (l) Sext. Emp. (k) *Indicative*, or (l) *definitive* is that which consists of a demonstrative right case, and a Categorem; as, *this man walketh*.

(m) Laert. Sext. Empir. (m) *Indefinite*, is that, which consists of one or more indefinite particles; as *a certain man walketh, he is moved*.

(n) Sext. Empir. (n) *Intermediate* are of this kind, *a man sitteth, or a man walketh: a certain man walketh* is indefinite, for it determines no single person; *that man sitteth* is definite. *Socrates sitteth*, is intermediate; for it is not indefinite, because it determines the species; nor definite, because it is not pronounced with demonstration, but it is intermediate betwixt both.

(o) Sext. Em. (o) An indefinite axiom, as, *some one sitteth*, is true, when the thing definite is true; as, *he sitteth*; but, if none of the singulars do sit, the indefinite axiom is not true, that *some one sitteth*.

## CHAP. XXI.

### *Of not-simple Axioms.*

(a) Laert. Sext. Emp. adv. Log. de vero. (a) NOt-*simple* axioms are those, which are in a manner double, consisting of one axiom diversified, or of axioms: of one axiom diversified; as, *if it be day, it is day*: of axioms, as, *if it be day*, *'tis light*.

(b) Sext. Emp. adv. Log. de vero. (b) In *not-simple* axioms, that which immediately followeth the conjunction *if*, or *whereas*, is called the *Antecedent*, *the first*, or *the beginning*; the rest is called *the ending*, or *Consequence*, or *second*. Notwithstanding that the axiom be pronounced by inversion; as, *It is light, if it be day*; for in this, the ending or consequence, is, *it is light*, although it be spoken first: the antecedent, *it is day*, although it be put in the second place; for it immediately followeth the conjunction *if*.

The Laws and rules of Consequents are these:

(c) Laer. 1. (c) From true followeth true: as, if it be day, it followeth that it is light. 2. From false followeth false; as, if this be false *that it is night*, this is likewise, *it is dark*. 3. From false followeth true, as from this, *the Earth flieth*, followeth, *the Earth is*. 4. From true doth not follow false; for from this, *the Earth is*, it followeth not, *that the earth flies*.

(d) Laer. (d) Of *not-simple* propositions there are many kinds, *Connex*, *Adnex*, *Conjunct*, *Causal*, *Declarative of the more*, and *Declarative of the less*.

(e) Laer. (e) *Connex* (according to *Chrysippus* in his *Dialectick*, and *Diogenes* in his *Dialectick Art*) is that which consists of the connective conjunction, *if*: which conjunction declareth, that the consequent is second to the first: as, *if it be day, it is light*. Of a diversified axiom, and the conjunction *if*, consisteth this connex, *If it be day, it is day*, these are properly right axioms. Of different axioms, and the conjunction *whereas*, this, *if it is day, 'tis light*. (f) Connex axioms are called also *Tropical*, because they turn from the antecedent to the consequent.

(f) Phil. Anal. pro.

The rules of connex axioms are these: (f) That is a *true* connex, wherein the contrary of the consequent is repugnant to the antecedent, as, *if it is day*, *'tis light*; for, *that it is not light*, the contrary to the consequent, is repugnant to, *it is day*, the antecedent. A *false* connex is that wherein the contrary to the consequent, is not repugnant to the Antecedent; as this, *if it is day, Dion walks*; for, that *Dion walketh not*, is not repugnant to, *it is day*.

(f) Laer.

(g) Laer. (g) *Adnex* (which some reckon as a species of the connex) according to *Crinis*, in his Dialectick, is an axiom connected by the conjunction *whereas*

*whereas*, beginning with an axiom, and ending with an axiom; as, *whereas it is day, it is light*, the conjunction ſheweth, that the ſecond is a conſequent of the firſt, and that the firſt is ſubſiſtent.

(b) Laert. The rules of adnex axioms are theſe: (*b*) That is a *true* adnex, which beginneth from true, endeth in that which is conſequent; as, *whereas it is day, the Sun is over the earth. Falſe* is that, which beginneth from falſe, or endeth not conſequently; as, *whereas it is day, Dion walketh*, if this be ſaid when it is not day.

(i) Laert. (*i*) A *conjunct* axiom is that, which is knit together by Conjunctions copulative; as, *it is both day, and it is light.* The rules thereof are theſe: That is a *right* conjunction wherein all things are true; as, *it is day, and it is light.* That is *falſe*, which hath ſomething falſe. An axiom which hath neither conjunction nor disjunction, is to be taken in the ſenſe of the ſpeaker; for conjunction is ſometimes taken for disjunction; as, to me, and my heir.

Laert. A *disjunct* axiom is that which is disjoyned, by a disjunctive conjunction; as, *either it is day, or it is night.* This conjunction ſheweth, that one of the axioms is falſe.

Agell. 16. 8. All things that are disjoyned, are repugnant to one another, and their oppoſites likewiſe are repugnant. Of all things that are disjoyned, one muſt be true, the reſt falſe, otherwiſe nothing at all is true, or all, or more than one are true, either thoſe which are disjunct, will not be repugnant, or thoſe which are oppoſite to them will not be contrary to one another, then the disjunct will be falſe, and is called παραδιζευγμένον, as this is, in which the oppoſites are not contrary; either thou runneſt, or walkeſt, or ſtandeſt, for they are repugnant to one another, but their oppoſites are not repugnant, becauſe not to walk, and not to ſtand, and not to run, are not contrary in themſelves; for thoſe things are ſaid to be contrary, which cannot be true together. But you may at the ſame time neither walk, nor run, nor ſtand. Every disjunction therefore is not only true, but neceſſary; for if of contraries there could be a falſe conjunction, no disjunction could be true.

A *Cauſal* axiom is that which is connected by this conjunction, becauſe, as becauſe it is day, 'tis light; for the firſt is, as it were cauſe of the ſecond. The rules thereof are theſe: A cauſal conjunction is *true*, when beginning from true, it endeth in the conſequent, and cannot have the antecedent for its conſequent; as becauſe it is day, 'tis light: but this axiom, it is light, doth not follow from the other, it is day.

A *falſe* cauſal is that which either beginneth from falſe, or endeth in that which is not conſequent, or whoſe antecedent may be the conſequent, as, becauſe it is night, *Dion* walks.

An Axiom *declarative of the more*, is that which is conſtrued with this conjunction, *more*, as *it is more day than night. Declarative of the leſs*, is contrary to the former, as, *it is leſs day than night.*

## CHAP. XXII.

### *Of contrary Axioms.*

Laert. CONtrary Axioms are thoſe which are repugnant to one another, according to truth and falſhood, whereof one affirmeth, the other denieth, as, *it is day, it is not day.* Only Negatives are contrary, ἀντικείμενα, and oppoſite, and repugnant, for only in contraries one propoſition is true, the other falſe. The other three kinds of contraries alledged by *Ariſtotle*, are pronounced without a conjunction. Whatſoever is pronounced without a conjunction, is neither true nor falſe, for true and falſe belongeth to axiom. Axiom is a ſpeech which conſiſteth in the conjunction of ſome thing, whereas of *Ariſtotle's* other three kinds of contraries, none are conjunct but ſimple, as black and white, double and ſingle, ſight and blindneſs.

*Adverſe* are (as likewiſe defined by *Ariſtotle*) thoſe which in the ſame kind are moſt diſtant. Nothing that is pronounced by negation is adverſe, (ἐναντίον) to another, for then the adverſe to Virtue will be not Virtue, and to Vice not Vice, and under not Virtue will be included many other things beſides Vice, even a Stone, a Horſe, and whatſoever is beſide Virtue; under not vice, will be found Virtue, and all other things. Thus all things would be adverſe to one, and the ſame the adverſe to virtue and vicei Moreover if virtue were not adverſe to vice, but to not-vice, the intermediate will be adverſe both to good and bad, which is abſurd.

The rules of contraries are theſe: 1. Contrariety is principally in acts, habits, and the like. 2. Categorems and qualitatives are called as it were contrary Prudently and imprudently in ſome manner lead to things contrary, but contraries abſolutely are in things: and prudence is ſo immediately contrary to imprudence, not this to that. * *Simplic.*

Contraries are either *disjunctive* or *ſubdisjunctive*; *disjunctive*, as when we ſay, *it is either day or night. Subdisjunctive*, are of two kinds, either *in whole*, betwixt Univerſals, as *every living creature either doth or ſuffereth, no living creature either doth or ſuffereth*; or *in part*, betwixt particulars; as *he either ſitteth or walketh; he neither ſitteth nor walketh.*

The rules of contraries are theſe: of Disjunctives one being aſſerted, the other is neceſſarily taken away; one being taken away, the other is neceſſarily aſſerted.

Of ſubdisjunctives in whole, both cannot be true, both may be falſe; both cannot be affirmative, both cannot be negative.

Of ſubdisjunctives in part, both may be true, becauſe they are taken in part.

## CHAP. XXIII.

### *Of Poſſible and Impoſsible, Neceſſary and Unneceſſary, Probable, Paradoxal and Reaſonable axioms.*

(a) Laert. (*a*) MOreover of axioms ſome are *poſſible*, others *impoſſible*; ſome *neceſſary*, others not *unneceſſary*. A *poſſible* Axiom is that which is

ſuſceptible of a true prædication, without obſtruction from thoſe things, which though external, are yet contingent with the thing it ſelf; as *Diocles lives*. *Impoſſible* is that which can never be ſuſceptible of truth, externals oppugning it, as, *the Earth flies*. *Neceſſary* is that which is ſo true as that it cannot any way receive a falſe prædication, or, may receive it, but thoſe things which are extrinſecal, will not permit that it be true, as *Virtue profiteth*. *Not-neceſſary* is that which may be either true or falſe, exterior things not obſtructing it, as *Dion walks*.

(b) *Simplic. in lib. Ariſt. de oppoſit.* (b) Theſe future repugnants and their parts are according to the ſame manner, as the preſent and the paſt. For, if it be true that the thing either ſhall be or ſhall not be, it muſt be either true or falſe, becauſe futures are determined according to theſe; as, if a Navy is built to morrow, it is true to ſay that it ſhall be built; but if it be not, it is falſe to ſay that it ſhall be built, becauſe it will not be; therefore it will either be, or not be, and conſequently one of the two is falſe.

Concerning poſſibles and neceſſaries, there is great difference betwixt *Diodorus* and *Chryſippus*.

(c) *Joha. Grammat. in Ariſt. de oppoſit.* (c) *Diodorus* holds that only to be poſſible which either is, or will hereafter be. That which neither is, nor ever ſhall be, is impoſſible. As *for me to be at* Corinth is poſſible, if I ever were there, or ever ſhall be there; but if I never was there, nor ever ſhall be there, it is impoſſible. That *a Boy ſhall be a Grammarian* is not poſſible, unleſs hereafter he come to be one.

(d) *Cic. de fat.* (d) On the contrary, *Chryſippus* held, that thoſe things which neither are nor ever ſhall be, are yet poſſible to be, as, *to break a Gem*, though it never come to be broken. (e) Moreover that from poſſibles an impoſſible may follow, as in this Axiom, which is a true connex: *If* Dion *be dead*, *He* (pointing to *Dion*) *is dead*: The antecedent, *if* Dion *be dead*, is poſſible, becauſe it may at ſome time be true that he ſhall be dead; but this Axiom, *he is dead*, is impoſſible: for *Dion* being dead, the Axiom likewiſe is aboliſhed, that *he is dead*, ſeeing he is no longer that man, capable of being demonſtrated by the Pronoun, *He*, for *he* is a demonſtration of a living creature. If therefore *Dion* being not yet dead, this word, *He*, may be ſaid of him, being dead, it cannot be ſaid *he is dead*. So that in this place, *he is dead*, is impoſſible. For it were not impoſſible, if, ſome time after the death of *Dion*, of whom it was before prædicated in the connex whilſt he lived, it might be again prædicated, *he is dead*; but becauſe that cannot be, it is impoſſible, that, *he is dead*, ſhould be prædicated of him.

(e) *Alex. Aphrod. in anal. prior.*

(d) *Epictet.* 1. 19. To conclude, (d) ſome held with *Diodorus*, that whatſoever is paſt, is true of neceſſity. That to impoſſible there followeth not a poſſible, and that what cannot be done, neither is nor ſhall be true. Others (as *Cleanthes* and *Antipater*) that ſomething is poſſible that neither is nor ſhall be; that to poſſible followeth not impoſſible; and that which is paſt, is not true of neceſſity. Others, that ſomething is poſſible which is not true; that whatſoever is paſt, is true of neceſſity, and that to poſſible followeth alſo impoſſible.

(e) *Laert.* Furthermore of Axioms, ſome are (e) *probable*, ſome *paradoxal*, ſome *reaſonable*. A *probable* Axiom is that which perſwadeth us by a ſpecious ſhow to aſſent unto it; as, *whatſoever bringeth forth another, is a mother*; which is falſe, for the Hen is not the mother of the Egg.

(f) *Paradoxal* Axioms are thoſe which ſeem true only to the wiſe, (g) contrary to the opinion of all others. (h) Theſe are likewiſe in other Arts, beſides Philoſophy; for what is ſtranger than to prick the eyes for the recovery of ſight? If we ſay this to one ignorant of Chirurgery, will he not laugh at it? is it not therefore ſtrange, that ſuch things as are true in Philoſophy ſhould ſeem paradoxes to the unlearned.

(f) *Laert.* (g) *Cic. Par.* (h) *Epictet.*

(i) A *reaſonable* axiom, is that which hath many conditions requiſite to the truth thereof, as, *I ſhall live to morrow*. (i) *Laert.*

## CHAP. XXIV.

### *Of Reciprocal Axioms.*

HItherto of the contrariety and repugnance of axioms. Now of their conſent and agreement, whereby one followeth and is correſpondent to another, either according to truth or falſhood, by μετάπτωσις, *reciprocation*.

Of Reciprocation there are three kinds: the firſt ἀνασροφὴ, *perverſion*, a migration into falſe; the ſecond ἀντισροφὴ, *converſion*, a migration into true; the third ἰσοδυναμία, *equipollence*, into the ſame.

## CHAP. XXV.

### *Of Signs.*

TO the place of Axioms appertain likewiſe Signs. (a) *Sign* is an axiom antecedent, in a true connex, and having power to detect the conſequent. (a) *Sext. Emp. hypot.* 2. 1.

(b) Sign is taken two ways: Commonly, for whatſoever falleth under any ſenſe, and ſignifieth ſomething that proceedeth from it: and Properly, for that which declareth a thing, which is not manifeſt. (b) *Sext. Emp. log. cap. de ſigns.*

Things which are certain require no ſign, for they are comprehended of themſelves; neither thoſe which are wholly uncertain, for they can no way be comprehended; but thoſe only, which are uncertain in time, or by nature, may be comprehended by ſigns, but not by the ſame. Things that are uncertain in time, are comprehended by commemorative ſigns; things uncertain by nature, are comprehended by demonſtrative. *Sext. Emp. & Pyrrh.* 2. 10. *Galen. Hiſt. Philoſ.*

Of Signs therefore, ſome are *demonſtrative*, others *communicative*. A *communicative* ſign is that, which is ſo near to the thing, that together with the ſign the thing it ſelf appeareth, into the knowledg whereof the ſign bringeth us, as ſmoak, which when we ſee, we know it proceeds from fire. A *demonſtrative* ſign is that, which not being obſerved before with an evident ſign, leads us by that to the knowledg of the thing; as when a Female hath milk, we preſently know that ſhe hath brought forth.

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## CHAP. XXVI.

### *Of Reasons or Arguments.*

Dialectick is the discipline of speech, concluded by reason. *Reason*, λόγος, sometimes called also *Argument*, and *Interrogation*, is according to (a) *Crinis*, that which consists of one or more sumptions, and an assumption, and an inference; as,

(a) Laert.

*If it be day, it is light.* } *Sumption.*
*But it is day:* } *Assumption.*
*Therefore it is light.* } *Inference.*

The *Reason* of the Stoicks differs from the *Syllogisms* of *Aristotle* in three respects: (b) First, a Syllogism, according to *Aristotle*, cannot have less than two propositions, a reason may have but one; as, *Thou livest, therefore thou breathest*: which kind *Antipater* calls μονολήμματα. Secondly, in Syllogisms, something besides that which is granted in the premises; but in Reasons, the conclusion may be the same with both, or either of the sumptions. The first are called διαφέμενοι, as,

(b) Alexand. Aphrod. in anal. prior.

*If it is day, it is day.*
*But it is day:*
*Therefore it is day.*

(c) The second are called ἀδιαφόρως περαίνοντες, as

(b) Alex. Aphrod. in anal. prior.

*It is either day, or not day.*
*But it is not day,*
*Therefore it is not day.*

(d) Lastly, in Syllogisms, the conclusion must necessarily follow by reason of the premises, whereas there are three kinds of reasons which have not this property: The first, μονολήμματα, already mentioned: The second ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες, *not methodically conclusive reasons*; as

(d) Alex. Aphrod. in anal. prior.

*The first is greater than the second.*
*The second greater than the third:*
*Therefore the first is greater than the third.*

This concludes necessarily, but not Syllogistically, unless this proposition be put in the first place: *What is greater than another, is greater also than that which is less than that other.* Of the same kind is that Theorem in the first of *Euclid's* Elements, *This line is equal to that, therefore this line is likewise equal to that*; which is true indeed; but to conclude syllogistically, requires this universal proposition, *Those which are equal to a third, are equal to one another.*

The third kind of reasons, from which Syllogism differeth by this property, are (e) παρέλκοντες λόγοι redundant reasons, and those of two kinds. The first are such as have a superfluous sumption; as,

(e) Alex. Aphrod. in anal. prior. & in Topic. 1.

*Every just thing is honest,*
*Every honest thing is good,*
*Every good thing is expetible in it self;*
*Therefore every just thing is good.*

The second are those in which the proper conclusion is not inferr'd, but something consequent, or accident, as that argument of *Epicure*:

*Whatsoever is dissolved hath not sence,*
*Whatsoever hath not sence pertaineth not to us:*
*Therefore death pertaineth not to us.*

Whereas to conclude syllogistically, we should say, *Therefore whatsoever is dissolved pertaineth not to us.*

In a reason or argument the *sumption* λῆμμα and the *assumption* (f) πρόσληψις (termed by *Aristotle* μετάληψις) are axioms recieved by consent of the adversary, for construction of that which is called Inference ἐπιφορὰ (by *Aristotle* συμπέρασμα conclusion) because it is inferr'd from the rest.

(f) Not πρόσληψις as the learned Bursius but observed, dial. Cic. 6. 2.

(g) Of *sumption* and *assumption* according to *Chrysippus*, there are four differences: The first *Scientifick*: The second *Exercitative*, or (as *Aristotle* calls it) *Dialectick*; The third *Probable* and and *Rhetorical*; The fourth *Sophistick*.

(g) Galen. de Doctrina Hippocr. & Plat. lib. 2.

## CHAP. XXVII.

### *Of conclusive Reasons.*

(a) OF *Reasons* there are two kinds, *conclusive*, and *not-conclusive*. *Conclusive* reasons are those, in which the *Sumptions* being granted, from the concession thereof, the *Inference* seemeth to follow.

(a) Laert. Sext. Empir.

Conclusive reasons, in respect of their matter, are of two kinds, *true* and *false*. *True* are those, which from true sumptions collect a true inference. *Not-true* the contrary.

The Laws and rules of true and false reasons, are these: 1. Truth is consequent to truth: as, if it is day, it is light. 2. False is consequent to false: as, If it be false that it is night, it is likewise false that is dark. 3. False is consequent to true: as, Earth, if it flies, is earth. 4. False is not consequent to true: for, because it is earth, it is not therefore consequent that it flies.

Again, of true reasons, some are *demonstrative*, others *not-demonstrative*. A *demonstrative* reason is that which by things that are certain, or perspicuous, collecteth that which is uncertain and less perspicuous: as, *If sweat issue through the skin, we may understand pores; but sweat issues through the skin; therefore we may understand pores.*

*Not-demonstrative* are contrary: as, *If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore it is light.* Herein the inference, *it is light*, is certain.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

### *Of Syllogistick Conclusive Reasons, or Syllogism.*

CONclusive reasons, as to their form likewise are of two kinds; *Syllogistically conclusive*, and *not Syllogistically conclusive*.

(a) *Syllogistically-conclusive* Reasons (or Syllogisms) are those which either cannot be more concluded, or whereof one or more of the sumptions are reduced to those which cannot be concluded again; as, if *Dion* walks, he is moved.

(a) Laert.

Syllogisms (by which the Stoicks understand only the tropical, or hypothetical) are of three kinds, *connex*, *disjunct*, *conjunct*. (b) A

(b) *Simplic. in Epictet.*

(b) A *connex* Syllogiſm is, when two are ſo connected in themſelves, that one is the antecedent, the other the conſequent, in ſuch manner, as, if the antecedent be aſſerted, the conſequent followeth, and the conſequent being taken away, the antecedent is likewiſe taken away, as, if it be day, it is not night, this antecedent is true, therefore it followeth, it is night. This kind of Syllogiſm pertains to the firſt and ſecond moods. In the firſt it is called from poſition of the antecedent, to Poſition of the conſequent; in the ſecond, from negation of the antecedent, to negation of the conſequent. The Laws concerning the truth, or falſhood of theſe Syllogiſms are the ſame with thoſe of connex axioms.

Of connex Syllogiſms there are two kinds; *connex in themſelves*, as, *if it is light, it is light; but it is light, therefore it is light*; and *connex by others*; as, *if it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore it is light.*

(c) *Cic. Topic.* 1.

(c) A *conjunct* Syllogiſm, is when we deny ſomthing conjunct, and to theſe add another negation, and of theſe take the firſt, that what remains be taken away, as, (d) it cannot be that a Legacy is money, and money not a Legacy; but a Legacy is money, therefore money is a Legacy.

(d) *Cic. ibid.*

(e) *Simplic.*

(e) A *disjunct* Syllogiſm is that in which there cannot be more than one thing true, or, that in which if one be, the other is not; or, if one be not, the other is, as, *It is either day or night, but it is not night, therefore it is day*; for one being aſſerted, the other is taken away, and ſo on the contrary. (f) The evidence of this Syllogiſm *Chryſippus* concieves to be ſo great, that even dogs have knowledge thereof. For coming to a place where are three ways, if by the ſcent they find that the Beaſt hath not gone in two of them, they run directly to the third without ſcenting, as if they argued thus, the Beaſt went either this way, or that way, or that way, but neither this way nor that way, therefore that way: The Laws of disjunct Syllogiſms are the ſame as thoſe of disjunct Axioms.

(f) *Sext. Hyp. Pyrrh. cap.* 14.

## CHAP. XXIX.

### *Of Moods.*

(a) *Laert.*

(a) SYllogiſtick, concluſive Reaſons are diſpoſed into *Moods*. Of *Moods* there are two kinds, the firſt *ſimple*, properly called a Mood, τρόπος, defined a kind of figure of the Reaſon, as thus,

*If the firſt is, the ſecond is,*
*But the firſt is,*
*Therefore the ſecond is.*

(It is obſervable by the way, that the Stoicks for letters uſed numbers). The other *compounded*, called λογοτρόπος, as being conſiſtent of both reaſon and Mood, as,

*If* Plato *liveth*, Plato *breatheth,*
*But the firſt,*
*Therefore the ſecond.*

This is uſed in a long Syntax, that it be not neceſſary to ſpeak a long aſſumption, or a long inference, but they abbreviate them thus, but the firſt, therefore the ſecond.

Of *Moods* or Tropes there are two kinds, one of *Indemonſtrables*, ſo termed, not that they cannot be demonſtrated, but becauſe they conclude ſo evidently, that they need not be reproved; the other of *Demonſtrables*.

Of Indemonſtrable *Moods*, there are (according to *Chryſippus*) five, according to *others more or leſs.

* *Cic. Top. Martianus.*

The *firſt*, wherein every reaſon conſiſts of a Connex, and an Antecedent from which begineth the Connex, and the conſequent is inferred, as,

*If the firſt, then the ſecond,*
*But the firſt,*
*Therefore the ſecond.*

The *ſecond* Indemonſtrable is, which, by the conſequent of the Connex, and the contrary of the conſequent, hath a concluſion contrary to the Antecedent, as,

*If it is day, 'tis light,*
*But it is night,*
*Therefore it is not day.*

The third is, that which by a negative complication, and one of thoſe which are in the complication, infers the contrary to that which remains, as,

Plato *is not both dead and alive,*
*But* Plato *is dead,*
*Therefore* Plato *is not alive.*

The *fourth* is that which by a disjunctive, and one of thoſe which is in the disjunctive, concludeth the contrary to that which remains, as,

*Either it is the firſt or ſecond,*
*But it is the firſt,*
*Therefore it is not the ſecond,*

The *fifth* is that wherein the whole reaſon is connected by a disjunctive, and one of thoſe which are in the disjunctive of the contrary, inferreth the reſt, as,

*Either it is night, or it is day,*
*But it is not night.*
*Therefore is is day.*

## CHAP. XXXI.

### *Of not-Syllogiſtick-concluſive Reaſons.*

(a) *Laert.*

(a) REaſons *not-Syllogiſtically-concluſive* (which are likewiſe eſpecially called (as their Genus) concluſive in oppoſition to Syllogiſms) are thoſe which conclude not by way of Syllogiſm, as,

*It is falſe, that it is both night and day,*
*But it is day,*
*Therefore it is not night.*

And this of *Chryſippus*.

*What-*

*Whatsoever is good is laudable,*
*Whatsoever is laudable is honest,*
*Therefore whatsoever is good is honest.*

These *not-Syllogistick*, or *Categorick*-Conclusives, are frequently used by the Stoicks (as by *Zeno* in *Cicero*) but immethodically, not reduced to Mood and Figure. Those they applied only to Tropical reasons, as in which consisteth the sole way and order of inference. The Categorical are not Syllogisms, because in them something is ever omitted, and therefore they are ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες, immethodically conclusive; as in that argument of *Chrysippus* last mentioned, two assumptions, and an inference are omitted, for it ought to be thus,

*If it be good, it is laudable,*
*But it is good,*
*Therefore it is laudable,*

And again,

*If it be laudable, it is honest,*
*But it is laudable,*
*Therefore it is honest.*

Hence are Derived those reasons which are called ὑπεράλλοντες, and ὑπερβαλλόμενοι *Adjicient* and *Adject*, consisting of propositions continually assumed without conclusions. *Adject* are those whose conclusion is omitted; *Adjicient*, those whose demonstrative proposition is omitted, as,

*The first of every second,*
*The second of every third,*
*The third of every fourth,*
*Therefore the first of every fourth.*

In this adject, the conclusion is omitted, which is, therefore the first of every third.

## CHAP. XXXI.

### *Of not-conclusive Reasons.*

(a) Laert.

(b) Sext. Emp. adv. Logic.

(a) NOt-*conclusive* Reasons are those, whose opposite to the inference is repugnant to the connexion of the sumptions: (b) They are four kinds. 1. By incoherence. 2. By redundance. 3. By being in an ill figure. 4. By defect.

*By incoherence*, when the propositions have no conjunction or communion with one another, nor with the inference, as,

*If it is day, it is light,*
*But corn is sold,*
*Therefore it is light.*

For neither, *it is day*, hath any communion with, *Corn is sold*, nor both of them together, with, *it is light*; but each dependeth upon something else.

By redundance, when something is assumed to the proposition extrinsecal and superfluous, as,

*If it is day, it is light,*
*But it is day, and Virtue profiteth,*
*Therefore it is light.*

For *Virtue profiteth*, is superfluously assumed with the other proposition, the inference depending upon the other two.

By *being in an ill figure*, as this is a right figure,

*If the first, the second,*
*But the first is,*
*Therefore the second.*

But this,

*If the first, the second,*
*But not the second.*

Is not conclusive; not that in this figure, there cannot be reason which may collect truth from truth, for that it may do as thus,

*If three are four, six are eight,*
*But three are not four*
*Therefore six are not eight.*

But because there may be some ill reasons in it, as this,

*If it be day, 'tis light,*
*But it is not day,*
*Therefore it is not light.*

By *defect*, when there want one of the collective propositions, as,

*Riches are either ill or good,*
*But riches are not good;*
*Therefore they are ill.*

For in the disjunct there wanteth this, or *indifferent*; so that to be perfect the sumption should be thus, Riches are ill, or good, or indifferent.

## CHAP. XXXII.

### *Of fallacious Reasons or Sophisms.*

BY Dialectick are discerned true and false reasons: The latter are *Sophisms*, proper to *Sophists*, who dispute for vain-glory, or gain; as *true* reasons are to *Logicians*, whose end is only to find out truth.

Of *fallacious* reasons there are many kinds; the *Quiescent* reason, or *Sorites*, the *Lying*, the *Inexplicable*, the *Sluggish*, the *Dominative*, the *Vailed*, *Electra*, the *Horned*, the *Crocodilite*, the *Reciprocal*, the *Nullity*, the *Defective*, the *Mower*, the *Bald*, the *Occult*, the *Negative*.

(a) *Sorites*, named from σωρὸς, *a heap*, is (b) when from things evidently true, by short mutations, the dispute is brought to things evidently false: (c) As, *Are not two few? Are not three so likewise? And four, and so on to ten? But, two are a few, therefore ten.* (d) It is called also ἡσυχάζων λογὸς, *the quiescent reason*, (e) because the way to withstand it, is by stopping, and witholding the assent.

The *lying* reason, ψευδόμενος λόγος, is a captious argument, not to be dissolved. Of this, see the life of *Eubulides*.

(a) *Suid.*
(b) *Ulpian.* 48. *ad Sabin.*
(c) *Laert. tho the example be falsely applied, as* Burtius *and* Casaubon *have observed.*
(d) *Laert. in Chrysip.*
(e) *Cic. Acad. quæst.* 4.

The

(f) *Agel.* 9.15. (*f*) The *inexplicable* reason, ἄπορος λόγος, ſo called, from the intricate nature thereof, not to be diſſolved; wherefore it ſeems to be the ſame with the lying, and perhaps the genus to moſt of thoſe which follow.

The *ſluggiſh* reaſon, ἀργὸς λόγος, is manifeſted by this example: (*g*) *If it be decreed that you ſhall recover of this ſickneſs, you ſhall recover whether you take Phyſick or not. Again, if it be decreed you ſhall not recover, you ſhall not recover, whether you take Phyſick or not: Therefore it is to no purpoſe to take Phyſick.* This Argument is juſtly termed ſluggiſh, ſaith *Cicero*, becauſe by the ſame reaſon, all actions may be taken away from life.

(*g*) *Cicer. de Fato.*

The *Dominative* reaſon, κυριεύων λόγος: Of this already in the Life of *Diodorus*.

The *vailed* reaſon, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος λόγος: Of this, and *Electra*, and the *Horned* reaſon, κερατίνος λόγος, in the life of *Eubulides*.

The *Crocodilite*, ſo named from this Ægyptian fable: (*h*) A Woman ſitting by the ſide of *Nilus*, a Crocodile ſnatched away her Child, promiſing to reſtore him, if ſhe would anſwer truly to what he asked; which was, *Whether he meant to reſtore him or not?* She anſwered, *Not to reſtore him*, and challeng'd his promiſe, as having ſaid the truth. He replied, that *if he ſhould let her have him, ſhe had not told true.*

(*h*) *Doxopat. in Aphth.*

The *reciprocal* reaſons, μεταπίπτοντες, ſuch was that of (*i*) *Protagoras* the Sophiſt, againſt *Evathlus*, a rich young man, his diſciple, who promiſed him a great ſum of mony for teaching him, whereof half he paid in hand, the other half was to be paid the firſt that he ſhould plead before the Judges, and carry the cauſe. Having learned long, and attained a great perfection in Rhetorick, he forbore to plead in publick, that he might defraud *Protagoras*. *Protagoras* ſues him, and the cauſe coming to hearing, begins thus: *Know, fooliſh young man, that which way ſoever the Cauſe goes, whether for thee or againſt thee, thou muſt pay what I demand. If againſt thee, it will be given me by judgment; if for thee, thou muſt pay it according to our agreement.* *Evathlus* anſwers: *I might have been intrapped by your ſubtilty, if I did not plead my ſelf, but had employ'd ſome other to plead for me. Now I rejoyce doubly in the victory, that I ſhall be too hard for you, not only in cauſe, but in argument. Know therefore, my moſt wiſe Maſter, that which way ſoever the cauſe go, either with me, or againſt me, I will not pay what you demand. If it go with me, the judgment will acquit me; if againſt me, you are to have nothing by our agreement.* The Judges not able to determine it, diſmiſt them both.

(*i*) *Agell.* 5.10.

(*k*) The *nullity*, Τὶς, uſed by *Ulyſſes*, who called himſelf Τὶς, no body, when he hurt *Polypheme*, whence it came to be ſo named.

(*k*) Od. 9.

The *defective* reaſon, ἐλλιπὴς λόγος, mentioned by *Laertius in Zenone*: The *mower*, θερίζων λόγος, by *Lucian*: The *bald*, φαλακρὸς λόγος, by *Laertius in Eubulide*: The *occult*, διαλανθάνων λόγος, by *Laertius in Eubulide*; The *negative*, ἀποφάσκων λόγος, by *Laertius in Chyrſippo*, and by *Epictetus*. But of theſe enough.

## CHAP. XXXIII.

### *Of Method.*

THere are two kinds of diſputation: (*a*) One, when the truth it ſelf is ſubtilly poliſhed in the diſpute: The other, when every expreſſion is accommodated to the vulgar opinion; for, we muſt uſe popular and uſual words, when we ſpeak of popular opinions, which *Panætius* in the like manner hath done.

(a) Cic. Of.

(*b*) The firſt way was peculiar to the Stoicks, ſhort, acute, and ſpinous, called likewiſe Logick, moſt worthy of Philoſophy; for this uſeth definition, diviſions, and the lights which they afford, as likewiſe ſimilitudes, diſſimilitudes, and the nice acute diſtinction of them.

(b) Cic. de fin.

The vulgar way of diſpute is likewiſe twofold: One by continued oration; The other by queſtion and anſwer: The firſt called (*c*) *Analytick*, or (*d*) *Rhetorical*; the other (*e*) *Topick*, or (*f*) *Dialectical*. (*g*) Tho the firſt be delightful, yet the latter is more commodious, when we inſiſt on particulars, and underſtand what every man granteth, what every man denieth, what we would have concluded from conceſſions, and brought to an end. For, when a ſpeech is carried on like a Torrent, although it bears many things along with it; yet we can hold nothing, we cannot ſtop the rapid courſe of an oration. (*h*) The other, concluding as *Zeno* uſed, more ſhortly and narrowly, lieth more open to reprehenſion. As a River in its courſe, cannot at all, or very hardly be corrupted, but water ſhut up, eaſily: So by a fluent oration, the faults of the oppoſer are carried quite away; in a narrow ſpeech, they are not eaſily defended.

(c) Senec. Epiſt. 14. (d) ic. de (e) Senec. 14. 90. (f) Cic. de 2. (g) Cic. (h) Cic. nat. deor.

But each of theſe methods hath a ſeveral uſe; the firſt is proper for expoſition of Arts and Sciences, the other for diſputation.

THE

# THE SECOND PART.

## CHAP. I.

### *ETHICK and the parts thereof.*

(a) THE Moral part of Philoſophy is divided into theſe places; *Of Appetite, Of Good and Ill, Of Paſſions, Of Virtue, Of the End, Of the firſt Æſtimation, of Actions, Offices, Exhortations and Dehortations:*

Thus diſtinguiſheth *Chryſippus*, *Archidemus*, *Zeno* of *Tarſis*, *Apollodorus*, *Diogenes* (the Babylonians) *Antipater* and *Poſſidonius*. But *Zeno* the Cittiean, and *Cleanthes*, as being more ancient, were leſs accurate in their manner of treating upon theſe things.

(a) Laert.

## CHAP. II.

### *Of Appetite.*

THE conſideration of Ethick, beginneth properly from Appetite. (a) *Appetite* is moved by Phantaſy of an Office, for it is the impulſion of the ſoul to ſomething.

(a) Stob. Eclog. Ethic.

Appetite in rational and irrational Creatures is different; ὄρεξις is not rational appetite, but a ſpecies of rational appetite. Rational appetite is defined an impulſion of the intellect to the doing of ſomething. Ὁρμὴ is a ſpecies of practick appetite, being an impulſion of the Intellect to ſomething future. Hence appetite is taken four ways, for rational and irrational Inclination, andſor rational and irrational Averſion. To theſe may be added the habit of Appetition, which is likewiſe called appetite, the Origine of all appetitive acts.

Of practick appetite there are many ſpecies, of which are

1. πρόθεσις, a Deſignation.
2. ὁρμβολὴ, an appetite before appetite.
3. πρεγασιὴ, an action before action.
4. ἐγχείρησις, an appetite to ſomething now exiſtent.
5. ἄνεσις, a Will by ratiocination.
6. προαίρεσις, a Will before Will.
7. βούλησις, an appetite joined with reaſon.
8. θέλησις, a ſpontaneous Will.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of firſt natural Appetite.*

(a) Laert.

(a) THE firſt appetite of a living creature is to preſerve it ſelf, this being from the beginning proper to it by nature, as *Chryſippus* in his firſt Book of Ends, who affirms that the care of our ſelves, and conſciouſneſs thereof, is the firſt property of all living Creatures. For, Nature producing a living Creature, intended either to alienate it from it ſelf, or to commend it unto its own care; but the firſt is not likely; it followeth therefore, that Nature commendeth to every thing the preſervation of it ſelf, whereby it repulſeth whatſoever is hurtful, and purſueth what is convenient.

(b) As ſoon therefore as a living Creature cometh into the World, it is conciliated to it ſelf; commended to the conſervation of it ſelf and its own ſtate, and to the election of ſuch things as may preſerve its ſtate; but alienated from deſtruction, and from all ſuch things as may deſtroy it. This is manifeſt, in as much as before the acceſſion of pleaſure or grief, young creatures deſire thoſe things which conduce to their welfare, and refuſe the contrary; which would not be, if they did not love their own ſtate, and fear deſtruction. Neither could they deſire any thing without having ſome ſenſe of themſelves, whereby they love themſelves, and what belongs to them. Hence it is manifeſt, that the principle of this love is derived from themſelves.

(b) Cic. de fin. 3.

(c) Whereas ſome muſt hold the firſt appetite of a living creature to be that of pleaſure, that is falſe. (d) The greater part of Stoicks conceive that Pleaſure is not to be placed amongſt the natural principles of love to our ſelves; for if nature had ſo ordered it, many diſhoneſt things would have followed. (e) Pleaſure is an after-acceſſion, when as Nature enquiring by it ſelf into it ſelf, receiveth thoſe things which are agreeable to its conſtitution, after which manner living creatures are exhilarated, and plants ſprout forth. Nature hath thus far made no difference betwixt plants and living creatures, that whereas plants are ordered without appetite or ſenſe, there is in living creatures ſomething according to the nature of plants: But, there being over and above in living creatures, an innate appetite, whereby they go to thoſe things that are proper for them, the natural part in them is governed by the appetitive.

(c) Laert. (d) Cic. fin. 3. (e) Laert.

(f) That we naturally love thoſe things which are firſt propoſed unto us by nature, may be argued from hence, in that there is no man, if both were put to his choice, but had rather have all his limbs able and ſound, than uſeleſs and imperfect. Theſe comprehenſions we conceive fit to be acquired for their own ſake, becauſe they have in themſelves ſomething, as it were, complex, including Truth. This is diſcernable in young ones, whom we ſee delighted, tho it nothing concerns them, if they themſelves

(f) Cic. fin. 3.

find out any thing by reaſon. Even the Arts we conceive to be aſſumed for themſelves, as well becauſe in theſe there is ſomething worthy aſſumption, as becauſe they conſiſt of knowledg, and contain ſomethings conſtituted by reaſon and power.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Of Appetites conſequent to the firſt.*

(a) Cic. de fin. 3. (a) THus according to the firſt innate principles of Nature, thoſe things which are according to nature being expetible in themſelves, their contraries avoidable in themſelves, the firſt office is to conſerve it ſelf in the ſtate of nature, the next, to obtain thoſe things which are according to nature.

Here beginneth good to be firſt underſtood, for it is the firſt conciliation of man to things according to nature. This Good, as ſoon as man receiveth intelligence or notion thereof, and ſeeth the order and concord of Offices, he eſteemeth far above thoſe things which he formerly loved; and by rational knowledg collecteth, that herein is placed the chief good of man, laudable and expetible in it ſelf. To this chief good, which conſiſteth in homologie or convenience, all honeſt actions having reference, honeſty it ſelf, which is reckoned amongſt the good, tho it riſe afterward, is notwithſtanding alone expetible in its own power and dignity. But, of thoſe which are the firſt objects of nature, none is expetible in it ſelf.

Now whereas offices proceed from the firſt natural objects, they muſt neceſſarily be referred to the ſame; ſo as all Offices tend to to the fulfilling of the firſt natural appetites; yet, not ſo, as if therein conſiſted the ultimate good. Honeſt action is in the firſt conciliation of nature, for it is conſequent, and ariſeth as we ſaid afterward; yet, it is according to nature, and much more allective than all that go before it.

And ſeeing that all Offices proceed from the firſt natural appetites, even wiſdom it ſelf muſt be derived from thence likewiſe. But as it often happens, that he who is recommended to another, more eſteemeth him to whom he is recommended, than the perſon which recommended him: ſo it is not ſtrange, that we being recommended to wiſdom by the firſt natural appetite, afterwards more eſteem that wiſdom, than thoſe things whereby we arrived at it. And as our limbs are given to us for a certain reaſon of living, ſo the appetition of the ſoul is given, not for every kind of life, but for one certain form of living; ſo likewiſe reaſon and perfect reaſon. For, as action is proper to a Player, motion to a Dancer; yet, not any, but one certain kind: ſo the life that is to be acted, is in one certain kind, not in any, which kind we call convenient and conſentaneous. Wiſdom is not like the art of a Pilot, or a Phyſician; but rather to that Action we mentioned, and to Dancing, that the extream, that is, the effection of the Art be in the Art it ſelf, and not extrinſecal. There is another ſimilitude betwixt Wiſdom and theſe Arts, for in them are thoſe things which are done rightly; yet, are not all the parts, whereof they conſiſt, contained therein. Things done rightly, or Rectitudes, contain all numbers of virtue; for, only wiſdom is wholly converted into it ſelf, which is not in other Arts. But, improperly is the Art of a Pilot and a Phyſician, compared with the ultimate of Wiſdom: For, wiſdom includeth Fortitude and Juſtice, and judgeth all things that happen to man to be below it, which happeneth not in other Arts: but none can hold theſe virtues which we laſt mentioned, unleſs he affirm, there is nothing that is different, but honeſt and diſhoneſt.

## CHAP. V.

### *Of Good and Ill.*

HItherto of Appetites; we come next to their Objects. (a) Things (according to *Zeno*) are whatſoever participate of Eſſence: Of things, ſome are *good*, ſome *ill*, ſome *indifferent*. (a) Stob.

(b) *Good* is ſeveral ways defined by the Stoicks; but their definitions tend all to one end. (b) Cic. de fin. 3.

(c) Good is profit, or that which differeth not from profit. Profit is virtue, and virtuous action; not different from profit is a virtuous man, and a friend. For virtue being a quodammodotative Hegemonick, and virtuous action being an operation according to virtue, is plainly profit. A virtuous man and a friend is not different from profit; for profit is a part of Virtuous, as being the Hegemoniack thereof. Now the wholes are neither the ſame with their parts, for a man is not a hand; nor different from their parts, for they ſubſiſt not without parts; wherefore the whole is not different from its parts, and conſequently, a virtuous man being the whole, in reſpect of his Hegemoniack, which is profit, is not different from profit. (c) Sext. Emp. pyr. Pyrrh. 3. 20.

*Good* is by ſome defined, that which is expetible in it ſelf; by others, that which aſſiſteth to felicity, or compleateth it: by (e) *Diogenes*, that which is abſolute by nature; [or, (f) that which is perfect, according to the nature of a rational creature.] The conſequent thereof is a beneficient motion, or ſtate abſolute in nature. (e) Cic. de finib. 3. (f) Laert.

Whereas things are known, either by uſe, or conjunction, or ſimilitude, or collation, by this fourth kind is the knowledg of good; for when from thoſe things which are according to nature, the mind aſcendeth by collation of reaſon, then it attaineth the notion of good.

(h) Good is known and named, not by acceſſion, increaſe, or compariſon with other things, but by its proper power. For as Honey, tho it be moſt ſweet, yet, in its proper kind of taſt, not comparative to any other, we perceive it to be ſweet: So this good of which we ſpeak, is that which is moſt to be eſteemed; but that eſtimation conſiſteth in the kind, not the magnitude. For, eſtimation being neither amongſt the good nor ill, whatſoever you apply it to, it will remain in its kind. Different therefore is the proper eſtimation of virtue, which conſiſteth in the kind, not in increaſe. (h) Cic. de finib. 3.

(i) To *Good* belongeth all virtue, as Prudence, Juſtice, Temperance, Fortitude, and whatſoever participates of thoſe, as virtuous actions and perſons. (k) Acceſſions here are joy, cheerfulneſs, and the like. (i) Laert. (k) Laert.

(l) *Ills*

(l) Laert. Sub. (l) *Ills* are the contrary Vices, as Imprudence, Injuſtice, Intemperance, Puſillanimity, and whatſoever participates of Vice, as Vicious Actions and Perſons. (m) The acceſſions hereunto are diſcontent, affliction, and the like,

(m) Laert. (n) Of *Goods*, ſome, as we have ſaid, are *Virtues*, others *not-virtues*, as Joy, Hope, and the like. In like manner of *Ills*, ſome are *Vices*, as thoſe already mentioned; others *not-vices*, as Grief and Fear.

(n) Stob. Again, (o) Of *Goods*, ſome are *continual* in all the virtuous, and at all times; ſuch is all virtue, ſound ſence, wiſe appetition, and the like. Others are *intermiſſive*, as joy, hope, and prudent counſel, which are not in all the wiſe, nor at all times.

(o) Stob. In like manner of *Ills*, ſome are continual in all, and always in the imprudent, as all vice, and imprudent ſenſe, and imprudent appetite: Others intermiſſive, as grief, fear, and imprudent anſwer, which are not always in the wicked, nor at all times.

(p) Laert. Stob. Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hypot. 3. (p) Again, Of *Good* there are three kinds: The firſt *from which* profit cometh, as from its firſt cauſe, ſuch is Virtue: The ſecond, *by which* profit cometh, as Virtue, and Virtuous action: The third *that which may* profit, as Virtue, and Virtuous actions, and a Virtuous man, and a Friend, and the Gods, and good Demons. (q) Thus the ſecond ſignification includeth the firſt; and the third, both the firſt and ſecond.

(q) Sext. Empir.

(r) Laert. Stob. (r) In like manner of *Ills*, there are three kinds: Firſt, that from which hurt originally proceedeth, as vice: Secondly, that by which hurt cometh, as vicious actions: Laſtly, and moſt largely, whatſoever is able to hurt.

(s) Laert. Stob Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. (s) Again, Of *Goods*, ſome are *in the Soul*, as Virtue, and Virtuous Actions: Some *without the Soul*, as a true Friend, a good Country, and the like: Some *neither* within nor without the Soul: As Good and Virtuous Men.

(t) Laert. Stob. (t) In like manner of *Ills*, ſome are *within* the Soul, as Vices, and Vicious Actions; ſome *without* the Soul, as imprudent Friends, Enemies, and the like; ſome *neither* within nor without the Soul, as wicked men, and all that participate of Vice.

(u) Laert. Stob. (u) Of *Goods within the Soul*, ſome are *habits*, ſome *affections*, ſome *neither* habits nor affections. The *virtues* themſelves are affections; their *ſtudies* habits, not affections; their *acts* neither habits nor affections.

(x) Laert. Stob. (x) In like manner of *Ills*, ſome are *affections*, as vices; ſome *habits* only, as infirmities of mind, and the like; ſome *neither* habits nor affections, as vicious actions.

(y) Laert. Stob Cic. de finib. 3. (y) Again, Of *Goods*, ſome are *final*, ſome *efficient*, ſome *both* final and efficient. A Friend, and the benefits ariſing from him, are *efficient* Goods. Fortitude, Magnanimity, Liberty, Delectation, Joy, Tranquillity, and all Virtuous actions, are final Goods. Both efficient and final, as all Virtues, as they perfect felicity, they are efficient, as they conſtitute it as parts thereof, final.

(z) Laert. Stob. (z) In like manner of *Ills*, ſome are final, ſome efficient, ſome both. Fear, baſeneſs, ſervitude, ſtupidity, frowardneſs, grief, and all vicious actions, are final: Participant of, are vices, as they procure misfortune they are efficient, as they conſtitute it as parts thereof, final.

(a) Stob. (a) Again, Of Goods, ſome are *expetible in themſelves*, not deſired for the ſake of any other: Others are *preparatory* to ſome other, called effectively expetible. The expetible in themſelves are (according to *Diogenes*) of two kinds: 1. Ultimately expetible, as Beatitude. 2. Thoſe which have in them the cauſe of being expetible, as every good hath.

(b) Stob. (b) Again, Of Goods ſome are *neceſſary to Beatitude*, as all Virtues and their Acts; others *not-neceſſary*, as Joy, delectation, and ſtudy. In like manner of Ills, ſome are neceſſary to Infelicity, as all the Vices and their Acts; others not-neceſſary thereunto, as, all paſſions and infirmities of the Soul and the like.

(c) Stob. (c) Again, Of Goods, ſome conſiſt in motion, as Joy, delectation and the like; ſome in affection, as quiet, imperturbation; Of thoſe which conſiſt in affection, ſome are likewiſe in habit, as the Virtues; others in affection only, as the former. Neither conſiſt the Virtues only in habits, but other Acts likewiſe, changed by a Virtuous Man, in a manner, into Virtue. Of theſe Goods which are in habit, are thoſe we call ſtudies, as love of Learning, and the like. For theſe arts by their affinity with Virtue lead directly to our chief end.

(d) Stob. Again, (d) Of Goods, ſome are *abſolute*, as Science; others *relative*, as honour, benevolence, friendſhip, and the like.

(e) Stob. (e) *Science* is a certain infallible comprehenſion by reaſon. It is taken three ways. Firſt, for a Syſtem of Sciences conjoyned together in a good man; Secondly, for a Syſtem of artificial Sciences, having a certainty. Laſtly, for a demonſtrative infallible habit of Phantaſies by reaſon.

(f) Stob. (f) *Friendſhip*, is a community of life and conſent of ſtudies. The kinds thereof are ſix.

1. γνωειμωτατη a friendſhip amongſt known perſons
2. συνήθεια, amongſt Familiars.
3. ἡλικεία, amongſt thoſe of the ſame age.
4. ξενία, towards ſtrangers.
5. συγγενικὴ, amongſt kinred.
6. ἐρωτικὴ, from Love.

(g) Laert. Stob. (g) Again, of Goods, ſome are *ſimple*, as knowledg; others *mixt*, as, εὐτεκνία, a good uſe of Children conformable to nature, εὐγηρία, a good uſe of old age conformable to nature, εὐζωία, a good uſe of life conformable to Nature.

*Exemption from grief*, ἀλυπία, and *conſervation of order*, εὐταξία are the ſame with, as the mind is with prudence, and communion with goodneſs; yet are otherwiſe referred, which is obſervable likewiſe in the other Virtues. Hence are the ſame diſtinctions appliable to ill.

(b) Laert. Stob (b) Every good is *beneficial*, *opportune*, *conducible*, *uſeful*, *commendable*, *fair*, *helpful*, *eligible*, *juſt*.

*Beneficial*, συμφέρον, as conferring that whereby we receive benefit.

*Opportune*, δέον, as compriſing that whereof we ſtand in need.

*Conducible*, λυσιτελὲς, as reſolving into it ſelf the means, as the gain acquired by traffick exceeds the charge.

*Uſeful*, χρησιμον, as conducing to our profit.

*Commendable*, εὐχρηστον, from the uſe.

*Fair*, καλὸν, as proportioned to the neceſſities of receivers.

*Helpful*, ὠφέλιμον, as it relieves us.

*Eligible*, αἱρετὸν, as being in reaſon to be preferred.

*Juſt*, δίκαιον, as being conformable to Law.

(i) Stob. (i) On the contrary, every ill is unbeneficial, importune, inconducible, unuſeful, uncommendable, foul, unhelpful, avoidable, and unjuſt.

(k) Laert. (k) Perfect good, is called καλὸν, *Fair*, becauſe it is abſolute in all numbers required of Nature, and perfectly proportionate.

(l) Laert. (l) Of *Fair*, (or *Honeſt*) there are four ſpecies, *Juſt*, *Valiant*, *temperate*, *knowing*; in theſe are honeſt actions conſummated.

(m) Laert. (m) Likewiſe of αἰσχρὸν, *foul* (or *diſhoneſt*) are four ſpecies, *unjuſt*, *cowardly*, *diſſolute*, *fooliſh*.

(n) Laert. (n) *Honeſt*, is called καλὸν *fair*, firſt becauſe it renders thoſe who are endued therewith, worthy of praiſe; Secondly, becauſe it is moſt ſuitable to its proper work; Thirdly, becauſe it is an ornament; we ſay, a wiſe man is only good and fair.

(o) Laert. (o) Only that which is good, is fair or honeſt: So *Hecato* in his third Book of Good; and *Chryſippus* of Fair. This is Virtue, and what participates thereof, which is all one as to ſay, that whatſoever is good, is honeſt likewiſe; and reciprocally whatſoever is honeſt, is good.

(p) Cic. de fin. 3. (p) That what is honeſt, only is good, is proved thus. Whatſoever is good, is laudable; whatſoever is laudable, is honeſt; therefore whatſoever is good is honeſt. Again, there is no good which is not expetible, nothing expetible which is not pleaſant and amiable, therefore approvable, therefore laudable, therefore honeſt. Again, no man can glory in a life that is miſerable or not happy, therefore to glory is proper to the happy, but to glory relateth only to that which is honeſt, therefore honeſt life is happy. And as he who is laudable, hath ſome Eminent mark of Renown and Glory, for which he is juſtly ſtiled happy, the ſame may be ſaid of the life of ſuch a man, whence if a happy life conſiſt in honeſty, only that which is honeſt is to be eſteemed good. Moreover, what man can be termed conſtant, firm, magnanimous, unleſs we grant that pain is not an ill? For, he who reckoneth Death amongſt the Ills, cannot but fear it; ſo no man in any thing can neglect and contemn that which he accounteth ill. This being granted, the next aſſumption is this, he who is magnanimous and valiant, deſpiſeth, as if they were nothing, all things that can arrive to man; whence it followeth, that nothing is ill which is not diſhoneſt; and this ſublime, excellent magnanimous perſon, accounting all human things below him, confideth in himſelf and his own life paſt and future, knowing that no ill can happen to a wiſe man. Whereby we ſee that what is honeſt only is good, which is to live happily and honeſtly.

(q) Cic. ibid. (q) On the other ſide, nothing is good, but what is honeſt; for who is, or ever was ſo fervently covetous, and of ſuch diſordinate affections, that the ſame things, for the attainment whereof he would perpetrate any wickedneſs, he had not much attain'd unto (ſetting aſide all puniſhment) without all that wicked means? What advantage or fruit do we aim at, in deſiring to know thoſe things which are hidden from us, how they are moved, and by what cauſes agitated in Heaven? Who is ſo ſavage, ſo obdurate to natural Studies, that he abhors things worthy knowledg, receives them without pleaſure or ſome benefit, and values them at nothing? Who is there, that when he heareth of the actions, ſpeeches, counſels of magnanimous perſons, Eminent in all Virtue, is not affected with any pleaſure? Who is there, that being inſtituted in an honeſt Family, and ingenuouſly Educated, is not offended at diſhoneſty, tho it bring no hurt to him? Who is there, that looks without trouble upon ſuch as live impurely and flagitiouſly? Who doth not hate ſordid, vain, light, frivolous perſons? If diſhoneſty were not in it ſelf avoidable, why ſhould men, when they are in the dark, or in a Wilderneſs, abſtain from any thing that is evil, but that the very deformity and diſhoneſty thereof deters them? Nothing therefore is more clear, than that honeſt things are expetible in themſelves, and diſhoneſt things avoidable in themſelves.

Hence it followeth, that what is honeſt, is more eſtimable than thoſe mean things which accrue by it. And when we ſay, that folly, temerity, injuſtice, and intemperance, are avoidable, in reſpect of thoſe things which are conſequent to them, it contradicts not the former aſſertion, that what is diſhoneſt only is ill, becauſe they relate not to the hurt of the Body, but to diſhoneſt actions which proceed from Vice.

(r) Laert. (r) All good is equal, and every good is highly expetible, and admits neither increaſe, nor decreaſe. (ſ) Cic. de fin. 3 Here cometh in a great controverſy betwixt the Stoicks and the Peripateticks, which tho *Carneades* affirm to be only verbal, *Cicero* hodeth to be more in things than words.

(t) Cic. ibid. (t) The Peripateticks hold, that all goods are requiſite to happy life; the Stoicks, that whatſoever is worthy eſtimation, comprehendeth happy life. Thoſe holding pain to be an ill, it follows, that a wiſe man cannot be happy upon the Rack. Theſe, who account not pains among the ills, hold, that a wiſe man continueth happy in the midſt of Torments: For, if ſome bear thoſe pains with greater Courage for their Country, or ſome lighter cauſe, opinion, not nature increaſeth or diminiſheth the power of the pain. Again, the Peripateticks aſſerting three kinds of good, affirm a man to be ſo much the more happy, the fuller he is of external corporeal goods; or, in the Stoicks expreſſion, he who hath moſt corporeal eſtimables, is moſt happy, for as much as by them, Beatitude is compleated. On the contrary, the Stoicks hold, that thoſe goods which they call of Nature, make not by their frequency a life more happy, or are more expetible, or more eſtimable: For then Wiſdom being expetible, and Health expetible, both together would be more expetible than Wiſdom alone; whereas either being worthy eſtimation, both are not more worthy of eſtimation than Wiſdom alone. For the Stoicks, who hold Health to be eſtimable, but place it not amongſt the goods; hold likewiſe, that no eſtimation is to be preferred before Virtue. From this, the Peripateticks diſſent, aſſerting, that an honeſt action without pain, is more expetible than the ſame action with pain; the Stoicks otherwiſe. For, as a Taper is darkened by the light of the Sun, and as a drop of water is loſt in the vaſtneſs of the *Ægean* Sea, and as in the riches of *Cræſus* the acceſſion of one farthing, and one ſtep in the way between this and *India*, ſo

ſo in that end of all good which the Stoicks aſſert, all the eſtimation of corporeal things muſt neceſſarily be obſcured, overwhelmed, and periſh, by the ſplendor and magnitude of virtue. And as opportunity ἐυκαιρία, is not made any thing greater by production of time, for whatſoever is opportune hath its meaſure; ſo right affection, κατόρθωσις, and the good it ſelf placed in it, that it be conformable to nature, admitteth no acceſſion of increaſe. For as that opportunity, to thoſe of which we ſpeak, are not made greater by production of time, for which reaſon the Stoicks conceive, that a happy life is not more to be deſired, if it be long, than if it be ſhort; and they uſe this ſimily: As it is the praiſe of a ſhooe to fit the foot, neither are many ſhooes preferred before two, nor the greater before the leſs: So in thoſe things, whoſe good is confined to opportunity and convenience, neither are the more to be preferred before the fewer, nor the longer before the ſhorter. Nor do they argue acutely, who ſay, if long health be more to be eſteemed than ſhort, then likewiſe a long uſe of wiſdom, more than a ſhort; they underſtand not, that the eſtimation of health is judged by ſpace, that of virtue by oppotrunity; as if they ſhould ſay likewiſe, a good death, or a good labour to a woman in travel, is better long than ſhort; ſo that they ſee not, that ſome things are more eſteemed for their ſhortneſs, others for their length.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of Eupathies.*

(a) Cic. Tuſc. quæſt. lib. 4.

(a) AS ſoon as any object is preſented to us, which ſeemeth good, Nature [*as we ſaid*] drives us on to the acquiſition thereof, which being done conſtantly and prudently, is called Will; imprudently and exceſſively, Deſire.

(b) Cic. ibid.

(*b*) Moreover, while we are ſo moved, that we are in ſome good, that happeneth alſo two ways, when the Soul is moved quietly and conſtantly according to reaſon, this is called Joy; when vainly and exceſſively, Pleaſure.

(c) Cic. ibid.

(*c*) In like manner, as we deſire good things by nature, ſo by nature we decline the ill: This declination, if done according to reaſon, is called *Caution*, if without reaſon, *Fear*. (*d*) Caution is only in a wiſe man, of fear he is not capable.

(d) Cic. ibid. Laert.

Hence it appeareth, that there are three kinds of good affections of the mind, called (*e*) *Eupathies*, or (*f*) *Conſtancies*; *Joy*, *Caution*, *Will*.

(e) Laert. (f) Cic. (g) Laert.

1. (*g*) *Joy* is contrary to pleaſure, as being a rational elevation of the mind.

2. *Caution* is contrary to fear, as being a rational declination of ill.

3. *Will* is contrary to deſire, as being a rational appetite.

Theſe are the primary Eupathies; and as under the primary paſſions are comprehended many ſubordinate paſſions; ſo are there ſecondary Eupathies ſubordinate to thoſe.

Under *Joy* are 1. *Delectation*. 2. *Cheerfulneſs*. 3. *Æquanimity*.

Under *Caution*, 1. *Reſpect*. 2. *Clearneſs*.

Under *Will* are, 1. *Benevolence*. 2. *Salutation*. 3. *Charity*.

Notwithſtanding that Eupathies and paſſions are contrary; yet are there but three Eupathies, though there are four paſſions; for there is no Eupathy contrary to *Grief*. Cic. Tuſc. quæſt 4.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of Paſſions.*

(a) FRom falſities proceedeth a perverſity of Intellect, hence ſpring up ſeveral paſſions, and cauſes of diſorder. (a) Laert.

(*b*) *Zeno* defineth paſſion, a præternatural motion of the Soul, (or as (*c*) *Cicero* renders it, *a commotion of the Soul, averſe from right reaſon, againſt Nature.*) *Others more briefly, a more vehement appetite. More vehement they call that, which recedeth from the conſtancy of Nature,* (*d*) and is contrary to nature, wherefore all paſſion is an exceſſive ſtupid deſire. (b) Laert. (c) Tuſc. quæſt. 4. (d) Laert.

(*e*) The kinds of paſſion ariſe from two opinionated goods, and two opinionated evils, ſo they are four. From the good, *deſire* and *pleaſure*; pleaſure from preſent good, deſire from future, from the ill, *fear* and *grief*; fear, from the future, grief from the preſent; for theſe things, whoſe coming we fear, when they do come, grieve us. Pleaſure and deſire ariſe from an opinion of good things, deſire is fervently tranſported to that which ſeemeth good, pleaſure rejoiceth when we have obtained what we deſire. Thus (*f*) *deſire* and *fear* go foremoſt, that to apparent good, this to apparent ill, *pleaſure* and *grief* follows; pleaſure, when we attain what we deſire, * grief, when we incur what we fear. (e) Cic. ibid. (f) Stob. * λυπεῖται ὅτι φεύξεσθαι &c. ſo ſupply the Text.

(*g*) All paſſions ariſe from *Judgment* and *Opinion*, whence they are more ſtrictly defined, (that it may appear not only how vicious they are, but alſo that they are in our power) thus; (g) Cic. ibid.

(*h*) *Grief* is a freſh opinion of preſent ill, wherein it ſeemeth fit that the mind be contracted and dejected, or (*i*) a contraction of the ſoul cauſed by opinion of preſent ill. (h) Cic. (i) Stob.

(*k*) *Pleaſure* is a freſh opinion of preſent good, wherein it ſeemeth good that the mind be exalted, or (*l*) an irrational elevation of mind to ſomthing that ſeemeth elegible. (k) Cic. (l) Laert.

(*m*) *Fear* is an opinion of eminent ill, which ſeemeth to be intolerable; or a contraction of the ſoul diſobedient to reaſon, cauſed by expectation of ill. (m) Cic.

(*n*) *Deſire* is an opinion of good to come, that if it were preſent, it were fit for our uſe, or (*o*) an appetite diſobedient to Reaſon, cauſed by the opinion of conſequent good. (n) Cic. (o) Stob.

Theſe four are, as *Hecato* ſaith, primary paſſions, under each of which there are ſubordinate paſſions, ſeveral ſpecies belonging to their proper genus.

Under *Grief* are theſe kinds,

(*p*) Envy, φθόνος, *invidentia*; a grief at the proſperity of others, (*q*) which doth no hurt to him that envieth, * for ſome men deſire to ſee their neighbours ſuppreſs'd, that themſelves might be advanced above them. For if a man grieve at the proſperity of another, whereby he is damaged, he is not properly ſaid to envy, as (p) Laert. Cic. (q) Cicer. * Plut. Cont. Stoic.

that

that of *Hector* to *Agamemnon*; but he who is nothing dammag'd by the proſperity of another, yet grieveth thereat, truly envieth.

(r) *Cic.* (r) *Æmulation*, ζῆλος, (not here taken for the imitation of Virtue, for that is laudable) a grief that another man enjoyeth that which we deſire and want, or as *Laertius*, a grief for another's felicity, which we wiſh to our ſelves, and an æmulation thereof as greater than our own.

(s) *Laert.* (s) *Jealouſie*, ζηλοτυπία, *obtrectation*, a grief

(t) *Cic.* leſt another enjoy what we (t) love and poſſeſs.

(u) *Laert.* (u) *Compaſſion*, ἔλεος, *miſericordia*, a grief for the miſery another ſuffers undeſervedly, (y) for

(y) *Cic.* no man compaſſionates the puniſhment of a Parricide or Traytor.

(y) *Laert.* (y) *Anguiſh*, ἄχθος, *anger*, an oppreſſive grief.

*Cic.* (z) *Mourning*, πένθος, *Luctus*, grief for the

(z) *Cic. Stob.* death of a friend that was dear to us.

(a) *Cic.* (a) *Wailing*, *Mæror*, a grief accompani'd with Tears.

(b) *Cic. Laert.* (b) *Trouble*, ὀδυνή, *ærumna*, a laborious piercing grief.

(c) *Cic.* (c) *Sorrow*, *Dolor*, a vexatious grief, perhaps the ſame which in *Stobæus* is termed ἄση, a grief with conflict of Spirit.

(d) *Cic.* (d) *Lamentation*, ὠδὴ, a grief with thought-

(e) *Laert.* fulneſs, (e) proceeding from, and encreaſing by conſideration and diſcourſe.

(f) *Cic.* (f) *Moleſtia*, a permanent grief.

(g) *Cic.* (g) *Affliction*, a grief with corporeal torment.

(h) *Cic.* (h) *Deſperation*, a grief without any hope of amendment.

(i) *Laert.* (i) Ἐπάχθησις, an urgent grief attended by difficulty.

(k) *Stob.* (k) Ἄχος, a grief taking away the voice.

(l) *Laert.* (l) Σύγχυσις, an irrational grief corroding, and hindring us from enjoying the preſent.

Under *Pleaſure* are,

(m) *Cic. Laert.* whence ſupply *Stobæus* where (pleaſure being omitted) theſe are applied to a wrong head. (m) Malevolence, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, a Pleaſure at anothers ill, without any good to our ſelves. This hath no real ſubſiſtence; for no good man was ever known to rejoyce at the harm of another..

(n) *Cic. Laert.* (n) Delectation, κήλησις, a pleaſure affecting and ſoothing the mind by the Ear, and in like manner by the eye, touch, ſmell or taſt, which are all of one kind.

(o) *Cic.* (o) *Jactation*, a boaſting Pleaſure, with inſolent behaviour.

(p) *Laert.* (p) Τῆψις, *quaſi* πεῆψις, an inclination of the mind to diſſoluteneſs.

(q) *Laert.* (q) Διάχυσις, the diſſolution of Virtue.

(r) *Stob.* (r) Ἀσμένισμος, a pleaſure from things not expected.

(s) *Stob.* (s) Τοήτησις, a Pleaſure cauſed by ſight, without deceit.

Under *Fear*, are

(t) *Laert. St.* (t) *Dread*, δεῖμα, a fear cauſing δέος.

(u) *Laert. Stob.* (u) *Sloth*, ὄκνος *Pigritia*, a fear of future action, or ſuſception of labour.

* *Laert. Stob.* * *Shame*, αἰσχύνη, a fear of ignominy.

(y) *Laert.* (y) Ἔκπληξις, a fear of ſome unuſual phantaſie.

(z) *Laert.* (z) Θόρυβος, a fear with loſs, or trepidation of voice.

(a) *Laert.* (a) Ἀγωνία, a fear of ſomething uncertain, or a fear of offending or falling.

(b) *Stob.* (b) Δεισιδαιμονία, a fear of Gods or Demons.

(c) *Stob.* (c) Δέος, a fear of ſome grievous thing.

(d) *Cic.* (d) *Terrour*, a fear, which by ſtriking the mind cauſeth redneſs, paleneſs, trembling, or gnaſhing of the teeth.

(e) *Cic.* (e) *Timor*, a fear of approaching ill.

(f) *Cic.* (f) *Pavor*, a fear thruſting the mind out of its place.

(g) *Cic.* (g) *Exanimatio*, a fear conſequent, and as it were companion to *Pavor*.

(h) *Cic.* (h) *Conturbatio*, a fear, which diſperſeth all our thoughts.

(i) *Cic.* (i) *Formido*, a permanent fear.

(k) *Stob.* (k) The Paſſions ſubordinate to deſire, are generally two, *Anger* and *Love*.

(l) *Laert. Cic.* (l) *Anger* is a deſire of taking revenge upon thoſe by whom we conceive our ſelves wronged.

(m) *Stob.* (m) The Species thereof are,

(n) *Laert.* (n) Θυμὸς, or as *Cicero*, θύμωσις, *excandeſcentia*, anger beginning.

(o) *Laert.* (o) Χόλος, anger encreaſing.

(p) *Cic. Stob.* (p) Μῆνις, *odium*, anger inveterate.

(q) *Cic. Stob.* (q) Κότος, *inimicitia*, anger watching the occaſion of revenge.

Μῆνις & κότος are confounded by Laertius.

(r) *Stob.* (r) Πικρία, anger breaking forth into action.

(s) *Laert.* (t) *Cic.* (s) Μῖσος, a deſire, whereby we wiſh ill to another, with continual progreſſion.

(u) *Laert.* * *Stob.* (y) *Laert.* (t) *Malice*, *Diſcordia*, a bitter anger, with utmoſt hatred, conceived in the Heart.

(u) Φιλονεικία, a deſire converſant in difference of opinions.

* *Love* is an impulſion of good will for apparent beauty, (y) whereby it is diſtinguiſhed from the love of the virtuous, which is a voluntary ſuſception of labour for true beauty. The ſpecies of Love are,

(z) *Laert. Cic.* (z) Σπάνις, *indigentia*, an (inexpleble) deſire of that which we want, and being ſeparated from it, in vain incline to it.

(a) *Stob.* (b) *Cic.* (a) Πόθος, *deſiderium*, a deſire to ſee that which is not preſent. They (b) diſtinguiſh theſe two thus: Deſire is of thoſe things which are ſaid, or prædicated of any thing which they call *Categoremes*, as to have riches, to take honours; Indigence is of the things themſelves, as of honours, of money.

(c) *Stob.* (c) Ἵμερος, deſire of converſation of that which is abſent.

(d) *Stob.* (d) Φιληδονία, deſire of Pleaſure.

(e) *Stob.* (e) Φιλοπλουτία, deſire of Riches.

(f) *Stob.* (f) Φιλοδοξία, deſire of Glory.

(g) *Stob.* (b) *Laert.* *Cic.* (i) *Laert.* (g) In all theſe Paſſions there is opinion. (b) Opinion is a weak aſſent. (i) Hence paſſions, (as *Chryſippus* in his Book *of Paſſions* affirms) are Judgments; for Avarice is an opinion, or falſe judgment that money is good; drunkenneſs and intemperance, are the like.

(k) *Stob.* (k) Opinion is likewiſe ſudden from the contractive motion of an unreaſonable elation of mind, unreaſonable and præternatural, in as much as it is not obedient to reaſon. For every paſſion is violent: wherefore oftentimes, though we ſee in thoſe that are tranſported by paſſion, the inconvenience thereof; yet notwithſtanding, the ſame perſons that condemn it, are carried away by it, as by a headſtrong horſe, and therefore properly may uſe that ſaying:

*Againſt my Judgment Nature forceth me.* Meaning by Judgment, the knowledg of right things; for man is carried beyond nature by paſſion, to tranſgreſs natural reaſon and right.

(l) *Stob.* (l) All thoſe who are led by paſſion, are diverted from reaſon, but in another manner than thoſe

those who are deceived. For the deceived, as for example, They who think Atomes to be the principles of all things, when they come to know that they are not, change their judgment: But, those that are in passion, altho that they are taught not to grieve, or fear, or give way to any passion in the Soul, yet, they do not put them off, but are lead on by their passions, until they come to be subject to their tyrannical sway.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of Sickness and Infirmities.*

(a) THE fountain of all passions is Intemperance, which is a total defection from the mind, and from right reason, so averse from the prescription of reason, that the appetites of the Soul can by no means be ruled or contained. As therefore Temperance allayeth appetites, and causeth them to obey right reason, and preserveth the considerate judgments of the mind; so Intemperance, the enemy thereto, enflameth, troubleth, and inciteth the state of the Soul. Thus griefs and fears, and the rest of the passions, all arise from this. For, as when the blood is corrupt, or flegm, or choler aboundeth, sicknesses, and infirmities arise in the body: so the disorder of ill opinions, and their repugnance to one another, divesteth the Soul of health, and troubleth it with diseases.

(a) Cic. Tusc. quæst. 4

(b) By passions the mind becometh indisposed, and as it were sick. *Sickness* of mind, νόσημα, is an opinion and desire of that which seemeth greatly expetible, but is not such, as love of women, of wine, of money. These νοσήματα, have likewise their contraries in the other extream, as hatred of women, of wine, of money.

(b) Laert. Stob. &c.

(c) This sickness of mind happening with imbecillity, is called ἀῤῥῶστημα, *infirmity*. For, as in the body there are infirmities, as Gouts, Convulsions, and the like; so are there infirmities in the mind, as love of glory, love of pleasure. And as in bodies there is a propensity to some particular diseases; so in the mind there is a proclivity ἐυπτωσία, or ἐυκαταφορία, to some particular passions, as φθονερία, *propensity to envy*, ἀνελεημοσύνη, *propensity to unmercifulness*, and the like.

(c) Laert. Stob. &c.

(d) In this place, much pains hath been taken by the Stoicks, chiefly by *Chrysippus*, to compare the sicknesses of the mind with those of the body.

(d) Cic. Tusc. quæst. 4.

Passion (for as much as opinions are inconstantly and turbulently tossed up and down) is always in motion; and when this fervour and concitation of the mind is inveterate, and, as it were, setled in the veins and marrow, then ariseth sickness and infirmity, and those aversions which are contrary to those infirmities and diseases. These differ only intentionally, but really are the same, arising from desire and pleasure; for when money is desired, and reason not immediately applied, as a Socratick medicine, to cure that desire, the evil spreadeth through the veins, and cleaveth to the bowels, and becometh sickness and infirmity, which when they grow inveterate, cannot be plucked away. The name of this sickness is avarice. In like manner arise other sicknesses, as desire of glory, desire of women, φιλογυνία, and the rest of sicknesses and infirmites. Their contraries arise from fear, as hatred of women, μισογυνία, hatred of mankind, inhospitality, all which are infirmities of the mind, arising from fear of those things which they flie and shun.

Infirmity of mind is defined, a vehement opinion, inherent, and wholly implanted in us, of a thing not to be desired, as if it were exceedingly to be desired. That which ariseth from aversion, is defined a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, of a thing that ought not to be shunn'd, as if it ought to be shunned. This opinion is a judging our selves to know what we have not.

Under *Infirmity* are these species, *Love of Money, of Honour, of Women, of curious Meats*, and the like. Love of Money, Avarice, is a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, as if it were exceedingly to be desired: In the like manner are all the rest defined.

Aversions are defined thus, Inhospitality is a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, that guests ought to be shunned. In like manner is defined hatred of Womenkind, such as was that of *Hippolitus*; and of mankind, as that of *Timon*.

As some are more prone to one sickness than to another; so are some more inclinable to fear, others, to other passions; in some is anxiety, whereby they are anxious; in others choler, which differeth from anger; for it is one thing to be Cholerick, another to be Angry, as anxiety differs from grief; for all are not anxious who are sometimes grieved, nor are all that are anxious grieved always: As there is a difference betwixt Ebriety and Ebriosity, and it is one thing to be a Lover, another to be Amorous.

This propensity of several Persons to several sicknesses, is called, from an Analogy to the body, Infirmity, whereby is understood a propensity to be sick: But in good things, because some are more apt to some goods than to others, it is stiled Facility, in ill things Proclivity, implying a lapsion; in neuters it hath the former name.

As there is sickness, infirmity, and defect in the Body, so in the mind. Sickness is the corruption of the whole body. Infirmity is sickness with some weakness. Defect is, when the parts of the body disagree with one another, whence ariseth pravity, distortion, deformity of the Limbs; so that those two, sickness and infirmity, arise from the confusion and trouble of the health of the whole Body; defect is seen in perfect health. But, in the mind, sickness is not distinguish'd from infirmity, but by cogitation only.

Vitiosity is a habit or affection, inconstant in it self, and oft differing in the whole course of life; so that in one by corruption of opinions, is bred sickness and infirmity; in the other, inconstancy and repugnance. For, every vice hath not disagreeing parts, as of them who are not far from Wisdom, that affection is different from it self, as being unwise, but not distorted nor depraved.

Sickness and infirmities are parts of Vitiosity; but, whither passions are parts thereof also, it is a question. For Vices are permanent affections, passions are moving affections, so that they cannot be parts of permanent affections.

And

And as in all things the Soul reſembleth the Body, ſo in good likewiſe. In the body, the chiefeſt are beauty, ſtrength, health, ſoundneſs, agility; ſo likewiſe in the mind. And as the good temper of the body is, when thoſe things whereof we conſiſt, agree well among themſelves: ſo the health of the Soul is, when the judgments and opinions thereof agree. This is the virtue of the Soul, which ſome affirm to be Temperance; others, a Soul obedient to the precepts of Temperance, and obſequious thereunto, not having any ſpeciouſneſs of her own. But, whether one or other, it is only in a wiſe man; yet, there is one kind of health of the ſoul, which is common alſo to the unwiſe, when by the care of Phyſicians, the diſtemper of the mind is removed.

And as there is in the body an apt figure of the limbs, together with a ſweetneſs of colour, which is called Beauty; ſo in the ſoul, equality, and conſtancy of opinions, and judgments following virtue, with a certain firmneſs and ſtability, or, including the very power of virtue, is called Beauty.

Likewiſe, correſpondent to the powers, nerves, and efficacity of the body, in the ſame terms are named the powers of the Soul. Agility of body is called quickneſs; the ſame commendation is aſcribed to wit, in reſpect, that the Soul over-runneth many things in a ſhort time.

Only there is this difference betwixt Souls and Bodies: Strong ſouls cannot be aſſaulted by diſeaſes, ſtrong bodies may. But, the offenſions of bodies may happen without any fault; thoſe of the Soul cannot, all whoſe ſickneſſes and paſſions proceed from contempt of reaſon, and therefore are in men only; for, though beaſts do ſomethings like this, yet, they fall not into paſſions.

Betwixt acute and obtuſe perſons, there is this difference, the ingenious, as *Corinthian* Braſs ruſteth, ſlowly falling into ſickneſs, and more quickly get out of it: the dull do not ſo; neither doth the ſoul of an ingenious perſon fall into every ſickneſs and paſſion; for, there are not many things extreamly ſavage and cruel, and ſome alſo have a ſhew of humanity, as compaſſion, grief, fear.

But, the infirmities and ſickneſſes of the mind are leſs eaſily rooted out, than thoſe great vices which are contrary to the virtues; for, the ſickneſſes remaining, the vices may be taken away, becauſe the ſickneſſes are no ſooner healed, than the vices are removed.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Of Virtue and Vice.*

(a) Laert. (a) *Virtue* is a convenient affection of the Soul, throughout all life.

Of Virtues there are three kinds: The firſt *general*, taken for any perfection of a thing, as of a Statue: The ſecond are (c) *Sciences*, or *contemplative*, which, according to *Hecaton*, conſiſt in ſpeculation, as *Prudence* and *Juſtice*. (d) The third *not-ſciences*, or *not-contemplative*, which are conſidered as conſequent to the ſpeculative; as, *health*, *ſtrength*, *hope*, *joy*, and the like. Health is conſequent to Temperance, a theoretick virtue, as ſtrength to the building of an Arch. They are called *not-contemplative*, becauſe they require no aſſent, but are by after-acceſſion, and common even to the wicked, as health and ſtrength.

(c) Stob. (d) Stob.

*Vice* is the contrary to virtue, for (e) the rational creature is perverted ſometimes by the perſwaſion of exterior things, ſometimes by the counſel of thoſe with whom he converſeth, contrary to nature, who gives us inclinations unperverted. (e) Laert.

Of Vices therefore there are two kinds: The firſt (f) *ignorance* of thoſe things whereof Virtues are the knowledg; as, Imprudence, Intemperance, Injuſtice: The ſecond *not-ignorances*; as, Puſillanimity, Imbecillity. (f) Laert.

(g) *Panætius* aſſerteth two Virtues, *Theoretick* and *Practick*: others three, *Rational*, *Natural*, *Moral*. *Poſſidonius* four; *Cleanthes*, *Chryſippus*, and *Antipater* more; *Apollodorus* one only, *Prudence*. (g) Laert.

(b) Of Virtues, ſome are *primary*, others *ſubordinate*. The *primary* are four, *Prudence*, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, *Juſtice*; the firſt converſant in offices, the ſecond in appetite, the third in tolerance, the fourth in diſtribution. (b) Laert.

(i) *Prudence* is the Science of things that are to be done, and not to be done, and neuter; or the knowledg of good, bad and neuter in civil life. (i) Laert.

(k) The Virtues ſubordinate to Prudence are five. (k) Stob.

Ευβυλία, (l) The Science of things that are to be done, how they may be done beneficially. (l) Laert. Stob.

Ευλογίστα, The Science of comprehending things to be effected. Stob.

Αγχίνοια, The Science of finding out our office. Stob.

Νυσχία, The Science of attaining the ſcope in every thing. Stob.

Ευμηχανία, The Science of finding out the iſſues of things. Stob.

(m) *Temperance*, is the Science of things expetible, avoidable and neuter. Under Temperance are theſe ſpecies. (m) Stob. by whom correct Laert. who adds this definition to Temperance.

Ευταξία, (n) The Science of time and order for the well-doing of things. (n) Stob.

Κοσμιότης (o) The Science of honeſt and diſhoneſt motions. (o) Stob.

Αιδημοσύνη, (p) The Science of avoiding juſt blame. (p) Stob.

(q) *Fortitude*, is the Science of things grievous, not grievous and neuter; the Species under it theſe: (q) Stob.

Εγκράτεια, (r) A Science tenacious of right reaſon. (r) Stob.

Καρτερία, (s) A Science perſiſting in right judgment. (s) Stob.

Θαρραλεότης, (t) A Science whereby we truſt. (t) Stob.

Μεγαλοψυχία, (u) The Science of overcoming thoſe things which happen to the good and bad. (u) Stob. Laert.

Ευψυχία, * A Science of the Soul which renders her invincible. * Stob.

Φιλοπονία, (y) The Science of going through to the attainment of that which we propoſe to our ſelves. (y) Stob.

(z) *Juſtice* is the Science of diſtributing to every one according to his deſert; under Juſtice are four ſubordinate Virtues. (z) Stob.

Ευσέβεια, (a) The Science of worſhipping the gods. (a) Stob.

Χρηστότης, The Science of well doing.

Ευκοινωνησία, The Science of equality in community.

Ευσυναλλαξία, The Science of contracting honeſtly with others.

(b) In

(b) In like manner of Vices, ſome are primary, others ſubordinate to the primary. The primary vices are, *Imprudence*, *Intemperance*, *Puſillanimity*, *Injuſtice*.

(c) *Imprudence* is the ignorance of things good, ill and neuter; and the ignorance of things to be done, not to be done, and neuter.

*Intemperance* is the ignorance of things expetible, avoidable and neuter.

*Puſillanimity* is the ignorance of things grievous, not grievous and neuter.

*Injuſtice* is the ignorance of diſtributing to every one according to his deſerts.

(d) The ſubordinate vices to theſe are correſpondent to the ſecondary Virtues, as, ἀπειρία, βραδυνόια, κακοβυλία, which are defined anſwerably to their oppoſite Virtues.

(e) Theſe vritues are perfect, and conſiſt in contemplation; but, there are other virtues, which are not arts, but faculties, conſiſting in exercíſe, as, health of the Soul, integrity and ſtrength thereof, and pulchritude. For, as the health of the body is a good temperature of hot, cold, dry, and moiſt; ſo the health of the ſoul is a good temperature of the Doctrines in the ſoul. And as the ſtrength of the body conſiſteth in a tenſion of the nerves; ſo the ſtrength of the ſoul in a proper extenſion thereof to judgment and action. And as the beauty of the body is a ſymmetry of all the parts to one another, and to the whole: ſo the beauty of the ſoul is the ſymmetry of the reaſon and parts thereof, to the whole, and to one another.

(f) All thoſe virtues which are Sciences and Arts, have common theorems, and the ſame end, wherefore they are (as (g) *Zeno* ſaith) inſeparable, connexed to one another, as *Chryſippus*, *Apollodorus* and *Hecaton* affirm. He who hath one, hath all, (ſaith (h) *Chryſippus*) and he who doth according to one, doth according to all. He who hath virtue, is not only contemplative, but alſo practick of thoſe things which are to be done. Things which are to be done are either expetible, tolerable, diſtributible, or retainable; ſo that whoſoever doth one thing wiſely, doth another juſtly, another conſtantly, another temperately; and ſo is both wiſe, magnanimous, juſt, and temperate.

(i) Notwithſtanding theſe virtues differ from one another by their heads: For, the heads of prudence are, to contemplate and do well; that which is to be done in the firſt place, and in the ſecond, to contemplate what things are to be avoided, as obſtructive to that which is to be done. The proper head of temperance is to compoſe our own appetites in the firſt place, and to conſider them; in the ſecond, thoſe under the ſubordinate virtues, as being obſtructive and divertive of appetites. The heads of Fortitude are in the firſt place, to conſider all that we are to undergo; in the ſecond, other ſubordinate virtues. The heads of Juſtice are in the firſt place, to conſider what every one deſerves; in the ſecond, the reſt. For all virtues conſider the things that belong to all, and the ſubordinate to one another. Whence *Panætius* ſaith, it is in virtue as in many Archers, who ſhoot at one mark diſtinguiſhed by divers colours: every one aims at the mark, but one propoſes to himſelf the white line, another the black, and ſo of the reſt. For, at theſe place their ultimate end in hitting the mark, but every one propoſes to himſelf a ſeveral manner of hitting: ſo all virtues have Beatitude, which is placed conformably to nature for their end, but ſeveral perſons purſue it ſeveral ways.

(k) As virtues are inſeparable, ſo are they the ſame ſubſtantially with the ſupream part of the ſoul, in which reſpect all virtue is ſaid to be a body, for the Intellect and Soul are a body; for the ſoul is a warm ſpirit innate in us. Therefore our ſoul is a living creature, for it hath life and ſence, eſpecially the ſupream part thereof, called the Intellect. Wherefore all virtue is a living creature, becauſe it is eſſentially the Intellect. And therefore φρονήσις φρόνησις, for that expreſſion is conſequent to this aſſertion.

(l) Between virtue and vice there is no medium (contrary to the Peripateticks, who aſſert a mean progreſſion betwixt virtue and vice) for all men have a natural appetite to good: and as a ſtick is either ſtraight or crooked, ſo man muſt be either juſt or unjuſt; but cannot be either more or leſs juſt or unjuſt.

(m) That virtue may be learned, is aſſerted by *Chryſippus*, in his firſt book of the End, and by *Cleanthes*, and *Poſſidonius* in his Exhortations, and *Hecaton*, becauſe men of bad are made good.

(n) That it may be loſt, is likewiſe affirmed by *Chryſippus*, denied by *Cleanthes*. The firſt ſaith, it may be loſt by drunkenneſs or madneſs: the other, that it cannot be loſt, by reaſon of the firm comprehenſions of the Soul.

(o) Virtue is in it ſelf virtue, and not for hope or fear of any external thing. It is expetible in it ſelf; for which reaſon, when we do any thing amiſs, we are aſhamed, as knowing that only to be good, which is honeſt.

(q) In virtue conſiſteth Felicity, for the end of virtue is to live convenient to nature. Every virtue is able to make a man live convenient to nature: for, man hath natural inclinations for the finding out of Offices, for the compoſure of Appetites, for tolerance and diſtribution. Virtue therefore is ſelf-ſufficient to Beatitude, as *Zeno*, *Chryſippus*, and *Hecaton* aſſert. For if, ſaith he, magnanimity, as conceiving all things to be below it ſelf, is ſelf-ſufficient, and that be a part of Virtue, Virtue it ſelf, which deſpiſeth all things that obſtruct her, muſt alſo be ſelf-ſufficient to Beatitude. But *Panætius* and *Poſſidonius* deny, that Virtue is ſelf-ſufficient, affirming, that it requireth the aſſiſtance of health, ſtrength, and neceſſaries; yet, they hold, that Virtue is always uſed, as *Cleanthes* affirms, for it cannot be loſt, and is always practiſed by a perfect mind, which is good.

(s) Juſtice is not by nature, but by preſcription, as Law and right reaſon: Thus *Chryſippus* in his Book of Honeſt.

(t) Virtue hath many attributes, it is called

1. Ἀγαθὸν, a good, becauſe it leadeth us to right life.

2. Ἀρετὸν, becauſe it is approved without any controverſie, as being moſt excellent.

3. σπουδαῖον, becauſe it is worthy of much ſtudy.

4. Ἐπαινετὸν, becauſe it may juſtly be praiſed.

5. Καλὸν, becauſe it inviteth thoſe who deſire it.

6. Συμφέρον, becauſe it conduceth to goodneſs of life.

7. χρήσιμον, becauſe it is uſeful.

8. αἱρετὸν, because it is rightly expetible.

9. ἀναγκαῖον, because being present it profiteth; being absent, it doth not.

10. λυσιτελὲς, because it hath an use that exceeds the labour.

11. αὔταρκες, because it is alone sufficient to him that hath it.

12. ἀπροδεὲς, because it takes away all want.

13. ἐπιχώριον, because it is common in use, and extendeth to all the uses of life.

## CHAP. X.

### *Of the End.*

(a) Stob. (a) THE End is that, for whose sake all offices are done, but it self is not done for the sake of any: or that to which all things done conveniently in life are referred, it self is referred to nothing.

(b) Stob. (b) The end is taken three ways: First, for the final good, which consisteth in rational conversation: Secondly, for the scope, which is convenient life, in relation thereto: Lastly, for the ultimate of expetibles, unto which all the rest are referred.

(c) Stob. (c) Scope and end differ; for scope is the proposed body, which they who pursue Beatitude aim at. Felicity is proposed as the scope, but the end is the attainment of that felicity. If a man throw a spear or an arrow at any thing, he must do all things that he may take his aim aright, and yet so, as to do all things whereby he may hit: So when we say, it is the ultimate end of man to obtain the principles of nature, we imply in like manner, he must do all things necessary to taking aim, and all things likewise to the hitting of the mark; but, this is the last, the chief good in life, that as to be selected, not desired.

Reason being given to rational creatures, for the most perfect direction, to live according to reason, is in them to live according to nature, that being the Artificer of Appetite. Hence (e) *Zeno* first (in his discourse of humane nature) affirms, that the end is, to live conformably, that is, to live according to one reason concordantly, as on the contrary, savage Beasts that are always at difference, live miserably.

(e) Stob.

(f) Stob. (f) The followers of *Zeno*, conceiving his expression not full enough, enlarged it. First, *Cleanthes* his successor, added, *to nature*, making it up thus, *The End is to live conformably to Nature, which is to live according to virtue*: for nature leads us to virtue. Thus *Cleanthes* in his Book of *Pleasure*, and *Possidonius*, and *Hecaton* in his Book *of Ends*.

(g) Stob. (g) *Chrysippus*, to make the expression of *Cleanthes* more clear, expounds it thus, *To live according to expert knowledg of things which happen naturally*: For our natures are parts of the Universe, our end therefore is to live conformably to nature, which *Chrysippus*, in his first Book of Ends, expounds, both our own proper humane nature, and likewise the common nature of the Universe. But *Cleanthes* allows only common nature to be followed, and not the particular. To live according to this knowledg, is all one, as to live according to virtue, not doing any thing forbidden by our common Law. Right Reason, which is current amongst all, being the very same that is in God, the Governour of all. The virtue therefore, and beatitude of a happy man, is, when all things are ordered according to the correspondence of a mans Genius, with the will of him who governs the Universe.

(b) Stob. (b) *Diogenes* defineth the end, *A good use of reason, in the election and refusal of natural things, chusing those that are according to nature, and refusing those that are repugnant to nature.* So likewise *Antipater*.

*Archidemus* defineth it, *To live, performing compleatly all offices, chusing of those things which are according to nature, the greatest and most principal, and not to be able to transgress them.*

*Panætius*, to *live according to the appetites given us by nature.*

*Possidonius*, to *live contemplating the truth and order of the Universe.*

(i) Cic. de fin. 4. (i) Thus by living according to nature, the Stoicks understand three things: First, to live according to the knowledg of those things which happen by nature. This is *Zeno*'s end, to live convenient to nature. Secondly, to live, preserving all, or the greater part of mean offices. This exposition differeth from the former; for that is a Rectitude, proper only to a wise man, this is the office of a progressive, not perfect person, which may likewise be to the foolish. The third is, to live in enjoyment of all, or the greater part of those thing which are according to nature. This is not constituted in our action, for it consisteth of that kind of life which enjoyeth virtue, and of those things which are according to nature, and are not in our power.

(k) Cic. de fin. 2. (k) The chief good therefore, is to live suitably to the knowledg of those things which arrive by nature, elective of those which are according to nature, and rejective of those which are contrary to nature. (l) This is to live conveniently and conformably to nature, when the soul entring into the path of virtue, walketh by the steps and guidance of right reason, and followeth God. That which in other arts is artificial, is here epigematick and consequent.

(l) Plut. de Stoic. rep.

(m) Stob. (m) This end is Beatitude. *Beatitude*, by *Zeno*, is defined *a good course of life*, which definition is used likewise by *Cleanthes* and *Chrysippus*, and all their followers, who affirm Beatitude to be nothing but happy life.

*Fair*, and *good*, and *Virtue*, and that which *participates of Virtue*, are equivalent terms, whence it follows that (n) Beatitude is all one with living according to Virtue. (o) And as Good, and Virtue admit no degrees of increase or diminution, neither doth the ultimate end of all good and Virtue increase or diminish. For, as they who are drowned, are no more able to breathe, though they are nearer the top of the water than they who are in the bottom; nor a little whelp, the time of whose sight approacheth, see any more than one that is newly litter'd; so he, who hath made some little progress in Virtue, is no less in misery than he who hath made none.

(n) Stob. (o) Cic.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of Indifferents.*

OF things as we have ſaid, ſome are good, ſome ill, ſome indifferent. (*a*) To deny this difference of things, would be to confound all life, as *Ariſto* doth; neither could there be any function or act of wiſdom, ſince that, if amongſt thoſe things which appertain to life there were no difference, no election were requiſite.

(a) Cic. de fin. lib. 3.

Good and ill, as we ſaid, are thoſe things which are honeſt or diſhoneſt. Of theſe hitherto. Betwixt both theſe, there are ſome things which conſer nothing to happy or unhappy life, called Indifferents. (*b*) To profit is a motion or ſtate proceeding from Virtue; To hurt is a motion or ſtate proceeding from Vice; but Indifferents neither profit nor hurt; ſuch are Life, Health, Pleaſure, Beauty, Strength, Riches, Honour, Nobility, and their contraries; Death, Sickneſs, Grief, Deformity, Imbecillity, Poverty, Diſhonour, Meaneſs and the like. Thus *Hecaton* in his Seventh Book of *Ends*, and *Apollodorus* in his *Ethicks*, and *Chryſippus*. Theſe therefore are not goods, but indifferents. For, as the property of Heat is to warm, not to cool; ſo is it of good to profit, not to hurt. But health and wealth do not hurt more than they profit, therefore health and wealth are not goods. Again, that which we may uſe ill as well as well, is not good; but health and wealth may be uſed ill as well as well, therefore health and wealth are not goods. Yet *Poſſidonius* reckons theſe amongſt goods. But *Hecaton* in his 19*th* of Good, and *Chryſippus* of Pleaſure, will not allow Pleaſure a good: For Pleaſures are diſhoneſt, but nothing diſhoneſt is good.

(b) Laert.

(c) Cic. de fin. lib. 3.

(*c*) Moreover, Riches, as *Diogenes* conceiveth, have not only this power that they guide to Pleaſure and good health, but that they compriſe them. They do not the ſame in Virtue nor in other arts, whereto money may be a guide, but it cannot contain them. Thus if Pleaſure or health were good, riches likewiſe ſhould be numbred amongſt the good; but if wiſdom be good, it followeth not that riches likewiſe be good, nor that any thing which is not reckoned amongſt the good; that which is good can not be contained by any thing which is not amongſt the good. And alſo for this reaſon, becauſe Sciences and comprehenſions of things, by which Arts are produced, move appetition; but riches are not reckoned among the good, it followeth that no Art can be contained in Riches, and much leſs any Virtue, for Virtue requireth far more ſtudy and exerciſe than Art, and compriſeth the firmneſs, ſtability, and conſtany of all life, which Art doth not.

(d) Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 22. whence Apply Laertius and Stobæus.

(*d*) Things are ſaid to be indifferent in three reſpects: Firſt, if they move neither appetite nor averſion, as, if the Stars be of even number, or to have even or uneven hairs on our head, to ſtretch out the finger this way or that way, to take up ſtraw, and the like. Secondly, things are ſaid to be indifferent which move appetite and averſion equally, not one more than the other; as in two pieces of Silver of equal value, no way different, which to him who comes to make choice of either, are indifferent. There is an appetition to the election of one, but not more of this than of that. The third kind of Indifferents are thoſe which are neither good nor ill, expetible nor avoidable, conducing neither to happineſs nor unhappineſs. In this ſenſe all things are called indifferent, which are betwixt Virtue and Vice, as health, wealth, ſtrength, glory, and the like; for we may be happy without theſe, though their uſe hath ſome relation to happineſs, their abuſe to unhappineſs. In this ſenſe whatſoever we may ſometimes uſe well, other times ill, is indifferent, which kind appertaineth chiefly to Ethick.

(*e*) Again, of Indifferents ſome are *Natural*, and move appetite, as health, ſtrength, ſoundneſs of ſenſe, and the like; ſome *Præternatural*, which move averſion, as ſickneſs, infirmity, and the like; ſome *Neuter*, which move neither appetite nor averſion, as the conſtitution of the ſoul and body, one capable of receiving Phantaſies, the other wounds. (e) Stob.

(*f*) Of natural and præternatural Indifferents, ſome are *primary*, others by *participation*. *Primary* natural Indifferents are motions or affections convenient with reaſon, as health and ſtrength. *Participant* are thoſe by which that motion or affection is communicated, as a healthful body, ſound ſenſe. (*g*) *Præternatural* Indifferents are the contrary to theſe. (f) Stob. (g) Stob.

## CHAP. XII.

### *Of Eſtimation.*

(*a*) *Eſtimation*, ἀξία, is a certain concurrence with convenient life, which concerns all good. (*b*) Eſtimation is twofold; one, a mediate power or uſe concurring with life according to nature; ſuch we call health or wealth, as far as they conduce to life, according to nature. The other is the valuation of the Eſtimator, impoſed by him who is skilful in ſuch things. (a) Laert. (b) Stob.

(*c*) Again, *Eſtimation* is taken three ways: Firſt, for abſolute *donation*: Secondly, for *return of approbation*: Thirdly, as *Antipater* calls it, *Elective*, by which, when ſome things are propoſed, we rather chuſe theſe than thoſe; as health before ſickneſs, life before death, and riches before poverty. In like manner, diſeſtimation is taken three ways, the terms only changed to the contrary. *Donation* according to *Diogenes*, is a judgment, that a thing is according to nature, or conferreth uſe thereto. *Approbation* is in man, not in things. *Election* only in the good, not the indifferent. (c) Stob.

(*d*) Hence followeth another diſtinction of indifferents, whereof ſome are *preferred*, ſome *rejected*, ſome *neither preferred nor rejected*. *Preferred* are thoſe, which though they are Indifferents, have nevertheleſs a ſufficient reaſon why they are to be had in eſtimation, as health, ſoundneſs of ſence, exemption from grief, glory, and the like. *Rejected* are thoſe, which are not worthy any eſtimation, as poverty, ſickneſs, and the like. *Neuter* are thoſe, which are neither preferred nor rejected, as to extend or contract the finger. (d) Laert Stob. Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 24.

Theſe terms preferred, προηγμένον, and rejected, ἀποπροηγμένον, were invented by *Zeno*, upon this ground: (*e*) As when we ſpeak of the (e) Cic. de fin. 3.

Court, no man ſaith, the King himſelf is preferred to dignity, but thoſe who are in ſome honour, next and ſecond to him in rank: ſo when we ſpeak of life, we call not thoſe things which are in the firſt place, the preferred or promoted, but thoſe which are in the ſecond: and ſo likewiſe in the rejected. Now foraſmuch as good hath the firſt place, it follows, that what is preferred, is neither good nor ill. [No good is reckoned amongſt the preferred, becauſe that hath the greateſt eſtimation; but the preferred having the ſecond eſtimation, approacheth ſomewhat to the nature of good. It is called preferred, not that it conduceth to Beatitude, but in reſpect of the rejected. We define it thus: *an Indifferent with mean eſtimation*; for it could not be, that nothing ſhould be left in mean things, that is according to, or contrary to nature, neither being left, that nothing ſhould be placed in them, which is ſufficiently eſtimable, this being granted, that there is not ſomething preferred. Rightly therefore this diſtinction is made, and may more fully be explained by this ſimilie. As if we ſhould ſuppoſe our ultimate end, to be ſo to caſt the Die that it may chance right, the Die that ſhall be ſo caſt as to fall right, muſt have ſomething prepoſed and preferred towards its end; and on the other ſide the contrary; yet the prepoſition of the Die, nothing conduceth to that end; ſo thoſe which are preferred, relate indeed to the end, but nothing pertain to the power and nature thereof.

(f) Laert. Stob. (f) Of the *preferred* ſome are *in the Soul*, as ingenuity, art, progreſſion, and the like; ſome *in the body*, as life, health, ſtrength, ability, ſoundneſs, beauty; ſome *external*, as riches, honour, nobility and the like.

(g) Laert. Stob. (g) In like manner of the *rejected*, ſome are *in the Soul*, as habitude, ignorance; ſome *in the body*, as death, ſickneſs, infirmity, maim, deformity. Some *external*, as poverty, diſhonour and meaneſs.

Likewiſe of the *Neuter*, ſome are *in the Soul*, as imagination, aſſent; ſome *in the body*, as whiteneſs, blackneſs, ſome *external*, which having no eſtimation or uſe, are of little value.

Thoſe which are preferred in the Soul, conduce more to living according to Nature, and are of more worth than thoſe of the body, or the external, as to have a good diſpoſition of mind, is better than to have a good diſpoſition of body.

(h) Stob. (h) Again, of the *preferred*, ſome are preferred *for themſelves*, as ingenuity, countenance, ſtate, notion, and the like; ſome *for others*, becauſe they effect ſomething, as Riches, and Nobility; ſome *both for themſelves and others*, as health, ſtrength, ſoundneſs, ability: for themſelves, as being according to Nature; for others, as affording no ſmall benefit.

(i) Cic. de fin. b. 3. (i) As concerning *Reputation*, εὐδοξία, *Chryſippus* and *Diogenes* affirm, that being ſeparated from utility, we ſhould not ſo much as ſtretch out our finger for it. But thoſe who followed them, not able to withſtand *Carneades*, affirmed Reputation to be preferred for it ſelf, and that it was proper for an ingenuous man freely educated, to deſire to be well ſpoken of by his Parents, kindred, and good men, and that for the thing it ſelf, not for the uſe thereof; adding, that as we provide for Children, though to be born after our death; ſo we muſt provide for future reputation after death, even for its own ſake ſeparated from all uſe.

(k) Stob. (k) In like manner of the *rejected*, ſome are rejected *for themſelves*, ſome *for others*, ſome *both for themſelves and others*, which appears by the rule of Contraries.

## CHAP. XIII.

### *Of Actions and Offices.*

OF thoſe *Actions* which proceed from appetite, ſome are *Offices*, ſome *præter-offices*, ſome *neuter*.

(a) Laert. Cic. de fin. b. 3. (a) *Office* is that which is preferred, and hath a good reaſon for the doing thereof, as being convenient to life; or, as others, Office is whatſoever reaſon requireth to be done, as, to honour our Brethren, Parents, Country, to relieve our friends. *Zeno* firſt gave it this name, τὸ καθῆκον, *Office*, ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ τινὰς ἥκειν. It is an action conformable to the dictates of nature, and extends even to plants, and irrational living creatures, for Offices may even be obſerved in thoſe.

*Præter-office* is an action, which reaſon requireth that we do not, as, to neglect our Parents, to contemn our Brethren, to diſagree with our Friends, to deſpiſe our Country, and the like.

*Neuter* are thoſe actions which reaſon neither requireth nor forbiddeth, as the taking up of a ſtraw.

(b) Stob. (b) Of *Offices*, ſome are *perfect*, called κατορθώματα, *Rectitudes*, actions done according to virtue; as, to do wiſely, to do juſtly: Others *not-rectitudes*, actions which have not a perfect office, but a mediate; as, to Marry, to go an Embaſſy, to Diſcourſe, and the like.

Of *rectitudes*, ſome are *in things requiſite*, others *not*: Of the firſt kind are, to be wiſe, temperate, and the like: of the ſecond, thoſe which are not requiſite to the being ſuch. In like manner are *præter-offices* divided.

Again, of *Offices* ſome are *ordinary*, as, to have a care of our ſelves, of our limbs, and the like: Some *extraordinary*, as, to maim our ſelves, throw away our goods. Accordingly is it of *præter-offices*.

Again, of *Offices*, ſome are *continual*, as, to live virtuouſly: ſome *intermiſſive*, as, to queſtion, anſwer, walk, and the like. Accordingly it is of *præter-offices*.

(c) Cic. de fin. b. 3. (c) Office is a mean thing, placed neither amongſt the good, nor their contraries; for, there is ſomething in this approvable, ſo as a right reaſon may be given for it, as done approvably. That which is ſo done is office. And foraſmuch as in thoſe things which are neither Virtues nor Vices, there is ſomething which may be of uſe, it is not to be taken away. Again, it is manifeſt, that a wiſe man doth ſomething in theſe mean things; he therefore, when he doth it, judgeth that it is his office ſo to do; but, a wiſe man is never deceived in judgment, therefore there is an office in mean things. Again, we ſee there is ſomething which we call a thing rightly done, or a Rectitude, but that is a perfect office; therefore there is an inchoat office; as, if it be a Rectitude *juſtly* to reſtore a depoſitum; to reſtore a depoſitum muſt

must be a ſimple Office. The Addition of *juſtly* makes it Rectitude, the ſimple Reſtitution without the additional term, is an Office.

(d) Cic. de fin. (d) And ſince it is not to be doubted, but that in mean things, ſome are to be performed, others rejected, whatſoever is done in that manner, is comprehended in common Office; whence it is manifeſt, that all men by nature loving themſelves, as well the fooliſh as the wiſe, will take thoſe things which are according to Nature, and reject the contrary. This is therefore one common Office of the wiſe and unwiſe, converſant in mean things.

All Offices proceeding from theſe, it is juſtly ſaid, that to thoſe are referred all our thoughts, even the forſaking of Life, or continuing in it. In whom moſt things are according to Nature, the Office of that Perſon is to remain in Life; in whom there are, or are foreſeen to be more things contrary to Nature, his Office is to forſake Life, altho he be happy, and of a fool to continue in Life, altho he be miſerable; for that good, and that ill, as we have often ſaid, are things that follow afterwards. The firſt Principles of natural Appetite, fall under the Judgment and Election of a wiſe Man, and is as it were the matter ſubjected to Wiſdom. Thus the reaſon of continuing Life, or forſaking it, is to be meaſured by all thoſe things we mentioned. For, neither are they who enjoy Virtue, obliged to continue in Life, nor they who live without Virtue to Die; and it is often the Office of a wiſe Man, to part with his Life, even when he is moſt happy, if it may be done opportunely, which is to live conveniently to Nature. This they hold, that to live happily, depends on opportunity; for Wiſdom commandeth, that a wiſe Man, if it be required, ſhould part with his Life. Wherefore Vice having not Power to bring a cauſe of voluntary Death, it is manifeſt, that the Office even of Fools, who are likewiſe wretched, is to continue in Life, if they are in the greater part of thoſe things, which we hold to be according to Nature. And foraſmuch as going out of Life, and continuing in it, be alike miſerable, neither doth continuance make his Life more to be avoided. We ſay not therefore without cauſe, that they who enjoy moſt Naturals, ſhould continue in Life.

Hitherto it appertains to know, that the love of Parents towards their Children is the effect of Nature, from which beginning, we may track all Mankind, as proceeding from thence. Firſt, by the Figure and Parts of the Body, which declare, that Nature carefully provided for Procreation. Neither can theſe two agree, that Nature orders Procreation, and takes no care that thoſe which are procreated ſhould be loved: For even in Beaſts the Power of Nature may be ſeen, whoſe care when we behold in bringing up of their Young, methinks we hear the very Voice of Nature her ſelf. Wherefore as it is manifeſt, that we abhor Pain by Nature, ſo it is likewiſe apparent, that we are driven by Nature to Love thoſe we have begotten.

Hence ariſeth a common natural Commendation of Men amongſt Men, that it behoveth a Man not to ſeem alienate from Man, for this very Reaſon, becauſe he is Man. For, as among the Parts of the Body, ſome are made only for themſelves, as the Eyes and Ears; others aſſiſt towards the uſe of other Parts, as the Thighs and Hands: ſo, tho ſome huge Beaſts are born only for themſelves; yet, that ſhell Fiſh which is called *Patula prima*, and the *Pinnoteres*, ſo named from keeping its Shell, which ſhutteth it ſelf up ſo cloſe, as if it taught others to look to themſelves; as alſo Ants, Bees, Storks, do ſomething for the ſake of others. Much nearer is the Conjunction of Mankind, ſo that we are inclined by Nature to Conventions, Counſels, Cities.

(e) Cic. offic. 1. (e) Whatſoever is produced upon the Earth, is created for the uſe of Man; but Men are generated for Men that they may profit one another. In this we ought to follow Nature our Leader, and to bring forth common benefit to the publick by mutual Offices, by Giving, by Receiving, by Arts, by Endeavours, and by Faculties, to unite the Society of Man with Man.

(f) Cic. de finib. 3. (f) The World is governed by the Power of God; it is as it were, a common City of Men and Gods, and each of us is a part of the World; whence it followeth by Nature, that we ſhould prefer the common Benefit before our own. For as Laws prefer the ſafety of the general before that of any particular; ſo a good and wiſe Man conformable to Law, not ignorant of Civil Office, taketh more care for the Benefit of the general, than of any particular, or of his own. Nor is he who betraies his Country more to be condemned, than he who deſerts the common Benefit or Safety. Whence it followeth, that he is to be commended who undergoeth Death for the Commonwealth, and teacheth us, that our Country is dearer to us than our ſelves. And becauſe that Speech is eſteemed inhumane and wicked of thoſe who affirm, They care not when they are dead, if all the Earth were ſet on Fire; it is certainly true, that we are likewiſe to provide for thoſe who ſhall hereafter be, even for their own ſake. From this Affection of the Soul, whence proceed Wills and Commendations of dying Perſons, as alſo, foraſmuch as no Man will live Solitary in a Deſart, even with the greateſt abundance or plenty; it is eaſily underſtood, that we are born for Conjuction, Congregation, or natural community; we are impelled by Nature to benefit others the moſt that we can. All theſe are Offices, chiefly by teaching and communicating the Reaſons of Prudence, ſo that it is not eaſy to find one, who will not communicate to ſome other what he knoweth himſelf. Thus we are not only inclined to learn, but alſo to teach. And as it is given to Bulls by Nature, to fight even with Lyons, for their Heifers, with great force and impetuoſity; ſo they who abound in Wealth, and are able to do it (as is related of of *Hercules* and *Bacchus*) are incited by Nature to preſerve Mankind. Likewiſe, when *Jupiter* is ſtil'd *Optimus* and *Maximus*, *Salutaris*, *Hoſpitalis*, *Stator*, we hereby expreſs that the ſafety of Mankind is under his Tuition. But we cannot expect, if we our ſelves are vile, abject, and neglected amongſt our ſelves, that we ſhould be dear to the immortal Gods, and loved of them. As therefore we make uſe of our Limbs, before that we have learnt for what cauſe of Utility we have them; ſo are we conjoined and conſociated

ſociated amongſt our ſelves by Nature to civil Community, which if it were otherwiſe, neither would there be any room for Juſtice or Goodneſs.

Yet tho there are mutual Chains betwixt Man and Man, Man hath no common right with Beaſts, [(g) *by reaſon of our diſſimilitude, as both* Chryſippus *and* Poſſidonius *affirm*] for all other things, ſaith *Chriſippus*, were made for Men and the Gods; but they for Community and Society one with another, ſo that Men may make uſe of Beaſts for their benefit, without doing any wrong.

(g) *Laert.*

Moreover, ſince the Nature of Man is ſuch, that there is a certain civil Right betwixt him and all Mankind, he who preſerveth that right, is juſt; who tranſgreſſeth it, unjuſt. But as in a Theater, tho it be common, that room which a man poſſeſſeth, is juſtly ſaid to be his place; ſo this civil Right in a City and the World, doth not repugn to the Propriety of particular Perſons.

In order to the Conſervation of all Society, Conjunction, and dearneſs betwixt Man and Man, Emoluments and Detriments, ὀφελήματα and βλάμματα, which benefit or hurt, muſt be common amongſt them, and not only common but equal. Convenients and Inconvenients, εὐχρηςήματα and δυσχρηςήματα, muſt be common, but not equal. Thoſe which benefit or hurt, are either good or ill, and therefore muſt neceſſarily be equal; Convenient and Inconvenient are ranked amongſt the preferred and rejected, and therefore cannot be equal: Emoluments and Detriments are common, but Rectitudes and Sins not common.

Herein Friendſhip is requiſite, as being one of thoſe things which benefit. Some affirm, That a good Man ought to be as much concern'd for his Friend as for himſelf; others, that every Man ought to be moſt concern'd for himſelf. Yet theſe latter confeſs, that it is contrary to Juſtice, whereunto we are born, to take away any thing from another, and aſſume it to our ſelves.

Neither can Friendſhip be contracted, nor Juſtice performed for private reſpects and advantages, for then theſe advantages might overthrow and pervert them. But neither could Juſtice or Friendſhip be at all, unleſs they were expetible in themſelves. Juſtice is by Nature; it is contrary to a wiſe man, not only to do an injury, but even to hurt. Neither can it be right to injure thoſe who are our Friends, or have deſerved well of us; Equity cannot be ſeparated from Utility; whatſoever is equal and juſt, is likewiſe honeſt; and reciprocally, whatſoever is honeſt, is equal and juſt.

(b) Cit. *offic. lib.* 1. *and again lib.* 3.

(b) *Panætius*, who diſcourſed moſt accurately of Offices, propoſeth three kinds wherein Men uſe to deliberate or conſult of Offices. Firſt, when they doubt, whether that of which the queſtion is, be Honeſt or Diſhoneſt. Secondly, whether it be Profitable or Unprofitable. Thirdly, if that which hath the ſhew of Honeſty, be Repugnant to that which ſeems Profitable.

(i) *Laert.* (k) *Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hypot.* 3. 25.

(i) Next the *Gods*, we are to reverence our *Parents* and *Brethren*. (k) As concerning the Burial of Parents, *Chryſippus* ſaith, it ought to be done in the moſt ſimple manner. For the Body, as the Nails, Teeth or Hair, thereof nothing pertaineth to us, and therefore ought not to be uſed with any curioſity or reſpect. Fleſh, if it be uſeful, ought to be converted into Aliment (tho it were a part of our own Body, as the Foot) as is proper to it; if uſeleſs, put under Ground, or thrown into ſome remote Place, without more reſpect than we have of our Nails or Hair when cut off.

(l) Concerning the Office of the *Buyer*, and the *Seller*, *Diogenes* the *Babylonian*, and *Antipater* his Diſciple differ. *Antipater* holds that all muſt be laid open, that the Buyer be not ignorant of any thing that the Seller knoweth; *Diogenes*, that the Seller as far as is appointed by Civil Law, ought only to tell the Faults, and to conceal the reſt, for as much as hein ſelling deſireth to ſell to his beſt advantage. (l) Cit. *de offic. lib.* 3.

*Hecaton* in his ſixth Book *of Offices*, is full of theſe Queſtions, as *whether a good Man in a dearth may give over Houſe-keeping*. He diſputes it on both ſides, but concludes that the Office is directed rather by Profit than Humanity.

He queſtions, *Whether if at Sea, a Ship be to be disburthen'd by the caſting out of ſomething, we ſhould rather caſt over board a Horſe of great price, or a Slave worth little.* In this caſe, private Intereſt leads one way, Humanity another.

*If a Fool in a Shipwrack catch hold of a Plank, may a wiſe Man wreſt it from him, if he can?* He ſaith, he may not, for it is injurious. What may the Maſter of the Ship? May not he take his own? No; no more than he may throw a Paſſenger out of the Ship, becauſe it is his own, into the Sea. For until they come to the place to which they are bound, the Ship is not the Maſters, but the Paſſengers.

*What if two Shipwrack'd Perſons light upon one Plank, and both pluck at it, ſhould one give it over to the other?* Yes; but to him, who, it is more expedient, ſhould live, either for his own ſake or the Commonwealth. But what if theſe be alike in both? There will be no Contention, but either as it were by Lot, or Mication with the Fingers (*giuoco della mora*) one will give place to the other.

*What if a Father rob Temples, undermine the publick Treaſury, ſhould the Son reveal it to the Magiſtrates?* It were a great wickedneſs. On the contrary, he ought to defend his Father, if he be called into queſtion. But is not our Country before all Offices? Yes, but it is for the good of our Country to have Citizens pious to their Parents.

*What if a Father ſhould aim at Poſſeſſion of the Tyranny, or endeavour to betray his Country, ſhall the Son keep his Counſel?* He ſhall beſeech him not to do it. If that prevail not, he ſhall accuſe him, yea, threaten; and laſtly, if the matter ſhall tend to the deſtruction of the Country, he ſhall preſer the ſafety of the Country before that of his Father.

*If a wiſe Man receive Counterfeit Money for good, if afterwards he know it to be Counterfeit Money, may he pay it where he ows any thing, for good?* *Diogenes* ſaith he may, *Antipater*, that he may not.

*If a Man ſell Wine that will not laſt, and know it to be ſuch, ought he to declare it or no?* *Diogenes* thinks he is not obliged, *Antipater* conceives a good Man muſt. Theſe are, as it were, caſes of Controverſy amongſt the Stoicks.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *Of Præter-offices.*

(a) Stob. (a) AS every perfect Office in a rational Creature is a Rectitude, and always compleat in all numbers; so every *Præter-office* in a rational creature is a sin. A sin is that which is done contrary to right reason, or in which something of Office is omitted by a rational Creature.

(b) Plut. de repugn. Stoic. (b) A good deed is the command of the Law. Sin the prohibition of the Law. Hence it is that the Law forbiddeth fools and madmen many things, but prescribeth them nothing, because they are not capable of doing any thing well.

(c) Stob. (c) All sins are impiety, as being a resisting of the will of the Gods. The Gods love Virtue and its works; they hate vice and its works. Every sin therefore displeaseth them, and consequently is impiety.

(d) Plut. de repugn. Stoic. (d) All sins are equal (so *Chrysippus* in the first of his *moral questions*, and *Persæus*, and *Zeno*) though not alike, for they flow from one fountain, as it were of vice, and the judgment is the same in all, but by the external object by which that judgment is made, they are rendred unlike. That they are equal, is evident from this: If there be not one truth more truth than another, nor one falshood more falshood than another, neither is one deceit more deceit than another, nor one sin more sin than another. He who is distant from *Canobus* a hundred furlongs, and he who is distant but one furlong, are both alike not at *Canobus*: so he who sins more, and he who less, are both alike not in the right way.

Yet, though sins are equal, there are some differences in them, forasmuch as some proceed from an obdurate incurable affection, others from an affection not obdurate nor incurable. And though every lie is equally a lie, yet all men do not lie equally; but, every sin is equally sin, for every sin consisteth in lying. Thus *Chrysippus*, *Persæus*, and *Zeno*. But *Heraclides* of *Tarsis*, friend to *Antipater*, and *Athenodorus* hold, that sins are unequal.

## CHAP. XV.

### *Of wise or virtuous Persons Paradoxes.*

THere are (according to *Zeno*) two kinds of men, the wise or virtuous, and the vicious. The wise make use of virtue through the whole course of their life, the vicious of Vice.

(a) Senec. (a) Of the wise there are two sorts, one in perfection consummate; the other in progression, procedent. Of the first are these following Paradoxes to be understood; (b) not that the Stoicks positively affirm there ever was such a one in nature (for (c) *Zeno*, *Cleanthes*, and *Chrysippus* were great and venerable persons, yet did not attain the height of human nature) but, that such a one might possibly be.

(b) Cic. in Laer. (c) Quintil. lib. 12.

(d) Laert. (d) *A wise man is void of passion*, for he cannot fall. There is another kind of person void of passion likewise, a wicked man that is obdurate and inflexible.

(e) Laert. (e) *A wise man is void of pride*, honour and dishonour are alike to him. There is another kind of person void of pride, a wicked man, equally inclinable to dishonour as to honour.

(f) Laert. Stob. (f) *A wise man is austere*, for he neither speaketh for complaisance, nor admitteth any thing spoken in that kind. There is another sort of austere persons, which resemble sowre wine, not fit for drinking, but for medicines only.

(g) Laert. (g) *A wise man is sincere*, for he taketh care, that he be not thought better than he is, by reason of some specious show, and withal to express whatsoever good he hath, without any Rhetorical gloss.

(h) Laert. Plut. de repug. Stoic. citing Chrysippus. (h) *A wise man is not pragmatical*; for he declines the doing of any thing that is beyond his office.

(i) Laert. Stob. (i) *A wise man is never drunk*, although he drink wine; for he never sinneth, but doth all things according to Virtue.

(k) Laert. (k) *A wise man is never mad*, yet sometimes strange phantasies may occur to him through melancholly or deliration, not according to the reason of eligibles, but præternatural.

(l) Laert. (l) *A wise man is never grieved*; for grief, according to *Apollodorus*, is an irrational contraction of the Soul.

(m) Laert. (m) *A wise man is divine*: for he hath God with himself; but a wicked man is an Atheist. An Atheist is taken two ways, for him who is an enemy to the gods, and for him who believeth there are no Gods: which all wicked men do not.

(n) Stob. (n) A wicked man is impious, because he doth all things according to Vice, as the good according to Virtue; and he who hath one vice, hath all. He is an enemy to the Gods, for enmity is the discord of life, as amity is the concord. The wicked differs from the gods in his course of life, and therefore is an enemy to them, for they account all their enemies who are contrary to them. The wicked are contrary to the good, God is good, therefore the wicked are enemies to God.

(o) Laert. (o) *A wise man is religious*; for he is skilful in all Divine rites. Religion is the Science of Divine worship. He sacrificeth to the gods, and is pure, detesting all sin, holy and just in Divine things.

(p) Laert. (p) *A wise man only is a Priest*, skilful in Sacrices, business of the Temple, Expiations, and other things proper to the Gods.

(q) Stob. (q) *A wise man only is a Prophet*, endued with the Science of those signs which are communicated by Gods or Demons which belong to humane life. In him therefore are all kinds of vaticination, as well by dreams, birds, and other things.

(r) Laert. (r) *A wise man reverenceth and loveth his Parents and Brethren, next the Gods.* He hath likewise an innate love of his Children, which the vicious hath not.

(s) Laert. (s) *A wise man ought to apply himself to some Office in the Commonwealth*, (according to *Chrysippus*) unless otherwise diverted: For he will encourage Virtue, and suppress Vice, (t) especially in those Commonwealths which are far from perfection. He ought to make Laws, instruct men, prescribe rules. To which is opposite, study of popularity, specious deceit, prescription of things unprofitable, which are not competible to a wise man.

(t) Stob.

(u) Laert. Cic. de finib. 3. (u) *A wise man ought to marry* (as *Zeno* in his Commonwealth) that he may have Children.

(x) *A*

(x) Laert. (x) *A wiſe man doth not opinionate* or think; but believe or know, for he never aſſents to any
(y) Stob. falſity. (y) Ignorance is an infirm aſſent; he thinks all firmly. There are two kinds of opinion, one an aſſent to things not comprehended, the other a weak belief. Neither of theſe are in a wiſe man, for he never aſſented without comprehenſion, and then always firmly, for nothing is hidden from him, otherwiſe he might have a falſe opinion. Therefore he is never diffident. Faith is proper to a wiſe man, for it is a firm exiſtmation. A Science is a firm habit, therefore a wicked man doth neither know nor believe.

(z) Laert. Cic. de finib. lib. 3. (z) *A wiſe man muſt imitate the Cynicks:* for Cyniciſm is the neareſt way for virtue, as *Apollodorus* in his Ethick: (a) Others ſay, a wiſe man
(a) Stob. ought to continue in that Sect, if he have been thereof; but if he have not, not to enter into it.

(b) Laert. (b) *A wiſe man may upon occaſion eat mans fleſh.* Of this already amongſt the Offices.

(c) Laert. Cic. Paradox. (c) *A wiſe man only is free*, the wicked are ſlaves; for liberty is the power of doing according to our own judgment. Servitude is a privation of the power of doing according to our own judgment. There is another kind of ſervitude which conſiſteth in ſubjection, a third in being poſſeſt and ſubjected, to which is oppoſed vicious domination.

(d) Laert. (d) *A wiſe man only is a King:* For Monarchy is a Principality ſubordinate to none, which only conſiſts in the wiſe, as *Chryſippus* in his Treatiſe, *That Zeno uſed words properly.* For (ſaith he) a Prince muſt know both good and bad, which
(e) Stob. none of the wicked knoweth. (e) Dominion and the kinds thereof, Monarchy, Magiſtracy, Generalſhip, Admiralty, and the like, are only proper to a wiſe man; therefore the wiſe only command, though not actually, yet potentially.

(f) Laert. (f) *A wiſe man only is proper to be a Magiſtrate, Judg, and Orator*; but not any of the wicked.

(g) Laert. (g) *A wiſe man is void of ſin*; for he cannot fall into error.

(h) Laert. (h) *A wiſe man is innocent, and uninjurious*, for he cannot hurt either himſelf or others,
(i) Stob. (i) nor receive, nor do any injury: For, injury is a hurtful injuſtice, which is not competible to a wiſe man, although he may be unjuſtly aſſaulted: for he having within himſelf all good and virtue, is not capable of vice or harm.

(k) Laert. Stob. (k) *A wiſe man is not merciful*, nor pardons any, remitting nothing of the puniſhments inflicted by Law, as knowing them to be proportioned to, not exceeding the offence; and that whoſoever ſinneth, ſinneth out of his own wickedneſs. A wiſe man therefore is not benign, for he who is benign, mitigates the rigor of Juſtice, and conceives the puniſhments inflicted by Law to be greater than they ought: But, a wiſe man knoweth the Law to be good, or a right reaſon, commanding what is to be done, and what not.

(l) Laert. (l) *A wiſe man nothing wonders at thoſe things which ſeem Paradoxal*, as *Charon*'s Cave, the ebbing and flowing of the Sea, and hot Springs, and ebullitions of fire.

(m) Laert. (m) *A wiſe man will not live in a deſart*, for he is communicative by nature, and practick, and will undertake exerciſe to ſtrengthen his body.

(n) *A wiſe man will pray*, requeſting good (n) Laert.
things of the Gods, as *Poſſidonius* affirms, in his firſt of Offices, and *Hecaton* in his Thirteenth of Paradoxes.

(o) *A wiſe man only is a friend:* Friendſhip is (o) Laert. Stob.
only amongſt the wiſe, for in them only is an unanimity as to things that concern life and community, ſo as our friends may make uſe of them as freely, as we our ſelves. Unanimity is the Science of common good. A friend is expetible in himſelf. Plenty of friends is a good: but, amongſt the wicked, there is no friendſhip; for friendſhip being real and not feigned, it is impoſſible it ſhould conſiſt without faith and conſtancy. But, in the wicked, there is infidelity, and inconſtancy, and hoſtility, and therefore not friendſhip, but ſome external connexions, whereby neceſſity or opinion ties them together.

(p) *A wiſe man doth all things well*, as we ſay, all (p) Laert.
Pipes play the *Iſmenian* tune well. (q) He doth (q) Stob.
all things wiſely, temperately, prudently, modeſtly, and according to the other virtues, throughout the whole courſe of his life. A wicked man doth all amiſs, ſinning in the whole courſe of his life, inconſtant by nature, often grieved by his own ill actions, wretched and troubled, foraſmuch as he is vexed at the thing done, ſo much is he angry at himſelf for being the Author of it.

(r) *A wiſe man loveth* (s) (*virtuouſly*) *thoſe, whoſe beauty expreſs their inward virtue.* Thus (r) Laert. Cic. Tuſc. quæſt. 4.
*Zeno*, *Chryſippus*, and *Apollodorus* affirm. For love (s) Cic. de finib. 3.
is an impulſion of benevolence, raiſed from beauty, which love is not of conjunction, but of friendſhip. For this reaſon, *Zeno*, though he were in love with *Theraſonides*, a young woman that was in his power, yet, ſuppreſt his affection becauſe ſhe was averſe from him. This *Chryſippus* calls the love of friendſhip, it is no way diſcommendable, for beauty is the flower of virtue.

(t) *A wiſe man upon occaſion will die voluntarily* (t) Laert.
for his Country and friends; or, in caſe he be ſeized by ſome exceſſive pain, loſs of his ſenſes, or incurable diſeaſes.

(u) *A wiſe man is* μάγας, for he compaſſeth that (u) Stob.
which is propoſed; ἄσφαλτος, for he is every way augmented; ὕψηλος, for he hath attained the juſt height of wiſdom; ἴσχυρος, for he is invincible, and inſuperable. The wicked are the contrary.

(x) *A wiſe man profiteth the wiſe, and is mutually profited by all the wiſe*, though not friends x Stob.
or acquaintance; for betwixt them there is a concord and community of goods, and he who benefiteth another, benefiteth likewiſe himſelf. A wicked man neither conferreth nor receiveth benefits; for one is to move towards virtue, the other is to be moved towards virtue.

(y) *A wiſe Man is a good Oeconomiſt*, skilful to y Stob.
acquire Wealth. Oeconomiſt is a habit Active, and Contemplative in the Buſineſs of a Family; Oeconomy is the ordering of Expences, Works and Poſſeſſions; the Science of Acquiſition is a Reaſon, whereby Wealth is attained, which ſome account in indifferents, others in good. But no wicked Man is a good Oeconomiſt, ſince only a wiſe Man knoweth from whence, how, and how far gain may be acquired.

(z) *A wiſe Man* only is perfect, for he wanteth z Stob.
no Virtue; a wicked Man is imperfect, for he hath no Virtue. Therefore the wiſe are always

happy,

happy, the wicked miſerable; which happineſs, according to *Chryſippus*, differs nothing from that of God, nor is leſs expetible. The wicked partake of no good, becauſe Virtue and that which partakes thereof is good, and thoſe things which are convenient and requiſite are proper only to the wiſe, as the contraries to the wicked.

(a) Stob. (a) *A wiſe Man is only Rich*; for good is true Riches, and ill true Poverty; a wicked Man is Poor, not having the means to become Rich.

(b) Stob. (b) *A wiſe Man is only Obedient*; the wicked can neither Obey nor Command.

(c) Stob. (c) *A wiſe Man only is honourable*; for honour is the reward of Virtue, the wicked wanting this, are juſtly diſhonourable.

(d) Stob. (d) *A wiſe Man is only Ingenuous and Noble*, according to ſome of the Stoicks; but others deny it, referring theſe not to Nature, but Inſtitution only, according to the Proverb, Cuſtom is a ſecond Nature. So that Ingenuity is an habit of Nature or Inſtitution, apt to Virtue; Nobility is a habit of Deſcent or Inſtitution, apt to Virtue.

(e) Stob. (e) *A wiſe Man is Pleaſing, Perſwaſive, Opportune and Sincere*; for he is expert in every thing, affable in Converſation, and helpful to the Publick: The wicked are the contrary.

(f) Stob. (f) *A wiſe Man is the beſt Phyſician*, for he hath conſidered his Conſtitution, and thoſe things which are requiſite for his Health.

(g) Stob. (g) *A wiſe Man may lawfully part with his Life*, the witked cannot, becauſe in their Life they never acquire Virtue, nor eſchew Vice. But Life and Death are limited by Offices, and their contraries.

(h) Stob. (h) *A wiſe Man will accept of Empire, and cohabit with Princes*; but not unleſs he perceive it may be done without danger, and to much advantage.

(i) Stob. (i) *A wiſe Man never lyeth*; for he who ſpeaketh a falſhood is not properly ſaid to lie, unleſs it be with intent to deceive. A lie may be uſed many waies without aſſent, as in War againſt Enemies, or in the like neceſſity.

(k) Stob. (k) *A wiſe Man neither deceiveth, nor is deceived*, for he never ſinneth, he uſeth not his ſight, hearing, or any other Senſe ill. He is not ſuſpicious, nor repenteth, for both theſe are proper to fallacious Aſſent. He can no way be chang'd, or err, or opinionate.

(l) Stob. (l) *A wiſe Man only* (tho not all wiſe Men) *is happy in Children, in old Age, in Death.*

(m) Stob. (m) *A wiſe Man doth nothing contrary to his Appetite*, for all ſuch things are done with a Privation, and nothing adverſe unforeſeen happeneth to him.

(n) Stob. (n) But in the Primitive time, there was ſome wiſe Man that did not deſire or will any thing, becauſe that thoſe things which were then preſent, were not ſufficient to be required by him.

(o) Stob. (o) *A wiſe Man is meek*, for meekneſs is a habit whereby things are done meekly, not breaking forth into Anger.

(p) Stob. (p) *A wiſe Man is Peaceful and Modeſt.* Modeſty is the Science of decent Motion; Tranquillity the order of natural Motions. The contrary to theſe are ſeen in the wicked.

(q) Stob. (q) *A wiſe Man is free from all Calumny*; he Calumniates none, and is not Calumniated by any; for Calumny is a lying Imputation of feigned Friends, to which the wiſe are not liable, for they are true Friends; the wicked are, for they are feigned.

(r) Stob. (r) *A wiſe Man delayeth nothing*, for delay is an Omiſſion of Office through Slothfulneſs, of which *Heſiod*,

> *Nothing defer a Year, a Month, a Day;*
> *He fights againſt himſelf that doth delay.*

(ſ) Stob. (ſ) *A wiſe Man can only incite, and be incited to Virtue*, a Fool cannot, for he neglecteth Precepts, and goeth no further than the Words, not proceeding to Action. A wicked Man is not deſirous to hear or Learn, as not being capable by Reaſon of his Imprudence of what is rightly ſaid; whence it followeth, that he can neither be incited nor incite to Virtue. He that is capable to be incited, or to incite, muſt be prepared by Philoſophy, which is not competible to a wicked Man, for he who diligently heareth Philoſophers, is not prepared to Philoſophy, but he who expreſſeth their Doctrine in their Life and Actions. This no wicked Man can do, for he is prepoſſeſs'd by Vice. If he ſhould be incited, Vice would pull him back; but none that is vicious incited to Virtue, as none Sick to Health.

(t) Stob. (t) *Every wicked Man is an Exile, wanting Law and Country*, for both theſe are good. That a City or Country is good, *Cleanthes* proveth thus. If there be a Habitation, where thoſe, who fly for Succor, find Juſtice, it is Good; but a City is ſuch a Habitation, therefore a City is Good. A City is taken three ways; for a Habitation, for a Convention of Men, and for both. In the two latter Significations it is called Good.

(u) Stob. (u) *Every wicked Man is Ruſtick*, for Ruſticity is Ignorance of Laws and Civil manners. A wicked Man refuſeth to live according to Law, and is hurtful as a Savage Beaſt.

(x) Stob. (x) *A wicked Man is Tyrannical, Cruel, Violent and Injurious*, whenſoever he gets an Occaſion.

(y) Stob. (y) *A wicked Man is Ungrateful*, not obliging nor requiring; for he doth nothing by Friendſhip.

(z) Stob. (z) *A wicked Man is not Perſeverant*, for Perſeverance is the Science of obtaining our purpoſe, not being deterred by Labour.

(a) Stob. (a) *A wicked Man is not capable of the right of Donation.* Donation is the good beſtowing of Eſtimation, but nothing that is good is competible to the wicked.

(b) Stob. (b) *Every wicked Man is delighted with his Wickedneſs*, which we may perceive not ſo much by his Diſcourſe, as Actions, which ſhews that he is carried on to Wickedneſs.

# THE THIRD PART.

## CHAP. I.

### *PHYSICK and the parts thereof.*

(a) Laert. (a) PHysick is divided into these places; *Of Bodies, Of Principles, Of Elements, Of Gods, Of Place, Of Vacuum:* thus especially; but generally into three places; *Of the World, Of Elements, Aitiologick of Causes.*

That concerning the *World*, is divided into two parts; whereof one, Contemplation is common also to the Mathematicks, concerning fixed Stars and Planets; as whether the Sun be of the same Magnitude as he appears to be, and whether the Moon be so likewise; of their Periods and the like: The other Contemplation proper only to Physick, to enquire into the Essence of these; whether the Sun and Stars consist of Matter and Form; whether Generate or Ingenerate, whether Animate or Inanimate, whether Corruptible or Incorruptible, whether govern'd by Providence or the like.

The place concerning *Causes*, is likewise twofold; whereof one, Contemplation, is common also to the Medicinal Disquisitions, whereby they enquire concerning the principal part of the Soul, and those things which are produced in the Soul and Seed, and the like. The other is likewise usurped by the Mathematicks, as, in what manner we see, what is the cause of the visual Phantasy; How are made Clouds, Thunder, Rainbows, Halo's, Comets, and the like.

## CHAP. II.

### *Of Bodies.*

(a) Senec. Epist. 89. (a) NAtural Philosophy brancheth into two parts, of Corporeals and Incorporeals.

(b) Laert. A Body is that which doeth or sufficeth; (b) It is the Sense with Essence or Substance, and finite:

(c) Plut. cont. Stoic. (c) whatsoever is, is a Body, for whatsoever is, either doeth or suffereth.

(d) Laert. (d) Principles are Bodies void of Form.

Elements are Bodies endued with Form.

(e) Plut. plac. phil. 1. 11. (e) Causes are Corporeal, because they are Spirits.

(f) Plut. cont. Stoic. (f) Qualities are Corporeal, for they are Spirits, and aerical Intentions, which affect the parts of all things, generated with Form and Figure.

(g) Plut. cont. Stoic. Tertul. de anima cap. 6. (g) Virtues, Vices, Arts, Memory, Phantasies, Affections, Appetitions, Assents, are Bodies, existing in the Supream part of the Soul.

(h) Sen. Ep. 1. 3. The Soul is a Body, because it maketh us to be living Creatures.

(i) Night and Day are Bodies.

(i) Plut. (k) Laert. (k) Voice is a Body, for it maketh that which is heard; in a word, whatsoever is, is a Body and a Subject, (l) for the Stoicks take away intellectual Substances, affirming all things that are, to be comprehended by Sense) only differences are not subsistent.

(l) Orig.

(m) Laert. (m) A solid Body (according to *Apollodorus*) is divisible three ways, into length, breadth and depth.

A Superficies is the term of a Body, or that which hath only Length and Breadth, but no depth; thus *Possidonius*.

A Line is the term of a Superficies, or a Length without Breadth, that which hath Length only.

A Point is the term of a Line, or the least mark.

(n) Stob. Phys. 17. (n) A Body is divisible into Infinite, yet it consisteth not of infinite Bodies.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of Principles.*

(a) Senec. Ep. 89. (a) THE place concerning Bodies, is divided into two degrees, into those which produce, and those which are produced, the first Principles, the second Elements.

(b) Laert. (b) Principles and Elements differ: Principles are Ingenerate, Incorruptible: Elements shall perish by Conflagration. Moreover, Principles are Bodies, and void of Form; Elements have Form.

(c) Laert. (c) There are two Principles of all things, the Agent, and the Patient: The Patient is a Substance void of Quality, called Matter: the Agent is the Reason which is in the Matter, God.

(d) Stob. Ph. (d) Matter is sluggish, a thing ready for all things, but will cease if none move it. The Cause, that is, the Reason formeth matter, and moldeth it which way he pleaseth, out of which he produceth various Works. There must therefore be something out of which a thing is made, and also by which it is made. This is the Cause, that Matter. (e) The Cause or active Reason is God.

(e) Ibid.

(f) Cic. (f) In the Agent there is Power, in the Patient a certain Matter [or Capacity,] and in both, both; for Matter it self could not Cohere, if it were not kept together by Power, nor that Power without some Matter; for there is nothing, which is not compelled to be somewhere.

(g) Both

(g) Both these, God and the World, the Artist and his Work, they comprehend within this term, *Nature*, as if Nature were God mixed through the World. (b) Sometimes they call that Nature which containeth the World, sometimes that which generateth and produceth things upon the Earth.

The Agent is, as we said, called the Cause. (i) A Cause, according to *Zeno*, is that, by which there is an effect, which is not a Cause; or, as *Chrysippus*, the Reason of the effect; or, as *Possidonius*, the first Author of a thing. A Cause is a Body, a not-Cause a Categorem. It is impossible that the cause being assigned, the Effect should not be present, which is to be understood thus: The Soul is the Cause through which we Live, Prudence the Cause by which we are Wise. It is impossible, that he who hath a Soul should not Live, or he who hath Prudence should not be Wise.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Of Matter.*

(a) THE Substance of all [(b) qualitative] Beings, is first Matter, acccording to *Zeno* and *Chrysippus*, in his first *of Physicks*.

(c) Matter is that of which every thing is made, it hath two Names, ὐσία Substance, and ὕλη Matter. Substance is of all things in general, Matter of particulars.

(d) Universal Matter is [(e) according to *Zeno*, wholly Eternal] not admitting, as *Chrysippus* saith, encrease or decrease.

(f) Particular Matter admitteth Augmentation and Diminution, (g) for it remaineth not always the same, but is separated and mixed, so that, according to *Chrysippus*, its parts perish by Separation, and exist by mutual Mistion. But those who call Fire, Air, Water and Earth, Matter, assert not a thing void of Form, but of a Body.

(b) Matter is a Body, [(i) and Finite.] *Possidonius* saith, that the Substance and Matter of the Universe is void of Quality and Form, in as much as it hath not a certain Figure and Quality in its self; but it is always seen in some Figure and Quality. But, the substantial Nature of the Universe, differs from Matter intentionally only.

(k) Matter is passible, for if it were immutable, things could not be generated of it. Hence it followeth, that it is divisible into infinite; yet, it self, as *Chrysippus* saith, it not Infinite, for nothing that is divisible is Infinite, but Matter is continuous.

(l) Through this Matter, *Zeno* affirmeth, that the Reason of the World, which some call Fate, is diffused as Seed.

## CHAP. V.

### *Of the World.*

OF this Matter was made *the World*. The World hath several Appellations, κόσμος, *the World*, τὸ πᾶν, *the All*; τὸ ὅλον, *the Whole*.

(a) κοσμος, World, is taken three ways: First, for God himself, who is properly qualified with all Essence, Incorruptible and Ingenerate, who framed the Universe after a certain period of time, who resolved all Nature into himself, and again generated it out of himself. Secondly, for the starry Ornament: and thirdly, that which consists of both:

(b) *The All*, τὸ πᾶν, is one way taken, as *Apollodorus* saith, for the World, and another way for the System of the World, and the Vacuity beyond it. The World is Finite, the Vacuity Infinite.

(c) Thus likewise they distinguish betwixt τὸ πᾶν, and τὸ ὅλον: τὸ πᾶν, includeth also an infinite Vacuity, in which the World is: τὸ ὅλον, signifies the World without that Vacuity, which neither is increased nor diminished; but its parts are sometimes extended, sometimes contracted. It began from the Earth as its Center, for the Center is the beginning of a Circle.

(d) The World is that which is properly qualited with the Essence of all things; or, as (e) *Chrysippus* and (f) *Possidonius* define it, a System of Heaven and Earth, and of the Natures therein contained; or a System of God and Men, and of all things that were made for them.

(g) The World was made by God; for if (saith *Chrysippus*) there be any thing which produceth such things, as Man, tho indued with Reason, cannot produce, that (doubtless) is greater and stronger, and wiser than Man. But a Man cannot make the Cœlestial things, therefore that which made them, transcendeth Man, in Art, Counsel, Prudence and Power, and what can that be but God?

(h) The World was made for those animate Essences which have the use of Reason, these are the Gods and Men, than whom nothing is better. (i) All things of which it consisteth, and which it produceth within it self, are accommodated to the use of Man.

The World was made in this manner; (k) God in the beginning being alone by himself, converted all Substance (which according to *Zeno*, was Fire) first into Air, then into Water. And as in the Plant the Seed is contained; so God, who is the prolifick Reason of the World, left such a Seed in the Humidity, as might afford easy and apt matter for the Generation of those things that were to be produced.

(l) *Zeno* addeth, that one part tending downward, was condensed into Earth, another part remained partly Water, and partly, being exhal'd, Air, of a particle of which Air flashed out Fire.

(m) *Cleanthes* describeth it in this manner. The Universe being set on Fire, the middle part thereof first setled downwards, then the next parts by little and little were quenched. Thus the Universe being wet, the extream fire, (the middle part opposing it) sprang upward, and began the constitution of the World, and the revolution of this constitution shall never end. For as the parts of every thing are at certain times produced of Seed; so the parts of the Universe (amongst which are living Creatures and Plants) are produced in their seasons; and as some reasons of the parts are mixed together in the seed, which being composed, are again dissolved; so of one are all things made; and again, of one

is all compounded by an equal and perpetual revolution.

(n) Laert. (n) The World is *One*, of the ſame corporeal ſubſtance, and of a Sphærical figure, for this is of all figures moſt apt for motion. Thus *Zeno*, *Chryſippus*, *Poſſidonius*, and others.

(o) Laert. (p) Plut. Pl. Phil. 2. 9. (o) The World is ſeated in an infinite incorporeal vacuity, which is beyond it, circumfuſed about it, (p) into which the World ſhall be diſſolved by Conflagration. The World is finite, the vacuity infinite; yet (q) *Poſſidonius* ſaith, it is no more than will ſuffice for the revolution of the World, when it ſhall periſh. (r) By this argument they confute the motion of Atomes downward, introduced by *Epicure*; for in that which is infinite, there are no local differences of high or low.

(q) Plut. pl. Phil. 2. 9.

(r) Plut. contra Stoic.

The world is not heavy, becauſe the whole Fabrick thereof conſiſteth of heavy and light Elements, and being placed in the midſt, whither ſuch bodies tend, it keepeth its place.

(s) Laert. (s) In the World there is no vacuity, but it is compleatly one, for that neceſſitates a conſpiration and harmony, betwixt Celeſtials and Terreſtrials.

(t) Plut. contra Stoic. The World only is (t) ſelf-ſufficient, becauſe it alone hath all in it ſelf, whereof it ſtandeth in no need. Of it ſelf it is nouriſhed and augmented, whereas the parts are tranſmuted and converted into one another.

u Plut. contr. Stoic. The World is a (u) perfect body, the parts of the World are not perfect; becauſe they are reſpective to the whole, and not of themſelves. The Univerſe is by Nature apt to move it ſelf in all parts, to contain, preſerve, and not break, diſſolve and burn it ſelf, the Univerſe ſending and moving the ſame point, and the parts thereof having the ſame motion from the Nature of the body. Like it is that this firſt motion is naturally proper to all Bodies, namely, to incline towards the midſt of the World, conſidering the World moveth ſo in regard of it ſelf; and the parts likewiſe, in that they are parts of the whole.

(x) Laert. (x) The World is a living Creature, rational, animate and intellectual (ſo *Chryſippus*, *Apollodorus* and *Poſſidonius*) and hath an animate ſenſible eſſence. For a living Creature is more excellent than that which is not a living Creature; but nothing is more excellent than the World, therefore the World is a living Creature That it is animate is manifeſt from our Soul, which is a piece thereof taken out of it. (But *Boethius* de-

(y) Laert. nies that the World is a living Creature) (y) The mind, or Providence paſſeth through every part thereof, as the Soul doth in us, but in ſome parts more, in others leſs; through ſome permeating, as a habit, as in the Bones and Nerves; through ſome as a mind, as through the principal (Hegemonick) part. In like manner the whole World is an animate rational Creature, the Hegemonical part thereof is the Æther, as *Antipater* the *Tyrian* in his Eighth Book of the World. But *Chryſippus* in his firſt of *Providence*, and *Poſſidonius*, *of the Gods*, affirm, that Heaven is the Hegemonick of the World; *Cleanthes*, the Sun. But *Chryſippus* in the ſame Book (differing from what he ſaid before) affirmeth it to be the pureſt part of the Æther, which they call the firſt God, ſenſibly, becauſe it paſſeth through all in the air, and through all living Creatures and Plants, but through the Earth as a habit.

(z) Laert. (z) The World, according to the greater part of Stoicks, is corruptible, for it is generated in the ſame manner as things comprehenſible by ſenſe. Again, if the parts thereof be corruptible, the whole is alſo corruptible; but the parts of the World are corruptible, for they are daily changed into one another, therefore the whole it ſelf is corruptible. And again, if any thing admit any change into the worſe, it is corruptible; but the World doth, for it admitteth exſiccation, and inundation; therefore, *&c.*

(a) Phil. Jud. de Immort. mundi. (a) The World ſhall periſh by fire, cauſed by the power of fire which is in all things, which after a long time, conſuming all the moiſture, ſhall reſolve all things into it ſelf. The Moon, Stars and Sun, ſaith (b) *Cleanthes*, ſhall periſh, but God ſhall aſſimilate all things to himſelf, and reſolve all into himſelf. (c) This opinion of the general Conflagration of the World, was held by the firſt and moſt ancient of this Sect, *Zeno*, *Cleanthes* and *Chryſippus*.

(b) Plut. com. not.

(c) Numen. apud. Euſeb.

(d) Plut. com. not. (d) This fire is the ſeed of the World; after the Conflagration it diffuſeth it ſelf even into the Vacuity that was beyond the World. Afterwards, by order of the ſame reaſon which made the World, it ſhall withdraw and contract it ſelf towards the generation of a new World, yet not be quite extinguiſhed, but ſo as that ſome portion thereof remain, foraſmuch as it is the cauſe of motion.

(e) Phil. Jud. (f) Cic. Acad. But (e) *Boethius*, *Poſſidonius*, and (f) *Panætius* deny this Conflagration of the World, conceiving rather that the VVorld is eternal, to whom likewiſe *Diogenes* the *Babylonian* aſſents.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of Elements.*

(a) Laert. (a) GOD having converted, as we ſaid, all matter into moiſture, and prepared it for the generation of future things, in the next place, produced the four Elements, Fire, VVater, Air, and Earth. Of theſe diſcourſeth *Zeno* in his Book of the Univerſe, and *Chryſippus* in his firſt of Phyſicks, and *Archedemus* of Elements.

(b) Laert. (b) Element is that, of which generated things are firſt made, and into which they are reſolved. The four Elements are matter or ſubſtance endued with quality. Fire is hot, Water moiſt, Air cold, Earth dry; yet not ſo, but that in Air, there is part of the ſame quality, for in the higheſt it is Fire, which is called Æther, in which is generated the firſt Sphere of Planets; next Air, then VVater, the baſis of all, Earth being placed in the midſt of all.

(c) Laert. (c) Of the four Elements, two are light, Fire and Air; the other two, Earth and VVater, heavy, which properly tend to the Center, but the Center it ſelf is no way heavy.

CHAP.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of Fire.*

(a) THE first Element is that of *Fire*, which, as all Bodies tend to the middle, inclineth, as much as the lightneſs of its Nature permits, to the centre of the World, by a circular motion round about it.

(b) There are (according to *Zeno*) two kinds of Fire, one artificial, requiſite to the uſe of life, which converteth nutriment into it ſelf; the other inartificial (ſo (c) *Cicero* renders ἀπεχνικὸν) by which all things grow, and are preſerved; (d) for whatſoever is nouriſhed and groweth, compriſeth within it ſelf the power of heat. This Fire is diffuſed through all the parts of the World, and they are all ſuſtained by it. That it is in the Earth, appeareth by Seeds and Roots, which ſpring up and grow by the temperament of this heat. That it is in Water appeareth, foraſmuch as Water is ſuſceptible of greater cold, as by freezing. It is conſequently in air alſo; that being a vapour extracted from Water, and ſupply'd by motion of the heat which is in the Water. But primarily, and originally, it is in the Element of Fire, a Nature abſolutely hot, which diſpenſeth ſalutary vital heat to all other things. (e) This is Nature, ſaith *Zeno*, and the Soul: Of Fire conſiſt the Sun, Moon, and Stars.

(a) *Stob.*
(b) *Stob.*
(c) *De Nat. deor.* 2.
(d) *Cic. de Nat. deor.* 2.
(e) *Stob. Phyſ.* p. 47.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of the Stars.*

(a) IN the *æther* are generated the Stars of the nobleſt and pureſt part thereof, without admixtion of any other Nature, wholly hot and pellucid, animate creatures indued with ſenſe and Intellect.

(b) *Poſſidonius* defineth a Star, a Divine body, conſiſting of ætherical fire, ſplendid and fiery, never reſting, but always moving circularly.

(c) That the Stars are wholly fiery, *Cleanthes* proveth by the teſtimony of two ſenſes, touch and ſight. For the Luſtre of the Sun is brighter than of any fire, ſeeing that it ſhines ſo far and wide, to ſo vaſt a world; and ſuch is its touch, that it not only warmeth, but oftentimes burneth, neither of which it would do if it were not fiery.

Now (ſaith he) the Sun being fiery, is either like that fire which is requiſite to the uſe of life, or unto that which is contained in the bodies of living creatures; but this our fire, which the uſe of life requireth, is a conſumer of all things, diſturbeth and diſpatcheth all things. On the contrary, the other is corporeal, vital, and ſalutary, it conſerveth all things, it nouriſheth, encreaſeth, ſuſtaineth, and affecteth with ſenſe; therefore, ſaith he, there's no queſtion to which of theſe fires the Sun is like, for he cauſeth all things to flouriſh and ſprout up, according to their ſeveral kinds: Wherefore the fire of the Sun being like thoſe fires which are in the bodies of living creatures, the Sun muſt be a living creature alſo, and ſo muſt be likewiſe the reſt of the Stars in the cæleſtial fire, which is called Æther or Heaven.

* For ſeeing that of living creatures, one kind is generated in the earth, other kinds in the water, others in the air, it were abſurd to think, that in that part which is moſt apt for generation of living creatures, no living creature is generated. The Stars poſſeſs the Æther, which being moſt rare, and in perpetual agitation and vigor, it is neceſſary the living creature that is generated in it, be endued with moſt acute ſenſe, quickeſt mobility. The Stars therefore have ſenſe and intelligence; whence it followeth, that they are to be reputed Gods. For we ſay, that they who live in the pureſt air, are much more acute and underſtanding, than thoſe who live in a thick climate: The diet likewiſe is thought to conduce not a little to the ſharpening of the underſtanding. Whence it is probable, the Stars are endued with moſt excellent underſtanding, foraſmuch as they dwell in the ætherial part of the World, and are nouriſhed with exhalations from the Sea and Earth, extenuated by a long diſtance. * *Cic. Nat. deor.* 2.

The ſenſe and intellect of the Stars is chiefly manifeſt from their order and conſtancy, for nothing can be moved by proportion and number without providence, in which nothing is temerarious, nothing various, nothing caſual. But the order of Stars, and conſtancy throughout all eternity, cometh neither from Nature, for that is void of Reaſon, nor from Fortune, which affecteth variety, and diſalloweth conſtancy.

Again, all things are moved either naturally, or violently, or voluntarily. Thoſe which move naturally, are carried either by their weight downward, or by their lightneſs upwards, neither of which is proper to the Stars, for their motion is circular. Neither can it be ſaid, that they are moved violently againſt their own nature; for what power can be greater? it remaineth therefore, that their motion be voluntary.

(d) No fire can ſubſiſt without ſome aliment, (e) the Stars therefore are nouriſhed by the vapours of the Earth. (d) *Cic.* (e) *Laert.*

(f) Of Stars (according to *Chryſippus*) there are two ſorts, both which are by nature divine, animate, and providential, the fixed and the Erratick. The multitude of the fixed is incomprehenſible; the Erratick are lower than the fixed; The fixed are all ranked in one ſuperficies, as is manifeſt to the ſight; the Erratick in ſeveral. The Sphere of fixed Stars includeth that of the Erratick. The higheſt of the Erratick, and next to the fixed Stars, is the Sphere of *Saturn*, next, that of *Jupiter*, after which, that of *Mars*, then that of *Mercury*, then that of *Venus*, then that of the *Sun*, and laſtly that of the *Moon*, which being neareſt the air, ſeemeth therefore aerial, and hath greateſt influence upon Terreſtrial Bodies. (f) *Stob.*

(g) *Saturn*, φαίνων, finiſheth his courſe in almoſt thirty years; *Jupiter*, φαέθων, in twelve; *Mars*, πυρόεις, in twenty four Months wanting ſix days; *Mercury*, στίλβων, in a year; *Venus*, φωσφόρος, (loweſt of the five Planets) in a year. (g) *Cic de Nat. deor.* 2.

(h) The *Sun* and the *Moon* are properly called ἄστρα, Stars; but ἀστὴρ and ἄστρον differ; for every ἀστὴρ is ἄστρον, but not the contrary. (h) *Stob.*

(i) The *riſing* of a Star, *Chryſippus* defineth, its advancement above the Earth; and the *ſetting* thereof its occultation under the Earth. The ſame Stars at the ſame time, riſe to ſome, and ſet (i) *Stob.*

set to others. The apparition of a Star, ὀπτολὴ, is its rising together with the Sun; and the setting thereof, is its setting with the Sun: for setting is taken two ways, in opposition to rising, and in opposition to apparition. As the apparition of the Dog-star is its rising together with the Sun, and its setting is its occultation under the Earth together with the Sun. The same is said of the Pleiades.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Of the Sun.*

(a) NExt *Venus* (the lowest Planet) is the *Sun*, the (b) chief of all that consist of this ætherial fire. The *Sun* is defined by *Cleanthes* and *Chrysippus*, an intellectual Taper, gather'd and kindled from the vapours of the Sea. (c) *Possidonious* defineth the *Sun* a most pure fire, greater than the Earth, of a Sphærical figure (as (d) *Cleanthes* also affirms) answerable to that of the World.

(e) That the *Sun* is fiery, is manifest in that it hath all the operations of (f) fire; and forasmuch as he is fire, it followeth that he must be nourished. (g) The *Sun* is nourished by exhalations from the great Ocean.

(h) According to the expansion of this subjected aliment, saith *Cleanthes*, in his motion from Tropick to Tropick, e moveth in a spiral line, from the Æquinoctial towards the North, and towards the South. (i) *Zeno* saith, he hath two motions, one with the World from *East* to *West*, the other contrary, through the Signs.

(k) That the *Sun* is greater than the Earth, appeareth in that it enlightneth, not only all the Earth, but Heaven also. Again, the shadow of the Earth being conical, argues the Sun to be greater than the Earth. Again, it is visible every where by reason of its magnitude.

(l) The *Sun* is Eclipsed by interposition of the *Moon* betwixt us and that part of the *Sun* which is toward us (as *Zeno* in his Book of the Universe.) For meeting the *Sun*, and coming under him, she seemeth to darken his light, and afterwards to disclose it again, as will appear in a Basin of water.

a Cic. Nat. deor. 2.
b Stob. p. 56, 57
(c) Laert.
d Stob. p. 57.
(e) Laert.
(f) Cic.
g Stob. p. 56. Laert.
h Stob.
i Stob. p. 57.
(k) Laert.
(l) Laert.

## CHAP. X.

### *Of the Moon.*

(a) IN the lowest part of the æther is the *Moon*: The Moon (according to *Zeno*) is an intellectual, wise, igneous Star, consisting of artificial fire. *Cleanthes* saith, she is of a fiery substance, and of a dirty figure. (b) *Lipsius* for πιλοειδῆ, dirty, substitutes πιλοτιδῆ, as if of the same figure, as a Hat or Cap. But perhaps there needs no alteration, for they (c) affirmed, as she is nearer to the Earth than the *Sun*, so is she of a more terrene Nature. (d) *Possidonius* and most of the Stoicks affirm, she is mixt of fire and air, (e) by reason of which diversity of substance she is not subject to corruption. (f) To this mixtion of air in her composition, they impute likewise those spots which are seen in her face. (g) She is greater than the Earth, as well as the *Sun* is, and Sphærical as the *Sun*, yet appeareth in various figures, the Full Moon, First Quarter, New Moon, Last Quarter.

(h) *Chrysippus* saith, she is a fire collected after the *Sun*, from the exhalation of fresh Waters, for which cause she is likewise nourished by them, as (i) *Possidonius* also asserteth.

(k) Her motion is spiral; (l) *Zeno* saith, she hath two motions, as the one with the VVorld from *East* to *West*, the other contrary through the Signs. (m) The period of her course is called a Month; μὴν, is likewise that part of the Moon which appeareth to us, for one half of her is always turned towards us.

The Moon is Eclipsed when she falleth into the shadow of the Earth. For although every Month she is opposite to the Sun, yet she is then only eclipsed when she is fullest, by reason of the obliquity of her course, whereby her latitude is varied towards the North and South. VVhen therefore she happens to be near the Ecliptick, and opposite to the *Sun*, she is Eclipsed; which happens (as *Possidonius* saith) in *Libra* and *Scorpio*, and in *Aries* and *Taurus*. Thus *Laertius*; but *Possidonius* seems to have been ignorant of, or not to have considered the motion of the Nodes of the Moon (commonly called *Caput & Cauda Draconis*) whereby the restitution or period of Eclipses is made in nineteen years, (κατὰ τὸ ὁλοσχερέστερον) which was the ground of *Meton's Period*, and of the *Cycle of the Moon*, in the *Julian* Calender.

h Stob. p. 57.
i Laert.
k Laert.
l Stob p. 57.
m Stob. p. 59.
Laert.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of Air.*

(a) NExt the sphere of the Moon (saith *Chrysippus*) is the Element of *Air*, interposed betwixt the Sea and Heaven ((b) spherical in figure) (c) consecrated by the name of (d) *Juno*, Sister and VVife of *Jupiter*, who is the Æther; betwixt these there is a near conjunction.

(e) The Air is divided into three Regions, the highest, the middle, and the lowest. The highest Region is the hottest and driest, and rarest, by reason of the vicinity of the eternal fires. The lowest and nearest to the Earth is thick and caliginous; because it receiveth terrene exhalations. The middle Region is more temperate than the higher and lower, as to siccity and rarity, but colder than both. This, wherein the clouds and winds are generated, is, according to *Possidonius*, forty furlongs above the Earth. Next to it is the pure and liquid air of untroubled light. From the turbulent part to the Moon is twenty hundred thousand furlongs.

(f) To the Air is attributed the primitive cold.

(g) As concerning things in the Air, *Winter* is the rigor of the Air, next above the Earth, occasion'd by the remoteness of the *Sun*, and is the coldest of the Seasons of the year. *Spring* is the season succeeding VVinter, preceding *Summer*, and is a good temperature of the Air, occasion'd by approach of the Sun. *Summer* is that season of the year, when the Air above the Earth is warmed, by the *Suns* access towards the North.

*Autumn*

a Stob.
b Cic.
c Laert.
d Cic.
e Stob. Phys.
f Laert.
g Laert.

a Stob. Phys. p. 59.
b Phys. Stoic. 2. 13.
(c) Laert.
d Plut. plac. 2. 25. Stob. p. 59. 2. 30.
e Pl. plac. Phil.
f Stob p. 60.
g Pl. Phil. 2. 26.

*Autumn* that ſeaſon of the year which followeth Summer, and precedeth VVinter, is made by the return of the Sun from us.

(b) Laert. (*b*) Winter cometh when the air is predominant in thickneſs, and is forced upward: Summer, when the fire is predominant, and driven downward.

(i) Plut. plac. Phil. 3. 7. (*i*) VVind is a fluxion of the air, having ſeveral names, from the variety of places; as for example: That which bloweth from the darkneſs of the night, and Sun-ſetting, is called *Zephyrus*: from the Eaſt and Sun-riſing, *Apeliotes*; from the North, *Boreas*; from the South, *Lybs*. (*k*) It is occaſion'd by the Sun's extenuation of the vapours.

(k) Laert.

(l) Laert. (*l*) The *Rain-bow* is a reflection of the Sun's beams from a humid Cloud: or, as *Poſſidonius*, an apparition of part of the Sun or Moon in a Cloud, dewy, concave, and continuous to the phantaſie, as in a Looking-glaſs, the repreſentation of a Circle.

(m) Laert. (*m*) *Comets* are fires ſubſiſting of thick air, carried up to the ætherial place.

(n) Laert. (*n*) Σέλας is an accenſion of ſudden fire, ſwiftly carried through the air, appearing lengthways.

(o) Laert. (*o*) *Rain* is a converſion of clouds into water, when either from the Earth, or from the Sea, by the power of the Sun, the humour is drawn upwards ineffectually.

(p) Laert. (*p*) *Froſt* is congealed rain.

(q) Laert. (*q*) *Hail* is a concrete cloud, diſperſed by the wind.

(r) Laert. (*r*) *Snow* is humidity, from a concrete cloud, according to *Poſſidonius*.

(s) Laert. (*s*) *Lightning* is an accenſion of clouds, which are driven by the winds upon one another, and broken, according to *Zeno*.

(t) Laert. Plut. plac. Phil. 3. Stob. p. 65. (*t*) *Thunder* is a noiſe occaſion'd by the colliſion of clouds.

(u) Laert. (*u*) *Thunderbolt* is a ſtrong inflammation ruſhing upon the Earth with great violence, when the clouds by impulſion of the winds are broken againſt one another. Some define it a converſion of fiery inflamed air, violently ruſhing down.

(x) Laert. (*x*) *Typho* is a violent Thunder, thruſt down with a great force of wind, or a ſmoking wind, which ruſheth down upon the breaking of the cloud.

*Preſter* is a cloud incloſed with fire by wind in the concavity of the Earth: There are many kinds, *Earthquakes*, *Chaſma*'s, and the like.

## CHAP. XII.

### *Of Water and Earth.*

(a) Stob. THat part of the World (ſaith (*a*) *Chryſippus*) which is the moſt ſolid ſupport of Nature, as bones are in a living Creature, is called the Earth: About this the Water is evenly diffuſed. The Earth hath ſome uneven parts ariſing out of the Water, called Iſlands, or, if of large extent, Continents, from the ignorance of man, who knows not, that even thoſe are Iſlands, in reſpect of the great Ocean.

Plut. plac. Phil. 3. 9. Laert. Plut. plac. Phil. 3. 10. The Earth is in the midſt, being in the nature of a Center, (*b*) one and finite, (*c*) ſpherical in figure. The Water is likewiſe ſpherical, having the ſame Center with the Earth.

The Earth hath five *Zones*, one Northern, beyond the Artick Circle, uninhabitable through extremity of Cold: another Temperate; a third not Habitable by reaſon of extream Heat, whence it is called Torrid; a fourth Temperate; a fifth Southern, not Habitable by reaſon of Cold. * But *Poſſidonius* conceiveth the Climate under the Equinoctial to be Temperate; for, ſaith he, under the Tropicks where the Sun dwells longeſt, the places are habitable, and why not then under the Æquator? Again, the Night being equal to the Day, affordeth leiſure enough for refrigeration, which is aſſiſted likewiſe by ſhowers and winds. * *Cleomed.*

* The generation of the world began from the Earth, as from the Center; for the Center is the beginning of a ſphear. * *Stob.*

(d) Plut. plac. Phil. 5. 56. (*d*) Plants have not any ſoul at all, but ſpring up of themſelves, as it were by chance.

## CHAP. XIII.

### *Of Moſtion and Temperament.*

(a) Stob. Phyſ. 20. CHryſippus aſſerteth a (*a*) Spirit moving it ſelf to it ſelf, and from it ſelf, or a ſpirit moving it ſelf backwards and forwards. He calleth it ſpirit, as being moved air, anſwering in ſome proportion to the Æther, ſo that it both meets in one; and this motion is only according to thoſe who think, that all nature receiveth mutation, ſolution, compoſition, and the like.

*Compoſition*, *mixtion*, *temperament*, and *confuſion* are different. Compoſition is a contract of bodies, whoſe ſuperficies are contiguous to one another, as in heaps of grain or ſand. Mixtion is of two or more bodies, whoſe qualities are diffuſed through the whole, as we ſee in fire, and red hot iron, and in our own ſouls; for every where there is a diffuſion through entire bodies, ſo as one body doth paſs through another. Temperament is of two or more humid bodies, whoſe qualities are diffuſed through the whole. Mixtion is alſo common to dry bodies, as to fire and iron, to the ſoul and the body, temperament only to the humid. For qualities appear from the temperament of ſeveral humid things, as of Wine, Honey, Water, Vinegar, and the like; that in ſuch temperament, the qualities of the things tempered remain, is evident from this, that oftentimes they are by ſome art ſeparated from one another. For, if we put a ſponge dipped in oyl into wine mixt with water, the water, ſeparating it ſelf from the wine, will gather to the ſponge. Laſtly, confuſion is the tranſmutation of two or more qualities into another of a different nature, as in compoſition of Unguents and Medicines.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *Of Generation and Corruption.*

(g) Stob. Phyſ. (*a*) POſſidonius aſſerteth four ſpecies of Generation and corruption, of things that are, into things that are (for that of things that are not, and of things that are not to be rejected, conceiving there is none ſuch.) Of tranſmutations into

into things that are, one is by diviſion, another by alteration, a third by confuſion, a fourth of the whole by reſolution. Of theſe, alteration concerneth the ſubſtance, the other three are of the qualities which inhere in the ſubſtance. According to theſe are generations made. But the ſubſtance it ſelf is neither augmented nor diminiſhed by appoſition or detraction, but is only altered as happeneth to numbers and meaſures. But in things properly qualited, as *Dion* and *Theon*, there is augmentation and diminution, wherefore the quality of each remaineth from the generation until the corruption thereof, in plants and living creatures which are capable of corruption. In things properly qualited, he aſſerted two ſuſceptible parts; one, according to the ſubſtance, another according to the quality. This, as we have often ſaid, admitteth augmentation and diminution. Neither is the thing properly qualited, and the ſubſtance out of which it is, all one, nor divers, but only, not all one, becauſe the ſubſtance is a part, and occupateth the ſame place; but things that are divers have diſtinct places, and are not conſider'd in part. That as to the thing properly qualited, and as to the ſubſtance, it is not the ſame, *Mneſarchus* affirmeth to be evident, becauſe it is neceſſary, that to the ſame happen the ſame things. For if, for example, a man having formed a horſe, ſhould break it, and make a dog, we would preſently, beholding it, ſay, this was not before, but it is now: So are the qualited and the ſubſtance divers. Neither is it likely that we ſhould all be the ſame as to ſubſtance; for it often happens, that the ſubſtance is preexiſtent to the generation, as the ſubſtance of *Socrates* was, before *Socrates* was; and after the corruption and death of *Socrates*, the ſubſtance remaineth, though *Socrates* himſelf be not.

## CHAP. XV.

### *Of Motion.*

(a) Stob. (a) MOtion (according to *Chryſippus*) is a mutation of Parts, either in whole or in parts, or an exceſſion out of place, either in whole or in part, or a change according to place, or figure. *Jaculation* is a vehement motion from on high. *Reſt* is partly a privation of Motion in a Body, partly the ſame habit of a Body before and after. There are two firſt Motions, *right* and *oblique*; from the Mixtion of theſe ariſeth great variety of Motions.

(b) Stob. (b) *Zeno* affirms the parts of all things conſiſting by themſelves, are moved towards the middle of the whole, and likewiſe of the World it ſelf; wherefore it is rightly ſaid, that all parts of the World tend to the middle thereof, and principally the heavy, and that there is the ſame cauſe of the *Reſt* of the World in the infinite Vacuity, and of the *Reſt* of the Earth, in the World, in the midſt of which it is conſtituted as a point. All Bodies have not Gravity, as Air and Fire; yet theſe in ſome manner tend to the midſt of the World.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of Living Creatures.*

(a) Plut. Pl. Ph. (a) OF animate Creatures there are two kinds (for Plants as we ſaid have no Souls) ſome are Appetitive and Concupiſcible, others Rational. The *Soul*, according to *Zeno*, *Antipater* and *Poſſidonius*, is a hot Spirit, for hereby we Breathe and Move. *Cleanthes* ſaith, we Live ſo long as that heat holdeth.

Every Soul hath Senſe, and is a Spirit innate in us, wherefore it is a Body, and ſhall not continue after Death; yet is it by Nature corruptible, notwithſtanding, that it is a part of the Soul of the Univerſe which is incorruptible: Yet ſome hold, that the leſs firm Souls, ſuch are thoſe of the unlearned, periſh at the Diſſolution of the Body; the ſtronger, as thoſe of the wiſe and virtuous, ſhall laſt even until the general Conflagration.

(b) Laert. Plut. plac. phil. 4. 4. (b) The Soul hath eight parts, whereof five are the Senſes, the ſixth Generative, the ſeventh Vocal, the eighth Hegemonick.

(c) Plut. plac. phil. 4. 4. (c) The Supream or Hegemonick part of the Soul, is that which maketh Phantaſies, Aſſent, Senſe, Appetite. This Supream part is called Ratiocination; (d) it is ſeated in the Heart, ſome ſay in the Head, as in its Sphear.

(d) Plut. plac. phil. 4. 4. (e) Plut. plac. phil. 4. 21. (e) From the Hegemonick iſſue, are extended to the Body the ſeven other parts, which it guideth by their proper Organs, as a Fiſh its Claws.

*Senſe* is an Apprehenſion by the Senſitive Organ, or a Comprehenſion. Senſe is taken many ways; For the Faculty, Habit, Act, Phantaſy, whereby the ſenſible Object is comprehended, and the Hegemonick parts of the Soul are called Senſe. Again, the Senſories are intelligent Spirits, diffuſed from the Hegemonick to the Organs.

(f) Plut. plac. phil. 4. 21. (f) The Senſes are Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taſt, Touch.

(g) Plut. plac. phil. 4. 21. (g) *Sight* is a Spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the Eyes. *Sight* is made by Contraction of that Light which is between the Eye and the Object, into a Cone, according to *Chryſippus*. *Apollodorus* ſaith, that part of the Air which is Conical is next the Sight, the Baſe next the Object; ſo as that which is ſeen is pointed out to by the Air as by a ſtick.

*Colour* is the firſt Figuration or habit of matter.

*Darkneſs* is viſible, for from the Sight there iſſueth a Splendor which paſſeth round about that Darkneſs. Neither is the Sight deceived, for it truly ſees that it is Dark. *Chryſippus* ſaith, that we ſee according to the Intention of the mediate Air, which is ſtruck by the viſual Spirit, which paſſeth from the Hegemonick to the Apple of the Eye, and after that blow, falleth upon the Ear next, extending it ſelf in a Conical Figure. Again, from the Eye are emitted fiery Rays, not black or dusky, and therefore Darkneſs is viſible.

(i) Plut. plac. phil. 4. 21. (i) *Hearing* is a Spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the Ears. *Hearing* is made when the Air betwixt the Speaker and Hearer is verberated in a Circulation, and at laſt by Agitation, paſſeth in at the Ears, as the circles that are made in a Pond, by caſting in a Stone.

(k) Smel-

(k) *Smelling* is a Spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the Noſtrils.

(l) *Taſting* is a Spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the Tongue.

(m) *Touching* is a Spirit, extended from the Hegemonick part to the Superficies, ſo that it perceiveth that which is obliged to it.

(n) The ſixth part of the Soul is the Generative, which is a Spirit from the Hegemonick to the *Paraſtatæ*; of this part, ſee *Laertius* from πνεύμα δὲ λέγουσιν εἶναι, &c. to ὡς ὁ σφαῖρος, and *Plutarch de Philoſoph. Plac. lib.* 5. *cap.* 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 23.

(o) The ſeventh and laſt part of the Soul, is that which *Zeno* calls Vocal, commonly called the Voice. It is a Spirit proceeding from the Hegemonick part to the Throat, Tongue, and other proper Inſtruments of Speech. (p) Voice is Air, not compoſed of little pieces, but whole and continuous, having no Vacuity in it. This Air being ſtruck by the Wind, ſpreadeth into Circles infinitely, until the Air round about it be filled like the Water in a Pond by throwing in of a Stone, only the Water moves ſpherically, the Air circularly. Voice is a Body, for it acteth, it ſtriketh upon, and leaveth an Impreſſion in our Ear, as a Seal in Wax. Again, whatſoever moveth and diſturbeth ſome Affection, is a Body; Harmony moveth with delight, Diſcord diſturbeth. Again, whatſoever is moved is a Body, but Voice is moved and reverberated from ſmooth Places, as a Ball againſt a Wall. So in the *Egyptian* Pyramids, one Voice is redoubled four or five times.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *Of* GOD.

HItherto of the material Principle, and that which is produced of it; we come now to the other Principle, the Agent, *God*.

(a) This queſtion they divide into four parts; firſt, that there are Gods; ſecondly, what they are; thirdly, that they order the World; fourthly, that they take care of human Affairs.

*Cleanthes* ſaith, That the notions of God are imprinted in the minds of Men from four Cauſes. Firſt, from Divination, for the Gods afford us ſigns of future things, wherein if there be any miſtake, it is not from their part, but from the Error of humane Conjecture. The ſecond is from the multitude of good things we receive by the temperature of Heaven, the fertility of the Earth, and abundance of other benefits. The third from the Terror of Thunder, Tempeſt, Rain, Snow, Hail, Devaſtation, Peſtilence, Earthquakes, and ſometimes Groanings, ſhowers of Stones and Blood, Portents, Prodigies, Comets and the like; with which men are affrighted into a belief, that there is a heavenly Divine Power. The fourth and greateſt cauſe is the Æquability of the Motion and Revolution of Heaven, the Sun, Moon and Stars, their Diſtinctions, Variety, Beauty, Order, the very ſight whereof declares that they were not made by chance.

That there are Gods, *Chryſippus* proveth thus: (b) If there is ſomething in Nature, which the Mind, Reaſon, Power, and Faculties of Man could not make, that which did make it is better than Man; but Celeſtial things, and all thoſe, whoſe order is Sempiternal, could not be made by Man; there is therefore ſomething which made them, which is better than Man, and what is that but God? For if there are no Gods, what can there be in Nature better than Man? For in him only is reaſon, than which nothing is more excellent. But for a man to think that there is nothing in the World better than himſelf, is a fooliſh Arrogance. Therefore there is ſomething better, and conſequently there is a God.

(c) *Zeno* more conciſely thus; That which is Rational, is better than that which is Irrational, but nothing is better than the World, therefore the World is Rational. In like manner may be proved that the World is wiſe, that it is happy, that it is Eternal, for all theſe are better than the want of theſe: But there is nothing better than the World; whence it followeth that the World is God. (c) *Cic. ibid.*

Again, he argues thus. No part of an inſenſible thing hath Senſe; but the parts of the World have Senſe, therefore the World hath Senſe.

He proceedeth to urge this more ſtrictly: Nothing, ſaith he, that is void of Mind and Reaſon, can of it ſelf Generate that which is Animate and Rational; but the World generates animate and rational Creatures, therefore the World is animate and rational.

Likewiſe, according to his Cuſtom, he concludeth his Argument with a Similitude: If out of an Olive-tree ſhould come harmonious Pipes, that made Muſick, you would not doubt, but that the Science of Muſick, were in the Olive-tree. What if a Plain-tree ſhould bear Muſical Inſtruments? you would think there were Muſick in thoſe Plain-trees: Why then ſhould we not judg the World to be animate and wiſe, that produceth out of it ſelf animate and wiſe Creatures?

There is nothing beſides the World which wanteth nothing, and which is perfect and compleat in all its Numbers and parts: for as the cover, ſaith *Chryſippus*, was made for the Shield's ſake, and the Scabbard for the Sword's; ſo beſides the World, all other things were made for the ſake of ſomething elſe. Fruits of the Earth were made for living Creatures, living irrational Creatures for the uſe of Man, Horſes for Carriage, Oxen for Tillage, Dogs for Hunting and Defence; but Man himſelf was made to contemplate and imitate the World. Not that he is at all perfect, but only a part of that which is perfect. But the World it ſelf, foraſmuch as it comprehendeth all things, neither is there any thing which is not in it, is every way perfect. What therefore can be wanting to that which is beſt? But, there is nothing better than the Mind and Reaſon, therefore theſe cannot be wanting to the World.

*Chryſippus* addeth this Compariſon: As all things are beſt in the moſt perfect and mature Creatures, as in a Horſe better than in a Colt, in a Dog better than in a Whelp, in a Man better than in a Child: So that which is beſt in all the World, muſt be in that which is perfect and abſolute;

but, than the World, nothing is more perfect, nothing better than Virtue, therefore the World hath proper Virtue. The Nature of Man is not perfect; yet, in Man there is Virtue, how much more then in the World? The World therefore hath Virtue, therefore it is wise, and consequently God.

(d) Plut. pl. Ph. 1. 6. (d) Thus the notion and apprehension men have of God, is, first, by conceiving the beauty of those things which are objected to their eyes, for no beautiful thing hath been made by chance and adventure, but composed and framed by some ingenious and operative art. Now that the Heaven is beautiful, appeareth by the form, colour, and bigness thereof, by the variety also of Stars disposed therein. Moreover, the World is round in manner of a Ball, which figure of all others, is principal and most perfect, for it alone resembleth all the parts; for being round it self, it hath the parts also round.

(e) Laert. As to the second part of the question, (e) God is an Immortal being, rational, perfect, or intellectual in Beatitude, void of all evil, provident over the world, and things in the world, not of humane form, maker of all, and as it were father of all.

(f) Plut. pl. Ph. 1. 6. (f) They define God a spirit full of intelligence, of a fiery nature, having no proper form, but transforming himself into whatsoever he pleaseth, and resembling all things.

We understand by God, saith *Antipater*, a living nature or substance, happy, incorruptible, doing good to mankind. All men acknowledg the Gods immortal. They who deprive the Gods of beneficence, have an imperfect notion of them, as they likewise, who think they are subject to generation and corruption.

(g) Pl. contrad. Stoic. (h) Stob. (g) Yet, are there some Gods, saith *Chrysippus*, generative and mortal, as well as there are others ingenerate: [The (h) World, Stars, and Earth are Gods, but the supreme God is the ætherial mind, *Jupiter*.] The Sun, Moon, and other such like Gods were begotten; but *Jupiter* is eternal. Other Gods use a certain nourishment, whereby they are maintained equally; but *Jupiter* and the World after another sort than the generated, which shall be consumed by fire. *Jupiter* groweth continually, until such time as all things be consumed in him, death being the separation of the soul and body; for seeing that the soul of the World never departeth at all, but augmenteth continually, until it have consumed all the matter within it self, we cannot say that the World dieth.

(i) Laert. (i) The substance of God, *Zeno* affirms to be the whole World and Heaven; so also *Chrysippus* in his 11*th* of the Gods, and *Possidonius* in his first of the Gods. But *Antipater* in his *Seventh of the World*, affirms his substance to be aerial. *Boethius* in his Book of Nature, saith, the substance of God is the Sphere of fixed Stars. Sometimes they call him a nature containing the World, sometimes a nature producing all upon Earth.

(k) Plut. As concerning the *third* part of the question, they affirm, that (k) God is an operative artificial fire, methodically ordering and effecting the Generation of the World, comprehending in himself all prolifick reason, by which every thing is produced according to Fate. God is a Spirit, diffused through the whole World, having several denominations, according to the several parts of the matter through which he spreadeth, and the (l) several effects of his power shewn therein. They call him Δία, as Δι' ὃν πάντα, by whom all things are: ζωὴν, as the Author τῆς ζωῆς, of Life. *Minerva*, as diffused through the Æther; *Juno*, as through the air; *Vulcan*, as through the (m) artificial fire; *Neptune*, as through the water; *Ceres*, as through the Earth. In like manner the rest of his Names were imposed, with respect to some property. (n) This place was first discoursed upon by *Zeno*, after whom *Cleanthes* and *Chrysippus* dilated more largely upon it.

(l) Laert.

(m) Perhaps should be χνάδε, the Æschylus ascribe this to Vulcan, τὸν πύριχνον πῦρ.

(n) Cic.

(o) By this Providence, the World, and all parts of the World, were in the beginning constituted, and are in all time ordered. This disputation they divided into three parts: The first, from the same reason that teacheth us there are Gods, inferreth, that the World is ordered by them, seeing that there is nothing higher or more excellent than this administration. The second, from that reason which teacheth us, that all things are subjected to an understanding nature, and exquisitely ordered by it, inferreth, that it is generated of animate principles. The third place is derived from admiration of Cœlestial and Terrestrial things. Upon these *Cicero* discourseth at large, according to the opinion of the Stoicks.

(o) Cic.

As to the fourth part of the question in general concerning the Gods, that they have a particular providential care of mankind, it is manifest, in that whatsoever is in this World was made for the use of man, and is conducible thereunto; and if for the whole species, they must consequently have the same care of particulars, which they express by many portents, and all those signs whereupon the Art of *Divination* depends. There was never any great person without some divine inspiration. But we must not argue from hence, that if the Corn or Vineyard of any man be hurt by a Tempest, or Fortune deprive him of any of the conveniencies of life, that he to whom this hath happened, may be judged to be hated or neglected of God. The Gods take care of great things, the little they neglect; but to great persons all things have always a happy issue.

(p) *Chrysippus* in his fourth Book of *Providence* saith, there is nothing more ignorant, nothing more sordid than those persons, who think, good might have been without ill. For Good and Ill being contraries, it is necessary, that both consist together mutually, sustaining one another, as it were by opposition. For, how could we understand *Justice*, unless there were *Injuries*? What is Justice, but a privation of Injustice? How can *Fortitude* be understood, but by opposition to *Fear*? How *Continence*, but from *Intemperance*? How *Prudence*, if there were not *Imprudence*? Why do not these Fools desire that *Truth* might be without *Falshood*? Such are *Good* and *Ill*, *Happiness* and *Misery*, *Grief* and *Pleasure*; one is ti'd to the other, as *Plato* says, by their contrary ends.

(p) Aul. cap. 1.

(q) Here followeth the Question, Whether that Providence which framed the World and Mankind, did make likewise those corporeal Infirmities and Sicknesses which Men suffer. *Chrysippus* affirmeth, it was not the intent of Nature

(q) Aul.

to

to make Men obnoxious to Sickneſs: For this agreeth not with the Author of Nature, and Parent of all good things; but he having generated many great things, moſt apt and uſeful, other things alſo, incommodious to thoſe which he made, were aggenerated together with them, coherent to them, made, not by Nature, but certain neceſſary conſequence κατὰ παρακολούθησιν. As, ſaith he, when Nature framed the Bodies of Men, more ſubtle reaſon and the benefit of the World, would have required that the Head ſhould have been made of the ſmalleſt and thin bones; but this utility would have been followed by another extrinſecal inconvenience of greater conſequence, that the Head would be too weakly defended, and broken with the leaſt blow. Sickneſſes therefore and Diſeaſes are engendred whilſt health is engendred. In like manner, ſaith he, whilſt *Virtue* is begotten in Man, by the counſel of Nature, Vices likewiſe are begotten by contrary affinity.

## CHAP. XVIII.

### *Of Nature.*

(a) Plut. plac. 28. Laert. (a) NExt *Jupiter*, *Poſſidonius* placeth Nature. By Nature they ſometimes underſtand that which containeth the World, ſometimes that which produceth things upon Earth; both which, as we ſaid, is to be underſtood of God. For that Nature which containeth and preſerveth the World, hath perfect ſenſe and reaſon, which power is the Soul of the World, the Mind and Divine Wiſdom. (b) Thus under the term of Nature, they comprehend both God and the World, affirming that the one cannot be without the other, as if Nature were God permeating through the World, God the Mind of the World, the World the Body of God. (c) This *Chryſippus* calleth *Common-Nature* in diſtinction from particular Nature.

(b) Lactant. 7. cap. 3.

(c) Plut.

(d) Laert. (d) Nature is defined by *Zeno* an artificial fire, proceeding in the way of Generation, which is the fiery ſpirit, the Artiſt of forms; by others, a habit receiving motion from it ſelf, according to prolifick reaſon, and effecting and containing thoſe things which ſubſiſt by it, in certain definite times, producing all things, from which it ſelf is diſtinct by Nature, propoſing to it ſelf theſe two ends, Utility and Pleaſure, as is manifeſt from the production of Man.

## CHAP. XIX.

### *Of Fate.*

(a) Stob. 1. 9. (a) THE third from *Jupiter* (according to *Poſſidonius*) is *Fate*, for *Jupiter* is firſt, next Nature, then Fate.

(b) Plut. pl. l. 1. 28. (b) They call Fate a concatenation of Cauſes, that is, an order and connexion which cannot be tranſgreſſed.

Fate is a cauſe depending on Laws, and ordering by Laws, or a reaſon by which the World is ordered.

Laert. (c) Fate is, according to *Zeno*, the motive power of matter, diſpoſing ſo and ſo, not much differing from Nature and Providence.

(d) *Panætius* affirmeth Fate to be God. (d) Stob.

(e) *Chryſippus* defineth Fate a ſpiritual power, governing the World orderly; or, (f) a ſempiternal and indeclinable ſeries and chain of things, it ſelf, rolling and implicating it ſelf by eternal orders of conſequence, of which it is adapted and connected; or, as *Chryſippus* again in his Book of *Definitions* hath it, (g) The reaſon of the World, or Law of all things in the VVorld, governed by Providence; or the reaſon why things paſt have been, the preſent are, the future ſhall be. For Reaſon, he uſeth Truth, Cauſe, Nature, Neceſſity, and other terms, as attributed to the ſame thing in different reſpects. Fate from the ſeveral diſtributions thereof, is called *Clotho*, *Lacheſis* and *Atropos*. *Lacheſis*, as it diſpenſeth to every one, as it were by lot; *Atropos*, as it is an immutable diſpenſation, from all eternity; *Clotho*, in alluſion to the reſemblance it hath with ſpinning and twiſting of Threads.

(e) Stob. (f) Agel. (g) Stob.

(b) Neceſſity is a cauſe invincible, moſt violent, and inforcing all things. (i) Fortune is a Cauſe unknown and hidden to humane reaſon. For ſome things come by Neceſſity, others by Fate, ſome by deliberate Counſel, others by Fortune, ſome by Caſualty.

(b) Plut. pl. Phil. 1. 27. (i) Plut. ph. 1. 29.

(k) But Fate, being a connexion of Cauſes interlaced and linked orderly, compriſeth alſo that cauſe proceedeth from us.

(k) Pl. Phil. 1. 27.

(l) That all things are done by Fate, is aſſerted by *Zeno* in his Book of *Fate*, and *Poſſidonius* in his ſecond Book of *Fate*, and *Boethus* in his 11*th* of *Fate*. VVhich (m) *Chryſippus* proves thus: If there is any motion without a cauſe, then every axiom is not either true or falſe; for that which hath not efficient cauſes, will be neither true nor falſe; but every axiom is either true or falſe, therefore there is no motion without a cauſe. And if ſo, then all things that are done, are done by precedent cauſes, and if ſo, all things are done by Fate. That all axioms are either true or falſe, *Cicero* ſaith, he labour'd much to prove, whereby he takes away, *Poſſibles*, *Indeterminates*, and other diſtinctions of the *Academicks*, of which ſee *Alcinous*, Chap. 26.

(l) Laert. (m) Cic. de Fato.

(n) In anſwer to *the ſluggiſh reaſon*, if it be your fate to die of this ſickneſs, you ſhall die whether you have a Phyſician or no; and if it be your fate to recover, you ſhall recover whether you have a Phyſician or not. *Chryſippus* ſaith, that in things ſome are *ſimple*, ſome *conjunct*. Simple is thus, *Socrates* ſhall die on ſuch a day; for whether he do any thing or not, it is appointed he ſhould die on ſuch a day. But if it be deſtin'd thus, *Laius* ſhall have a ſon *Oedipus*, it cannot be ſaid, whether he accompany with a woman or not, for it is a *conjunct* thing, and *confatal*, as he terms it, becauſe it is deſtin'd that *Laius* ſhall lie with his wife, and that he ſhall get *Oedipus* of her. As if we ſhould ſay, *Milo* ſhall wreſtle at the Olympick Games, and another ſhould infer, then he ſhall wreſtle whether he have an adverſary or no, he were miſtaken; for that he ſhall wreſtle is a conjunct thing, becauſe there is no wreſtling without an adverſary. Thus are refelled all ſophiſms of this kind (you ſhall recover whether you have a Phyſician or not) for it is no leſs determined by fate that you ſhall have a Phyſician, than that you ſhall recover. They are *confatal*.

(n) Cic. de fin.

Thus there being two Opinions of the old Philoſophers; one, that all things are ſo done by Fate, that Fate inferreth a Power of Neceſſity, as *Democritus*, *Heraclitus*, *Empedocles*, and *Ariſtotle* held; the other, That the motions of our Souls were voluntary without any Fate: *Chryſippus*, as an honourable Arbitrator, took the middle way betwixt theſe, but inclining moſt to thoſe who conceive the motions of our Souls free from neceſſity. The Antients, who held all things to be done by Fate, ſaid, It was by a violence and neceſſity; thoſe who were of the contrary Opinion, denied, that Fate had any thing to do with our Aſſent, and that there was no neceſſity impoſed upon Aſſents. They argued thus: If all things are done by Fate, all things are done by an antecedent Cauſe; and if Appetite, then likewiſe thoſe things which follow Appetite, therefore Aſſents alſo. But, if the cauſe of Appetite is not in us, neither is the Appetite it ſelf in our Power; and if ſo, neither thoſe things which are effected by Appetite are in our Power, and conſequently neither Aſſents nor Actions are in our Power; whence it followeth, that neither Praiſe can be Juſt, nor Diſpraiſe, nor Honour, nor Puniſhment; but this is falſe, therefore all things are not done by Fate.

But *Chryſippus* not allowing this neceſſity, yet maintaining that nothing happened without precedent Cauſes, diſtinguiſheth thus. Of Cauſes, ſaith he, ſome are perfect and principal, others aſſiſtant and immediate. When we ſay, all things are done by Fate, from antecedent Cauſes, we underſtand not the perfect and principal Cauſes, but the aſſiſtant and immediate. He therefore Anſwers the former Objection thus: If all things are done by Fate, it followeth, that all things be done by antecedent Cauſes, but not by the principal and perfect, but by the aſſiſtant and immediate, which tho they be not in our Power, it followeth not, that the Appetite likewiſe is in our Power. This Argument therefore concludes well againſt thoſe who joyn Neceſſity with Fate, but nothing againſt thoſe who aſſert antecedent Cauſes not perfect nor principal. What Aſſent is, and how it cometh to be in our Power, we have already ſhewn in the *Logick*.

(*o*) *Agell.* 6. 2. Hence it followeth, that (*o*) notwithſtanding that all things are neceſſarily co-acted and connected by Fate, with a certain principal Reaſon; yet (ſaith *Chryſippus*) our Minds are ſo obnoxious to Fate, as their property and quality is. For, if at the firſt by nature they were formed ſoundly and profitably, all that Power which cometh upon them extrinſecally from Fate, they tranſmit eaſily and inoffenſively; but, if they are Harſh, Ignorant and Rude, not ſupported by any helps of good art, altho they are preſſed by little or no conflict of fatal incommodity, yet by their own Unluckineſs, and voluntary Impulſion, they ruſh into continual Sins and Errors, which thing maketh that this natural and neceſſary Conſequence of things, which is called Fate, be by this Reaſon. For it is, as it were fatal, and conſequent in its kind, that wicked Minds ſhould not be without Sins and Errors, an inſtance whereof he bringeth not unappoſite. As, ſaith he, a rolling Stone, if you turn it down a ſteep Place, you firſt give it the cauſe and beginning of its Precipitation, but afterwards it rolleth headlong of it ſelf; not that you make it do ſo any longer, but becauſe its Figure, and the Volubility of its form is ſuch. In like Manner, Order, and Reaſon, and Neceſſity, moveth the beginnings of Cauſes; but the impetuouſneſs of our Thoughts and Minds, and our own Actions, are guided by every Mans private Will and Mind. Thence, continueth he, the *Pythagoreans* ſay,

*Men of their own accord their Ills procure.*

As conceiving that all Ills proceed from themſelves, and according to their own Appetites when they Sin and Offend, and according to their own mind and deſign.

For this Reaſon he denieth, That we ought to ſuffer and hear ſuch wicked, or idle, or noxious, or impudent Perſons, who being taken in ſome fault and wickedneſs, have recourſe to the neceſſity of Fate, as to a Sanctuary, affirming, that they have done wickedly, is not to be attributed to their timerity, but to Fate.

## CHAP. XX.

### *Of Not-Bodies, or Incorporeals; and firſt of Dicibles.*

HItherto of Bodies; we come next to the ſecond place of Phyſick, concerning Not-Bodies, or Incorporeals. Incorporeal is that which may be, but is not contained in Bodies. (*a*) Of thoſe there are four kinds, Dicibles, Vacuum, Place and Time. (*a*) Sext. Emp. adv. Phyſ.

Dicible is that which conſiſteth according to rational Phantaſy, a mean betwixt Notion and Thing. Of this already in the Logick.

## CHAP. XXI.

### *Of Vacuum and Place.*

THE ſecond Incorporeal is *Vacuum*, which is the Solitude or Vacuity of a Body. In the World there is no Vacuum, neither in the whole nor in any part: Beyond it there is an infinite Vacuity, into which the World ſhall be reſolved. Of this already in the Chapter concerning the World.

Next is Place: Place is that which is fully occupated by the Body; or, as *Chryſippus* defines it, that which is or may be occupated by one or more things. Thus it differs from Vacuity, which hath no Body, and from Space, which is occupated but in part, as a Veſſel half full of Wine.

## CHAP. XXII.

### *Of Time.*

LAſt of the Incoporeals is *Time*. Time is, according to many of the Stoicks, the motion of it ſelf, not of Heaven, and had no beginning of

of Generation. *Chryſippus* ſaith, That Time is the meaſure of Slowneſs or Swiftneſs. *Zeno* defined it the interval of Motion, and meaſure of Slowneſs and Swiftneſs, according to which, all things were and are.

*Poſſidonius* ſaith, That ſome are wholly infinite, as all Time; ſome only in part, as the paſt and future; for they are joyned together by the preſent. He defined Time the interval of Motion, or the meaſure of Swiftneſs and Slowneſs, one part of it being preſent, the other future, the preſent connected to the future by ſomething like a point. It is called τὸ νῦν, attributed to the leaſt part of Time that falleth under Senſe, ſubſiſting according to the difference of paſt and future.

*Chryſippus* ſaith, That Time is the interval of Motion, the meaſure of Swiftneſs and Slowneſs, a conſequent interval to the Worlds motion, according to which all things are, and are moved, unleſs rather there be a two-fold Time, as the Earth and Sea, and Vacuity, and Univerſe, have the ſame names with their parts. And as Vacuity is every way infinite, ſo Time is both ways infinite, for the preſent and future have no end. He likewiſe aſſerts, That no entire preſent is Time, for continuous things being divided into Infinite, Time likewiſe admitteth of the ſame Diviſion; ſo that no Time is properly preſent, but ſo called, after a leſs accurate manner. The preſent only is, ſubſiſtent, unleſs it be underſtood as of *Categorems*; as, walking is attributed to him that walketh, but not to him that ſitteth or lieth. Thus much for the *STOICAL PHILOSOPHY.*

# CLEANTHES.

## CHAP. I.

### *His LIFE.*

*Cleanthes* was of *Aſſus* an *Æolian* City (fortified, as *Strabo* deſcribes it, both by Nature and Art) Son of *Phanias*. He was firſt according to *Antiſthenes* a Wreſtler, and coming to *Athens*, having no more than four Drachms, he applied himſelf firſt to *Crates*, then to *Zeno*, whom he heard conſtantly, and perſevered in his Philoſophy and Opinions.

He was much commended for his Laborioufneſs, in as much as being poor, he went by Night to the Gardens to draw Water, and in the Day time ſtudied Philoſophy. Hence he was called φρεάντλης. *The Drawer of Water.*

Being cited to the Court to give an Account how he lived, being ſo Healthful and Luſty, he produced the Gardener, under whom he drew Water, and a Woman for whom he ground Meal, to witneſs how he Subſiſted. The *Areopagites* wondring hereat, allotted him, 10 *minæ*, which *Zeno* would not ſuffer him to accept. *Antigonus* gave him 3000. *minæ*. On a time leading ſome young Men to a Spectacle, the Wind blew back his Cloak, and diſcovered that he had no Coat; whereupon the *Athenians* much applauded him, and, as *Demetrius* the *Magneſian* ſaith, beſtowed a Coat upon him.

*Antigonus*, who was his Auditor, asked him why he drew Water, he anſwer'd *Do I only draw Water? Do I not alſo dig and water the Ground, and all for the ſake of Philoſophy?* For *Zeno* brought him up to this, and bad him bring him an *Obolus* gained by his Labour. Upon a time he brought in his gains before all his Diſciples, ſaying, *Cleanthes, if he would, could maintain another* Cleanthes; *but they who have wherewithal to maintain themſelves, would be ſuppli'd by others; yet ſtudy Philoſophy nothing the more diligently.* Hence *Cleanthes* was called a *ſecond Hercules.* He was very Laborious, but dull and ſlow.

He uſed to write the Dictates of *Zeno* in Shells, and the Shoulder-blades of Oxen, for want of Money to buy Paper. He was his Auditor 19. years.

For theſe Reaſons, tho *Zeno* had many other eminent Diſciples, yet he ſucceeded him in the *School.*

## CHAP. II.

### *His Apophthegms.*

(a) HIS Fellow-Diſciples derided him, he took it patiently, and being called *Aſs*, anſwered, he only could bear *Zeno*'s burthen. (a) *Laert.*

Another time being reproached as Timerous, *Therefore*, ſaith he, *I ſin little.*

Preferring his own Poverty before the plenty of the Rich; *Whilſt they*, ſaith he, *Play at Ball, I Manure a hard barren Soil.*

He often chid himſelf, being all alone, which *Ariſto* over-hearing; whom, ſaith he, do you chide? he ſmiling, anſwered, *A Gray-headed old Fellow without Wit.*

To

To one that ſaid, *Arceſilaus* abrogated the Offices of Life; Peace, ſaith he, diſpraiſe him not, for tho he take away Offices in Diſcourſe, he commends them in his Actions; To whom *Arceſilaus* ſaying, I cannot endure Flattery; *I do indeed Flatter*, replies *Cleanthes*, *when I ſay, you ſpeak one thing and do another.*

To one that asked what he ſhould teach his Son; he anſwer'd in the words of *Electra*;

*Peace, peace, a little Step.*

A *Lacedemonian* ſaying, that Labour was good, he laughed, anſwering,

*My Son, thou of a gen'rous Race art come.*

Diſputing with a young Man, he asked him whether he did feel; the other anſwers he did; he replied, *Why then do I not feel that you feel?*

*Soſythius* the Poet, ſaying in the publick Theatre when *Cleanthes* was preſent;

*Thoſe whom* Cleanthes *madneſs leads away*; he ſat ſtill, not changing his Countenance; whereupon the Auditors applauding him, turned out *Soſythius*, who afterwards coming to *Cleanthes*, told him he was ſorry that he had reproached him; *Cleanthes* anſwer'd, *It were unfit I ſhould behold unconcerned* Bacchus *and* Hercules *derided by the* Poets, *and be angry at a little word againſt my ſelf.*

He compared the *Peripateticks* to *Lutes*, that make good Muſick, but hear it not themſelves.

Holding, according to *Zeno*, that the mind may be diſcerned in the Countenance, ſome merry young Men brought an effeminate Youth to him ruſtically Cloathed, deſiring his Opinion of that Mans Diſpoſition. He bad him depart, which the other going to do, ſneezed; *Cleanthes* preſently cried out, *I have found out the Man, he is Effeminate.*

To one that was all alone talking to himſelf, *You Diſcourſe*, ſaith he, *with a Man that is not Ill.*

To one that repeoach d him with his Age, *I would be gone*, ſaith he, *but when I conſider that I am in Health, fit to Write and Study, I rather chuſe to ſtay.*

(b) *Cic. de Finib. lib.* 2. (b) *Cleanthes* bad thoſe who came to hear him, to fancy Pleaſure painted in a Tablet, richly habited and adorned, ſitting upon a Throne, the Virtues ſtanding about her, as her Handmaids, doing nothing elſe but wait on her Commands, and whiſpering in her Ear (if it can be fancied of a Picture) to bid her take heed of doing any thing imprudently, that may offend the Minds of Men, or any thing that may occaſion Grief.

(c) *Stob. Ser.* 116. (c) He ſaid, Whoſoever ſweareth, at the ſame time ſweareth truly, or forſweareth himſelf: if he intend to do that which he ſweareth, tho he do it not, he ſweareth truly; if he intend it not, he is forſworn.

(d) *Ser.* 126. (d) One obſerving him ſilent, ſaid to him, why do you hold your Peace? it is pleaſant to talk to Friends; *It is indeed*, anſwer'd *Cleanthes*, *but the more pleaſant it is, the more we ought to allow them the freedom of it.*

(e) *Ser.* 210. (e) He ſaid, That unlearned Men differed from Beaſts in their Figure.

(f) *Ser.* 212. (f) Being demanded why amongſt the Ancients, when there were feweſt Philoſophers, there were more Eminent than at this time; he anſwer'd, *Becauſe then they minded the thing it ſelf, now only in Words.*

(g) To one that asked him, how a Man might be Rich, he anſwered, by being Poor in Deſire. (g) *Ser.* 230

## CHAP. III.

### *His Writings.*

HE left behind him (ſaith *Laertius*) theſe excellent Books.

*Of Time.*
*Of* Zeno's *Philoſophy.*
*Explications of* Heraclitus, 3.
*Of Senſe* 4.
*Of Art.*
*To* Democritus.
*To* Ariſtarchus.
*To* Erillus.
*Of Appetite*, 2.
*Archæology.*
*Of God.*
*Of Gyants.*
*Of Hymeneals.*
*Of a Poet.*
*Of Office*, 3.
*Of right Conſultation.*
*Of Gratitude.*
*Protreptick.*
*Of Virtues.*
*Of Ingenuity.*
*Of* Gorgippus.
*Of Envy.*
*Of Love.*
*Of Liberty.*
*The Art of Love.*
*Of Honour.*
*Of Glory.*
*The Politick.*
*Of Counſel.*
*Of Laws.*
*Of Judging.*
*Of the Reaſon of Living.*
*Of Speech*, 3.
*Of the End.*
*Of honeſt Things.*
*Of Actions.*
*Of Science.*
*Of a Kingdom.*
*Of Friendſhip.*
*Of a Sympoſium.*
*That the Virtue of Man and Woman is the ſame.*
*That a wiſe Man may uſe Sophiſms.*
*Of* Chria's.
*Diſſertations*, 2.
*Of Pleaſure.*
*Of Properties.*
*Of Inexplicables.*
*Of Dialectick.*
*Of Tropes.*
*Of Categorems.*

*Beſides theſe, are mentioned*

(a) *Of Atoms.* (a) Laert. in Zen.
*Of Braſs.*
(b) *Of Sumptions.* (b) Athen. deipn.
*Fabulous Traditions.*
(c) *The Art of Rhetorick.* (c) Cic. de Inv. l. 4.

CHAP.

## CHAP. IV.

*His Death.*

HE lived according to *Laertius* 80 Years, according to *Lucian*, 99. The occasion of his Death this, being troubled with a soreness of his Gums (*Stobeus* saith, an Ulcer under his Tongue) he was enjoyned by the Physitians to fast two days; which he did, and was well; then they told him he might eat again, but he would not, saying, he was now gone a great way on his Journey; (*a*) *would you have me*, saith he, *having past over the greatest part of my Life, return back again, and begin it a new?* (*b*) Having fasted two days more, he Died. (*a*) *Stob.* (*b*) *Laert.*

(*c*) *Simplicius* saith, he saw an exquisite statue of *Cleanthes* in *Assus*, an example of the magnificence of the Roman Senate, dedicated to his Honour. (*c*) *In Epictet.*

# CHRYSIPPUS.

## CHAP. I.

*His Life.*

CHrysippus was of *Soli*, (a City of *Cilicia*, afterwards called *Pompeiopolis*) his Father was of *Tarsis*, named *Apollonius*, or, as *Suidas*, *Apllonides*, who came and lived at *Soli*, which perhaps gave *Laertius*, and from him *Suidas*, occasion to doubt whether *Chrysippus* himself were not of *Tarsis*.

He first exercised in the *Hippodrome*. *Hecaton* saith, that having wasted his Patrimony in the Kings service, he applyed himself to Philosophy. Coming to *Athens*, he heard, as some affirm, *Zeno*, or rather (as *Diocles* and others) *Cleanthes*, from whom whilst he was yet alive he dissented. He was an eminent Philosopher, Ingenious and Acute in every thing; so that in most opinions he differ'd from *Zeno* and *Cleanthes*, to whom he would only say, *tell me the Doctrines, and let me alone for Proofs*. If at any time he crossed *Cleanthes* in dispute, he was afterwards sorry for it, often saying,

*Of happiness in all I am possess'd,*
*But in* Cleanthes; *there alone unbless'd.*

He was so famous for *Dialectick*, that it was a common speech, *If the Gods themselves would use Dialectick, they would make use only of the Chrysippean*. But he was more plentiful in matter, than free in expression.

He was infinitely studious and industrious, as appeareth from the multitude of his Books. An old Woman that waited on him said, that he wrote every day 500 Paragraphs.

When any question'd him in private, he answer'd meekly and freely; but as soon as any company came, he grew eager and litigious, saying,

*Brother, there hangs a cloud before your Eyes;*
*Cast quite away this madness, and be wise.*

When he drunk at Feasts, he lay very still, only shaked his Legs; whereupon his Woman said, *Chrysippus's legs only are drunk*.

He had so good an opinion of himself, that to one who asked him to whom he should commend his Son, he answered, *To me; for if I knew any better, I would hear Philosophy of him my self*: Whence it was said of him,

*He is inspir'd by* Jove,
*The rest like shadows move.*

As also that,

*Had not* Chrysippus *been,*
*No* Stoa *we had seen.*

*Arcesilaus* and *Lacydes* (as *Sotion* saith) coming into the *Academy*, he studied Philosophy with them; whence he disputed *against* Custome, and *for* Custome, and of *Magnitude* and *Multitude*, using the arguments of the *Academicks*. *Laert.*

(*b*) He was a great despiser of Honours, for of all his Writings, he Dedicates none to any King. (*b*) *Laert.*

(*c*) He was content with little, for (*d*) he lived without any other attendants than one old Woman; and when *Ptolomy* wrote to *Cleanthes*, desiring he would come to him, or send some one of his Disciples, *Sphærus* went, but *Chrysippus* refused. (*c*) *Stob.* (*d*) *Laert.*

Having sent for *Aristocreon* and *Philocrates*, his sisters sons, he first taught in the *Lyceum* in the open Air, as *Demetrius* writes.

CHAP.

## CHAP. II.

### His Apophthegms.

(a) Laert. (a) TO one that blamed him for not hearing *Ariſto* as *many* did; If I ſhould follow *many*, ſaith he, I ſhould not ſtudy Philoſophy.

To a Dialectick aſſaulting *Cleanthes* with Sophiſms: *Leave*, ſaith he, *diverting an aged perſon from ſerious things; propound thoſe to us that are young.*

(b) Stob. (b) He ſaid, meditation is the fountain of diſcourſe.

(c) Stob. Ser. 44. (c) He ſaid, drunkenneſs is a leſſer madneſs.

(d) Ser. 48. (d) He ſaid, a wiſe man grieveth, but is not troubled, for his mind yields not to it.

(e) Ser. 71. (e) To one that ſaid to him, Your friend revileth you behind your back: *Blame him not*, ſaith he, *for he might do it before my Face.*

(f) Ibid. (f) To a wicked man that caſt many aſperſions upon him: *You have done well*, ſaith he, *not to omit any thing that is in your ſelf.*

(g) Ibid. (g) Being told that ſome ſpoke ill of him; *It is no matter*, ſaith he, *I will live ſo, that they ſhall not be believed.*

(h) Ser. 116. (h) He ſaid, there is a difference between ſwearing true, and ſwearing truly; and betwixt ſwearing falſe, and forſwearing. That which is ſworn, at the time that it is ſworn, muſt neceſſarily be either true or falſe, ſeeing that the form of ſwearing is an *Axiom*: But he that ſweareth, at the ſame time that he ſweareth, is not neceſſarily perjur'd, or ſweareth true, becauſe the time is not yet arrived that muſt determine his Oath. For as a man is ſaid to have covenanted truly or falſely, not when the covenant is made, but when the time whereby it is limited is come: ſo a man is ſaid to ſwear truly or falſely, when the time comes wherein he promiſed to make good his oath.

(i) Ser. 151. (i) Being demanded why he did not undertake the government of the Commonwealth; *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *If I govern ill, I ſhall diſpleaſe the Gods; if well, the people.*

(k) Ser. 249. (k) He ſaid, he who hath arrived at perfection, diſchargeth all offices, omitting none, yet his life is not happy, for Beatitude is a poſt-acceſſion thereto, when as the mean actions acquire a conſtancy, habit, and peculiar confirmation.

## CHAP. III.

### His Writings.

BEcauſe, ſaith *Laertius*, his Writings were very celebrious, we ſhall give an account of them digeſted according to their ſubjects: They were theſe.

*Of the Logical place, Theſes.*
*Logick.*
*Philoſophick Commentaries.*
*Dialectick definitions, to* Metrodorus, 6.
*Of Dialectick names, to* Zeno 1.
*Dialectick art, to* Ariſtagoras 1.
*Of connex Probables, to* Dioſcorides 4.

The firſt Order of the *Logical* place of things.

*Of Axioms* 1.
*Of not-ſimple Axioms* 1.
*Of Connex, to* Athenades 2.
*Of Negatives, to* Ariſtagoras 3.
*Of Catagoreuticks, to* Athenodorus 1.
*Of things ſpoken by privation, to* Thearus 1.
*Of beſt Axioms, to* Dion 3
*Of Indefinites* 4
*Of things ſpoken according to Time* 2
*Of perfect Axioms* 2

The ſecond Order.

*Of true disjunct, to* Gorgippides 1
*Of true connex, to* Gorgippides 4
*Diviſion, to* Gorgippides 1
*Of Conſequents* 1
*Of that which is for three, to* Gorgippides 1
*Of Poſſibles, to* Clitus 4
*Of Significations, againſt* Philo 1
*What are falſe* 1

The third Order.

*Of Precepts* 2
*Of Interrogations* 2
*Of Percontation* 4
*Epitome of Interrogation and Percontation* 1
*Epitome of Anſwers* 1
*Of Queſtion* 2
*Of Anſwer* 4

The fourth Order.

*Of Categorems, to* Metrodorus 10
*Of right and ſupine, to* Philarchus 1
*Of Conjunctions, to* Apollonides 1
*To* Paſylus, *of Categorems* 4

The fifth Order.

*Of the five caſes* 1
*Of expreſſions defined according to the ſubject* 1
*Of Aſſimilation, to* Teſagoras 2
*Of Appellatives* 2

Of the Logical place concerning words, and their reaſons. The firſt Order.

*Of ſingular and plural expreſſions* 6
*Of Words, to* Soſigenes *and* Alexander 5
*Of the anomaly of Words, to* Dion 4
*Of Sorites pertaining to voice* 3
*Of Solœciſmes, to* Dionyſius 1
*Of unuſual ſpeech* 1
*Words, to* Dionyſius 1

The ſecond Order.

*Of the elements of ſpeech* 5
*Of the ſyntax of things ſaid* 4
*Of the ſyntax and elements of ſpeech, to* Philip 3

Of

*Of the Elements of Speech, to* Nicias 1.
*Of Relative Speech* 1.

The third Order.

*Of Not-dividents* 2.
*Of Amphibolies, to* Apollas 4.
*Of Tropical Amphibolies* 1.
*Of Connex Tropical Amphibolies* 2.
*Upon* Panthœdus, *of Amphibolies* 2.
*Introduction to Amphiboly* 5.
*Epitome of Amphibolies, to* Epicrates 1.
*Connex to the Introduction of Amphibolies* 2.

Of Logical place concerning Reasons and Moods: The first Order.

*The Art of Reasons and Moods, to* Dioscorides 5.
*Of Reasons* 3.
*Of the Composition of Moods, to* Stesagoras 2.
*Comparison of Tropical Axioms* 1.
*Of reciprocal Reasons and Connex* 1.
*To* Agatho, *or of sequent Problems* 1.
*Of Inferences, to* Aristagoras 1.
*Of placing the same Reason in diverse Moods* 1.
*Against those who oppose that the same Reason may be placed in Syllogistick and not Syllogistick Moods* 2.
*Against those who oppose the Reduction of Syllogisms* 3.
*Against* Philo's *Book of Moods, to* Timostratus 1.
*Logical Conjuncts, to* Timocrates *and* Philomathes.
*Upon Reasons and Moods* 1.

The second Order.

*Of conclusive Reasons, to* Zeno 1.
*Of first indemonstrable Syllogisms, to* Zeno 1.
*Of Reduction of Syllogisms* 1.
*Of Redundant Syllogisms, to* Pasylus 2.
*Theorems of Solœcisms* 1.
*Syllogistick Introductions, to* Zeno 1.
*Introductions to Moods, to* Zeno 3.
*Of Syllogisms false in Figure* 5.
*Syllogistick Reasons by Reduction in Indemonstrables* 1.
*Tropical Questions to* Zeno *and* Philomathes (*suspected to be spurious*) 1.

The third Order.

*Of Coincident Reasons, to* Athenades 1. *spurious.*
*Coincident Reasons* as to the Medium 3. *spurious.*
*Of* Aminius's *Disjunctions* 1.

The fourth Order.

*Of Hypotheses, to* Meleager 3.
*Hypothetick Reasons in Law, to* Meleager 1.
*Hypothetick Reasons for Introduction* 2.
*Hypothetick Reasons of Theorems* 2.
*Solution of* Hedyllus's *Hypotheticks* 2.
*Solution of* Alexander's *Hypotheticks* 3. *spurious.*
*Of Expositions, to* Leodamas 1.

The fifth Order.

*Of Introduction to the lying Reason, to* Aristocreon 1.
*Lying Reasons to the Introduction* 1.
*Of the lying Reason, to* Aristocreon 6.

The sixth Order.

*Against those who think true and false are one,* 1.
*Against those who dissolve the lying Reason by Distinction* 2.
*Demonstration, that Infinites are not to be divided* 1.
*Upon that which hath been said against the Division of Infinites, to* Pasyllus 3.
*Solutions according to the Ancients, to* Dioscorides 1.
*Of the Solution of the lying Reason, to* Aristocreon 3.
*Solution of* Hedyllus's *Hypotheticks, to* Aristocreon *and* Apollas.

The seventh Order.

*Against those who say the lying Reason hath false Sumptions* 1.
*Of the Negative, to* Aristocreon 2.
*Negative Reasons, to* Gymnasias 1.
*Of the diminutive Reason,* to Stesagoras 2.
*Of opinionative and quiescent Reasons, to* Onetor 2.
*Of the veiled Reason, to* Aristobulus 2.
*Of the occult Reason, to* Athenades 1.

The eighth Order.

*Of the* Nullity, *to* Menecrates 8.
*Of Reasons consisting of Indefinite and Definite, to* Pasyllus 2.
*Of the* Nullity, *to* Epicrates 1.

The ninth Order.

*Of Sophisms, to* Heraclides *and* Pollis 2.
*Of insoluble Dialectick Reasons, to* Dioscorides 5.
*Against* Arcesilaus's *method, to* Sphærus 1.

The tenth Order.

*Against Custom, to* Metrodorus 6.

Of the Logical place besides these four differences, there are dispersed, not containing in the Body of Logical Questions, 39.

Of the *Ethick* place, for Direction of moral Notions: The first Order.

*Description of Speech, to* Theoporus 1.
*Moral Theses* 1.

*Probable Sumptions for Doctrines*, to Philomathes 3.
*Definitions of civil Persons*, to Metrodorus 2.
*Definitions of wicked Persons*, to Metrodorus 2.
*Definitions of mean Persons*, to Metrodorus 2.
*General Definitions*, to Metrodorus 7.
*Definitions of other Arts*, to Metrodorus 2.

The second Order.

*Of Things like*, to Aristocles 3.
*Of Definitions*, to Metrodorus 7.

The third Order.

*Of Things not rightly objected against Definitions*, to Laodomas, 7.
*Probables for Definitions*, to Dioscorides.
*Of Species and Genus*, to Gorgippides, 2.
*Of Divisions* 1.
*Of Contraries*, to Dionysius 2.
*Probables for Divisions, Genus's and Species.*
*Of Contraries* 1.

The fourth Order.

*Of Etymologicks*, to Diocles 6.
*Etymologicks*, to Diocles 4.

The fifth Order.

*Of Proverbs*, to Zenodotus 2.
*Of Poems*, to Philomathes 1.
*How Poems must be heard* 2.
*Against Criticks*, to Diodorus 1.

Of the Moral place of common Speeches, according to Arts and Virtue: The first Order.

*Against Rescriptions*, to Timonax 1.
*How we think and speak Singulars* 1.
*Of Notions*, to Laodamus 2.
*Of Suspition*, to Pythonax 2.
*Demonstrations that a wise Man doth not Opinionate* 1.
*Of Comprehension and Science, and Ignorance* 4.
*Of Speech* 2.
*Of the use of Speech*, to Leptines.

The second Order.

*That the Ancients approved Dialectick with Demonstration*, to Zeno 2.
*Of Dialectick*; to Aristocreon 4.
*Upon the Objections against Dialectick* 3.
*Of Rhetorick*, to Dioscorides 4.

The third Order.

*Of Habitude*, to Cleon 3.
*Of Art and Sloth*, to Aristocreon 4.
*Of the differences in Virtues*, to Diodorus.
*What Virtues are* 1.
*Of Virtues*, to Pollis.

Of the Moral place concerning Good and Ill: The first Order.

*Of Honesty and Pleasure*, to Aristocreon 10.
*Demonstration, that Pleasure is not the chief end* 4.
*Demonstration, that Pleasure is not Good* 4.
*Of those which are said* ********.

Thus concludes the seventh Book of *Laertius*; and who seeth not that the last of these Titles is defective, and moreover that the rest of the *Orders*, concering this place *of God and Ill*, (whereof this is but the first) are wanting. Doubtless the end of this Book is Imperfect, and wanteth, if not the Lives of any Stoical Philosophers, who succeeded *Chrysippus* (whereof he mentions *Zeno* and others elsewhere) yet at least a considerable part of his Catalogue, containing the rest of his *Ethick* Writings, and all his Physick, many of which are elsewhere cited even by *Laertius* himself, which as the learned *Casaubon* had observed, he would not have ascribed to *Laertius*'s neglect that *Chrysippus*'s Book of *Laws* is not mentioned. Of his *Ethick* Writings, besides those here named, were these,

(a) *Of Laws.*
(b) *Introduction to the Consideration of Things Good or Ill.*
(c) *Of Honest.*
(d) *Of Consent.*
(e) *Of Things expetible in themselves.*
(f) *Of Things not expetible in themselves.*
(g) *Of Politick.*
(h) *Of Ends.*
(i) *Of Passions.*
(k) *Of* Ethick *Questions.*
(l) *Of Lives, whereof* Plutarch *cites the* 4th *Book.*
(m) *That* Zeno *used Names properly.*
(n) *Of Justice, the first Book cited by* Laertius.
(o) *Of Life and Transaction.*
(p) *Of Offices.*
(q) *Demonstration of Justice.*
(r) *Protrepticks.*
(s) *Of the End.*
(t) *Of a Commonwealth.*
(u) *Of the Office of a Judg.*
(x) *Of Good.*
(y) *Of Habits.*

To Physick belong these.

(z) *Physicks.*
(a) *Of the Soul, the* 12th *Book cited by* Laertius.
(b) *Of Providence, the first Book cited.*
(c) *Of the Gods.*
(d) *Of Fate.*
(e) *Of Divination.*
(f) *Of the Philosophy of the Ancients.*
(g) *In Calumniation of the Senses.*
(h) *Of* Jupiter.
(i) *Of Nature.*
(k) *Physical Theses.*

(l) *Of*

(l) *Of Substance.*
(m) *Of Motion.*
(n) *Physical Questions, the third Book cited.*
(o) *Of Vacuity.*
(p) *Epistles.*

The Number of all his Writings, according to *Laertius*, was 705. He wrote so much, that he had often occasion to Treat upon the same Subject, and setting down whatsoever came into his Mind, he often corrected and enlarged it by the Testimonies of others; whence having in one Book inserted all *Euripides*'s *Medea*, one having the Book in his hand, answer'd another, that asked him what Book it was, It is *Chrysippus*'s *Medea*. And *Apollodorus* the *Athenian*, in his Collection *of Doctrines*, asserting, that *Epicurus* had written many Books upon his own Strength, without using the Testimonies of others, and that he therein far exceeded *Chrysippus*, adds these words; *For if a Man should take out of* Chrysippus's *Writings, all that belongs to other Men, he would leave the Paper blank.*

*Seneca* gives this Censure of him: (q) He is most Subtle and Acute, penetrating into the depth of Truth. He speaks to the thing that is to be done, and useth no more words than are necessary to the understanding thereof; but adds, that his (r) Acuteness being too fine, is many times blunted, and retorted upon it self; even when he seems to have done something, he only pricks, not pierceth.

(s) Some there are who inveigh against him, as one that wrote many obscene Things, not fit to be spoken, as in his *Commentary of the Ancient Physiologists*; what he writes concerning *Jupiter* and *Juno*, is obscenely feigned, delivering that in 600. Paragraphs, which the most impudent Person would not have commited to Writing; for, say they, he hath related the Story most unhandsomely; and tho he prais'd it as natural, yet it becometh Curtezans rather than Gods.

Moreover, what he saith of those that writ *of Tables*, is false, not to be found in *Polemo*, nor *Hipsicrates*, nor *Antigonus*, but forged by himself.

In his Book of *Commonwealth*, he allows Marriage with the Mother and a Daughter, and repeats the same in the beginning of his Book, *Concerning Things expetible in themselves.*

In his third Book of *Justice*, extending to a thousand Paragraphs, he advised to feed upon the very Dead.

In his second Book *of Life and Transaction*, he affirmeth, A wise Man ought to take care to provide himself Food; but to what end must he provide himself Food? For Livelyhood? Life is an *indifferent*. For Pleasure? Pleasure also is *indifferent*. For Virtue? that is Self-*sufficient* for *Beatitude*. Such kinds of Acquisition of Wealth are very Ridiculous. If they proceed from a King, there is a necessity of complying with him; if from a Friend, that Friendship is Venial; if from Wisdom, that Wisdom is mercenary. For these things, saith *Leartius*, some have inveigh'd against him.

## CHAP. IV.

### *His Death.*

HE died, according to *Apollodorus*, in the 143*d* Olympaid, (so supply *Laertius*, in whom the centenary Number is wanting by *Suidas*) having lived 73. years.

The manner of his Death is differently related; *Hermippus* affirms, That being in the *Odæum* (a kind of publick Theatre at *Athens*) his Disciples called him away to Sacrifice, and thereupon taking a draught of Wine, he was immediately seized by a *Vertigo*, of which at the end of five days he died. Others report, he died of excessive Laughter: Seeing an Ass eat Figs, he bid his Woman offer it some Wine, and thereat fell into such extremity of Laughter, that it killed him.

As to his Person, he was very little, saith *Laertius*, as appeareth by his Statue in the *Ceramick*, which is almost hid by the Horse that stands next it, whence *Carneades* called him ὑπόλιππος, *hid by a Horse*. The Posture of this Statue, *Cicero* saith, was Sitting, and stretching forth his Hand. *Pausanias* saith, It wat set up in the *Gymnasium*, called *Ptolomæan* from the Founder, not far from the *Forum*.

*Laertius* reckons four more of this Name.

The *first*, a Physician, to whom *Erasistratus* acknowledgeth himself beholding for many things.

The *second*, his Son, Physician to *Ptolomy*, who, upon the Calumnies of some that maligned him, was publickly punished and beaten with Rods.

The *third*, Disciple to *Erasistratus*.

The *fourth*, a Writer of *Georgicks*.

# ZENO.

(a) ZENO was of *Tarsis*, or, according to others, of *Sidon*, his Father named *Dioscorides*. He was Disciple to *Chrysippus*, and his Successor in the School. (b) He wrote few Books, but left behind him many Disciples. (b) *Laert. vit. Zen.*

# DIOGENES.

(a) Laert. vit. D.oz.

(a) DIOGENES was Born at *Selencia*, he was Sirnamed the *Babylonian*, from the Vicinity of that place. He was Disciple of *Chrysippus*, and is stiled by *Cicero* an eminent and serious Stoick. (b) *Seneca* relates, That discoursing earnestly concerning Anger, a fooliſh young Man ſtanding by, ſpat in his Face, which he took meekly and discreetly, saying, *I am not Angry, but am in doubt whether I ought to be ſo or not.* He was one of the three that was ſent from *Athens* on Embaſſy to *Rome*; of which already in the Life of *Carneades*, who learn'd Dialectick of him. *Cicero* ſaith, he lived to a great Age. Amongſt other things, he wrote a Treatiſe *of Divination.*

(b) De ira 3. 38.

# ANTIPATER.

(a) Laert.
(b) De Offic. 3.

(a) ANTIPATER was of *Sidon*, Diſciple to (b) *Diogenes* the *Babylonian*. *Cicero* calls him a moſt acute Perſon; *Seneca*, one of the great Authors of the Stoical Sect. (c) He declined to diſpute with *Carneades*, but filled his Books with Confutations of him, whence he was called κελαμοβίβλος, *The clamorous Penman.* (d) He diſputed much againſt thoſe who aſſerted *nothing.* Beſides other things, he writ two Books of *Divination.* (e) *Cicero*, at the latter end of his ſecond Book of *Offices*, ſaith, he then was lately dead at *Athens.*

(c) Plut. de Garrul.

(d) Cic. &c. queſt. 4.
(e) Cic. de Divin. l.

# PANÆTIUS.

(a) Strab. l. 4.

(a) PANÆTIUS was of *Rhodes*, his Anceſtors eminent for Martial Affairs and Exerciſes. He was (b) Diſciple to *Antipater*, intimate Friend to (c) *P. Scipio Africanus*, whom he accompanied in his Journey to *Alexandria.* *Cicero* calls him, (d) *Almoſt Prince of the Stoicks, a Perſon extreamly Ingenious and Grave, worthy the familiarity of* Scipio *and* Lælius.

(b) Cic. de Divin. lib. 1.

(c) Plut. Apoph.

(d) Acad. Q. 4.

Cic. Tuſc. quæſt. lib. 1.

He was a great Admirer of *Plato*, whom every where he calleth, *Divine, moſt Wiſe, moſt Holy, the* Homer *of Philoſophers.* But his Opinion of the Immortality of the Soul he approved not, arguing thus; Whatſoever is generated, dieth; but Souls are generated, as is manifeſt from the likeneſs of thoſe that are begotten, to their Parents, not only in Body, but Diſpoſition. His other Argument was, There is nothing that is grieved or pained, but is ſubject to be Sick; whatſoever is ſubject to Sickneſs, is likewiſe ſubject to Death; Souls are ſubject to Grief, therefore they are ſubject to Death:

He alone rejected Aſtrological Predictions, and receded from the *Stoicks*, as to *Divination*; yet would not poſitively affirm there was no ſuch Art, but only that he doubted it.

Cic. de Divin. lib. 2. De divin. l.

He wrote three Books *of Offices*, much commended by *Cicero.*

*Lipſius* Conjectures he died old, becauſe *Cicero* affirmeth out of *Poſidonius*, that he lived thirty Years after he had written his Books of Offices.

POSIDO-

# POSIDONIUS.

*POSIDONIUS* was Born at *Apamea* in *Syria*. He lived at *Rhodes*, and there managed civil Affairs, and taught Philoſophy. *Pompey* in his return from *Syria*, went to *Rhodes* purpoſely to hear him, and coming to his Door, forbad the Lictor to knock, as was the Cuſtom; but he (ſaith *Pliny*) to whom the *Eaſt* and *Weſt* had ſubmitted, himſelf ſubmitted his *Faſces* at this Gate. But underſtanding that he was very Sick of a great Pain in his Joynts, he reſolved only to give him a viſit. At his firſt Coming and Salutation, he told him with much Reſpect, that he was extreamly ſorry he could not hear him. *Poſidonius* anſwer'd, *You may, for no corporeal Pain ſhall make me fruſtrate the coming of ſo great a Perſon:* And thereupon he diſcourſed ſeriouſly and copiouſly upon this Subject, as he lay in his Bed, *That nothing is good, but what is Honeſt.* And as often as his Pain took him, he would ſay, *Pain, it is to no purpoſe; tho thou art troubleſome, I will never acknowledg thou art Ill.*

He made a Sphear, wherein were all the Converſions of the Sun, Moon and Planets, exactly as they moved in the Heavens every day and night. *Cic. de nat. Deor. lib. 2.*

Of his Writings are cited by *Cicero*, five Books *of Divination*; as alſo five Books *of the Nature of the Gods.* *De divinat.*

Thus far we have a continued Succeſſion of the *Stoick* Philoſophers, the laſt *School*, according to *Laertius*'s Diſpoſition, of thoſe that were deſcended from *Thales.*

*The End of the Eighth Part.*

Francis

# Francis Lord Verulam

## Advancement of Learning, Lib. 3. Sect. 5.

*As for the Placits of Ancient Philoſophers*, as were thoſe of *Pythagoras*, *Philolaus*, *Xenophon*, *Anaxagoras*, *Parmenides*, *Leucippus*, *Democritus*, and others, (which men uſe diſdainfully to run over); it will not be amiſs to caſt our eyes with more reverence upon them. *For although Ariſtotle (after the manner of the race of the Ottomans) thought he could not ſafely reign, unleſs he mode away all his Brethren*; yet to thoſe who ſeriouſly propound to themſelves the inquiſition and illuſtration of *Truth*, and not *Dominion* or *Magiſtrality*, it cannot but ſeem a matter of great profit, to ſee at once before them, the ſeveral Opinions of ſeveral Authors touching the Natures of things. Neither is this for any great hope conceiv'd, that a more exact truth can any way be expected from theſe or from the like Theories: For, As the ſame *Phænomena*, the ſame *Calculations*, are ſatisfied upon the Aſtronomical Principles, both of *Ptolomy*, and *Copernicus*: So the popular experience we imbrace, and the ordinary view and face of things, may apply it ſelf to many ſeveral Theories; whereas a right inveſtigation of Truth requires another manner of ſeverity and ſpeculation. For as *Ariſtotle* ſaith Elegantly, *That Children at firſt indeed call all men Fathers, and women Mothers; but afterwards they diſtinguiſh them both:* So certainly experience in Childhood, will call every *Philoſophy*, *Mother*; but when it comes to ripeneſs, it will diſcern the true Mother. In the mean time it is good to read over divers *Philoſophies*, as divers Gloſſes upon Nature; whereof, it may be, one in one place, another in another, is more corrected: Therefore I could wiſh a Collection made, but with diligence and judgment, *De Antiquis Philoſophiis*, out of the lives of Ancient Philoſophers; out of the Parcels of *Plutarch*, of their *Placits*; out of the Citations of *Plato*; out of the Confutations of *Ariſtotle*; out of a ſparſed mention found in other Books, as well of Chriſtians, as of Heathens, (as out of *Lactantius*, *Philo*, *Philoſtratus*, and the reſt): *For I do not yet ſee extant a work of this Nature.* But here I muſt give warning, that this be done diſtinctly, ſo as the *Philoſophies*, every one ſever'dly, be compoſed and continued, and not collected by titles and handfuls, as hath been done by *Plutarch*. *For every Philoſophy, while it is entire in the whole piece, ſupports it ſelf; and the Opinions maintained therein, give light, ſtrength, and credence mutually one to the other; whereas if they be ſimple and broken, it will ſound more ſtrange and diſſonant.* In truth, when I read in *Tacitus* the Actions of *Nero*, or of *Claudius*, inveſted with Circumſtances of Times, Perſons, and Inducements; I find them not ſo ſtrange, but that they may be true: But when I read the ſame Actions in *Suetonius Tranquillus*, repreſented by Titles and common Places, and not in order of Time, they ſeem monſtrous, and altogether incredible. *So is Philoſophy when it is propounded entire; and when it is ſliced and articled into fragments.*

## MONTAIGNE, *Eſſayes, Chap.* 12.

*How much do I deſire, that, in my life-time, either ſome other, or* Juſtus Lipſius, *the moſt knowing perſon that is left us, of a moſt poliſhed and judicious wit, truly allied to my* Turnebus, *had both the will and the health, and leaſure enough to collect in one Regiſter, according to their diviſions and their claſſes, ſincerely and curiouſly, as much as we can ſee thereof, the opinions of the ancient Philoſophy, upon the ſubject of our Being, and of our Manners, its Controverſies, the credit ond ſucceſſion of its Sects, the application of the Life of the Authors and followers, to their precepts in memorable and exemplary accidents! What an excellent and profitable work would this be?*

PYTHA-

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

## The Ninth Part.

### Containing the *ITALICK* Sect.

PYTHAGORAS.

## CHAP. I.

### *The Country, Parents, and Time of* Pythagoras.

THE *Italick* Sect was distinct from the *Ionick*, in respect of the Author, Place, Discipline, and Doctrine; denominated from that part of *Italy*, which from the frequency of Greek Colonies, was called *Magna Græcia*. Yet was not the Author, *Pythagoras*, an Italian; (a) for, tho some

(a) *Porphyr. de vit. Pythag.*

some think, his Father was of *Metapontum*; (*b*) some, a Tyrrhene, of *Etruria* in *Italy*; yet (*c*) *Diogenes* and others report him a Tyrrhene, of the race of those who inhabited *Lemnus*, *Imbrus*, and *Scyrus*; and that coming upon Traffick to *Samus*, he setled there, and was made free. With these concurs (*d*) *Aristoxenus*, (to whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* joyneth *Aristarchus* and *Theopompus*) who ((*e*) in the life of *Pythagoras*) saith, (*f*) That he was born in one of those Islands which the *Athenians* won, and expelled thence the Tyrrhenians. Whence *Suidas* saith, That *Pythagoras was a Samian, but by birth a Tyrrhenian, brought over young by his father from* Tyrrhenia *to* Samus. And indeed, his Country seems inscrutable to (*g*) *Lycus*; to (*h*) *Josephus no less difficult to find out, than that of* Homer.

(*b*) *Plut. Sympos.* (*c*) *Porph.* (*d*) *Porph.* (*e*) *Strom.* lib. 1. (*f*) *Porph.* (*g*) *Porph.* (*h*) Contra. *Appion.*

Nor is it strange, that the Country of his Father should be question'd, since it is not agreed concerning his name and quality: (*i*) *Justin* calls him *Demaratus*, (and *Johannes Sarisburiensis*, from *Justine*, *Maratus*) (*k*) others, *Mamercus*: But the greater part of Writers agree, that he was called (*l*) *Mnesarchus*; his profession, according to *Hermippus* and others, a Graver of Rings; according to others, a Merchant.

(*i*) Lib. 20. (*k*) *Laert.* (*l*) *Laert. Suid. Apul.*

(*m*) Some there are who affirm, he was a *Phliasian*; *Pausanias* reports, that he was Son of *Euphron*, Grandson of *Hippasus*, who, upon the taking of *Phlius* by the *Dorians*, fled to *Samus*. (*o*) Others, that he was Son of *Hippasus*; *Hippasus* was Son of *Euthyphron*, *Euthyphron* of *Cleonymus*, who was banished out of *Phlius*; and that *Mamercus* (or rather *Mnesarchus*) lived in *Samus*, whence *Pythagoras* was said to be a *Samian*. (*p*) *Cleanthes* relates, he was a *Syrian*, of the City *Tyrus* in *Syria*, (or rather in *Phœnicia*) whence making a Voyage to *Samus* for Traffick, at such time as the *Samians* were much oppress't with Famine, he furnished them with Corn, in requital whereof, they made him free of their Country. (*q*) *Hippobotus* saith, that *Pythagoras* was a *Samian*.

(*m*) *Porph.* (*o*) *Laert.* (*p*) *Porph.* (*q*) *Clem. Alex. Strom.*

Indeed, the most general and approved opinion is, that *Mnesarchus* was a *Samian*, descended from *Ancæus*, who first brought a Colony into *Samus*; and that *Pythagoras*, his Son, was born at *Sidon* in *Phœnicia*; but by education, as well as extraction, a *Samian* also. This is ratifi'd by the authority of *Jamblichus*, who begins his life with this fabulous Narration.

(*r*) *Jambl.* vit. *Pyth.* cap. 2. (*s*) So read both here and afterwards, as appeareth by the Oracle, ἐντε Σάμυης.

(*r*) *It is reported, that* Ancæus, *who liv'd at* (*s*) Same *in* Cephalenia, *was descended from* Jupiter, [others say from *Neptune* and *Astypalæa*] *an opinion occasioned by his virtues, or some particular greatness of soul. In prudence and magnanimity, he excelled all other* Cephalenians. *This* Ancæus *was commanded by the* Pythian *Oracle, to gather together a Colony out of* Cephalenia, Arcadia, *and* Thessaly, *augmenting it from* Athens, Epidaurus, *and* Chalcis; *and that having got them together under his command, he should people an Island, named from the richness of the soyl* Melamphyllos, (*t*) black-leaf) *and call the City which they built* Samus, *from* Same *in* Cephalenia. *The Oracle was thus:*

(*t*) *Strab.* lib. 14.

In stead of *Same*, *Samus* thou (an Isle)
Shalt plant *Ancæus*, which men *Phyllas* style.

*That this Colony was drawn from those several places, appears, not only from their religious rites and sacrifices, (which are derived from the Countries out of which those people came) but also from the affinities and mutual conventions made by the* Samians. Mnesarchus *and* Pythais, *the parents of* Pythagoras, *are said to be descended from the family of the same* Ancæus, *that planted this Colony there.* [(*u*) Of *Pythais* it is confirmed by *Apollonius.*] *Which nobleness of their extraction, being much celebrated amongst their Country-men, a* Samian *Poet declar'd him to be the son of* Apollo, *in* (*x*) *these words:*

(*u*) Porph. pag.

(*x*) Cited by Porph.

*Pythais* of all *Samians* the most fair,
*Jove*-lov'd *Pythagoras* to *Phœbus* bare.

*Which report was raised thus. This* Mnesarchus *the* Samian *being upon occasion of Traffick at* Delphi, *with his Wife, who was at that time newly with Child, and not known to be so; he enquired of the Oracle concerning his Voyage to* Syria. *The Propheteſs told him, That his Journey should be according to his mind, very advantagious. That his Wife was already with Child, and should bring forth a Son, that should exceed all men that ever were, in Beauty and Wisdom, and through the whole course of his Life, conduce much to the benefit of Mankind.* Mnesarchus *considering, That the Oracle would not have spoken of his Son, seeing that he demanded nothing concerning him, if there were not something extraordinary to be expected from him, immediately hereupon changed the Name of his Wife, which before was* Parthenis *to* Pythais, *from the Propheteſs; and as soon as She was delivered at* Sidon *in* Phœnicia, *they called the Child* Pythagoras. *For* Epimenides, Eudoxus, Xenocrates, [and others mentioned by (*y*) *Apollonius*] *are to be rejected, who affirm,* Apollo *at that time lay with* Pythais, (*z*) *and got her with Child, (She not being so before) and thereupon foretold it by the Propheteſs, this is not to be admitted. But that the Soul of* Pythagoras, *being of the Regimine of* Apollo, *(whether as a Follower, or some other way more near to him) was sent to men, none can doubt, since it may be evinc'd by these circumstances of his Birth, and the universal Wisdom of his mind. Thus much* (saith *Jamblichus*) *concerning his Generation.* Whence we see, the Greeks did so much admire his Wit, that they thought it could be nothing less than Divine, and thereupon fabled *Apollo* to be his Father.

(*y*) Porph. pag. (*z*) Adding ἀναίτιον ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ἐχέτω τὸν τρόπον.

*Pythagoras* was the youngest of three Sons, the eldest (*a*) *Cleanthes*, calls *Eunestus*; *Laertius*, and *Suidas Eunomus*; the second, *Tyrrhenus*. He had likewise an Uncle, *Zoilus*, mentioned by *Laertius*.

(*a*) Porph.

The reasons for establishing the times concerning *Pythagoras*'s life, will hereafter be set forth, upon occasion of his going into *Italy*. In the mean time, I shall desire it may be admitted, that he was born about the third year of the fifty third Olympiad: That being eighteen years old, he heard *Thales* and others. Then he went to *Phœnicia*, thence into *Egypt*, where he staid twenty two years; afterwards at *Babylon* twelve years; then returned to *Samus*, being fifty six years old; and from thence went into *Italy*. The particulars whereof shall in their several places be more fully discourſed.

CHAP.

## CHAP. II.

### His first Education and Masters.

MNesarchus (saith (a) *Jamblichus*) *returning from* Syria *to* Samus, *with much wealth, and abundance of Merchandise, built a Temple, which he dedicated to* Apollo *the* Pythian, *and brought up his son in several excellent disciplines, committing him sometimes to* Creophilus, *sometimes to* Pherecydes *of* Syrus, *and to almost all the Præfects of the Temple; as being blest with the faireſt and moſt divine ſon that ever man had.*

(a) Vit. Pythag. p. 2.

Some there are who affirm, that (b) *he was first a Wrestler*; and that (c) *when* Pherecydes *first discoursed among the Greeks, concerning the immortality of the Soul,* Pythagoras *the* Samian, *moved at the novelty of the discourse, became, of a Wrestler, a Philosopher.* But these relations seem to have been occasion'd, by confounding *Pythagoras* the Philosopher with a Wrestler of that name, his contemporary, of whom hereafter.

(b) Laert. St. Augnst. p. 3. ad Volus.

(d) *Cleanthes* and (e) *Suidas* relate, That *he first heard* Pherecydes *the Syrian, at* Samus; *and in the second place* Hermodomas, τῷ Κρεοφυλίῳ, *the* Creophylian, *at the same* Samus, *then very old.* (f) Hermodamas *was his name, but he was sirnamed* Creophylus. Wherefore perhaps instead of τῷ Κρεοφύλῳ, should be (g) read, τῷ Κρεοτύλῳ; or else he was termed a *Creophylian*, as well as sirnamed *Creophylus*; (h) *for that reported to be descended from* Creophylus *a* (i) Samian, *who, in times past, entertained* Homer *as his guest, and was, as some say, his Master and his Rival in Poetry.* But (k) *Apuleius*, who saith, *Hermodamas*, or *Leodamas*, as he calls him, was disciple to that *Creophilus*, an error no less in Chronology, than when he saith, *Pythagoras* was Disciple to *Plato*, unless the whole Text be corrupted.

(d) Porph. p. 2. In Pythag. (e) Jambl. (g) As once in Herbusius's Edition, or perhaps τῷ Κρεοτύλῳ Jambl: Scrabo. (h) Florid. l. 2.

(l) Pythagoras *his father dying, he grew up in prudence and temperance, being, whilst he was yet very young, generally much respected and honoured, even by the most aged. His presence and discourse attracted all persons; to every one on whom he looked, he appeared worthy admiration, insomuch that many averred, he was the son of a deity. He being thus confirm'd by the great opinions that were had of him, by the education of his infancy, and by his natural excellency, made himself daily more worthy of these advantages, adorning himself with Devotions, with Sciences, with excellent conversation, with constancy of mind, with grave deportment, and with a sweet inimitable serenity; never transported with anger, laughter, emulation, contention, or any other disorder; living like some good genius, come to converse in* Samus. *Hereupon, tho young, a great report was spread of him, to* Thales *at* Miletus, *to* Bias *at* Priene, *two of the Sages, and to all the Cities thereabout; many in all those parts commending the young man, made him famous, calling him by a Proverb,* [The Samian Comer] *or,* [The fair-hair'd Samian.]

(k) Jambl. con-

*About this time began the tyranny of* Polycrates, *when* Pythagoras, *about eighteen years old, foreseeing the event, and how obstructive it would prove to his designs, and to the pursuit of Learning, which he intended above all things,* [(m) being young, and desirous of knowledg, left his Country to go to travel] *stole away privately by night, taking with him* Hermodamas, (*sirnamed* Creophylus, *and descended, as was reported, from that* Creophylus, *who was Host to* Homer) *and made a voyage to* Pherecydes, [at *Lisbus*, to whom, *Laertius* saith, he was recommended by his Uncle *Zoilus*] *and to* Anaximander, *the natural Philosopher, and to* Thales *at* Miletus. *With each of these he conversed severally in such manner, that they all lov'd him, admired his parts, and communicated their learning to him.* [(n) Under *Anaximander* the *Milesian*, he is said to have studied the knowledg of natural things] Thales *entertain'd him kindly, and, wondring at his excellency above other youths, which much surpassed the report he had received, assisted him as far as he was able in Sciences; withal, accusing his own age and infirmity, he advised him to make a voyage to* Egypt, *there to get acquaintance with the Priests of* Memphis *and* (o) Diospolis, *since of them he had learned those things, for which he was by many esteemed wise, tho he were not of such forwardness, neither by nature or education, as he saw* Pythagoras *to be. Whence he presaged, that, if he conversed with those Priests, he should become the most divine and wisest of men.*

(m) Laert. (n) Apul. Florid. lib. 2. (o) Thebes.

This *Pherecydes* fell sick at *Delus*: That he outlived not the fifty seventh Olympiad, is manifest from a (p) Letter which he writ the day before his death, to *Thales*, who died the first year of the Olympiad following. And tho the greater part of Authors write, that at the same time, when the *Cylonians* in *Crotana*, conspir'd against the *Pythagoreans*, (which was not long before *Pythagoras* died) *Pythagoras* was gone from *Italy* to *Delus*, to visit and bury *Pherecydes*, yet *Dicæarchus and other more accurate Authors* (saith * *Porphyrius*) *aver, that* Pythagoras *was present when that conspiracy broke forth; and that* Pherecydes *died before* Pythagoras *departed from* Samus. The former relation hath imposed, among others, ‡ upon the learned *Salmasius*, who, to reconcile this with other circumstances concerning *Pherecydes*, is constrain'd to imagine another person of the same name. It was therefore before *Pythagoras* left *Samus*, that (q) *Pherecydes, being desperately seized by a Phthiriasis, he went to visit him, and attended him in his sickness, until he died, and then performed the rites of funeral, as to his Master.* For *Laertius* and *Porphyrius* add, that *after the death and burial of* Pherecydes, *he returned to* Samus, *out of a desire to enjoy the society of* Hermodamus.

(p) Laert. vit. Thaletis. * Pag. 38. † Plin. exercit. (q) Porph. p. 10, 11. Jamb. cap. 30 pag. 162. Laert.

(r) *Phavorinus*, in the seventh Book of his various History, and (s) *Porphyrius*, relate, that after he had lived a while with *Hermodamas*, he first taught Wrestlers, and of them *Eurimenes*, to diet with flesh, (whereas other Wrestlers used to eat dry'd Figs, Cheese-curds, and Whey) whereby he became Victor at the Olympick Games. But *Laertius* and (t) *Jamblichus* observe, that this is falsly ascribed to *Pythagoras* the *Samian*, (for he allowed not the eating of flesh) but was indeed the invention of *Pythagoras*, son of *Eratocles*, of whom hereafter.

(r) Laert. (s) Vit. Pyth. (t) Cap. 5.

## CHAP. III.

*How he travelled to* Phœnicia.

(a) *Jamb.* cap. 13. (a) HAving learn'd of *Thales* above-all things to husband his time, and for that reason forbearing wine and flesh, and having before refrained from eating much, and accustomed himself to such meats, as were light and easie of digestion, by which means he procur'd a habit of watchfulness, clearness of mind, and an exact constant health of body; He made a voyage to *Sidon*, as well out of a natural desire to the place it self, esteeming it his Country, as conceiving that he might more easily pass from thence into *Egypt*.

Here he conferred with the Prophets, successors of *Moctus* the Physiologist, and with others, and with the *Phœnician* Priests, and was initiated into all the mysteries of *Byblus*, and *Tyre*, and sundry of the (*b*) principal sacred Institutions in divers other parts of *Syria*, not undergoing these things out of Superstition, as may be imagined; but out of love to knowledg, and a fear, lest any thing worthy to be known, which was preserved amongst them, in the miracles or mysteries of the gods, might escape him. Withal, not being ignorant, that the rites of those places were deduced from the *Egyptian* ceremonies, by means whereof he hoped to participate of the more sublime and divine mysteries in *Egypt*, which he pursued with admiration, as his Master *Thales* had advised him.

(b) Reading ἔξας, ἐτως.

## CHAP. IV.

*How he travell'd to* Egypt.

(a) *Jamblicus* continueth. (a) SOme *Egyptian* Mariners passing accidentally along that coast, which lies under *Carmel*, (a *Phœnician* mountain, where he spent much of his time in private retirement at the Temple) willingly received him into their Ship. But observing, during the voyage, how temperately he liv'd, keeping his usual diet, they began to have a greater esteem for him. And perceiving some things in the excellency of his demeanour, more than human, they reflected within themselves, how that he appeared to them as soon as they landed, coming down from the top of the mountain *Carmel*, (which they knew to be more sacred than other Hills, and not trode upon by the vulgar) easily and directly, neither stones nor precipices obstructing his passage; and how that coming to the side of the Ship, * he asked, Whether they were bound for *Egypt*; and they answering, That they were, he went into the Vessel, and silently sitting down in a place, where he might least disturb the Mariners, in case they should be in any streis, continued in the same posture. two nights and three days, without meat, drink, or sleep, (except when none perceived he slumbred a little, sitting in the same unmovable posture, and this constantly to the end) and how that the voyage proceeded direct, beyond their expectation, as if assisted by the presence of some god. Laying all these things together, they concluded and perswaded themselves, that some Divine Genius did indeed come along with them from *Syria* to *Egypt*. The rest of the voyage they performed prosperously, observing a greater respect than formerly in their words and actions, as well to one another, as towards him, until they at last arrived upon the coast of *Egypt*, by a most fortunate passage, without any storm.

* For μόγοντε ἐπορθεγξάμενος τε, reading ἐπορθεγξάμενος τε μῶν εἰς Αἰγύπτον ὁ πόπλος, &c.

As soon as he landed, they reverently took him up, and seating him on the cleanest part of the Sand, rear'd an extemporary Altar before him, on which they laid part of all the sorts of provisions which they had, as the first fruits of their lading, and drew up their Vessel in the same place, where they first put to Sea. *Pythagoras*, tho weakned with long fasting, was not sick, either at his landing, or by their handing of him; nor did he, when they were gone, abstain long from the fruits which they had laid before him, but took them, and preserved his constitution therewith undisturbed, till he came to the next houses. (*b*) From thence he went to search after all the Temples with diligent and exact inquisition. (b) cap. 4.

(*c*) *Antiphon*, in his Book concerning such as were eminent for virtue, extolleth his perseverance when he was in *Egypt*, saying, *Pythagoras designing to become acquainted with the institution of the* Egyptian *Priests, and diligently endeavouring to participate thereof, desired* Polycrates *the Tyrant to write to* Amasis *King of* Egypt, *with whom he had friendship,* (as appears also by (*d*) *Herodotus*) *and hospitality,* (formerly) *that he might be admitted to the aforesaid Doctrine. Coming to* Amasis, Amasis *gave him Letters to the Priests, and going first to those of* Heliopolis, *they sent him to the Priest of* Memphis, *as the more ancient, which was indeed but a pretence of the* Heliopolitans: [(*e*) For the *Egyptians* imparted not their mysteries to every one, nor committed the knowledg of Divine things to profane persons, but to those only who were to inherit the Kingdom; and, of Priests, to those who were adjudged to excel the rest in education, learning, and descent.] *From* Memphis, *upon the same pretence, he was sent to* Thebes. *They not daring, for fear of the King, to pretend excuses; but thinking, that by reason of the greatness and difficulty thereof, he would desist from the design, enjoyned him very hard precepts, wholly different from the institution of the* Grecians, *which he readily performed, to their so great admiration, that they gave him power to sacrifice to the gods, and to acquaint himself with all their studies, which was never known to have been granted to any forraigner besides.* (*f*) *Clemens Alexandrinus* relates particularly, that *he was disciple to* Sonchedes, *an* Egyptian *Arch-prophet.* (c) *Porphyr. vit. Pythag.* pag. 5. cited also by Laertius. (d) Lib. 3. (e) *Clem. Alex. Strom.* (f) *Strom.* I.

(*g*) *Diogenes* saith, that *whilst he lived with these Priests, he was instructed in the Learning and Language* (as *Antiphon* also affirms) *of the* Egyptians, *and in their three kinds of writing*, Epistolick, Hieroglyphick, *and* Symbolick; *whereof one imitates the common way of speaking; the rest allegorical, by Ænigms:* (*g*) They who are taught by the *Egyptians*, learn first the method of all the *Egyptian* Letters, which is called *Epistilographick*; the second, *Hieratick*, used by those who write of sacred things; the last and most perfect *Hieroglyphick*, whereof one is *Curiologick*, the other, *Symbolick*. Of the *Symbolick*, one is properly spoken by *Imitation*, another is written (g) *Porph.* (g) *Clem. Alex. Strom.* lib. 5.

written as it were *Tropically*; another on the contrary doth allegorize by *Ænigms*. For instance, in the *Kyriologick* way, to expreſs the Sun, they make a Circle; the Moon, a Creſcent. *Tropically*, they do properly traduce, and transfer, and expreſs by exchanging ſome things, and variouſly transfiguring others. Thus when they deliver the praiſes of Kings, in Theological Fables, they write by *Anaglyphicks*. Of the third kind, by *Ænigms*, let this be an example: All other Stars, by reaſon of their oblique courſe, they likened to the bodies of Serpents, but the Sun to that of a *Beetle*, becauſe having formed a ball of Cow-dung, and lying upon its back, it rolls it about (from claw to claw.) They ſay moreover, that this creature liveth ſix months under ground, and the other half of the year upon the earth; and that it immits ſeed into the Globe (of the earth) and ſo generates, there being no female of that ſpecies. Hitherto *Clemens*.

(h) *Val. Max.* l. 7.

Thus (*h*) *being acquainted with the learning of that Nation, and enquiring into the Commentaries of the prieſts of former times, he knew the obſervations of innumerable Ages*, as *Valerius Maximus* ſaith. And (*i*) *living admir'd and belov'd of all the prieſts and prophets with whom he converſed, he informed himſelf by their means accurately, concerning every thing; not omitting any perſon, eminent at that time for learning, or any kind of religious rites; nor leaving any place unſeen, by going into which he conceived, that he might find ſomething extraordinary.* [For (*k*) he went into the *Adyta* of the *Egyptians*, (and, as (*l*) *Clemens* ſaith, permitted himſelf to that end to be circumciſed) and learned things not to be communicated concerning the gods, myſtick Philoſophy.] *He travelled to all the Prieſts, and was inſtructed by every one, in that wherein they were particularly learned. In* Egypt *he lived twenty two years, in their private ſacred places, ſtudying* Aſtronomy *and* Geometry, *and was initiated (not curſorily or caſually) into all the religious myſteries of the gods.*

(i) *Jamb.* cap. 4. continuing.

(k) *Laert.* (l) *Strom.* 1. pag. 302.

*Laertius* ſaith, *He made three Cups of ſilver, and preſented them to each* [Society] *of the* Egyptian *Prieſts*; which, as we ſaid, were three, of *Heliopolis*, *Memphis*, and *Thebes*.

## CHAP. V.

### *How he went to* Babylon.

(a) *Olymp.*

(*a*) A *Maſis* dying in the third year of the ſixty third Olympiad, (which was the 223d. of *Nabonaſſer*) his ſon *Pſamminitus* ſucceeded him, who is by *Creſias* named *Amiſtæus*, and (*b*) lib. 36. cap. 9. ſeems to be the ſame whom (*b*) *Pliny* calls *Semniſerteus*, (tho (*c*) others interpret it of *Amaſis*) *in whoſe Reign*, ſaith he, *Pythagoras was in Egypt.* At this time, *Cambyſis* invaded and conquered *Egypt*, (*d*) *by whom* Pythagoras *was taken priſoner, and ſent to* Babylon. *There he lived* [(*e*) with the moſt excellent among the *Chaldeans*, and] *with the Magi*, the *Perſian* Magi, (for ſo (*f*) *Cicero*, (*g*) *Apuleius*, and (*h*) *Euſebius* term them) in reſpect that *Babylon* was then under that Monarchy; which is the meaning alſo of (*i*) *Valerius Maximus*, and (*k*) *Lactantius*, who affirm, that *he went from* Egypt *to the* Perſians, (not to *Perſia*, as (*l*) ſome conceive) *and reſigned himſelf to the moſt exact prudence of the Magi, to be formed.*

(b) *Uſher Annal.* 4167.

(d) *Jamb.* cap. 4. (e) *Clem. Strom.* 1. *Laert.*

(f) *de finib.* 5. (g) *Florid.* 2. (h) *Præp.* 10. (i) lib. 8. cap. 7. (k) lib. 4. c. 2.

(*l*) *Vorgius* de Philoſoph. Sectis cap. 6. ſect. 4.

(*m*) *The Magi received him kindly, and inſtructed him in the moſt profound and ſublime myſteries, of the worſhip of the gods. By their means alſo, he arrived at the heighth of* Arithmetick, Muſick, *and other Mathematical Sciences. From them*, ſaith (*n*) *Valerius Maximus*, *he, with a docile mind, received the motions of the Stars, their power, property, and effects*, (*o*) *their ſtates and periods; the various effects of both in the nativities of men, as likewiſe the remedies of diſeaſes, which are purchaſed at vaſt rates by Sea and Land.*

(*m*) *Jambl.* continueth. (*n*) lib. 3. (*o*) *Apul. Florid.* lib. 2.

Of the *Chaldeans*, with whom he lived in *Babylon*, (*p*) *Diogenes* particularly inſtanceth *Zabratus, by whom he was cleanſed from the pollutions of his life paſt, and inſtructed from what things virtuous perſons ought to be free; and learnt the diſcourſe concerning Nature*, (Phyſick) *and what are the principles if the Univerſe.* This *Zabratus* was probably the ſame with that *Zoroaſtres*, one of the *Perſian* Magi, whom, (*q*) *Apuleius* ſaith, *he chiefly had for Teacher*, terming him, *Omnis divini arcanum antiſtatem*: and the ſame with *Mazaratus* the *Aſſyrian*, whom (*r*) *Alexander*, in his Book of Pythagorick Symbols, affirms to have been Maſter to *Pythagoras*; the ſame whom (*ſ*) *Suidas* calls *Zares*; *Cyril*, *Zaran*; *Plutarch*, *Zaratas*: whence (*t*) ſome conceive, that they all mean *Zoroaſtres* the Magus, who was alſo called *Zarades*, as evidently appears from *Theodoret* and *Agathias*. Indeed, he could not hear *Zoroaſtres* himſelf, as being ſome Ages later; yet it appears from the relation of *Apuleius*, that many conceived *Pythagoras* to have been a follower of *Zoroaſtres*. Perhaps him, whoſe doctrine *Pythagoras* embraced, (for (*u*) *Clemens* ſaith, *he explained* Zoroaſtres *the Perſian Magus*) poſterity believed to have been his Maſter. This *Nazaratus* the *Aſſyrian*, was by ſome ſuppoſed to be the Prophet *Ezekiel*, which opinion *Clemens* oppugns; nevertheleſs (as Mr. *Selden* obſerves) the moſt accurate Chronology teacheth, that *Ezekiel* and *Pythagoras* flouriſhed together, betwixt the 50th and 52d. Olympiad; and therefore the account of time hinders not, but that this *Nazaratus* might be *Ezekiel*.

(*p*) *Porphyr.* p. 2. (*q*) *Florid.* 2. (*r*) *Porphyr.* p. (*s*) In voce *Pythagoras*. (*t*) *Selden.* de Diis Syris. (*u*) *Strom.* 1.

(*x*) *Diogenes* (in his Treatiſe of incredible things, beyond *Thule*) adds, that he went alſo to the *Hebrews*, which (*y*) *Lactantius* expreſly denies. (*z*) *Euſebius* ſaith, *He is reported to have heard the* Perſian Magi, *and the Diviners of the* Egyptians, *at what time ſome of the Jews were gone to* Babylon, *others to* Egypt. That he converſed with the Jews at *Babylon*, (ſaith the (*a*) Biſhop of *Armagh*) may be argued, for that he transferred many of their Doctrines into his Philoſophy, as *Hermippus* declares in his firſt Book of things concerning *Pythagoras*, cited by (*b*) *Joſephus*; and in his firſt Book of Law-givers, cited by (*c*) *Origen*, which likewiſe is confirmed by (*d*) *Ariſtobulus* the Jew, a Peripatetical Philoſopher, in his firſt Book to *Philometor*; who moreover was induced by the ſame reaſon to believe, that the Books of *Moſes* were tranſlated into *Greek* before the *Perſian* Empire; whereas it is much more probable, that *Pythagoras* receiv'd that part of his Learning, from the converſation which he had with the *Hebrews*.

(*x*) *Porph.* p. 8. (*y*) lib. 4. c. 2. (*z*) Præpar. lib. 13. (*a*) Annal. p. 151. (*b*) Contra *Appion.* lib. 1. (*c*) Contra. *Celſum.* lib. 1. (*d*) *Clem. Strom.* 1. *Euſeb.* Præpar. lib. 13.

(e) Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. (e) *Allexander* adds, that he heard the *Galatæ* and the *Brachmanes*. *From* Chaldea (saith *Apuleius*) *he went to the* Brachmanes; *these are wise persons, a Nation of* India, *for which reason he went to their Gymnosophists. The* Brachmanes *conferred many things to his Philosophy; what are the documents of minds, what the exercises of bodies, how many are the parts of the soul, how many the vicissitudes of life; what torments or rewards, according to their merits, are allotted to men after death.*

(f) Porph. (f) *Diogenes* adds, that *he went also to* Arabia, *and lived with the King there*; but it is not easie to find the name of the Court of the King of that wandring Nation.

As concerning his Learning, it is generally said, that (g) *he learned many, and those the most excellent parts of his Philosophy, of the* Barbarians. (h) *Diogenes* affirms, *he gained the greatest part of his wisdom from these Nations.* (i) *The Sciences which are called Mathematical, he learnt of the Egyptians, and the Chaldeans, and the Phœnicians; for the Egyptians were of old studious of Geometry; the* Phœnicians, *of numbers and proportions; the* Chaldeans, *of Astronomical Theorems, divine rites, and worship of the gods; and other institutions concerning the course of life, he learned and received of the Magi. These are more generally known, as being committed to writing; but the rest of his institutions are less known.*

(g) Clem. Strom. 1. (h) Porph. p. 8. (i) Porph. p. 4.

(k) Joseph. contra Appion lib. 1. (l) Vossius de Philos. Sect. cap. 6. sect. 2. (k) *Hermippus* saith, *He embraced the opinions of the Thracians*; which (l) some interpret of *Pittacus*, whose Father *Hyrrhadius* was of that Country: But with more reason may it be understood of *Orpheus*, from whom *Jamblichus* acknowledgeth, that he derived much of the Theological part of his Science.

## CHAP. VI.

*How he returned to* Samus.

Jambl. cap. 2, 5 (for the Chapters are ill distinguisht.) HAving lived at *Babylon* twelve years, he returned to *Samus*, [for, that he was redeemed by one *Gyllus* Prince of *Crotona*, *Apuleius* cites but for a less creditable relation] about the fifty sixth year of his age, *where being known by some of the most ancient persons, he was looked upon with greater admiration than before, for he seemed to them more wise, more beautiful, and more divinely majestick. His Country summoned him to some publick employment, that he might benefit the generality, and communicate his knowledge: which he not refusing, endeavoured to instruct them in the symbolical way of learning, altogether resembling that of the* Egyptians, *in which he himself had been instituted. But the* Samians *not affecting this way, did not apply themselves to him.*

Pythagoras, *tho he saw that no man came to him, or sincerely affected his learning, endeavoured nevertheless all possible waies to continue amongst them, not despising or undervaluing* Samus, *because it was his Country. And whilst he was very desirous that his Country-men should taste, tho against their wills, the sweetness of his Mathematicks, he observed in a* Gymnasium, *a young man that play'd at Tennis dexterously and nimbly, but otherwise poor and indigent: and imagining that this Youth would be wholly guided by him, if without labour he should supply him with necessaries; when they had done washing, he called him to him, and told him, That he would continually furnish him with all things sufficient for his maintenance, if he would learn busily, and without labour, and constantly (that he might not be over-burthened) some Mathematicks, which he himself, when he was young, had learned of the* Barbarians, *which had now left him, by reason of old age and forgetfulness. The Youth promising, and being allured by the hopes of maintenance, he endeavoured to initiate him in Arithmetick and Geometry, drawing the demonstration of each in a Table; and teaching him, he gave the young man for every Scheme (or Diagram) three* Oboli, *as a reward and compensation. And this he continued to do a long time, out of a love of glory, and industriously bringing him into the Theory by an exact method. But when the young man, having made a good progress, was sensible of the excellency, both of the pleasure and the consequences in Mathematicks, the wise man perceiving it, and that he would not now quit his learning, what inconvenience soever he might suffer, pretended, that he had no more* Trioboli *to give him.* 'Tis no matter, said the 'youth, I am able to learn and receive your A-'rithmeticks without it. *He replied,* 'But I have 'not sufficient to find food for my self, where-'fore I must now give over, to acquire necessa-'ries for every day, and daily food; nor is it fit 'now to be taken up with Tables and fruitless 'studies. *Whereupon the young man, loth to be hindred from continuing his learning, replied,* 'I 'will supply you, and in some manner requite 'you; for I will give you for every Scheme three 'Oboli. *And from thence-forward became so much in love with Mathematicks, that he alone of all the* Samians *was commended with* Pythagoras, *being likewise of the same name, son of* Eratocles. *His* Aleiptick Commentaries *are extant, and his directions* to the Wrestlers of that time, to eat flesh instead of dried Figs; *which by some are falsly ascribed to* Pythagoras *the son of* Mnesarchus, [as is formerly intimated] but by * *Pliny*, to one of that name, who professed Exercises of the Body, which agreeth with the relation of *Jamblichus*.

* lib. 23 cap.

## CHAP. VII.

*How he went to* Delus, Delphi, Creet, *and* Sparta.

NOT long after, according to the relation of (a) *Jamblichus*, Pythagoras *went to* Delus, *where he was much admir'd by the inhabitants, for that he prayed only at the Altar of* Apollo Genitor, called (b) unbloody, [which stands behind the horn Altar] (c) because at it were offered only Wheat, and Barley, and Cakes; but no Victim, as *Aristotle* saith, in his Treatise concerning the *Delian* Common-wealth) *and applyed himself to none but the attendants thereof.*

(a) Cap. 5. & cap. 7. (b) Clem. Strom. 7. (c) Laert.

*From* Delus, (d) *Jamblichus* saith, *he went to all places of* Oracle. (e) At *Delphi* he writ an Elegy upon the Tomb of *Apollo*, whereby he declared, that *Apollo* was son of *Silenus*, but slain by *Pytho*, and buried in the place called (f) *Triops*, which was so named, for that the three daughters of *Triopas* mourned there for *Apollo*. *At* Delphi *also* ((g) *Aristoxenus* saith) *he learned many moral documents of* Themistocles. He

(d) cap. 5. p. 20. (e) Porph. p. 10, 11. (f) Reading ἐν τῷ κατὰ μέσον ὄρους Hesych. Τριὼψ ὁ τόπος ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐν ᾧ Τριόπου θυγατέρες ἐθρήνουν τὸν Ἀπόλλω ἐν Δελφοῖς κ.τ.λ. (g) Laert.

He went also to *Creet* and *Sparta*, to acquaint himself with the Laws of *Minos* and *Lycurgus*, which at that time were much renowned, as (*b*) *Justine* and (*i*) *Jamblichus* affirm.

(*b*) *Lib.* 20.
(*i*) *Cap.* 5.

Neither was *Creet* less famous for religious Ceremonies, being esteemed the place where *Jupiter* was Born, and brought up by the *Corybantes* or *Dactyli* Priests of *Cybele*, in a Cave of the Mountain *Ida*, which they so named after that of *Phrygia*, whence they came. They had also a Tradition, that *Jupiter* was buried there, and shew'd his Tomb. Here (*k*) *Pythagoras* addressed himself to the Priests of *Morgus*, one of the *Idæan Dactyli*, who purifi'd him with the *Ceraunian* Stone, [so called, in that it is conceived to be a piece of *Jupiter*'s Thunderbolt, and therefore perhaps used by his Priests.] In the morning he lay stretch'd forth upon his Face by the Sea-side; at night by a River, Crown'd with a Wreath, made of the Wool of a black Lamb.

(*k*) *Porph. p.* 11.

He also appli'd himself to the *Cretan Epimenides*, that Eminent Southsayer, as *Apuleius* calls him. (*l*) He went [(*m*) down] with him into the *Idæan* Cave, wrapt in black Wool, and stayed there three times nine days, according to the Custom; and to *Jupiter*, and saw the Throne which is made yearly there for him, and writ an Epigram upon his Tomb, beginning thus:

(*l*) *Porph. p.* 11.
(*m*) *Laert.*

*Here* Zan *deceased lies, whom* Jove *they call.*

Thus was he (*n*) initiated into all religious rites, as well *Grecian* as *Barbarian.*

(*n*) *Laert.*

## CHAP. VIII.

### *How he went to* Olympia *and* Phlius.

(*a*) After he had made enquiry into the Laws and Customs of *Creet* and *Lacedæmon*, he went down to the Olympick Games; and having given a proof of his multiplicious Knowledg, to the Admiration of all *Greece*, being demanded what his Appellation was, he answer'd, That he was not *Sophos*, Wise; (for excellent men had already possess'd that Name) but, *Philosophos*, A lover of Wisdom.

(*a*) *Val. Max.*

But (*b*) some relate this, as done at *Sicyon*, in Discourse with *Leon*, Tyrant of that place; others at *Phlius*, distant from *Sicyon* a hundred Furlongs. Of the latter are (*c*) *Heraclides*, in his Book of the breathless Woman; and (*d*) *Sosicrates* in his Successions. The Testimony of *Heraclides* is thus delivered by (*e*) *Cicero*. He went (as is reported) to *Phlius*, and discoursed upon some things learnedly and copiously with *Leo* Prince of the *Phliasians*. *Leo* admiring his Wit and Eloquence, demanded in what Art he did most confide. 'He answered, That he knew 'no Art, but was a Philosopher. *Leo* wondring 'at the Novelty of the Name, asked, Who were 'Philosophers, and what difference there is be-'tween them and others? *Pythagoras* answered, 'That human Life seem'd to resemble that pub-'lick Convention, which is celebrated with the 'Pomp and Games of all *Greece*. For, as there, 'some by bodily Exercises aim at the Glory and 'Nobility of a Crown; others are led away by 'Gain in Buying or Selling: But there is a certain 'kind of Persons, and that those of the better 'quality, who seek neither applause nor gain, 'but come to behold, and curiously observe what 'is done, and how. So we coming out of ano-'ther Life and Nature, into this Life, as out of 'some City into the full throng of a publick 'Meeting, some serve Glory, others Riches: on-'ly some few there are, who despising all things 'else, studiously enquire into the Nature of 'things. These he called Enquirers after Wis-'dom, that is, Philosophers.

(*b*) *Laert.* in Procem.
(*c*) *Laert.* in Procem.
(*d*) *Laert. vit. Pythag.*
(*e*) *Tuscul. quæst.* 5.

Thus, whereas Learning before was called *Sophia*, *Wisdom*; and the Professors thereof, *Sophoi*, *Wise-men*, (as *Thales* and the rest, of whom we treated in the first Book) *Pythagoras*, by a more modest Appellation, named it *Philosophy*, *Love of Wisdom*; and its Professors, *Philosophers*; conceiving the Attribute of Wise not to belong to Men, but to God only; that which is properly termed Wisdom, being far above human Capacity. (*f*) 'For tho the frame of the whole Heaven, and 'the Stars which are carried about in it, if we 'consider their order, is fair; yet is it such, but 'by Participation of the primary Intelligible, 'who is a Nature of Numbers and Proportions, diffusing it self through the Universe, according to which, all these things are ordered 'together, and adorn'd decently. Wisdom 'therefore is a true Knowledg, conversant about 'those fair things which are first, and Divine, and 'Incommixt, and always the same; by Partici-'pation whereof, we may call other things Fair. 'But Philosophy is an Imitation of that Science, 'which likewise is an excellent Knowledg, and 'did assist towards the Reformation of Man-'kind.

*Laert.* Procem.

(*f*) *Jamb.* cap.

## CHAP. IX.

### *How he lived at* Samus.

(*a*) HAving been a diligent Auditor and Disciple of all these, he returned home, and earnestly addicted himself to enquiry after such things as he had omitted; and first, [as soon as he returned to *Ionia*] (saith *Antiphon*, cited by (*b*) *Porphyrius*, repeated and enlarged by *Jamblicus*) *he built* [in his Country] *within the City*, a School, which even yet is called the Semicircle of *Pythagoras*, in which the *Samians*, when they would consult about publick Affairs, Assemble; chusing to enquire after things Honest, Just, and Advantageous in that place, which he, who took care of them all, had erected. Without the City he made a Cave, proper for his Study of Philosophy, in which he lived for the most part Day and Night, [and discoursed with his Friends] and made enquiry into the most useful part of Mathematicks, taking the same course as *Minos* Son of *Jupiter*. And so far did he surpass all whom he taught, that they for the smallest Theorems were reputed great Persons.

(*a*) *Jamb.* cap. 5. pag. 40.
(*b*) pag. 5.

*Pythagoras* now perfected the Science of the Celestial Bodies, and over-run it, with all Demonstrations Arithmetical and Geometrical. Nor this only, but he became much more admir'd for the Things he performed afterwards; for Philosophy had now received a great increase, and all *Greece* began to admire him; and the best

best and most studious Persons, for his sake, resorted to *Samus*, desiring to participate of his Institutions.

## CHAP. X.

### *His Voyage to* Italy.

*Jamb.* cap. 5. 6. (for these also are ill distinguisht.)

BUT *Pythagoras* being engaged by his Country-men in all Embassies, and constrained to be interested in their publick Negotiations, and perceiving that if he should comply with the Laws of his Country, and continue there, it would be hard for him to study Philosophy; for which Reason, all former Philosophers ended their Lives in forraign Countries. Weighing all these considerations, and to avoid civil Employments; or, as others say, declining the negligence of Learning, which at that time possess'd the *Samians*, departed into *Italy*, preferring that place before his Country, which contained most Persons, fervently desirous of Learning.

But before we speak of his Actions in *Italy*, it will be requisite, as well to settle the time of his coming, as the State of that Country, as it was at that time. It was a received Opinion amongst the more Ancient, but less Learned, *Romans*, That *Pythagoras* was Contemporary with King *Numa*. The occasion of that Tradition might perhaps arise from those Books, which were found in the Sepulcher of *Numa*, 805 years after his Death, as *Antius Valerius*, cited by (*a*) *Livy*; and *Cassius Hemina*, by (*b*) *Pliny*, relate; and supposed to contain Pythagorical Philosophy. But that Opinion is long since refuted, by the more Learned *Romans* and *Grecians*, *Cicero*, *Titus Livius*, *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*, *Plutarch*, and others.

(*a*) *Decad.* 4. *lib ult.*
(*b*) *Lib.* 13. *cap.* 13.

They who have looked more strictly into the time of *Pythagoras*, seem to follow two different Accounts. *Jamblichus* saith, That he lived in *Egypt* 22 years, That he was carried from thence by *Cambyses*, That he lived in *Babylon* 12 years, That from thence he returned to *Samus*, being 56 years old; That from *Samus* he went into *Italy* in the 62 Olympiad, *Eryxidas*, a *Chalcidean*, being Victor at the Olympick Games: From whence it follows, that he went into *Egypt* about the third year of the 53*d* Olympiad; and that he was Born the second year of the 48*th* Olympiad; and that it was the 52*d* Olympiad, when he, in the 18*th* year of his Age, heard *Thales*, *Pherecydes* and *Anaximander*. This Account seems to be followed by *Laertius*, *Porphyrius*, *Themistius*, *Suidas*, (from *Laertius*) and others, who affirm, he went from *Samus* into *Italy*, at what time *Polycrates* was Tyrant of *Samus*, conceiving it unfit for a Philosopher to live under such a Government: For by (*c*) *Diodorus*, *Pythagoras* is acknowledged in the 61*st* Olympiad, *Thericles* being Archon; by (*d*) *Clemens Alexandrinus*, about the 62*d* Olympiad, under *Polycrates*; and in the second year of the 64*th* Olympiad, *Policrates* was betrayed and put to Death by *Oroetas*. This Account *Antilochus* also seems to follow, who reckons from the time of *Pythagoras* to the Death of *Epicurus*, 312 years. *Epicurus* died in the second year of the 127*th* Olympiad; the 312*th* year upwards, is the first of the 49*th* Olympiad. Neither is *Livy* much different from this Computation, who makes him to come into *Italy*, *Servio Tullio regnante*, who died about a year or two before. And this Account might be the occasion of making him live to 90 years, as *Laertius* saith, many do; and to 104 years, as the nameless Author of his Life in *Photius*, the year of his Death being according to *Eusebius*, the fourth of the 70*th* Olympiad.

(*c*) *Excerpt. Vales, p.* 241.
(*d*) *Strom.*
*Clem. Strom.* 1.

But this Account may, with good Reason, be question'd; for if it be granted, (as by *Jamblichus* himself, and other good Authorities it is affirmed) that *Pythagoras* was in *Egypt* when *Cambyses* subdu'd it, and that he was carried away Captive by him into *Babylon*, the time of his going into *Italy* must of necessity be much later; for *Cambyses* invaded *Egypt* in the fifth year of his Reign, which is the third year of the 63*d* Olympiad, and the 223*d* year of *Nabonassar*, of which there is no question in Chronology. For that the seventh year of *Cambyses* is known to be the 225*th* year of *Nabonassar*; because *Ptolomy* in his (*e*) *Almegist* relates an Astronomical Observation, of a Lunar Eclipse at *Babylon*, on the 17*th* day of the Month *Pharemoth*, according to the *Egyptians*, which is with us the 16*th* of *July*, one hour before Midnight. From whence now it follows, that he if lived 22 years in *Egypt*, that then he went thither in the third year of the 58*th* Olympiad; and that if he staid in *Babylon* twelve years, he went into *Italy* about the end of the 66*th* Olympiad; and that if he were then 56 years old, he was not Born before the first year of the 53*d* Olympiad. And according to this Account, they who make him to live but 70 or 80 years, do not much differ in the time of his Death from them, who, according to the other Account, make him live so much longer; for they who give him most years, do not make him to dye later, but to be Born sooner.

(*e*) *Lib.* 5. *cap.* 4.

This Account they seem to follow, who affirm, (*f*) he went from *Samus* to *Italy*, for that he could not brook *Syloson* the Brother of *Polycrates*, on whom (being a private Person, after his Brothers Death) *Darius Hystaspis* afterward bestow'd the Tyranny of *Samus*, in requital of a Garment which *Syloson* had given him, before he came to the Empire. And thus perhaps is (*g*) *Strabo* to be understood, who saith, Pythagoras, *as they reported, in the time of* Polycrates, *seeing the Tyranny begun, forsook the City, and went from thence to* Egypt *and* Babylon, *out of Love to Learning; and returning home, and seeing that the Tyranny continued still, he went into* Italy, *where he ended his days.* By this Continuation of the Tyranny, seems to be meant the Reign of *Solyson*, who Ruled so Cruelly, that many Persons forsook the City, insomuch that it became a Proverb,

(*f*) *Diod. in excerpt. Vales. p.* 241.
(*g*) *Lib.* 14.
*Strabo, ibid.*

*A Region vast*
*By* Syloson *laid waste.*

With both these Accounts agree what (*h*) *Cicero* and (*i*) *Agellius* affirm, concerning his coming into *Italy*, that it was in the Reign of *Tarquinius Superbus*; but to neither can that of (*k*) *Pliny* be

(*h*) *Tusc. quæst.* 1.
(*i*) *Lib.* 17. *cap. ult.*
(*k*) *Lib.* 2. *cap.* 8.

be accommodated, who saith, That Pythagoras *observed the Nature of the Star* Venus *about the* 42*d Olympiad, which was of the City of* Rome *the* 142*d year*. There must therefore be either an Error in both the Numbers; or, which I rather believe, in *Pliny* himself, occasion'd, perhaps by mistaking *Tarquinius Priscus* (under whom they both fall) for *Tarquinius Superbus*, under whom *Pythagoras* flourished.

If therefore he came into *Italy* in the Reign of *Tarquinius Superbus*, the opinion of *Cicero* is to be received, that he was there when *Lucius Brutus* free'd his Counry; and upon the expulsion of *Tarquinius Superbus*, he and *Lucius Collatinus* were made the first Consuls, at which time the Dominion of the *Romans* extended not any way above six Miles from their City; and the Southern parts of *Italy* were chiefly inhabited by the *Grecians*, who at several times had there planted divers Colonies, whereof we shall only mention those, which were more particularly concerned in the Actions of *Pythagoras*.

The most Ancient of these is *Metapontum*, seated in the *Bay* of *Tarentum*, betwixt *Heraclea* and *Tarentum*, built by *Nestor* and the (*l*) *Pylians*, a People of *Peloponnesus*. Long after were founded;

*Catana*, a City on the East-side of *Sicily*, betwixt *Messena* and *Syracusæ*, Built by a Colony of *Chalcideans*, in the (*m*) 11*th* Olympiad.

*Tarentum* in *Italy*, in the (*n*) 18*th* Olympiad, Built (*o*) by the *Parthenians*, who were Children of the *Lacedæmonian* Women, Born in the absence of their Husbands, at the *Messanian* Wars; and therefore called *Parthenians* in reproach; which not brooking, they conspired against the *Lacedæmonian* People, but being betrayed and banished, came hither.

*Crotona*, a City in the *Bay* of *Tarentum*, Built in the (*p*) 19*th* Olympiad, (*q*) by a Colony of *Achæans*, under the Conduct of *Miscellus*, by whom named *Crotona*, at the Command of *Hercules*, in memory of *Croto*, his Host, whom having unwittingly Slain, he Buried there; This City, for being Built by the command of *Hercules*, engraved his Figure in their Coins.

*Sybaris*, a City distant from *Crotona* 200 Furlongs, according to *Strabo*'s Account; but, as others conceive, more than twice so much; built at the same time (*r*) by a Colony of *Troezenians*, under the Conduct of *Iselicus*, betwixt the two Rivers *Crathis* and *Sybaris*

(*s*) *Locri* in *Italy*, built the 24*th* Olympiad, by the *Locrians*, a People of *Achaia*.

(*t*) *Agrigentum*, an *Ionian* Colony, built by the *Geloans* (*u*) 108 years after their own Foundation. (*x*) *Gela* was built in the 45 year after *Syracusa*; (*y*) *Syracusa* in the 11*th* Olympiad: *Agrigentum* therefore in the 49*th*.

To these add, of less certain time, *Rhegium* in *Calabria*, built by the *Chalcedeans*. *Nimera* and *Tauromenium* in *Sicily*, Colonies of the *Zanclæans*. Indeed so generally was the Pythagorical Doctrine received in these parts, that (*z*) *Jamblicus* affirms, *All* Italy *was filled with Philosophical Persons; and whereas before it was obscure, afterwards by Reason of* Pythagoras, *it was named* Μεγάλη Ἑλλάς, Magna Græcia.

(*r*) *Solin.*
(*s*) *Eus.b.*
(*t*) *Strab.l.6.*
(*u*) *Toucyd.l.6.*
(*x*) *Toucyd.l.b.*
(*y*) *Eusch.*
(*z*) *Cap.* 29.

## CHAP. XI.

*His Arrival at* Crotona, *and upon what Occasion he first became Eminent there.*

HE came at first to *Crotona*, the State of which City in particular was this; (*a*) At the beginning, the *Crotonians* joyning with the *Sybarites* and the *Metapontines*, determined to expel the rest of the *Grecians* out of *Italy*. They first took the City *Syris*; and taking it ill, that at their besieging *Syris*, the *Locrians* assisted the adverse Party, raised a War against them, related thus by (*b*) *Justin*: 'The *Locrians* being terrifi'd, re-
'cur to the *Spartans* for Refuge, and beg their
'aid. They oppress with a long War, bad them
'seek help of *Castor* and *Pollux*. Neither did the
'Ambassadors sleight the Advice of the Associate
'City, but going into the next Temple, they
'sacrific'd, and implor'd the help of the Gods;
'having offered Victims, and obtained, as they
'thought what they requested, no less joyful,
'than as if they were to carry the Gods them-
'selves along with them, they made Couches
'for them in the Ship, and by a fortunate Voy-
'age, bring Comfort, instead of Relief to their
'Country-men. This known, the *Crotonians*
'also send Ambassadors to the Oracle at *Delphi*,
'praying for Victory, and a happy Success of the
'War. Answer is made, that Enemies must be
'overcome in Vows first, before in Arms. They
'vow'd to *Apollo* the Tenths of the Spoil. The
'*Locrians* understanding the Vow of their Ene-
'mies, and the Answer of the god, vow'd the
'Ninths, and kept it secret, lest they might be
'out-done in Vowing. Being drawn forth into
'the Field, the *Crotonian* Army consisting of
'120000 Soldiers; the *Locrians* beholding how
'small a Number they were, (for they had but
'15000) gave over all hope of Victory, and
'unanimously resolved to dye; and so great
'Courage did every Man take from Desparati-
'on, that they conceived they should be Con-
'querors, if they did not dye unwillingly. But
'whilst they sought to dye honourably, they
'overcame more fortunately; neither was there
'any

(*a*) *Justin.l.20.*
(*b*) *Lib.* 20.

'any other cause of that Victory, than that they 'despaired of it. Whilst they were in fight, an 'Eagle never left the *Locrian* Army, but flew 'about it all the while, until they had gain'd 'the Victory. In the Wings of the Army also, 'two young men, armed after a fashion different 'from all the rest, of extraordinary bigness, up-'on white Horses, in crimson mantles, were seen 'to fight; and, after the fight, were seen no 'more. This wonder was increased by the in-'credible swiftness of fame; for the very same 'day that this fight hapned in *Italy*, the victory 'was reported at *Corinth*, *Athens*, *and Lacedæ-'mon*. After this, the *Crotonians* used no mili-'tary exercise, nor minded Arms; for they hated 'what they had taken up unsuccesfully, and 'would have changed their life into luxury, had 'it not been for *Pythagoras* the Philosopher. Hi-therto *Justine*.

*Porphyr.* vit. *Pythag.* pag. 'As soon as he arriv'd in *Italy*, and came to '*Crotona*, *Dicæarchus* saith, That upon the com-'ing of a person, who was a great traveller, and 'excellent, and through a peculiar advantage of 'nature, prosperously guided by fortune, (for 'he was of a free presence, tall, graceful in his 'speech and gesture, and in all things else) the 'Citizens of *Crotona* were so taken with him, 'that having won the affections of the old men, 'who were the Magistrates of the City, and 'made an excellent and large discourse to the 'young men; he did the second time, by com-'mand from the Magistrates, make an exhorta-'tion to the young men, and afterwards to the 'boys, who came flocking out of the School to 'hear him; and lastly to the women, assembled 'to that purpose. The occasion and manner mentioned, by *Plutarch* and * *Porphyrius*, re-lated thus by † *Jamblichus*.

* Pag. ‡ cap. 8.

'At this time, walking from *Sybaris* to *Croto-'na*, upon the Sea-side, he lighted upon some 'fisher-men; and whilst their Net was yet at the 'bottom loaden, he told them exactly the num-'ber of the fishes that they should draw up: And 'the men undertaking to do whatsoever he 'should command them, if it fell out according-'ly; he required them to turn back again the 'fishes alive, after they had exactly numbred 'them; and which is more wonderful, not one 'of all the number, at that time, of the Fishes, 'whilst they were out of the water, died; he 'being present, and giving the Fishermen the 'price of the Fish, he departed to *Crotona*. But 'they divulged what was done, and, learning his 'name of the Boys, declared it to every one; 'which they hearing, desired to see the stranger, 'which was opportune to him; for he was of 'such an Aspect, that whosoever saw him could 'not but admire him, and conceive him to be 'the person that he really was.

## CHAP. XII.

### *His Oration to the young Men.*

*Jambl.* continueth. || The beginning of this Oration is in *Laertius* also.

SOme few days after, he went into the publick School, and the young men flocking to him, it is said, that he made discourses to them, where-in || he exhorted them to respect their Elders, de-claring, 'That in the World, and in Life, and 'in Cities, and in Nature, that which is precedent 'in time is more honourable, than that which is 'subsequent; as, the East than the West, the 'Morning than the Evening, the Beginning than 'the End, Generation than Corruption; more-'over, Natives than Strangers. In like manner, 'in Colonies, the Leader and Planter of Cities, 'and generally the Gods than Dæmons, Dæmons 'than Semi-gods, Heroes than Men: and of these '(men) the causes of Generation, than the 'younger. This he said by way of induction, 'to make them have a greater esteem of their 'Parents, to whom, he said, they had as much 'obligation, as a dead man might owe to him, 'that should raise him again to life. Moreover, 'that it was just to love above all, and never to 'afflict the first, and those who have done us 'greatest benefits: But Parents only, by the be-'nefit of generation, are the first, and Prede-'cessors are the causes of all things that succeed 'rightly to their Successors; shewing, that they 'are nothing less beneficial to us, than the gods, 'against whom it is not possible to offend in so 'doing; and the gods themselves cannot but in 'justice pardon those, who reverence their Pa-'rents equal to them; for it is from them that 'we learn to worship the Deity; whence *Homer* 'gives the King of the gods the same stile, call-'ing him, *Father of gods and mortals*. And ma-'ny other fabulous writers have delivered, that 'the chiefest of the gods were ambitious, to 'make up the divided love of children, by a 'new conjunction of parents; and for this end, 'making a new supposition of Father and Mother, '*Jupiter* brought forth *Minerva*; *Juno*, *Vulcan*, 'of a contrary sex to their own, that they might 'participate of that love which was more re-'mote.

'Now all persons granting the judgment of 'the gods to be strongest, he demonstrated this 'particularly to the people of *Croto*, because that '*Hercules* was of Affinity with them, therefore 'they ought willingly to obey the injunctions of 'their Parents, since they understood, that this 'god, in obedience to another elder than him-'self, underwent his labours, and presented to 'his father, as the Epinicium of his actions, the 'Olympick Games.

'He declared likewise, that in their conversa- This also is in Laertius. 'tion to one another, they should so behave them-'selves, that they might hereafter never become 'enemies to their friends, but might soon be-'come friends to their enemies; as to their 'friends they should never become enemies, but 'to their enemies quickly become their friends. 'And that they should study in their behaviour 'towards their elders, their reverence towards 'their parents, and in their love to one another, 'their community towards their brethren.

'Furthermore he discoursed concerning Tem-'perance, saying, That young men should make 'tryal of their nature at that time, in which they 'have their desires vigorous. Then he advised 'them, that it was worth their observation, that 'this only virtue was convenient both for chil-'dren, and maids, and women, and old men, 'but especially for young men. Further, this 'Virtue only declares, that they understand the 'goods of the body and the soul, seeing it pre-'serves health, and a desire of the best studies.

'This

'This is manifeſt from the contrary; for the 'Barbarians and the Grecians contending about 'Troy, both parties, for the intemperance of one 'Man, fell into extraordinary Calamities; thoſe 'in the War; theſe in their Voyage home. 'And God appointed ten years, and a thouſand 'years, only for the puniſhment of this Injuſtice, 'foretelling by Oracle the taking of *Troy*, and 'the ſending of the Virgins by the *Locrians*, to 'the Temple of *Minerva* the *Ilian*.

'He likewiſe exhorted the young Men to 'love Learning, telling them, how abſurd it 'were to judg Learning to be the moſt advan-'tageous of all things, and to wiſh for it 'above all things, yet to beſtow no time or 'pains in that Exerciſe: Eſpecially, ſeeing the 'care of our Bodies is like evil Friends, which 'ſoon forſake us; but that of Inſtitution, like 'the good, which ſtay with a Man till Death; 'procuring to ſome immortal Glory after 'Death.

'He framed many other things, partly out 'of Hiſtory, partly out of Doctrines, ſhew-'ing, that Learning was a common Nobility 'of thoſe, who were firſt in every kind, for 'their Inventions were the Inſtitutions of the 'reſt. Thus is this naturally advantageous, 'that of other commendable things, ſome it 'is not poſſible to communicate to another, 'as Strength, Beauty, Health, Courage; ſome, 'whoſoever imparts them to another, cannot 'have them himſelf, as Riches, Government, 'and the like: But for this, you may receive 'it of another, and yet the giver have nothing 'the leſs of it. Moreover ſome, a man cannot 'gain if he would; he may receive Inſtitution 'if he will: then he may apply himſelf to the 'Affairs of his Country, not upon Self-confi-'dence, but Inſtitution; for by Education, Men 'differ from Beaſts, *Greeks* from *Barbarians*, 'Free-men from Slaves, Philoſophers from the 'Vulgar. Who have in general this advantage, 'that as of thoſe who run ſwifter than others, 'there had been ſeven out of this their own City, 'at one Celebration of the Olympick Games; 'but of ſuch as did excel in Wiſdom, there had 'been found but ſeven in the whole World, and 'in the following times in which he lived, there 'was but one who did excel all others in Phi-'loſophy: for he called himſelf by that Name, '(*Philoſopher*) inſtead of *Sophos*, a wiſe Man.

Stob.

## CHAP. XIII.

### *His Oration to the Senators.*

Jamb. cap. 9. THus he diſcourſed to the young Men in the School; but they relating to their Fathers what he had ſaid, the Thouſand-men ſummoned *Pythagoras* to the Court, and commending him for the advice he had given to their Sons, they commanded him, that if he had any thing which might benefit the People of *Crotona*, he ſhould declare it to the Magiſtrates of the Commonwealth.

Lib. 8. cap. 18. The *Crotonians* (ſaith *Valerius Maximus*) did earneſtly entreat him, that he would permit their Senate, which conſiſted of a thouſand Perſons, to uſe his advice.

'Herenpon he firſt adviſed them to build a 'Temple to the Muſes, that they might pre-'ſerve their preſent Concord; for theſe God-'deſſes * have all the ſame Appellation, ‖ and 'have a reciprocal communication and delight, 'chiefly in honours common to them all; and 'the *Chorus* of the Muſes is always one and the 'ſame. Moreover, Concord, Harmony, Rythm, 'all thoſe things which procure unanimity, are 'comprehended.

'He likewiſe ſhewed them, that their power did 'not only extend to the excellent, but to the con-'cord and harmony of Beings.

'Further he ſaid, They ought to conceive, 'they received their Countrey as a *depoſitum* from 'their people: wherefore they ought ſo to ma-'nage it, as being hereafter to reſign up their 'truſt with a juſt account to their own chil-'dren. That this will certainly be, if they be 'equal to all their Citizens, and excel other 'men in nothing more than in Juſtice; knowing, 'that every place requireth Juſtice. He ſhow'd 'it out of the Mythology, that *Themis* hath the 'ſame place with *Jupiter*, as *Dice* with *Pluto*, and 'Law among Cities; ſo that he who did any 'thing unjuſtly in things under his charge, ſeemed 'to abuſe the whole world, [*both above, below, and 'on Earth.*]

'That it is convenient in Courts of Judicature, 'that * none atteſt the Gods by Oath, but uſe to 'ſpeak ſuch things, as that he may be believed 'without Oath.

'Moreover, That every one ſhould ſo govern 'his Family, as that they ſhould refer themſelves 'to their own houſe, as to a Court of Judicature; 'and that they ſhould be naturally affectionate to 'ſuch as are deſcended of them, as having only 'of all creatures received the ſenſe of this affecti-'on; and that they ſhould converſe with the wo-'man that is partner of their life: For, as ſome 'men making contracts with others, write them 'in Tables and Pillars; thoſe with Wives, are in 'the Children. And that they ſhould endeavour 'to be belov'd of thoſe which come from them, 'not by Nature, of which they are not the cauſe, 'but by Election; for that kindneſs is voluntary.

'That they ſhould likewiſe take care, that they 'know no women but their Wives, and that the 'Wives do not adulterate the Race, through the 'careleſneſs and wickedneſs of their Husbands.

'Further, they muſt conſider, they take the 'Wife from the Altar with Libations, as a Votareſs, 'in the ſight of the gods, and ſo to go in unto her, 'and that ſhe become, in order and temperance, 'a pattern to thoſe that live in the houſe with her, 'and to the women of the City,

'And that they ſhould ſee carefully that none 'tranſgreſs, leſt, not fearing the puniſhments of 'Law, ſuch as do unjuſtly lye hid; but having a 'reſpect to honeſty in their carriage, they may be 'incited to juſtice.

'Further, he commanded, That in all their acti-'ons they ſhould avoid Idleneſs; for there is no 'other good, than the opportunity in every action.

'He aſſerted, that it is the greateſt of Injuſtices, 'to ſeparate children and parents from each other.

'That he is to be thought the greateſt Perſon, 'who can of himſelf foreſee what is advanta-'geous: The next to whom is he, who by thoſe 'things which happen to other Men, obſerves

* Μῦσαι q ὐ. μῶσαι Syncſius in Dione & Caſſidor. lib. 3. var. ‖ Ariſt. A poſt. ωσπερ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐστι φύσει αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι ἀλλήλαις. Cicer quaſi cognatione quadam, &c.

* To the ſame effect *Laertius*.

'what is good for himself. The worst is he, who 'stays to Learn what is best, by the experience 'of suffering ill.

'He said, That they who are desirous of Glo-'ry, shall not do amiss, if they imitate those 'who are crowned for Running; for they do no 'harm to their Adversaries, but desire that they 'themselves may obtain the Victory. And it be-'seemeth Magistrates, not to be rigid to those 'who contradict them, but to benefit those who 'obey them.

'He likewise exhorted every one that aimed 'at true Glory, to be indeed such, as he desired 'to appear to others; for it is not so sacred a 'thing to be advised by another, as to be praised 'for what is done; for one is only requisite 'to Men, the other much more used by the 'Gods.

'In Conclusion he said, That their City 'chanced to be built by *Hercules*. When he 'drove [*Gerion's*] Oxen through *Italy*, being 'injured by *Lacinius*, *Croto* coming to help him; 'not knowing him by reason of the Night, and 'thinking him to be one of his Enemies, he slew 'him; and then promising at his Grave, that he 'would build a City which should bear his Name, 'if ever he came to be a God; in gratitude for 'his kindness, he said, it behoved them to govern 'their Commonwealth justly.

'They hearing this, Built a Temple to the 'Muses, and put away the Concubines which 'they used to keep; and entreated him to Dis-'course severally in the Temple of *Pythian Apol-*
* *Mentioned by* Cicero *and others.* '*lo* to the Boys, and in the Temple of * *Juno* to 'the Women.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *His Oration to the Boys.*

*Jamb.* cap. 10. HE being perswaded by them, discoursed to the Boys in this manner; 'That they should 'neither begin Contumelies, nor return them to 'the Reproachers.

'And concerning παίδευσις, (Institution) which 'is of the same Name as the time of their Youth, 'he commanded them diligently to pursue it; ad-'ding, That to a well disposed Youth, it is easie 'to preserve honesty throughout all his Life; 'but to him that is not well disposed, it is 'hard at that time to continue it, but more 'difficult from an ill beginning to run to the 'end.

'Moreover he declared, That they are most 'beloved of the Gods, and for that reason in 'times of Dearth, they are sent forth to pray 'to the Gods for Rain, as if the Deity would 'soonest hear them. And they only being al-'ways sanctified, had leave to live in the Tem-'ple.

'For the same Reason, the Gods that are most 'kind to Men, *Apollo* and *Cupid*, are by all Pain-'ters represented, as having that Age (of Boys.) 'It is likewise acknowledged, that the crowned 'Games were instituted for the sake of Boys; 'the *Pythian*, upon the Conquest of *Pytho* by a 'Boy; that in *Nemea*, for a Boy likewise; and 'that in *Isthmus*, upon the Death of *Archemorus* 'and *Melicertus*.

'Besides all this, at the building of the City 'Croto, *Apollo* told the Leader of the Colony, 'That he would give him a Progeny, if he con-'ducted his Colony to *Italy*; whence they 'ought to reflect, that *Apollo* hath a particu-'lar Providence for that Generation; and over 'Youth, even all the Gods. Wherefore they 'ought to study to be worthy of their Love, 'and employ themselves in hearing, that they 'may be able to speak. Moreover, if they 'would live to be old themselves, they should 'obey their Elders, and not contradict them; 'for by that means they will become esteemed 'worthy, not to be injured by those that are 'younger than themselves.

## CHAP. XV.

### *His Oration to the Women.*

IT is said, That he discoursed to the Women *Jamb.* cap. 11. concerning Sacrifices; first, that 'As when 'another Man were to pray for them, they 'would have him to be Honest and Good, be-'cause the Gods hearken to such Men; in like 'manner ought they above all things so to behave 'themselves, as that they may indeed have the 'Gods attentive to their Prayers.

'Next, That they must present the Gods 'with such things, as they themselves make 'with their own hands; and without the help 'of Servants, offer them at the Altar; as Cakes, 'Wax and Incense: But that they present not 'the Deity with Slaughter and Death; nor that 'they offer so much at one time, as if they were 'never to come thither again.

'As concerning their Conversation towards 'their Husbands, he commanded them to con-'sider, that Fathers did yield to their Daugh-'ters, that their Husbands should be more 'beloved by them than their Parents. Where-'fore it is fit, that either they contradict their 'Husbands in nothing, or then think they have 'the Victory, when they are over-ruled by them.

'Moreover he spared that celebrious Apoph-'thegm concerning Coition, That for her who 'riseth from her own Husband, it is lawful to go 'to the Temples the same day; but for her who 'riseth from him that is not her Husband, never.

'He exhorted them likewise, throughout their 'whole life to speak well of others, and to take 'care that others speak well of them, and that they 'destroy not that good report which is given; nor 'confute those Mythographers, who (seeing the 'Justice of Women, in respect that they lend their 'Garments without witness, when any hath need 'of them, and that they made no Bargains and En-'gagements) feigned three Women who made 'use of one Eye amongst them, because of their 'readiness to communicate. Which if ap-'ply'd to Men, as if when one had received any 'thing, he should restore presently, or com-'municate to his Neighbour, every one would 'say, there is no such thing, it being contrary to 'their Nature.

'Further, he who is said to be the wisest of all 'Persons, who disposed the Language of Men, 'and invented all Names, whether he were a 'God, or a Dæmon, or some divine Man, upon consi-

'consideration, because the female Sex is most 'addicted to Piety) made every degree of Age 'synonymous with some God, and called the 'unmarried Woman, *Core*; her who is given to 'Man, * *Nympha*; her who hath Children, *Mo-* 'ther; her who hath Childrens Children, in the 'Dorick Dialect, *Maja*; To which respect of 'their Devotion) it agrees, that the Oracles at 'Dodona and *Delphi*, are delivered by Wo- 'men.

'Having thus commended their Devotion, 'he converted his Discourse to speak of Decency 'of Habit, that none should presume to wear any 'sumptuous Cloaths, but offer them all at *Juno*'s 'Temple (which amounted to) many millions of 'Garments.

'He is reported also to have said thus, That 'throughout the Country of the *Crotoniates*, the 'Virtue of a Man towards his Wife was much 'celebrated. *Ulysses* refusing Immortality at '*Calypso*'s hands, rather than to forsake *Penelope*. 'Let it be the part of the Wives to express their 'virtuous Loyalty towards their Husbands, that 'this praise may be Reciprocal.

* So supply the Text from Laertius, who cites something to the same purpose out of Timæus. Kopn is a Name of Proserpina; Νύμφη, Bride, relates to the Nymphs; Μῆτηρ, to Cybele Mother of the Gods; Maia, to Maja, mother of Mercury.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *His Institution of a Sect in Private and Publick.*

Jamb. cap. 12. Porph. p. 12. BY this Discourse, *Pythagoras* gained no small Honour and Esteem in *Crotona*, and by means of that City, throughout all *Italy*.

Jamb. cap. 6. At the first Oration which he made in *Crotona*, he attracted many Followers, insomuch that it is said, he gained six hundred Persons, who were by him not only won to the Philosophy which he profest, but following his Rules, became as we call it, *Cœnobii*; and these were they who studied Philosophy. [They did put their Estates into one common Stock, and kept Silence five years, only hearing his Discourses, but not seeing him, until they were fully proved, and then they became of his Family, and were admitted to him.] There were the same *six hundred Persons*, who, *Laertius* saith, *came to his nocturnal Acroasis*, (perhaps meaning the Lectures through a Skreen during their Probation, for he adds) if any of them were thought worthy to see him, they wrote of it to their Friends, as having obtain'd a great matter. This Society *Laertius* calls, *his System*, (which *Cassiodorus* interprets Colledg) *Agellius*, his Family.

Laert.

Jamb. cap. 6. (a) Porph. p. 13. Besides these, There were many Auditors, called *Acousmaticks*, whereof he gained [as (*a*) *Nicomachus* relates] two thousand by one Oration, which he made at his first coming into *Italy*, who [that they might not live from home] erected a large *Homacoceion*, [which *Clemens Alexandrinus* interprets to be the same as *Ecclesia*, Church, with us] whereinto were admitted also Boys and Women; and built Cities, and inhabited all that part of *Italy* which is called *Magna Græcia*, and received Laws and Statutes from him as divine Precepts, without which they did not any thing; they lived together unanimously, praised by all, and applauded as happy by such as lived round about them.

Strom. 1. Thus *Pythagoras* distinguished those whom he admitted, according to their several merits; for it was not fit that all should partake alike, being not of a like Nature; nor fit, that some should receive all the Learning, others none, for that would have been contrary to his Community of all, and to his Equality. He therefore, of the Discourses which he made, communicated to every one that part which was proper for him; and distributed his Learning so, as that it might benefit every one according to his Capacity; and observing the Rules of Justice, in giving to every one that share of the Discourse which they deserved; calling upon this account, some *Pythagoreans* (those of the *System*) some *Pythagorites*, (those of the *Homacoeion*) as we call some *Atticks*, some *Atticists*. Dividing them thus aptly into two Names, he appointed one part to be γνησίους, Genuin, the other he ordered to be Imitators of them. As to the *Pythagoreans* he decreed, that all their Estates should be in common, and that they should lead their whole Lives together in Community; but the others he ordered to keep their Estates to themselves, yet to meet together. Thus was this Succession of both Parties constituted by *Pythagoras*. The Discipline which was observed by the more Genuine, the *Pythagoreans*, we shall remit, together with his Doctrine, to the end of his Life.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *His Authority in Civil Affairs.*

WHatsoever Cities in his Travels through *Italy* and *Sicily*, he found subjected to one another, (whereof some had been so of a long time, others of late) he infused into them a Resentment of Liberty by his Disciples, of whom he had some out of every City, he restored them to Liberty. Thus he freed *Crotona*, *Sybaris*, *Catana*, *Rhegium*, *Himera*, *Agrigentum*, *Tauromenium*, and some others, to whom he sent Laws by *Charondas* the *Catanæan*, and *Zaleucus* the *Locrian*, by means whereof they lasted a long time well governed, and were deservedly envied by their Neighbours. He wholly took away Dissention, not only from among his Disciples, and their Successors for many Ages after, but also from all the Cities of *Italy* and *Sicily*, both intestine and external Dissention. For he did frequently pronounce to all manner of Persons every where, whether many or few, an Apophthegm, which resembles a monitory Oracle of God, which was a kind of Epitome or Recapitulation of all that he taught. The Apophthegm was thus, *That we ought to avoid with our utmost endeavour, and to amputate with Fire and Sword, and all other means from the Body, Sickness; from the Soul, Ignorance; from the Belly, Luxury; from a City, Sedition; from a Family, Discord; from all Things, Excess.* By which he did indulgently put every one in mind of his best Doctrines. *Porphyr. p. 14. and from him Jamb. cap. 7.*

Yet is he reported to have been the occasion of the War between the *Sybarites* and the *Crotonians*, which ended in the total Subversion of the *Sybarites*; The manner is thus related by *Diodorus Siculus*, and *Jamblichus*.

* When the *Grecians* built *Sybaris* in *Italy*, it soon came to pass, that through the goodness of the Soil, [tho ‡ *Athæneus* deny it to be Fertile] 'the

* *Diod.* lib. 12.

‡ *Deip.* lib. 12.

'the City became in a short time very rich; for 'being seated betwixt two Rivers, *Crathis* and '*Sybaris*, (from which it took its name) and the 'Citizens possessing a large Country, they soon 'gathered together great Riches; and admitting 'many to be free of their Country, they arrived to 'such height, that they seemed far to excel all the 'rest of the inhabitants of *Italy*. [* But so luxurious, that they became infamous even to a proverb; and no less addicted to all other vices, insomuch that they, out of insolence, put to death thirty Ambassadours of the *Crotonians*, and threw their bodies from the walls to be devoured by beasts.] 'The City was so populous, that it contained no 'less than 300000 persons. At that time *Telys* was 'chief Magistrate, who, accusing the greatest men, 'procured of the *Sybarites* to banish 500 of the 'richest Citizens, and to confiscate their goods. 'These banished men went to *Crotona*, and 'there (after the manner of Suppliants) fled 'to the Altars erected in the *Forum*. Hereupon *Telys* sent Ambassadours to the *Crotonians*, 'to declare, that they should either deliver up 'the banished men, or expect war. [These *Sybarate*-Ambassadors had been instrumental in the murther of some friends of *Pythagoras*, perhaps some of the thirty *Crotonians* whom they slew.] 'Amongst them, one there was, who 'had killed some of them with his own hands; 'another was son to one of the same murtherers, 'who was dead. Moreover, he was of those 'kinds of persons, who, being oppress't with 'want, stir up sedition, that they may take occasion thereby to fall on the goods of others. 'These *Sybarites* came to *Pythagoras*, and blamed 'him; and one of them (which was he that had 'a hand himself in the death of his friends) demanding a reason of his reproof, he said, That 'he did not give Laws. Whereupon they accused him, as if he had made himself *Apollo*, 'and especially for that before, upon a question 'being asked, Why these things were so, he asked 'him that propounded the question, Whether, 'when *Apollo* delivered his Oracles, he would 'require him to render a reason? The other deriding, as he thought, those discourses, in 'which *Pythagoras* declared the return of the 'Soul, and telling him, That when he went into the other world, he would give him a Letter 'to carry to his Father, and desired him to bring 'an Answer of it when he came back. I shall 'not, replied *Pythogoras*, go to the place of the 'wicked, where murtherers are punished. The 'Ambassadors having thus reviled him, and he 'going to the Sea-side, and washing himself, 'many following him, one of those who advised 'the *Crotonians*, said, When he had sufficiently 'spoken against all the other things that they did, 'at last he accused them especially, for offering 'to oppose and abuse *Pythagoras*, of whom when 'heretofore, as fables report, beasts could speak, 'no one of them durst ever speak an ill word.

'*Diodorus* saith, that a Councel being called, 'and it being put to the question, Whether they 'should deliver up the ‡ *Italiotes* to the *Sybarites*, 'or undergo a War with an enemy more powerful than themselves; The Senate and People 'made some doubt, and the People first inclined 'to the delivery of the Suppliants, rather than 'endure the War. But afterwards, *Pythagoras* 'the Philosopher advising them to protect the 'Suppliants, they changed their opinion, and 'determined to fight in their defence. The *Sybarites* came into the Field, with an Army of 'three hundred thousand; the *Crotonians* had 'but one hundred thousand: They were led by '*Milo* the Wrestler, who at the first onset himself 'put to flight that wing of the Army which was 'opposite to him; for he was of invincible 'strength. This man having Courage answerable to his Strength, had been six times Victor at 'the Olympick Games; and when he began this 'Fight, was crowned with Olympick Wreaths, 'wearing like *Hercules*, a Lyon's Skin, and a 'Club; and obtaining the Victory for his Country-men, was much admired by them. [The *Crotonians* likewise made use of a Stratagem, whereby they got the day: * The *Sybarites* were so much addicted to Luxury, that they taught their Horses to dance at Feasts. This the *Crotonians* knowing, (as *Aristotle* relates) in the midst of the Fight, they commanded some Pipers, whom, to that purpose, they had brought along with them, to play dancing Tunes. The Horses, as soon as they heard the Musick, not only fell a dancing, but carried their Riders violently over to their Enemies.] 'Thus the *Sybarites* being put to Flight, the *Crotonians* spared none 'that they took, but put all to the Sword, 'whereby the greater part of the Army was Slain, 'and the City, after a dishonourable surrender, 'laid waste. This according to *Diodorus*, happ'ned 63 years before the second of the 83*d* Olympiad, which falls upon the first year of the 68*th* Olympiad.

*Agrigentum* was by his means freed from the Tyranny of *Phalaris*, in this manner: '‡ When '*Pythagoras* was detained by *Phalaris*, a most 'cruel Tyrant, [* *with whom he stayed six Months*] and *Abaris* the *Hyperborean*, a wise 'Person, came to converse with him, and asked 'him Questions, particularly concerning sacred 'Rites, Images, Divine Worship, Providence of the 'Gods, as well of those in Heaven, as conversant about the Earth, and such like demands; '*Pythagoras*, as being highly inspired, answered 'him with much Truth and Perswasion, insomuch as he drew the Standers by to his Opinion. Whereupon *Phalaris* seeing the People 'taken with him, was angry with *Abaris* for 'praising *Pythagoras*. He grew fierce against '*Pythagoras* himself, and at last came to that 'heighth, as to speak all Blasphemies against the 'Gods, as were possible for such a kind of Person. But *Abaris* acknowledged himself thankful to *Pythagoras* for these things. He learned 'next of him, that all things depend upon 'Heaven, and are disposed of from thence, 'which he collected, as from many other things, 'so especially from the Efficacy of Sacrifices. 'Far therefore was he from thinking, that *Py*'thagoras, who taught him these things, was a 'deceiver; but he rather admir'd him, as a Person supernaturally inspir'd. *Phalaris*, in answer hereunto, deni'd plainly and openly all 'things that were done in sacred Rites. Whereupon *Abaris* transferred his Discourse from 'these things, to such as appear manifestly to all 'Men, and by the Divine Operations which are 'in all Extremities; as in extraordinary Wars, 'and

* *Athen. Deip. lib.* 12.

*Jambl. cap.* 30.

*Lib.* 12. *Olymp.* 83. 2.

‡ *So were the Greeks that inhabited Italy called, not the Natives. The same difference betwixt* Siciliotes *&* Sicilians

‡ *Jambl.* 31.

* *Tzetzes Chil. lib.* 6. 31.

* *Athen. Deip. lib.* 12.

'and in incurable Diſeaſes, Deſtruction of Fruit, 'Tranſmiſſion of Peſtilence from Country to 'Country. By theſe difficult irremediable Cauſes, 'he endeavoured to prove, that there is a Divine 'Providence, which over-ruleth all human Hope 'and Power. But *Phalaris* impudently oppoſed 'it. Hereupon *Pythagoras*, knowing that that 'Day would be fatal to *Phalaris*, ſpoke very 'freely; and looking upon *Abaris*, ſaid, That 'there is a paſſage from Heaven to the Aerial 'and Terreſtrial parts; and did likewiſe Diſcourſe 'ſcientifically, concerning the dependance of all 'things upon Heaven, and did irrefragably de-'demonſtrate the free Power of the Soul, and 'proceeded to ſhew the perfect Operation of 'the Reaſon, and of the Mind. Then he ſpoke 'boldly concerning Tyranny, and all exceſs of 'Fortune, all Injuſtice, all Covetouſneſs, ſtrong-'ly maintaining that they are all nothing worth. 'After this, he made a Divine Exhortation con-'cerning the beſt Life, and made a reſolute Op-'poſition againſt the worſt, and did moſt plainly 'deliver the Doctrine, concerning the Power 'and Paſſions of the Soul; and which was more 'then all theſe, he demonſtrated, that the Gods 'are not the cauſes of Ills; and that Diſeaſes 'and Paſſions are Seeds of the Intemperance of 'the Body; and reprehended *Mythographers* and 'Poets for ſuch things as they had falſly deliver-'ed; and ſharply reproved *Phalaris*, and ſhewed 'what the Power of Heaven is, and how great, 'by its Operations. As concerning Infliction of 'Puniſhment by Law, he gave many inſtances 'thereof, and clearly ſhewed the difference be-'twixt Man, and other living Creatures. He 'likewiſe ſcientifically diſcourſed, concerning 'intrinſical and enunciative Reaſon, and con-'cerning the Mind, and the Knowledg proceed-'ing from it, with many other moral Documents 'dependent thereon. He treated of what things 'are uſeful in Life, making an Exhortation to the 'purſuit of the uſeful, and dehorting from the 'hurtful; and that which is moſt of all, he made 'a diſtinction between the things done according 'to Fate, and according to the Mind, and of thoſe 'which are done according to Neceſſity, and 'according to Decree. Moreover he diſcourſed 'concerning *Dæmons*, and the Immortality of 'the Soul, much and wiſely; whereof we ſhall 'have occaſion to ſpeak elſewhere, and ſhew, 'that theſe things do confer moſt to Fortitude, 'ſeeing that he himſelf in the midſt of all Dan-'gers, did with a conſtant mind diſcourſe Philo-'ſophy, and arm himſelf againſt Fortune; as al-'ſo for that he ſlighted and contemned the Per-'ſon that attempted to hurt him, and deſpiſed 'the fear of Death, and all human Contingen-'cies, nor was he at that inſtant any thing con-'cerned for them. Indeed (continues *Jamblichus*) 'it is manifeſt, that he was nothing troubled 'with the fear of Death, but had a far more no-'ble deſign, the freeing of *Sicily* from the Op-'preſſion of Tyranny. That it was he who did 'it, is manifeſt from the Oracle of *Apollo*, which 'declared, That *Phalaris*, when his Subjects 'grew better and more Unanimous, ſhould loſe 'his Authority; which they did at the coming 'of *Pythagoras*, through his Exhortations and In-'ſtructions. But a clearer Evidence hereof is 'from the time: for that very day that *Phalaris* 'went about to bring *Pythagoras* and *Abaris* into 'danger of Death, he was himſelf Slain. The 'manner thus related by * *Tzetzes*: It chanced, * *Chil.* 6. 30. 'that a Hawk purſued a great flight of Pigeons; 'which *Phalaris* ſeeing, ſaid to thoſe that ſtood 'by him, Behold Friends, how much an igno-'ble Fear can do; for if but one of all theſe 'Pigeons would turn again, it would preſently 'give a ſtop to the Purſuer. This Speech an old 'Man that was preſent no ſooner heard, when 'taking up a Stone he threw it at *Phalaris*; and 'the reſt, following his Example, did the like. 'Some ſay they ſtoned him to Death; others, 'that they put him into Chains, and wrapt him 'in a ſheet of Lead, wherein he died miſerably.

To the *Locrians*, beſides *Charondas* and *Zeleucus*, already mentioned, he ſent † *Timarus* alſo, to make Laws for them. † *Jamb.* p. 103. & 134.

To the *Rheginenſes* he ſent upon the ſame Employment * *Theatetus*, *Helicaon*, *Ariſtocrates* and *Phytius*. * *Jamb.* p. 103.

Thus, as † *Porphyrius* ſaith, *Pythagoras* and his Friends were a long time ſo much admired in *Italy*, that many Cities committed themſelves to be governed by them. † *Pag.* 36.

## CHAP. XVIII.

### *Wonders related of Him.*

IF we may credit (ſaith (*a*) *Porphyrus*, and from him (*b*) *Jamblichus*) what is related of him, by ancient and creditable Authors, his Commands had an Influence even upon irrational Creatures; for he laid hold of the *Daunian* Bear, which did much hurt to the People thereabout, and having ſtroked her awhile, and given her Maza and Fruits, and Sworn her, that She never more touch any living Creature, he let her go. She ſtraight-way hid her ſelf in the Hills and Woods, and from thence-forward never aſſaulted any living Creature. (*a*) *Pag.* 15. (*b*) *Cap.* 13.

Seeing an Ox at *Tarentum* in a Paſture, wherein grew ſeveral things, cropping green Beans, he came to the Neat-heard, and counſelled him to ſpeak to the Ox, that he ſhould abſtain from the Beans. But the Neat-heard mocking him, and ſaying, He could not ſpeak the Language of Oxen; he himſelf went to him, and whiſpering in the Ear of the Ox, he not only refrained immediately from Beans at that time, but from thence-forward would never touch any, and lived many years after about *Juno*'s Temple at *Tarentum*, till he was very old; and was called the ſacred Ox, eating ſuch Meats as every one gave him. *Porph.* p. 15. *Jambl. cap.*

An Eagle flying over his head at the Olympick Games, as he was by chance diſcourſing to his Friends concerning *Auguries* and *Omens*, and divine Signs, and that there are ſome meſſages from the Gods to ſuch Men as have true Piety towards them; He is ſaid [(*c*) *by certain Words to have ſtopt here, and*] to have cauſed her to come down; and after he had ſtroaked her awhile, he let her go again. This perhaps was that white Eagle, which *Jamblichus* reports he ſtroaked at *Croto*, and She endured it quietly. For the *Crotonians* inſtituted Games, which they called *Olympick*, in Emulation of the *Grecians*. *Porph.* p. 16. *Jamb. cap.* (*c*) *Plin. in N. ma.*

‡ Pag. 18. A River (which ‡ *Porphyrius* calls *Caucasus*, *Apollonius* Πόταμον κατὰ Σάμον; *Laertius* and *Jamblichus*, *Nessus*; *Ælian*, *Cosa*; St. *Cyril*, *Causus*) as he passed over it, with many of his friends, spoke to him, and said with a plain clear voice, Χαῖρε Πυθαγόρα. Hail *Pythagoras*.

*Porph* p. 18. *Jamb.* In one and the same day, almost all affirm, that he was present at *Metapontum* in *Italy*, and at Tauromenium in *Sicily*, with the friends which he had in both places, and discoursed to them in a publick Convention, when as the places are distant many *Stadia* by Sea and Land, and many days journeys asunder. *Apollonius* relates this, as done at *Croto* and *Metapontum*.

*Plut.* in Numa. *Laert.* *Porph.* p. 18. At the publick solemnity of the Olympick Games, he stood up and shewed his golden thigh; as he did in private, to *Abaris*, to confirm him in the opinion, that he was Hyperborean *Apollo*, whose Priest *Abaris* was.

*Porph.* p. 18. A Ship coming into the Harbour, and his friends wishing they had the goods that were in it: Then (saith *Pythagoras*) you will have a dead body: And, when the Ship came at them, they found in it the body of a dead man.

*Jamb.* cap. To one who much desired to hear him, he said, That he would not discourse until some sign appeared. Not long after, one coming to bring News of the Death of a White Bear in *Caulonia*, he prevented him, and related it first.

*Anon.* de vita *Pyth.* apud *Phot.* ‡ *Laert.* They affirm, he foretold many things, and that they came to pass; insomuch that † *Aristippus* the *Cyrenæan*, in his Book of Physiologick, saith, He was named *Pythagoras*, from speaking things as true as *Pythian Apollo*. He foretold an Earthquake by the Water which he tasted out of a Well; and foretold, That a Ship, which was then under sail with a pleasant gale, should be cast away.

At *Sybaris* he took in his hand a Serpent of deadly biting, and let it go again. And at *Tyrrhenia* he took a little Serpent, and biting it, kill'd it with his teeth.

*Porph* p. 18, 19. A thousand other more wonderful and Divine things are related constantly, and with full agreement, of him; so that, to speak freely, more was never attributed to any, nor was any more eminent. For his Predictions of Earthquakes most certain are remembred, and his immediate chasing away of the Pestilence, and his suppression of violent Winds and Hail, and his calming of Storms, as well in Rivers as upon the Sea, for the ease and safe passage of his Friends, from whom *Empedocles*, and *Epimenides*, and *Abaris* learning it, often performed the like, which their Poems plainly attest. Besides, *Empedocles* was sirnamed *Alexanemos*, the chaser away of Winds; *Epimenides*, *Cathartes*, the Lustrator; *Abaris*, *Æthrobates*, the walker in the Air; for, riding upon an Arrow of *Hyperborean Apollo*, which was given him, he was carried in the Air over Rivers and Seas, and inaccessible places, which some believed to have been done by *Pythagoras*, when he discoursed with his friends at *Metapontum* and *Tauromenium* upon the same Day.

*In Nubes.* pag. 169. To these add his trick with a Looking-glass, as the Scholiast of *Aristophanes* calls it, who describes it thus: The Moon being in the Full, he wrote whatsoever he pleased in blood upon a Looking-glass, and telling it first to the other party, stood behind him, holding the Letters towards the Moon; whereby he who stood betwixt him and the Moon looking steadfastly upon her, read all the Letters which were written in the Looking-glass in the Moon, as if they were written in her.

But these things, some even of the Ancients, have imputed to Goetick Magick, as *Timon*, who terms him, Γοὴτα, a Magician; others, to imposture, as appears by this Relation of *Heraclides*, and the Scholiast of *Apollonius*: † When he came into *Italy*, he made a Vault under ground, and charged his Mother [* to give out that he was dead, and] to set down in a Table-book all things that hapned, expressing the times punctually. Then he went down [and shut himself up in the Vault], and his Mother did as he ordered her, until such time as he came up again. After a while *Pythagoras* came up, lean and withered; and coming into the Congregation, declared, That he was returned from the *Inferi*, and related to them what was done there] and told them many prodigious Stories concerning the *Palingenesie*, and the things of the *Inferi*; telling the living news of their dead friends, with whom, he said, he met in the *Inferi*.] † *Hieronymus* relates, That he saw there the Soul of *Hesiod* bound with Brass to a Pillar, skreeking; and that of *Homer* hung up on a Tree, encompassed by Serpents, for the Fables which he had raised concerning the gods: Those likewise tormented who used not the company of their own Wives. For this he was much honoured by the *Crotonians*. They being much moved at what he said, wept and lamented, and hereupon conceived such an esteem of *Pythagoras*, as being a Divine Person, that they sent their Wives to him to be instructed in his Doctrine, which women were called *Pythagoreans*. Thus *Hermippus*. The Scholiast adds, [Hereby he raised an Opinion concerning himself, That, before the *Trojan* War, he was *Æthalides*, the Son of *Mercury*; then *Euphorbus*, then *Hermotimus*, then † *Pyrrhus*, a *Delian*; lastly, *Pythagoras*.] And, as *Laertius* saith, in his Writings he reported of himself, That he had come from the *Inferi* to Men, 207. years since. Of this, more in his Doctrine, *Part* 2. *Chap.* 5. *Sect.* 10.

‡ *Heraclides* apud *Laert.* * Schol. *Ap.* ‡ *Laert.* ‡ So read, not *Pythius*.

## CHAP. XIX.

### *His Death.*

THE time of *Pythagoras* his Death hath been formerly touched; It was, according to *Eusebius*, in the Fourth year of the 70*th Olympiad*, after he had lived, as † *Justine* saith, at *Crotona* 20. years. The occasion is differently related. *Laertius* thus.

‡ Lib. 20.

*Pythagoras* died in this manner: As he sate in counsel together with his Friends, in the House of *Milo*, it happened that the House was set on fire by one who did it out of Envy, because he was not admitted. Some affirm, the *Crotonians* did it, out of fear of being reduced to a Tyranny. *Pythagoras* running away, was overtaken; coming to a place full of Beans, he made a stop, saying, It is better to be taken, than to tread; and better to be killed than to speak.

ſpeak. So the purſuers ſlew him. In the ſame manner died moſt of his Diſciples, about Forty in number; ſome few only eſcaped, of whom were *Archytas* the *Tarentine*, and *Lyſis*, of whom we ſpake before. *Dicæarchus* ſaith, That *Pythagoras* fled to the Temple of the Muſes at *Metapontum*, and died † for want of Food, having lived there forty days without eating. *Heraclides*, in his Epitome of the Lives of *Satyrus*, relates, That having buried *Pherecydes*, he returned to *Italy*, where finding the Faction of *Cyclo* (prevalent), he departed to *Metapontum*, and there ſtarved himſelf, not willing to live any longer. *Hermippus* ſaith, That the *Agrigentines* and *Syracuſians* warring againſt one another, *Pythagoras*, with his Friends, went to the *Agrigentines*, and was Head of them: but they being vanquiſhed, and he flying to a field of Beans, was there ſlain; the reſt (being thirty five) were burn'd at *Tarentum*, for intermedling with the Governors and Rule of the Commonwealth.

*Aeliſtrav.* So in *Porphyrius*, pag. *ἐκαύθη τῶν ἐχθρῶν*, ill rendred, *amiſſum inopia.*

*Jamblichus*, from *Ariſtoxenus*, and others, gives a more particular account: There were (*ſaith he*) ſome, who oppugned theſe men, and roſe up againſt them. That this Conſpiracy happened in the abſence of *Pythagoras*, is acknowledged by all; but they diſagree concerning his Journey: Some ſay, he was gone to *Pherecydes*, the *Syrian*; others, to *Metapontum*. The Cauſes of this Conſpiracy are diverſly related alſo; one is ſaid to have proceeded from the Men, who were called *Cylonians*, thus: *Cylo*, a *Crotonian*, who, in Race, and Honour, and Wealth, excelled all the reſt of the Citizens, but otherwiſe of a harſh, violent, turbulent, and tyrannical Humour, was exceedingly deſirous to participate of the *Pythagorick* Inſtitution; and coming to *Pythagoras*, who was now very old, he was repulſed for the Reaſons aforeſaid. Hereupon there aroſe a great Conteſt, *Cylo* and his Friends oppoſing *Pythagoras* and his Friends: and ſo eager and violent was the Malice of *Cylo* and his party, that it extended even to the laſt of the *Pythagoreans*. *Pythagoras* therefore for this reaſon departed to *Metapontum*, where it is ſaid that he died. The *Cylonians* (ſo called) continued to exerciſe their hatred and enmity towards the *Pythagoreans*: for a while, the integrity of the *Pythagoreans*, and the kindneſs of the Cities (which was ſo great as to be governed by them) was prevalent; but at laſt they ſo plotted againſt the Men, as that ſurpriſing them, aſſembled in the Houſe of *Milo*, at *Crotona*, conſulting about Military Affairs, they burned them all, except two, *Archippus* and *Lyſis*, who being youthful and ſtrong, eſcaped out of doors. This falling out, and the Cities not taking any notice of the misfortune, the *Pythagoreans* gave over their buſineſs. This happened from two Cauſes, as well by reaſon of the unconcernment of the Cities (for they had no regard of the Murther, to puniſh the Authors thereof) as by reaſon of the Death of the moſt excellent perſons, two onely of them were ſaved, both *Tarentines*; of whom, *Archippus* retired to *Tarentum*; but *Lyſis*, out of hatred of the neglect they had received from the Cities, departed into *Greece*, and lived at *Achaia* in *Peloponneſus*: thence, upon a particular deſign, he removed to *Thebes*, where *Epimanondas* heard him, and called him Father: there he died. The reſt of the *Pythagoreans*, all but *Architas* the *Tarentine*, forſook *Italy*, and aſſembling at *Rhegium*, they lived there together. But in progreſs of time, the management of publick Affairs decayed. The moſt eminent of theſe were *Phanto*, and *Echecrates*, and *Polymnaſtus*, and *Diocles* (both *Phliaſians*), and *Xenophilus*, a *Chalcidean* of *Chalcis* in *Thrace*; theſe preſerved the Cuſtoms and Doctrines from the beginning, but with the Sect it ſelf at laſt they were wholly extinguiſhed. This is related by *Ariſtoxenus*.

*Nicomachus* agreeth in all things with this Relation, except in that he ſaith, This Inſurrection happened at what time *Pythagoras* was gone to *Delus*, to viſit *Pherecydes*, who was ſick of a *Phthiriaſis*; then were they ſtoned and burned by the *Italiotes*, and caſt forth without burial. Hitherto *Jamblichus*.

With theſe alſo agreeth the Relation of *Neanthes*, thus delivered by † *Porphyrius*. † Pag. 37.

*Pythagoras* and his Friends having been a long time ſo much admired in *Italy*, that many Cities committed themſelves to them, at laſt they became envied, and a Conſpiracy was made againſt them in this manner: *Cylo*, a *Crotonian* (who, in Extract, Nobility, and Wealth, exceeded all the reſt of the Citizens, but otherwiſe was of a violent, rigid, and tyrannical Diſpoſition, and one that made uſe of the multitude of his friends to compaſs his unjuſt ends) as he eſteemed himſelf worthy of all excellent things, ſo moſt particularly to partake of the Pythagorick Philoſophy; he came to *Pythagoras*, and much extolled himſelf, and deſired his Converſation. But *Pythagoras* preſently obſerving the Nature and Manners of the Perſon, and perceiving by the ſigns which he obſerved in the bodies of ſuch as came to him, what kind of diſpoſition he was of, bad him depart, and go about his buſineſs. Hereat *Cylo* was not a little troubled, taking it for a great affront, being of himſelf a perſon of a rough violent Spirit. Therefore calling his Friends together, he began to accuſe *Pythagoras*, and to conſpire againſt him, and his Diſciples. Whereupon, as ſome relate, the Friends of *Pythagoras* being gathered together in the Houſe of *Milo* the Wreſtler, *Pythagoras* himſelf being abſent (for he was gone to *Delus*, to viſit *Pherecydes* the *Syrian*, formerly his Maſter, who was deſperately fallen ſick of a *Phthiriaſis*, and to attend on him), they ſet the Houſe on fire, and burned and ſtoned them all, except two who eſcaped the fire, *Archippus* and *Lyſis*, as *Neanthes* relates; of whom, *Lyſis* went into *Greece*, to *Epimanondas*, whoſe Maſter he had formerly been.

But *Dicæarchus*, and other more accurate Authors affirm, That *Pythagoras* himſelf was there preſent when this Conſpiracy was perpetrated; for *Pherecydes* died before he left *Samus*. Of his friends, Forty being gathered together, were beſet in a Houſe; moſt of them, going diſperſedly to the City, were ſlain. *Pythagoras*, his Friends being taken, firſt eſcaped to the *Caulonian* Haven, thence went to the *Locrians*. The *Locrians* ſent ſome old men to the borders of their Countrey, who gave him this anſwer, We have heard, *Pythagoras*, that thou art a perſon wiſe, and of great worth; *Porph.* p. 38.

but

but we have nothing in our Laws that is reprehenſible, and therefore we will endeavour to preſerve them. Go to ſome other place, taking of us whatſoever you have need of. Hereupon leaving the City of the *Locrians*, he ſailed to *Tarentum*, where receiving the ſame entertainment he had at *Croto*, he went to *Metapontum*; for great Seditions were raiſed againſt him in every part, which are remembred by the Inhabitants at this day, who recount the Seditions againſt the *Pythagoreans*, as they call them; for all that Faction which ſided with *Pythagoras* were called *Pythagoreans*. In the *Metapontine* Faction, *Pythagoras* is ſaid to have died, flying to the Temple of the Muſes, and ſtaying there forty days, through want of neceſſaries.

Others relate, That when the houſe wherein his Friends uſed to meet, was fired, his Friends threw themſelves into the fire, to make a way for their Maſter, ſpreading their bodies like a bridge upon the firſt; and that *Pythagoras*, eſcaping out of the burning, deſtitute of all his Friends, for grief ended his days.

With theſe men, oppreſſed with this Calamity, failed their Knowledge alſo, which till then they had preſerved ſecret and concealed, except ſome things difficult to be underſtood, which the Auditors that lived without (*the Skreen*), repeated by heart. *Lyſis* and *Archippus* eſcaping, and as many as were at that time in other parts, preſerved ſome little ſparks of Philoſophy, obſcure and difficult to be found out; for being now left alone, and much grieved at the perpetration of that wickedneſs, fearing leſt the Name of Philoſophy ſhould be quite extinguiſh'd amongſt men, and that for this reaſon the gods would be angry with them, they made ſome ſummary Commentaries; and having reduc'd the Writings of the Ancients, and thoſe which they remembred, into one body Body, every one left them in the place where they died, charging their Sons, Daughters, and Wives, that they ſhould not communicate them to any out of their own Family. Thus privately continuing it ſucceſſively to their Succeſſors, they obſerved it a long time. And for this reaſon, ſaith *Nicomachus*, we conjecture, that they did purpoſely avoid friendſhip with ſtrangers; and for many Ages they preſerved a faithful conſtant friendſhip amongſt themſelves.

‡ *Porph.* p. 36. †*Moderatus* ſaith, That this (Pythagorick Philoſophy) came at laſt to be extinguiſhed, firſt, becauſe it was ænigmatical; next, becauſe their Writings were in the *Dorick* Dialect, which is obſcure, by which means, the Doctrines delivered in it were not underſtood, being ſpurious and miſapprehended, becauſe (moreover) they who publiſh'd them were not *Pythagoreans*. Beſides, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Speuſippus*, *Ariſtoxenus*, and *Xenocrates*, as the *Pythagoreans* affirm, vented the beſt of them, as their own, changing only ſome few things in them; but the more vulgar and trivial, and whatſoever was afterwards invented by envious and calumnious perſons, to caſt a contempt upon the *Pythagorean* School, they collected and delivered as proper to that Sect.

*Jamb.* cap. 35. pag. 211. But foraſmuch as *Apollonius* gives a different Account of theſe things, and adds many things which have not yet been ſpoken, let us give his Narration alſo concerning the Inſurrection againſt the *Pythagoreans*. He (therefore) ſaith, That the *Pythagoreans* were envied from their very Childhood; for the People, as long as *Pythagoras* diſcourſed with all that came to him, loved him exceedingly; but when he apply'd himſelf only to his Diſciples, they undervalued him. That he ſhould admit Strangers, they well enough ſuffered; but that the Natives of the Countrey ſhould attribute ſo much to him, they took very ill, and ſuſpected their meetings to be Contrivements againſt them. Beſides, the young men being of the beſt rank and eſtate, it came to paſs, that after a while, they were not only the chief Perſons in their own Families, but governed even the whole City, they becoming many, as to a Society, (for they were above three hundred perſons) but being a ſmall part as to the City, which was not ordered according to their Manners and Inſtitutions. Notwithſtanding, as long as they poſſeſſed the place they were in only, and *Pythagoras* lived there, the City followed the Original Government thereof, though much perplexed, and watching an opportunity for change. But after they had reduced *Sybaris*, and that he departed, and they diſtributed the conquered Countrey into Colonies, as they pleaſed; at length, the concealed hatred broke forth, and the multitude began to quarrel with them. The Leaders of this diſſention were thoſe who were neareſt ally'd to the *Pythagoreans*. Many things that had paſt, grieved them, according as they were particularly affected; but one of the greateſt was, that he only ſhould be thought capable of diſreſpect. For the *Pythagoreans* uſed never to name *Pythagoras*; but whilſt he lived, they called him, *Divine*; after Death, *the Man*: As *Homer* introduceth *Eumæus* mentioning *Ulyſſes*;

*I to pronounce his Name, though abſent, fear;*
*So great is my reſpect, and he ſo dear.*

In like manner, not to riſe out of bed after the Sun's up, nor to wear a Ring, whereon the Image of God is engraved; but to obſerve the Sun, that they may adore his riſing; and not to wear a Ring, leſt they might chance to have it on at a Funeral, or carry it into any unclean place. Likewiſe, not to do any thing without premeditation, nor any thing whereof they could not give a good account; but that in the Morning they ſhould conſider what they were to do, and at Night they ſhould make a recollection thereof, as well to ponder the things themſelves, as to exerciſe the Memory. Likewiſe, if any one of that Community had appointed to meet another in any place, he ſhould ſtay there Day and Night until the other came. The *Pythagoreans* likewiſe accuſtomed themſelves to be mindful of what is ſaid, and to ſpeak nothing raſhly. But above all things, as an inviolable Precept, to be kept even until Death, he adviſed them not to reproach, but always to uſe good words, as at Sacrifices. Theſe things much diſpleaſed all in general,

general, as I said, forasmuch as they admitted men to be educated in this singularity amongst them. But, in that they reached forth the hands to *Pythagoreans* onely, and not to any of their own Family, except their Parents: likewise, in that they had their Estates in common, wholly alienated from their own Domesticks: hereat their Allies were much displeased. And they beginning the dissention, the rest readily joyned themselves, and engaged in it. And at the same time, *Hippasus*, and *Diodorus*, and *Theages* saying, That it was fit every one should partake of the publick Government and Convention; and that the Magistrates being chosen by lot, ought to give an Account. But on the other side, the *Pythagoreans*, *Alcimachus*, and *Dimachus*, and *Meto*, and *Democedes*, opposing it, and forbidding that the Government of the Countrey should be abrogated; these taking the part of the Commons, got the better. But afterwards, many of the common people understanding that there was a division in the publick Convention, *Cylo* and *Nino*, Orators, framed an Accusation against them; the first was one of the best quality; the other of the vulgar sort. To this effect, a long discourse being made by *Cylo*, the other continued it, pretending that he had found out the greatest Secrets of the *Pythagoreans*. But indeed having forged and writ such things, as thereby he might chiefly traduce them; and having delivered the Book to a Notary, bad him read it: the Title was, *The Sacred Discourse*: the Sum whereof this: 'That Friends ought 'to be reverenced as the Gods themselves, but 'all other Men tyranniz'd over like Beasts. 'That the same Sentence of *Pythagoras* him-'self reduc'd to Verse, was thus rehearsed by his 'disciples:

*Friends equal with the gods he did respect,*
*All others (as of no account) neglect.*

'And that he chiefly praised *Homer*, for say-'ing, Ποιμένα λαῶν, the Shepherd of the people, 'for that he tacitely imply'd, that the rest of 'Mankind were but Beasts. That he affected 'Oligarchy, and was an Enemy to unmarried 'persons, as those who had been chief in Ele-'ction of Magistrates by lot. That he affected 'Tyranny, in as much as he saith, It is better 'to be a Bull, though but one day, than an 'Ox all our life time. That he praised the 'Laws and Customs of other People, and 'commanded, That whatsoever was decreed 'by them, should be used. In fine, he decla-'red, That their Philosophy was a conspiracy 'against the people, and advised them, that 'they should not hearken to the Voice of 'their consultations, but rather think of for-'bidding them to meet in counsel at all, if 'they alledged, That they had a setled As-'sembly, consisting of a Thousand Voices. 'Wherefore it was not fit that they should, 'as far as in them lay, give ear to prohibited 'persons, and permit them to speak; but to 'esteem their right hand which they held from 'them hostile, when they should offer to put 'in a stone for voting, conceiving it an un-'worthy thing, that three hundred thousand 'men, who all lived about the River *Tetrais*, 'should be oppressed by Seditions, and over-'come by the thousand part of them in that 'City. This calumny so much exasperated the hearers, that some few days after, as they were sacrificing in the Temple of *Pythian Apollo*, they ran in tumultuously to do violence to them. But the *Pythagoreans* being informed before-hand thereof, fled to the publick Hall. *Democedes*, with the young men, went to *Plætea*; but they dissolving the Laws, used Decrees, whereby accusing *Democedes* of stirring up the young men to Tyranny, they proclaimed, That whosoever did kill him, should have in recompence Three Talents. And there being a Fight, wherein he, by the means of *Theages*, was overcome, they gave him Three Talents out of the publick Treasury. But there arising many misfortunes in the City and Countrey, the banished persons being called to judgment, and the Examination thereof being committed to Three Cities, *Tarentum*, *Metapontum*, and *Caulon*, they were put in commission, thought good (as appears by the *Crotonian* Records) to banish them. So they banished the whole Generation, saying, That the children ought not to be separated from their parents, and seiz'd their Estates. But after many years, *Dimachus* and his Friends being slain in another Fight, and *Litago* also, who was head of this Faction, they took compassion on them, and resolved to call home those who were left. Wherefore sending for their Ambassadors from *Achaia*, they made an agreement with the banished men by them, and hung up the Copies of their Oaths in the Temple of *Delphi*. The *Pythagoreans* who returned, were about Threescore, besides those who were very aged, of whom some addicted themselves to Medicine, and cured the sick, and so became Masters of that which is called Method. Those who were restored, grew into great favour with the people, at that time in which it was proverbially said, in opposition to those who violate the Laws, *These are not under the Government of* Nino.

## CHAP. XX.

### *His Person and Virtues.*

His Person (*a*) *Jamblichus* describes to have been in his Youth extraordinary beautiful, called, The fair hair'd *Samian*; (*b*) and at 56. years of age, of a more comely and divine presence. (*c*) *Laertius* saith, *He is reported to have been of a most awful aspect, insomuch as his disciples thought him* Hyperborean Apollo: Adding, That (*d*) *Timon* takes notice of the awfulness of his presence in his *Silli*, though he alledg'd it in disparagement of him.

(*a*) Cap. 2. p. 31.
(*b*) Cap. 5. p. 7.
(*c*) Pag. 7
(*d*) Pag. 590.

Pythagoras *skill'd in the Goetick Laws,*
*Who courts by grave discourse humane applause.*

So great an impression it made upon those with whom he conversed, that a young man being sharply reprehended by him, immediately went and hanged himself. Whereupon

*Pythagoras* ever after forbore to reprove any person.

(e) *Athen.* Deipn. 10. (f) Ibid. (e) *Lycon*, in the Life of *Pythagoras*, saith, That he used a spare Diet: (f) *Athenæus*, That he drunk very little, and lived so moderately, that he was often content onely with Honey.

(g) *Porph.* (g) *By his moderate Diet, he preserved his Body in the same constant state, not sometimes sick, sometimes well; sometimes fat, sometimes lean: It appeared by his Countenance, that the same Constancy was in his Soul also. He was not subject to Joy* (as *Cicero* likewise observes) *or Grief, no man ever saw him rejoyce or mourn.*

(g) *Laert.* (g) Neither did any ever see him *alvum exonerantem, coeuntem*, or drunk. He refrained wholly from derision, and assentation, and scoffs, and detractive speeches. He never punished any in Anger, neither Servant nor free person.

(b) *Laert.* see also *Jamb.* c. 21. (i) *Ælian.* var. Hist. 12. 22. (b) *He wore a white and clean Stole*, (or Gown) *and used white woollen Blankets, for as yet linnen was not known in those parts, and* (i) *a gold Crown and Breeches.*

(k) *Porph.* (k) *Diogenes* discoursing of his Daily Conversation, saith, He had Morning Exercitations at his own House, composing his own Soul to the Lyre, and singing some old Pæans of *Thales*. He likewise sung some Verses of *Homer* and *Hesiod*, whereby he rendred his Mind more sedate. Moreover, he used some Dances, which he conceived to conduce to Agility and Bodily Health. His Walks he used not with many, promiscuously, but with Two or Three, in the Temples or Groves, making choice of such places as were most pleasant, and remote from noise.

(l) *Jamb.* cap. 30. Pag. 153. (l) Having purchased the Estate of *Alcæus*, who, after his Embassy to *Lacedæmon*, died, he was no less admired for his Oeconomy than Philosophy.

Besides this *Pythagoras* the Philosopher, there were many others of the same Name, the most ancient a (m) *Laconian*, Contemporary with King *Numa*.

(m) *Plut.* in Numa.

*Laertius* reckons Four, all about the same time, or at least not long distant from one another; for, (besides the Philosopher) there was one a *Crotonian*, a tyrannical person; another a *Phliasian*, σωμασμητὴς, ἀλειπλὴς, (*Exercitator*, as (n) *Pliny* renders it) one that professed to teach Corporeal Exercises, and to diet and order the Body for them. This seems to be the same *Pythagoras*, (o) Son of *Eratocles*, who writ *Aleiptick Commentaries*, and advised the Wrestlers, instead of Figs to eat Flesh; both which are ascribed by some to *Pythagoras* the Philosopher. The Third a *Lacynthian*, to whom are ascribed the Doctrines of Philosophy, which it was lawful to divulge, and the proverbial αὐτὸς ἔφα; both which were proper to *Pythagoras* the Philosopher. Some reckon another *Pythagoras* of *Rhegium*, a Statuary, who invented Rythm and Symmetry, and another of *Samus*, a Statuary also, (perhaps the same whom (p) *Pliny* placeth in the 67*th Olympiad*) and another an Orator, of no Reputation; another, a Physician, who writ of σκύλλη, the Sea-Onyon, (ascribed by * *Pliny* to the Philosopher) and concerning *Homer*; and another, the History of the *Doreans*, as *Dionysius* relates. Hitherto *Laertius*.

(n) Lib 23 cap. 7. (o) *Jamb.* cap. 6. pag. 40. (p) Lib 34. cap. 8. *Lib. 19 cap. 5.

(q) *Suid.* To these add (q) *Pythagoras* the *Ephesian*, who lived before *Cyrus*; another of the same Name, (r) Præfect under *Ptolemy*; a Third, a (s) Painter.

(r) Plin. (s) Plin.

## CHAP. XXI.

### *His Wife, Children, Servants.*

HE took to Wife *Theano*. Some affirm, she was a (a) *Crotonian*; but (b) *Porphyrius*, a *Cretan*, Daughter of *Pythanax*, or (c) *Pythonax*. After the Death of *Pythagoras*, she took upon her the Tuition of their Children, and the (d) Government of the School, (e) marrying *Aristæus*, who succeeded him in that Dignity. *Laertius* saith, *There were some Writings extant under her Name*; whereof *Suidas* instanceth, *Philosophical Commentaries, Apophthegms, and a Poem in* Hexameter *Verse*. Of her Apophthegms are remembred these: (f) Being demanded how soon, after Coition, a Woman is pure, she answered, *If with her own Husband, at the same instant; if with a strange person, never.* She advised every Woman, when she goeth to bed to her Husband, to put off her Modesty with her Cloaths, and when she riseth, to put it on again with them. Being asked (upon occasion perhaps of some ambiguous word) ποῖα; which of the two she meant? she answered, *That for which I am called a woman.* To one, admiring her Beauty, and saying, *How white an Arm!* she answered, *But not common.* *Laertius*, who affirms, she was Daughter to *Brontinus*, a *Crotonian*, adds, That, according to some, *Theano* was Wife to *Brontinus*, and Disciple to *Pythagoras*. And with this Second, it seems, the former was frequently confounded, as particularly in the first of the precedent Apophthegms, which *Jamblichus* affirms to have been spoken by *Theano*, the Wife of *Brontinus*, though attributed by some (of whom is *Laertius*) to *Theano*, the Wife of *Pythagoras*.

(a) Suid. in Theano. (b) Pag. (c) Suid. (d) Theodor. de princip. gent. Serm. (e) *Jamb.* cap. ult. (f) *Laert.*

(g) Of his Sons by *Theano* are remembred *Telauges* and *Mnesarchus*: *Mnesarchus* seems to be the same whom (h) *Plutarch* calls *Mamercus*; for both these Names are given to the Father of *Pythagoras*, from whom that of his Son, doubtless, was derived. (i) By some he seems to be called *Damo*, if there be no mistake occasion'd by *Pythagoras* his Daughter, of the same Name. These Two, *Telauges* and *Mnesarchus*, were, upon their Father's Death, bred up under their Mother *Theano*, and afterwards governed the School, as *Jamblichus* attests of *Mnesarchus*, *Laertius* of *Telauges*, who adds, That he taught *Empedocles*, as some conceive; and *Hippobotus* cites, out of *Empedocles* himself, this:

(g) *Suid.* (h) In Numa. (i) *Suid.* in Pythag.

(k) *Noble* Telauges *from* Theano *sprung,*
*And great* Pythagoras ——

(k) Perhaps Τηλαυγὴς, καυτὶ γαῖα, &c.

But of *Telauges* there is no Writing extant. Thus *Laertius*, who yet elsewhere cites an Epistle of *Telauges* to *Philolaus*. And *Jamblichus* affirms, That some ascribed to him the sacred Discourse, which went under the Name of *Pythagoras*.

To

To these two sons, add, (upon the authority of (l) *Duris* the *Samian*, in his second Book of Hours) *Arimnestus*, Master to *Democritus*, who returning from banishment, suspended a brazen Tablet in the Temple of *Juno*, the Diameter whereof was nigh two cubits, bearing this Inscription.

(l) Porphyr.

*Me* Arimnestus, *who much learning trac'd,*
Pythagoras *beloved son here plac'd.*

His Daughters were *Sara*, *Muya*, *Arignota*, (whose Pythagorical Writings *Porphyrius* mentioneth, as extant in his time) and (m) *Damo*: With her, *Pythagoras* left his Writings at his death, charging her not to communicate them to any that were not within the family. Whereupon she, though she might have had much money for the Books, would not accept it, preferring poverty, with obedience to her Fathers command, before riches. One of his Daughters *Pythagoras* gave in Marriage to *Meno* of *Crotona*, whom he had educated so well, that when a Virgin, she went foremost in the company of the Virgins; and when a Wife, foremost among the married women. The *Crotonians* made of her House a Temple to *Ceres*: the street they called *Musæum*.

(m) Suid. Jam.

Of his Servants are particularly remembred two, *Astræus* and *Zamolxis*: of the first, thus (n) *Diogenes*, in his Treatise of incredible things beyond *Thule*; *Mnesarchus* being a *Tyrrhenian*, by extract of those Tyrrhenians who inhabited *Lemnus*, *Imber*, and *Scyrus*, went from thence, and travelled to many Countries and Cities, found an Infant lying under a large tall Poplar, and coming to it, he perceiv'd that it lay with the face towards the sky, looking stedfastly upon the Sun without winking. In its mouth was put a little slender Reed like a Pipe. And seeing, to his great wonder, that the child was nourished with the drops that distill'd from the Tree, he took the child away, believing it to be of a divine race. This child when he grew up, was entertain'd by *Androcles*, a native of that Country, who adopted him into his own family, and committed the management of his affairs to his trust. *Mnesarchus* afterwards growing very rich, brought up the child, naming him *Astræus*, together with his own three Sons, *Eunostus*, *Tyrrhenus*, and *Pythagoras*: which boy, as I said, *Androcles* being yet very young, adopted his Son. He put the boy to a Lutenist, a Wrestler, and a Painter; but as soon as he was grown up, he sent him to *Miletus* to *Anaximander*, to learn Geometry and Astronomy. *Mnesarchus* gave *Astræus* to *Pythagoras*, who receiving him, and considering his Physiognomy, and examining the motions and restings of his body, instructed him. For he first found out the way of discerning the nature of every man; neither did he entertain any as his friend or disciple, before he had examined by Physiognomy his disposition.

(n) Porph. p. 7.

He had likewise another servant whom he entertained in *Thrace*, named *Zamolxis*, for that as soon as he was born, they wrapped him in a Bear's skin, which skin the *Thracians* call *Zalmus*; whom *Pythagoras* affecting, instructed in sublime speculations, and concerning sacred Rites, and the worship of the gods. Some affirm, he was called *Thales*. The Barbarians worshipped him instead of *Hercules*. *Dionysiphanes* saith, he was servant to *Pythagoras*, and falling into the hands of Thieves, and being branded by them, when *Pythagoras* was disturbed by seditious factions, and banished, he bound his forehead about because of the scars. Some say, that the name *Zamolxis* signifies a strange person. Hitherto *Diogenes*. To this *Zamolxis* (saith *Laertius*) the *Getes* sacrifice, as *Herodotus* relates, conceiving him to be *Saturn*. But (o) *Herodotus* having delivered the Tradition of the *Grecians*, (that he served *Pythagoras* at *Samus*, bought out his freedom at a great rate, and returning to his Country, reformed their manners) concludes with his own opinion, that *Zamolxis* lived many years before *Pythagoras*.

(o) Lib. 4.

## CHAP. XXII.

### *His Writings.*

SOme there are who hold, that *Pythagoras* left not any thing in Writing; of this opinion are (a) *Plutarch*, (b) *Josephus*, (c) *Lucian*, (d) *Porphyrius*, (e) *Ruffinus*, and others: but (f) *Laertius* saith, that all such as affirm he wrote nothing, do but jest; for *Heraclitus* the Natural Philosopher said expresly of him, *Pythagoras* son of *Mnesarchus* was skilful in History above all men; and selecting those Writings, made up his own wisdom, and variety of learning and art. To which citation perhaps, (g) *Clemens Alexandrinus* refers, who saith, *Heraclitus* being later than *Pythagoras*, mentioneth him in his Writings. The Books attributed to him are these:

(a) De virt. Alexand. lib. 1.
(b) Orig. Judaic. lib. 1.
(c) De Laps. in in Salut.
(d) *Porphyr.*
(e) D. Hieron. Epist. adv. Rufin.
(f) Κακοτεχνίαις, artes callidas & vafras. So is κακοτέχνως sometimes taken in a good sense; *Greg. Naz.* adv. *Jul.* Orat. 3. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἔστι μιμεῖσθαι μὲν λόγοντας ἢ ἀνθρωπίνων τινὰ διελεγμάτων μὴ τοὺς κακοτέχνως περὶ διαμάντων τούτοις δὲ ἁλίσκονται, the Text being so to be restored. (g) Strom.

(b) Three Treatises, *Pædeutick*, *Politick*, *Physick*, to which *Laertius* refers the foresaid Testimony of *Heraclitus*, forasmuch as *Pythagoras*, in the beginning of his Physical Treatise, saith, *No, by the air which I breathe*; *no, by the water which I drink*, *I shall not* (i) *bear the blame of this Discourse.*

(b) *Laert.*
(i) κατοΐσω, the Interpreters both otherwise.

(k) Six Treatises, reckoned by *Heraclides*, son of *Serapion*, in his Epitome of Solion, thus; *One concerning the Universe in Verse.* The second Intituled, *The sacred Discourse*, *beginning thus:*

(k) *Laert.*

*Young men in silence entertain all these.*

[To the same perhaps belongs this;

Wretched, thrice wretched, Beans forbear to (eat,
Your Parents heads as well may be your meat.

(l) And this cited by *Eustathius*;

*l* In Iliad. 2.

Which way to *Orcus* souls descend; which way
Return, and the Sun's chearful light survey.]

The third, of the Soul. The fourth, of Piety. The fifth, *Helothales*, father of *Epicharmus*. The sixth, *Crotona*, and others.

Two Treatises, a Discourse concerning Nature, and another concerning the gods; (m) both which

m *Jamb.* cap.

which he in a ſhort time taught *Abaris* the *Hyperborean*. The firſt may poſſibly be the ſame with the Phyſical Treatiſe, mentioned by *Laertius*; the other, as *Jamblicus* ſaith, is intituled alſo, *The Sacred Diſcourſe*, [but it is not the ſame with that Sacred Diſcourſe, which *Heraclides* aſcribes to him; for that was in Verſe, this in Proſe] as being collected out of the moſt myſtical places of *Orpheus*, written either by *Pythagoras*, as moſt hold; or, as ſome eminent and creditable perſons of that School aſſert, by *Telauges*, out of the Commentaries left by *Pythagoras* with *Damo* his daughter, ſiſter of *Telauges*, which after her death they report to have been given to *Bitale*, daughter of *Damo*, and to *Telauges* ſon of *Pythagoras*, Husband to *Bitale*. What *Jamblichus* cites out of this work, ſee hereafter in the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*; it is cited alſo by (*n*) *Hierocles*, *Syrianus*, and others.

(*n*) In Aur.

An Oration to *Abaris*, mentioned by *Proclus*.
*Orpheus*, a Poem, as *Ion* the Chian (*in triagmis*) (affirms. *Laert.*
The *Scopiads*, beginning thus, Μὴ ἀναιδὲς μηδένι. (*Laert.*
*Hymns*, out of which *Proclus* brings theſe Verſes.

——*Sacred Number ſprings*
*From th' uncorrupted Monad, and proceeds*
*To the Divine Tetractys, ſhe who breeds*
*All; and aſſigns the proper bounds to all,*
*Whom we the pure immortal Decad call.*

(*o*) De Origin. *Arithmetick*, mention'd by (*o*) *Iſidore*, who affirms, *He was the firſt that writ upon this ſubject amongſt the Grecians, which was afterward more copiouſly compoſed by* Nicomachus.

(*p*) Chil. 1. 58. *Prognoſticks*, of which thus (*p*) *Tzetzes*,

Pythagoras *Samian*, Mneſarchus *ſon*,
*Not only knew what would by fate be done,*
*But even for thoſe who futures would perceive,*
*He of Prognoſticks ſeveral Books did leave.*

(*q*) Lib. 24. c. 17. Of the Magical Vertues of Herbs, frequently cited by (*q*) *Pliny*, who ſaith, That though ſome aſcribe it to *Cleemporus* a Phyſician; yet pertinacious fame and antiquity vindicate it to *Pythagoras*; and this very thing gives authority to the Volumes, that if any other thought his pains worthy the name of that perſon, which that *Cleemporus* did, who can believe? ſeeing that he hath put forth other things in his own name. To this work ſeems to belong that Volume, which *Pythagoras* wrote concerning the Sea-Onyon, cited alſo by *Pliny*; but by *Laertius* aſcribed to another *Pythagoras* a Phyſician.

*The Golden Verſes* of *Pythagoras*, or, as others, of the *Pythagoreans*. But indeed their Author, as *Suidas* ſaith, is not certainly known, though ſome aſcribe them to him. Of theſe is (*r*) *Proclus*, who ſtyles him, *Father of the Golden Verſes*. Even the Verſes themſelves ſeem to confirm it, there being amongſt them ſome, which *Pythagoras* is known to have repeated to his Diſciples, by the Teſtimonies of *Laertius*, *Porphyrus*, and others.

(*r*) In *Timæum*, lib. 3.

*Nor ſuffer ſleep at night to cloſe thy eyes,*
*Till thrice thy acts that day thou haſt ore-run;*
*How ſlipt? what deeds? what duty left undone?*

Others, (as (*s*) *Chryſippus*) attribute them to his Diſciples; ſome particularly to *Lyſis* the *Tarentine*; ſome to *Philolaus*. St. *Hierom* conceives that the Sentences and Doctrines were of *Pythagoras*, but reduced to verſe ſuccinctly by *Archippus* and *Lyſides* his Diſciples, who had their Schools in *Greek*, and at *Thebes*, and having the precepts of their Maſter by heart, made uſe of their own ingenuity inſtead of Books. Or they might be compiled by *Epicarmus*, of whom *Jamblichus* ſaith, (*t*) coming to *Syracuſa* in the reign of *Hiero*, he forbore to profeſs Philoſophy openly, but did reduce the opinions of the *Pythagoreans* into Verſe, thereby in ſportive manner venting the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*.

(*s*) Agel. lib.

(*t*) Cap. ult.

*Epiſtles*; of which are extant two only, one to *Anaximenes*, the other to *Hiero*.

## *Pythagoras* to *Anaximenes*.

AND *thou, O beſt of men, if thou didſt not excell* Pythagoras *in extract and honour, wouldſt have left* Miletus; *but now the honour of this Country detains thee, and would alſo detain me, were I like* Anaximenes. *But if you who are the moſt conſiderable perſons ſhould forſake the Cities, their glory would be loſt, and they become more infeſted by the Medes. Neither is it fit to be always buſied in Aſtrology, but better to take care of our Country. Even I my ſelf beſtow not all my time in ſtudy, but ſometimes in the Wars, wherein the* Italians *are engaged one againſt another.*

This Epiſtle ſeems to have been written in anſwer to that of *Anaximenes* to *Pythagoras*, already produc'd in the Life of *Anaximenes*.

## *Pythagoras* to *Hiero*.

MY *life is ſecure and quiet, but yours will no way ſuit with me; A moderate and ſelf-denying perſon, needs not a* Sicilian *Table.* Pythagoras, *whereſoever he comes, hath all things ſufficient for the day; but to ſerve a Lord is heavy and intolerable, for one unaccuſtomed to it.* Αὐτάρκεια, *ſelf-ſufficiency, is a great and ſafe thing, for it hath none that envies or conſpires againſt it; whence that life ſeemeth to come neareſt God. A good habit is not acquired by venereal pleaſures, nor high feeding; but by indigence, which leadeth to Virtue; Various and intemperate pleaſures enſlave the ſouls of weak perſons, but eſpecially thoſe which you enjoy, inaſmuch as you have given your ſelf over to them; for you are carried in ſuſpence, and cannot be ſafe, becauſe your reaſon oppoſeth not it ſelf to thoſe things which are pernicious. Therefore, write not* Pythagoras *to live with you; for Phyſicians will not fall ſick to bear their patients company.*

Theſe are mentioned as the genuine Writings of *Pythagoras*; others there were accounted ſpurious, as,

*The Myſtick Diſcourſe*, which (ſaith *Laertius*) they affirm to have been written by *Hippaſus*, in detraction from *Pythagoras*.

(*u*) Many Writings of *Aſto*, a *Crotonian*, were likewiſe aſcribed to *Pythagoras*; as were alſo,

(*u*) Laert.

(*x*) *Aliptick Commentaries*, written indeed by another of that name, ſon of *Eratocles*.

(*x*) Jambl. c

The

The Dialect uſed by *Pythagoras* and his Diſciples, was the Dorick, which ſome conceive choſen by them as the moſt excellent, as *Metrodorus*, cited by (*y*) *Jamblichus*; *Epicharmus* (ſaith he) and before him *Pythagoras*, took the Dorick, the beſt of Dialects, as it is alſo the beſt muſical Harmony; for the Ionick and Æolick partake of the Chromatick, the Attick is much more participant of the Chromatick; but the Dorick Dialect is Enarmonick, conſiſting of full ſounding Letters. The Antiquity of the Dorick Dialect is teſtified by the Fable: For *Nereus* married *Doris*, Daughter of the Ocean, whom they feign to have had Fifty; of whom, one was the Mother of *Achilles*. Some (ſaith he) affirm, That *Deucalion*, Son of *Prometheus*, and of *Pyrrha*, Daughter of *Epimetheus*, begot *Dorus*; he, *Hellen*; he, *Æolus*. But in the *Babylonian* Sacred Records, *Hellen* is ſaid to be the Son of *Jupiter*, and that *Hellen* begot *Dorus*, and *Xanthus*, and *Æolus*, by whoſe direction he went to *Rhodes*. Now it is not eaſie to ſpeak exactly concerning the Ancients to thoſe of later times, yet is it acknowledged by both theſe ſtories, That the *Dorick* is the moſt ancient of theſe Dialects. Next which the *Æolick*, ſo named from *Æolus*. The Third the *Ionick*, derived from *Io*, Son of *Xanthus*. The Fourth the *Attick*, founded by *Creuſa*, Daughter of *Erechtheus*, ſo named Three Ages after the reſt, according to the *Thracians*, and the Rape of *Orithuia*, which many Hiſtories declare. *Orpheus* alſo, the moſt ancient of Poets, uſed the *Dorick* Dialect.

But perhaps the true Reaſon is, becauſe it was the Dialect of the Countrey. For the *Pythagoreans* (*z*) admoniſhed all perſons to uſe the Language of their own Countrey, what *Grecians* ſoever came into their Community; for, to ſpeak a ſtrange Language, they approved not. The *Dorick* Dialect was common throughout *Magna Grecia*. *Crotona* and *Sybaris* were Colonies of the *Achæans*, *Syracuſe* of the *Corinthians*; both which were originally *Dorick*, as being of *Peloponneſus*; (*a*) *Thucidides* alledgeth this as a Motive which induced the *Athenians* to war with the *Sicilians*, leſt being *Doreans*, they ſhould at ſome time or other aſſiſt the *Doreans*, by reaſon of their Affinity; and, being a Colony of the *Peloponneſians*, ſhould joyn with the *Peloponneſians*. Hence, to the Stranger, in *Theocritus* his *Adoniazuzæ*, reproving the *Syracuſian* Women thus,

(*b*) *Peace fooliſh babling women, leave your prate;*
*Your wide mouth'd* Dorick *here is out of date.*

One of them anſwers,

*Gup, whence are you? what is our talk to thee?*
*Correct your Maids, not us of* Sicilie.
*I would you knew't, we are from* Corinth *ſprung,*
*As was* Bellerophon, *our Mother-tongue*
Peloponneſian *is, nor is it ſcorn*
*That they ſpeak* Dorick *who are* Dorick-*born.*

For (ſaith the Scholiaſt) the *Syracuſians* were originally *Corinthians*: *Peloponneſus* was inhabited by the *Doreans*, together with the *Heraclidæ*.

## CHAP. XXIII.

### *His Diſciples.*

MAny were the Perſons, who from ſeveral parts, reſorted to *Pythagoras*, to be his Diſciples, and lived with him in that Condition. Of theſe there were (as (*a*) *Ariſtoxenus* relates) *Leucanians*, *Meſſapians*, (or, as *Lacertius*, *Peucetians*) and *Romans*. (*a*) *Porph.*

(*b*) *Simichus*, Tyrant of the *Centoropians*, [a People of *Sicily*, the Town it ſelf being called *Centorpa*] having heard him, laid down his Command, and diſtributed his Riches, part to his Siſter, part to his Citizens. (*b*) *Porph.*

(*c*) *Abaris* alſo of *Scythia*, a *Hyperborean*, came hither, who being unacquainted with the *Greek* Language, and not initiated, and withal advanced into Years, *Pythagoras* would not introduce him by various Theorems; but inſtead of the ſilence, and the long attention, and other trials, he made him preſently fit to receive his Doctrines, and taught him in a ſhort time to underſtand thoſe Two Books concerning Nature, and concerning the Gods. For *Abaris* now in years, came from the *Hyperboreans*, a Prieſt of *Apollo* there, and converting the wiſeſt things concerning Religion, from *Greece* to his own Countrey, that he might lay up the collected Gold to his God's uſe, in his Temple among the *Hyperboreans*; but coming by the way into *Italy*, and ſeeing *Pythagoras*, and likening him to the God whoſe Prieſt he was, and believing he was no other, not a man like him, but very *Apollo* himſelf, both by his Gravity, and by ſome Marks and Tokens which he knew, he gave *Pythagoras* an Arrow which he brought from the Temple, as neceſſary for his Journey, through ſo many different Contingencies, and ſuch a long Travel: For riding upon that, and ſo paſſing over places that were otherwiſe impaſſible, as Rivers, Lakes, Marſhes, Mountains, and the like, and coming to any place, as they ſay, he made Purifications, and expelled Peſtilences and Storms from thoſe Cities that deſired his aſſiſtance. We are informed, that *Lacedæmon* being purged by him, never had the Peſtilence afterwards, whereas it was formerly very ſubject to that ſickneſs, by reaſon of want of free paſſage of the Air (the *Taygetan* Mountains, amongſt which it is built, penning it up: for thoſe Hills lye above it, as *Gnoſſus* to *Creet*) and other ſuch Signs of the power of *Abaris* are reported. But *Pythagoras* accepting the Arrow, and not looking ſtrangely upon it, or asking the cauſe why he gave it him; but, as if he were himſelf the true God, taking *Abaris* aſide, he ſhowed him his golden Thigh, as an aſſured mark that he was not miſtaken, and then reckoning every particular of all thoſe that were in the Temple, that he did not gueſs amiſs, and adding, That he came for the benefit of men, and for this reaſon was in man's ſhape, that they might not be aſtoniſhed at one ſo far above them, and ſo fly his Doctrine. And he commanded him to ſtay there, and to joyn with him in inſtructing them who came to him: and as for the Gold which (*c*) *Jamb.* cap.

For τεχνη perhaps read ἰχνη.

which he had gathered for his God, he commanded him to give it to those whom he had assembled; insomuch that he actually confirmed the Sentence, *All things are common amongst Friends*. *Abaris* thus staying with him (as we said), he gave him the Epitome of Physiology and Theology, and instead of the Art of guessing by Sacrifices, he taught him that kind of Prognostick which is by Numbers, as thinking that more Sacred and Divine, and more agreeable to the Celestial Numbers of the Gods. And other Doctrines he taught *Abaris*, such as were proper for him.

(e) *Strab.* lib. 6. page 263. (e) *Milo* of *Crotona*, the most eminent Wrestler of those times, was Disciple to *Pythagoras*; He, when in the Hall of the Colledg a Pillar begun to yield, went under it, and by that means saved all the Scholars, and at last got away himself; and it is probable that this confidence in his great strength was the occasion of his Death. For they report that as he was going through a thick Wood far from any way, finding a great Tree with Wedges in it, he set his Hands and feet to it, trying to reive it asunder; whereupon the Wedges fell out, and he being caught, became a Prey to the Wild Beasts. In his House it was, that the *Pythagoreans* were surprised and burned by the *Cylonians*.

(f) *Joseph.* contra Appion. lib. 11. (f) *Calliphon* of *Crotona*, is mentioned by *Hermippus*, as an intimate Friend of *Pythagoras*, who reported, when *Calliphon* was dead, That his Soul was continually present with him, and that the Soul commanded him that he should not pass the place where his Asse fell; and that he should abstain from impure Water, and avoid ill-speaking.

We onely mention these here, as being most particularly interested in the Relation of *Pythagoras* his Life: a more perfect Account of the rest, receive in the following Catalogue.

## CHAP. XXIV.

### *The Succession of his School.*

*Jambl.* cap. *ult.* THE Successor of *Pythagoras* is by all acknowledged to have been *ARISTÆUS*, Son of *Damophon*, a *Crotonian*, who lived in the time of *Pythagoras*, Seven Generations above *Plato*: neither did he succeed in the School onely, but in breeding the Children of *Pythagoras*, and in the Marriage of *Theano*, for his eminent understanding of his Opinions; for he is said to have taught the Doctrine of *Pythagoras* Forty Years together lacking one, living in all, near an Hundred; He assigned the School to *Aristæus*, as being the oldest.

Next him, *MNESARCHUS*, Son of *Pythagoras*.

He delivered it to *BULAGORAS*, in whose time the City of *Crotona* was sacked.

Him succeeded *TIDAS*, a *Crotonian*, returning from travel which he began before the War, but he died with grief for the calamity of his Countrey; whereas it was a common thing to others, when they were very old, to free themselves from the fetters of the body.

Afterwards they took one of the *Lucanians*, saved by some strangers, to be President of the School, to whom came *DIODORUS* the *Aspendian*, who was taken by reason of the scarcity of men in their Colledg.

As *Heraclea*, *CLINIAS* and *PHILOLAUS*.

At *Metapontum*, *THEORIDES* and *EURYTUS*.

At *Tarentum*, *ARCHYTAS*.

Of the External *Acroaticks* was *Epicharmus*, but not of the Colledge. Coming to *Syracusa*, in the time of the Tyranny of *Hieron*, he forbare publickly to profess Philosophy; but he reduced the Opinions of those men, (the *Pythagoreans*) into Verse, sportively divulging the abstruse Doctrines of *Pythagoras*.

Of the *Pythagoreans* it is likely that many were obscure; the Names of such as were eminent, are these;

### Crotonians.

*Hippostatus*, *Dymas*, *Ægon*, *Æmon*, *Silius*, *Cleosthenes*, *Agelas*, *Epicylus*, *Phyciadas*, *Ecphanius*, *Timæus*, *Buthius*, *Eratus*, *Itanaus*, *Phodippus*, *Bryas*, *Evander*, *Millias*, *Antimedon*, *Ægeas*, *Leophron*, *Agylas*, *Onatus*, *Hipposthenes*, *Cleophron*, *Alcmæon*, *Damocles*, *Milon*, *Meton*.

### Metapontines.

*Brontinus*, *Parmiscus*, *Arestadas*, *Leo*, *Damarmenos*, *Æneas*, *Chilas*, *Melisias*, *Aristeas*, *Laphaon*, *Evander*, *Agesidamus*, *Xenocides*, *Euriphemus*, *Aristomenes*, *Agesarchus*, *Alcias*, *Xenophantes*, *Thraseos*, *Arytus*, *Epiphron*, *Eiriscus*, *Megisteas*, *Leocydes*, *Thrasymides*, *Euphemus*, *Proclus*, *Antimedes*, *Lacritus*, *Damotages*, *Pyrrhon*, *Rhexibius*, *Alopecus*, *Astylus*, *Dacydus*, *Aliochus*, *Lacrates*, *Glucinus*.

### Agrigentine.

*Empedocles*.

### Velian.

*Pamenides*.

### Tarentines.

*Philolaus*, *Arytus*, *Archytas*, *Theodorus*, *Aristippus*, *Lycon*, *Estiæus*, *Polemarchus*, *Asteas*, *Cænias*, *Cleon*, *Eurymedon*, *Arceas*, *Clinagoras*, *Archippus*, *Zopyrus*, *Euthynus*, *Dicæarchus*, *Philonides*, *Phrontidas*, *Lysis*, *Lysibius*, *Dinocrates*, *Echecrates*, *Paetion*, *Acusiladas*, *Iccus*, *Pisicrates*, *Clearatus*, *Leonteus*, *Phrinichus*, *Simicheas*, *Aristoclides*, *Climas*, *Abroteles*, *Piserrydus*, *Brias*, *Evander*, *Archemachus*, *Mimnomachus*, *Achmonidas*, *Sicas*, *Caraphantidas*.

### Sybarites.

*Metopus*, *Hippasus*, *Proxenus*, *Evanor*, *Deanax*, *Menestius*, *Diocles*, *Empedus*, *Timasius*, *Polemæus*, *Evæus*, *Tyrsenus*.

### Parians.

*Ætius*, *Phenecles*, *Dexitheus*, *Alcimachas*, *Dinarchus*, *Meton*, *Timæus*, *Timesianax*, *Amcærus*, *Eumaridias*.

### Locrians.

*Gyptius*, *Xenon*, *Philodamus*, *Euetes*, *Adicus*, *Sthe-*

*Sthenonidas, Sofiſtratus, Euthynus, Zaleucus, Timares.*

Poſidonians.
*Athamas, Simus, Proxenus, Cranius, Mayes, Bathylaus, Phædo.*

Lucanians.
*Ocellus* and *Ocylus* (brethren), *Oreſander, Cerambus, Dardaneus, Malias.*

Ægeans.
*Hippomedon, Timoſthenes, Euelthon, Thraſydamus, Crito, Polyctor.*

Laconians.
*Antocharidas, Cleanor, Eurycratus.*

Hyperborean.
*Abaris.*

Rhegians.
*Ariſtides, Demoſthenes, Ariſtocrates, Phytius, Helicaon, Mneſibulus, Hipparchides, Athoſion, Euthycles, Opſimus.*

Selinuntian.
*Colæs.*

Syracuſians.
*Leptines, Phintias, Damon.*

Samians.
*Meliſſus, Lacon, Archippus, Glorippus, Heloris, Hippon.*

Caulonians.
*Callibrotus, Dicon, Naſtas, Drymon, Xentas.*

Phliaſians.
*Diocles, Echecrates, Polymnaſtus, Phanton.*

Sicyonians.
*Paliades, Demon, Soſtratius, Soſthenes.*

Cyrenæans.
*Prorus, Melanippus, Ariſtangelus, Theodorus.*

Cyzicenes.
*Pythodorus, Hippoſthenes, Butherus, Xenophilus.*

Catanæan.
*Charondas.*

Corinthian.
*Lyſiades.*

Tyrrhene.
*Chryſippus.*

Athenian.
*Nauſitheus.*

Of Pontus.
*Neocritus, Lyramnus.*
In all, 208.

The *Pythagorean* Women eminent, are,
*Tymicha*, wife of *Millius* the *Crotonian.*
*Philtes*, daughter of *Leophron*, a *Crotonian*, ſiſter of *Bindæcus.*
*Oecelo* and *Eccelo*, of *Luca.*
*Chilonis*, daughter of *Chilo* the *Lacedæmonian.*
*Theano*, wife of *Brontinus* the *Metapontine.*
*Muya*, wife of *Milo* the *Crotonian.*
*Laſthenia* of *Arcadia*, daughter of *Abroteles* the *Tarentine.*
*Echecrates*, a *Phliaſian.*
*Tyrſenes* of *Sybaris.*
*Pyſirronde* of *Tarentum*, daughter of *Niſtiades.*
*Salacera.*
*Bio* of *Argos.*
*Babelyma* of *Argos.*
*Cleæchma*, ſiſter of *Autocharides*, a *Lacedæmonian.*
In all, 17. Thus *Jamblichus.*

*Laertius* ſaith, His Syſteme (or, as *Caſſiodorus*, Colledg) continued for Nineteen Generations; for the laſt of the *Pythagoreans* (whom *Ariſtoxenus* ſaw) were *Xenophilus* the *Chalcidean* of *Thrace*, and *Phanton* a *Phliaſian*, and *Echecrates*, and *Diocles*, and *Polymneſtus*, who alſo were *Phliaſians.* They heard *Philolaus* and *Eurytus*, both of *Tarentum.*

THE

# THE Discipline and Doctrine OF PYTHAGORAS.

## CHAP. I.

### *The great Authority and esteem of* Pythagoras *amongst his Disciples.*

PYTHAGORAS, to render his Disciples capable of Philosophy, prepar'd them by a Discipline so strict and severe, as might seem incredible to have been undergone by free persons, were it not founded upon the great Authority and Reputation which he had amongst them.

(a) Jamb. c. 28. p. 131. (a) The Credit of their Opinions they conceived to be this, That he who first communicated them was no ordinary Person, but a God; and one of these Acousmata is, Who *Pythagoras* was: for they say, He was *Hyperborean Apollo.* (b) In confirmation hereof, they instance those Wonders related in his Life, and the like, which being acknowledged to be true, and it being impossible they should all be performed by one Man, they conceive it manifest, that these Relations are to be ascribed, not to a Humane Person, but to something above Mankind. This they acknowledg; for amongst them there is a saying, That,

(b) Pag. 132.

(c) Read δίτες. See Etymolog. magn.

*(c) Two-footed Man, and Bird*
*Is, and another Third.*

by which Third they meant *Pythagoras.* And (d) *Aristotle*, in his Book of Pythagorick Philosophy, relates, That such a Division as this was preserved by the *Pythagoreans*, amongst their ineffable Secrets. Of Rational Animals, one kind is God; another, Man; a third between both these, *Pythagoras.*

(d) Jamb. c. 6 p. 44.

(e) Jamb. c. 6. p. 43. (e) They esteemed *Pythagoras* in the next place to the Gods, as some good Genius indulgent to Mankind: some affirming, that he was *Pythian*; others, *Hyperborean Apollo*; Some, one of those *Genii* which dwell in the Moon; others, one of the Celestial Deities, appearing at that time in a humane shape, for the benefit and direction of Mortal Life, that he might communicate the wholsome Illumination of Beatitude and Philosophy to Mortal Nature; than which, a greater good can never come, nor shall ever come, which is given by the Gods through the means of this *Pythagoras.* Whence to this day the Proverb of the Fair-hair'd *Samian* is used for a most reverend person.

(f) Porphyrius saith, They reckon'd him amongst the Gods; and therefore whensoever they went to deliver to others any excellent thing, out of the Secrets of his Philosophy, whence many Physical Conclusions might be deduced, then they swore by the *Tetractys*, and calling *Pythagoras*, as some God, to witness, said,

(f) Pag. 1

*Who the* Tetractys *to our Souls expres't,*
*Eternal Nature's Fountain I attest.*

(g) Which Oath they used, as forbearing, through Reverence, to name him; for they were very sparing in using the Name of any God.

(g) Jamb. pag. 138.

So great indeed was the respect they bare him, That (h) it was not lawful for any one to doubt of what he said, nor to question him further concerning it; but they did acquiesce in all things that he deliver'd, as if they were Oracles. And when he went abroad to Cities, it was reported, He went not to teach, but to cure.

(h) Ælian. hist. 4. 27.

Hence it came to pass, That (i) when they asserted any thing in dispute, if they were questioned why it was so, they used to answer, *Ipse dixit*, He said it, which *He* was *Pythagoras.* This (k) αὐτὸς ἔφα was amongst them the first and greatest of Doctrines, his Judgment being a Reason free from, and above all Examination and Censure.

(i) Cic. nat. deor. lib. 1.

(k) Greg. Naz. Orat. 3.

CHAP.

## CHAP. II.

*The two sorts of Auditors: and first of the* Exoterick, *how he explored them.*

THE Auditors of *Pythagoras*, (such, I mean, as belonged to the family) were of two sorts, *Exoterick* and *Esoterick*: the *Exotericks* were those who were under probation, which if they well performed, they were admitted to be *Esotericks*. For, of those who came to *Pythagoras*, he admitted not every one, but only those whom he liked: first, upon choice; and next, by tryal.

(a) Jamb. c. 34. (*a*) *The* Pythagoreans *are said to have been averse from those who sell learning, and open their souls like the gates of an Inn, to every one that comes to them; and if they find not a vent or sale in this manner, then they run into Cities, and ransack the* Gymnasia, *and exact a reward from dishonourable persons: Whereas* Pythagoras *hid much of his speeches; so as they who were purely initiated might plainly understand them. But the rest, as* Homer *said of* Tantalus, *grieve, for that being in the midst of learning, they cannot taste of it. Moreover, they said, That they who for hire teach such as come to them, are meaner than Statuaries and Chariot-makers; for, a Statuary, when he (b) would make a* Mercury, *seeks out some piece of wood fit to receive that form; but these, of every disposition endeavour to make that of Virtue.*

(b) Apul. in Apolog. lib. 1. cites this sentence of Pythagoras.

(c) Jamb. c. 17. (*c*) *When (*therefore*) any friends came to him, and desired to learn of him, he admitted them not, till he had made tryal and judgment of them. First, he enquired, how they did heretofore converse with their parents and friends; next, he observed their unseasonable laughters, and unnecessary silence or discourse. Moreover, what their inclinations were,* [(*d*) whether possess'd with passion and intemperance, whether prone to anger or unchast desires, or contentious or ambitious, and how they behaved themselves in contention and friendship.]

(d) Jamb. c. 20.

(e) Jamb. c. 17. *As likewise what friends those were, with whom they were intimate, and their conversation with them, and in whose society they spent the greatest part of the day; likewise upon what occasions they joyed and grieved.*

(f) Jamb. c. 20. (*f*) *Moreover he considered their presence and their gaite, and the whole motion of their body: and, physiognomizing them by the symptoms, he discovered by manifest signs the occult dispositions of their souls.* For, (*g*) *he first studied that Science concerning men, thereby discovering of what disposition every one was; neither did he admit any into his friendship and acquaintance, before he had physiognomized the man what he were.* This word (saith (*b*) *Agellius*, upon the same occasion) signifieth to make enquiry into the manners of some, by some kind of conjecture of the wit by the face and countenance, and by the air and habit of the whole body.

(g) Porph. pag.

(b) Lib. 1. c. 4.

(i) Jamb. c. 20. (*i*) *If upon exact observation of all these particulars, he found them to be of good dispositions, then he examined whether they had good manners, and were docile; first, whether they could readily and ingeniously follow that which he told them; next, whether they had any love to those things which they heard. For he considered what disposition they were of as to being made gentle, this he called* κατάρτισιν; *for he accounted roughness an enemy to his way of teaching, because it is attended by impatience, intemperance, anger, obtuseness, confusion, dishonour, and the like; but mildness and gentleness by their contraries.*

Likewise (*k*) *in making the first tryal of them, he considered, whether they could* ἐχεμυθεῖν, (*for that was the word he used*) *and examined, whether if they could learn that which they heard, they were able to be silent, and to keep it to themselves.*

(k) Jamb. cap. 1. pag. 95.

## CHAP. III.

*Purificative Institution by sufferings.*

(a) Porph. (*a*) *The chiefest scope which* Pythagoras *propos'd, was to deliver and free the mind from the ingagements and fetters, in which it is confin'd from her first infancy; without which freedom, none can learn any thing sound or true, nor can perceive by what that which is unsound in sense operates. For, the mind (according to him) seeth all, and heareth all, the rest are deaf and blind.*

This he performed by many exercises which he appointed for purification of the mind, and for the probation of such as came to him, which endured five years before they were admitted.

(b) Jamb. c. 17. pag. 77. (*b*) *If upon this examination (*which we declared*) he judged any person capable, he then remitted him three years to be despised, making a test of his constancy and true love to learning, and whether he were sufficiently instructed as to despise glory, to contemn honour, and the like.*

(c) Jamb. (*c*) *He conceived it in general requisite, that they should take much labour and pains, for the acquisition of Arts and Sciences; and to that end he appointed for them some torments of cauterising and incision to be performed by fire and steel, which none that were of an ill inclination would undergo.*

## CHAP. IV.

*Silence.*

(a) Jamb. (*a*) *Moreover, he enjoyned those that came to him Silence for five years, making tryal how firmly they would behave themselves in the most difficult of all continencies; for such is the government of the tongue, as is manifest from those who have divulged mysteries.*

This πενταετὴς σιωπὴ, a quinquennial silence, was called ἐχεμυθία, (and sometimes, but less frequently, ἐχεφημοσύνη) (*b*) ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐχειν ἢν ἑαυτῷ ἢ λόγον, from keeping our speech within our selves.

(b) Hesych.

(c) Simplic. in Epictet. The reason of this silence was, (*c*) *That the soul might be converted into her self from external things, and from the irrational passions in her, and from the body even unto her own life, which is to live for ever.* Or, as (*d*) *Clemens Alexandrinus* expresseth it, *That his disciples, being diverted from sensible things, might seek God with a pure mind.*

(d) Strom. 5.

(e) In vit. act. Hence (*e*) *Lucian* to the demand, how *Pythagoras* could reduce men to the remembrance of the things which they had formerly known, (for he held Science to be only Reminiscence) makes him answer, *First, by long quiet and silence, speaking nothing for five whole years.*

(f) lib. 1. cap. 4. Yet (f) *Agellus* affirms, That he appointed not the same length of silence to all, but several to several persons, according to their particular capacities. And *Apuleius*, That for the graver sort of persons, this taciturnity was moderated by a shorter space; but the more talkative were punished, as it were, by exile from speech five years.

(g) *Agel.* ibid. (g) He who kept silence, heard what was said by others, but was not allowed either to question, if he understood not, or to write down what he heard. None kept silence less than two years. *Agellius* adds, That these within the time of silence and hearing, were called *Acoustici*. But when they had learned these things the most difficult of all, to hold their peace, and to hear, and were now grown learned in silence, which they called ἐχεμυθίαν, then they were allowed to speak, and to question, and to write what they heard, and what they conceived. At this time they were called *Mathematici*, from those Arts which they then began to learn and to meditate. Thus *Agellus*, how rightly, I question; for *Mathematici* and *Acousmatici* were distinctive appellations of the *Pythagoreans*, not in probation, but after admission, as we shall see hereafter.

(h) *Florid.* Thus, (h) *Apuleius* saith, He taught nothing to his disciples before silence; And with him, the first meditation, for one that meant to be a wise man, was, wholly to restrain the tongue of words, those words which the Poets call Winged, to pluck off the fears, and to confine them within the walls of our teeth. This, I say, was the first rudiment of wisdom, to learn to meditate, and to unlearn to talk.

## CHAP. V.

### *Abstinence, Temperance, and other ways of Purification.*

(a) *Jamb.* c. 16. p. 74. (a) MOreover, he commanded them to abstain from all things that had life, and from certain other meats also which obstruct the clearness of the understanding, (b) and for the same end (viz. in order to the inquisition and the apprehension of the most difficult Theoremes) he likewise commanded them to abstain from wine, to eat little, to sleep little; a careless contempt of honour, riches, and the like; an unfeigned respect towards kindred, sincere equality and kindness towards such as were of the same age, and a propensity to further the younger without envy.

(b) *Jamb.* ibid.

(c) *Jamb.* ibid. (c) In fine, he procured to his Disciples a conversation with the gods by visions and dreams, which never happen to a soul disturbed with anger or pleasure, or any other unbefitting transportation, or with impurity and a rigid ignorance of all these. He cleansed, and purified the soul divinely from all these, and inkindled the divine part in her, and preserved her, and directed in her that intellectual divine eye which is better, (d) as *Plato* saith) then a thousand eyes of flesh, for by the help of this only, Truth is apprehended; After this manner he procured purification of the Intellect: And such was his form of Institution as to those things.

(d) For σωθῆναι reading ὡς ἔφησε καὶ ὁ Πλάτων.

(e) Excerpt. Valef. p. 245. (e) *Diodorus* saith, they had an exercise of temperance after this manner; There being prepared and set before them all sorts of delicate food, they looked upon it a good while, and after that their appetites were fully provoked by the sight thereof, they commanded it to be taken off, [(f) and given to the servants] they themselves going away without dining; (this they did, saith *Jamblichus*) to punish their appetite.

(f) *Jambl.*

## CHAP. VI.

### *Community of Estates.*

IN this time, all that they had (that is their whole estate) was made common [(a) put together and made one.] They brought forth, saith (b) *Agellius*, whatsoever they had of stock or money, and constituted an inseparable Society, as being that ancient way of association, which truely is termed Κοινοβίον. (c) This was given up to such of the disciples, as were appointed for that purpose, and were called *Politici & Oeconomici*, as being persons fit to govern a family, and to give Laws.

(a) *Jambl.* c. 17. (b) *Laert.* (c) *Lib*

This was conformable to the precepts of *Pythagoras* (as (d) *Timeus* affirms) first κοινὰ τὰ φίλων εἶναι, All common amongst friends; and, φιλότητα ἰσότητα, friendship, equality; (e) and, esteem nothing your own. By this means (f) he exterminated all propriety, and increased community even to their last possessions, as being causes of dissention and trouble; for all things were common amongst them, no man had a propriety to any thing.

(d) *Jambl.* (e) *Laert.* (f) *Jambl.*

But what *Agellius* terms *an inseparable Society*, is to be understood only conditionally, provided that they misliked not at any time this community: for, whosoever did so, (g) *took again his own estate, and more than that which he brought into the community, and departed.*

(g) *Laert.*

## CHAP. VII.

### *Admission or Rejection.*

(a) THey who appeared worthy to participate of his doctrines, judging by their lives and moderation, after their five years silence, were made *Esotericks*, and were admitted to hear *Pythagoras* within the Screen, and to see him; but before that time they heard him discourse, being on the outside of the Screen, & not seeing him, giving a long time experiment of their proper manners by Hearing only. But if they were rejected, they received their estate double, and a tomb was made by the Disciples, as if they had been dead; for so all that were about *Pythagoras* spoke of them, and when they met them, behaved themselves towards them, as if they had been some other persons, but the men themselves they said were dead.

(a) *Jambl.* c. 17.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Distinction.*

(a) WHatsoever he discoursed to those that came to him, he declared either plainly or symbolically (for he had a two-fold form of teaching): and of those who came to him, some were called *Mathematici*, others *Acousmatici*. The *Mathematici* were those who learnt the fuller and more exactly-elaborate reason of Science. The *Acousmatici* they, who heard only the chief heads of learning, without more exact explication.

(a) *Porph.* p. 24.

Thus

) Jamb. c. 18. Thus (*b*) as there were two kinds of Philoſophy, ſo were there two ſorts of thoſe who ſtudied Philoſophy. The *Acouſmatici* did confeſs that the *Mathematici* were *Pythagoreans*; but the *Mathematici* did not acknowledg that the *Acouſmatici* were *Pythagoreans*; for they had their learning, not from *Pythagoras*, but from *Hippaſus*; who, ſome ſay, was of *Crotona*, others of *Metapontium*.

The Philoſophy of the *Acouſmatici* conſiſts of Doctrines without demonſtrations and reaſons, but that, So it muſt be done, and the like, which they were to obſerve as ſo many Divine Doctrines, and they did eſteem thoſe amongſt them the wiſeſt, who had moſt of theſe *Acouſmata*. Now all theſe *Acouſmata* were divided into three kinds; ſome tell, *what ſomething is*; others tell, *what is moſt ſuch a thing*: the third ſort tell, *what is to be done, and what not*. Thoſe that tell *what a thing is*, are of this kind, *as* What is the Iſland of the Bleſſed? The Sun? the Moon? What is the Oracle at *Delphi*? the Tetractys? What is the Muſick of the Syrens?

Thoſe which tell *what is moſt*, as, *What is moſt juſt? To ſacrifice. What is the wiſeſt? Number; and in the next place that which gave names to things. What is the wiſeſt amongſt us? Medicine. What the moſt beautiful? Harmony. What the moſt powerful? Reaſon. What the beſt? Beatitude. What the trueſt? That men are wicked.* For which (they ſay) he commended *Hippodamas*, a Poet of *Salamis*, who ſaid,

*O Gods! whence are you? How ſo good? ſo bleſt?*
*O Men! whence are you? How with ill poſſeſt?*

Theſe and ſuch like are the *Acouſmata* of this kind; for every one of theſe telleth, What is moſt. The ſame it is with that which is called the wiſdom of the Seven Sages, for they enquired not what is good, but what is moſt good; not what is difficult, but what is moſt difficult, which is to know our ſelves; not what is facile, but what is moſt facile, which is the cuſtome of Nations. Thoſe *Acouſmata* ſeem to follow this kind of wiſdom for thoſe Sages were before *Pythagoras*. The *Acouſmata* which tell *what is to be done, or what is not to be done*, are thus, *As that we ought to beget children, for we muſt leave behind us ſuch as may ſerve the Gods in our room; or, that we ought to put off the right ſhoe firſt*; *or, that we ought not to go in the common Road*, and the like. Such were the *Acouſmata*; but thoſe which have moſt ſaid upon them, are *concerning ſacrifices*, at what times, and after what manner they are to be performed, and *concerning removal* from our place of habitation, and concerning *Sepulture*, how we muſt bury the Dead, for ſome whereof there is a *reaſon* given. As, that *we ought to get children, that we may leave in our room another ſervant of the Gods*. But of others there is no reaſon: and, in ſome, that which follows the precept ſeems to be allied to the words, but in others is wholly diſtant, as, *that we ought not to break bread, becauſe it conduceth to judgment in Hell*. But the reaſons that are applied to theſe, are not *Pythagorean*, but given by ſome other who ſtudied *Pythagorean* Learning, endeavouring to apply ſome probable conjecture to them; As of the laſt mentioned, That Bread is not to be broken; ſome ſay, He who gathers together, ought not to diſſolve. For anciently all Friends uſed after a barbarous manner to meet at one Loaf; others, That you muſt not give ſo bad an omen, as, when you are going about any thing, to break it off.

But there was one *Hippomedon*, an (*c*) *Agrinean*, a *Pythagorean* of the Acouſmatick rank, who ſaid, That *Pythagoras* gave reaſons and demonſtrations of all theſe things; but becauſe they were delivered by Tradition through many, and thoſe ſtill growing more idle, that the Reaſons were taken away, and the Problems only left. Now the Mathematical *Pythagoreans* grant all this to be true, but the occaſion of the difference they ſay was this: *Pythagoras* went from *Ionia*, and *Samus*, in the time of *Policrates*'s reign, to *Italy*, which was then in a flouriſhing condition, where the chiefeſt perſons of the Cities became converſant with him. To the moſt ancient of theſe, and ſuch as had leaſt leaſure, (becauſe they were taken up with publick employments, ſo that it would be very hard for them to learn Mathematicks and Demonſtrations) he diſcourſed barely, conceiving it did nothing leſs advantage them, even without the cauſes, to know what they had to do: as Patients, not enquiring why ſuch things are preſcribed them, nevertheleſs obtain health. But to the younger, who were able to act and learn, he imparted by Demonſtrations and Mathematicks. The *Mathematici* profeſſed that they came from theſe; the *Acouſmatici*, from the others, chiefly from *Hippaſus*, who was one of the *Pythagoreans*. But becauſe he publiſhed [their doctrine] and firſt wrote of the Sphear of twelve Pentagones, he died in the Sea as an impious perſon, not obtaining the fame at which he aimed.

(c) For ἀγρεανὸν & ἀιτιατὸν, perhaps read Ἀγριανὸν.

## CHAP. IX.

*How they diſpoſed the Day.*

(*a*) WE ſhall next ſpeak concerning thoſe things which he taught them in the day; for, according to his directions, thus did they who were taught by him. Theſe men performed their morning walks by themſelves, and in ſuch places where they might be exceeding quiet and retired, where were Temples, and Groves, and other delightful places; for they thought it was not fit they ſhould ſpeak with any one, till they had firſt compos'd their Souls, and fitted their intellect, and that ſuch quiet was requiſite for the compoſure of their intellect; for, as ſoon as they aroſe, to intrude among the people, they thought a tumultuous thing. Therefore all the *Pythagoreans* ever made choice of the moſt ſacred places.

(*a*) *Jamb.* cap. 20. pag. 97. and cap. 21. for the chapters are here alſo confounded.

After their morning-walk, they came to one another, chiefly in the Temples, or in ſome ſuch places. They made uſe of theſe times for doctrines and diſciplines, and rectifications of their manners.

After they had ſtudied a while, they went to their morning exerciſes; the greater part uſed to anoint themſelves, and run races; the fewer, to wreſtle in Orchards and in Groves; ſome, by throwing ſledges, or by grappling hands, to make tryal of their ſtrength; chooſing ſuch

exercises as they judged most convenient for them.

At Dinner they used Bread and Honey. Wine after meals they drunk not. The time after Dinner they employ'd in Political affairs, as well foreign as domestick, according to the injunction of their Laws; for they endeavoured to manage every thing in the afternoons. As soon as the evening came, they betook themselves again, not singly, as in their morning walks, but two or three walked together, repeating the Doctrines they had learnt, and exercising themselves in virtuous employments. After their walks, they used baths and washing; having washed, they met together to eat; but they did not eat together more than ten persons. As soon as they who were to come together were met, they used libations, and sacrifices of meal and frankincense. Then they went to supper, that they might end it before the Sun were set. They used Wine, and Maza, and Bread, and Broth, and Herbs, both raw and boiled: they likewise set before them the flesh of such beasts as used to be sacrificed. They seldom eat broths of fish, because some of them are, in some respects, very hurtful; likewise (seldom) the flesh of such creatures as use not to hurt mankind. After Supper, they offered libations, then had lectures. Their custom was, that the youngest amongst them should read, and the eldest should, as President, order what and how he should read. When they were to depart, he who filled the Wine poured forth to them in libation; and during the libation, the eldest of them declared these things, That none should hurt or kill a domestick plant or fruit; besides, that they should speak well, and think reverently of the gods, dæmons, and heroes; likewise to think well of Parents and Benefactors; to assist Law, and oppose Rebellion. This said, every one departed to his house.

They wore a white and clean garment; they had also coverlets white and clean of (*b*) linnen, for they used not any of skins, because they approved not the exercise of Hunting.

(*b*) For ἰμαλίαινά, perhaps read ἢ ἰμάθιαινα. Yet *Laertius* expressly saith, that linnen was not as yet used in those parts.

These were the Traditions that were delivered to that society of men, partly concerning diet, [of which hereafter more particularly] partly concerning the course of life.

## CHAP. X.

### *How they examined their actions morning and evening.*

THese and all other actions of the day, they contriv'd in the morning before they rose, and examined at night before they slept; thus, by a twofold act, exercising the memory. (*a*) *They conceived that it was requisite to retain and preserve in memory all which they learnt, and that lessons and doctrines should be so far acquired, as until they are able to remember what they have learnt; for that is it which they ought to know, and bear in mind. For this reason they cherished memory much, and exercised it, and took great care of it; and in learning they gave not over, until they had gotten their lesson perfectly by heart. A* Pythagorean *rose not out of bed, before he had called to mind the actions of the day past, which recollection he performed in this manner: He endeavour'd to call to mind what he first, as soon as he rose, either had heard, or given in charge to his servants; and what in the second place, and what in the third, and so on in the same order. And then for his going forth, whom he met first, whom next; and what discourses he had with the first, what with the second, what with the third, and so of the rest; for he endeavoured to repeat in memory all that happed throughout the whole day, in order as it happed: And if at their up-rising they had more leisure, then after the same manner they endeavoured to recollect all that happed to them for three days before. Thus they chiefly exercised the memory; for they conceived, that* (*b*) *nothing conduceth more to science, experience, and prudence, than to remember many things.*

(*a*) *Jam.* cap.

(*b*) From Iamblichus relating Diodorus in Excerpt. Vales. pag. 243. reading ὐδὲν γὰρ μεῖζον πρὸς ἐπιστήμην καὶ φρόνησιν, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς πάσαν πραξιν, τὸ δύνασθαι πολλὰ μνημονεύειν.

This was conformable to the institution of *Pythagoras*; for, (*c*) *He advised to have regard chiefly to two times, that when we went to sleep, and that when we rose from sleep; at each of these we ought to consider, what actions are past, and what to come. Of the past, we ought to require an account of our selves; of the future, we ought to have a providential care. Wherefore he advised every one to repeat to himself these verses* [ (*d*) *so soon as he came home,* or] *before he slept.*

(*c*) Porph.

Nor suffer sleep at night to close thine eyes,
Till thrice thy acts that day thou hast o're-run,
How slipt? what deeds? what duty left undone?

(*d*) Laer.

*And before they arose, these:*

As soon as e're thou wak'st, in order lay
The actions to be done that following day.

To this effect *Ausonius* hath a *Pythagorical Acroasis*, as he terms it.

*A good wise person, such as hardly one*
*Of many thousands to* Apollo *known,*
*He his own judg strictly himself surveys,*
*Nor minds the Noble's or the Common's ways:*
*But, like the world it self, is smooth and round,*
*In all his polisht frame no blemish found.*
*He thinks how long* Cancer *the day extends,*
*And* Capricorn *the night: Himself perpends*
*In a just ballance, that no flaw there be,*
*Nothing exuberant, but that all agree;*
*Within that all be solid, nothing by*
*A hollow sound betray vacuity.*
*Nor suffer sleep to seize his eyes, before*
*All acts of that long day he hath run o're;*
*What things were mist, what done in time, what not;*
*Why here respect, or reason there forgot;*
*Why kept the worse opinion? when reliev'd*
*A beggar; why with broken passion griev'd;*
*What wish'd which had been better not desir'd;*
*Why profit before honesty requir'd?*
*If any by some speech or look offended,*
*Why nature more than discipline attended?*
*All words & deeds thus search't from morn to night,*
*He sorrows for the ill, rewards the right.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Secrecy.*

BEsides the Quinquennial silence, τετραετὴς ἐχεμυθία, of the *Pythagoreans*, whilst they were Exotericks; there was another, termed πανελὴς ἐχεμυθία, a perpetual or compleat silence, (or secrecy) proper to the Esotericks, not amongst one another, but towards all such as were not of their society.

(a) *Jambl.* cap. pag.

(a) The principal and most efficacious of their Doctrines they all kept ever amongst themselves, as not to be spoken, with exact *Ecbemythia* towards extraneous persons, continuing them unwritten, and preserv'd only by memory to their successors, to whom they delivered them as mysteries of the gods; by which means, nothing of any moment came abroad from them. What had been taught and learnt a long time, was only known within the walls; and if at any time there were any extraneous, and as I may say, profane persons amongst them, the Men (so commonly were the *Pythagoreans* termed) signify'd their meaning to one another by Symbols.

(b) *Jambl.* cap. 17. pag. 80.

(b) Hence *Lysis* reproving *Hipparchus*, for communicating the discourse to uninitiated persons, void of Mathematicks and Theory, saith, They report, that you teach Philosophy in publick to all that come, which *Pythagoras* would not do, as you, *Hipparchus*, learnt with much pains. But you took no heed after you had tasted (O noble person) the *Sicilian* delicacies, which you ought not to have tasted a second time. If you are changed, I shall rejoyce; if not, you are dead to me; for he said, We ought to remember, that it is pious, according to the direction of divine and human exhortations, that the goods of wisdom ought not to be communicated to those, whose soul is not purify'd so much as in dream. For it is not lawful to bestow on every one that which was acquired with so much labour, nor to reveal the mysteries of the *Eleusian* Goddesses to prophane persons; for they who do both these, are alike unjust and irreligious. It is good to consider within our selves, how much time was employ'd in taking away the spots that were in our breasts, that after five years we might be made capable of his discourses. For as Diers first wash and wring out the clothes they intend to die, that they may take the die so, as that it can never be washed out, or taken away; in like manner the Divine prepared those who were inclined to Philosophy, lest he might be deceived by those, of whom he hoped that they would prove good and honest. For he used no adulterate learning, nor the nets wherewith many of the Sophists intangle the young men; but he was skilful in things divine and human: whereas they, under the pretence of his Doctrine, do many strange things, inveigling the young men unbeseemingly, and as they meet them, whereby they render their Auditors rough and rash. For they infuse free Theorems and Discourses, into manners that are not free but disordered. As if into a deep Well full of dirt and mire, we should put clear transparent water, it troubles the dirt, and spoils the water: the same is it, as to those who teach and are taught; for, about the minds and hearts of such as are not initiated, there grows thick and tall coverts, which darken all modesty and meekness, and reason, hindring it from increasing there. Hence spring all kinds of ills, growing up, and hindring the reason, and not suffering it to look out. I will first name their mothers, Intemperance and Avarice, both exceeding fruitful. From Intemperance spring up unlawful marriages, lust, and drunkenness, and perdition, and unnatural pleasures, and certain vehement appetites leading to death and ruin; for some have been so violently carried away with pleasures, that they have not refrained from their own mothers and daughters; but violating the Commonwealth, and the Laws, tyrannically imprison men, and carrying about their (c) *Jailes* (or Stocks) violently hurry them to destruction. From Avarice proceed rapines, thefts, parricides, sacriledges, poysonings, and whatsoever is allied to these. It behoves therefore first, to cut away the matter wherein these vices are bred, with fire and sword, and all arts of discipline, purifying and freeing the reason from these evils: and then to plant something that is good in it. Thus *Lysis*. Neither is that expression, [If you are not changed, you are dead to me] to be understood simply: for this *Hipparchus*, (d) because he communicated, and publickly set forth by writing, the *Pythagorick* Doctrines, was expelled the School, and a Tomb was made for him, as if he were dead, (according to the custom (e) formerly mentioned). So strict were the *Pythagoreans* in observance of this Secrecy.

(c) Ἀγαίνας.

(d) *Cle. Alex. Strom.* 5.

(e) Chap.

THE

# THE DOCTRINE OF PYTHAGORAS.

## CHAP. I.

### *Sciences preparative to Philoſophy.*

THE mind being purify'd [by Diſcipline(*a*)] ought to be applied to things that are beneficial; theſe he procured by ſome contrived ways, bringing it by degrees to the contemplation of eternal incorporeal things, which are ever in the ſame ſtate; beginning orderly from the moſt minute, leſt by the ſuddenneſs of the change it ſhould be diverted, and withdraw it ſelf through its ſo great and long pravity of nutriment.

(*a*) *Porph.* vit. *Pyth.* pag. 31.

To this end, he firſt uſed the Mathematical Sciences, and thoſe Speculations which are intermediate betwixt Corporeals and Incorporeals, (for they have a Threefold Dimenſion, like Bodies, but they are impaſſible like Incorporeals) as Degrees of Preparation to the Contemplation of the things that are; diverting, by an artificial Reaſon, the Eyes of the Mind from corporeal things (which never are permanent in the ſame manner and eſtate) never ſo little to a deſire of aliment; by means whereof, introducing the contemplation of things that are, he rendred men truly happy. This uſe he made of the Mathematical Sciences.

Hence it was, that (*b*) *Juſtin Martyr* applying himſelf to a *Pythagorean*, eminently learned, deſirous to be his Diſciple, he demanded, whether he were verſt in Muſick, Aſtronomy, and Geometry: Or do you think, ſaith he, you may be able to underſtand any thing that pertains to Beatitude, without having firſt learned theſe, which abſtract the Soul from Senſibles, preparing and adapting her for her intelligibles? Can you without theſe contemplate what is honeſt and what is good? Thus, after a long commendation of theſe Sciences, he diſmiſt him, for that he had confeſt himſelf ignorant of them.

(*b*) Dial. cum Tryph.

## CHAP. II.

### *Mathematick, its name, parts.*

THeſe Sciences were firſt termed Μαθήματα by *Pythagoras* upon conſideration that all *Matheſis* (diſcipline) is Reminiſcence, which comes not extrinſecally to ſouls as the phantaſies which are formed by ſenſible objects in the Phantaſie; nor are they an advantageous adſcititious knowledg, like that which is placed in Opinion; but it is excited from Phænomena's, and perfected intrinſecally by the cogitation converted into it ſelf.

(*a*) Procl. in Eucl. l. 1.

(*b*) The whole ſcience of Mathematicks, the *Pythagoreans* divided into four parts, attributing one to *Multitude*, another to *Magnitude*; and ſubdividing each of theſe into two. For Multitude either ſubſiſts by it ſelf, or is conſider'd with reſpect to another; Magnitude either ſtands ſtill, or is moved. *Arithmetick* contemplates Multitude in it ſelf: *Muſick* with reſpect to another: *Geometry*, unmoveable magnitude; *Sphærick*, moveable.

(*b*) Procl. in Eucl. l. 1.

Theſe Sciences conſider not Multitude and Magnitude ſimply, but in each of theſe that which is determinate: for Sciences conſider this abſtracted from infinite, that they they may not (in vain) attempt in each of theſe that which is infinite. When therefore the wiſe perſons ſay thus, we conceive it is not to be underſtood of that multitude which is in the ſenſible things themſelves, nor of that magnitude which we perceive in bodies, for the contemplation of theſe I think pertains to Phyſick, not to Mathematick. But becauſe the Maker of all things took Union and Diviſion, and Identity, and Alterity, and Station and Motion to compleat the ſoul, and framed it of theſe kinds, as *Timæus* teacheth, we muſt conceive that the Intellect, conſiſting according to the diverſity thereof, and the diviſion of proportions and multitude, and knowing it ſelf to be both one and many, propoſeth numbers to

(*c*) Τὸ καθ' ἑκάστην ... μέγεθος. Barrow renders otherwiſe.

to it self, and produceth them and the Arithmetical knowledg of them. According to the union of multitude and communication with it self, and colligation, it acquireth to it self Musick: for which reason Arithmetick excels Musick in antiquity, the soul it self being first divided by the Maker, then collected by proportions. And again establishing the operation within it self, according to its station, it produceth Geometry out of it self, and one figure, and the principles of all figures, but according to its motion, Sphærick: for she is moved by circles, but consists always in the same manner according to the causes of those circles, the straight and the circular: and for this reason likewise Geometry is precedent to Sphærick, as Station is to Motion.

But forasmnch as the Soul produced these Sciences, not looking on the excitation of Ideas, which is of infinite power, but upon the boundure of that which is limited (*d*) in their several kinds, therefore they say that they take infinite from multitude and magnitude, and are conversant only about finite: for the mind hath placed in her self all principles both of multitude and magnitude, because being wholly of like parts within her self, and being one and indivisible, and again divisible, and producing the world of Ideas, it doth participate essential finiteness and infiniteness from the things which it doth understand: But it understands according to that which is finite in them, and not according to the infiniteness of its life. This is the opinion of the *Pythagoreans*, and their division of the four Sciences. Hitherto *Proclus*.

(d) Read Kaτὰ γὰρ.

## SECT. I.

### *Arithmetick.*

(a) OF these four methods, Which is that which ought necessarily to be learned the first, (*viz.* that which is by nature præexistent to the rest and chiefest, being as it were principle and root, and mother of the rest)? *Arithmetick*: Not only for that it is præexistent before the rest in the Intellect of the efficient God, as an ornative and exemplary reason, according to which the Maker of the Universe caused all things to be made out of matter to its proper end, as after a παράδειγμα and archetypal pattern: but also because being (*b*) naturally first generated, it together takes away the rest with it self, but is not taken away with them. Thus Animal is first in nature before Man: for taking away animal, we take away man, but not in taking away man do we take away animal. (Of this *Nicomachus* discourseth more largely.]

As concerning Arithmetick, *Timæus* affirms that *Pythagoras addicted himself chiefly to it*: (*d*) Stobæus, that *he esteemed it above all others, and brought it to light, reducing it from the use of Trading*. (*e*) Hence *Isidore*, and others, style him *the Inventer of Arithmetick*, affirming (*f*) *he was the first who writ upon this subject amongst the* Græcians, *which was afterwards more copiously composed by* Nicomachus. *He studied this Science exceedingly, and so much did he prefer it above all the rest, that he conceived, The ultimate good of man to consist in the most exact Science of Numbers.*

(a) Nicom. 'Aριθμητικῆς εἰσαγωγῆς (so apply the Title, as a pag. 35. 44. 62. (b) cap. 4.

(b) Read πρωτοτόκως.

(d) Physic. 2. Chron. Orig. 3. 2. Phys. 2.

## CHAP. I.

### *Number, its kinds; the first kind, Intellectual in the Diviue Mind.*

(a) NUmber is of two kinds, the Intellectual, (or immaterial) and the Sciential. The Intellectual is that (*b*) *eternal substance* of Number, which *Pythagoras* in his Discourse concerning the Gods asserted to be the *principle most providential of all Heaven and Earth, and the nature that is betwixt them*. Moreover, it is *the root of Divine Beings, and of Gods, and of Dæmons*. This is that which he termed (*c*) *the principle, fountain, and root of all things*, and defined it to be *that which before all things exists in the Divine mind; from which and out of which all things are digested into order, and remain numbred by* (*d*) *an indissoluble series*.

For all things which are ordered in the world by nature according to an artificial course in part and in whole, appear to be distinguished and adorn'd by Providence and the All-creating Mind, according to Number; the Exemplar being established by applying (as the reason of the principle before the impression of things) the number præexistent in the Intellect of God, maker of the world. This only in intellectual, and wholly immaterial, really a substance according to which as being the most exact artificial reason, all things are perfected, Time, Heaven, Motion, the Stars, and their various revolutions.

(a) Nicom. Arith. (b) Iambl. vit. Pyth. cap. 38.

(c) Theon. Smyrn.

(d) Nicom. Arithm. cap. 5.

## CHAP. II.

### *The other kind of Number, Sciential; its Principles.*

SCiential Number is that which *Pythagoras* defines *the extension and production into act of the seminal reasons which are in the* (*a*) *Monad, or a heap of Monads, or a progression of multitude, beginning from Monad, and a regression ending in Monad*.

(a) Moderat. ap. Stob.

(*b*) The *Pythagoreans* affirmed the expositive terms, whereby even and odd numbers are understood, to be the principles of [Sciential] Numbers, as of three insensible things, the Triad; of four Insensibles, the Tetrad; and so of other numbers.

(b) Theon. Mathem. cap. 4. (c) Anon. Phot. vit. Pythag.

They make a difference betwixt the Monad and One, conceiving the Monad to be that which exists in Intellectuals; One, in numbers [or as (*d*) *Moderatus* expresseth it, *Monad* amongst numbers, One amongst things numbred, one body being divisible into infinite: thus Numbers and things numbred differ, as incorporeals and bodies] in like manner Two is amongst numbers. The Duad is indeterminate; Monad is taken according to equality and measure, Duad according to excess and defect: mean and measure cannot admit more and less, but excess and defect (seeing that they proceed to infinite) admit it, therefore they call the Duad indeterminate (*e*) holding Number to be infinite, not that number which is separate and incorporeal, but that which is (*f*) not separate from sensible things.

(d) Stob. Phys. 2.

(e) Themist. in Phys. 3.

(f) Arist. Phys. 3. 4.

CHAP.

## CHAP. III.

### *The Two kinds of Sciential Number, Odd and Even.*

(a) Eustrat. in Ethic. 1. Serv. in Eclog 8. (b) Nicom Introduct. Arithmet. cap. 6.

(a) OF [Sciential] Numbers *Pythagoras* asserted Two Orders, one bounded Odd, the other infinite, Even. (b) *Even Number* (according to the Pythagorick definition) is that which at once admits division into the greatest and the least; into the greatest Magnitudes, (for halves are the greatest parts) the least in multitude (for Two is the least number) according to the natural opposition of these two kinds. *Odd* is that which cannot suffer this, but is cut into Two unequals.

(c) Themist. in Phys. 3.

(c) Herein the *Pythagoreans* differ from the *Platonists*, in that they hold not all Number to be infinite, but onely the Even: for even Number is the cause of section into equal parts, which is infinite, and by its proper Nature generates infinity in those things in which it exists. But it is limited by the Odd; for that being applied to the Even, hinders its dissection into Two equal parts.

(d) Macrob. Saturn. 1. 13. (e) Serv. in Æned. 3. (f) Plutarch de Hom. poesi. (g) Serv. ad Æn. 3.

(d) Odd Number is said to have been found by *Pythagoras*, and to be of Masculine Virtue, and proper to the Cælestial Gods ((e) to whom they sacrificed always of that Number), and to be (f) full and perfect. Even, is indigent and imperfect, and Female, and (g) proper to the subterraneous Deities, to whom they sacrificed Even things.

(h) Anon. in Ptolem. Tert. bibl. lib. 1.

(h) Moreover, whatever is generated of Odd Number is Male, whatsoever of Even is Female; for Even Number is subject to Section and Passion, Odd is void of both, and is efficacious: wherefore they call one the Male, the other the Female.

(i) Anon. Theolog.

(i) A Number, which ariseth out of the Power and Multiplication of Even and Odd, is called ἀρρενόθηλυς, *Hermaphrodite.*

(k) Plut. de anima. procr.

This Opinion *Pythagoras* seems to have derived from *Zaratas*, his Master, (k) who call'd *Duad* the Mother of Number, *Monad* the Father; and therefore they said, That those Numbers which resemble *Monad* (*viz.* the Odd) are the best.

(l) Simplic. in phys. lib. 3.

(l) Odd Numbers they called *Gnomons*, because being added to Squares, they keep the same Figures; so *Gnomons* do in Geometry.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Symbolical Numbers.*

(a) Porph. p 32.

(a) THE *Pythagoreans* (saith *Moderatus* of *Gades*, who learnedly comprised their Opinions in Eleven Books) using the Mathematical Sciences as degrees of preparations to the contemplations of the things that are, were studiously addicted to the business of Numbers, for this reason. Seeing they could not clearly explain the first Forms and Principles in discourse (those being the most difficult to understand and express) had recourse to Numbers for the better explication of their Doctrine, imitating Geometricians, and such as teach to read. For as these going about to explain Letters and their Powers, recur to Marks, saying, That these are, as it were, the first Elements of Learning; nevertheless afterwards they tell us, That they are not the Elements, but that the true Elements are known by them. And as the Geometricians, not being able to express Incorporeal Forms in words, have recourse to the description of figures, saying, This △ is a Triangle, not meaning that this which falleth under the sight is a Triangle, but that which hath the same figure, and which is by the help thereof, and representeth the knowledge of a Triangle to the Mind. The same did the *Pythagoreans* in the first Reasons and Forms; for, seeing they could not in words express incorporeal forms, and first principles, they had recourse to demonstration by Numbers. And thus they called the Reason of Unity, and Indentity, and Equality, and the cause of amicable Conspiration, and of Sympathy, and of the Conservation of the Universe, which continueth according to the same, and in the same manner, ONE. For the one which is in particulars, is such united to the parts, and conspiring by participation of the first cause. But the two-fold Reason of diversity and inequality, and of every thing that is divisible and in mutation, and exists sometimes one way, sometimes another, they called *DUAD*, for the Nature of the *Duad* in particular things is such. These Reasons are not only according to the *Pythagoreans*, and not (acknowledg'd by) others, but we see that other Philosophers also have left certain unitive powers, which comprize all things in the Universe; and amongst them there are certain Reasons of Equality, dissimilitude and diversity. Now these Reasons, that the way of teaching might be more perspicuous, he called by the names of *Monad* and *Duad*; but it is all one amongst them if it be called biform, or æqualiform, or diversiform.

The same Reason is in other Numbers, for every one is ranked according to some powers. In the Nature of things exists something which hath beginning, middle and end. To such a form and nature they attributed the number Three, saying, That whatsoever hath a middle is triform; so they called every perfect thing. And if any thing be perfect, they affirm it maketh use of this principle, and is adorned according to it; which, since they could not name otherwise, they made use of the term *Triad* to express it; and when they endeavour to bring us to the knowledg thereof, they lead us to it by the form of this *Triad.* The same in other Numbers.

These therefore are the Reasons, according to which the foresaid Numbers were placed; but these that follow are comprehended under one form and power, which they call *Decad*, q. *Dechad* [from comprehension.] Wherefore they say, that Ten is a perfect number, even the most perfect of all numbers, comprehending in it all difference of numbers, all Reasons, Species and Proportions. For if the Nature of the Universe be defined according to the Reasons and Proportions of Numbers; and that which is produced, and increased, and perfected, proceed according to the Reasons of Numbers; and the *Decad* comprehends every Reason of Number, and every Proportion, and all Species: Why should not Nature it self be termed by the Name of Ten, the

the moſt perfect Number? Hitherto *Moderatus.*

Thus from the ſymbolical uſe of numbers proceeded a multiplicious variety of names, attributed to them by *Pythagoras* and his followers. Of which we ſhall ſpeak more particularly, beginning with the *Monad.*

## CHAP. V.

### *The* Monad.

Moderatus and Stob. Phyſ. 1. 2.

THE *Monad* is a quantity, which in the decreaſe of multitude, being deprived of all number, receiveth manſion and ſtation; for below Quantity, *Monad* cannot retreat. The *Monad* therefore ſeems to be ſo called, either from ſtanding, or from remaining (μένειν) always in the ſame condition, or from its ſeparation (μεμονῶσθαι) from multitude.

To the *Monad* are attributed theſe Names.

*Mind*, (*Nicom. Phot. Anon. Theolog.*) becauſe the Mind is ſtable, and every way alike, and hath the preheminence. (*Alex. Aphrod. in Metaph.*)

*Hermaphrodite*, (*Nicom.*) it is both Male and Female, Odd and Even, (*Macrob. in Somn. Scip.* 1. 6.) it partakes of both Natures; being added to the even, it makes odd, to the odd, even. (*Ariſtot. in Pythagorico*, cited by *Theon. Smyrn. Mathem.* cap. 5.)

*God*, becauſe it is the beginning and end of all, It ſelf having neither beginning nor end. (*Macrob.*)

*Good*, for ſuch is the Nature of one. (*Porphyr. vit. Pyth.*)

*Matter, receptacle of all*, (*Nicom.*) becauſe it produceth *Duad*, which is properly Matter. (*Anon. Theol.*)

*Chaos*, *Confuſion*, *Contemperation*, *Obſcurity*, *Chaſme*, *Tartarus*, *Styx*, *Horrour*, *Impermiſtion*, *Subterraneous Barathrum*, *Lethe*, *Rigid Virgin*, *Atlas*, *Axis*, *Sume*, *Pyralios*, *Morpho.* (*Nicom. Anon.*)

*Tower of Jupiter*, (Nicom) *Cuſtody of Jupiter*, *Throne of Jupiter*, (Simplic.) from the great power which the Center hath in the Univerſe, being able to reſtrain the general Circular Motion, as if the Cuſtody of the Maker of all things were conſtituted therein. (*Procl. in Timæum.* com. 4.

*Seminal Reaſon*, (*Nicom.*) becauſe this one onely is one to the Retractours, and is alone, and the reſt are procreated of it, and it is the onely Seminary of all Numbers. (*Mart. Capel.* 7.)

*Apollo Prophet.* (Nicom.)

*Prometheus*, as being Author of Life. (*Anon. Theol.*

*Geniture*, becauſe without it no number hath being. (*Anon. Theol.*)

*Subſtance*, (Theolog.) becauſe Subſtance is primary. (*Alex. Aphr. Met.* 1.)

*Cauſe of Truth*, *Simple Exemplar*, *Conſtitution of Symphony.* (Anon. Theolog.)

In Greater and Leſſer, *Equal*; in Intention and Remiſſion, *Middle*; in Multitude, *Mean*, (*Theolog.*) in Time, *Now*, the preſent, (*Anon. Theolog*) becauſe it conſiſts in one part of time which is always preſent. (*Macrob. in Somn.* 1. 6.)

*Ship*, *Chariot*, *Friend*, *Life*, *Beatitude.* (Anon. Theolog.)

*Form*, (or *Species*) becauſe it circumſcribes, comprehends, and terminates, (*Anon.*) and becauſe it produceth the reſt of the effects. (*Mart. Capel*)

*Jupiter*, (*Anon. Procl. in Tim.*) becauſe he is Father and Head of the Gods, (*Mart. Cap.*) whence the Pythagorick Verſe:

*Hear noble Number, Sire of gods and men.*

*Love*, *Concord*, *Piety*, *Friendſhip*, becauſe it is ſo connected, that it cannot be divided into parts. (*Mart. Cap.*)

*Proteus*, as containing all forms. (*Anon.*)

*Mnemoſyne*, (Anonym.)

*Veſta*, or *Fire.* (*Plut. in Numa.*) For the nature of *Monad*, like *Veſta*, is ſeated in the midſt of the World, and keeps that Seat, enclining to no ſide.

*Polyonymous.* (Heſych.)

## CHAP. VI.

### *The* Duad.

THE Names of the *Duad* are theſe,

*Genius*, *Evil*, (Plut. Plac. Phil. 1. 3.)

*Darkneſs*, *Siniſter*, *Unequal*, *Unſtable*, *Moveable.* (Porphyr. vit. Pythag.)

*Boldneſs*, (Nicom.) *Fortitude*, (Anon.) *Contention*, (Plut. de Iſid. & Oſird.) becauſe it proceeds to action, and firſt ſeparates it ſelf from the *Monad.* (*Anon.*)

*Matter*, (*Nicom.*) becauſe indefinite; indeterminate *Duad*, proceeds from *Monad* as Matter. The cauſe of tumour and diviſion. (*Simplic. Phyſ.* 1.)

*Cauſe of Diſſimilars.* (Nicom.)

*Partition betwixt Multitude and Monad.* (Nicom.)

*Equal*, becauſe, in compoſition and permiſtion, this only makes Equality. (*Nicom.*) Two and two are equal to twice two.

*Unequal*, *Defect*, *Superfluity*, (*Nicom.*) according to the motion of matter. *Anon.*

*Onely inform*, *Indefinite*, *Indeterminate*, (Nicom.) becauſe from a Triangle and Triad, Polygones are actually procreated to infinite; in *Monad* they exiſt all potentially together: but of two right Lines or Angles is made no Figure. (*Anon*)

*Onely principle of Purity*, yet not even, nor evenly even, nor unevenly even, nor evenly uneven. (*Nicom.*)

*Erato*, (*Nicom.*) becauſe through love applying it ſelf to *Monad*, as the ſpecies it procreated the reſt of the effects. (*Anon.*)

*Harmony*, (Nicom.)

*Tolerance*, (Nicom.) becauſe it firſt underwent ſeparation. (*Anon.*)

*Root, but not in act.* (Nicom.)

*Feet of Fountain-abounding Ida.* (Nicom.)

*Top*, *Phanes*, (Nicom.)

*Juſtice*, becauſe of its two equal parts. (*Anon. Mart. Cap.*)

*Isis*, *Nature*, *Rhea*, *Jove's mother*, *Fountain of distribution*, *Phrygia*, *Lydia*, *Dindymene*, *Ceres*, *Eleusinia*, (Nicom.)

*Diana*, (Nicom.) because the Moon takes many Settings from all the fixed Stars, and because she is forked, and called Half-moon. (*Anon.*)

*Love*, *Declinata*, *Aeria*, *Asteria*, *Disamus*, *Station*, *Venus*, *Dione*, *Micheia*, *Cythereia*, *Ignorance*, *Ignobility*, *Falsity*, *Permission*, *Alterity*, *Contention*, *Diffidence*, *Fat*, *Death*, (Nicom.) *Impulse*. (Anon.)

*Opinion*, because it is true and false. (*Anon. Alex. Aphrod. Met.* 1. *Philop. ibid.*)

*Motion*, *Generation*, *Mutation*, *Division*, Anon (*Meursius* reads Διακοσις, Dijudication) *Longitude*, (Anon.) or rather, *first Longitude*, (Simplic.) *Augmentation*, *Composition*, *Communion*. (Anon.)

*Misfortune*, *Sustentation*, because it first suffered separation, (*Anon. Martian.*) *Discord*. (*Plut. de Isid. & Osirid.*)

*Imposition*. (Hesych.)

*Marriage*, *Juno*; *Juno* being both Wife and Sister to *Jupiter*. (*Mart. Capel. Eulog. in Somn. Scip.*)

*Soul*, from motion hither and thither. (*Philop. Metaph.* 1.)

*Science*, for all demonstration, and all Credit of Science, and all Syllogism Collects from some things granted, the thing in question, and easily demonstrateth another; the comprehension of which things is Science. (*Plut. de Plac.* 1. 3.)

*Maia*. (Nicom apud Phot.)

## CHAP. VII.

### *The* Triad.

(a) THE Triad is the first number, actually odd, and the first perfect number, and middle, and proportion. It causeth the power of the Monad to proceed to act and extension; it is the first and proper Coacervation of Unities. (b) For which Reason *Pythagoras* said, *Apollo* gave Oracles from a Tripod; and he advised to offer Libation Three times.

(a) *Anon.* Theolog.

(b) *Jamb.* vit. cap. 28.

The Names of the Triad are these:

*First Latitude*, not simply Latitude. (*Simp. de Anim.* 1.)

*Saturnia*, *Latona*, *Cornucopiæ*, *Ophion*, *Thetis*, *Harmonia*, *Hecate*, *Erana*, *Charitia*, *Polyhymnia*, *Pluto*, *Arctus*, *Helice*. Not descending to the Ocean, *Damatrame*, *Dioscoria*, *Metis*, *Tridume*, *Triten*, *President of the Sea*, *Tritogenia*, *Achelous*, *Naïus*, *Agyieptza*, (perhaps ἀγυιεπτζα, as before, *Thetis*) *Curetis*, *Cratæis*, *Symbenia*, *Mariadne*, *Gorgonia*, *Phorcia*, *Trisamus*, *Lydius*. (Nicom.)

*Marriage*, *Friendship*, *Peace*, *Concord*, (*Nicom.*) because it collects and unites, not similars, but contraries. (*Anon.*)

*Justice*, (Nicom.)

*Prudence*, *Wisdom*; because men order the present, foresee the future, and learn Experience by the past. (*Anon.*)

*Piety*, (Anon.) *Temperance*, (Anatol.) All Virtues depend upon this number, and proceed from it.

It is the *Mind*; It is *cause of Wisdom and Understanding*. It is *Knowledge* which is most proper to number.

It is the *power and composition of all Musick*, and much more of *Geometry*: it hath all *power in Astronomy*, and the nature and knowledg of Celestials, containing and impelling it to the production of substance.

(c) *The Cube of this number* Pythagoras *affirmed to have the power of the Lunar Circle, in as much as the Moon goeth round her Orb in* 27. *days, which the Number* Ternio, *in* Greek Τεμας, *the Triad gives in its Cube.*

(c) Agel.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *The* Tetrad.

(a) THE Tetrad was much honoured by the *Pythagoreans*, and (b) esteemed the most perfect number, the (c) primary and primogenious, which they called the Root of all things, and the Fountain of Nature.

(a) Procl. in Hesiod.
(b) Lucian. lapsu in salut. adm.
(c) Irenæus 1. cap. 1.

(d) The Tetrads are all intellectual, and have an emergent Order, and (for that Reason) the Empyreal Præfecture; they go round about the World, as the *Empyreum* passeth through all.

(d) Simpl. ad Phys.

Even God himself *Pythagoras* expressed by the Tetrad.

(e) How God is a Tetrad, you will clearly find in the Sacred Discourse ascribed to *Pythagoras*, wherein God is the number of numbers. For if all Beings subsist by his eternal Counsel, it is manifest, that number in every species of Beings depends upon their Causes; the first number is there, from thence derived hither: The determinate stop of number is the Decad, for he who would reckon further, must return to 1, 2, 3. and number a second Decad; in like manner a third, to make up 30. and so on, till having numbred the tenth Decad, he comes to a 100. Again, he reckons from a 100. in the same manner, and so may proceed to infinite, by revolution of the Decad. Now the Tetrad is the power of the Decad; for, before we arrive at the perfection of the Decad, we find an united perfection in the Tetrad, the Decad being made up by addition of 1, 2, 3, 4.

(e) Hierocl. aur. carm.

Moreover, the Tetrad is an Arithmetical mean betwixt 1 and 7, equally exceeding, and exceeded in number. It wants 3 of 7, and exceeds 1 by 3. Monad, as being the Mother of numbers, contains all their powers within it self. The Hebdomad, as being motherless, and a Virgin, possesseth the second place in dignity, for it is not made up of any number within the Decad, as 4 is of twice two, 6 of twice 3, 8 of twice 4, 9 thrice 3, 10 of twice 5. Neither doth it make up any number within the Decad, as 2 makes 4, 3 makes 6, 5 makes 10. But the Tetrad lying betwixt the unbegotten Monad, and the motherless Hebdomad, comprehends all powers, both of the productive and produced numbers; for this of all numbers under 10, is made of a certain number, and makes a certain number; the Duad doubled makes a Tetrad, the Tetrad doubled makes 8.

Fe-

Beſides, the firſt ſolid figure is found in a Tetrad, for a point is correſpondent to Monad, a line to Duad, [becauſe drawn from one point to another] a Superficies to Triad, (becauſe it is the moſt ſimple of all rectiline figures) but a ſolid properly agrees with the Tetrad. For the firſt Pyramis is in a Tetrad, the Baſe is triangular, ſo that at the bottom is 3, at the top 1.

Furthermore, the judicative power in things are Four, Mind, Science, Opinion, and Senſe; for all beings are dijudicated either by Mind, or Science, or Opinion, or Senſe: [(*f*) for which reaſon *Pythagoras* affirmed, the Soul of man to conſiſt of a Tetrad.]

(*f*) *Plut.* plac. phil. lib. 1. cap.

Finally, the Tetrad connects all beings, of Elements, Numbers, Seaſons of the Year, Coævous Society; neither can we name any thing, which depends not on the Tetractys, as its Root and Principle: for it is, as we ſaid, the maker and cauſe of all things; intelligible God, Author of Celeſtial and ſenſible Good. The knowledge of theſe things was delivered to the *Pythagoreans* by *Pythagoras* himſelf. Hitherto *Hierocles*.

For this Reaſon the Word *Tetractys* was uſed by *Pythagoras*, and his Diſciples, as a great Oath, who likewiſe, out of reſpect to their Maſter, forbearing his Name, did ſwear by the perſon that communicated the *Tetractys* to them.

*Eternal Nature's Fountain I atteſt,*
*Who the* Tetractys *to our Soul expreſt.*

(*g*) In procr. in fec. *Timæum.*

(*g*) But *Plutarch* interprets this *Tetractys* (which he ſaith was alſo called κόσμος, World) to be 36, which conſiſts of the firſt four odd numbers, thus:

1 } 3 2 }
3 } 7 4 }
5 } 11 6 }
7 } 15 8 }
3 }
7 }
11 } 36
15 }

The Names of the Tetrad are theſe;

*Another Goddeſs, Multideity, Pantheos, Fountain of natural Effects.* (Nicom.)

*Key-keeper of Nature*, becauſe the univerſal conſtitution cannot be without it; to theſe Sciences it conferreth conſtitution and ſettlement, and reconcileth them: yea, it is Nature it ſelf and Truth. (*Nicom.*)

*Nature of Æolus.* (Nicom.) from its various property. (*Anon.*)

*Hercules, Impetuoſity, moſt ſtrong, Maſculine, Ineffeminate, Mercury, Vulcan, Bacchus, Soritas, Maiades, Erinnius, Socus, Dioſcorus, Baſſarius, Two-mother'd, of Feminine Form, of Virile performance, Bacchation.* (Nicom.)

*Harmony.* (Nicom.) becauſe it hath a *ſeſquitertia.* (Anon.)

*Urania* the Muſe. (*Nicom.*) *World.* (*Plut.*)

*Body*, as a Point, is 1, a Line 2, a Superficies 3.

*Soul*, becauſe it conſiſts of Mind, Science, Opinion and Senſe. (*Plut. Plac. Phil.* 1. 3.)

*Firſt Profundity*, as it is a body. (*Simplic. de Anim.* 1.)

*Juſtice.* The Property of Juſtice is Compenſation and Equality. This Number is the firſt evenly even; and whatſoever is the firſt in any kind, is moſt that thing. This, they ſaid, was the Tetrad, becauſe being quadrate, it is divided into Equals, and is it ſelf equal. (*Alex. Aphrod. Metaph.* 5.)

## CHAP. IX.

### *The Pentad.*

(*a*) THE Pentad is the firſt complexion of both kinds of number, even and odd, two and three: Its names theſe: (*a*) *Theon.* Smyrn. c. 44.

Ἁρμονία, *Reconciliation.* (Nicom.) becauſe the fifth Element, *Æther*, is free from the diſturbances of the other four. (*Anon.*)

*Alteration, Light*, becauſe it changed that which was ſeparated threefold, into the Identity of its ſphear, moving circularly, and ingenerating light. (*Anon.*)

*Juſtice*, (*Nicom.*) becauſe it divides 10 into two equal parts. (*Johan. Port. in Heſ.*)

*The leaſt and top of livelihood.* (Nicom.)

*Nemeſis.* (Nicom.) becauſe it diſtributes conveniently Celeſtial, Divine, and natural Elements. (*Anon.*)

*Bubaſtia.* (Nicom.) becauſe worſhipp'd at *Bubaſtus* in *Ægypt.* (Anon.)

*Venus, Gamelia, Androgynia, Cytherea, Zoneia:* (Nicom.) *Marriage.* (Anon.) becauſe it connects a maſculine and feminine number (*Anon. Plut. de* Εἰ. *delph.*) conſiſting of 2. the firſt even, and 3. the firſt odd (*Alex. Aphrod. in Metaph. Protoſp. in Heſiod.*)

Κυκλοῦχος, Præſident of Circles. (*Nicom.*)

*Semi-goddeſs*, (Nicom.) not only as being the half of 10. (which is divine, but for that it is placed in the middle. (*Anon.*)

*Tower of Jupiter.*

*Didymæa*, or *Twin.* (Nicom.) becauſe it divides 10 into two. (*Anon.*)

*Firm Axis.* (Nicom.)

*Immortal, Pallas*, implying the fifth Eſſence. (*Anon.*)

Καρδιακὸς, *Cordial.* (Nicom.) from ſimilitude with the heart. (*Anon.*)

*Providence*, becauſe it makes unequals equal. (*Anon.*)

Τρόφος, *Sound*, the fifth being the firſt diaſteme. (*Plut. de An. procr. e Tim.*)

*Nature*, becauſe multiply'd by it ſelf, it returns into it ſelf. For as Nature receiving Wheat in ſeed, and introducing many forms by altering and changing it, at laſt returns it Wheat, at the end of the whole mutation reſtoring the beginning: ſo, whilſt other numbers multiply'd in themſelves, are increaſed and end in other numbers, only 5 and 6 multipli'd by themſelves, repreſent, and retain themſelves. (*Plut. de* Εἰ *delph.*

This number repreſents all ſuperiour and inferiour beings; for it is either the ſupreme God, or the Mind born of God, wherein are contained the Species of all things, or the Soul of the World, which is the fountain of all Souls, or Celeſtials, down to us; or it is Terreſtial Nature, and ſo the Pentad is repleat with all things. (*Macrob. in Somn. Scip.* 1. 6)

## CHAP. X.

### *The Hexad.*

THE Pythagoreans held the number Six to be perfect, respecting (as *Clem. Alexandrinus* conceives) the creation of the World according to the Prophet. The names of the Hexad, are these;

*Form of Form, Articulation of the Universe, Maker of the Soul, Harmony*; (Nicom.) because it hath the power to ingenerate a vital habit; Whence it is called *Hexad*, ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως: and *Harmony*, because all Souls are harmonick, (Anon.)

Ὁλομέλεια, *perfection of Parts*, (Nicom.) or (as Anon.) Ὁλομέλεια. The Pythagoreans called it thus, imitating *Orpheus*, either as being the only number under ten, which is whole and equal in its parts; or because the whole Universe is divided into parts by it. (Anon.)

*Venus*, (Nicom.) because it procreates harmony: 6. to 12. is a diapason concord; 6. to 9. hemiolos; 6. to 8. epitrites; that is a diatessaron concord: whence it is named *Venus* who was the Mother of Harmony. (Mart. cap. 7.)

Ζυγία, (Nicom.) Γαμήλια, (Nic.) Γάμος, *Marriage*, (Clem. Strom. 5.) because of the mixtion of the first even and first odd. (Plut. de An. procr. Sec Tim.): For as Marriage procreates by a male and female; so this number is generated of 3. which is odd and called male, and of 2. which is even and called female; for twice 3. make 6. (Clem. Alexand. Strom. 6.) It produceth Children like the Parents; (Theon. Smyr. Mathem. 45.)

Ζυγίτις, Φιλοτησία, (Nicom.) or Φιλώσις, *Conciliation*, because it conciliates the male and female: (Anon.)

Ὑγιία, *Health*; (Nicom. Anon.) a triple triangle which being alternately conjoyned within it self ✡ constituteth a figure of five lines; they used it as a Symbol to those of their own sect, and called it ὑγιία, *Health*. (Lucian. prolapf. in fal. admiff.)

Ἄκμων, *Anvile*; (Nicom.) qu. ἀκάματον, unwearied; because the principal triangles of the mundane Elements have share in it, being each of them Six, if measured by three perpendiculars. (Anon.)

Ἑκατηβόλιστις, being compounded of and as it were βολήσασαν, the triad, which is called Hecate, (Anon. Theol.)

*Trioditis*; from the nature of that Goddess, or because the Hexad first assumes the three motions of intervals, being divided into two parts, each of which is on each side. (Anon.)

Διχοσία, the distribution of all time, of things above the earth, and under the earth, which is done by the Hexad in the Zodiack; or because Time is of the nature of the Triad, consisting of three parts, and the Hexad consists of two Triads. (Anon.)

*Persæa, Triform* (Nicom.)

*Amphitrite*; (Nicom.) because it hath a Triad on each side. (Anon.)

*Neighbour to Justice*, (Nicom.) as being nearest to 5. (which is named Justice. (Anon.)

*Thalia*, the Muse; (Nicom.) because of the harmony of the rest. (Anon.)

*Panacæa*, (Nicom.) in respect to health mentioned already; or, *q. Panarceia*, omni-sufficience, endued with parts sufficient for totality. (Anon.)

Μεσευθύς, *Middle-right*, being in the midst betwixt 2 and 10, æquidistant from both. (Clem. Alexandr. Strom. 6.)

*World*, because the World, as the Hexad, is often seen to consist of contraries by harmony. (Anon.)

## CHAP. XI.

### *The Heptad.*

(a) THE Heptad was so called, *qu.* σεπτὰς σεβασμῶ ἄξιος, worthy of veneration; for (b) *Pythagoras* held this number to be most proper to Religion. (c) He also held, that it is perfect; and (d) thence it was, (as the Pythagoreans conceived) that creatures born in the seventh month live.

(a) Nicom. apud. Phot. Anon Macrob. in Somn. Scip. (b) Apud. Metam. lib. 15. (c) Alex. Aphrod. Probl. 2. Quæst. 47. (d) Jul. Paul. recept. sent. lib. 4 cit. fin.

The names of the Heptad, are these.

*Fortune, Occasion*; (Nicom.) because it occurs casually and opportunely to every thing. (Anon.) Whatsoever is best amongst sensible things, by which the seasons of the year and their periods, are orderly compleat, participates of the Hebdomad, (Philo. de die sept.) the Moon having 7 days measures all time. (Johan. Philop. in Metaphys. 7.)

Ἀμήτωρ, *Motherless, Virgin*, (Hieroc. in aur. car. Nicom.) *Minerva*, as being a Virgin, unmarried, not born of a Mother (odd number), nor of a Father, (even number); but out of the Crown or top of the Father of all, Monad. (Anon. Chalcid. in Tim. Theon. Smyrn. c. 45.)

*Mars*, Nicom. Anon. Ἀκρέωσις. (Nicom.)

*Ageleia*, (Nicom.) an epithet of *Minerva*. (Hesych.)

Ἀτρυτώνη. (Nicom.)

Φυλακιτὶς, *Custody*, (Nicom.) because the Stars which guard the Universe are seven. (Anon.)

Ὀβριμοπάτρα, *Tritogenia* Γλαυκῶπις, Ἀγελαμόνεια, Παντυχία, Ἐργάνη, Πολυαρήτη, Ὁλομέλεια; *Stock of Amalphea, Ægis, Osiris, Dream, Voice, Sound, Clio* the Muse, *Judgment, Adrastia*. (Anon.)

Τελίσφορος, *leading to the end*; (Anon.) because by it all are led to the end. (Philo. de Mund. opif.)

## CHAP. XII.

### *The Ogdoad.*

THE Ogdoad, they said, was the first Cube, and the only number evenly even under ten. (Anon.)

The Names of it.

*Panarmonia*, (Nicom.) because of its excellent convenience. (Anon.)

*Cadmæa, Mother, Rhea*, Θηλυτόκος, *Cibele, Dindymene*, Πολιοῦχος, *Love Friendship, Council, Prudence, Orcia, Themis, Law*, Ἡλιτόμπια, *Euterpe* the Muse, Ἀσφάλεια, Ἔδεσμα, (Anon.) *Neptune*, (Plut. de Isid. & Osirid.

*Justice*,

*Juſtice*, becauſe it is firſt reſolved into numbers, eſpecially equal. (Macrob. in Somn. Scip. 1. 5.)

## CHAP. XIII.

### *The Ennead.*

THe Ennead is the firſt ſquare of an odd number. Its names, theſe:

*Ocean*, *Horizon*; becauſe number hath nothing beyond it, but it revolves all within it. (Anon.)

*Prometheus*, becauſe it ſuffers no number to out-go it, and juſtly, being a perfect ternary. (Anon.)

*Concord*, (Nicom. Anon.) *Peraſia.* (Anon.) *Halius*, (Nicom. Anon.) becauſe it doth not permit the conſent of number to be diſperſed beyond it, but collects it. (Anon.)

Ἀνακλὰ, becauſe of the revolution to Monad. (Anon.)

Ὁμολωγὶς, becauſe it is the firſt odd Triangle. (Anon.)

*Vulcan*, becauſe to it, as conflature and relation, there is no return. (Anon.)

*Juno*, becauſe the ſphear of the Air hath the ninth place. (Anon.)

*Siſter and Wife to Jupiter*, from conjunction with unity. (Anon.)

Ἐκάεργος, becauſe there is no ſhooting beyond it (Anon.)

*Pæan*, *Nyſſeis*, *Agyica*, *Ennalios*, *Agelia*, *Tritogegenia*, *Suada*, *Curetis*, *Proſerpina*, *Hyperion*, *Terpſichore* the Muſe. (Nicom. Anon.)

Τελεσφόρος, Τέλειος, becauſe nine months compleat the Infant.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *The Decad.*

(a) Athenag. apolog. pro. Chriſt.

(b) Plut. plac. l. 3

(a) TEN, according to the Pythagoreans, is the greateſt number, as well for that it is the Tetractys, as that it comprehends all arithmetical and harmonical proportions. (b) *Pythagoras* ſaid, that ten is the nature of number: becauſe all Nations, Greeks, and Barbarians, reckon to it; and when they arrive at it, return to the Monad.

Names of the Decad.

*World*; becauſe according to the Decad, all things are ordered in general and particular. (Anon.) The Decad comprehends all numbers, the World all forms; (Philop. Metaph. 1.) for the ſame reaſon termed alſo Sphear. (Anon.)

*Heaven*, (Nicom.) becauſe it is the moſt perfect term of number, as Heaven the receptacle of all things. (Anon.) The Decad being a perfect number, the Pythagoreans deſired to apply to it thoſe things which are contained in Heaven, where finding but 9, (the Orbs, the ſeven Planets, and the Heaven of fixed Stars, with the earth) they added an Antichthon, (another earth oppoſite to this) and made Ten; by this means they accommodated them to the Decad. (Pachymer. in Metaphyſ. 3.)

*Fate*, (Nicom.) becauſe there is no property neither in numbers nor beings, according to the compoſition of number, which is not ſeminally contained in the Decad. (Anon.)

*Age*, (Nicom.)

*Power*, (Nicom.) from the command it hath over all other Numbers. (Anon.)

*Faith*, *Neceſſity*. (Anon.)

*Atlas*; for as *Atlas* is fabled to ſuſtain Heaven with his ſhoulders, ſo the Decad all the Sphears, as the Diameter of them all. (Anon.)

*Unwearied*, *God*, *Phanes*, *Sun*, *Urania*, *Memory*, *Mnemoſyne*. (Anon.)

*Firſt ſquare*, becauſe made of the firſt four numbers, 1 2 3 4. (Chalcid. in Tim.)

Κλειδοῦχος, as the magazine and confinement of all proportions; (Anon.) or, Κλειδοῦχος, becauſe other numbers branch out of it. (Cedren.)

Παντέλεια, becauſe it perfects all number, comprehends within it ſelf all the nature of even and odd, moved and unmoved, good and ill (Anon.)

## CHAP. XV.

### *Divination by Numbers.*

UPon the near affinity which *Pythagoras* (following *Orpheus*) conceived to be betwixt the gods and numbers, he collected a kind of Arithmomanty; not practiſed by himſelf only, but communicated to his diſciples, as is manifeſt from (a) *Jamblichus*, who cites this fragment of *the Sacred Diſcourſe*, a Book aſcribed to him: *Concerning the gods of* Pythagoras, *ſon of* Mneſarchus, *I learned this when I was initiated at* Libeth *in* Thrace, Aglaophemus *adminiſtring the rites to me*; Orpheus *ſon of* Calliope, *inſtructed by his mother in the Pangæan mountain, ſaid, That number is an eternal ſubſtance, the moſt provident principle of the Univerſe, Heaven, and Earth, and middle Nature; likewiſe the root of Divine beings, and of gods and dæmons.* (a) vit. Pyth. cap. 28.

*Hence* (ſaith *Jamblichus*) *it is manifeſt, that* Pythagoras *received of Numbers the determinate eſſence of the gods, from the traditions of* Orpheus. *By theſe Numbers he framed a wonderful divination and ſervice of the gods, of neareſt affinity to numbers, as may be evinced from hence, (for it is requiſite to give an inſtance for confirmation of what we ſay,) Whereas* Abaris *performed thoſe kind of ſacrifices to which he was accuſtomed, and practiſed diligently divination, after all the ways of the* Barbarians, *by Victims, principally of* Cocks, *(whoſe entrals they conceived to be moſt exact for inſpection)* Pythagoras *willing not to take him off from his ſtudy of truth; yet to direct him by a ſafer way, without blood and ſlaughter, (moreover eſteeming the Cock ſacred to the Sun) taught him to find out all truth by the ſcience of Arithmetick.* Thus *Jamblichus.* (b) And elſe-where he ſaith, that *Pythagoras, inſtead of the art of divining by ſacrifices, taught him that kind of prediction which is by Numbers, as conceiving that to be more ſacred and divine, and more agreeable to the celeſtial numbers of the gods.* (a) vit. Pyth. cap. 19.

This hint ſome have taken to impoſe upon the world, under the name of *Pythagoras*, an Onomantick kind of Arithmetick, aſſigning particular numbers *to the letters of the Alphabet, to the Planets,*

*Planets, to the days of the Week, and to the Signs of the Zodiack*; thereby resolving questions concerning *Nativities, victory, life, or death, journeys, prosperity or adversity*; as is set down by (c) *Flud*, who adds, *Apollonius hath delivered another way of divination, according to the Pythagorick Doctrine; affirming, that future things may be prognosticated by virtue of a Wheel invented by* Pythagoras, *whereby is treated of life and death, of fugitives, of litigious business, of victories, of the sex of children unborn, and infinite others of the like kind. But concerning the exposition of the Wheel, and the true position of Numbers, therein the ancient Authors have written very inconstantly, so as the truth of its composition cannot be comprehended otherwise than by conjecture.* What ancient Authors he means, I know not; the citation of *Apollonius*, I doubt to be no'less suppositious, than the Wheel it self, which (d) *Trithemius* and others acknowledg to be an invention of later times.

(c) Microcosm.

(d) *Antip.* Mal. 1. 3.

## SECT. II.

### *Musick.*

(a) THE *Pythagoreans* define Musick an apt composition of contraries, and an union of many, and consent of differents. For it not only co-ordinates rythms and modulation, but all manner of Systems. It's end is to unite, and aptly conjoyn. God is the reconciler of things discordant, and this is his chiefest work according to Musick and Medicine, to reconcile enmities. In Musick, say they, consists the agreement of all things, and Aristocracy of the Universe: For, what is harmony in the world, in a City is good Government, in a Family Temperance.

(a) *Theon. Smyrn. Math.* cap. 1.

(b) Of many Sects (saith *Ptolemais*) that were conversant about harmony, the most eminent were two, the *Pythagorick* and *Aristoxenian*; [(c) *Pythagoras* dijudicated it by reason, *Aristoxenus* by sense.] (d) The *Pythagoreans* not crediting the relation of hearing in all those things, wherein it is requisite, adapted reasons to the differences of sounds, contrary to those which are perceived by the senses; so that by this critery (reason) they gave occasion of calumny to such as were of a different opinion.

(b) *Porphyr.* in Harm. *Ptolomæi.* (c) *Plut.* de Mus. *Porph.* in *Ptol.* Harm. &c. (d) *Ptolem.* Harmonic c. 2.

(e) Hence the *Pythagoreans* named that which we now call Harmonick, Canonick; not from the Canon or Instrument, as some imagine, but from rectitude, since reason finds out that which is right, by using Harmonical Canons or Rules. Even of all sorts of Instruments, framed by Harmonical Rules, (Pipes, Flutes, and the like) they call the Exercise, Canonick; which although it be not Canonick, yet is so termed, because it is made according to the reasons and Theorems of Canonick. The Instrument therefore seems to be rather denominated from its Canonick affection. A Canonick in general is a Harmonick, who is conversant by ratiocination, about that which consists of Harmony. Musicians and Harmonicks differ; Musicians are those Harmonicks who begin from sense, but Canonicks are *Pythagoreans*, who are also called Harmonicks; both sorts are termed by a general name, Musicians.

(e) *Ptolemais* loco citato apud *Porphyr.*

## CHAP. I.

### *Voice, its kinds.*

(a) OF human voice, they who are of the *Pythagorean* School, said, That there are (as of one Genus) two Species. One they properly named Continuous, the other, Diastematick, (intermissive) framing appellations from the accidents pertaining to each. The Diastematick they conceived to be that which is sung, and rests upon every note, and manifests the mutation which is in all its parts, which is inconfused, and divided, and disjoined, by the magnitudes which are in the several sounds, as coacerved, but not commixt; the parts of the voice being apply'd mutually to one another, which may easily be separated and distinguished, and are not destroy'd together. Such is the Musical kind of voice, which to the knowing, manifests all sounds, of what magnitude every one participates: For if a man use it not after this manner, he is not said to sing, but to speak.

(a) Nicom. Harm. cap.

The other kind they conceived to be *Continuous*, by which we discourse one to another, and read, and are not constrained to use any manifest distinct tensions of sounds, but connect the discourse, till we have finished that which we intended to speak. For if any man in disputing, or apologizing, or reading, make distinct magnitudes, in the several sounds, taking off, and transferring the voice from one to another, he is not said to read, but to sing.

Human voice having in this manner two parts, they conceived, that there are two places, which each in passing possesseth. The place of Continuous voice, which is by nature infinite in magnitude, receiveth its proper term from that, wherewith the speaker began, until he ends, that is the place from the beginning of his speech to his conclusive silence; so that the variety thereof is in our power. But the place of Diastematick voice is not in our power, but natural; and this likewise is bounded by different effects. The beginning is that which is first heard, the end that which is last pronounced; for from thence we begin to perceive the magnitude of sounds, and their mutual commutations, from whence first our hearing seems to operate; whereas it is possible there may be some more obscure sounds perfected in nature, which we cannot perceive or hear. As for instance, in things weigh'd, there are some bodies which seem to have no weight, as Straws, Bran, and the like; but when as by apposition of such bodies, some beginning of ponderosity appears, then we say, They first come within the compass of Statick. So, when a low sound increaseth by degrees, that which first of all may be perceived by the ear, we make the beginning of the place which musical voice requireth.

CHAP.

## CHAP. II.

### *First Muſick in the Planets.*

(a) Nicom. Harm. cap. 3. (b) Macrob. in Somn. Scip. 2. 1.

(a) THe names of Sounds, in all probability, were derived from the ſeven Stars, which move circularly in the Heavens, and compaſs the earth. [(b) *The circumagitation of theſe bodies muſt of neceſſity cauſe a ſound; for air being ſtruck from the intervention of the blow, ſends forth a noiſe; Nature her ſelf conſtraining that the violent colliſion of two bodies ſhould end in ſound.*

(c) Nicom. ibid.

(c) Now (ſay the *Pythagoreans*) all bodies which are carried round with noiſe, one yielding and gently receding to the other, muſt neceſſarily cauſe ſounds different from each other, in the magnitude and ſwiftneſs of voice, and in place; which (according to the reaſon of their proper ſounds, or their ſwiftneſs, or the orbs of repreſſions, in which the impetuous tranſportation of each is performed) are either more fluctuating, or on the contrary, more reluctant. But theſe three differences of magnitude, celerity, and local diſtance, are manifeſtly exiſtent in the Planets, which are conſtantly with ſound circumagitated through the ætherial diffuſion; whence every one is called ἀεὶ ῥοὴ, as void of στάσις, ſtation; and ἀεὶ θέων, always in courſe, whence God and Æther are called Θεὸς and Αἰθὴρ.

Macrob. ibid.

*Moreover the ſound which is made by ſtriking the air, induceth into the ear ſomething ſweet and muſical, or harſh and diſcordant: for, if a certain obſervation of numbers moderate the blow, it effects a harmony conſonant to it ſelf; but if it be temerarious, not governed by meaſures, there proceeds a troubled unpleaſant noiſe which offends the ear. Now in heaven nothing is produced caſually, nothing temerarious, but all things there proceed according to divine Rules and ſetled Proportions: whence irrefragably is inferr'd, that the ſounds which proceed from the converſion of the Cæleſtial Spheares, are muſical. For ſound neceſſarily proceeds from motion, and the proportion which is in all divine things cauſeth the harmony of this ſound. This* Pythagoras *firſt of all the* Greeks *conceived in his mind; and underſtood that the Spheares ſounded ſomething concordant, becauſe of the neceſſity of proportion, which never forſakes Cæleſtial Beings.*

Nicom. ibid.

From the motion of *Saturn*, which is the higheſt and furtheſt from us, the graveſt ſound in the diapaſon concord, is called *Hypate*; becauſe ὕπατον ſignifieth *higheſt*: but from the Lunary, which is the loweſt and neareſt the earth, *neate*; for νήατον ſignifieth *loweſt*. From thoſe which are next theſe, *viz.* from the motion of *Jupiter* who is under *Saturn*, *parypate*; and of *Venus*, who is above the *Moon*, *paraneate*. Again, from the middle, which is the *Sun*'s motion, the fourth from each part, *meſe*, which is diſtant by a diateſſaron, in the Heptachord from both extreams according to the ancient way; as the Sun is the fourth from each extream of the ſeven Planets, being in the midſt. Again, from thoſe which are neareſt the Sun on each ſide, from *Mars* who is placed betwixt *Jupiter* and the Sun, *Hypermeſe*, which is likewiſe termed *Lichanus*, and from *Mercury* who is placed betwixt *Venus* and the *Sun*, *Paramеſe*.

Ptol. l. 2. c. 22.

*Pythagoras* by Muſical proportion calleth that a Tone, by how much the *Moon* is diſtant from the Earth: from the *Moon* to *Mercury* the half of that ſpace, and from *Mercury* to *Venus* almoſt as much: from *Venus* to the *Sun* ſeſquiple: from the *Sun* to *Mars* a Tone, that is as far as the *Moon* is from the Earth: from *Mars* to *Jupiter* half, and from *Jupiter* to *Saturn* half, and thence to the Zodiack ſeſquiple: thus there are made ſeven Tones, which they call a Diapaſon harmony, that is a univerſal concent: In which *Saturn* moves in the *Dorick* mood, *Jupiter* in the *Phrygian*, and in the reſt the like.

Porph. p. 21.

Thoſe ſounds which the ſeven Planets, and the Sphear of fixed Stars, and that which is above us, termed by them *Antichthon*, make, *Pythagoras* affirmed to be the Nine Muſes: but the compoſition, and ſymphony, and as it were connexion of them all, whereof as being eternal and unbegotten, each is a part and portion, he named *Mnemoſyne*.

## CHAP. III.

### *The Octochord.*

(a) Nicom. c. 5. (b) The Heptachord was made up of two Tetrachords, which being conjoyned, the middle Note was the end of one, and the beginning of the other.

(a) NOw *Pythagoras* firſt of all, (b) left the middle ſound by conjunction, being it ſelf compared to the two Extreams, ſhould render only a Diateſſaron concent, both to the Neate and to the Hypate: but that we might have greater variety, the two Extreams making the faileſt concord each to other, that is to ſay, the concord of Diapaſon, which conſiſts in a double proportion. Which inaſmuch as it could not be done by two Tetrachords, he added an eighth ſound, inſerting it betwixt the Meſe and Paramеſe, ſetting it from the Meſe a whole Tone, and from the Paremeſe a Semitone; ſo, that which was formerly the Parameſe in the Heptachord, is ſtill the third from the Neate, both in name and place; but that which was now inſerted is the fourth from the Neate, and hath a concent unto it of Diateſſaron, which before the Meſe had unto the Hypate; but the Tone between them, that is, the Meſe, and the inſerted, called the Parameſe, inſtead of the former, to which ſoever Tetrachord it be added, whether to that which is at the Hypate, being of the lower; or to that of the Neate, being of the higher; will render Diapente concord; which is either way a ſyſteme, conſiſting both of the Tetrachord it ſelf, and the additional Tone, as the Diapente-proportion (*viz.* ſeſquialtera) is found to be a ſyſteme of ſeſquitertia, and ſeſquioctava, the Tone therefore is ſeſquioctava, (c) Thus the interval of four Chords, and of five, and of both conjoyned together, called Diapaſon, and the Tone inſerted between the two Tetrachords, being after this manner apprehended by *Pythagoras*, were determined to have this proportion in numbers.

(c) Meibomius ſeems to miſtake the meaning of κατὰ διεζευγμένα συναφὴ and therefore puts a point after λεγόμενη.

## CHAP. VI.

### *The Arithmetical Proportions of Harmony.*

(a) Theon. Smyrn.

(a) PYthagoras *is ſaid to have firſt found out the proportion and concord of Sounds one to another, the Diateſſaron in ſeſquitertia, the Diapente in ſeſqui-*

*ſeſquialtera, the Diapaſon in duple.* The occaſion and manner is related by (*b*) *Cenſorinus*, (*c*) *Boethius*, (*d*) *Macrobius*, and others; but more exactly by (*e*) *Nicomachus*, thus:

(*b*) De die nat. cap. 10.
(*c*) Muſ. l. cap. 10. 11.
(*d*) In Somn. Scip. 2.
(*e*) Harm. enchirid. cap. 6. repeated by *Iamblichus* de vit. *Pyth.* cap.

Being in an intenſe thought, whether he might invent any inſtrumental help for the Ear, ſolid and infallible; ſuch as the Sight hath by a compaſs and a rule, and by a dioptre; or the Touch by a ballance, or by the invention of meaſures: As he paſt by a Smith's ſhop, by a happy chance he heard the Iron Hammers ſtriking upon the Anvile, and rendring ſounds moſt conſonant one to another in all combinations except one. He obſerved in them theſe three concords, the Diapaſon, the Diapente, and the Diateſſaron; but that which was between the Diateſſaron and the Diapente, he found to be a diſcord in it ſelf, though otherwiſe uſeful for the making up of the greater of them, (the Diapente). Apprehending this to come to him from God, as a moſt happy thing, he haſted into the ſhop, and by various trials, finding the difference of the ſounds to be according to the weight of the Hammers, and not according to the force of thoſe who ſtruck, nor according to the faſhion of the Hammers, nor according to the turning of the Iron which was in beating out: Having taken exactly the weight of the hammers, (*f*) he went ſtraight-way home; and to one beam faſtned to the walls, croſs from one corner of the room to the other, (leſt any difference might ariſe from thence, or might be ſuſpected to ariſe from the properties of ſeveral beams) tying four ſtrings of the ſame ſubſtance, length, ſwiftneſs, and (*g*) twiſt, upon each of them he hung a ſeveral weight, faſtning it at the lower end, and making the length of the ſtrings altogether equal. Then ſtriking the ſtrings by two at a time interchangeably, he found out the aforeſaid concords, each in its own combination; for that which was ſtretched by the greateſt weight, in reſpect of that which was ſtretched by the leaſt weight, he found to ſound a Diapaſon. The greateſt weight was of 12 pound, the leaſt of 6. Thence he determined, that the Diapaſon did conſiſt in double proportion, which the weights themſelves did ſhew. Next he found, that the greateſt to the leaſt but one, which was of eight pound, founded a Diapente, whence he inferred this to conſiſt in the proportion, called, Seſquialtera, in which proportion the weights were one to another. But unto that which was leſs than it ſelf in weight, yet greater than the reſt, being of nine pound, he found it to ſound a Diateſſaron; and diſcovered, that, proportionably to the weights, this concord was ſeſquitertia, which ſtring of nine pound is naturally ſeſquialtera to the leaſt, for 9 to 6 is ſo, (*viz.* ſeſquialtera) as the leaſt but one, which is 8, was to that which had the weight 6, in proportion ſeſquitertia; and 12 to 8 is ſeſquialtera; and that which is in the middle between Diapente and Diateſſaron, whereby Diapente exceeds Diateſſaron is confirmed to be in ſeſquioctava proportion, in which 9 is to 8. The ſyſteme of both was called Diapente, that is, both of the Diapente and Diateſſaron joyned together, as duple proportion is compounded of ſeſquialtera and ſeſquitertia; ſuch as are 2. 8. 6. Or on the contrary of Diateſſaron and Diapente, as duple proportion is compounded of ſeſquitertia and ſeſquialtera, as 12. 9. 6. being taken in that order.

(*f*) Πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀπηλλάξη, *Meibomius* otherwiſe.

(*g*) Ἰσοστρόφους, which *Meibomius*, contrary to all MSS. would change unneceſſarily into ἰσοβρόπους, and renders æquè graves.

Applying both his hand and ear to the weights which he had hung on, and by them confirming the proportion of the relations, he did ingeniouſly transfer the common reſult of the ſtrings upon the croſs-beam, to the bridg of an Inſtrument, which he called Χορδοτόνην; and as for ſtretching them proportionably to the weights, he did transfer that to an anſwerable ſcrewing of the pegs. Making uſe of this foundation as an infallible rule, he extended the experiment to many kinds of Inſtruments, Cymbals, Pipes, Flutes, Monochords, Trigons, and the like; and he found, that this concluſion made by numbers was conſonant without variation in all. That ſound which proceeded from the number 6, he named *Hypate*; that which from the number 8, *Meſe*, being ſeſquitertia to the other; that from 9, *Parameſe*, being a tone ſharper than the *Meſe*, viz. ſeſquioctava: that from 12, *Neate*. And ſupplying the middle ſpaces according to the Diatonick kind, with proportionable ſounds, he ſo ordered the Octochord with convenient numbers duple, ſeſquialtera, ſeſquitertia, and (the difference of theſe two laſt) ſeſquioctava.




Thus he found the progreſs by a natural neceſſity, from the loweſt to the higheſt, according to the Diatonical kind; from which again he did declare the Chromatick and Enarmonick kinds.

## CHAP. V.

### *The Diviſion of the Diapaſon, according to the Diatonick kind.*

(*a*) THis Diatonick kind ſeems naturally to have theſe degrees and progreſſes, hemitone, tone and tone, (half-note, whole note and whole note.) This is the ſyſteme Diateſſaron, conſiſting of two tones, and that which is called a hemitone; and then another tone being inſerted, Diapente is made, being a ſyſteme of three tones and a hemitone. Then in order, after this there being another hemitone, tone and tone, they make another Diateſſaron, that is to ſay, another ſeſquitertia. So that in the antienter Heptachord, all fourths from the loweſt, ſound a Diateſſaron one to another, the hemitone taking the firſt, ſecond, and third place, according to the progreſſion in the Tetrachord. But in the *Pythagorical* Octochord, which is by a conjunction a ſyſteme of the Tetrachord, and the Pentachord, and that either joynt-

joyntly of two Tetrachords, or disjoyntly of two Tetrachords, separated from one another by a tone, the procession will begin from the lowest, so that every fifth sound will make a Diapente, the hemitone passing into four places, the first, the second, the third, and the fourth.

## CHAP. VI.

### *The Canon of the Monochord.*

(a) Lert. (a) PYthagoras, *as* Timæus *saith, found out the Canon of one Chord*, that is the rule of the Monochord. (b) De Musica, lib. 3. (b) *Aristides* relates, that *a little before he dyed, he exhorted his friends to play on the Monochord, thereby implying, that the heighth which is in Musick, is to be received rather by the Intellect through numbers, than by the sense through the ears.*

(c) Vit. Pythag. *Duris* (cited by (c) *Porphyrius*) mentions a brazen Tablet, set up in the Temple of *Juno*, by *Arimnestus* son to *Pythagoras*, on which were graven, besides other arts, a Musical Canon; which was afterwards taken away by *Simon* a Musician, who arrogated the Canon to himself, and published it as his own.

(d) Mathemat. (d) *The division of the Canon*, saith *Theon*, *is made by the Tetractys in the Decad, which consists of a Monad, a Duad, a Triad, a Tetrad*, 1, 2, 3, 4. *For it comprehends a Sesquitertia, a Sesquialtera, a Duple, a Triple, and a Quadruple proportion.* The Section of the Pythagorical Canon, *according to the intention of* Pythagoras *himself, not as Eratosthenes misunderstood it, or, Thrasyllus* [whose operation *Theon* sets down] *but as Timæus the Locrean* (*whom* Plato *also followeth*) *to* 27. (f) Manual. Music. lib. 1. p. 24. (f) *Nicomachus* mentions, as intending to deliver it in his larger Treatise of Musick. See also (g) *Euclid*, (g) Sect. Canon (h) Mus. lib. 3. pag. 116. (h) *Aristides*, *Quintilianus*, and others.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Institution by Musick.*

(a) Jamb. vit. Pyth. cap. 15. (a) COnceiving, that the first institution of men was to be made by sense, so that a man might see those fair figures and forms, and might hear the most excellent Musick, he first began by teaching Musick by Songs and Rythms, by which the cures of manners and passions were made, and by which the harmonies of the faculties of their souls were reduced to their primitive dispositions; and cures of distempers both of body and mind were invented by him. And that which was above all these, worthy to be taken notice of, that he made for his disciples those which were called Ἐκστάσεις and ἐπῳδαί, [of Musick] both by weight and by sound, and composed them harmonically, in a strange way making the commixtures of those tones which are called Diatonick, Chromatick, and Enarmonick, by which he changed all the passions of the mind, which were newly raised in them without reason, and which did procure griefs, and angers, and pities, and unseemly loves, and fears, and all kind of desires, and vexations, and appetites, and softnesses, and idlenesses, and impetuosities, correcting and directing every one of these towards virtue, by convenient harmonies, as by certain effectual medicines. And at night when his disciples went to sleep, he delivered them from all the noises and troubles of the day, and purified the perturbations of their minds, and rendred their sleeps quiet, with good dreams and predictions. And when they rose again from their beds, he freed them from the drousiness of the night, from faintness and sluggishness, by certain proper Songs, either set to the Lute, or some high Voice. As for himself, he never played on Instrument, or any thing, but he had it within him; and by an unconceivable kind of divinity, he applied his ears and mind unto the harmony of the world, which he alone did understand; and understanding the universal harmony and concent of the Spheares, and those Stars that move in them, which makes a more full and excellent musick than mortals by reason of their motion, which of unequal differing swiftnesses and bignesses overtaking one another, all which are ordered and disposed in a most musical proportion one towards another, beautified with various perfections, wherewith being irrigated, as having likewise orderly the discourse of his mind, as we may say, exercising, he framed some representations of these, to exhibit them as much as was possible, imitating (that Musick) chiefly by Instruments, or the voice alone. For he conceived that to himself only of all upon the earth, were intelligible and audible, the universal sounds, from the natural fountain and root, and thought himself worthy to be taught and to learn, and to be assimilated by desire and imitation to the celestials, as one that was organized [in the parts of the body] by the deity which begot him. But it was sufficient for other men, that they, always looking upon him, and such things as they received from him, be benefited by images and examples, as not being able to lay hold on the first clear archetypes of all things: As to them, who cannot look upon the Sun, by reason of its splendour, we show the Eclipse either in a pond of water, or by some boared pitched thing, or by some dark-coloured glass, fearing the weakness of their eyes, and framing another way of perception, instead of looking on it, to those who love such things, tho something inferiour. This *Empedocles* seemeth to imply, concerning his extraordinary and divine constitution above others, when he said:

*'Mongst these was one in things sublimest skill'd,*
*His mind with all the wealth of learning fill'd.*
*He sought what ever Sages did invent;*
*And whilst his thoughts were on this work intent,*
*All things that are, he easily survey'd,*
*And search through ten or twenty ages made.*

Intimating by *sublimest things*; and, *He survey'd all things that are*; and, *The wealth of the mind*, and the like, the exquisite and acurate constitution of *Pythagoras* beyond others, both for body and mind, in seeing, hearing, and understanding.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Medicine by Muſick.*

(a) Jamb. c. 25. (a) Pythagoras conceived, that Muſick conduced much to health, if uſed appoſitely; for he was accuſtomed to make uſe of this purification, not perfunctorily. This he called, *Medicine by Muſick*, which kind of Melody he exerciſed about the Spring-time. He ſeated him who play'd on the Lute in the midſt, and thoſe who could ſing ſat round about him; and ſo he playing, they made a conſort of ſome excellent pleaſant Verſes, wherewith they ſeemed exhilerated, and decently compoſed.

They likewiſe at another time made uſe of Muſick as of a Medicine, and there were certain pleaſant Verſes framed, conducing much againſt the affections and diſeaſes of the mind, and againſt the dejections and corrodings of the ſame. Moreover, he compoſed others againſt anger and malice, and all ſuch diſorders of the mind. There was alſo another kind of Muſick and Song invented, againſt unlawful deſires. He likewiſe uſed Dancing. He uſed no muſical inſtrument but the Lute. Wind-Inſtruments he conceived to have an ignoble ſound, and to be only fit for the common people, but nothing generous.

*He likewiſe made uſe of the words of* Homer *and* Heſiod, *for the rectification of the mind. It is reported, that* Pythagoras, *by a Spondiack Verſe* (b) *out of the works* [perhaps of *Heſiod*, whoſe Poem bears that title, Ἔργα,] *by a Player on the Flute, aſſwaged the madneſs of a young man of* Tauromenium, *who being drunk, and having employ'd all the night laſciviouſly with his miſtreſs, was going about to fire the dore of his Rival's houſe; for he was exaſperated and enflamed by the Phrygian mood. But* Pythagoras, *who was at that time buſied in obſerving the Stars, immediately appeaſed and reclaimed him, by perſwading the Piper to change his Air into the Spondiack mood. Whereupon the young man being ſuddainly compoſed, went quietly home, who but a little before would by no means hear the leaſt exhortation from* Pythagoras, *but threatned and reviled him. In like manner* Empedocles, *when a young man drew his ſword upon* Anchitus, *his Hoſt, (for that he had in publick judgment condemned his father to death) and was about to have killed him, ſtraightway changing his Tune, ſung out of* Homer,

(b) Reading Ἀπὸ τῆς Ἔργων. This example of *Pythagoras* ſeems to relate to *Heſiod*; the other of *Empedocles* to *Homer*.

*Nepenthe* calming anger, eaſing grief:

*and by that means freed* Anchitus *his Hoſt from death, and the young man from the crime of murther; who from thence-forward became one of his diſciples, eminent amongſt them.*

(c) See cap. *Moreover the whole School of* Pythagoras *made that which is called (c)* Κάθαρσις, *and* συναγωγὴ, *and* ἐπαγὼ, *by certain Verſes ſuitable thereto, and proper againſt the contrary affections, profitably diverting the conſtitutions and diſpoſitions of the mind. For when they went to bed, and reſigned themſelves to reſt, they purified their minds from the troubles and buſie noiſes of the day, by ſome Songs and proper Verſes, whereby they rendred their ſleeps pleaſant and quiet, and little troubled with dreams, and thoſe dreams which they had were good. In the morning, when they aroſe from the common relief of ſleep, they expelled drowſineſs and ſleepineſs of the head with other Songs.*

*Sometimes alſo, without pronouncing Verſes, they expelled ſome affections and diſeaſes, and reduced the ſick to health,* ἐπαοιδαῖς, *by charming them. And from hence it is probable, that the word* Epode *came to be uſed. After this manner,* Pythagoras *inſtituted a moſt profitable correction of manners and life by Muſick.* Hitherto *Jamblichus.* All which is ratifi'd by other teſtimonies: That *they had Verſes againſt the affections of the mind, grief, anger, luſt,* is related alſo by (d) *Seneca*, who ſaith, that Pythagoras *compoſed the troubles of his ſoul by the Lute.* And (e) *Cicero*, That *the Pythagoreans uſed to deliver Verſes, and ſome Precepts, and to reduce the mind from intenſeneſs of thoughts to tranquillity, by Songs and Inſtruments.* To which effect, (f) *Ælian* relates of *Clinias* the Pythagorean, that *if at any time he perceived himſelf enclining to anger, he, before it took full poſſeſſion of him, plaid upon the Lute; and to thoſe who asked him, Why he did ſo, anſwered, Becauſe I am calmed.*

(d) De ira 3.
(e) Tuſc. quæſt. 4. procem.
(f) Lib. 3. c. 23.

That he *danced*, (g) *Porphyrius* confirms, ſaying, *He danced ſome dances, which he conceived to confer agility and health to the body.*

(g) Pag. 31.

That he *diſallowed Flutes and wind-Inſtruments*, appears from (h) *Ariſtides Quintilianus*, who ſaith, *He adviſed his diſciples to refrain from permitting their ears to be defiled with the ſound of the Flute; but on the contrary, to purifie the irrational impulſions of the ſoul by ſolemn Songs to the Lute.*

(h) Lib. 3.

That *he made uſe of* Homer *and* Heſiod *for rectification of the mind*, is thus related by (i) *Porphyrius*; *He had morning Exerciſes at his own houſe, compoſing his ſoul to the Lute, and ſinging ſome old* Pæans *of* (k) Thales. *He likewiſe ſung ſome Verſes of* Homer *and* Heſiod, *whereby the mind ſeemed to be rendred more ſedate.*

(i) Pag. 31.
(k) Not the Philoſopher, but the Cretan. See the life of Thales cap.

The ſtory of the yong man is confirmed by (l) *Ammonius*, by (m) *Cicero*, related thus; *Whenas ſome young men being drunk, and irritated by the muſick of Flutes, would have broken open the door of a modeſt Matrons houſe, he had the woman-piper play a Spondiack tune; which as ſoon as ſhe did, their raging petulancy was allayed by the ſlowneſs of the Mood, and ſolemneſs of the Tune.* (n) St. *Baſil* relates another ſtory to the ſame purpoſe, That *Pythagoras meeting with ſome, that came from a feaſt drunk, bid the Piper (the Muſitian at that feaſt) to change his Tune, and to play a Dorick Air; wherewith they were ſo brought to themſelves, that they threw away their Garlands, and went home aſhamed.*

(l) In quinq. voc.
(m) Cited by Boerhaus.
(n) Homil. 1.

That, *evening and morning, they uſed Muſick to compoſe their minds*, is affirmed by many others. (o) Quintilian. *It was the cuſtom of the Pythagoreans as ſoon as they waked, to excitate their ſouls with the Lute, that they might be the readier for action; and before they went to ſleep, to ſoften their minds by it.* (p) Plutarch. *The Muſick of the Lute the Pythagoreans uſed before they went to ſleep, thereby charming and compoſing the paſſionate and irrational part of the ſoul.* (q) Cenſorinus. *Pythagoras, that his mind might be continually ſeaſoned with Divinity, uſed (as they ſay) to ſing before he went to ſleep, and as ſoon as he waked.*

(o) lib. 9. cap. 4.
(p) De Iſid. & Oſirid.
(q) Cap. 12.

As for the ſeveral moods, which, in muſical compoſitions, were obſerved by the Ancients, for

for moving particular passions, there is a remarkable fragment of *Damon* the Musitian, cited by (r) *Aristides.*

(r) *Mus.* lib. 2. p. 95.

## SECT. 3.

### *Geometry.*

PYthagoras (saith (a) *Jamblichus*) *is reported to have been much addicted to Geometry; for, amongst the Egyptians* [of whom he learned it] *there are many Geometrical Problems, the most learned of them having been continually, for many ages of gods and men, necessitated to measure their whole country, by reason of the over-flowing and decrease of* Nilus; *whence it is called Geometry.* (b) *Some there are who ascribe all Theorems concerning Lines, joyntly to the* Egyptians *and the* Chaldeans; *and all these, they say,* Pythagoras *took, and augmenting the Science, explained them accurately to his Disciples.* (c) *Proclus* affirms that he *first advanced the Geometrical part of Learning into a Liberal Science, considering the Principles more sublimely* (than *Thales*, *Ameristus*, and *Hippias*, his predecessors in this study) *and perscrutating the Theorems immaterially and intellectually:* (d) *Timæus* saith, That *he first perfected Geometry; the Elements whereof,* (*as Anticlides affirms*) *were invented by* Moeris. (e) Aristoxenus, that *he first introduced Measures and Weights amongst the Græcians.*

(a) Cap. 29. p. 94.
(b) Ibid.
(c) In Euclid. l. 2.
(d) Laert.
(e) Laert.

## CHAP. I.

### *Of a Point, Line, Superficies and Solid.*

(a) PYthagoras asserted a Point to be correspondent in proportion to an unite; a Line, to 2; a Superficies, to 3: a Solid, to 4. (b) The *Pythagoreans* define a point, A *Monad* having position.

(c) A line being the Second, and constituted by the first Motion, from indivisible nature, they called *Duad.*

(d) A superficies they compared to the Number 3. for, that is the first of all causes which are found in figures: for a Circle, which is the Principle of all round figures, occultly compriseth a Triad in center, space, and circumference. But a Triangle which is the first of all rectiline figures, is manifestly included in a Ternary, and receiveth its form according to that number. (e) Hence the *Pythagoreans* affirm, that the Triangle is simply the Principle of generation, and of the formation of things generable; whereupon *Timæus* saith, that all proportions, as well natural, as of the constitution of Elements, are Triangular, because they are distant by a threefold interval, and are collective of things every way divisible: and variously permutable, and are replenished with Material infinity, and represent the natural conjunctions of bodies dissolved: as Triangles which are comprehended by three right lines, but they have Angles which collect the multitude of Lines, and give an adventitious Angle and Conjunction to them. With reason therefore did *Philolaus* dedicate the Angle of a Triangle to four Gods, *Saturn*, *Pluto*, *Mars*, *Bacchus*, comprehending in these the whole quadripartite Ornament of Elements coming down from Heaven, or from the four quarters of the Zodiack. For *Saturn* constituteth an essence wholly humid and frigid: *Mars* wholly fiery. *Pluto* compriseth all Terrestrial life, *Bacchus* predominates over humid and hot generation, of which Wine is a sign, being humid and hot. All these differ in their operations upon second bodies, but are united to one another, for which reason *Philolaus* collected their Union according to one Angle. But if the differences of Triangles conduce to generation, we must justly acknowledg the Triangle to be the principle and Author of the constitution of sublunary things, for the right Angle gives them essence, and determines the measure of its being; and the proportion of a rectangle triangle causeth the essence of generable Elements; the obtuse Angle giveth them all distance, the proportion of an obtuse angled triangle augmenteth material forms in magnitude, and in all kinds of mutation; the acute Angle maketh their nature divisible, the proportion of an acute-angled Triangle prepares them to receive divisions into infinite; And simply, the Triangular proportion constituteth the essence of Material bodies distant and every way divisible: Thus much for Triangles.

(a) Procl. in Euclid. lib. 2. def. 2.
(b) Procl. in Eucl. lib. 2. l. 1.
(c) Procl. lib. 2. l. 2.
(d) Procl. lib. 2. l. 3.
(e) Procl. in Eucl. lib. 2. def. 24.

(f) Of quadrangular figures, the *Pythargoreans* hold that the square chiefly representeth the divine essence, for by it they principally signify pure and immaculate order; for rectitude imitateth inflexibility, equality firm power; for Motion proceedeth from inequality, rest from equality. The Gods therefore, who are Authors in all things of firm consistence, and pure incontaminate order, and inevitable power; are not improperly represented by the figure of a square. Moreover, *Philolaus* by another apprehension calleth the Angle of a Square, the Angle of a *Rhea*, *Ceres*, and *Vesta*; for seeing that the Square constituteth the Earth, and is the nearest Element to it, as *Timæus* teacheth, but the earth it self receiveth genital seeds and Prolifick power from all these gods; he not unaptly compareth the Angle of a Square to all these life communicating Deities. For some call the Earth and *Ceres* her self, *Vesta*; and *Rhea* is said wholly to participate of her, and that in her are all generative causes. Whence *Philolaus* saith, the Angle of a Square by a certain terrestrial power, comprehends one union of these divine kinds.

(f) *Procl.* in *Eucl.* lib. 2, def. 34.

## CHAP. II.

### *Propositions.*

OF the many Geometrical Theoremes invented by *Pythagoras*, and his followers, these are particularly known as such.

(a) *Only these three* Polygones *fill up the whole space about a point, The æquilateral Triangle, and the Square, and the Hexagone æquilateral and æquiangle.* The equilateral Triangle must be taken six times, for six two thirds make four right Angles, the Hexagone must be taken thrice, for every sex angular Angle is equal to one right Angle, and one third; the square four times, for every Angle of a Square is right. Therefore six æquilateral Triangles joyned at the Angles, com-

(a) *Procl.* in *Eucl.* lib. 3. Com. 20.

compleat four right Angles, as do alſo three Hexagones and four ſquares. But of all other Polygones whatſoever, joined together at the Angles, ſome exceed four right Angles, others fall ſhort. This *Proclus* calls *a celebrious Theoreme of the Pythagoreans.*

(b) *Procl.* in *Eucl.* lib 4. Prop. 32. Com. 6.

(*b*) *Every Triangle hath the internal Angles equal to two right Angles.* This Theoreme *Eudemus* the Peripatetick, aſcribes to the *Pythagoreans*; their manner of Demonſtration ſee in *Proclus.*

(c) *Euclid.* lib. 1. Prop.

(*c*) *In rectangle Triangles the ſquare which is made of the ſide that ſubtendeth the right Angle, is equal to the ſquares which are made of the ſides containing the right Angle.*

(d) Vitruv. Archit. 9. 1.

(*d*) This Theoreme *Pythagoras* found out; and by it ſhewed how to make a gnomon or ſquare (which the Carpenters cannot do without much difficulty and uncertainty) not Mechanically but according to Rule; for if we take three Rulers one of them being three foot long, the Second four foot, the Third five foot, and put theſe three ſo together that they touch one another at the ends in a Triangle, they make a perfect Square: Now if to each of theſe Rulers be adſcribed a Square, that which conſiſted of three foot will have 9; that which of 4. will have 16: that which of 5. will have 25. So that how many feet the area's of the two leſſer ſquares of three and four make, ſo many will the ſquare of 5 make.

(e) *Laert.* (f) Vitruv. loco. cit.

(*e*) *Apollodorus* the *Logiſtick*, and others, relate, that *upon the invention of this Theorem*, Pythagoras *ſacrificed a Hecatomb* (*f*) to the Muſes, in confirmation whereof they alledg this Epigram,

*That noble Scheme* Pythagoras *devis'd,*
*For which a Hecatomb he ſacrific'd.*

(g) Non poſſe ſuaviter vivere ſec. Epicur. (h) Nat. deor. 3. * Pag.

(*g*) *Plutarch* ſaith, it was only *an Ox*; and even that is queſtioned by (*h*) *Cicero*, as inconſiſtent with his doctrine, which forbad bloody ſacrifices. *The more accurate therefore* (ſaith * *Porphyrius*) *ſay, he ſacrificed an Ox made of Flower*; or, as (*i*) *Gregory Nazianzen, of Clay.*

(i) Epiſt.

(k) *Non poſſe ſuaviter vivere* ſec. Epicurum.

But (*k*) *Plutarch* doubts, whether it were for the invention of the forementioned Propoſition, that *Pythagoras* ſacrificed an Ox, or for *the Problem concerning the Area of a Parabole.* Indeed, (*l*) *the application of ſpaces or figures, to lines, is*, as *Eudemus* his followers *affirm, an invention of the Pythagorick Muſe, Parabole, Hyperbole, Elleipſis. From them the later Writers taking theſe names, transferr'd them to Conical lines, calling one Parabole, another Hyperbole, another, Elleipſis: whereas thoſe ancient divine perſons* (the Pythagoreans) *ſignified by thoſe names the deſcription of places, applied to a determinate right line.* (*m*) *For when a right line being propoſed, the ſpace given is wholly adæquate to the right line*; *then, they ſay, the ſpace is applied,* (παραβάλλειν) *but when you make the length of the ſpace greater than that of the right-line, then, they ſay, it exceeds*; (ὑπερβάλλειν) *but when leſs, ſo as the ſpace being deſcribed, there is ſome part of the right line beyond it, then it falls ſhort.* (ἐλλείπειν) *In this ſenſe* Euclid *uſeth Parabole*, lib. 1. prop. 44. *and Hyperbole and Elleipſis, in the 6th Book.*

(l) *Procl.* in *Eucl.* lib. 4. prop. 44.

(m) Reading ὅτ' ἂν γὰρ εὐθείας ἐκκειμένης τὸ δοθὲν χωρίον παρὰ τὴν εὐθεῖαν συμπεσεῖν τότε παραβαλεῖν ἐκεῖνο τὸ χωρίον φάσιν ὅταν δὲ μεῖζον, &c.

## CHAP. III.

### *How he collected the Stature of* Hercules.

(a) *Plutarch* in his Treatiſe, entituled, How great difference there is in the ſouls and bodies of men, as to ingenuity and ſtrength, relates, that *Pythagoras* reaſoned curiouſly and ſubtilly, in finding out and collecting the extraordinary ſtature and length of *Hercules* his body: for, it being manifeſt, that *Hercules* meaſured with his feet the running courſe of Olympian-*Jupiter* at *Piſa*, and that he made it 600 feet long; and that all the other running courſes in *Greece*, inſtituted afterwards by other perſons, were 600 foot long, yet ſhorter than this; He eaſily underſtood the meaſure of *Hercules* his foot, conſidering that it was proportionably ſo much longer than that of other men, as the Olympick courſe was longer than all others. And having comprehended the ſize of *Hercules* his foot, he conſidered what length of body did ſuit with that meaſure, according to the natural proportion of all the members one to another; and ſo collected the conſequent, That *Hercules* was ſo much taller in body than others, by how much the Olympick courſe was longer than the reſt, which were made after the ſame number of feet.

(a) Agel. l. 9. c. 1.

## SECT. IV.

### *Aſtronomy.*

(a) *Neither did they ſuperficially conſider the ſpeculation of celeſtial things, in which* Pythagoras *was exquiſite*, as appears by theſe few remains.

(a) Jamb. cap. 29. pag.

## CHAP. I.

### *The Syſteme of the Sphears.*

(a) THE word οὐρανὸς, Heaven, is taken three ways; firſt, for the ſphear of fixed Stars; ſecondly, for all that is betwixt the ſphear of fixed Stars and the Moon; laſtly, for the whole world, both Heaven and Earth.

(a) Anon. de Pyth. apud Phot.

(*b*) The anonymous writer of the life of *Pythagoras* affirms, that *he ſaid, there are twelve orders in Heaven, whereof the firſt and outmoſt is the fixed ſphear, next to this is the Star of* Saturn, *and then the other ſix Planets*, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury, Sun *and* Moon; *next theſe, the ſphear of Fire, then that of Air, then that of Water, laſt of all the Earth.*

(b) Apud Phot.

But they who ſeem more ſtrictly to follow the mind of *Pythagoras* and his diſciples, averr, *They held the celeſtial ſphears to be ten, whereof nine only are viſible to us*, (the fixed Sphear, the ſeven Planets, and our Earth) *the tenth is* Antichthon, an Earth above, or oppoſite to ours. This Antichthon they (*d*) *added, to make up the number of the moving bodies.* For (*e*) *conſidering, that the affections and proportions of Muſick conſiſt in numbers, that all other things appear to be aſſimilated to numbers, that numbers are the firſt of all nature, that the elements of numbers are the elements of all beings*; They

(d) Plut. Sym. plic. (e) Ariſtot.

They asserted, that all Heaven is Harmony and Number, and that the affections and parts of Heaven are correspondent to number: and collecting these, they adapted them to the composition of the whole, wherein if any thing were wanting, they supplied it, that the whole might be alike compacted. As, because the Decad seems to be perfect, and to comprehend the whole nature of numbers, therefore they asserted the Celestial Sphears to be Ten. Now there being Nine onely visible to us, hereupon they conceived the Tenth to be *Antichthon*, an Earth opposite to ours.

As concerning the Order and Systeme of these, the *Pythagoreans* (*f*) held, *That in the middle of the world is fire*; or, (as (*g*) *Stobæus*) *in the midst of the Four Elements is the fiery Globe of Unity*, (*b*) which they term *Vesta* and *Monad*. *They* (saith *Simplicius*) *who understand this thing more intimately, say, that this fire is the procreative, nutritive, and excitative power, which is in the midst of the Earth.* But *Simplicius* himself seems not to have apprehended the right meaning of the *Pythagoreans*, who by this *fire*, or *fiery Globe of Unity*, meant nothing else but the Sun, seated in the midst of the Universe, immoveable, about which the other parts of the World are moved. This Opinion *Pythagoras* seems to have derived from the *Ægyptians*, who Hieroglyphically represented the Sun by a Beetle, (*k*) because, as the Beetle having formed a Ball of Cow-dung, and lying upon its back, rolls it about from Claw to Claw; so the other parts of the World are moved and rolled by and about the Sun.

(*f*) *Arist.* de Cœlo. lib. 2. (*g*) Phys. cap. (*b*) *Plut.* in Numa. (*k*) *Clem. Alex. Strom.* lib. 5.

That by this immovable fire in the midst of the Universe, they understood not (as (*l*) *Simplicius* conceiveth) the Earth, is manifest, forasmuch as they further held, that (*m*) the Earth is not immovable, nor seated in the midst of the Globe, but suspended, as being (*n*) one of the Stars carried about the fire which is in the middle, and that thereby it maketh Day and Night. (*o*) The Reason why the Earth ought not to have the middle place, is, because the most excellent body ought to have the most excellent place: but Fire is more excellent than Earth, and the Center more excellent than all places without it; therefore they conceived, that not the Earth, but the Fire, is placed in the midst. (*p*) Moreover, because that which is the most excellent of the Universe, ought principally to be preserved, and the middle is such, therefore they term the Fire, Διὸς φυλακὴν, *the custody of* Jupiter.

(*l*) Loc. cit. (*m*) *Plut.* in Numa. (*n*) *Aristot.* de Cœlo. lib. 2. (*o*) *Arist.* loc. cit. (*p*) *Arist.* ibid.

(*q*) The same they held of the *Antichthon* also, [*viz.* That like our Earth it is suspended, as being one of the Stars carried about the Fire, and thereby maketh Day and Night.] By this *Antichthon*, *Clemens* saith, they understood *Heaven*: *Simplicius*, the *Moon*, as being a kind of ætherial Earth, as well for that it eclipseth the light of the Sun, which is proper to the Earth, as for that it is the bound of Cœlestials, as the Earth of Sublunaries. But the contrary is manifest, as well from the compleating of the number ten (in respect whereof this *Antichthon* was imagined) as for that they held, (*r*) it is not visible to us, by reason, that following the motion of this Earth, it is always opposite to, or beneath us, and the bigness of our Earth hinders us from seeing it: And *Aristotle* affirms, there were some who conceived the Antichthon to be the cause why there are more Eclipses of the Moon than of the Sun, which may likewise happen by reason of many other bodies invisible to us.

(*q*) *Arist.* ibid. (*r*) *Plut. Simplic.*

(*s*) *Laertius*, who saith *Philolaus* was the first that conceived the Earth to have a Circular Motion, seems to mean no more, than that he first committed this Opinion of *Pythagoras* to writing, and first made it publick; for *Eusebius* expressly affirms, that he committed to writing the dissertations of *Pythagoras*. His Opinion, as delivered by *Plutarch* and *Stobæus*, is exactly the same; for he placed fire in the midst, which he called the *Genius* of the Universe, and the Mansion of *Jupiter*, and the Mother of Gods, and Altar, and Ward, and Measure of Nature: he conceived that the Ten Celestial Bodies move about it. Heaven, of the sphear of fixed Stars, the five Planets, the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, and lastly the *Antichthon*.

(*s*) in *Philelaõ*.

From the same Fountain, seems *Aristarchus* the *Samian*, to have derived this Hypothesis, though some ascribe the invention thereof to him; for he supposed, that (*u*) the Sun and Planets move not, but that the Earth moveth round about the Sun, which is seated in the middle. (*x*) *Plutarch* adds, that *Plato* in his old age repented for that he had placed the Earth in the midst of the Universe, and not in its proper place.

(*u*) *Archimed.* in *Arenar.* *Plut.* plac. 3. 13. (*x*) In *Platon.* quæst. and in Numa.

This Opinion was of late revived by *Nicolaus Copernicus*, who considering how inconvenient and troublesome it is to understand, and maintain the motions of the Heavens, and immobility of the Earth, explained it with admirable Ingenuity, after the mind of the *Pythagoreans*. According to whose Hypothesis, the Sun (as we said) is settled in the midst of the World, immovable: The sphear of fixed Stars in the extremity or outside of the World, immovable also; betwixt these are disposed the Planets, and amongst them the Earth as one of them; The Earth moves both about the Sun, and about his proper Axis. Its diurnal Motion by one revolution, makes a night and a day; its annual motion about the Sun, by one revolution makes a year; so as by reason of his diurnal motion to the *East*, the Sun and other Stars seem to move to the *West*; and by reason of its annual motion through the *Zodiack*, the Earth it self is in one Sign, and the Sun seems to be in the Sign opposite to it; Betwixt the Sun and the Earth they place *Mercury* and *Venus*; Betwixt the Earth and the fixed Stars, *Mars*, *Jupiter*, and *Saturn*: The Moon being next the Earth, is continually moved within the great Orb betwixt *Venus* and *Mars*, round about the Earth, as its Centre: Its revolution about the Earth is compleated in a Month; about the Sun (together with the Earth) in a Year.

## CHAP. II.

### *The Motions of the Planets.*

AS concerning the Course and Revolution of the Planets, (*a*) They affirm the great year to be the Revolution of *Saturn*; for the rest of the Planets absolve their Periods in a shorter time; but *Saturn* in no less than Thirty Years, *Jupiter* in 12. Years, *Mars* in Two; the Sun [speaking according

(*a*) Anon vit. *Pyth.* apud Phot.

ing to the *Phænomenon*] in One; *Mercury* and *Venus* as the Sun, [or to ſpeak more exactly, *Mercury* in Three Months, *Venus* in Eight] the Moon, as being next the Earth ſooneſt, in a Month.

According to this inequality, appears the motion of the Planets to our ſight, by reaſon that the Eye is out of the Center of the Orb: But in the whole courſe of Aſtronomy (ſaith *Geminus*) are ſuppoſed the motions of the Sun, Moon, and five Planets, equal and circular, contrary to the diurnal Revolution of the World. The *Pythagoreans* firſt applying themſelves to theſe diſquiſitions, ſuppoſed circular and equal motions of the Sun, the Moon, and the five Planets; for they admitted not ſuch irregularity in eternal and divine bodies, that ſometimes they ſhould move ſwifter, ſometimes ſlower, and ſometimes ſtand ſtill (as the ſtationary Points in the Planets.) Neither in any ſober, well tempered perſon could we admit ſuch irregularity of pace. Indeed, the neceſſities of life often cauſe men to move faſter or ſlower; but in the incorruptible Nature of the Stars, there cannot be alledged any cauſe of ſwiftneſs and ſlowneſs. Wherefore the *Pythagoreans* propoſed this queſtion, how the *Phænomena*'s might be ſalved by circular and equal motions.

That *Pythagoras* himſelf obſerved theſe Irregularities, and the ways to ſalve them, appears from (b) Cap. 6. *Jamblichus*, who ſaith, (*b*) he communicated a revelative right knowledge of all manner of motion of the Sphears and Stars; ἐπιπροθήσεών τε, καὶ ὑπολείψεων, καὶ ἀνωμαλιῶν, ἐκκεντροτήτων τε, καὶ ἐπικύκλων. Ἐπιπρόθησις is the anticipation of any Planet, either in reſpect to ſome other Planet, or to the fixed Stars. Ὑπόλειψις is the *falling later* of any Planet, either in reſpect to ſome other Planet, or to the fixed Stars. Ἀνωμαλία, *Inequality*, is, when the ſame Planet moveth ſlower and faſter, according to its diſtance from the Sun, in the Pythagorick Hypotheſis; (or in the Ptolemaick, from the earth) ſlower in its *Aphelium*, faſter in its *Perihelium*.

The two ways of ſalving theſe *Phænomena*'s, are by *Eccentricks*, or by *Epicycles*; for a *Hemocentrick* with an *Epicycle* (as *Eudoxus* firſt demonſtrated) is equipollent to an *Eccentrick*. *Eccentricity* is, when the Center of their equal motion is diſtant from the Center of their apparent motion. (c) Loc. cit. Both theſe (*c*) *Jamblichus* aſcribes to *Pythagoras*, from whom perhaps they were derived to (d) Laert. Eudox. *Eudoxus*, to whoſe invention (*d*) others aſcribe them.

## CHAP. III.

### *The Intervals and Harmony of the Sphears.*

(a) De de Natal. cap. 13. *Pythagoras* (ſaith (*a*) *Cenſorinus*) aſſerted, that this whole world is made according to muſical proportion, and that the Seven Planets, betwixt Heaven and the Earth, which govern the Nativities of Mortals, have a harmonious motion, and Intervals correſpondent to muſical Diaſtemes, and render various ſounds, according to their ſeveral heights, ſo conſonant, that they make moſt ſweet melody; but to us inaudible, by reaſon of the greatneſs of the noiſe, which the narrow paſſage of our Ears is not capable to receive. For, as *Eratoſthenes* collected, that the largeſt Circumference of the Earth is 252000. *Stadia*; ſo *Pythagoras* declared how many *Stadia* there are betwixt the Earth and every Star. In this meaſure of the World, we are to underſtand the *Italick Stadium*, which conſiſts of 625 Feet; for there are others of a different length, as the *Olympick*, of 600. Feet, the *Pythick* of 500. From the Earth therefore to the Moon, *Pythagoras* conceived to be about 126000. *Stadia*, and that diſtance [according to muſical proportion] is a Tone; from the Moon to *Mercury* (who is called στίλβων) half as much, as it were a *Hemitone*, from thence to *Phoſphorus*, which is the ſtar *Venus*, almoſt as much, that is, another *Hemitone*; from thence to the Sun twice as much, as it were a *Tone* and a half. Thus the Sun is diſtant from the Earth Three *Tones* and a half, which is called *Diapente*; from the Moon Two and a half, which is *Diateſſaron*; from the Sun to *Mars*, who is called πυρόεις. there is the ſame Interval as from the Earth to the Moon, which makes a *Tone*; from thence to *Jupiter*, who is called φαέθων, half as much, which makes a *Hemitone*; from thence to the ſupream Heaven, where the Signs are, a *Hemitone* alſo; ſo that the Diaſteme from the ſupream Heaven to the Sun is *Diateſſaron*, that is, Two *Tones* and a half: from the ſame Heaven to the top of the Earth ſix *Tones*, a *Diapaſon* concord. Moreover he referred to other Stars many things, which the Maſters of Muſick treat of, and ſhowed, that all this world is Enarmonick. Thus *Cenſorinus*. But (*b*) *Pliny* delivering this Opinion of *Pythagoras*, (b) Lib. 9. cap. 21, 22. reckons ſeven *Tones* from the Earth to the ſupream Heaven; for whereas *Cenſorinus* accounts but a *Hemitone*, from *Saturn* to the *Zodiack*, *Pliny* makes it *Seſquiple*.

CHAP.




## CHAP. IV.

### *Of the Planet* Venus.

(a) Lib. 2. cap. 8.

NExt the Sun (ſaith *Pliny*) there is a great Star called *Venus*, alternately errant, in Names emulating both the Sun and Moon. For, preventing and riſing before morning, he takes the Name of *Lucifer*, as another Sun bringing on day; on the other ſide, ſhining at Sun-ſet, it is called *Veſper*, as proroguing light, and performing the Office of the Moon, which its Nature *Pythagaras* the *Samian* firſt found out, about the XLII *Olympiad*, which was of *Rome* the 147*th* year. In magnitude it exceeds all the other ſtars, and is of ſo great ſplendor, that this ſtar only caſts a ſhadow; whence it hath diverſity of Names; ſome call ir *Juno*; others, *Iſis*; others, *Mother of the gods*. By the Nature hereof, all things are generated upon Earth; for, at either riſing, it ſcattereth prolifick dew, ſupplying not only the Conceptions of Earth, but likewiſe ſtimulating all living Creatures. It performs the Revolution of the *Zodiack* in 348 days, never receding from the Sun more than 46 parts, according to *Timæus*. Thus *Pliny*. That there is a miſtake in the time, hath been already ſhown; but the thing it ſelf is confirmed by *Laertius*, who affirms, *Pythagoras* firſt ſaid, that *Veſper* and *Lucifer* are the ſame ſtar: yet elſewhere adds, that ſome aſcribe this to *Parmenides*. But that it was a Doctrine of the *Pythagoreans*, appears from this account given by *Timæus*; The ſtar *Juno* many call *Venus* and *Lucifer*. All perſons are not skilful in the Rules of ſacred Aſtronomy, and in the Sciences of Riſing and Setting; for the ſame ſtar is ſometimes *Heſper*, when it followeth the Sun in ſuch manner, that it is conſpicuous to us when the Sun is ſet; and ſometimes *Eous*, when it goeth before the Sun, and riſeth before Sun-riſing.

THE

# THE DOCTRINE OF PYTHAGORAS.

## CHAP. I.

### *Philoſophy, its Name, Definition, Parts, Method.*

(a) *Agell.* 1.9. (a) THE *Pythagoreans* being adorned with theſe ſtudies of Science, from thence aſcended to perfect the Works of the World, and the Principles of Nature.

(b) *Jamb.* cap. 29. pag. 144. (b) *Pythagoras* firſt gave the Name to Philoſophy, defining it, An Appetition, and Love to Wiſdom. *Wiſdom* is the Science of Truth in things that are. *Things that are*, he called Immaterials, and Eternals, and ſole Agents, which are the Incoporeals; the reſt are equivocally called ſuch, by participation with theſe, *viz.* Corporeals, Materials, and Corruptibles, which indeed are not. Now Wiſdom is the Science of thoſe things which are, but not of thoſe which are equivocally; for Corporeals are not docible, nor admit certain knowledge, being infinite, and not comprehenſible by ſcience, and things which (as it were) are not, according to the difference of all things, neither can be rightly deſcribed by any definition. Of thoſe whoſe Nature is ſuch, as that they cannot be known, it is impoſſible to frame a Science; wherefore neither is it likely, that there can be a love of a Science which is not. But rather of that which is converſant about thoſe things which properly are, and continue always the ſame, and like themſelves, and co-exiſt always with a true appellation. Upon the knowledg of theſe followeth that which is of equivocal things, (though not ſought after) as the ſcience of Particulars follows the ſcience of Univerſals: For, as *Architas* ſaith, *They who know Univerſals well, will plainly ſee what particulars are.* Wherefore *things that are*, are not of one kind onely and ſimply, but of many various kinds, Intelligibles and Incorporeals, whoſe appellation is τὰ ὄντα, *things that are.* Corporeal things, ſubject to ſenſe, are thoſe which are by participation of thoſe that are. Concerning all theſe, he delivered moſt proper Sciences, leaving nothing unexcuſſed, and delivered alſo to men the common Sciences, as the demonſtrative, the definitive, the diviſive, as is manifeſt from the Commentaries of the *Pythagoreans.*

Hereupon he defined Philoſophy, (c) the knowledg of things that are, as things that are, and (d) the knowledg of things divine and humane; as alſo (e) the meditation of death, daily endeavouring to free the ſoul from the Priſon of the body; and (f) the reſemblance of God as far as is poſſible for man.

(c) Phil. com-pend. de you
(d) Phil. loc. cit.
(e) D. Hieron adv. Rufin.
(f) Stob. Ser

For (g) the ſcope of Philoſophy is to free the mind, (the divine part of the ſoul) which is planted in us, and to ſet it at liberty, without which liberty none can learn or perceive any thing ſolid or true, by the help or benefit of ſenſe: for the mind, according to him, ſeeth all things, and hears all things: all things elſe are deaf and blind.

(g) Porph. V

In order hereunto it is, that Philoſophy being of two kinds, Practick and Theoretick; the Practick, according to the method of the *Pythagoreans*, precedes the Theoretick. The Reaſon receive thus, explain'd by (h) *Hierocles.*

(h) in aur.

*Philoſophy is the purification and perfection of humane life; purification, from material irrationality and the mortal body; perfection, from the recovery of its own excellent life, reducing it to the Divine Reſemblance. Virtue and Truth are chiefly able to effect theſe, that taking away Exceſs of paſſions, this (rightly had) inducing the divine form.*

*Firſt are laid down the Inſtructions of Practick Virtue: for firſt we muſt compoſe the Irrationality which is in us, and then (ſo prepar'd) apply our ſelves to the knowledg of the more divine things. For as it is not poſſible for the Eye, being full of dirt, and not cleanſed, to look upon things very bright; ſo neither can the Soul, not poſſeſſing Virtue, gaze upon the Beauty of Truth. For that which is not pure, is not capable of touching that which is pure. Practick Philoſophy produceth Virtue; Theoretick, Truth. As in theſe Golden Verſes (of* Pythagoras) *we find the Practick Philoſophy called Humane Virtue, but the*

*the Theoretick celebrated as Divine Virtue, when closing the Instructions of Civil Virtue,*

*These labour* (saith he) *study these, and these affect;*
*To divine Virtue, these thy steps direct.*

First therefore a man must be made good, then a God: good the Civil Virtues render a man, but the Sciences conducing to the Divine Virtue divinifie. But to those who ascend; the lesser things precede the greater; for which reason in the Pythagorical Precepts, the Rules of Virtue are first delivered, teaching us to ascend from the greatest use of life, to the Divine Resemblance.

Anon. Phot. * Three ways, say they, man may become better than himself, first by Conversation with the Gods; for it is necessary, that he who addresseth himself to them, at that time, sequester himself from all evil, assimilating himself as near as he can to God: Secondly, by well doing, for that is proper to God, and therein he imitates God: Thirdly, by death; for if the Soul in this Life, being a little separated from the Body, becometh better, and beginneth to divine in Dreams by Visions and Extasies of Diseases, it will be much better when it shall be wholly separated from the Body.

(i) Laert. (k) Laert. ibid. citing Alexander. (l) Clem. Strom. 2. citing Heraclitus. (m) Jamb. protrept. cap. 9. pag. 58. (n) Laert. loco cit. (o) Stob Eth. 2. pag. 163. (p) Porph.

Hence he affirmed, that (*i*) the most considerable of all things Humane, is to inform the Soul concerning good and ill; That (*k*) men have perfect felicity when they have a good Soul, or that (*l*) the knowledge of the perfection of the Virtues of the Soul is the chief felicity; That (*m*) every man is appointed by God to know and to contemplate; That (*n*) Virtue is a Harmony, and so is all good, even God himself; That (*o*) the end or chief Good is to resemble God: whence he exprelly said, Follow God, not visible to the Eye, but intelligible to the understanding, by the harmony of the World; That (*p*) the most excellent things given by the Gods unto men, are, to speak truth, and to benefit others, [Theoretick and Practick Virtue] and that each of these resembled the Works of God: to this lalter *Strabo* alludes, commending those who said, (*q*) Men imitate the Gods most when they benefit others: The former is confirmed by (*r*) *Porphyrius*, that he advised above all things to speak truth, for that onely is able to make Men like to the Gods; for God himself, as he learn'd of the *Magi*, who term him *Oromasdes*, in his Body resembles light, in his Soul truth. This is that Δαίτυς, (*Divinity*) which (*s*) *Jamblichus* reckons last in his Recapitulation of the Heads of the Pythagorick Philosophy, and is the same with which the Golden Verses conclude, thus,

(q) Lib. (r) Pag. 27. see also Stob. Serm. 11. (s) Cap. 6.

*Then stript of flesh up to free Æther soare,*
*A deathless God, divine, mortal no more.*

## SECT. I.

### *Practick Philosophy, its parts; and first of Pædeutick.*

PRactick Philosophy seems to have been the Invention of *Pythagoras*; for *Aristotle* affirms that he first undertook to discourse concerning Virtue; That *Socrates* is generally esteemed the Author thereof, perhaps is only because, as *Aristotle* adds, coming after him he discoursed better and more fully thereupon.

To this part of Philosophy alludes (*b*) this Sentence of *Pythagoras*; That the discourse of that Philosopher is vain, by which no passion of a man is healed: for as there is no benefit of Medicine, if it expel not diseases out of bodies, so neither of Philosophy, if it expel not ill out of the soul. (b) Stob. serm 80.

Virtues being of two kinds, *private*, which respect our selves, and *publick*, which have reference to others, *Pythagoras* seems to have comprehended the first under *Pædeutick*, the second under *Politick*. *Laertius* affirms he writ Three Treatises, *Pædeutick*, *Politick*, *Physick*. The Heads of *Pædeutick*, according to the general recapitulation of (*c*) *Jamblichus*, seem to have been these, *Institution, Silence, Abstinence from Flesh, Fortitude, Temperance, Sagacity.* (c) Cap. 6.

## CHAP. I.

### *Institution, Silence, Abstinence.*

COncerning Institution, &c. there are these Sentences and Precepts of *Pythagoras*, preserved by *Stobæus* and others.

(*a*) We ought to make choice of the best course of life; for Custom will make it pleasant: Wealth is a weak Anchor, Glory a weaker: The Body, Magistracies, Honours, all these are infirm and unable. What are then able Anchors? Wisdom, Magnanimity, Fortitude; these no tempest shakes. This is the Law of God, that Virtue only is solid; all else are but trifles. (a) Stob. serm. 1. mentioned also by Plutarch, de exilio.

(*b*) To take away bitterness from Wormwood, and liberty from speech, are both alike. (b) Stob. ser. 9.

(*c*) Endeavour not to conceal thy faults with words, but to amend them by reproof. (c) Stob. ibid.

(*d*) It is not so hard to offend, as not to reprove an offending person. (d) Stob. ibid.

(*e*) As the sickness of the body, if hid or praised, is not healed, so the soul cherished in its ways, or concealed, is not reformed. (e) Stob. 13.

(*f*) Rejoice more in reprovers than in flatterers: flye from flatterers as Enemies. (f) Stob. 14.

(*g*) We ought either to be silent, or to speak things that are better than silence. (g) Stob. 24.

(*h*) It is better to throw a stone at random, than an idle word. (h) Stob. 34.

(*i*) Comprehend not few things in many words, but many things in few words. (i) Stob. 35.

(*k*) We must faithfully restore to him that entrusts us, the *Depositum*, not only of money, but of words. (k) Porph. p 25.

(*l*) Of Opinion, the *Pythagoreans* said thus: It is the part of a man void of understanding, to adhere to all mens Opinions, especially to that which is maintained by the greatest number: for to conceive and judge aright is proper to few, it only belongs to the knowing, who are not many: this power therefore extends not to many. On the other side, it is no less madness, to contemn all Conception and Opinion. Such a person must be unlearned, and unrectifiable: for it is necessary, that he who is ignorant learn those things where- (l) Jamb. cap

of he is ignorant; and that he who learneth, addict and resign himself to his Teacher. In a word, they said, It is necessary, that such young men as would be preserved, should addict themselves to the Conceptions and Opinions of their Elders, and such as lead a good life.

Now in the whole course of humane life, there are certain distinct Ages, which are not temeariously to be connected, for they are expelled by one another, unless a man be well and rightly ordered from his birth. It is requisite therefore, that from the institution of a Child in Goodness, Temperance, and Fortitude, a great part be transmitted to his Youth, when he arrives at that age; likewise of his Youth instituted in Goodness, Fortitude and Temperance, a great part be transmitted to his manly estate. Herein the course ordinarily taken, is ridiculous; for most think, that Children ought to be well ordered, instructed in Temperance, and to abstain from all things odious and undecent; but when they come to be Youths, most leave them to their own management, to do what they please; whereas at that Age they are subject to both sorts of Vices, of Children and of Men. To shun Study and Order, and to follow Play and Wantonness, the Vice of Childhood, is likewise most proper to Youth. Again, vehement desires, Ambition, and the like, the Affections of Manhood, insinuate into Youth, for which Reason, this Age requireth care above all the rest. In fine, a man should never be so given over, as to do whatsoever he pleaseth, but that there should always be some Overseer president over the rest, a legitimate sitting Magistrate, whom every Citizen ought to obey. For a living creature, as soon as ever it is neglected, falls into ill and wickedness.

They affirm, that they often have enquired and examined, for what reason we give Children food at set times, and moderately; the ordinary Answer is, That Order and Moderation are good; their contraries, Disorder and Immoderateness, ill, as is manifest, in as much as to be a Glutton or a Drunkard is esteemed a great reproach. For if none of these were useful and beneficial to us when we arrive at man's estate, it were needless to accustom our selves, whilst Children, to such Order. It is the same in other habits. We see it manifest also in all other kinds of living creatures, which are taught by man from the very beginning, as Whelps and the like, those things which they are required to practise when they are come to full growth. Thus *Iamblichus*. Of *Silence*, *Abstinence*, and the whole course of his *Institution*, we have formerly treated.

## CHAP. II.

### *Fortitude.*

(a) *Iamb* cap. 32. pag. 189.

(a) THE greatest Argument of the *Pythagoreans* for Fortitude, was, for that they fully perswaded themselves, that of all Humane Chances, nothing ought to happen unexpectedly to any, but that they should expect all things which were not within their own power. Precepts of *Pythagoras*, tending to this Virtue, are these.

(b) *Stob.* serm.

(b) *Do those things which you judge to be good, although after you have done them, you shall be disesteemed; for the vulgar is an ill judge of all good things: As you despise their praise, so despise their dispraise.*

(c) *He forbad to forsake the protection and station of this life, without the command of our supream Lord.* (c) Cic. de Sen. nect.

## CHAP. III.

### *Temperance and Continence.*

(a) HE often used this Apophthegm to all his Auditors, whether many or few, *We must avoid with our utmost endeavour, and amputate with Fire and Sword, and by all other means, from the Body, Sickness; from the Soul, Ignorance; from the Belly, Luxury; from a City, Sedition; from a Family, Discord; from all things, Excess.* (a) Porph. Iamb.

(b) It is better to live lying on the ground with a settled confidence, than to have a golden bed and be troubled. (b) Stob. ser. 4.

(c) Temperance is the strength of the Soul; for it is the light of the Soul clear from Passion. (c) Stob. 3.

(d) To serve Passions is more grievous than to serve Tyrants. (d) Stob. Tit.

(e) It is impossible he can be free, who serves passions, and is governed by them. (e) Stob. Tit.

(f) No man is free who doth not command himself. (f) Stob. Tit.

(g) The labour of Continence precedes all excellent things. (g) Stob. Tit.

(h) To possess Continence is the best strength and wealth. (h) Stob. Tit.

(i) It is better to die, than to cloud the Soul by Intemperance. (i) Stob. Tit.

(k) He said, that Drunkenness is a little Madness; or, that it is the study of Madness; or, as *Laertius*, that it is the Canker of the flower of the Mind. (k) Stob. Tit.

(l) The Voice of the flesh is, No hunger, no thirst, no cold. (l) Stob. 95.

(m) He admonished all men to shun Ambition and Vain-glory, because these chiefly excite Envy. (m) Porph. p. 21.

(n) He discommended all Excess, saying, that we ought not to exceed a due proportion in labour and food. (n) Laert.

(o) We must consider, there are three kinds of things which deserved to be pursued and acquired; the first is of those which are honourable and vertuous; the second, conducing to life; the last, pleasures: not the vulgar enchanting pleasure, for that he allowed not, but the solid and grave, free from blame. For, he said, there are two kinds of pleasure, whereof that which indulgeth to the belly, and to lasciviousness, by profuseness of wealth, be compared to the murtherous Songs of the *Syrens*; the other, which consists in things honest and just, as also in the necessaries of life, is sweet as well as the first, and withal it is not followed by Repentance. Hither perhaps alludes (p) *Clemens*, who saith, *Pythagoras* advised to esteem the Muses sweeter than *Syrens*; teaching, that we should study Learning not with delight; whereby he condemned the other delight of the Mind, which is fallacious. (o) Porph. (p) Strom. pag. 594.

(q) Py-

(q) *Pythagoras* seeing one that made himself fat by exercising and eating: (r) *This man* (saith he) *will not cease to make a stricter Prison for himself.*

(s) The *Pythagoreans* exhorted such as came into their Society, to shun Pleasure as much as any thing that ought to be avoided; for nothing so deceives us, and draws into sin, as this passion. In general, as it seems, they endeavoured not to do any thing which might tend to pleasure, this scope being for the most part undecent and hurtful; but that they should aim at what is good and decent, to do what they ought. In the next place, to discern what is convenient and beneficial, it requireth a more than ordinary judgment.

As to that which is called Desire, they said thus: Desire is an impulsion and appetite of the Soul, either of some repletion, or derogation of some things belonging to sense, or the sensitive affection. This passion is various, and the most multiplicious of all that belong to man. Of humane desires many are acquired and framed by the persons themselves; wherefore this Passion requireth greatest care and observation, and corporeal Exercises more than ordinary. For the body, when its aliment is evacuated, to desire Repletion, is natural; and again, being repleat, to desire evacuation, is natural also: But to desire superfluous Aliment, or superfluous and sumptuous Rayment and Lodging, or superfluous and various Houshold-stuff, and Utensils, and Cups, and Servants, and Herds of Cattel, bred for diet; in a word, of all humane passions, this is most such, that it never is at a stay, but proceeds to infinite. Wherefore from our very Childhood, care must be taken, that we desire such things as are needful, and shun vain and superfluous desires, being undisturbed and clear from such appetites, and contemning those who deserve contempt, being fettered in their desires.

It is of most concernment to observe the vain, hurtful, superfluous desires of those, who are transported by their Power; there is nothing so absurd, whereto the Souls of such persons, Children, Men, and Women, are not transported. The most various is that of Meats, infinite is the multitude of fruits, infinite of Roots, used by Mankind. Besides this, all sorts of flesh, making it their business to find, of terrestrial, volatile, and aquatile creatures, wherewith to satisfie their taste; and all variety of dressing them, with the mixture of all kind of Juices, whereby Mankind is really prophetick and multiform, as to the motion of the Soul; for every several sort of Meat is cause of a peculiar Constitution. Now men behold, that these produce great alteration, as Excess of Wine to such a degree exhilerates; further, causeth frenzy and disorder: But those things which discover not so much their force and efficacy, they are ignorant of, notwithstanding, that whatsoever food we take, is cause of some peculiar constitution. Wherefore it is a great part of Wisdom to know and understand, what kind, and quantity of Meat is requisite for Nourishment. This Science was first communicated by *Apollo* and *Paeon*, afterwards by the *Æsculapians*.

Concerning Generation, (t) he said thus: We ought principally to observe that which is called πρωϊμοὶ, *præcocious*: for neither too forward Plants nor Animals, before the due season, when they are in their full strength. Youths therfore and Virgins ought to be educated in labour and exercises, and actions conducing to fortitude, using food convenient thereto, and in a laborious, temperant and tolerant life. Of the things in humane life there are many, in which to be late conversant is best; of this kind is Coition. A Youth ought so to be educated, as not to addict himself thereto before twenty years of age; and when arrived at those years, to use it seldom is best, if we esteem a good habit of body; for Intemperance and Good rarely meet in the same person.

They commended the Rites and Laws of the Ancients, in the *Greek* Cities, not to lie with Mothers, or Daughters, or Sisters, nor in a Temple, nor in publick, for this is evil; and to procure all possible Impediments thereof, is very profitable.

They were of Opinion, That all unnatural ignominious Generations ought to be taken away, and those onely preserved which were according to Nature, with Temperance, and lawful.

They conceived, that such as go about to beget Children, ought to have much providence of their future Issue: The first and greatest providence is, to prepare himself for that action by a temperate healthful Life, not eating too much at unseasonable times, nor using such meats as deprave the habits of the body; but above all things, not to perform it when drunk; for they thought that by ill and discordant, and disturbed temperament, the Seed became adulterate. They also thought him a foolish inconsiderate person, who being desirous of Children, and taking a Wife to that end, should not with utmost study foresee by what means his Issue might be most advantaged. They who love dogs, are very careful of their breed, as of which they shall breed, and when, and accordingly the Whelps prove: the like do they who love birds. But though it be well known, that they who breed any other kind of living creature, use their utmost endeavour to procure a generous Race, yet men have no respect to their own Offspring, but beget them inconsiderately, and bring them up negligently. This is the chief and most manifest cause, that so many men are evil and wicked, the greater part begetting their children like beasts, without any consideration.

Finally, (u) *Pythagoras discoursing concerning the benefit of venereal pleasures, advised, in the Summer-time to abstain wholly from Coition; in the Winter, to use it but rarely; for it is generally hurtful: but the continual use thereof causeth debility, and is most pernicious. Laertius* saith, *He advised, that in the Winter and Spring it should not be used at all, in Summer and Autumn but sparingly: for at all times it is pernicious and prejudicial to the Health. And being asked, At what time a man should use it, he answered, When he hath a mind to be weaker.*

(u) *Diodor.* excerpt. *Vales.* pag. 247.

(q) D. Basil. Hom. 22 Πυθαγόρας ἰδὼν ποτέ τινα ἐκ πολλῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἀργίας παχυνόμενον τὸ σῶμα, Ἐπὶ τοῦτον, ἔφη, τὸν ἄνδρα οὐ παύσεται ἑαυτῷ φυλακὴν ἐπιτείνων. See Hom. in Ps. 29 p. 195. (r) *Stob. Serm.* 84.

(s) *Jambl.*

(t) Reading περὶ accordeng to *Stobæus*, Serm. 99. who cites this fragment out of *Aristoxenus*; perhaps it belonged to his book, *de vitâ Pythagoræ.*

## CHAP. IV.

### *Sagacity and Wiſdom.*

TO *Wiſdom* (the laſt general head of *Pædeutick*) belong theſe Sentences of *Pythagoras.*

(a) Stob. (a) *The ſtrength, wall, and armour of a wiſe man is wiſdom.*

*Call to mind, that moſt men acknowledge wiſdom to be the greateſt good, but few endeavour to poſſeſs this greateſt good.*

(b) Stob. (b) *The Sacrifices of Fools are the food of fire; their Donatives, the ſubſiſtence of ſacrilegious perſons.*

(c) Stob. (c) *A Horſe is not to be guided without a Bridle, nor Riches without wiſdom.*

(d) Cic. Tuſc. 1. (d) *He conceived the impoſition of names on things, to be the higheſt part of wiſdom.*

## SECT. II.

### *Of Politick, the other part of Practick Philoſophy.*

(a) Cap. 6. THE heads of Politick (according to (a) *Jamblichus*) are theſe; *Common Converſation, Friendſhip, VVorſhip of the Gods, Piety to the Dead,* and *Law making.*

(b) Jamb. cap. (b) They hold *Pythagoras* to be the Inventor of all Politick Diſcipline. He uſed to ſay, That amongſt Beings, nothing is pure, but every thing partakes of ſome other, as Earth of Fire, Fire of VVater and Air. In like manner, honeſt partakes of diſhoneſt, juſt of unjuſt, and the like. Hence it is, that Reaſon is carried away to either ſide. There are two motions, one of the Body, the other of the Mind; one irrational, the other elective. Commonwealths he compared to a rectangle Triangle, wherein one ſide conſiſts of Three parts, the Baſe of Five, the other ſide of the mean between them, of four. In the Coincidence of theſe Lines with one another, and their Squares, we behold delineated the beſt Form of a Commonwealth, [and of Juſtice.]

## CHAP. I.

### *Common Converſation.*

TO common converſation belong theſe Maxims of *Pythagoras.*

(a) Stob. (a) *A ſtranger juſt, is to be prefer'd not onely before a Countrey-man, but before a Kinſman.*

(b) Stob. (b) *Eſteem is a great part of good Education, to be able to ſuffer the want of Education in others.*

(c) Stob. (c) *Deſire that they who converſe with you, ſhould rather reſpect than fear you: for admiration accompanies reſpect; hatred, fear.*

(d) Jamb. cap. (d) There being a Juſtice in the mutual converſation of men, one towards another, of this alſo the *Pythagoreans* delivered this manner. There is in the common converſation of men one opportune, another importune: they differ in diverſity of Age, and in Dignity, and in nearneſs of Affinity, and Beneficence, and if there be any thing like theſe in mutual differences For there is a kind of Converſation which appeareth, to the younger towards the younger, not to be importune; but, towards the elder, it is importune: for no kind, neither of Anger, nor of menacing, or boldneſs, but all ſuch kind of importunity ought diligently to be avoided by the younger toward the elder. In like manner is the reaſon of Dignity; for coming to a perſon endowed with true Worth and Virtue, it is neither decent nor opportune to ſpeak much, or to commit any of the fore-mentioned things. Like theſe alſo are thoſe which concern ſuch as have obliged and deſerved well of others.

There is a various and multiplicious uſe of Opportunity. For, of thoſe that are angry and incenſed, ſome do it opportunely, others importunely: and again, of thoſe who covet and deſire, and have appetite, it may be opportune for ſome to purſue thoſe things, not for others. The ſame Reaſon there is of other affections, and actions, and diſpoſitions, and converſations, and interceſſions, and diſcourſes. But Opportunity is of ſuch a Nature, that it is docible and undeceivable, and capable of act, and generally, and ſimply, having nothing of all thoſe in it. But the conſequents are of ſuch a kind, that they together, decent, and convenient, and the like, attend the Nature of opportunity.

They held that there is a Primacy in every thing, and that every where there is one thing which is beſt; in Science, and in Experience, and in Generation, likewiſe in a Family, and in a City, and in an Army, and in all ſuch like Conſtitutions: but it is difficult to diſcern and underſtand the Nature of the Primacy in all the aforeſaid things; for in Sciences it is the part of more than ordinary intelligence, by clear intuition, to diſcern and judge the parts of the thing, which is the primacy of them. But there is a great difference, and almoſt of the whole and general a hazard, in not rightly taking the Primacy: For, in a word, nothing can afterwards be right, if the true Primacy be not known. The ſame Manner and Reaſon is in other kinds of Primacy; for neither can a Family be well governed, where there is not a true Maſter, and voluntary government; for it is requiſite, that both theſe be voluntary in the præfecture, as well he who is chief, as thoſe who are ſubject to him. As Learning is then right, when there is ſuch conformity betwixt the Maſters and the Scholars, that they will teach, theſe will learn; for if either be refractory, it cannot be rightly performed. In this manner he conceived it to be fit for Inferiors to obey Superiors, Diſciples their Maſters,

## CHAP. II.

### *Friendſhip.*

(a) Jamb. (a) PYthagoras evidently demonſtrated that there is a friendſhip of all unto all; of Gods towards men, by piety and religious worſhip; of doctrines to one another; of the ſoul to the body; of the rational part to the irrational, by Philoſophy and its Theory; of men towards one another; betwixt Countrymen, by right obſervation of Laws; betwixt

betwixt Strangers, by right Phyſiology; of a man to his Wife, or Children, or Brethren, and Servants, by unperverted Communion. In a word, of all towards all; moreover of ſome irrational Creatures, by Juſtice and natural affinity and communion; of the body, in it ſelf mortal, a conciliation and combination of the contrary faculties, by health and wholſome diet, and temperance, in imitation of the good compoſure in the Elements. In all theſe, of one and the ſame, according to comprehenſion of the name Friendſhip, *Pythagoras* is acknowledg'd to be the Inventer and Law-giver: and ſo admirable a Friendſhip did he deliver to thoſe who enquired of him, that, unto this day, (ſaith *Jamblichus*) we ſay of thoſe who are intimately joyned together by Friendſhip, *they are of the Pythagoreans.*

We muſt add the Inſtitution of *Pythagoras* herein, and the exhortations he uſed to his Diſciples. They were adviſed to take away all contention, and love of controverſie, out of true friendſhip; if poſſible out of All. But if that be not poſſible, at leaſt out of that which is our own Country, and generally that towards Elders. Likewiſe out of that towards Benefactors; for to become Antagoniſts, or conteſt with ſuch, when we are fallen into anger, or ſome other paſſion, is not conſiſtent with the preſervation of the amity we have with them. They ſaid, that in Friendſhip there ought to be leaſt ſcratches and cuts; and, if any happen, we ſhould flye and ſubdue anger: it were beſt, that both ſhould do ſo, but chiefly the younger, and that thoſe exerciſes which they called παιδαγωγίας, ought to be made from the elder towards the younger, with much commendation and benevolence. That there appear much care and tenderneſs in thoſe who give the correction; for by this means, the correction ſhall be profitable. That we do not extirpate credit out of friendſhip, neither in jeſt nor in earneſt; for it is not eaſie to heal the friendſhip betwixt men, if once a falſhood hath incurred into the manners of thoſe who call themſelves Friends.

That we muſt not renounce friendſhip for adverſity, or any other impotence which happens in life. That renunciation of friendſhip only is commendable, which is made by reaſon of ſome great wickedneſs, and miſdemeanour. But that we muſt not take away our friendſhip from them, unleſs they become abſolutely wicked; and, before we take it off, we muſt ingeniouſly pauſe, to try, if by conteſtation and fight he may be diverted from this ill habit, and become rectified. We muſt fight, not in words, but actions; the fight is lawful and pious. Though difference of power be not a juſt ground for one man to fight with another, yet this is a juſt ground, even the moſt juſt that is poſſible.

They ſaid, that to a friendſhip, that will prove true, are required many definitions and rules; theſe muſt be well diſcerned, and not confuſedly: Moreover, it ought to be accommodated to the diſpoſition of others, that no converſation be made negligently and vainly, but with reſpect and right order: Neither that any paſſion be excited vainly, and wickedly, and ſinfully, as concupiſcence, or anger. The ſame of the other paſſions and habits.

Much more admirable are thoſe things, which they defined concerning the community of the divine good, and thoſe concerning the unanimity of the mind, and thoſe concerning the divine mind. For they mutually exhorted one another, that they ſhould not tear aſunder the god which is in them. Thus their ſtudy of friendſhip by words and actions, had reference to ſome divine temperament, and to union with God, and to unity with the mind, and the divine ſoul. Thus *Jamblichus.*

(*b*) *He conceived the extremity (or end) of friendſhip, to be the making one of two.* (*c*) *Man ought to be one.* This ſentence (ſaith *Clemens*) is myſtick. (*d*) He firſt ſaid, κοινὰ φίλων, and φιλίαν ἰσότητα.

b *Cic* off 1.
c *Strom.* 4.
d *L ert.*

## CHAP. III.

### *Worſhip of the Gods.*

(*a*) THE principles of worſhipping the gods, propoſed by *Pythagoras* and his followers, are theſe.

a *Jambl.*

That all which they determine to be done, aim and tend to the acknowledgment of the Deity: This is the principle, and the whole life of man conſiſts in this, that he follow God, and this the ground of Philoſophy. For men do ridiculouſly, who ſeek that which is good any where elſe than from the gods. They do as if a man in a Country, govern'd by a King, ſhould apply his ſervice to ſome Citizen of inferior Magiſtracy, and neglect the ſupream Governour. In the ſame manner conceive they that ſuch men do; for, ſince there is a God, we muſt confeſs, that good is in his power. Now all, to thoſe whom they love and delight in, give good things; and to the contrary to theſe, their contraries. Therefore it is manifeſt, that ſuch things are to be done in which God delights.

Thus he defined particularly of all things. To believe of the Divinity, that it is, and that it is in ſuch manner as to mankind; that it over-looks them, and neglects them not; the *Pythagoreans*, taught by him, conceived to be profitable. For we have need of ſuch a Government, as we ought not in any thing to contradict; ſuch is that which proceeds from the Divinity; for the Divinity is ſuch, that it merits the dominion of all. Man they affirmed to be, rightly ſpeaking, A creature reproachful and fickle, as to his appetites, affections, and other paſſions; he therefore hath need of ſuch government and guidance, from which proceeds moderation and order. Now they conceived, that every one being conſcious of the fickleneſs of his own nature, ſhould never be forgetful of ſanctity, and ſervice towards the Divinity; but always have (the Divinity) in their mind, how it overlooks and obſerves human life.

In fine, they ſay, that *Pythagoras* was an imitator of the Orphean Conſtitutions, worſhipping the gods after the manner of *Orpheus*, placed in brazen images, not repreſenting the forms of men, but of the gods themſelves, who comprehending and foreſeeing all things, reſemble in nature and form the whole. He declared their purifications and rites, which are called τελεταὶ, having the moſt exact knowledg of them.

Moreover they affirm, he made a compoſition of the divine Philoſophy and ſervice, part whereof he had learned from the *Orpheans*, part from the

the *Ægyptian* Priests; some from the *Chaldeans* and *Magi*; some from the *Eleusinian* Rites, and those in *Imbrus*, and *Samo-Thracia*, and *Delos*, and the *Celtæ*, and *Iberians*.

Amongst the *Latines* also is read the Sacred Discourse of *Pythagoras*, not to all, but to such as are admitted to the doctrine of excellent things, and are not addicted to ought that is dishoneſt.

It prescribes, that men offer libation thrice; and *Apollo* gives Oracles from a Tripod, because number first consists in a Triad.

That we must sacrifice to *Venus* on the sixth day, because that is the first common number of the number of universal Nature. Now after all ways, the thing divided in like manner, assumes as well the power of those things which are taken away, as of those which are left.

That to *Hercules* we ought to sacrifice on the eighth day of the Month, in respect of his being born at the end of seven Months.

It saith also, That we ought to enter into a Temple having a pure garment, and in which none hath slept, the sleep of slothfulness; black and russet, testifying purity in ratiocinations of equality and justice.

It commanded, that if blood be shed unwillingly in a Temple, that it be either taken up in a dish, or scattered into the Sea; for that is the first element, and most estimable of all creatures.

It saith likewise, that a woman ought not to be brought to bed in a Temple, for it is religious; that the divinity of the soul should be annected to the body in a Temple.

It commanded, that upon Holy-days we cut not our hair, nor pare our nails; intimating, that the increase of our goods ought not to be prefer'd before the empire of the gods.

That we must not kill a flea in the Temple, because to the Deity we ought not to offer any superfluous things, or vermine; but that the gods are to be worshipped with Cedar, Lawrel, Cypress, and Myrtle, &c.

b *Cic.* leg. 2. (b) *He said, Piety and Religion is chiefly conversant in our minds, at such time as we attend the divine rites.*

c *Laert.* (c) *That the Gods and Heroes are not to be worshipped with equal honours, but that the gods must always be worshipped with applause,* (or silence, at the celebration of their rites) *we being white and pure; Heroes, only from noon,* [(d) He advised, that such as sacrifice should present themselves to the gods, not in rich, but in white and clean garments; and that not only the body be clear from all blemish, but that they bring also a pure mind.] *Purity is acquired by expiations, and bathings, and sprinklings; and by refraining from murther, and adultery, and all pollution; and by abstaining from the flesh of things that die of themselves, and from Mullets, and Melanures, and Sheep, and Oviparous Creatures, and Beans, and all other things which are commanded by those, who have the care of sacred rites.*

d *Diodor.* excerpt. Vales. pag. 247.

e *Laert.* (e) *He permitted not, that any man should pray for himself, because none knoweth what is good for himself.*

f *Laert.* (f) *An Oath is just, and therefore* Jupiter *is Sirnamed* Ὅρκιος. (g) He commanded his disciples to be very backward in taking an Oath; but that when they have taken it, they should be very forward and diligent to keep it.

g *Diod* excerpt. Vales.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Piety to the Dead.*

PIety to the Dead was a part, not the least, of the *Pythagorick* doctrine: whence *Cicero* speaking of the Immortality of the Soul; *More prevalent with me,* saith he, *is the authority of the Ancients, or our Ancestors, who afforded the dead so religious rites, which certainly they had not done, if they had conceived, that nothing pertains to them; or of those who were in this Country, and instructed* Magna Græcia, *which now is abolisht, but then flourish'd, with their institutions and precepts.*

(b) *Pythagoras* allowed not the bodies of the dead to be burned, herein imitating the Magi, as not willing that any mortal should participate of divine honour. The *Pythagorick* custom, as described by (c) *Pliny*, was, to put the dead into Earthen Barrels, amongst leaves of Myrtle, Olive, and black Poplar.

b *Jamb.*

c Lib. 35.

(d) To accompany the dead at Funerals in white garments, he conceived to be pious; alluding to the simple and first nature, according to number, and the principle of all things.

d *Jamb.*

(e) The *Crotonians* delighting to bury their dead sumptuously, one of the *Pythagoreans* told them, he had heard *Pythagoras* discoursing of divine things, thus: The cœlestial gods respect the affections of the sacrificers, not the greatness of the sacrifice. On the contrary, The terrestrial gods, as to whose share the lesser things belong, delight in banquets, and mournings, and funeral litations, and costly sacrifices; whence *Hades* (the Inferi) from its making choice of entertainment, is named *Pluto*; those who pay honours to him most sparingly, he permitteth to continue longest in the upper world; but of those who are excessive in mourning, he bringeth down ever and anon one, that thereby he may receive the honours which are paid in memory of the dead. By this discourse he wrought a belief in his Auditors, that they who do all things moderately upon such adverse occasions, further their own safety; but as for those who bestow excessive charge, they will all die untimely.

e *Jamb.*

(f) *They forbore to make Tombs of Cypress, forasmuch as* Jupiter's *Scepter was of that wood*; *as* Hermippus, *in his second Book of* Pythagoras, *affirms.*

f *Laert.*

## CHAP. V.

### *Reverence of Parents, and Obedience to the Law.*

(a) NExt to gods and dæmons, we ought to reverence Parents and the Law, and to render our selves obedient to them, not feignedly, but really. Or, as (b) *Porphyrius*, He commanded to think and to speak reverently of gods and dæmons, to be kind to parents and benefactors, and to obey the law.

a *Jamb.* cap.

b Pag.

They held (saith (c) *Jamblichus*) that we ought to believe, there is no greater ill than Anarchy; for a man cannot be safe, where there is no Governour. They held also, that we ought to persevere in the customs and rites of our own Country, though they be worse than those of other Countries. To revolt easily from setled laws, and to be studious of novelty, they conceived to be neither advantageous nor safe. (d) See-

c *Locus.*

(d) Seeing that contumelies, pride, and contempt of Law, often transport men to unjust actions, he daily exhorted, (e) *that the law should be assisted, and injustice opposed.* To which end he alledged this distinction: The first of ills, which insinuateth into Houses and Cities, is *Pride*; the second, *Contumely*; the third, *Destruction.* Every one therefore ought to expel and extirpate Pride, accustoming themselves from their youth to a temperate masculine life, and to be free from slanderous repining, contentious reproaching, and hateful scurrility.

*Wickedness disobeys the Divine Law, and therefore transgresseth.*

*A wicked man suffers more torment in his own conscience, than he who is punished in body, and whipped.*

## CHAP. VI.

### *Law-making.*

MOreover, (saith (a) *Jamblichus*) *he constituted another excellent kind of Justice, the Legislative part, which commandeth that which ought to be done, and forbiddeth that which ought not to be done, which is better than the Judicative part; for this resembles that part of medicine which cureth the sick, but the other suffers them not to fall sick, but takes care afar off of the health of the soul.*

(b) *Varro* affirms, that *Pythagoras delivered this discipline (of governing States) to his Auditors last of all, when they were now learned, now wise, now happy; for he saw so many rough waves therein, that he would not commit it, but to such a one as was able to shun the rocks, or, if all fail'd, might stand himself as a rock amidst those waves.*

(c) *They who punish not ill persons, would have the good injur'd.*

## SECT. 3.

### *Theoretick Philosophy, its parts; and first of the Science concerning Intelligibles.*

WE come next to the Theoretick part, to which more particularly belongs that saying of *Pythagoras, That by Philosophy he had this advantage, To admire nothing; for, Philosophical discourse takes away wonder, which ariseth from doubt and ignorance, by knowledg and examination of the facility of every thing.*

Theoretick Philosophy seems to have been divided by the *Pythagoreans* into two parts; *They first* (saith (b) *Jamblichus*) *delivered the Science of Intelligibles, and the gods; next which, they taught all Physick.* To the Science of Intelligibles belong these heads, wherewith (c) *Jamblichus* begins his recapitulation, *Of the gods, of heroes, of dæmons.*

## CHAP. I.

### *Of the Supream God.*

PYthagoras defined what God is, thus, (a) *A mind which commeateth, and is diffused through every part of the World, and through all Nature; from whom all animals that are produced receive life.*

(b) God is one. He is not (as some conceive) out of the world, but intire within himself, in a compleat circle surveying all generations. He is the Temperament of all ages, the Agent of his own powers and works, the Principle of all things, one, in heaven luminary, and father of all things; mind and animation of the whole, the motion of all circles.

(c) God (as *Pythagoras* learned of the Magi, who term him *Oromasdes*) in his body resembles Light, in his soul, Truth.

(d) He said, that God only is wise.

(e) He conceived that the first, (being) God, is neither sensible, nor passible; but invisible, and intelligible.

## CHAP. II.

### *Of Gods, Dæmons, Heroes.*

NExt to the supreme God, there are three kinds of Intelligibles, *Gods, Dæmons, Heroes*, that *Pythagoras* thus distinguished them, is manifest from his (a) precept, that *We must in worship prefer Gods before Dæmons, Heroes before Men:* But in (b) *Jamblichus*, he seems either to observe a different method, or to confound the Terms; teaching first *of Gods*, then of *Heroes*, last *of Dæmons*; which order perhaps is the same with that of the *Golden Verses*,

*First, as decreed, th' immortal Gods adore,*
*Thy Oath keep: next great Heroes, then implore*
*Terrestrial Dæmons with due sacrifice.*

By *Terrestrial Dæmons* seems to be understood (not Princes, as *Hierocles*; but) the Dæmons themselves, confin'd to several offices upon earth; For,

(c) All the air is full of souls, which are esteemed Dæmons and Heroes; from these are sent to men dreams and presages of sickness, and of health; and not only to men, but to sheep also, and to other cattle; to these pertain expiations and averruncations, and all Divinations, Cledons and the like.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of Fate and Fortune.*

(a) ALL the parts of the World above the Moon, are governed according to Providence and firm order, and ειμαρμένη, the Decree of God, which they follow: but those beneath the Moon by four causes, by God, by Fate, by our Election, by Fortune. For instance, to go aboard into a Ship, or not, is in our power: Storms and Tempests to arise out of a calm, is by fortune; for the Ship being under water to be preserved, is by the Providence of God. Of Fate, there are many manners and differences: it differs from Fortune, as having a determination, order, and consequence; but Fortune is spontaneous and casual, as to proceed from a boy to a youth, and orderly to pass through the other degrees of age happens by one manner of Fate. [Here the Text seems deficient.]

(b) Man

b *Laert.* (*b*) Man is of affinity with the Gods, by reason that he participates of Heat, wherefore God hath a Providential care of us. There is also εἱμαρμένη, a Fate of all things in general and in particular, the cause of their administration.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Divination.*

FOrasmuch as by Dæmons and Heroes, all Divination is convey'd to men, we shall here add what *Pythagoras* held and practised therein, *Jamblichus* saith, that (*a*) *he honoured Divination not the least of the Sciences*; (*b*) for what things are agreeable to God, cannot be known, unless a man hear God himself, or the Gods, or acquire it by divine art. For this reason they diligently studied Divination, as being the only interpretation of the benevolence of the Gods. It is likewise an employment most suitable to those who believe there are Gods: but whoever thinks either, (belief of the Gods, or Divination) a folly, to him the other is such also.

a Cap. 29. b *Jamb.* cap. 28.

c *Plut.* Plac. Phil. lib. 4. (*c*) Pythagoras *approved all kinds of Divination, except that which is performed by the sacrifice of living Creatures.*

d *Porph.* e *Laert.* (*d*) *He first used Divination by Frankincense.* (*e*) This was the only burnt offering, by which he divined.

f *Laert.* g *Cic.* divinat 1. h *Cic.* ibid. (*f*) *He also used Divination by Cledones, and by Birds*, which *Cicero* confirms, saying that (*g*) *he would himself be an* Augur; and that (*h*) *the Pythagoreans observed not only the voices of the gods, but of men also, which they call Omens. Cledones* are observations of occurrent speeches, collecting from what is accidentally said upon some other occasion, the effect of what is sought: an instance whereof, see in the Epigram of *Callimachus* upon *Pittacus.*

Life of *Pittacus* chap. pag. cap. *The Interpretation of Dreams*, (*Porphyrius* saith) *he learned of the Hebrews*: He communicated it also to his Disciples; for *Jamblichus* relates, *he used means to procure them quiet sleeps, with good and prophetick dreams*: Out of this respect some conceive it was, that he forbad flatulent and gross meats, for that they obstruct the serenity which is requisite thereto. Such apparitions he held not to be fantastick, but real, (not ὄναρ but ὕπαρ) as is manifest from one who *told him that he dreamed he had talked with his father, (who was dead) and asked him what it portended*; *Nothing (saith he) for you did really talk with him*; *as my speaking now to you, portends nothing, no more did that.*

*Jamb.* Florid. lib. 2. He was skilful likewise, in Judicial Astrology, if we credit *Apuleius*, who affirms *the Caldæans shewed him the Science of the Stars, the number of the Planets*; *their Stations, Revolutions, and the various effects of both in the Nativities of men.*

d *August.* civ. Dei, lib. 7. d *Varro* relates him skilful in *Hydromancy*, which (saith he) *came from* Persia, *and was practised by* Numa, *and afterwards by* Pythagoras; *wherein they used blood, and invocation of Dæmons.* Hither perhaps alludes *Eustathius*, who saith, *the Pythagoreans affirm that all brass doth sound by some diviner spirit, for which reason a Tripod of that metal is dedicated to* Apollo, *and when the Winds are all laid, the air calm, and all things else quiet, yet the hollow brass caldrons seem to quake*; the same may be the meaning of *Pythagoras*, when he saith, *The sound which is made by brass, is the voice of the voice of the Dæmon inclosed in the brass*; reading (perhaps) ἐναπολημμένου, for so *Psellus* describes a kind of Hydromancy, practised by the *Assyrians*; *They take a bason full of water convenient for the Dæmons to glide into the bottom: The bason of water seems to make a noise as if it breath'd*; *the water in the bason in substance differs nothing from other water, but through the virtue infused thereinto by charms is much more excellent, and made more ready to receive a prophetick spirit. This is a particular Dæmon, Terrestrial, attracted by compositions*; *as soon as he glideth into the water, he maketh a little sound inarticulate, which denotes his presence*; *afterwards the water running over, there are certain whispers heard with some prediction of the future: This kind of spirit is very wandring, because it is of the Solar order, and this kind of Dæmons purposely speak with a low voice, that by reason of the indistinct obscurity of the voice, their lyes may be less subject to discovery.* Hitherto *Psellus.*

Porph. pag.

## SECT. IV.

### *Physick.*

THE general Heads of Physick are these, *Of the World, and of all things in the world, of Heaven, and of Earth, and of the Natures betwixt them.* The defect of the fragments concerning these, we shall endeavour to supply, by adding the Treatise of *Timæus* the Locrian, upon the same subject. Jamb. cap. 5

## CHAP. I.

### *Principles.*

THE most learned of the Naturalists (saith *Sextus Empericus*) attributed so great power to Numbers, that they thought them to be the principles and elements of all things. These were the disciples of *Pythagoras*: For, say they, such as treat of Philosophy aright, imitate those who study a Language; they first examin words, because language consists of words; then, because words consist of syllables, they first consider syllables; and because syllables consist of letters, they first examin letters. In like manner, say the *Pythagoreans*, Natural Philosophers, when they make enquiry into the Universe, must first examin into what the Universe is resolved. Adv. Math. lib. 9.

Now to affirm, that something apparent to sense is the principle of all things, is repugnant to Physick; for, whatsoever is apparent to sense, must be compounded of things not apparent, whereas a Principle is not that which consists of any thing, but that of which the thing consists. Therefore things apparent cannot be said to be Principles of the Universe, but those of which things apparent consist, themselves not being apparent.

They who maintain Atoms, or Homoiomeria's, or bulks, or intelligible bodies, to be the principles of all things, were partly in the right, partly not: As conceiving the principles to be unapparent, they are in the right; as holding them to be corporeal, they err. For, as intelligible unapparent bodies precede the sensible, so most incorpo-

incorporeals precede intelligible bodies. The elements of words are not words; nor of bodies, bodies: but they muſt either be bodies, or incorporeal; therefore they are wholly incorporeal. Neither can we ſay, that Atoms are eternal, and therefore, tho corporeal, the principles of all things; for firſt, they who aſſert Homoiomeria's, and bulks, and leaſts, and indiviſibles, to be elements, conceive their ſubſtance eternal, ſo as in that reſpect, Atoms are no more elements than they. Again, tho it were granted, that Atoms were eternal; yet, as they who conceive the world to be unbegotten, and eternal, enquire by an imaginary way, the principles whereof it firſt conſiſts; So we (ſay the *Pythagoreans*) treating of Phyſick, conſider in an imaginary way, of what things theſe eternal bodies, comprehenſible only by reaſon, conſiſt. Thus the Univerſe conſiſts either of bodies or incorporeals; we cannot ſay bodies, for then we muſt aſſign other bodies whereof they conſiſt; and ſo proceeding to infinite, we ſhall remain without a principle. It reſts therefore to affirm, that intelligible bodies conſiſt of incorporeals, which *Epicurus* confeſſeth, ſaying, By collection of figure, and magnitude, and reſiſtance, and gravity, is underſtood a Body.

Yet it is not neceſſary, that all corporeals preexiſtent to bodies, be the elements and firſt principles of beings. Idea's (according to *Plato*) are incorporeals, pre-exiſtent to bodies, and all generated beings have reference to them; yet they are not the principles of being: for every Idea, ſingly taken, is ſaid to be one; when we comprehend others with it, they are two, or three, or four. Number therefore is tranſcendent to their ſubſtance, by participation whereof, one, two, or more, are predicated of them. Again, ſolid figures are conceived in the mind before bodies, as having an incorporeal nature; yet they are not the principles. Superficies precede them in our imagination, for ſolids conſiſt of ſuperficies. But neither are ſuperficies the elements of beings, for they conſiſt of lines; lines precede them; numbers precede lines. That which conſiſts of three lines, is called a Triangle; that which of four, a Quadrangle. Even line it ſelf, ſimply taken, is not conceived without number: but being carried on from one point to another, is conceived in two. As to Numbers, they all fall under the Monad: for the Duad is one Duad, the Triad one Triad, and the Decad one ſummary of number.

This moved *Pythagoras* to ſay, That the principle of all things is the Monad, by participation hereof, every being is termed One; and when we reflect on a being in its identity, we conſider a Monad: but when it receives addition by alterity, it produceth indeterminate Duad, ſo called, in diſtinction from the Arithmetical determinate Duads; by participation whereof, all Duads are underſtood, as Monads by the Monad. Thus there are two principles of beings, the firſt Monad, and the indeterminate Duad.

That theſe are indeed the principles of all things, the *Pythagoreans* teach variouſly. Of beings, (ſay they) ſome are underſtood by difference; others, by contrariety: others, by relation. *By difference*, are thoſe which are conſidered by themſelves, ſubjected by their proper circumſcription; as, a man, a horſe, a plant, earth, water, air, fire; each of theſe is conſidered abſolutely without any. *By contrariety*, are thoſe which are conſidered by contrariety of one to the other; as, good and ill; juſt, unjuſt; profitable, unprofitable; ſacred, profane; pious, impious; moving, fixt; and the like. *By relation*, thoſe which are conſidered by relation to others; as, right, left; upwards, downwards; double, half. For right is underſtood by a relative habit to left, and left by a relative habit to right; upwards to downwards, and downward to upwards; and ſo of the reſt. Thoſe which are underſtood by contrariety, differ from thoſe that are underſtood by relation. In contraries, the corruption of the one is the generation of another; as, of health, ſickneſs, motion, and reſt. The induction of ſickneſs is the expulſion of health, and the induction of health is the expulſion of ſickneſs; the ſame in grief and joy, good and ill, and all things of contrary natures. But the relative exiſt together, and periſh together; for right is nothing, unleſs there be left; double is nothing, unleſs we underſtand the half whereof it is the double. Moreover, in Contraries there is no mean, as between health and ſickneſs, life and death, motion and reſt. But betwixt Relatives there is a mean; as, betwixt greater and leſſer, the mean is equal: betwixt too much and too little, ſufficient: betwixt too flat and too ſharp, concord.

Above theſe three kinds, Abſolute, Contrary, Relative, there muſt neceſſarily be ſome ſupream Genus; every genus is before the ſpecies which are under it. For if the Genus be taken away, the ſpecies are taken away alſo; but the removal of the ſpecies takes not away the genus, the ſpecies depending on the genus, not the genus on the ſpecies. The tranſcending genus of thoſe things which are underſtood by themſelves, (according to the *Pythagoreans*) is the *One*; As that exiſts and is conſidered abſolutely, ſo they. Of contraries, equal and unequal, holds the place of a genus, for in them is conſidered the nature of all contrarieties; as, of reſt in equality, it admits not intenſion and remiſſion; of motion inequality, it admits intenſion and remiſſion. In like manner, natural inequality, it is the inſtable extremity; preternatural inequality, it admits intenſion and remiſſion. The ſame of health and ſickneſs, ſtraightneſs and crookedneſs. The relative conſiſts of exceſs and defect, as their genus; great and greater, much and more, high and higher, are underſtood by exceſs: little and leſs, low and lower, by defect.

Now foraſmuch as Abſolutes, Contraries, and Relatives, appear to be ſubordinate to other Genus's, (that is, to One, to Equality, and to Inequality, to Exceſs and Defect) let us examine, whether thoſe genus's may be reduc'd to others. Equality is reducible to One, for one is equal in it ſelf; inequality is either in exceſs or defect; of unequals, one exceeds, the other is deficient: Exceſs and defect are reducible to the indeterminate Duad; or, the firſt exeſs and defect is in two, in the excedent and the deficient. Thus the principles of all things appear in the top above all the reſt, the firſt Monad, and the indeterminate Duad.

Of these is generated the Arithmetical Monad and Duad, from the first Monad, one; from the Monad and the indeterminate Duad, two, the Duad being not yet constituted amongst Numbers, neither was there two, before it was taken out of the indeterminate Duad, of which, together with the Monad, was produced the Duad which is in Numbers. Out of these, in the same manner proceeded the rest of the Numbers, one continually stepping forward, the indeterminate Duad generating two, and extending Numbers to an infinite multitude.

Hereupon they affirm, that, in principles, Monad hath the nature of the efficient cause, Duad of passive matter; and after the same manner, as they produced Numbers, which consists of them, they composed the World also, and all things in it. A Point is correspondent to the Monad; the Monad is indivisible, so is the Point; the Monad is the principle of Numbers, so is the Point of Lines. A Line is correspondent to the Duad, both are considered by transition A line is length without breadth, extended betwixt two Points. A Superficies corresponds to the Triad; besides length whereby it was a Duad, it receives a third distance, breadth. Again, setting down three Points, two opposite, the third at the juncture of the lines made by the two, we represent a superficies. The solid figure and the body, as a Pyramid, answer the Tetrad; if we lay down, as before, three points, and set over them another point, behold the Pyramidical form of a solid body, which hath three dimensions, length, breadth, thickness.

Some there are who affirm, that a Body consists of one point, the point by fluxion makes a Line, the Line by fluxion makes a Superficies, the Superficies moved to thickness makes a Body, three ways dimensurable. This Sect of the *Pythagoreans* differs from the former; they held, that of two principles, the Monad and the Duad were made Numbers, of Numbers were made Points, Lines, Superficies, and Solids: These, that all things come from one point, for of it is made a line, of the line a superficies, of the superficies a body.

Thus are solid Bodies produc'd of Numbers precedent to them. Moreover, of them consist Solids, Fire, Water, Air, Earth, and in a word, the whole World, which is governed according to Harmony, as they affirm again, recurring to Numbers, which comprise the proportions that constitute perfect Harmony. (*b*) Harmony is a system consisting of three Concords, the Diatessaron, the Diapente, the Diapason; the proportions of these three Concords are found in the first four Numbers, one, two, three, four. The Diatessaron consists in a sesquitertia proportion. The Diapason in sesquialtera, the Diapente in duple; four being sesquitertius to three, (as consisting of three and one third) hath a Diatessaron proportion; three being sesquialter to two (as containing two and its half) a Diapente; four being the double of the Monad of two, a Diapason. The Tetractys affording the analogy of these Concords, which make perfect harmony, according to which all things are governed, they stil'd it,

b *Sext. Emp. adverſ. Log. lib.* 1.

*The root and fountain of eternal Nature.*

Moreover, whatsoever is comprehended by man, (say they) either is a body, or incorporeal; but neither of these is comprehended without the notion of Numbers: a body, having a triple dimension, denotes the number three. Besides, of Bodies, some are by connexion, as Ships, Chains, Buildings; others by union, compriz'd under one habit, as Plants, Animals; others by aggregation, as Armies, Herds. All these have numbers, as consisting of plurality. Moreover, of Bodies, some have simple qualities, others multiplicious, as an Apple, various colour to the sight, juyce to the taste, odour to the smell; these also are of the nature of numbers. It is the same of Incorporeals; Time, an incorporeal, is comprehended by number, years, months, days, and hours. The like of a Point, a Line, a Superficies, as we said already.

Likewise to numbers are correspondent both naturals and artificials. We judg every thing by criteries, which are the measures of numbers. If we take away number, we take away the Cubit, which consists of two half-cubits, six palms, twenty four digits; We take away the Bushel, the Ballance, and all other criteries, which consisting of plurality, are kinds of number. In a word, there is nothing in life without it. All art is a collection of comprehensions, collection implies number; it is therefore rightly said,

——*To Number all things reference have.*

that is, to dijudicative reason, which is of the same kind with numbers, whereof all consists. Hitherto *Sextus*.

(*c*) The sum of all (as by *Alexander* in his Successions, extracted out of the *Pythagorick* Commentaries) is this: *the Monad is the principle of all things. From the Monad came the indeterminate Duad, as matter subjected to the cause, Monad; from the Monad and the indeterminate Duad, Numbers; from Numbers, Points; from Points, Lines; from Lines, Superficies; from Superficies, Solids; from these, solid Bodies, whose Elements are four, Fire, Water, Air, Earth; of all which, transmutated, and totally changed, the World consists.* c *Laert.*

## CHAP. II.

### *Of the World.*

(*a*) THE World, or comprehension of all things, *Pythagoras* called κόσμος, from its order and beauty. a *Plut. plac. Stob. phyſ.*

(*b*) The World was made by God, (*c*) in thought, not in time; (*d*) He gave it a beginning from fire, and the fifth element: for there are five figures of solid bodies, which are termed Mathematical. Earth was made of a Cube, Fire of a Pyramis, Air of an Octaedre, Water of an Icosiedre, the Sphear of the Universe of a Dodecaedre. In these, *Plato* followeth *Pythagoras*. b *Plut. plac.* c *Stob. phyſ.* d *Plut. plac.*

(*e*) The World is corruptible in its own nature, for it is sensible and corporeal; but it shall never be corrupted, by reason of the providence and preservation of God. (*f*) Fate is the cause of the order of the Universe, and all particulars; (*g*) Necessity encompasseth the World. e *Plut.* f *Laert.* g *Plut. plac.* 25.

(*h*) The

(b) Laert. (b) The World is animate, intelligible, ſpherical, encloſing the earth in the midſt of it.

(i) Ariſt. phyſ. 4. (i) The *Pythagoreans* affirm, That what is without Heaven is infinite; for (k) beyond the

(k) Plut. plac. 2. 9. world there is a Vacuum, into which, and out of which, the world reſpires.

(l) Plut. plac. 2. (l) The right ſide of the World is the Eaſt, whence motion begins; the left is the Weſt.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of the Superiour or Ætherial parts of the World.*

(a) Anon. vit. (a) PYthagoras *firſt called* Heaven Κόσμον, *as being perfect in all kinds of animals, and adorned with all kinds of pulchritude.*

(b) Anon. vit. (b) *In the fixed Sphear reſides the firſt Cauſe; whatſoever is next him, that they affirm to be beſt, and firmly compounded and ordered; that which is furtheſt from him, the worſt. There is a conſtant order obſerved as low as the Moon, but all things beneath the Moon are moved promiſcuouſly.* For,

(c) Laert. (c) *The air which is diffuſed about the earth, is unmoved and unwholſome, and all things that are in it are mortal; but the air which is above is perpetually in motion, and pure, and healthful; and all that are in it are immortal, and conſequently divine.*

(d) Hierocl. in aur. carm. pag 313. (d) This they call, *The Free Æther,* (immediately above the Moon): *Æther, as being void of matter, and an eternal body; Free, as not being obnoxious to material diſturbances.* Hence it followeth, that

*The Sun, Moon, and the reſt of the Stars, according to* Pythagoras, *are gods.*

The *Pythagoreans* held, that every Star is a world in the infinite Æther, which containeth Earth, Air, and Æther. This opinion was alſo held by the followers of *Orpheus*, that every ſtar is a world.

(f) Plut. (f) The Sun is Spherical, eclipſed by the Moons coming under him.

(g) Plut. (g) The body of the Moon is of a fiery nature; ſhe receives her light from the Sun.

(h) Plut. (h) The Eclipſe of the Moon is a reverberation or obſtruction from the Antichthon.

(i) Plut. (i) The *Pythagoreans* affirm, that the Moon ſeems earthly, becauſe ſhe is round-about inhabited as our earth; but the creatures are larger and fairer, exceeding us in bigneſs fifteen times, neither have they any excrements; and their day is ſo much longer.

(k) Ariſtot. Meteor. 1. 6. (k) *Some of the* Pythagoreans *affirm, that a Comet is one of the Planets, but appears not in heaven but after a long time, and is near the Sun, as it happens alſo to* Mercury; *for, becauſe it recedes but little from the Sun, often when it ſhould appear it is hid, ſo as it appears not but after a long time.* Or,

(l) Plac. as (l) *Plutarch* expreſſeth it, *A Comet is one of thoſe ſtars which are not always apparent, but riſe after a certain period.*

(m) Plut. (m) Others hold, that it is the reflection of our ſight on the Sun, like images in glaſſes.

(n) Ælian. var. 27. (n) The Rain-bow he aſſerted to be the ſplendour of the Sun.

## SECT. IV.

### *Of the Sublunary parts of the World.*

OF the inferior Sublunary parts of the World, the (a) anonymous *Pythagorean* placeth *firſt the ſphear of fire, then that of Air, next that of Water; laſt, that of Earth.* (a) Apud Phot.

(b) the bodies of all the Elements are round, except that of Fire, which is conical. (b) Plut. plac. 1. 14.

(c) Below the Moon, all things move diſorderly, evil therefore neceſſarily exiſts about the Region of the Earth; that being ſetled loweſt as the baſis of the World, the receptacle of the loweſt things. (c) Anon apud Phot.

(d) The Air, which is diffuſed about the Earth, is unmoved and unwholeſom, and all things in it, are mortal. (d) Laert.

(e) There, is generation and corruption; for things are produced by alteration, mutation, and reſolution of the Elements. Motion is a difference, or alterity in matter. (e) Plut. plac. lib. cap. 23

(f) In the world, there is equally proportioned, light and darkneſs, and heat and cold, and ſiccity and humidity; which when they are exuberant, the exceſs of heat cauſeth Summer; of cold, Winter: when they are equal, then are the beſt ſeaſons of the year, whereof that which is growing up is the Spring, healthful; that which is decaying is Autumn, unhealthful. Even of the day, the morning is growing up, the evening decaying, and therefore more unwholeſome. (f) Laert.

## CHAP. V.

### *Of Living, and Animate Creatures.*

(a) THere *penetrates a beam from the Sun, through the Æther which is cold and dry; (they call the Air cold æther, and the Sun and humidity groſs æther) this beam penetrates to the Abyſs, and thereby all things vivificate; All things live in as much as they participate of heat; (wherefore even plants are* ζῶα, *living Creatures) but all things have not ſoul; the ſoul is a portion of æther of heat and cold, for it participates of cold æther; the ſoul differeth from life. She is immortal, becauſe that from which ſhe is taken is immortal.* Thus *Alexander* in his Succeſſions, out of the Commentaries of the *Pythagoreans.* (a) Laert.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of the Generation of Animate Creatures.*

(a) ANimate *Creatures are generated of one another by ſeed, (but of earth nothing can be generated). Seed is a diſtillation from the Brain,* [of the foam of the moſt uſeful part of the blood, the ſuperfluity of the Aliment, as blood and marrow] *which being injected* τῇ μήτρᾳ, *purulent matter, and moiſture, and blood, iſſue from the Brain, whereof Fleſh, Nerves, and Bones, and Hair, and the whole Body conſiſts:* [the power of Seed is incorporeal as the motive mind; but the effuſed matter corporeal.] *From the vapour comes the Soul* (a) Laert.

*and ſenſe; it is firſt compacted and coagulated in* 40 *days: and being perfected according to harmonical proportions in* 7, 9 *or* 10 *months (at the fartheſt) the Infant is brought forth, having all proportions of life; of which (aptly connected according to the proportions of harmony) it conſiſts; all things happening to it at certain times.* Thus *Alexander*, out of the Pythagorick commentaries; the proportions themſelves are more exactly deliver'd by (*b*) *Cenſorinus*; thus.

(*b*) *De die natal.* Cap. 11.

*Pythagoras* ſaid, that generally there are two kinds of births, one leſſer, of 7 months; which comes into the world the 207 day after the conception: the other greater of 10 months; which is brought forth in the 274 day. The firſt and leſſer is chiefly contained in the number 6: For that which is conceived of the Seed, (as he ſaith) the 6 firſt days, is a Milky ſubſtance; the next 8 days, bloody; which 8 with the 6 make the firſt concord, Diateſſaron: The third degree is of 9 days; in which time, it is made fleſh; theſe to the firſt 6 are in ſeſquialtera propoportion, and make the ſecond concord, Diapente: then follow 12 days more in which the body is fully formed; theſe to the ſame 6 conſiſt in duple proportion, and make the Diateſſaron concord: Theſe four numbers, 6, 8, 9, 12. added together make 35 days; nor without reaſon is the number 6 the foundation of generation, for the *Greeks* call it τελειον, we *perfect*; becauſe its three parts, $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{3}$ and $\frac{1}{6}$ (that is, 1, 2, and 3.) perfect it; Now as the beginnings of the Seed, and that Milky foundation of conception, is firſt compleated by this number; ſo this beginning of the Man now formed, and as it were another foundation of maturity, which is of 35 days, being multiplied by 6, makes 220 days, in which this maturity is fulfilled.

The other (greater) birth, is contained in the greater number 7. And as the beginning of the former is in 6 days, after which the ſeed is converted into blood; ſo that of this, is in 7. And as there the members of the Infant are formed; ſo here, in (about) 40. Theſe 40 days being multiplied by the firſt 7, make 280 days, that is, 40 weeks: but foraſmuch as the birth happens on the firſt day of the laſt week, 6 days are ſubſtracted, and the 274th obſerved.

(*c*) *Varro* de re ruſt. lib. 2. cap. 1. Cenſor. *de die nat.* cap. 4.

(*c*) He held that *Mankind had ever been; and never had beginning.*

## CHAP. VII.

*The Soul, its parts, and firſt of the irrational part.*

(*a*) Nemeſ. *de nat. hom.*

(*a*) THe power of number, being greateſt in Nature, *Pythagoras* defined the Soul,

(*b*) Plut.

(*b*) *A ſelf-moving Number.*

(*c*) Ariſt. de anima 1, 2.

(*c*) Of the *Pythagoreans*, ſome affirm, that the Soul is the motes in the Air; others, that it is that which moves thoſe motes.

(*d*) Plut. plac. 4 4.

(*d*) The ſoul is moſt generally divided into two parts, rational, and irrational, but more eſpecially into three; for, the irrational they divide into, iraſcible, and deſiderative. * Theſe are termed νῦς, Φρὴν, θυμὸς. Νῦς and θυμὸς are in other living Creatures, Φρὴν, only in man. [Yet

* Laert.

(*e*) Plut. plac. 20.

(*e*) The ſouls of all Animate Creatures are rational, even of thoſe which we term irrational, but they act not according to reaſon, becauſe of the ill Temperament of the body, and want of ſpeech, as in Apes, and Dogs, λαλοῦσι μὲν οὐ φθέγγονται δὲ, *They talk, but cannot ſpeak.*

The beginning of the ſoul, is from the heat of the brain, that part which is in the heart is θυμὸς, but φρένες and νῦς are in the Brain. The ſenſes are diſtillations from theſe, the rational part is immortal, the reſt mortal. The ſoul is nouriſhed by blood, and the faculties of the ſoul are ſpirits. Both the ſoul and her faculties are inviſible, for Æther is inviſible: The ſetters of the ſoul are Veins, Arteries, and Nerves; but when ſhe is ſtrong, and compoſed within her ſelf, her ſetters are Reaſons, and Actions.

(*g*) Every ſenſe is derived from its proper Element; ſight from Æther, hearing from Air, ſmelling from Fire, taſt from Water, touch from Earth.

(*g*) Stob. phy. 1. pag. 15.

Senſe in general, and particulary Sight, is a vapour very hot; and for this reaſon we are ſaid to ſee through air, and through water, for the heat pierceth the cold; for, if that which is in the eyes were a cold vapour, it would fight with the Air, which is like it, (hot.) In ſome places, he calleth the eyes the gates of the Sun; the ſame he determined concerning Hearing, and the reſt of the Senſes.

(*i*) Sight is the judge of Colours. (*k*) Colour they call the ſuperficies of a body. The kinds of Colour are Black, White, Red, Pale; or, (as the anonymous writer delivers the opinion of *Pythagoras*) Ten, Black, White, and the reſt between them, Yellow, Tawney, Pale, Red, Blew, Green, Bright, Grey. (**l*) The differences of Colours are derived from mixtions of the Elements, and, in living Creatures, from variety of place, and of Air.

(*i*) Anon. phy. (*k*) Plac. phy. 1. 15. for δόξαν perhaps ἀρχὰς. (*l**) Pa.

(*m*) The image in a mirrour is made by reflection of the ſight, which being extended to the * braſs, and meeting with a thick ſmooth body, is repercuſſed, and returns into it ſelf, as when the hand is ſtretch'd forth, and again brought back to the ſhoulder.

(*m*) Plac. phy. 4. 14. * Of which the Ancients made their Mirrours, as Callim. ſpeaks.

(*n*) Hearing, is the judge of Voice, ſharp and flat. (*o*) Voice is incorporeal; for not air, but the figure and ſuperficies of air, by a ſtroke becomes voice; but no ſuperficies is a body. And tho it followeth the motion of the body, yet it ſelf hath no body, as when a rod is bent, the ſuperficies ſuffers nothing, the matter only is bent.

(*n*) Anon. phy. (*o*) Plac. phy. 4. 20.

(*p*) Smelling judgeth of Odors, good and ill, and the ſix between them, putrid, humid, liquid, vaporate.

(*p*) Anon.

Taſte judgeth of ſavors, Sweet, Bitter, and the five between them, for they are in all ſeven, Sweet, Bitter, Sharp, Acid, Freſh, Salt, Hot.

Touching judgeth many things, Heavy, Leight, and thoſe that are between them; Hot, Cold, and thoſe that are between them; Hard, Soft, and thoſe that are between them; Dry, Moiſt, and thoſe that are between them. The other four Senſes are ſeated in the head only, and confined to their propar Organs; but Touching is diffuſed through the head, and the whole body; and is common to every ſenſe, but exhibits its judgment moſt manifeſtly by the hands.

CHAP.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of the Rational Part of the Soul, the Mind.*

IN *Pythagoras* his Definition of the Soul, *A self-moving Number*, (*a*) *Plutarch* ſaith, *he takes Number for Mind.* (*b*) The Mind, νοῦς, is induced into the Soul, *ab extrinſeco*, from without, (*c*) by divine participation, θείᾳ μέρᾳ, (*d*) delibated of the Univerſal Divine Mind. For (*e*) there is a Soul intent, and commeant through the whole Nature of things, from which our Souls are pluck'd. (*f*) She is immortal, becauſe that, from which ſhe is taken, is immortal; yet not a God, but the work of the eternal God. Thus (*g*) *Pythagoras* exceedingly confirmed the Opinion of his Maſter *Pherecides*, who firſt taught, that the Souls of men are ſempiternal.

a Plac. phil. 4. 2. b *Stob.* phyſ. 1. c Clem. Alex. ſtrom. 5. d Cic. de ſenect. e Cic. nat. deor. 1. f *Laert.* g *Cicer. Tuſc. queſt.* 1.

(*b*) Our Souls (ſaid he) conſiſt of a Tetrad, Mind, Science, Opinion, Senſe: from which proceeds all Art and Science, and by which we our ſelves are Rational. The mind therefore is a Monad, for the mind conſidereth according to a Monad. As for Example; There are many men; theſe one by one are incomprehenſible by Senſe, and innumerable, but we underſtand this, one Man, to which none hath Reſemblance; and we underſtand one Horſe, for the Particulars are innumerable. Thus every *Genus*, and *Species*, is according to Monad, wherefore to every one in particular they apply this Definition, A Rational Creature, or, A Neighing Creature. Hence is the mind a Monad, whereby we underſtand theſe things. The indeterminate Duad is Science: for all demonſtration, and all belief of Science, and likewiſe all Syllogiſm from ſome things granted, infers that which is doubted, and eaſily demonſtrateth another thing, the comprehenſion whereof is Science, therefore it is as the Duad. Opinion is juſtly a Triad, being of many. Triad implies a multitude, as, *Thrice happy* Greeks——[*The reſt of the Text is wanting.*

h Anon.

(*i*) The *Pythagoreans* aſſert Eight Organs of Knowledg, Senſe, Phantaſie, Art, Opinion, Prudence, Science, Wiſdom, Mind. Of theſe, we have common with Divine Natures, Art, Prudence, Science, Mind; with Beaſts, Senſe and Phantaſie; only Opinion is proper to us. *Senſe* is a deceitful knowledg through the Body; *Phantaſie*, a motion in the Soul; *Art*, a Habit of operating with Reaſon. We add, *with Reaſon*, for a Spider alſo operates, but without Reaſon. *Prudence* is a habit elective, of that which is right in things to be done; *Science* is a habit of thoſe things which are always the ſame, and in the ſame manner; *Wiſdom*, a knowledge of the firſt cauſe; *Mind*, the principle and fountain of all good things.

i *Anon.* apud *Phot.* de vit. Pyth.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Of the Tranſmigration of the Soul.*

WHat he delivered to his Auditors (ſaith (*a*) Porphyrius) none can certainly affirm, for there was a great and ſtrict ſilence obſerved amongſt them; but the moſt known are theſe: *Firſt, he ſaid, that the Soul is immortal; then, that it enters into other kinds of living creatures.* [Or, as *Laertius* expreſſeth it, *He firſt aſſerted, That the ſoul paſſing through the circle of Neceſſity, lives at ſeveral times in different living creatures.*] *Moreover, that after ſome periods, the ſame things that are now generated, are generated again, and that nothing is ſimply New; and that we ought to eſteem all animate creatures to be of the ſame kind with us. Theſe Doctrines* Pythagoras *ſeems to have brought firſt into* Greece. (*b*) *Diodorus Siculus* affirms, he learn'd them of the *Ægyptians*: (*c*) *They were the firſt who aſſerted, that the Soul of man is immortal, and the Body periſhing, it always paſſeth into another Body; and when it hath run through all things terreſtrial, marine, volatile, it again entreth into ſome generated humane body. Which circuition is compleated in three thouſand years. This Opinion* (adds *Herodotus*) *ſome of the* Greeks *have uſurped as their own, ſome more ancient, others later, whoſe Names knowingly I omit.*

a Pag. b Cited by *Euſeb* præpar. Evang. 10. c *Herodot.*

*Pythagoras*, (ſaith *Theodoret*) *Plato*, *Plotinus* and the reſt of that Sect, acknowledging Souls to be immortal, aſſerted, That they are præexiſtent to Bodies, that there is an innumerable company of Souls; that thoſe which tranſgreſs, are ſent down into bodies, ſo as being purify'd by ſuch Diſcipline, they may return to their own place. That thoſe which, whilſt they are in bodies, lead a wicked life, are ſent down farther into irrational creatures, hereby to receive puniſhment, and right expiation; the angry and malicious into Serpents, the ravenous into Woolves, the audacious into Lions, the fraudulent into Foxes, and the like.

(*e*) Upon this ground (as ſome conceive) it was, that he forbad to eat Fleſh: for, (*f*) *We ought to eſteem all animal creatures to be of the ſame kind with us*, and (*g*) *to have common right with us*, and (*h*) *to be allied* (*in a manner*) *to us.* Whence a Bean is by *Horace* ſtiled, *cognata Pythagoræ*, becauſe he forbad it to be eaten upon the ſame grounds; (*k*) *for that Men and Beans aroſe out of the ſame putrefaction.*

e *Anon.* vit. f *Porph.* loc. cit. g *Laert.* h *Jamb.* k *Porph.*

This Aſſertion he defended by many inſtances, particularly of himſelf. (*l*) *Heraclides* relates, that he ſaid, *He had been in former times* Æthalides, *eſteemed the Son of* Mercury, [(*m*) a powerful Orator, who wrote two Treatiſes, the one mournful, the other pleaſant; ſo that, like *Democritus* and *Heraclitus*, he bewailed and derided the inſtability of life, and was ſaid to die and live from day to day] *and that* Mercury *had him requeſt whatſoever he would, Immortality only excepted. That he deſired, that he might preſerve the remembrance of all actions, alive and dead: whereupon he remembred all things whilſt he lived, and after death retained the ſame memory. That afterwards he came to be* Euphorbus, *and was ſlain by* Menelaus. *Now* Euphorbus *ſaid, that he had been in former times* Æthalides, *and that he had received this gift from* Mercury, to know *the migration of the Soul, as it paſt from one Body to another, and into what Plants and Animals it migrated, and what things his Soul ſuffered after death, and what other Souls ſuffered.* Euphorbus *dying, his ſoul paſſed into* Hermotimus, *who deſiring to profeſs who he was, went to the* Branchidæ, *and coming into the Temple of* Apollo, *ſhewed the ſhield which* Menelaus *had hung up there,* [but (*n*) *Porphyrius* and (*o*) *Jamblichus* affirm, it was dedicated (together with other *Trojan* ſpoils) to Argive *Juno*, in

l *Laert.* m Τζετζ. Chil. 249. n Pag. o Cap.

in her Temple at *Mycenæ*) for he ſaid, That at his return from Troy, he had dedicated that Shield to Apollo, it being then old, and nothing remaining but the Ivory ſtock. As ſoon as Hermotimus died, he became Pyrrhus, a Fiſherman of Delus; and again remembred all things, how he had been firſt Æthalides, then Euphorbus, then Hermotimus, and laſtly Pyrrhus. When Pyrrhus died, he became Pythagoras, and remembred all that we have ſaid. Others relate, that he ſaid, he had been *firſt* Euphorbus; *ſecondly*, Æthalides; *thirdly*, Hermotimus; *fourthly*, Pyrrhus; *and laſtly*, Pythagoras.

p *Agell.* 4. 11. (p) *Clearchus* and *Dicæarchus*, that *he had been firſt* Euphorbus; *then* Pyrander; *then* Calliclea; *then*

q *Porph Jamb.* cap. 14. *a beautiful Curtezan, named* Alce. (q) *For this reaſon, of all* Homer's *Verſes, he did eſpecially praiſe theſe, and ſet them to the Harp, and often repeat them as his own Epicedium.*

As by ſome hand, a tender Olive ſet
In a lone place, near a ſmooth Rivolet:
Fair ſhe ſhoots up, and, fan'd on every ſide
By amorous winds, diſplays her blooming pride;
Until ſome churliſh unexpected guſt
Plows up her root, and buries her in duſt.
So by *Alcides* ſlain *Euphorbus* lay,
Stretch'd on the ground, his Arms the Victor's (prey.

r Lib. 15. Hence in his perſon, (r) *Ovid.*

s Engliſhed by my Uncle, Mr. *Sandys.* (s) O you, whom horrors of cold death affright,
Why fear you *Styx*? vain names, and endleſs night,
The dreams of Poets, and feign'd miſeries
Of forged Hell? Whether laſt-flames ſurprize,
Or age devours your bodies; they nor grieve,
Nor ſuffer pains. Our ſouls for ever live:
Yet evermore their ancient houſes leave
To live in new, which them, as gueſts receive.
In *Trojan* Wars, I (I remember well)
*Euphorbus* was, *Pantheus* ſon, and fell
By *Menelaus* Lance: my ſhield again
At *Argos* late I ſaw in *Juno's* fane.
All alter, nothing finally decays;
Hither and thither ſtill the ſpirit ſtrays,
Gueſt to all bodies, out of beaſts it flies
To men, from men to beaſts, and never dies.
As pliant wax each new impreſſion takes,
Fixt to no form, but ſtill the old forſakes,
Yet is the ſame: ſo ſouls the ſame abide,
Though various ſpecies their reception hide.
Then leſt thy greedy belly ſhould deſtroy
(I propheſie) depreſſed piety,
Forbear t'expulſe thy kindreds Ghoſts with food
By death procur'd, nor nouriſh blood with blood.

t *Porph.* p. 17. *Jamb.* cap. 14. u Pag. 31. x *Jamb.* cap. 28. pag. 132. See alſo *Ælian.* var. Hiſt. Neither did he inſtance himſelf only, but (t) *put many others alſo in mind of the accidents of their former life, how they had lived, before their ſouls were confined the ſecond time to the body. This he did* (adds (u) *Porphyrius*) *to thoſe, whoſe ſouls were rightly purifi'd; ſuch was* (x) Millias *of* Crotona, whom *he cauſed to call to memory, that he had been* Midas *ſon of* Gordias. *Whereupon* Millias *went to* Epire, *to perform ſome Funeral rites, as he appointed.*

## CHAP. X.

*The ſeparate life of the Soul.*

(a) THE Soul hath a twofold life, Separate, and in the body; her faculties are otherwiſe *in anima*, otherwiſe *in animali.* (a) *Stob. phyſ.*

(b) The Soul is incorruptible; for when it goes out of the body, it goes to the Soul of the world, which is of the ſame kind. (b) *Plut. plac.* 4. 7.

(c) When ſhe goeth out upon the earth, ſhe walketh in the air like a body. *Mercury* is the keeper of ſouls, and for that reaſon is called Πομπεὺς, and Πυλαῖος, and Χθόνιος, becauſe he brings ſouls out of bodies in the earth and the Sea; of which, thoſe that are pure, he leadeth into an high place; the impure come not to them, nor to one another, but are bound by the Furies in indiſſoluble chains. (c) *Laert.*

(d) The *Pythagoreans* affirmed, that *the ſouls of the dead neither caſt a ſhadow, nor wink*; for that it is the Sun which cauſeth the ſhadow. But he who enters there, is by the law of the place deprived of the Sun's light, which they ſignifie in that ſpeech. (d) *Plut. quæ. græc.*

(e) *Pythagoras* held, that *Earthquakes proceed from no other cauſe, but the meeting of the dead.* (e) *Ælian. var. hiſt.* 4. 26.

## SECT. V.

*Medicine.*

TO Phyſick we ſhall annex, as its immediate conſequent, Medicine. *Apuleius* affirms, that *Pythagoras* learnt the Remedies and Cures of Diſeaſes, of the Chaldeans. *Laertius*, that he neglected not Medicine. (a) *Ælian*, that he ſtudied it accurately. *Jamblichus*, that the *Pythagoreans* eſteem it not the leaſt of the Sciences. Laſtly, (b) *Diogenes* relates of *Pythagoras*, that whenſoever his friends fell into any indiſpoſition of body, he cured them. (a) *Var. hiſt.* 22. b *Porph.*

(c) Health *Pythagoras* defined, *The conſiſtence of a form.* Sickneſs, *The violation of it.* c *Laert.*

## CHAP. I.

*Diætetick.*

(a) OF *Medicine, the* Pythagoreans *chiefly applied themſelves to the Diætetick part, and were moſt exact in that; and endeavoured firſt to underſtand the proportion, not only of labour, but likewiſe of food and reſt. Then concerning the dreſſing of ſuch meats, they were almoſt the firſt who endeavoured to comment and to define.* a *Jamb.* cap. 29 pag. 147, 148.

(b) *Foraſmuch as Diet doth much conduce to good Inſtitution, being wholſome and regular. Let us examine what he decreed therein. Of meats, he abſolutely diſallowed ſuch, as are flatulent, and diſorder the body; on the contrary, he approved and commanded thoſe, which confirm and unite the conſtitution; whence he judged Millets to be a convenient food.* b *Jamb.* cap. 24.

*But he alſo wholly forbad ſuch meats as are not uſed by the gods, becauſe they ſeparate us from the correſpondence which we have with them.*

*Likewiſe he adviſed to abſtain from ſuch meats, as are eſteemed ſacred, which deſerve a reſpect, and are nothing convenient for the ordinary uſe of man.*

What-

*Whatsoever Meats obstructed Divination, or were prejudicial to the purity and sanctity of the mind, or to Temperance, and habitual Virtue, he advised to shun: As also those which are contrary to Purity, and defile the Imaginations which occur in sleep, and the other Purities of the Soul, he rejected and avoided.*

*These Rules concerning Diet he prescribed generally to (c) all persons, but more particularly to Philosophers (d), who are most addicted to contemplation of the sublimest things. He denied at once all superfluous meats as were unlawful to be eaten, not permitting them at any time to feed on that which had life, or to drink Wine, or to sacrifice to the Gods any living creature, or hurt any of them; but commanded with all exactness, to preserve the justice which belongs even to them. In this manner he lived himself, abstaining from the flesh of living creatures, and worshipping unbloody Altars, and both taking care, that others should not put tame beasts to death, and himself making the savage tame, and moderating and instituting them both by words and actions; but by no means would punish or kill them.*

c The Pythagorists. d The Pythagoricks.

*He likewise commanded civil Law-givers, to abstain from the flesh of living creatures, because it behoved them who would make use of the heighth of justice, no way to injure living creatures, which are of Affinity with us. For how can they perswade other men to do just things, who themselves are transported by Avarice to feed on living creatures, which are of Affinity with us, allyed, in a manner, to us, through the community of life, consisting of the temperament and commistion of the same Elements.*

*But to (e) others, whose life was not extraordinary pure, and sacred, and philosophical, he prescribed a certain time for Abstinence. To those he decreed, That they should not eat the Heart, That they should not eat the Brain. And these are prohibited to all* Pythagoreans; *for they are leaders, and, as it were, seats and houses of wisdom and life. But these were consecrated by the nature of the divine word.*

e Pythagorists.

*In like manner he prohibited Mallows, as being the first Messenger and Interpreter of Celestial Affections, and (as I may say) Compassions towards men.*

*Likewise he commanded to abstain from the Melanure,* [a fish so called from the blackness of its Tail] *because it is peculiar to the Terrestrial Deities.*

*He forbad also the Erythrine, for the like Reasons.*

*Also to abstain from Beans, for many Reasons, divine and natural, referring to the Soul.*

Iambl. cap. Athem. deipn. 10.

(f) The Pythagoreans at Dinner used Bread and Honey. VVine they drank not (betwixt Meals.) At Supper, VVine, and Maza, and Bread, and Broth, and Herbs, both raw and boiled. They likewise set before them the Flesh of sacrificed Beasts. They seldom eat Broths of Fish, because some of them are in some respects very hurtful, likewise (seldom) the Flesh of such Creatures as use not to hurt Mankind.

Porph. pag. 22. So Laertius also. Laert. Laert

(g) *As concerning the Diet of* Pythagoras *himself, his Dinner consisted (h) of Honey-Combs, or Honey, his Supper of Bread made of Millet, and* [(i) his Opsonium] *of boil'd or raw Sallads, very seldom of the Flesh of sacrificed Victims, and that not promiscuously of every part, (k)* [and seldom of Sea-fish.]

*(l) When he de designed to go into the private places of the Gods, and to stay there a while, he used for the most part such meats as expelled hunger and thirst. For the expelling of hunger, he made a composition of the seed of Poppy, and Sesame, and the skin of the Sea-Onyon well wash'd, till it be quite drain'd of the outward juice; of the Flowers of the Daffadil, and the leaves of Mallows, of Past of Barley and Pea: of all which taking an equal weight, and chopping them small, he made up into a Masse, with Hymettian Honey. Against thirst, he took of the seeds of Cowcumbers, and the fullest dried Raisins, taking out the kernels, and the Flower of Coriander, and the seeds of Mallows, and Purselain, and scraped Cheese, Meal and Cream; these he made up with wild Honey. This Diet, he said, was taught to* Hercules *by* Ceres, *when he was sent into the* Lybian *desarts.* l Porph pag. 23.

## CHAP. II.

### *Therapeutick.*

THE Therapeutick part *Pythagoras* practised by Cataplasms, Charms and Musick.

*(a) The* Pythagoreans (*saith* Jamblichus) *treated chiefly of* Cataplasms; *but Potions they less esteemed. And of those they used only such as were proper against Ulcerations; but Incision, and Cauterising they absolutely disallow'd.* a Cap.

*Magical Herbs, saith (b)* Pliny, *were first celebrated in our part of the world by* Pythagoras, *following the* Magi. *(c)* He *first wrote a Treatise of their Virtues, assigning the Invention and Original to* Apollo, *and* Æsculapius, *Immortal Gods.* b Lib. c Plin. 25. 2.

*(d) By* Coriacesia, *and* Callicia, Pythagoras *affirms, that water will be turned into ice, the mention whereof I find not, saith* Pliny, *in others, nor in him, any more concerning them.* d Plin. 24. 17.

*(e) He likewise speaks of* Menais, *which he also calls by another name* Corinthas, *the juice whereof boiled in water, he saith, immediately cures the biting of Serpents, fomenting the part therewith. The same juice being spilt upon the Grass, they who tread upon it, or are besprinkled therewith, die irrecoverably: a strange Nature of Poyson, except against Poyson.* e Plin. loc. cit.

*(f) There is an Herb called* Aproxis, *by the same* Pythagoras, *the Root whereof takes fire at distance, as* Naptha, *of which, saith* Pliny, *we have spoken in the wonders of the Earth. The same* Pythagoras *relates, That if any Disease shall happen to men when the* Aproxis *is in its Flower, although they be cured, yet shall they constantly have some grudging thereof as often as it blows: and VVheat, and Hemlock, and Violet, have the same quality. I am not ignorant, adds* Pliny, *that this Book is by some ascribed to* Cleemporus, *the Physician; but pertinacious Fame, and Antiquity, vindicate it to* Pythagoras. f Plin. loc. cit.

*(g)* Pythagoras *the Philosopher wrote also one Volume concerning the Sea Onyon, collecting the Medicinal properties thereof,* which *Pliny* professeth to have taken from him, *lib.* 20. And *(h)* again, he saith, *Pythagoras affirms, that a Sea-Onyon, hung over the Threshold of the Gate, hinders all ill Medicaments from entring the house.* g Plin. 19. 5. h Lib.

Like-

(i) Lib. 20. c. 9. (k) Lib 22. c 9. Likewise, *Coleworts* (as (i) *Pliny* relates) *were much commended by* Pythagoras. He adds (k) that *concerning the white kind of the Eringo, (by the* Romans *call'd,* Centum-capita*) there are many vanities delivered, not onely by the* Magi, *but by the* Pythagoreans.

Besides the Pharmaceutick, *Pythagoras* practised two other ways of cure, one by Musick, the other by Charm. Of the first we have already spoken. (l) Cap. Of the second, thus (l) *Jamblichus*: *There is also a way without the singing of birds, by which they expelled some passions, and sicknesses, (as they say) indeed by Incantation, whence it seems was derived the* (m) In ἐπαοιδὴ *word* ἐπῳδὴ, *The way of cure by Charm,* saith (m) the *Greek* Etymologist, *was of ancient use*; whence *Homer*:

—*And staid the black blood by a Charm.*

*and* Pindar, *speaking of* Æsculapius, ἀμφίτων, *with soft Charms.*

That *Pythagoras* made use of *Epodes*, is also affirmed by (n) *Porphyrius*. *He allayed*, saith he, *the passions of the Soul and Body by Rythms, and Verses, and Epodes.* (n) Pag. And *Diogenes*, cited by the same *Porphyrius*, *If his Friends fell into any indisposition of body, he healed them:* if they were troubled in mind, he asswaged their Grief, as we said, partly by Charms and Magick Verses, partly by Musick. For he had some Verses proper to the cure of the indispositions of the body, by singing which, he restored the sick to their former health: He had other Verses that procured forgetfulness of grief, asswaged anger, and suppressed inordinate desires.

Of these Charms we find an Instance preserved by (o) *Pliny*, who prescribes, as *an Invention of* Pythagoras, *which seldom fails against Lameness, or Blindness, or the like Accidents, to apply to the part; if on the right side, an uneven number of Vowels of impositive words; if on the left, an even.* (o) Lib. 23. c. 4.

# THE DOCTRINE OF PYTHAGORAS.

## CHAP. I.

### Pythagoras *his Symbolical way of Teaching.*

(a) Porph. pag. (a) PYTHAGORAS *had a two-fold manner of teaching: whatsoever he communicated to his Auditors, was delivered, either plainly or symbollically.* Hitherto of the plain way. We come now to the other, the symbollical.

(b) Jamb. cap. 89. pag. 146. (b) *He used by short sentences to vaticinate an infinite multiplicious signification to his Disciples, after a symbollical manner: no otherwise than* Apollo *by short Answers exhibits many imperceptible sentences; and Nature her self, by small seeds, most difficult effects. Of this kind is,*

——half, is the whole's beginning.

*an Apophthegm of* Pythagoras *himself. Neither in that Hemistick only, but in others of the same kind, the most divine* Pythagoras *wrapped up sparks of truth, for such as could enkindle them, in a short way of speech treasuring up concealed a most copious production of Theory: as in this,*

——to number all have reference.

*And again,* φιλότης, ἰσότης, Friendship, Equality; *and in the word* Κόσμος, (World, or Heaven) *and in the word* Philosophy, *and in* τὴν τετρακτύν, *and in that celebrious word* Tetractys. *All these, and many more, did* Pythagoras *invent, for the benefit and rectification of such as conversed with him.*

Some

Some things likewiſe (ſaith (c) *Porphyrius*) he ſpoke in a myſtical way ſymbollically, moſt of which are collected by *Ariſtotle*; as when he calleth the Sea, (d) *a tear of Saturn*; the two Bears, *the hands of Rhea*; the Pleides, *the Lutes of the Muſes*; the Planets, *the dogs of Proſerpina*; [the (e) eyes, *the gates of the Sun.*]

(f) He had alſo another kind of Symbols, as, *Go not over a ballance*; that is, *Shun avarice*, &c. Thus *Porphyrius*. Theſe are variouſly recited and interpreted by ſeveral Authors; we ſhall begin with *Jamblichus*, as being herein of greateſt credit.

(b) Pag. 24.
(d) For, τὴν ἀστρολογίαν ἐκάλεσε δάκρυα; read ἀκάλεσε Κρόνου δάκρυα, for Κρόνου, for
(e) Clemens Alexdrinus, Strom. lib. 5. pag. 571.
(f) Laert. & Porph. loco cit.

## CHAP. II.

### *The Symbols of* Pythagoras, *according to* Jamblichus.

(a) THE laſt way of exhortation to Virtue, and dehortation from Vice, is that by Symbols; one way being proper to the Sect, not communicable to other Inſtitutions; another vulgar and common to them; the third is betwixt both, neither abſolutely Publick, nor wholly *Pythagorical*, nor quite different from either; ſuch are thoſe they term Symbols, of which, as many as deſerve commemoration, in our opinion, of the adhortatory form, we ſhall communicate, and add a ſuitable interpretation; conceiving that hereby, the exhortation to Philoſophy may be more prevalent on thoſe that hear them, than if delivered more at large. And foraſmuch as we ſhall inſert ſome Exoterick ſolutions, common to all Philoſophy, it is to be underſtood, as different from the meaning of the *Pythagoreans*. But inaſmuch as we ſhall intermix ſome of the moſt particular opinions of the *Pythagoreans*, conſonant to each; this is wholly proper to them, and diſſonant from all other Philoſophers, but moſt fit to be alledged. This will inſenſibly lead us from the Exoterick notions, bringing us to the others, and acquainting us with them. And to the exhortations framed according to this Sect, as a Bridg or Ladder, by which we aſcend from a depth to a great heighth, guiding the minds of thoſe, who addict themſelves genuinely thereto. For to this end it was framed, according to imitation of the things already mentioned. For the moſt ancient, and ſuch as were contemporary with, and diſciples to *Pythagoras*, did not compoſe their writings intelligible, in a common vulgar ſtyle, familiar to every one, as if they endeavoured to dictate things readily perceptible by the hearer, but conſonant to the ſilence decreed by *Pythagoras*, concerning divine myſteries, which it was not lawful to ſpeak of before thoſe, who were not initiated; and therefore clouded both their mutual diſcourſes and writings by Symbols; which, if not expounded by thoſe that propoſed them, by a regular interpretation, appear to the hearers like old wives proverbs, trivial and fooliſh; [(b) but being rightly explained, and inſtead of dark, rendred lucid and conſpicuous to the vulgar, they diſcover an admirable ſenſe, no leſs than the divine Oracle of Pythian *Apollo*, and give a divine inſpiration to the Philologiſts that underſtand them.] That therefore their benefit may be known, and their adhortative uſe manifeſt, we will give the ſolutions of every Symbol, both after the Exoterick and the Acroatick way, not omitting thoſe things which were preſerved in ſilence, not communicable to uninitiated perſons. The Symbols are theſe:

(a) *Jamb. protrept. cap. ult.*

(b) *Vit. cap. 23.*

1. *When you go to the Temple, worſhip, neither do nor ſay any thing concerning life.*
2. *If there be a Temple in your way, go not in, no not though you paſs by the very doors.*
3. *Sacrifice and worſhip barefoot.*
4. *Decline high-ways, and take the foot-path.*
5. *Abſtain from the Melanure, for it belongs to the Terreſtrial gods.*
6. *Above all things, govern your tongue, when you follow the gods.*
7. *When the winds blow, worſhip the noiſe.*
8. *Cut not fire with a ſword.*
9. *Turn away from thy ſelf every edg.*
10. *Help a man to take up a burthen, but not to lay it down.*
11. *Put on the ſhoo firſt on the right foot, but the left foot firſt into the baſon.*
12. *Diſcourſe not of Pythagorean things without light.*
13. *Paſs not over a pair of Scales.*
14. *Travelling from home, turn not back; for the Furies go back with you.*
15. *Urine not, being turned towards the Sun.*
16. *Wipe not a ſeat with a Torch.*
17. *A Cock keep, but not ſacrifice; for it is conſecrated to the Moon and the Sun.*
18. *Sit not upon a Chœnix.*
19. *Breed nothing that hath crooked talons.*
20. *Cut not in the way.*
21. *Receive not a Swallow into your houſe.*
22. *Wear not a Ring.*
23. *Grave not the image of God on a Ring.*
24. *Look not in a glaſs by candle-light.*
25. *Concerning the gods, disbelieve nothing wonderful, nor concerning divine Doctrines.*
26. *Be not taken with immoderate laughter.*
27. *At a ſacrifice, pare not your nails.*
28. *Lay not hold on every one readily with your right hand.*
29. *When you riſe out of bed, diſorder the coverlet, and deface the print.*
30. *Eat not the Heart.*
31. *Eat not the Brains.*
32. *Spit upon the cuttings of your hair, and the parings of your nails.*
33. *Receive not an Erythrine.*
34. *Deface the print of a pot in the aſhes.*
35. *Take not a woman that hath gold, to get children of her.*
36. *Firſt honour the figure and ſteps, a figure and a Tribolus.*
37. *Abſtain from Beans.*
38. *Set Mallows, but eat it not.*
39. *Abſtain from living creatures.*

## CHAP. III.

### *An Explication of the* Pythagorick *Symbols, by* Jamblichus.

ALL theſe Symbols are in general adhortative to all virtue; and every one of them

in particular conduceth to ſome particular virtue, and part of Philoſophy, and learning; as the firſt are adhortative to devotion, and divine knowledg.

SYMB. I.

FOr this, *When you go to the Temple, worſhip, neither do nor ſay any thing concerning life*, obſerves the Divinity after ſuch manner, as it is in it ſelf, pure and incommixt. He joyns pure to the pure, and takes care, that no worldly buſineſs inſinuate it ſelf into the divine worſhip; for they are things wholly different and oppoſite to one another. Moreover, this conduceth much to Science; for we ought not to bring to the divine Science any ſuch thing, as humane conſideration, or care of outward life. Thus nothing is hereby commanded, but that divine diſcourſes, and ſacred actions, ought not to be intermixt with the inſtable manners of men.

SYMB. II.

TO that is conſonant the next, *If a Temple lie in your way, go not in, not though you paſs by the very doors.* For if like is delightful to its like, it is manifeſt that the Gods, having the chiefeſt eſſence of all things, ought to have the principal worſhip: but if any man doth it upon occaſion of any other thing, he makes that the ſecond, which is the firſt and chiefeſt of all; and by that means he ſubverts the whole order of worſhip, and ſcience. The moſt excellent good, ought not to be ranked in the latter place, as inferior to humane good; neither ought our own affairs to have the place of the chief end and better things, either in our words or thoughts.

SYMB. III.

THat which follows is an exhortation to the ſame, for this, *Sacrifice and worſhip bare foot*, ſignifieth one way, that we ought to ſerve the Gods, and perform their knowledg decently and moderately, not exceeding the order in the earth. Another way that we ought to perform their ſervice and knowledg, being free without Fetters. This the Symbol commands to be obſerv'd, not in the body only; but in the acts of the ſoul, that they be not reſtrained by paſſions, nor by the infirmity of the body, nor by our external generation, but all free and ready for communication with the Gods.

SYMB. IV.

THere is another Symbol of this kind, exhorting to the ſame virtue; *Concerning the gods, disbelieve nothing wonderful, and concerning divine Doctrines.* This rule is religious, and declareth the ſuperlative excellence of the Gods; inſtructing us, and putting us in mind, that we ought not to eſtimate the Divine power by our own Judgment. To us who are corporeal, and generated, and corruptible, and tranſitory, and obnoxious to ſeveral diſeaſes, and to narrowneſs of habitation, and to aggravation of motion towards the Center, and to ſleepineſs, and to indigence, and to abundance, and to imprudence, and to infirmity, and to impediment of ſoul, and the like, ſome things will ſeem difficult, and impoſſible; yet have we many excellencies by Nature: but we are quite ſhort of the Gods, neither have we the ſame power, or ability. This Symbol, therefore, chiefly adviſeth to a knowledg of the Gods, as of thoſe who are able to do all things; whence it admoniſheth *to disbelieve nothing concerning the Gods.* There is added, *nor concerning divine Doctrines*, meaning thoſe which are declared by the *Pythagorick* Philoſophy; becauſe they being ſetled by Mathematicks, and Scientifick ſpeculation, will ſhow by demonſtration, ſtrengthned by neceſſity, that there are true Beings exiſtent, void of fallaciouſneſs.

Theſe may alſo exhort to the Science concerning the Gods, and perſwade that ſuch a Science is to be acquired, as by which we ſhall not * diſbelieve any thing concerning the Gods: The ſame may adviſe to divine Doctrines, and to proceed by Mathematicks; for they only clear the eyes, and are illuminative of all Beings, to him that will behold them; for by participation of Mathematicks, One thing is conſtituted before all; that we disbelieve not any thing, either concerning the nature of the Gods, or their Eſſence, or their Power: nor of thoſe *Pythagorical* Doctrines, which ſeem monſtrous to perſons, not-initiated into Mathematicks: Thus *disbelieve not*, is equivalent to, *acquire and poſſeſs* thoſe things, by means whereof you ſhall not disbelieve; that is, Mathematicks, and Scientifick Demonſtrations.

* Perhaps ἀπιστήσωμεν.

SYMB. V.

THE next Symbol tends (as I conceive) to the ſame effect; *Declining high-ways, walk in path-ways.* For it commandeth to leave the publick popular courſe of life, and to purſue that which is ſeparate, and divine: Likewiſe that we deſpiſe the common opinions, and much eſteem the private, which are not to be divulged; and to contemn the pleaſure which tends towards men; but to value exceedingly that felicity, which is joyned with the divine will: And to leave humane cuſtomes as vulgar; but to apply our ſelves to the worſhip of the Gods, which far excels the ordinary courſe of life. Allied to this, is that which followeth.

SYMB. VI.

ABſtain from the Melanure, for it belongs to the Terreſtrial Gods. We ſhall ſay more upon it, in our explication of the adhortative Symbols: It adviſeth to make choice of the Heavenly Journey, and to adhere to the Intellectual Gods, and to withdraw our ſelves from Material nature, and to direct our courſe to that life, which is pure, void of matter, and to make uſe of the beſt way of Divine worſhip, and that which is moſt ſuitable to the chief deities. Theſe Symbols are adhortative to the knowledg and worſhip of the Gods.

SYMB.

SYMB. VII.

THe following Symbols exhort to Wiſdom; *Above all things govern your Tongue, following the Gods*; for the firſt work of Wiſdom is to revert our ſpeech into it ſelf, and to accuſtom it not to paſs forth, that it may be perfect within our ſelves, and in its converſion towards our ſelves; Moreover *in following the Gods:* For nothing renders the mind ſo perfect, as when a man, being reverted into himſelf, followeth the Gods.

SYMB. VIII.

THis Symbol likewiſe, *When the winds blow, worſhip the noiſe*, is an exhortation to Divine Wiſdom; For it implieth that we ought to love the ſimilitude of Divine Natures, and Powers: and when they make a reaſon ſuitable to their efficacies, it ought exceedingly to be honoured and reverenced.

SYMB. IX.

THe next Symbol, *Cut not fire with a Sword*, exhorts to wiſdom; for it excites in us a convenient knowledg, that we ought not to give ſharp language to a man full of fire and anger, nor to conteſt with him; for you may often by words exaſperate and trouble a rude and unlearned perſon. Of this *Heraclitus* witneſſeth; *To conteſt with anger* (ſaith he) *is hard, for whatſoever it would have done, it will purchaſe tho at the expence of life.* And he ſaid truly; for many, gratifying their own anger, have exchanged their Souls, and preferred death before them: but from continence of the Tongue, and peacefulneſs, this happens, that out of contention ariſeth friendſhip, the wrathful fire being extinguiſhed, and thou thy ſelf wilt appear, not to be void of reaſon. This Symbol is confirmed by that which followeth.

SYMB. X.

*TUrn away from thy ſelf every edge*; for, towards whomſoever it ſhall be turned, it will hurt him. This Symbol commandeth to uſe prudence, not anger; for that edg of the mind which we call anger, is void of reaſon and prudence; for anger boileth like a pot upon the fire, never dividing the mind to that which is paſt. You muſt therefore ſettle your mind in tranquillity, diverting it from anger, and often preventing your ſelf; as a man maketh braſs ſound, not without touching it. This paſſion therefore muſt be ſuppreſt by reaſon.

SYMB. XI.

THis, *Help to lay on a burthen, but not to take it off*, adviſeth to fortitude; for, whoſoever layeth on a burthen, ſignifieth labour and action; but he who taketh it off, reſt and remiſneſs. The meaning therefore of the Symbol is this, Be not the cauſe, either to thy ſelf or any other, of remiſneſs of mind, and ſoft life; for every uſeful thing is acquited by labour. This Symbol *Pythagoras* called Herculean, as being ſealed by his labours; for whilſt he lived amongſt men, he paſſed frequently through fire, and many difficulties, ſhunning idleneſs. From actions and labour proceeds a right office, but not from ſloath.

SYMB. XII.

THis, *Pluck off your right ſhoo firſt, but put your left foot firſt into the baſon*, exhorts to active prudence; that good actions, as right, are to be ſet round about us; but the ill, as leſt, to be laid aſide and rejected.

SYMB. XIII.

THis, *Diſcourſe not of Pythagorean things without light*, is chiefly adhortatory, that the mind acquire prudence; for that reſembles the light of the mind, which being indefinite, limits and reduceth it, as it were, out of darkneſs into light; It is therefore chiefly requiſite to look upon the mind, as guide of all good actions in life; but in the Pythagorick doctrines, this is moſt particularly neceſſary; for it is not poſſible to underſtand what they are, without light.

SYMB. XIV.

THis, *Paſs not over a ballance*, commands to do juſtly, and above all things, to reſpect equality and mediocrity, and to know juſtice, the moſt perfect Virtue, which compleats the reſt, and without which, the reſt profit nothing; neither muſt we know it ſuperficially only, but by Theorems, and ſcientifick Demonſtration. This knowledg is the work of no Art and Science, but only of the Philoſophy of *Pythagoras*, which preferreth Mathematicks before all things elſe.

SYMB. XV.

TO the ſame purpoſe is this, *Travelling from home, turn not back, for the furies go back with you.* This Symbol exhorteth to Philoſophy, and free action about the mind. It likewiſe manifeſtly teacheth thus, When thou ſtudieſt Philoſophy, ſeparate thy ſelf from all corporeal and ſenſible things, and truly make a meditation of death unto things intelligible, which are always the ſame, and after the ſame manner; proceeding (without turning back) by Mathematicks, conducing thereto. For travel is the change of Place, death is the ſeparation of the Soul from the Body. But we muſt ſo ſtudy Philoſophy, as to make uſe of the pure mind ſincerely, without the acts of corporeal ſenſes, to the comprehenſion of the truth which is in things that are, which is acknowledged to be wiſdom. But after you have once applyed your ſelf to ſtudy Philoſophy, turn not back, nor be drawn back to the former corporeal things, in which you were bred up; for you will much repent hereof, being hindred from ſacred comprehenſions, by the darkneſs which is in corporeal things. Repentance they called *Erinys*, or *Fury*.

SYMB. XVI.

THis, *Urine not being turned towards the Sun*, admoniſheth, that we offer not to do any beſtial action, but to ſtudy and practiſe Philoſophy, looking upon Heaven and the Sun; and remember, that in the ſtudy of Philoſophy, you never bear a low mind, but by the contemplation of heavenly things, aſcend to the gods, and to wiſdom. And having applyed your ſelf to ſtudy Philoſophy, and to the light of truth that is in it, purifying your ſelf, and converting your ſelf wholly to that deſign, to Theology, and Phyſiology, and Aſtronomy, and Ætiologick, which is above all the reſt, do nothing irrational or beſtial.

SYMB. XVII.

THe ſame meaning is of the next, *Wipe not a ſeat with a Torch*; for not only becauſe a Torch is purificative, as partaking of much quick fire, like Sulphur, it adviſeth, that this ought not to be defiled, its nature being ſuch, as it diſpelleth all things that defile; nor ought we to oppoſe natural habitude, by defiling that, whoſe nature is repugnant to defiling. Much leſs ought we to joyn and mix things proper to wiſdom, with thoſe which are proper to animality. For, *a Torch*, in reſpect of its brightneſs, is compared to Philoſophy; *a Seat*, in reſpect of its lowneſs, to Animality.

SYMB. XVIII.

THis, *Breed a Cock, but not ſacrifice it; for it is ſacred to the Moon and the Sun*; admoniſheth us, to nouriſh and cheriſh (and not to neglect, ſo as to ſuffer them to periſh and corrupt) the great evidences of the union, and coagmentation, and ſympathy, and conſpiration of the World. It therefore adviſeth, to addreſs our ſelves to contemplation of the Univerſe, and to Philoſophy; for the truth of all things being by nature concealed, and hard to be found out, yet requiſite to be ſought, and inveſtigated by man, chiefly through Philoſophy, (for to do it by any other ſtudy is impoſſible) which receiving ſome little ſparks from nature, blows them up, and makes them greater and more perſpicuous by its Doctrines. Philoſophy therefore ought to be ſtudied.

SYMB. XIX.

THis, *Sit not upon a Chœnix*, may appear to be more Pythagorical, from what was already ſaid; for becauſe aliment is to be meaſured by corporeity and animality, not by the Chœnix, reſt not, nor lead thy life uninitated into Philoſophy; but applying thy ſelf thereto, take greateſt care of that in thee which is moſt Divine, the Soul, and in the Soul, chiefly the mind, whoſe aliment is not meaſured by the Chœnix, but by contemplation and diſcipline.

SYMB. XX.

THis, *Breed nothing that hath crooked talons*, adviſeth to a thing which is yet more Pythagorical; be free and communicative, and endeavour to make others ſuch alſo, accuſtoming thy ſelf to give and receive without grudging or envy; not to take all things inſatiably, and to give nothing. For the natural condition of thoſe Fowls, which have crooked talons, is, to receive and ſnatch readily and quickly, but not eaſily to let go, or impart to others, by reaſon of the tenacity of their talons, being crooked, as the nature of Shrimps is ſuch, that they quickly lay hold of a thing, but very hardly part with it, unleſs they be turned upon their backs. Now we having hands given us by nature, proper to communicate, and ſtraight not crooked fingers, ought not to imitate thoſe which have crooked talons, unlike us; but rather mutually to communicate to, and participate from, one another, as being excited thereto by thoſe, who firſt gave names to things, who named the more honourable hand δεξιὰν, *the right*, not only ἀπὸ τῦ δέχεσθαι, *from receiving*; but likewiſe, ἀπὸ τῦ δεξίαν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ μεταδιδόναι, *from being ready to receive in communicating*. We muſt therefore do juſtly, and for that reaſon Philoſophiſe; for Juſtice is a return and remuneration, exchanging and ſupplying exceſs and defect.

SYMB. XXI.

THis, *Cut not in the way*, that truth is one, falſhood multiplicious; which is manifeſt from this, that what every thing is, ſpeaking plainly, is expreſſed but one way; but what it is not, is expreſſed infinite ways. Philoſophy ſeems to be a way; it therefore ſaith, Chooſe that Philoſophy, and that way to Philoſophy, in which thou ſhalt not cut (or divide) nor eſtabliſh contrary Doctrines, but thoſe which are conſtituted and confirmed by ſcientifick demonſtration, by Mathematicks and contemplation; which is, *Philoſophiſe Pythagorically*. It may be taken alſo in another ſenſe, foraſmuch as that Philoſophy which proceeds by corporeals and ſenſibles, (with which Philoſophy, the younger ſort are ſatisfied, who conceive, that God, and Qualities, and the Mind, and Virtues, and in a word, all the principal cauſes of things, are Bodies) is eaſily ſubverted and confuted, as appears by the great diſagreement amongſt them, who go about to ſay any thing therein. But the Philoſophy which is of incorporeals, and intelligibles, and immaterials, and eternals, which are always the ſame in themſelves, and towards one another, never admitting corruption or alteration, is firmly eſtabliſhed, and the cauſe of irrefragable demonſtration. Now this precept adviſeth us, when we Philoſophiſe, and perfect the way which is manifeſt, that we ſhun the ſnares and entertainments of corporeals and diviſibles, and intimately apply our ſelves to the ſubſtance of incorporeals, which are never unlike themſelves, by reaſon of the truth and ſtability which they naturally have.

SYMB.

SYMB. XXII.

THis, *Receive not a Swallow into your houſe*, adviſeth, that you admit not a ſlothful perſon (who is not a conſtant lover of labour, neither will perſevere to be a diſciple) unto your Doctrines, which require continual labour and patience, by reaſon of the variety and intricateneſs of the ſeveral diſciplines. He makes uſe of the Swallow to repreſent ſloth, and cutting off times, becauſe this bird comes to us but in one ſeaſon of the year, and then ſtays but a ſhort while with us; but is abſent from us, and out of our ſight, a much longer ſpace.

SYMB. XXIII.

THis, *Wear not a Ring*, is likewiſe adhortatory after the *Pythagorick* way, thus: Foraſmuch as a Ring encompaſſeth the finger of the wearer, in nature of a chain, but hath this property, that it pincheth not, nor paineth, but is ſo fit, as if it naturally belonged to that part; and the body is ſuch a kind of chain to the ſoul. *Wear not a Ring*, ſignifies, *Philophiſe truly*, and ſeparate your ſoul from the chain which goeth round about it. For Philoſophy is the meditation of death, and ſeparation of the ſoul from the body. Seriouſly and earneſtly therefore apply your ſelf to the *Pythagorick* Philoſophy, which ſeparates the ſoul, by the mind, from all corporeals, and is converſant about intellectuals and immaterials, by Theoretick doctrines. But untye and looſe your ſins, and all things that pluck you back and hinder philoſophiſing, diverſions of the fleſh, exceſſive eating, unſeaſonable repletion, which, as it were, fetter the body, and continually breed infinite diſeaſes.

SYMB. XXIV.

THis, *Grave not the image of God in a Ring*, adviſeth thus, Philoſophiſe, and, above all things, think, that the gods are incorporeal. This Symbol is, beyond all others, the Seminary of the *Pythagorick* doctrines; of it all things (almoſt) are fitly adapted, and by it, are eſtabliſhed to the end. Think not that they uſe forms that are corporeal, neither that they are received into material ſubſtance, fettered (as it were) to the body, like other living beings. The figures engraved in Rings, in the very Ring expreſs a chain, and corporeity, and ſenſible form, as it were the figure of ſome animal, perceptible by ſight, from which we muſt abſolutely ſeparate the gods, as being eternal and intelligible, and always the ſame in themſelves, and towards one another; as is largely diſcourſed in the Treatiſe concerning God.

SYMB. XXV.

THis, *Look not in a glaſs by candle light*, adviſeth more *Pythagorically* thus: Philoſophiſe, purſuing, not the phantaſies of ſenſe (which give a kind of light to comprehenſions, like a candle, neither natural nor true) but thoſe which procure Science, and are converſant in the mind, by which a moſt bright purity is conſtituted in the eye of the ſoul, of all Notions, and Intelligibles, and the ſpeculation of them, but not of Corporeals and Senſibles; for they are in continual fluxion and mutation, (as hath often been ſhown) no way ſtable, nor exiſting like themſelves, whereby they might uphold a firm and Scientifick comprehenſion, as the others do.

SYMB. XXVI.

THis, *Be not ſeiſed with immoderate laughter*, ſhoweth that we ſhould vanquiſh paſſions: Put thy ſelf in mind of right reaſon; be neither blown up in good fortune, nor caſt down in bad; admitting no thought of change in either. He named *Laughter* above all other paſſions, becauſe that is moſt apparently ſhown in the face it ſelf; perhaps alſo, becauſe this is proper to man only of all living Creatures; whence ſome define man, A riſible living Creature. This precept ſhows that we ought to take humanity only, as it were in our way, like gueſts; but to acquire the imitation of God, as far as we are able; by Philoſophiſing, ſecretly withdrawing our ſelves from the property of men, and preferring the rational before the riſible, in diſtinction from other Creatures.

SYMB. XXVII.

THis, *At a Sacrifice pare not your nails*, is adhortative to friendſhip: for of Domeſticks and Allies, ſome being nearly related to us, as Brothers, Children, Parents, are like our Limbs and Parts, which cannot be taken away without much pain and main: others who are allied to us at a great diſtance, as the Children of Uncles; or of Couſins, or their Children, or ſuch like, reſemble thoſe parts which may be cut off without pain, as Hair, Nails, and the like. Intending therefore to ſignifie thoſe allies, whom, by reaſon of this diſtance, we at other times neglect, he uſeth the word *nails*, ſaying, Caſt not thoſe quite away; but, in Sacrifices, though at other times neglected) carry them along with you, and renew your Domeſtick familiarity with them.

SYMB. XXVIII.

THis, *Lay not hold on every one readily with your right hand*, ſaith, Give not your right hand eaſily, that is, Draw not to you, nor endeavour to draw out improper and unitiated perſons, by giving them your right hand: Moreover, to ſuch as have not been long tried by Diſciplines and Doctrines, nor are approved as worthy to participate of Temperance, and of the Quinquennial ſilence and other Trials, the right hand ought not to be given.

SYMB. XXIX.

THis, *When you riſe out of bed, wrap the coverlets together, and confound the print of your body*, adviſeth, that having undertaken to Philoſophiſe, you ſhould acquaint your ſelf with Intellectuals, and Incorporeals: Therefore as ſoon as you riſe from the ſleep of ignorance, and that darkneſs which reſembles night; draw not to your ſelf any corporeal thing, to the light of Philoſophy,

loſophy which reſembles the day; but blot out of your remembrancce all prints of that ſleep.

SYMB. XXX.

THis, *Eat not the heart*, ſignifieth, that we ought not to tear aſunder the unity and conſpiration of the whole; Moreover it implieth, Be not envious, but obliging, and communicative: hereupon it exhorted to Philoſophiſe. For of all Arts and Sciences, only Philoſophy envieth not the good of others, nor grieveth thereat, nor rejoyceth in the ill of a neighbour; but declareth that all men are by nature allied to one another, and friends, and alike affected, and ſubjected alike to fortune, and alike ignorant of the future; and therefore commands them to commiſerate and love one another, as becomes a Creature, ſociable and rational.

SYMB. XXXI.

LIke that, is this, *Eat not the Brain*, for that is the principal inſtrument of Wiſdom; it ſignifieth therefore that we ought not with reproaches to bite and tear in pieces, things well intended, and Doctrines. Thoſe are well intended, which are exactly conſidered by the principal reaſon of mind, like to things comprehended by Science; for theſe are beheld not by the organs of the irrational ſoul, that is, by the heart and the liver; but by the pure rational part of the ſoul: wherefore it is a folly to oppoſe them. This Symbol rather adviſeth to worſhip the fountain of Minds, and next inſtrument of Intellection, by whoſe means we acquire Speculation and Science, and (in a word) all Wiſdom, and truly Philoſophiſe; and not to confound and deface the Prints that are therein.

SYMB. XXXII.

THis, *Spit upon the cuttings of thy Hair, and parings of thy Nails*, ſaith thus, Thoſe things are eaſily contemned which are born with thee, but are more diſtant from the Mind; as, on the other ſide, thoſe are more eſteemed, which are nearer to the mind. So having addicted thy mind to Philoſophy, above all, reverence thoſe things which are demonſtrated by the ſoul and mind, without the organs of ſenſe by ſpeculative Science: But contemn and ſpit upon thoſe things which are ſeen without the light of the mind, by the ſenſitive organs which are born with us: which are not capable of reaching the eternity of the mind.

SYMB. XXXIII.

THis, *Receive not an Erythrine*, ſeems to reſpect the Etymology of the word; Entertain not an impudent bluſhleſs perſon; nor on the other ſide one over-baſhful, ready to fall back from the mind and firm intellection; whence is underſtood alſo, Be not ſuch your ſelf.

SYMB. XXXIV.

THis, *Deface the print of a pot in the aſhes*, ſignifieth, that he who applies his mind to Philoſophy, muſt forget the Demonſtrations of confuſion and groſſneſs, (that is, of corporeals and ſenſibles) and wholly make uſe of Demonſtrations of Intelligibles; By *aſhes* are meant the duſt or ſand in Mathematical Tables, wherein the Demonſtrations and Fgures are drawn.

SYMB. XXXV.

BUt *approach not her to get Children, who hath money*, is not meant of a woman, but of a Sect and Philoſophy, which hath in it much corporeity and gravity tending downwards; for of all things in the Earth Gold is the moſt heavy, and apteſt to move towards the Center, which is the property of Corporeal weight: to *approach*, means not only *coition*, but to apply our ſelves, and to be *aſſiſtant*.

SYMB. XXXVI.

THis, *In the firſt place honour, the figure and the degrees, the figure and the Triobolus*; adviſeth to Philoſophiſe; and ſtudy Mathematicks not ſuperficially, and by them as by degrees of aſcention arrive at our propoſed end; but deſpiſe thoſe things which others prefer before theſe; and chiefly reverence the *Italick* Philoſophy which conſiders Incorporeals in themſelves, before the *Ionick* which firſt looks upon bodies.

SYMB. XXXVII.

THis, *Abſtain from Beans*, adviſeth to beware of every thing that may corrupt our diſcourſe with the gods, and preſcience.

SYMB. XXXVIII.

THis, *Plant Mallows, but eat it not*, ſignifies that ſuch things are turned with the Sun. *Plant*, that is, Inſiſting on its nature and application to the Sun, and Sympathy, neither abſtain from it, nor wholly adhere to it; but transfer your mind and intellect, and tranſplant them as it were to plants and herbs of the ſame kind; and to Animals which are not of the ſame kind, and to Stones and Rivers, and in a word to all natures, for thou wilt find that which deſigneth the unity and conſpiration of the World, to be fruitful and full of variety, and admirably copious, as if it ſprung from a Mallows root: Therefore not only eat not, nor deface ſuch obſervations, but on the contrary encreaſe them, and multiply them, as it were by tranſplantation.

SYMB. XXXIX.

THis, *Abſtain from living Creatures*, exhorts to Juſtice, and reſpect of alliance by a like kind of life, and the like.

By theſe is explained the Symbolical adhortative form; containing much, that is common with the Cuſtoms of the Ancients, and *Pythagorical*. Thus *Jamblichus*.

CHAP.

## CHAP. IV.

*The same Symbols explained by others.*

MOst of these Symbols are mentioned also by others, with different explications. The first (a) *Olympiodorus* ascribes to *Philolaus*, delivering it thus, *When you come into a Temple, turn not back.* (b) *Jamblichus*, in the life of *Pythagoras*, cites it in the same words, adding this exposition, *That we ought not to perform divine Rites, cursorily and negligently.*

(a) In Plat. Phædon. (b) Cap.

Upon the Second, *Adore not the gods, as it were, in passing by:* (c) *Plutarch* saith, *We ought to go from home with that express intent. And for this reason the Cryers used, upon Festival days, to go before the Priests, and commanded the people to forbear working.*

(c) In Num.

The same exposition (d) *Jamblichus*, in the life of *Pythagoras*, gives of the Third, *Sacrifice and go to sacred rites barefoot.*

(d) Cap.

To the Fourth, *Concerning the gods, disbelieve nothing wonderful, and concerning divine Doctrines,* may be applied to what *Jamblichus* saith in the life of *Pythagoras:* (e) *Many precepts were introduc'd into the practice of divine rites, forasmuch as they gave firm credit to these things, conceiving them not to be fantastick boasts, but to derive their beginning from some god. All this the* Pythagoreans *believe to be true, as the fabulous reports concerning* Aristæus *the Proconnesian, and* Abaris *the Hyperborean, and the like. And they did not only believe all these, but also endeavour themselves to frame many things, that seem fabulous, derogating from nothing which relates to the Deity. In all such things he conceived not, that the persons themselves were foolish, but those only who gave no belief to it. For they are not of opinion, that the gods can do some things, others they cannot, as the Sophists imagine; but, that all things are possible. And the same is the beginning of the Verses which they ascribe to* Linus, *but perhaps were made by* Pythagoras.

(e) cap. 28.

Hope all things, for to none belongs despair;
All things to God easie and perfect are.

The fifth, *Decline High-ways,* is mentioned by many; only *Laertius* delivers it quite otherwise, *Go not out of the high-way;* but, in the exposition, differs not from the rest, that *we ought not to follow the opinions of the vulgar, which are without judgment, and not indisputable; but those of the few and learned.*

The sixth, *Abstain from the Melanure, for it belongs to the Terrestrial gods,* (f) *Plutarch* interprets, as forbidding to converse with persons, black in impiety. *Tryphon*, as forbidding falshood and lies, which are black in their close. The *Melanure* is a kind of fish, so named from the blackness of its tayl.

(f) De Educ. lib.

The ninth, *Cut not fire with a sword,* is one of those Symbols which are ascribed to *Andocides*, the *Pythagorean.* (g) *Porphyrius*, (h) *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, and (i) *Athenæus*, interpret it, as advising, *not to exasperate an angry person, but to give way to him. Fire is anger, the sword contention.* St. *Basil* expounds it *of those, who attempt an impossibility.*

(g) Pag. (h) De Educ. lib. (i) Lib.

The Tenth, *Laertius* reads thus, *Turn away a sharp sword*; it is generally expounded, Decline all things dangerous.

The Eleventh, *Help to lay on a burthen, but not to take it off.* is expounded by *Porphyrius*, that *we ought to further others, not in sluggishness, but in virtue and labour.* Or, as *Jamblichus*, that *we ought not to be the cause of another's being idle. Laertius* and *Olympiodorus* cite it thus, *Lay not burthens down together, but take them up together*; expounding it, that *we must work together in the course of life, and co-operate with others in actions, tending not to idleness, but to virtue.*

Pag Vit. Pyth.

The Twelfth which is cited by *Suidas* out of *Aristophanes*, in verse, thus:

*Into the shoo first the right foot,*
*The left first in the bason put.*

He expounds it not as a Symbol, but a Proverb, *of those who perform things dextrously.*

The Fourteenth, *Pass not over a ballance,* is generally interpreted by (k) *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, (l) *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Porphyrius*, and others, that *we ought to esteem Justice, and not to exceed it. Athenæus* and *Porphyrius* expound it, as dehorting *from avarice, and advising to pursue equality.*

(k) De Educ. lib. (l) Strom. 5.

The Fifteenth, *Laertius* delivers thus, *When you go to travel, look not back upon the bounds.* (m) *Plutarch* thus, *When you come to the borders, return not back.* They both interpret it, that *when we are dying, and arrived at the bound or end of our life, we should bear it with an equal mind without grief, not to desire a continuance of the pleasures of this life.* So also (n) *Porphyrius.*

(m) De Educ. lib. (n) Pag.

The Sixteenth *Laertius* reads thus, *Wipe not a seat with Oyl.*

The Seventeenth, *Laertius* and *Suidas* deliver thus, *Touch not a white Cock, for it is sacred to the Moon, and a monitor of the hours.*

The Nineteenth, *Sit not upon a Chœnix*, *Plutarch* and *Porphyrius* interpret, that *we ought not to live idly, but to provide necessaries for the future.* For, a Chœnix, according to *Laertius* and *Suidas*, is the same which *Clearchus* calls *Hemerotrophen*, a proportion of food daily spent. But *Clemens Alexandrinus* interprets it, as advising to consider not the present day, but what the future will bring forth: To be sollicitous, not of food, but prepar'd for death.

The Twentieth, *Breed nothing that hath crooked talons*, is ascribed to *Andocydes* the *Pythagorean.*

The Twenty one, *Olympiodorus* delivers thus, *Cleave not wood in the way*; *whereby*, saith he, *the* Pythagoreans *advised, not to disquiet life with excessive cares, and vain solicitude.*

The Twenty second, *Entertain not a swallow under your roof,* (o) *Plutarch* interprets, *Take not unto you an ungrateful and unconstant friend and companion; for only this bird, of all the lesser kind, is reported to prey upon flesh.* (p) *Clemens Alexandrinus* and *Porphyrius* interpret it, as forbidding *to admit into our society a talkative person, intemperate of speech, who cannot contain what is communicated to him.*

(o) Sympos. quæst. (p) Strom. 5.

The Twenty third, (q) *Plutarch* alledgeth thus, *Wear not a strait Ring*; that is, saith he, *Follow a free course of life, and fetter not your self.* Or, as St. *Hierom, That we live not anxiously, nor put our selves into servitude, or into such a condition of life, as we cannot free our selves from, when we should have a mind to do it.*

(q) De Educ. lib.

The Twenty fourth, *Wear not the picture of the gods*

gods in Rings, (r) Porphyrius expoundeth, *Discourse not of the gods inconsiderately, or in publick.*

(r) Pag.

(s) Cap. 18. (s) Jamblichus, in the life of Pythagoras, delivers it thus, *Wear not the image of God in a Ring, lest it be defiled; for it is the image of God.* (t) Clemens *Alexandrinus* affirms the meaning to be, that *we ought not to mind Sensibles; but to pass on to Intelligibles.*

(t) Strom 5.

In the Twenty eighth, *Lay not hold on every one readily with your right hand.* Plutarch omits ἑαδίως, Suidas παντι. It is generally expounded thus, *Be not hasty and precipitate, in contracting friendship with any.*

The Twentyninth, *When you rise out of bed, wrap the coverlet together, and confound the print of your body*; Plutarch referreth it to the *modesty and respect due to the bed.* (u) Clemens Alexandrinus saith it signifies, that *we ought not in the daytime to call to mind any pleasures, even of dreams which we had in the night. Perhaps also*, saith he, *it means, that we ought to confound dark phantasie with the light of truth.*

(u) Strom. 5.

The 30th and 31th, *Eat not the Heart, and the Brain,* (x) Jamblichus, in the life of *Pythagoras*, saith, *he enjoyned; forasmuch as these two are the seats of life and knowledg.* Porphyrius to the first, and Plutarch to the second, give one interpretation, *Consume not your self with grief, Nor afflict your mind with cares.*

(x) cap. 24.

The Thirtysecond, *Laertius* delivers contrary to *Jamblichus*: *Upon the pairing of your nails or cuttings of your hair, neither urine nor tread.*

The Thirty fourth, *Deface the print of a pot in the ashes*, Plutarch and Clemens Alexandrinus expound, as advising, *that upon reconcilement of enmity, we utterly abolish, and leave not the least print or remembrance of anger.*

The Thirtysixth concerning *the figure and three oboli*, seems to have reference to the story, related in the sixth Chapter of his life.

Of the Thirtyseventh, *Abstain from Beans*, there are alledged many different reasons: (y) Aristotle saith, *He forbad them, for that they resemble* ἀιδοῖα, *or the gates of the Inferi*; *or, for that they breed worms*; [a little sort of Maggots called *Midæ*] *or, for that they resemble the nature of the Universe*; *or, for that they are Oligarchick, being used in Suffrages.* This last reason is confirmed by Plutarch, who explains this Symbol, *Abstain from Suffrages*; *which of old were given by Beans.* Porphyrius saith, *He interdicted Beans, because, the first beginning and generation being confused, and many things being commixed, and concrescent together, and computrified in the earth by little and little, the generation and discretion broke forth together*; *and living creatures being produced together with plants, then out of the same putrefaction arose both men and beans*; *whereof he alledged manifest arguments. For, if any one should chew a bean, and, having minced it small with his teeth, lay it abroad in the warm Sun, and so leaving it for a little time, return to it, he shall perceive the scent of human blood. Moreover, if any one at the time, when Beans shoot forth the flower, shall take a little of the flower which then is black, and put it into an Earthen vessel, and cover it close, and bury it in the ground ninety days*; *and at the end thereof take it up, and take off the cover*; *instead of the Bean, he shall find either the head of an Infant, or* γυναικὸς αἰδοῖον. The same reason (z) Origen ascribes to Zaratus; from whom perhaps Pythagoras, being his Scholar, received them. Hence it is that Pliny saith, *He condemned Beans, because the souls of the Dead are in them.* And Porphyrius elsewhere, *Because they most partake of the nature of a living creature.* Some, of whom is Cicero, say, It was, because they disturb the tranquillity of the mind. *Wherefore to abstain from them*, saith Porphyrius, *makes our Dreams serene and untroubled.* (a) Agellius saith, he meant, *from venereal delights.* And Plutarch saith, He forbad Beans, because they conduce thereto. On the contrary, (b) Clemens Alexandrinus affirms, they were prohibited out of no other reason, than that *women feeding on them, become barren.*

(y) Laert.

(z) In Philos.

(a) Lib.

(b) Strom. 5.

For the Thirtyninth, *Abstain from the flesh of living creatures*; the most general reason is, because they are of the same nature and temperament with us, and, in a manner, allied unto us. But of this, formerly.

## CHAP. V.

### *Other Symbols.*

TO the foregoing Symbols collected by *Jamblichus*, may be added these:

*Take not up what falls from the Table*; meaning that men should not accustom themselves to eat intemperately. Or, alluding to some religious rite; for, *Aristophanes* saith, That which falls so, belongs to the Heroes; saying in his *Heroes:*

*Taste not what from the Table falls.* (*Laert.*)

*Break not Bread*; Divide not friends. Others refer it to the judgment in the Infernal places. Others, that it implieth fear in War. (*Laert.*)

*Set down Salt*, in remembrance of Justice; for Salt preserves all things, and is brought out of the purest thing, Water. (*Laert.*)

*Pluck not a Crown*; that is, Offend not the Laws, for Laws are the Crown of Cities. (*Porphyrius.*)

*Offer libation to the gods, just to the ears of the cup*, signifying, that we ought to worship and celebrate the gods with musick, for that passeth in at the ears. (*Porph.*) And drink not of that libation. (*Jamb.* cap. 18. pag. 87.)

*Eat not* (which are unlawful) *generation, augmentation, beginning, end, nor that of which the first basis of all things consists.* Meaning, we must abstain from the loins, δίδυμων αἰδοίων, marrow, feet, and head of Victims. He called the loins, Basis, because living creatures are setled upon them as their foundation; δίδυμοι ἢ αἰδοῖα, Generation, for without the help of these, no living creature is engendered. Marrow he called Increase, it being the cause of augmentation in living creatures. The beginning, the feet; the head, the end; which have most power in government of the body. (*Porph.*)

*Eat not Fishes.* (*Laert.*) Some apply this to silence, (*Athen. Deipn.* Lib. 7.)

Others say, he disproved them, because not used in sacrifice to the gods.

*Put not meat in a Chamber-pot*; meaning, communicate nothing that is wise to a rude and foolish person. (*Plut.* de Educ. Lib.)

Sleep

*Sleep not at noon.* For at that time the Sun ſheweth its greateſt force,(*Olympiad.in Plat.Phædon.*) We ought not to ſhut our eyes againſt the light, when it is moſt manifeſt.

*Quit not your Station, without the command of your General:* Our ſouls ought to be kept in the body, neither may we forſake this life without ſpecial leave from him, who gave it us, leſt we ſeem to deſpiſe the gift of God. (*Cicer. in Cat.* and *de Repub.*)

*Roaſt not what is boiled*; that is, change not meekneſs to anger, (*Jambl.*)

*Heap not up Cypreſs*; Of this wood they conceived the Scepter of *Jupiter* to be made, (*Laertius.*)

*Sacrifice even things to the Celeſtial deities,odd to the Terreſtrial.* Of this, already in his Arithmetick.

*When it thunders, touch the earth,* calling to mind our own mortality: (*Jambl.*) or, When a King is angry, the offender ought to humble himſelf.

*Eat not ſitting in a Chariot* (*Plut.*)Some expound it, that we ought to eat in quiet; or, that we ought not to give our ſelves to luxury in a time of buſineſs.

*Go into the Temple on the right hand, go out on the left.* Right and left ſeem to refer to the Ceremonial numbers; of which, already.

*Where blood hath been ſhed, cover the place with ſtones*; that is, aboliſh the very remembrance of any war or diſſention. (*Jamb.*)

*Hurt not a mild plant.* (*Laert. Porph.*) Some expound it, Harm not the harmleſs.

*Pray aloud*; implying, not that God cannot hear ſuch as pray ſoftly, but that our prayers ſhould be juſt, (*Clem. Alex. Strom.* 4.) ſuch as we need not care who hears.

*Sail not on the ground*; ſignifying,that we ought to forbear raiſing Taxes, and ſuch revenues as are troubleſome and unſtable. (*Clem. Strom.* 5.)

*Beget children*; For it is our duty to leave behind us ſuch, as may ſerve the gods in our room. (*Jamb.* vit. cap. 18.)

*Neither dip in a baſon,nor waſh in a bath.*(*Jamb.* ibid.)

*Put not away thy wife,* for ſhe is a ſuppliant. (*Jamb.* ibid.)

*Counſel nothing but what is beſt,* for Counſel is a ſacred thing: (*Jamb.* ibid.)

*Plant not a Palm*; (Plut. in Iſid. and Oſir.)

Laſtly, Hither may be referred the Symbolical Letter Y. *They ſaid that the courſe of humane life is like that Letter, for every one arriving at the firſt ſtate of youth, where the way divides it ſelf into two, ſtands at a gaze, not knowing which to take; if he meets with a guide that leads to the better, that is, if he learn Philoſophy, Oratory, or ſome honeſt Art, which may prove beneficial, but cannot be attain'd without much labour; they affirm that he ſhall lead an Honourable and plentiful Life. But if not lighting upon ſuch a Maſter, he takes the left hand way, which ſeems at firſt to be the better, and to lead to virtue, that is, if he give himſelf over to ſloth and luxury, which ſeem pleaſant at firſt to him who is ignorant of true good, he ſhall e're long loſe both his Credit and Eſtate, and live thence forward, ignominiouſly, and miſerably.* Thus (*a*) *Lactantius,* perhaps alluding to the old Verſes.

*The Pythagorick Letter two ways ſpread,*
*Shows the two paths in which Mans life is led.*
*The right hand track to ſacred Virtue tends,*
*Though ſteep and rough at firſt, in reſt it ends;*
*The other broad and ſmooth, but from its Crown,*
*On rocks the Traveller is tumbled down.*
*He who to Virtue by harſh toyls aſpires,*
*Subduing pains, worth and renown acquires:*
*But who ſeeks ſlothful luxury, and flies,*
*The labour of great acts, diſhonour'd dies.*

(a) De vero bono, lib. 6. c. 31.

## The GOLDEN VERSES of *Pythagoras.*

A Summary of the *Pythagorick* Doctrine is extant in Verſe, Entituled, *The Golden Verſes of Pythagoras:* or as others, of the *Pythagoreans. For that,*ſaith *Hierocles,as Gold is the beſt and pureſt of Metals, ſo theſe are the beſt and moſt Divine of Verſes.* They are theſe.

*Firſt, in their ranks, th' Immortal Gods adore,*
*Thy Oath keep; next, great Heroes; then implore,*
*Terreſtrial Dæmons with due ſacrifice.*
*Thy Parents reverence, and near Allies:*
*Him that is firſt in Virtue make thy Friend,*
*And with obſervance his kind ſpeech attend:*
*Nor (to thy power) for leight faults caſt him by,*
*Thy pow'r is neighbour to Neceſſity.*
*Theſe know, and with intentive care purſue;*
*But anger, ſloth, and luxury ſubdue.*
*In ſight of others or thy ſelf forbear*
*What's ill; but of thy ſelf ſtand moſt in fear.*
*Let Juſtice all thy words and actions ſway;*
*Nor from the even courſe of Reaſon ſtray:*
*For know that all men are to die ordain'd,*
*And riches are as quickly loſt as gain'd.*
*Croſſes that happen by divine decree,*
*(If ſuch thy lot) bear not impatiently.*
*Yet ſeek to remedy with all thy care,*
*And think the Juſt have not the greateſt ſhare.*
*'Mongſt men, diſcourſes good and bad are ſpread,*
*Deſpiſe not thoſe, nor be by theſe miſled.*
*If any ſome notorious falſhood ſay,*
*Thou the report with equal Judgment weigh.*
*Let not mens ſmoother promiſes invite,*
*Nor rougher threats from juſt reſolves thee fright.*
*If ought thou wouldſt attempt, firſt ponder it;*
*Fools only inconſiderate acts commit.*
*Nor do what afterwards thou maiſt repent;*
*Firſt learn to know the thing on which th' art bent.*
*Thus thou a life ſhalt lead with joy repleat.*
*Nor muſt thou care of outward health forget.*
*Such temp'rance uſe in exerciſe and diet,*
*As may preſerve thee in a ſetled quiet.*
*Meats unprohibited, not curious chuſe,*
*Decline what any other may accuſe.*
*The raſh expence of vanity deteſt,*
*And ſordidneſs: A mean in all is beſt.*
*Hurt not thy ſelf: Before thou act, adviſe;*
*Nor ſuffer ſleep at night to cloſe thine eyes,*
*Till thrice thy acts that day thou haſt ore-run,*
*How ſlipt? what deeds? what duty left undone?*
*Thus thy account ſumm'd up from firſt to laſt,*
*Grieve for the ill, joy for what good hath paſt.*
*Theſe ſtudy, practiſe theſe, and theſe affect;*
*To ſacred virtue theſe thy ſteps direct.*

*Eternal Nature's fountain I atteſt,*
*Who the Tetractys on our ſoul impreſt.*
*Before thy mind thou to this ſtudy bend,*
*Invoke the Gods to grant it a good end.*
*Theſe if thy labour vanquiſh, thou ſhalt then*
*Know the connexure both of Gods and men;*
*How every thing proceeds, or by what ſtaid,*
*And know (as far as fit to be ſurvey'd)*
*Nature alike throughout: that thou maiſt learn*
*Not to hope hopeleſs things, but all diſcern.*
*And know thoſe Wretches whoſe perverſer wills*
*Drawn down upon their head ſpontaneous Ills;*
*Unto the good that's nigh them deaf and blind:*
*Some few the cure of theſe misfortunes find.*
*This only is the Fate that harms, and rolls,*
*Through miſeries ſucceſſive, humane ſouls.*
*Within is a continual hidden fight,*
*Which we to ſhun muſt ſtudy, not excite.*
*Great Jove! how little trouble ſhould we know,*
*If thou to all men wouldſt their Genius ſhow?*
*But fear not thou; Men come of heav'nly race,*
*Taught by diviner Nature what t'embrace:*
*Which if purſu'd, thou all I nam'd ſhalt gain,*
*And keep thy Soul clear from thy bodie's ſtain.*
*In time of Pray'r and cleanſing, meats deny'd*
*Abſtain from; thy mind's rains let reaſon guide:*
*Then ſtrip'd of fleſh up to free Æther ſoar,*
*A deathleſs God, Divine, mortal no more.*

# TIMÆUS
## THE
# LOCRIAN.

### *Of the Soul of the World, and of Nature.*

Princip'es.

TIMÆUS, the *Locrian*, ſaid theſe things: There are two Principles of all things; the *Mind*, of things effected according to Reaſon; *Neceſſity*, of thoſe which are by Violence, according to the powers of Bodies. Of theſe, one is of the nature of good, and is called *God*, and is principle of the beſt things; the conſequent and concauſals are reduced to *Neceſſity*. For all things are the off-ſpring of theſe, Idæa, Matter, Senſibles. The firſt is ungenerated, immovable, permanent, of the nature of Identity, intellectual, the exemplar of things that are made, and immutable. This is Idæa. Matter, is the print, mother, nurſe, and productrix of the third eſſence; for, receiving likeneſs into it ſelf, and being, as it were, characteriſed by them, it perfects all productions. This matter he aſſerted to be eternal, but not immovable, in form of it ſelf, and without figure; but receiving all forms. In bodies it is diviſible, and of the nature of Alterity: They call Matter, Place and Region. Theſe two principles are contrary. Form, hath the nature of male and father; Matter, of female and mother; the Third is their off-ſpring. Theſe being three, are known three ways; Idæa, by intellect, according to ſcience; Matter, by ſpurious ratiocination, not being underſtood by direct comprehenſion, but by analogy; their Off-ſpring, by ſenſe and opinion. Before Heaven was made, we muſt conceive, that there was Idæa, and Matter, and God, the maker of the better, [*viz.* Idæa.] Now foraſmuch as the elder is better than the younger, and the orderly than the diſorderly; God, being good, and ſeeing Matter receive Idæa, and become totally changed, yet diſorderly, ſaw alſo it was needful to bring it into Order, and from indefinite tranſmutations, to fix it determinately, that bodies might have proportionate diſtinctions, and not receive promiſcuous variations.

The Soul of the World.

The World.

Of all this Matter he framed the World, (making it the bound of the nature of Being, ſince it comprehends all other things) one, only-begotten, perfect, animate, and rational, (for theſe are better than inanimate and irrational) and a ſpherical body, that being more perfect than other figures. Deſigning therefore to make the beſt production, he made this God, generate, not corruptible by any other cauſe, but by the ſame God only which compos'd it, if it ſhould pleaſe him at any time to diſſolve it. But he who is good, will not be carried on to the deſtruction of the faireſt production. Wherefore it is permanent, and being ſuch, incorruptible, unperiſhable, and bleſſed. It is the beſt of productions, being made by

The Parts of the World.

by the beſt cauſe, who looked not upon patterns made by hands, but upon the Idæa, the intellectual eſſence: after which, this being exactly made, is the faireſt of all, and not to be demoliſh'd. It is perfect, as to ſenſible things, for the exemplar comprehending in it ſelf all intelligible creatures, left nothing out, it being the perfect bound of Intelligibles, as the World is of Senſibles; which being ſolid, tactile, and viſible, is divided into Earth, Fire, and (betwixt theſe) Air, and Water. It conſiſts of perfect bodies, which exiſt intirely in it, ſo as no part remains beyond it, that the body of the Univerſe might be ſelf-ſufficient, and not liable to diſſolution by any external accidents; for there are no other things beſides theſe, and what are contained in them, they being, after the moſt excellent analogy, connected in equal power, neither predominating over the other in any part, nor being predominated, that whereby ſome might encreaſe, others decreaſe; but it reſteth in an indiſſoluble harmonious concord, according to the beſt proportion. For there being three bounds, and the intervals diſtant from each other in the ſame proportion, the middle is that to the firſt which the third is to it, and ſo reciprocally, according to diſpoſure of place and order. But to number theſe without the help of another thing equal to them, is abſolutely impoſſible. It is well ordered both for figure and motion: As to the firſt, being round, it is every way like it ſelf, and able to contain all other figures. As to its circular motion, it keepeth a perpetual Tenor: for, a ſphear only, whether in reſt or in motion, is ſo adapted to the ſame place, as that it never ceaſeth nor removes; all its parts being equidiſtant from the Center. Now its outward ſuperficies being exactly ſmooth, it needs not the weak organs, which are beſtow'd on other living creatures, for their accommodation.

The Soul of the World.

The Soul of the World God inkindled in the midſt, but diffuſed beyond it, covering the Univerſe with it, and tempering it with a temperament of indiviſible Form, and diviſible Subſtance, ſo as theſe two make one temperament; with which he mingled two Powers, principles of the two motions of Identity and Alterity; which (Soul) being not eaſily miſcible, was not without difficulty contemperated.

All theſe proportions are mixed according to harmonical numbers, which proportions he cunningly divided, that it might be known of what, and by what, the Soul conſiſteth. This Soul God did not ordain (as we affirm) after corporeal ſubſtance, (for that which is moſt honourable, is firſt both in power and time) but made it before the body, removing one, the firſt of four Monads, into eight Decads, and three Centuries. Of this, the duple and triple is eaſily collected, the firſt being ſetled. All theſe, with their complements, and ſeſquioctaves, will amount to thirty ſix. The whole ſum will be one hundred and fourteen thouſand ſix hundred ninety five. The diviſions are one hundred and fourteen thouſand ſix hundred ninety five. After this manner he divided the Soul of the Univerſe.

The Parts of the World.

The Mind only ſeeth the Eternal God, the Ruler and Father of all things. That which is generated we behold with our eyes, this World, and its parts; the Ætherial are twofold, ſome of the nature of Identity: others, of Alterity. Of theſe, ſome extrinſecally carry about all that is within them, from Eaſt to Weſt, by an univerſal motion. The reſt, being of the motion of Alterity, intrinſecally turn about from the Weſt to the Eaſt, moved by themſelves. They are carried round by accident, with the motion of Identity, having the greateſt force in the World. The motion of Alterity, divided according to harmonical proportions, is diſpoſed into ſeven Circles; the *Moon* being neareſt the Earth, performeth her courſe in a Month: next her, the *Sun* perfects his courſe in a year. There are two of equal courſe with the *Sun*, *Mercury*, and the Star *Juno*, which many call *Venus*, and *Lucifer*. All perſons not being skilful in the Rules of ſacred Aſtronomy, and the obſervations of Riſing and Setting. The ſame Star is ſometimes *Heſper*, when it ſo followeth the *Sun*, that it is conſpicuous to us when the *Sun* is ſet: ſometimes *Eous*, when it goeth before the *Sun*, and riſeth before him. *Lucifer* therefore, many times is the Star *Venus*, when ſhe runs along with the *Sun*: And likewiſe is many of the fixed Stars and Planets, for any Star of viſible magnitude, uſhering the *Sun* above the Horizon, foretells day. The other three, *Mars*, *Jupiter*, and *Saturn*, have peculiar velocities and unequal years: but they compleat their courſe in certain and comprehenſible regularities, and appearances, and occultations, and Eclipſes, and Riſings, and Settings. They have, beſides their *phaſes*, Riſing and Setting in regard of the *Sun*: who maketh day in performing his Courſe from Eaſt to Weſt: night, by Motion from Weſt to Eaſt: whilſt he is carried about with the Motion of Identity, a year, by his own proper Motion. By theſe two Motions, the *Sun* performs a double courſe, one, as being carried about with the general Motion of Heaven, the other by an obl que Motion: One diſtinguiſheth the times of the day and the ſeaſons: The other, by which he is carried about after the rapid Motion of the fixed Stars, at every revolution maketh night day. Theſe are parts of Time called Periods, ordained by God together with the World: for before the World there were no Srars, and conſequently neither year nor ſeaſons, by which this generable World is commenſurated. This time is the image of that which is ingenerate, called Eternity: for as this Univerſe was formed after the eternal exemplar of the Ideal World, ſo was this Time ordained together with the World after its pattern, Eternity.

The Earth being eſtabliſhed in the midſt, the ſeat of the gods is the bound of night and day, of riſing and ſetting, according to the Section of Horiſons, as they are circumſcribed by the ſight, and by Section of the Earth. It is the moſt ancient of all Bodies in the Univerſe: for Water was not produced without Earth, nor Air without humidity: and Fire cannot ſubſiſt without humidity and matter, which it kindles. So that the Earth is ſetled upon its own weight, as the root and baſis of all things. The principle therefore of generated things, as to the ſubject, is Matter; as to form, Idæa. The productions of theſe are Bodies; Earth, Water, Air, and Fire, whoſe generation is thus: Every body conſiſts of ſuperficies's; a ſuperficies, of Triangles; of which this is a rectangled equi-crural ſemiquadrangle; the other unequilateral, having the greater Angle in power,

Triple to the leſſer. The leaſt Angle in it is one third of a right Angle: double to this is the middle Angle, conſiſting of two thirds, the greateſt is a right Angle, ſeſquialter to the middle, Triple to the leaſt. Now this Triangle is a ſeſquiquadrangle to an equilateral Triangle, the perpendicular from the Top to the bottom, being divided into two equal parts; there are therefore in each two rectangled Triangles, but in one the two ſides which include the right Angle are equal; in the other, all the three ſides are unequal. This figure is called *Scholion*. This ſemiquadrangle is the principle of which the earth was conſtituted; for the quadrangle is compounded of theſe four ſemiquadrangles. Of the quadrangle is generated the Cube, the firmeſt and moſt ſetled of all bodies, having ſix ſides, eight angles. For this reaſon Earth is the moſt heavy body, and unapt for motion, and not tranſmutable into any other, as being incommunicable with any kind of Triangle, for the Earth only hath a ſtable principle, which is the ſemiquadrangle, the element of the other bodies, Fire, Air, and Water: for the ſemiquadrangle being ſix times compounded, there ariſeth an equilateral Triangle, of which a Pyramis, with four baſes and four equal Angles is compounded, the form of fire moſt apt to motion, and of rareſt parts. Next, theſe Octaedron, with eight baſes and ſix angles, the element of Air. The Third, Icoſiedron, of twenty baſes, and twelve angles, the element of Water, being fulleſt of parts, and heavieſt. Theſe being compounded of the ſame Element, are tranſmutated into one another. The Dodecaedron, he made the image of the Univerſe, as neareſt to a Globe. Fire by reaſon of the rarity of its parts, penetrates all things; Air, all things but Fire; Water, Earth. All things therefore are full, and admit no vacuity. They are carried about by the circumvolution of the Univerſe, and by reaſon of their ſolidity, grate one another, rendring an unintermitted alteration to generation and corruption. Theſe God uſed in framing the World, tactile by reaſon of Earth; viſible, by reaſon of Fire, the two extreams. By Air and Water, he connected it in a moſt firm band, proportion, capable to contain both it ſelf, and the things that are compriſed in it. If then that which is connected be a Superficies, one Medium is ſufficient; if a ſolid, it requires two. To the two Mediums, he adapted the two Extreams, Fire to Air, Air to Water, Water to Earth; and again, Fire to Air, Air to Water, and Water to Earth; and again, as Earth to Water, Water to Air, and Air to Earth; and reciprocally, as Earth to Air, Water to Fire. And foraſmuch as all theſe are equal in power, their proportions are equal likewiſe. Thus is the World one, and by a happy connexure proportionable. Each of theſe four Bodies have divers ſpecies; the Fire, flame, light, ſplendor, by reaſon of the inequality of the Triangles in each of theſe. The Air is partly clear and dry, partly humid and cloudy. The Water, fluid and concrete, as Snow, Froſt, Hail, and Ice. Of Humid, one ſort is fluid, as Honey, Oyl; another compact, as Pitch, Wax. Of the compact are two kinds, one fuſile, as Gold, Silver, Braſs, Tin; Lead; the other frangible, as Sulphur, Bitumen, Nitre, Salt, Allom, and Stones of that kind.

After he had made the World, he proceeded to the production of mortal creatures, that it might be perfect and compleatly wrought according to its pattern. Having contemperated and diſtributed the Soul of Man, by the ſame proportions and powers, he delivered it over to that nature which had the power of changing. She ſucceeding him in the producing mortal tranſitory creatures, inſtilled their ſouls, ſome from the Moon, ſome from the Sun, ſome from the other Stars which wander in the Region of Alterity, excepting one ſoul in the power of Identity, which he mingled in the rational part, an image of wiſdom, to thoſe who make uſe of good Fate. For of the human ſoul, one part is rational and intellectual, the other irrational and fooliſh; of the irrational, the better is of the nature of Identity; the worſe, of that of Alterity. Each of theſe is reſident about the Head, that all the other parts of the ſoul and body may be ſubſervient to it, according to the analogy of the body of the Univerſe. Of the irrational part, one is iraſcible, placed about the heart; the other deſiderative, about the liver. Animals.

As for the Body, the principle and root of Marrow is in the Brain, wherein is the Hegemonick of the Soul. From the brain iſſues a defluxion along the ſpondyles of the back, from whence it is diſtributed into Seed and generative ſubſtance. The bones are the caſe of the marrow; the fleſh is the tegument of the bones, the joynts he connected by nerves for motion. Of the inward parts, ſome were made for nouriſhment, others for converſation. Of the Motions, thoſe which come from without, and flow into the apprehenſive part, are ſenſible; thoſe which fall not under comprehenſion, are inſenſible, whether by reaſon that the affected bodies are more earthy, or that the motions are weaker. Whatſoever motions change nature, are painful; whatſoever comply with her, are named pleaſures.

Of the Senſes, God enlightned our Sight for contemplation of Celeſtials, and apprehenſion of Science. Hearing, he framed perceptive of Diſcourſe and of Muſick. Of this, if any be deſtitute from his birth, he will alſo be uncapable of Speaking. Whence we ſay, This Senſe is neareſt ally'd to Reaſon. All that are termed affections of bodies, are denominated with reference to the Touch, and their inclination to a place; for, the Touch dijudicates vital faculties; warm, cold; dry, moiſt; ſmooth, rough; yielding, reſiſting; ſoft, hard: but heavy and leight the Touch prejudicates, Reaſon defines by inclination to move to the middle and from the middle; below, and the middle, they affirm to be the ſame thing, for the center of a Globe is below, whatſoever is betwixt that and the circumference is above. Heat, ſeems to conſiſt of rare parts, and diſgregates bodies; Cold, of more dense parts, and bindeth the pores. The Taſte reſembles the Touch in concretion and diſcretion, and in penetration of the pores, and in its objects, which are either harſh or ſmooth. Thoſe which have an abſterſive faculty, ſtupifying the tongue, are bitter; thoſe which are moderately abſterſive, ſalt; thoſe which

which inflame and pierce further into the flesh, acid. Contrary to these, are smooth and sweet. The kinds of Odor are not distinct, for they insinuate through narrow pores, which are too solid to be contracted and dilated by putrefaction, and concoction of earth and earthly things. They are sweet or stinking. Voice is a percussion in the air, passing to the soul through the ears, whose pores extend to the liver. In the ears is a spirit, whose motion is Hearing. Of voice and hearing some are swift, the sharp; some slow, the flat; the mean, are incommensurable. Again, one is much and diffused, the *loud*; another small and contracted, the *low*: one is ordered according to proportions, the *harmonious*; another disorderly and unproportionate, the *inharmonious*. The fourth kind of Sensibles is most various and multiform, termed Visibles, comprising all colours, and innumerable coloured things. The primary colours are four, White, Black, Bright, Purple; the rest are made by commixtion of these. White disperseth the sight, Black contracts it; as Hot diffuseth the touch, Cold contracts it; Bitter contracteth the taste, and Sweet dissipates it.

The bodies of creatures that breathe air, are nourished by aliment, distributed by the veins through the whole frame defluxively, as by channels, and irrigated by the spirit which diffuseth it to the utmost bounds. Respiration is made (there being no vacuity in nature) by influxion, and attraction of the air in the room of that which issued forth at invisible vents, out of which also sweat evaporates. Now something of it being wasted by the natural heat, it is necessary something be introduced to supply that which was consumed; otherwise there would be a vacuity, which is impossible: For a living creature could not be restored by perpetual fluxion, and entire, if the body were disjoyn'd by vacuity. The like composition of Organs is likewise in inanimate things, with an analogical respiration; a Cupping-glass and Amber are resemblances of respiration, for the spirits evaporate through the body, and enter again at the mouth and nostrils by respiration; then again, like *Euripus*, it is brought round into the body, which by these effluxions is extended. The Cupping-glass, the air being consumed by fire attracts moisture; the Amber, by emission of spirits, attracts the body that is like to it. All aliment is taken into the body from the root of the heart, and the fountain of the ventricle; if the accession be more than the defluxion, it is termed Growth; if the contrary, Decay. The *Acme* consist in the confine betwixt these two, and is conceived to be the equality of accession and defluxion. When the ligaments of the constitution are dissolv'd, so as there is no passage for the breath, or distribution of Aliment, the Animal dies. There are many things which are pernicious to life, and cause death; whereof one is termed, Sickness. The origines of sickness are the disproportions of the primary faculties: if the simple faculties, Heat, Cold, Humidity, Siccity, abound, or are Deficient, then follow Mutations, and alterations of the blood, by corruption, and depravations of the Consumptive flesh: If according to the changes into Sharp, or Salt, or Acid (humours) the turnings of the Blood, or Consumptions of the flesh be caused; for hence are generated Choler and Flegm. Unwholsome Chyles, and putrefaction of Humours, are inconsiderable except they be deep; but those whose causes lie in the bones are not easily cur'd; those which arise out of the marrow are painful. The Extremities of Diseases are Wind, Choler, Flegm, increasing and flowing, into places not proper to them, or into the vital parts, for then obtaining a better place, they expel their neighbours, and settle there, and afflicting the bodies, they resolve them into themselves.

These are the Diseases of the Body. Out of these arise many sicknesses of the soul, several of several faculties: of the sensitive, stupidity; of the reminiscent, forgetfulness; of the desiderative, loathing, and excessive appetite; of the Pathetick, wild passions, and furious frensies; of the rational, indocility and indiscretion. The forces of Vice, are pleasures and griefs, desires and fears, raised out of the body, mingled with the soul, and express'd by various names, Loves, Desires, dissolute affections, impetuous Angers, deep Malices, various Longings, inordinate Delights. In a word, to behave our selves amiss as to passions, or to subdue them, is the bound betwixt virtue and vice; for to be excessive in them, or too hard for them, put us in a good or bad condition. To these inclinations the temper of the body may contribute much: if vehement, fervent, or any way extraordinary, it transports us to Melancholy and extravagant lusts. For the parts being overflown by these defluxions, make the constitution of the body rather hydropical than sound, whence arise sadness, forgetfulness, folly, and consternation. The customs also, whereunto a man hath conformed himself in the City, or family, where he was born and bred, conduce much; as also the daily course of life, whether softning or corroborating the soul; for, living abroad, Diet, Exercise, and the manners of those with whom we converse, greatly avail to virtue or vice; and these occasions are derived rather from our Parents, and Elements, than from our selves; for they are not ineffectual, we our selves so easily receding from those *actions which are good.

* παθαρθίων perhaps is for περσικόσιων. *Doricè.*

To the well-being of an Animal, it is requisite that the body have the virtues competent to it, Health, perfect Sense, Strength, and Beauty. The principles of Beauty are a symmetry of the parts amongst themselves, and with the soul; for nature made the body as an instrument, obedient, and accommodate to all the businesses of Life. In like manner, the soul must be ordered to virtues answerable to those; to Temperance, as the body to Health; to Wisdom, as the body to perfect sense; to Fortitude, as the body to strength; to Justice, as the body to beauty. The principles of these are from Nature, their Means and Ends from industry; those of the body are attained by exercise and Medicine; those of the Soul by Institution and Philosophy. For these faculties nourish and strengthen both the soul and body, by Labour, Exercise, and pureness of Diet; these by Medicaments; those instituting the soul by chastisements and reprehensions, for they strengthen it, by exhortation, by exciting the inclination, and enjoyning those things which are expedient for action. The Aleiptick art, and, its nearest ally, Medicine, are design'd for the cure of Bodies, reducing

ducing the faculties to the beſt harmony; they purifie the blood, and make the ſpirits flow freely, ſo as if any thing unwholſome ſettle, the vigors of the blood and ſpirits being thus confirmed, overmaſter it. Muſick, and its director, Philoſophy, ordained by the gods, and by the Laws, for reformation of the ſoul, inure, compel and perſwade the irrational part to obey the rational, and in the irrational mollifie anger, and quiet deſire; ſo as they neither move nor reſt without reaſon, the mind ſummoning them either to action or fruition. The bound of Temperance is obedience and fortitude. Now ſcience and venerable Philoſophy, purifying the mind from falſe opinions, bring her to knowledg, and reducing her from great ignorance, raiſe her to contemplation of Divine things; wherein if a man be converſant with contentedneſs as to human things, and endeavour in a moderate way of living, he is happy. For he to whom God hath allotted this Eſtate, is undoubtedly guided to a moſt happy life. But if a man be ſtiff and refractory, he ſhall be purſued by puniſhment according to the Laws, and thoſe diſcourſes which declare things Cœleſtial and Infernal. For irremiſſible puniſhments are prepar'd for the unhappy dead, and many other things, for which I commend the *Ionick* Poet, who makes men religious by ancient fabulous Traditions. For as we cure Bodies with things unwholſome, when the wholeſome agree not with them; ſo we reſtrain ſouls with fabulous relations, when they will not be led by the true. Let them then, ſince there is a neceſſity for it, talk of theſe ſtrange puniſhments, as if ſouls did tranſmigrate, thoſe of the effeminate into the bodies of Women, given up to ignominy; of Murtherers, into thoſe of Beaſts, for puniſhment; of the Laſcivious, into the forms of Swine; of the leight, and temerarious into Birds; of the ſlothful, and idle, unlearned, and ignorant, into ſeveral kinds of Fiſhes. All theſe in the ſecond period, *Nemeſis* decrees together with the vindictive and Terreſtrial Dæmons, the over-ſeers of human affairs, to whom God the diſpoſer of all things, hath committed the adminiſtration of the World, repleniſht with Gods, Men, and all other living Creatures; all which are formed after the beſt image, of the ungenerate and eternal Idea.

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An Explication of the

# Pythagorick Doctrine:

By * JOHN REUCHLIN.

* *Cabalæ libro* 2.

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## CHAP. I.

### *Of* Pythagoras *his way of Teaching, by Silence and Symbols.*

(a) THE Indocible and abſtruſe tradition of *Myſteries* and *Symbols*, is not to be inveſtigated by acuteneſs of humane Wit, (which rather affects us with a doubtful fear, than an adherent firmneſs) it requires ample ſtrength of thinking and believing, and above all things, faith and taciturnity. Whence *Pythagoras taught nothing* (as (b) *Apuleius* ſaith) *to his diſciples before ſilence; it being the firſt rudiment of contemplative wiſdom to learn to meditate, and to unlearn to talk.* As if the *Pythagorick* ſublimity were of greater worth, than to be comprehended by the talk of Boys. This kind of learning (as other things) *Pythagoras* brought into *Greece* from the *Hebrews*, that the diſciple being to ask ſome ſublime queſtion, ſhould hold his peace; and being queſtioned, ſhould only anſwer αὐτὸς ἔφα, *He ſaid.* Thus the Cabaliſts anſwer אמכו הכמים *The wiſe ſaid*; and Chriſtians, πίστευσον, *Believe.*

(a) Pag. 664. b. out of which *Paulus Schalichius* collects his firſt Canon, *de Myſteriis Pythagoricis: Myſt. Philoſ.* cap. 7.

(b) *Florid.*

(c) Moreover, all the *Pythagorick* Philoſophy (eſpecially that which concerns divine things) is myſtical, expreſſed by *Ænigms* and *Symbols.* The reaſons, theſe: *Firſt*, The Ancients uſed to deliver wiſdom by Allegories; all their Philoſophers and Poets are full of Riddles, avoiding, by obſcurity, contempt of the vulgar; for the moſt apt interpreter of things, not perceptible by human infirmity, is Fable: *That befits Philoſophers, which is declared under the pious veil of Fictions, hidden in honeſt things, and attired in honeſt words; for, what is eaſily found, is but too negligently purſu'd. Secondly*, it ſometimes happens, that we cannot expreſs abſtruſe things without much circumlocution, unleſs by ſome ſhort Ænigm. *Thirdly*, as Generals uſe Watch-words to diſtinguiſh their own Souldiers from others; ſo it is not improper to communicate to friends ſome peculiar Symbols, as diſtinctive marks of a Society. Theſe, among the *Pythagoreans*, were a chain

(c) Pag. 665

Laert. chain of indiſſoluble love. (d) *Pythagoras* was ſtudious of friendſhip; and if he heard of any that uſed his Symbols, he preſently admitted him into his Society. Hereupon all became deſirous of them, as well thereby to be acceptable to their Maſter, as to be known Pythagoreans. *Laſtly*, As memorial notes; for, in treating of all things divine and human, the vaſtneſs of the ſubject requires ſhort Symbols, as conducing much to Memory.

## CHAP. II.

### *The Triple World.*

(a) Pag. 664. g. Laërtius, can. 4. (a) THe Pythagoreans reduce all *Beings*, ſubſiſtent or ſubſtant, immediatly to *Idæa's* which truly are; and thoſe to the *Idæa of Idæas*. Hereupon they aſſerted *three Worlds*, whereof the third is infinite, or rather not-finite; and that all things conſiſt of Three. *The Pythagoreans* (ſaith *Ariſtole*) *affirm, that the whole and all things are terminated by Three: Some are bodies and magnitudes, others keep and inhabit bodies and magnitudes, others are the rulers and origines of the Inhabitants.* This we underſtand of the three Worlds, the *Inferior*, the *Superior*, and the *Supream*. The *Inferior* containeth bodies and magnitudes, and their appropriate Intelligences, movers of the Sphears, overſeers and guardians of things generable and corruptible, who are ſaid to take care of bodies, each according to the particular task aſſign'd him; by the Ancients named ſometimes *Angels*, ſometimes *gods*, and (in repect of the anxious ſollicitude of thing whereto they are confin'd) *Dæmons*.

Next over it, immediately ſhineth the *Superior* World; this containeth the ſuperior Powers, incorporeal eſſences, divine exemplars, the ſeals of the inferior World, after whoſe likeneſs, the faces of all inferior things are formed. Theſe (b) Aur. carm. (b) *Pythagoras* calls, *Immortal gods*, as being the principles of things, produ'd out of the divine Mind, eſſential ἀρχαὶ, *cauſes* of thoſe forms which dwell in bodies, and inform the compounded ſubſtances of the lower World. There are alſo other gods, incorporeal beings, individual, differing (not by material, but) by formal number; ſpirits void of matter, ſimple, unmixt, ſeated beyond the ſenſible Heaven, confin'd neither to time nor place, neither ſuffering age nor tranſmutation, much leſs any alteration; In a word, not being affected with any paſſion, they lead a ſelf-ſufficient excellent life, and inhabit Eternity, which is ἀεὶ ὂν ὄν, *always being*, becauſe it always was, is, and ſhall be intemporally in the divine Mind; yet by the energy of God, it was created and placed beyond the convex of the viſible Heaven, as being the lucid manſion of the bleſſed ſpirits, [whom the Pythagoreans believe gods] placed in the higheſt region of Æther, æviternal, inveſted in the immortal Ævum.

The *third* World, *Supream*, containing all other Worlds, is that of the Deity, conſiſting of one divine Eſſence, exiſtent before *Ævum*, for it is the Age of Ages, the præexiſtent entity and unity of exiſtence, ſubſtance, eſſence, nature.

Theſe three Worlds are called *Receptacles*, in different reſpects; the firſt, of *Quantity*; the ſecond, of *Intelligences*; the third, of *Principles*. The firſt, *circumſcriptively*; the ſecond, *definitively*; the third is not received, but receiveth, becauſe it is every where, and is called a receptacle *repletively*.

Through the Superior World is communicated from the *Tetractys* to the inferior, life, and the being (not accidental, but ſubſtantial) of every ſpecies; to ſome, clearly; to others, obſcurely. This the Pythagoreans collect from thoſe words of their Maſter:

——— (c) *the* Tetractys *to our Souls did ſend,*
*The Fountain of Eternal Nature* ——— (c) Carm.

The *Tetractys*, is the *Divine mind* communicating, the *Fountain* is the *exemplar Idæa* communicated, and *eternal Nature* is the *eſſential Idæa* of things received. Idæa, conſidered as to God, (ſay they) is his *knowledge*; as to the ſenſible World, *exemplar*; as to it ſelf, *Eſſence*.

Now as in the Senſible World, the Superior ſphear hath an influence on all the ſphears beneath it; ſo in the Intelligible World, not onely every ſuperior Chorus of Angels, hath an influence upon all the inferior; but the whole ſuperior World hath an influence upon the whole inferior, whereby all things are reduced according to their capacities, as far as poſſible, momentary to Eternal, inferior to ſuperior. But to the third World, nothing that is meerly a Creature can be reduced, incapable in its own nature of that ſublimity, which is proper onely to God.

## CHAP. III.

### *The Supream World.*

(a) THe Supream World, being (as we ſaid) that of the Deity, is one divine, continual conſtant Eſſence of Sempiternity, poized, (as it were) with immoveable weight; not unfitly termed, παντοκρατορικὴ ἰδέα, *the all-governing Throne*. It is not confined to Genus, Place, Time or Reaſon, but is the free unlimited Preſident over all theſe; infinitely Supream in Place, Power, Poſſeſſion, Excellence, above all Eſſence, Nature, Ævum, Age. (a) Pag 656. g.

This Divine mind, the receptacle of principles, *Pythagoras* ſymbolically terms *Number*, ſaying, *Number is the Principle of all things*. (For none can believe ſo meanly of ſo wiſe a Perſon, as that he ſhould conceive the ordinary Numbers by which we caſt account, to be the Principles of all things, which are far from being antecedent to things, for they are conſequential accidents.) So (b) *Plutarch, by Number* Pythagoras *underſtands the Mind*; a Symbol not improper; in Incorporeals nothing more divine than the *Mind*, in Abſtractions nothing more ſimple than *Number*. (b) Plac. phil.

The divine Eſſence therefore, exiſtent before Ævum and Age, (for it is the Age of Ages) the præexiſtent entity and unity of exiſtence, ſubſtance, eſſence, nature, was by *Pythagoras* called ἓν *one*, by Parmenides ὂν *being*, both upon a like ground; becauſe it is the ſuper-eſſential Unite and Being, from which, and by which, and through which, and in which, and to which all things are, and are ordered and perſiſt, and are contained, and are filled, and are converted.

Of this firſt *one*, and firſt *ens*, Ariſtotle thus; *Plato and the Pythagoreans* (ſaith he) *hold no other concerning Ens or One, but that this is their Nature, their*

*their eſſence is the ſame, to be One and a Being. Xenophanes* declared this *One* to be *God*, herein agreeing with *Pythagoras* (c) who aſſerted *infinite*, and *one*, and *number* to be the firſt Principles of things; by *infinite* ſignifying the *power*; for nothing can be imagined before power, which in God is infinite, or rather it is infinite God: in him *eſſe* and *poſſe* are not diſtinct, who containeth the eſſences, virtues and operations of all producibles. With *Pythagoras* agreeth (d) *Anaxagoras*, ſaying, *for all things were together*; Democritus, *for all thing were in power*. This alſo is the *commixion of things* mentioned by *Empedocles*, and *Anaximander*; not confuſedly in *Chaos*, *Erebus*, or *Night*, but diſtinctly and orderly in *full light*, in the moſt perfect ſplendor of the divine light intuitive knowledge, that is the *Idæa*, (from ἰδέω. γινώσκω) whoſe power is being; including all, whether Mental, Rational, Intelligible, Senſible, Vital, Subſtantial, Adhæſible or Adhæſive; and is not onely all things that are, but thoſe that are not: This is no other than the divine Eſſence, within which (before all things) *one* produced *two*. *Two* is the firſt number, *one* is the principle of Number, *One* is God; and the production of *two* being within the divine Eſſence, (for number is conſtituted of it ſelf, and next *one* is naturally onely the number *two*) this *two* muſt neceſſarily be God alſo, for within God is nothing but God. Thus theſe three, (*One* and *Two*) being the Principle and firſt, and not exceeding the Eſſence of God, are indeed one God: for his Eſſence is not divided by the production of *two* out of *one*. In like manner, it often happens in corporeals, that *one* being moved to *two*, proceeds to *three*, the ſubſtance of things continuing; as, in a Tree, of boughs and branches; in Man, the body arms and fingers. Of *one* therefore in the Divinity producing, and *two* produced, ariſeth a *Trinity*, to which if there be added an eſſence formally diſtinct from them, there will be a formal *quaternity*, which is the infinite one and two, the Subſtance, Perfection, and end of all Number. *One*, *two*, *three*, *four*, by a collective progreſſion make *Ten*; beyond ten there is not any thing. This *Pythagoras* meant, when he aſſerted the Principle of all things *Tetractys*; he underſtood God by it; for he ſwore by it, and ſeems to have transferr'd the Hebrew Tetragrammaton, into a Greek Symbol.

(c) Scalich. Canon. 2.

(d) Laert.

(c) Pag 686 d.

(c) Thus the moſt apt Symbol, of the Principles of things, is *one and two*; for when we make enquiry into the cauſes and origine of all things, what ſooner occurs than one and two? That which we firſt behold with our Eyes, is the ſame and not another; that which we firſt conceive in our mind is *Identity* and *Alterity*, *One* and *Two*. (*Alcmæon*, contemporary with *Pythagoras*) affirmed *two* to be many, which he ſaid were *contrarieties*, (perhaps the ſame with *Empedocles* Ἔρις) yet unconfin'd and indefinite, as White and Black, Sweet and Bitter, Good and Evil, Great and Small. Theſe multiplicious diverſities the *Pythagoreans* deſigned by the number *Ten*, as finite and infinite, even and odd, one and many, right and left, male and female, ſtedfaſt and moved, ſtraight and crooked, light and darkneſs, good and ill, ſquare and oblong. Theſe pairs are two, and therefore contrary; they are reduced all into ten, that being the moſt perfect number, as containing more kinds of numeration than the reſt, even, odd; ſquare, cube; long, plain; the firſt uncompounded, and firſt compounded, than which nothing is more abſolute, ſince in ten proportions, four cubick numbers are conſummated, of which, (according to the *Pythagoreans*) all things conſiſt. By this all Nations reckon, (not exceeding it) as by the natural account of ten fingers; Heaven it ſelf conſiſts of ten Spheres. *Architas* includeth *all that is*, in the number *ten*; in imitation of whom *Ariſtotle* nameth ten kinds of Ens, *Categories*, reducible to two, *Subſtance* and *Accident*, both ſpringing from one Eſſence; for *ten* ſo loves *two*, that from *one* it proceeds to *two*, and by *two* it reverts into *one*. The firſt *Ternary* is of *one* and *two*, not compounded, but conſiſtent; *one* having no poſition, makes no compoſition, an unite whilſt an unite hath no poſition, nor a point whilſt a point. There being nothing before One, we rightly ſay, *one* is firſt; *two* is not compounded of numbers, but a co-ordination of unites only. It is therefore the firſt number, being the firſt multitude; not commenſurable by any number, but by unite the common meaſure of all number; for one two is nothing but two; ſo that the multitude which is called *Triad*, Arithmeticians term *the firſt number uncompounded*, the *Duad* being not an uncompounded number, but rather *not-compounded*.

Iliad. 14.

Pag 689. d.

(a) Now the *Triad*, through its propenſity to multiply, and communicate its goodneſs to all creatures, proceeds from power to operation, beholding with a perpetual intuition that fæcundity of multitude which is in it, productive (as it were) of number from number; and that eſſentiality which is one in it, the fountain of all production, the beginning of all progreſſion, the permanence of all immutable ſubſtance; it reverts it ſelf into it ſelf, multiplying it ſelf (as it were) by unity and duity, ſaying, *Once twice two, are four*. (b) This is the *Tetractys*, the Idæa of all created things; for all progreſſion is perfected in four. Hence ariſeth the *Decad*, the ten moſt general kinds of all things; *one*, *two*, *three*, *four*, going out of Omnipotency to Energy, (out of power to act) produce *ten*, the half whereof is five; now in the midſt put *five*, on the right hand the next ſuperior number *ſix*, on the left hand, the next inferior *four*; theſe added, make *ten*. Again, the next ſuperior *ſeven*, and the next inferior *three*, make *ten*. Again, the next ſuperior *eight*, and the next inferior *two*, make *ten*. Laſtly, *one* and *nine* make *ten*. This *ten* being carried up to *twenty*, comes again to *one*; and ſo on, in all the Cardinal numbers to a *hundred*: For, as twice one make two, thrice one three, four times one four, and ſo forward; ſo twice ten makes twenty, thrice ten thirty, four times ten forty, and ſo on; the like in a hundred, a thouſand, and forward. And becauſe the Decad ariſeth out of, and ends in a Monad, the *Greeks* expreſs ten by ι, the *Hebrews* by a Point, which marks (as well amongſt the Barbarians, as in *Latin*) denote one. (c) Hitherto alludes the *Pythagorick* Symbol, *One*, *Two*, by *Zaratas* (the Maſter of *Pythagoras*) uſed as the names of propagation; *one*, the father; *two*, the mother; one and two (in the divine eſſence) producing *four*, the *Tetractys*, the Idæa of all things, which are conſummated in the number Ten. This *Pythagoras* ſtyles

(a) Scalich. can. 9.

(b) Scalich. can. 10.

(c) Scalich. can. 11.

*Eternal*

*Eternal Nature's fountain* ———

no other than *the knowledg of things in the divine mind, intellectually operating.* From this *fountain of Eternal Nature*, floweth down the *Pythagorick* Number, One and Two, which from Eternity, in the fountain of the immenſe Ocean, was, ſhall be, or rather always is, plentiouſly ſtreaming. This one was by the Ancients termed Ζεὺς, *Jupiter*; two, Ἥρα, *Juno*, wife and ſiſter to *Jupiter*, of whom * *Homer*: * Iliad. 14.

*Golden-thron'd* Juno, *with eyes full of love,*
*Beheld her ſpouſe and brother, ſacred* Jove,
*Sitting on th' top of fount abounding* Ide.

In *Ida* (ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδέας, from *præſcience*) *Jupiter* and *Juno* ſat as *one* and *two*, in the ſtreaming Idæa of the *Tetractys*, whence flow the principles of all things, *Form* and *Matter*.

## CHAP. IV.

### *The Intelligible World.*

(a) THE *Intelligible World* proceeds out of the Divine mind, after this manner: The Tetractys reflecting upon its own eſſence, (the firſt Unite, productrix of all things) and on its own beginning, (the firſt product) ſaith thus, *Once one, twice two*, immediately ariſeth a *Tetrad*, having on its top the higheſt unite, and becomes a Pyramis, whoſe Baſe is a plain Tetrad, anſwerable to a Superficies, upon which the radiant light of the divine unity, produceth the form of incorporeal fire, by reaſon of the deſcent of *Juno*, (Matter) to inferior things. Hence ariſeth eſſential light, not burning, but illuminating. This is the creation of the *middle world*, (which the *Hebrews* call the *Supream*, the world of the Deity, admitting no compariſon.) It is termed *Olympus*, ὁλολαμπὴς, *wholly lucid* and repleat with ſeparate forms, where is the ſeat of the Immortal gods, Pag. 689. d.

——*Deum domus alta*

whoſe top is Unity, wall Trinity, ſuperficies Quaternity.

Number emanating from the divinity by degrees, declineth to the figure of creatures; inſtead of the Tetractys a Tetragone, in each of its angles a point, for ſo many unites, the unite at the top, which now begins to have poſition, elevated as much as is poſſible. Thus the former ſides elevated will be four triangles, built upon their quadrangular latitude, and carried on to one high point. This is the Pyramis it ſelf, *the ſpecies of fire, of which a Pyramis, having four baſes, and equal angles, is compounded, the moſt immovable and penetrant form*, without matter eſſential ſeparate light, next to God ſempiternal life. The work of the Mind is *life*, the work of God is immortality, *eternal life*. God himſelf is not this created light, but the Author of all light, whereof in the divine Trinity, he containeth a moſt abſolute Pyramid, which implieth the vigor of fire. Whence the *Chaldeans* and *Hebrews* affirm, that God is fire. But the Pyramid which this divine Tetractys produceth, is the fiery light of the immaterial world, of ſeparate intelligences, beyond the viſible Heaven, termed αἰὼν, *age, eternity, æther. Having overcome theſe things* (ſaith *Pythagoras*) *thou ſhalt know* σύγκρασιν, *the cohabitation of the immortal gods, and mortal men.* In which words are imply'd three properties of this middle world, (which he terms the *free Æther*; *free*, as being ſeparated from the power of matter; *Æther*, as receiving ardor from God, and heating all inferiors by an inſenſible motion) *Condition, Chorus, Order.* Aur. carmi.

*Condition*, it is repleniſhed with forms ſimple, immaterial, ſeparate, both univerſal and individual, containing all idæated Idæa's of genus's and ſpecies, the exemplars imitated in leſſer copies, their original being in the divine mind. Thus the world of the Deity is the abſolute exemplar, in the intelligible world: the abſtract example; and in the ſenſible world, not example, but contraction of exemplars, as ſeal, figure, and ſealed wax.

*Chorus*, the infinite joy of the bleſſed ſpirits, their immutable delight, ſtyl'd by *Homer* ἀσβέστου γέλως, *inextinguiſhable laughter.* For what greater pleaſure, than to behold the ſerene aſpect of God; and next Him, the Idæa's and forms of all things, more purely and tranſparently, than ſecondarily in created beeings? and to communicate theſe viſions to inferiors, the office of the gods called θεοὶ ἀπὸ τῆς θέας, *from ſpeculation and viſion*; Angels, from communicating their viſions to others; not that we imagin them equal to the ſupream God, who is ineffable. No Dæmons, how good ſoever, are admitted into this *Chorus*; ſo *Plotinus*, (the moſt exact follower of the *Pythagorick* Myſteries, as *Porphyrius* and *Longinus* atteſt.) *(b) The kind of gods we conceive to be void of paſſion; but to Dæmons we adjoyn paſſions, ſaying, They are ſempiternal in the next degree after the gods. It is better to call none in the intelligible world Dæmon; rather, if a Dæmon be placed there, to eſteem him a god.* (b) De abſtin. Deor.

*Order*, thus explained by *Pythagoras*: *If thou live according to right reaſon, grieving for what is ill done, and rejoycing in what is well done, and prayeſt the gods to perfect thy work:* (c) Aur. carm.

*Then ſtript of fleſh, up to free Æther ſoar,*
*A deathleſs god, divine, mortal no more.*

This is the order in the acquiſition of man's beatitude. The incorporeal Heaven of the middle world, the inviſible *Olympus* of the bleſſed, admits nothing impure; therefore vices are to be ſhun'd, and virtues to be embrac'd. The preſervation of men is by the mercies of God; therefore the Divinity is to be worſhipped, and the ſuperior powers to be invocated, that they would perfect our work. Laſtly, nothing material, corporeal, mixt, is received there. Therefore we muſt die, and holily put off the body, before we can be admitted to the ſociety of the gods.

Mund. de Anima Mundi.

## CHAP. V.

### *The Sensible World.*

(a) Pag. 694. f. (a) WE now come down to the *sensible* World. Its *exemplar* is the *world of the Deity*, its *example* the *intelligible world of Idæa's*, the ἀυθυπόστατον, subsistence of exemplars in *it self*. As *One* is the beginning of the intelligible world; so is *Two* of the corporeal, which were not corporeal, if it did not consist of these four, *point*, *line*, *superficies*, *solidity*, after the pattern of the Cube, made by *one*, *two*, *three*, *four*. *One*, fixed by position, creates a *point*; a *line*, being protracted from one point to another, is made of the number *two*; a *superficies* ariseth from *three* lines; a *solid*, from *four* positions, *before*, *behind*, *upwards*, *downwards*. *Two* multiplied in it self produceth *four*; retorted into it self (by saying twice two twice) makes the first *Cube*. Next *five* (the Tetragonical Pyramis principle of the Intelligible World) is the cube of *eight* with six sides, architect of the Sensible World. Amongst principles, the *Heptad* hath no place, being a virgin, producing nothing, and therefore named *Pallas*. This first cube is a fertile number, the ground of multitude and variety, constituted of two and of Four. *Zaratas* termed *two*, the *Mother*; we the *cube* that proceedeth from it, *Matter*, the bottom and foundation of all natural beeings, the seat of substantial forms. (b) *Timæus*, *of the Tetragone is generated the Cube, the most setled body, stedfast every way, having six sides, eight angles.* The form immers'd in this solid receptacle, is not received loosely, but fixtly, and singly it becomes individual and incommunicable, confin'd to time and place, losing its liberty in the servitude of Matter. Thus the two principles of temporal things, the *Pyramis* and *Cube*, *Form* and *Matter*, flow from one fountain, the *Tetragone*, whose Idæa is the *Tetractys*, the divine exemplar.

(b) *De Anima Mundi.*

Now there is requisite some third thing to unite these two, *Matter* and *Form*, for they flow not into one another spontaneously, or casually; the matter of one thing doth not contingently receive the form of another. When the soul departs out of man, the body becomes not brass or iron, neither is wool made of a stone. There must then be a third thing to unite them, (not *privation*; privation and power act nothing substantively; nor *motion*, an accident cannot be the principle of a substance; but) *God*, as *Socrates* and *Plato* acknowledg, saying, *There are three principles of things, God, Idæa, and Matter*; symbolized before by *Pythagoras* in these three secret marks, *Infinite*, *One* and *Two*; by *Infinite*, designing *God*; by *Unity*, *Form*; by *Alterity*, *Matter*. Infinite, in the *Supream* world; One, or Identity, in the *Intellectual*; Two, or Alterity, in the *Sensible*; for Matter is the mother of Alteration.

*Scalich.* can. 3.

The Tetragonal bases of these figures joyned together, make a *Dodecaedre*, the symbol of the Universe. * Alcinous, *The Dodecaedre God used in making the Universe*, this world. If upon an octangle Cube we erect a Pyramis, by four æqui-crural triangles, it makes a Dodecaedre, wherein the Cube is, as it were, mother, and the Pyramis father. Thus ‡ *Timæus*, *Form hath the nature of male and father*; *Matter*, *of female and mother*; the compositions are their off spring.

* Doctr. *Plat.*

‡ *De Anima mundi.*

Of these are produced all things in this world, by their seminal faculties, which things appear in a wonderful variety, by reason of the various commensuration of forms to their matter, and the admixtion of innumerable accidents, by excess and defect, discord and amity, motion and rest, impetuosity, and tranquillity, rarity and density. Hence arise the Spheres, the Stars, the four Elements, out of which evaporate hot, moist, cold, dry, and all the objects of sense, the transmutation of forms, and variety of colours in several things.

The gods are natural, the gods of gods supernatural; those inhabit the inferior world, these the superior. The gods of gods are most simple and pure, as being no where; they are supercelestial, as being every where, they are with us; here strangers, there natives; never in our world but when sent, *Angels*, messengers from heaven, appearing in what form they please, kind and beneficial to us. The inferior spirits never ascend to the super-celestial, but are sent sometimes on embassie to us, whence termed *Angels*, as the others. God himself inhabits the lowest, the highest, and the middle-most, intimately; so that there is no beeing without God. Moreover, the gods of this world are more excellent than the souls of men, though those assist, these inform bodies. Betwixt them, are placed *Dæmons* and *Heroes*; Dæmons next the gods, Heroes next souls; mentioned by *Pythagoras* in his *Golden Verses*, who assigns to each a peculiar worship.

## CHAP. VI.

### *The state of the Soul after Death.*

RAtional *man* is more noble than other creatures, as more divine, not content solely with one operation, (as all other things drawn along by nature, which always acts after the same manner) but endu'd with various gifts, which he useth according to his free will, in respect of which liberty, Pag. 675

(b) *Aur. carm.*

——(b) *Men are of heavenly race,*
*Taught by diviner Nature what t' embrace.*

By *diviner Nature* is meant the Intellectual soul; as to intellect, man approaches nigh to God; as to inferior senses, he recedeth from God: Reason teaching us *what to imbrace*, when it converts it self to the mind, renders us blessed; when perverted by the senses, wretched. For men often straying from the rule of right reason, precipitate themselves into misery, ἀυθαίρετα πήματ' ἔχοντες, in *Pythagoras's* word, *incurring ills voluntary.*

Thus is man placed between Virtue and Vice, like the stalk betwixt the two branches in the Pythagorical Y, or young *Hercules*, described by *Prodicus*. As therefore none can be called happy before their death, (as *Solon* said to *Cræsus*) so none is to be esteemed unhappy whilst he is in this life: *We must expect the last day of a man.* If when he hath put off his body, he remaineth burdened with vices, then begins he to be truly miserable. This misery after death, *Pythagoras* divides into two kinds. The unhappy are either near Beatitude, which

*Xenoph. memor. lib. Herod. lib. Ovid. Met.*

near Beatitude, which though at the present they enjoy not, yet are they not oppressed with extream misery, being hereafter to be delivered from their punishment: Or, wholly distant from Beatitude, in endless infinite pains. Thus there are two mansions in the Inferi, *Elizium*, possest by those that are to ascend into blessedness; and *Tartarus*, by those who endure infinite torments, ὅθεν ἄποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν, (as *Plato*, imitating *Pythagoras*, saith) *whence they never come out.* But when a man, who hath lived justly, dieth, his soul ascends to the pure Æther, and lives in the happy Ævum with the blessed, as a god with the gods.

Pag. 697. f. Man is the image of the world; he, in many things, metaphorically, receives the name of the world. The *mind* of man (as the supream mind) is termed *God*, by participation; the *rational soul*, if directed by the mind, it incline the will to virtue, is termed the *good Dæmon* or *Genius*; if by phantasie and ill affections, it draweth the will to vices, the *evil Dæmon.* VVhence *Pythagoras* desires of God, *to keep us from ill, and to shew every one the Dæmon he ought to use.* Leaving the body, the soul, if defiled with vices, becomes an evil Dæmon: Its life, δυσδαιμονία, *infelicity*; but if having forsaken vice, it retain a sollicitous affection to the good exercises and virtues which it practised in this life, it shall become a *good Dæmon*, and in the amænity of that world live happily, reflecting with joy upon the good actions it hath done, and retaining the same willingness to the right doing of them. This life is εὐδαιμονία, *felicity*, of which *Virgil:*

Aur. carm.

Æneid. 6.

*——the same care*
*VVhich heretofore, breathing this vital air,*
*Of Chariots, Arms, and sleekt-skin'd Steeds they*
*Pursues them now in earth's cold bosom laid.* (had,

These souls the Ancients termed *Lemures*; of these that which lives in, and takes care of any particular House, is *Lar familiaris*; that which for its demerits in this life, wanders up and down in the air, a terror, vain to good men, but to the bad hurtful, is *Larva*; those which are not certainly known to be *Larvæ* or *Lares*, are called *Dii manes*; *Dii*, out of reverence, who having performed the course of their lives prudently and justly, died holily.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of the Pythagorical Transmigration.*

Pag. 676. IT is commonly averred *Pythagoras* was of opinion, that the souls of men after death informed the bodies of beasts. VVe cannot imagin this of so knowing a person. This suspicion of this Transanimation, seems rather to have been raised by such, as were partly ignorant, partly envious, of the *Pythagorick* mysteries, as *Timon*, *Xenophanes*, *Cratinus*, *Aristophon*, *Hermippus*, and others, who have ascribed many things to *Pythagoras* which he never said nor wrote, and have perverted what he did say. (*b*) He holds, *that* the substantive unity of one number, is not the unity of another number. *That* the Monads in the Duad are inconnexive to those in the Triad. *That* the participate essence of every thing is One, which will not occupate the essence of another thing. No Animal (then) can transmigrate into the life of a different animal; but must continue under the Law of its own nature in its proper office; ὅτι τὸ εἶδος εἴδει οὐ συνέρχεται, *species not being coincident with species.* One seal may make many impressions upon several pieces of wax, but one piece of wax cannot bear the form of many seals. * The seal of human form (the image of God) is not permitted to set an impression upon inferior nature, implied by *Pythagoras* in this Symbol, *We must wear the image of God in a Seal-ring.* The image of God (mans soul) cannot seal or form the other natures that are near it. So *Hermes Trismegistus*, *Of man, one part is simple, which we call, The form of divine similitude.* And again, *There are two images of God, the World and Man.*

* *Scalich.* can. 5.

This is the meaning of *Pythagoras* concerning the transmigration of souls after death, and their descention into life. Others thought the soul educed out of the power of Matter; *Pythagoras* asserted it infused by God into the body, and therefore before it, not in time, but in purity and dignity. This infusion he termed, *The descent of the soul*, not understood of its situation, or its motion from the intellectual world thorough the several spheares to the Elementary, as *Proclus* and others; but of the natural series or form, the rational soul being the ultimate perfection of human body.

(*a*) That *Pythagoras* said, he was in times past *Euphorbus*, the meaning is this: The Ancients called the inclinations and wills of men their *Minds*, whence such as are of one study, intention, inclination, motion, and sense, are termed *Unanimous.* Thus the ancient Philosophers call the motive and sensitive faculty, *The Soul. An animate differs from an inanimate* (saith *Aristotle*) *chiefly in two things, Motion, and Sense.* Whosoever therefore are alike affected, and moved by the same object, are said to have *the same Soul.* The *Metempsychosis* then is nothing else, but equal care, motion, and study of some dead person, appearing in some living person. Thus *Pythagoras* might arrogate the soul of *Euphorbus*, *Callicles*, *Hermotimus*, *Pyrrhus*, *Pyrander*, *Calidona*, *Alce*; as having an inclination to the several excellencies that were in those persons. (*a*) *Scal.* can. 8.

Again, in saying he was *Euphorbus*, *Pythagoras* ænigmatically taught (not the transmigration of souls, but) the transmutation of bodies out of first matter; which is not only susceptible, but covetous of all forms, continually desiring, never satiated with any; as, *If a Comedy* (to use the comparison of *Aristotle*) *should say, I was first a Tragedy, because both Tragedy and Comedy are form'd of the same Letters and Elements.* Thus *Apollonius*, demanding of the Indian Brachmanes, what their opinion was concerning the Soul, *Iarchus* answered, 'According as Pythagoras *delivered to you, we to* 'the Ægyptians. *Apollonius* replies, 'VVill you then 'affirm you were one of the Trojan *Captains, as* Py- 'thagoras *said he was* Euphorbus? *The Spasion* warily asks, 'VVhom he thought the most worthy of 'them? Achilles (saith *Apollonius*) if we believe 'Homer. Then *Iarchus*, 'Look on him as my Pro- 'genitor, or πάγγονον σῶμα, progeniting body; for 'such Pythagoras *esteemed* Euphorbus. Pag. 681. *De Gener.* *Philostr.* vit. *Apollon.*

Or if he meant Historically, παλιγγενεσία, that is, The soul, separate from the body, may by the power of God, be brought again, the same into the

ſame body: The body in which *Pythagoras* was ſo often revived, though called by ſeveral names, was one and the ſame, not in quantity, but ſubſtance, as the Sea is one and homogenious in it ſelf, yet is here called *Ægean*, there, *Ionian*; elſewhere, *Myrtœan* and *Colſœan*; ſo one man often renate is named *Æthalides*, *Euphorbus*, *Hermotimus*, *Pyrrhus*, and laſtly *Pythagoras*. Theſe Generations he aſcribes not to the power of Nature, but to *Mercury*, God only; none can revive but by the Divine power of God, whom he acknowledgeth, ψυχωσις τῶν ὅλων, *Animation of all things*. He infuſeth ſoul into all men, and being infuſed, taketh it away; and being taken away, reſtores it, when, and as often as he pleaſeth.

CHAP.

Empedocle's.

## CHAP. I.

*His Country, Parents.*

IN the Catalogue of the *Pythagoreans*, we find *Empedocles*, not the leaſt eminent amongſt them. He was of *Agrigentum*, the moſt conſiderable City, next *Syracuſe*, of *Sicily*; built by a Colony (*a*) of *Geloans*, 108 years after their own foundation. *Gela* was built 45 years after *Syracuſe*; *Syracuſe* in the 11*th* Olympiad, *Gela* therefore in the 22*d*. *Agrigentum* in the 48*th*: It had its name from the River, and (*b*) grew in a ſhort while to ſo vaſt an increaſe, that in the time of *Empedocles* it contained 800000 Inhabitants. Eminent it was for many things, but for none ſo much as the birth of *Empedocles*: Whence *Lucretius*:

(*c*) *An* Agrigentine *Citizen 'mongſt theſe*
*Is chief and principal,* Empedocles:
*Born on the ſhore of* Sicil's *triple bounds,*
*VVhich the* Ionian *in wide bayes ſurrounds.*
*Laving its cliffs with azure waves, whoſe force*
*And rapid current* Italy *divorce*
*By a ſmall ſtrait; Here's vaſt* Charybdis *ſeat,*
*And here the murm'ring* Ætna's *flames do threat*

To

(*a*) Thucyd.

(*b*) Laert. lib. 6.

(*c*) By Mr. Evelin.

*To re-inforce once more their dreadful ire,*
*And vomit yet again devouring fire;*
*Belching it forth out of his ſooty jaws,*
*VVhich he at Heaven in lightning flaſhes throws.*
*Although this Iſle for ſundry things may ſeem*
*Famous, and many Nations it eſteem,*
*Renown'd for wealth, and many gallant men;*
*Yet never had it ought more glorious, then*
*This Perſonage, nought more miraculous,*
*More holy, or which was more precious.*
*His Verſe divine, and his Inventions rare;*
*The fruits of that rich breaſt do ſo declare*
*An univerſal knowledg, that ſome doubt*
*VVhether or no he ſprung from human root.*

Of his Parentage, *Laertius* gives this account. *Empedocles*, as *Hippobotus* ſaith, was an *Agrigentine*, Son of *Meto*, ſon of *Empedocles*, which *Timæus* confirms in his Sixteenth Book of *Hiſtories*, ſaying, that there was one *Empedocles* an eminent Perſon, Grandfather to the Poet. *Hermippus* ſaith the ſame. Likewiſe *Heraclides*, in his Treatiſe concerning Iſlands, affirms that his Grandfather was of a Noble family, and kept Chariot-Horſes. And *Eratoſthenes*, in his *Olympionicæ*, ſaith, that the Father of *Meto* was Victor in the 71 Olympiad, upon the teſtimony of *Ariſtotle*. But *Apollodorus* the Grammarian ſaith, it was that *Empedocles* who was ſon of *Meto*. *Glaucus* writes, that he came to the *Thurians*, at ſuch time as they had newly built their City; and not long after adds, They, who relate that he was baniſhed his Country, and came to *Syracuſe*, and fought with the *Syracuſians* againſt the *Athenians*, ſeem to me, to be quite miſtaken. For either *Empedocles* at that time was dead, or very old: the latter is not likely, for *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that he and *Heraclitus* dy'd in the Sixtieth year of their age. But he who won the Race in the Seventy-firſt Olmpiad, was of the ſame name, as *Apollodorus* hath ſet down the time. *Satyrus*, in his *Lives*, ſaith, that *Empedocles* was ſon of *Exænetus*, and that he himſelf had a ſon named *Exænetus*; and that in the ſame Olympiad, *Empedocles* won the Horſe-race, and the ſon was Victor at wreſtling, or, as *Heraclides*, won the Foot-race. But I find in the Commentaries of *Phavorinus*, that in the Olympick Games, *Empedocles* ſacrific'd an Ox made of honey and flower, and that he had a Brother named *Callicratides*. But *Telauges* ſon of *Pythagoras*, in his Epiſtle to *Philolaus* ſaith, that *Empedocles* was ſon of *Archinomus*. That he was of *Agrigentum* in *Sicily*, he himſelf profeſſeth in his *Luſtrations*, beginning thus.

*Friends, who in ſpacious Agrigentum dwell, &c.*

Thus much (ſaith *Laertius*) of his deſcent.

## CHAP. II.

### *His Maſters.*

(a) *Laert.* (a) *Timæus*, in the Ninth Book of his Hiſtory, affirms, he heard *Pythagoras*; adding, that he was taken ſtealing a diſſertation of his, (as *Plato* alſo was) and thereupon expelled out of their Society, and that he mentions *Pythagoras* in his Verſes, ſaying,

*Mongſt theſe was one in things ſublimeſt skill'd*
*His mind with all the wealth of Learning fill'd.*

But ſome there are who ſay, he meant this of *Parmenides*. *Neanthes* relates, that until *Philolaus* and *Empedocles*, the *Pythagoreans* communicated their Diſcourſes; but, after that *Empedocles* divulged them in his Poems, they made an order not to communicate any thing to an Epick Poet. They ſay likewiſe, that *Plato* was prohibited in the like manner.

But which of the *Pythagoreans Empedocles* heard, he tells not; the Epiſtle which goes abroad under the name of *Telauges*, affirming, *Empedocles* was Diſciple to *Hippaſus* and *Brontinus*, deſerves no credit.

*Theophraſtus* ſaith, he was an Æmulator and Imitator of *Parmenides* in his Poetry; for he among other things writ a Diſcourſe concerning Nature.

*Hermippus*, ſaith he, was not an Æmulator of *Parmenides*, but of *Xenophanes*, with whom he lived and imitated his Poetry, and afterwards applied himſelf to the *Pythagoreans*. But *Alcidamas*, in his Phyſick, relates, that *Zeno* and *Empedocles* heard *Parmenides* at the ſame time; at laſt both left him. *Zeno* went and ſtudied Philoſophy by himſelf; *Empedocles* went and heard *Anaxagoras* and *Pythagoras*: and imitated the one in his gravity of life and deportment; the other in his Phyſiology.

*Empedocles*, ſaith *Philoſtratus*, repeated by *Suidas*, is reported to have followed the *Pythagorean* Philoſophy, which is confirmed by many Verſes of his, as this.

*Farewell, friends, mortal I ſhall be no more.*

And this,

*A Boy I was, then did a Maid become.*

Beſides the Ox which he made of meal, and ſacrificed in *Olympia*, ſhews, that he approved the way of *Pythagoras*.

## CHAP. III.

### *How he lived amongſt the* Agrigentines; *his Power and Authority.*

(a) *Laert.* (a) *Neanthes* relates, that *Meto* dying, there began a Tyranny: But *Empedocles* perſwaded the *Agrigentines* to give over ſedition, and to endeavour a civil parity; and that he himſelf being very rich, beſtowed Dowries upon many Virgins that had none, and thereupon clothed himſelf in Purple, and wore a Golden Girdle, as *Phavorinus* affirms, and a Delphick Crown, and had ſervants attending on him; his look ſevere and conſtant. After this manner he went. And the Citizens that met him paid ſuch reſpect to him, as if thoſe had been the marks of Regal Authority.

(a) *Laert.*

Never-

Nevertheleſs, he was, as *Ariſtotle* affirms, very free, and averſe from taking any Government upon him; for he refuſed a Kingdom which was offered him, (as *Xanthus* ſaith in his Book concerning him) preferring a moderate condition. *Timæus* relates the ſame, adding the reaſon of his being Democratically affected; for being invited by one of the Governours, and the company falling to drink, he commanded, that Supper ſhould be brought in. He who had invited him, ſaid, That he ſtaid for the chief Magiſtrate. As ſoon as he came, he was made Sympoſiarch, Maſter of the Feaſt, for ſo it was ordered by him who invited them. He began to diſcover a tyrannical kind of humour, commanding, either that he ſhould drink, or that it ſhould be poured on his head. *Empedocles* for the preſent held his peace. But the next day citing them to the Court, he condemned them both to death, the Inviter, and the Sympoſiarch. Of ſo great authority was he in the Commonwealth.

Again, when *Acro* the Phyſician petition'd for a place, to build a Monument for his Father, *Empedocles* ſtood up and oppoſed it, and diſcourſed very largely of Parity; and withal asked, What Epitaph ſhould be inſcribed on the Tomb? This:

Ἄκρων ἰητῆρ' ἄκρον ἀκραγαντῖνον παῖδες ἄκρα
Κρύπτομεν κρημνὸς ἄκρος πατέρος ἀκροτάτης.

playing upon his name *Acro*. Others recite the ſecond Verſe thus:

Ἀκροτάτης κορυφῆς τύμβῳ ἄκρῳ κατέχω.

This, ſome aſcribe to *Simonides*.

Afterwards *Empedocles* diſſolved the Council of a thouſand Senators, and conſtituted it Triennial; ſo that it conſiſted, not only of the rich, but of the ordinary ſort.

But *Timæus*, in his firſt and ſecond Books, (for he often mentions him) ſaith, that he ſeems to be of an opinion contrary to the Democracy; ſometimes proud and ſelf-conceited in his Poetry, as when he ſaith,

*A deathleſs god am I, mortal no more.*

## CHAP. IV.

### *VVonders related of him.*

HE was ſo excellent, not only in Natural Philoſophy, but in Medicine alſo, that by his skill in both theſe, he performed many admirable things.

(a) *Timæus* relates, that the *Eteſian* winds blowing very ſtrongly, inſomuch that they deſtroy'd the fruits, he gave order, that many Aſſes ſhould be flead, and bottles made of their skins, and placed on the tops of the hills to receive the blaſts; by which means the winds gave over: And upon him was conferred the attribute of *Coluſanemos*, or *Alexanemos*, The chaſer away of the winds. (a) Laert.

Not unlike to this is that which *Plutarch* reports of him, that by ſtopping up a cleft in a mountain, out of which there came an unwholſome Southern blaſt to the plains, it is conceived, that he drove away the Plague out of that Country.

The ſame cure he wrought among the *Selinuntians*, by a different means; for they being, as *Diodorus* the *Epheſian* ſaith, infeſted by a plague, cauſed by the noyſomneſs of the River, whereof the men died, neither could the women be, without much difficulty, delivered; *Empedocles* contrived, and at his own charge convey'd two other Rivers that ran near, into this Channel; by which mixtion, the water became ſweet, and the plague ceaſed.

(d) Another time, a young man drawing a ſword upon *Anchitus* his Hoſte, (for that he had in publick judgment condemned his father to death) and being about to have killed him, *Empedocles* prevented it, and immediately changing his Tune, and ſinging out of *Homer*, (d) *Iamb.* vi. P

Nepenthe *calming anger, eaſing grief.*

freed *Anchitus* his Hoſt from death, and the young man from the crime of murder; who from thence-forward became one of his diſciples, eminent amongſt them.

(e) *Hermippus* ſaith, that he cured *Panthea*, a woman of *Agrigentum*, given over by all the Phyſicians. (e) Laert.

But the moſt memorable cure was that which he performed upon a woman that had lain ſeven days *dead*, as *Pliny* terms it; but as *Galen* more exactly out of *Heraclides*, deſcribes it, *breathleſs, and without pulſe, differing in nothing from a dead body, ſaving that ſhe had a little warmth about the middle parts of her body. The Book of* Heraclides *was intituled*, The breathleſs woman. *And it was a controverſie amongſt the Phyſicians that were preſent, whether ſhe were dead or alive.* (g) *Heraclides* adds, that *Empedocles acquainted* Pauſanias *with the whole buſineſs, and that the breathleſs woman could preſerve her ſelf thirty days, without breathing or eating.* Whence he terms *Empedocles* both a Phyſician and a Prophet, confirmed even by his own verſes. (g) Laert. uid. S

*Friends, who in ſpacious* Agrigentum *dwell,*
*Buſied in noble high deſigns, farewell.*
*A deathleſs god I am, mortal no more:*
*Honour'd by all, with Garlands cover'd o're:*
*VVhich, ſoon as e're I come to any Town,*
*Both men and women pay to me renown.*
*Thouſands of men enquire the way to wealth,*
*Some would divine, others reſtore to health.*

Some there were who aſcribed theſe to *Goetick-Magick*. *Satyrus* in his *Lives* relates, that *Gorgias* the *Leontine*, who had been diſciple to *Empedocles*, uſed to ſay, that he himſelf had been preſent with him, when he practiſed *Goetick*; and that *Empedocles*, makes a profeſſion thereof in his Poems, when he ſaith:

*Med'cines to ſtrengthen age and cure diſeaſe,*
*Thou ſhalt be taught, for I am skill'd in theſe;*
*The wrath of reſtleſs winds thou ſhalt aſſwage,*
*VVhich blaſt the corn in their pernicious rage.*

*And*

*And when thou call'ſt they ſhall come back again,*
*Rain thou ſhalt change todrought, and drought to rain,*
*By whoſe kind moiſture trees may ſprout and thrive,*
*And make the dead quit Pluto and revive.*

In fine, he was ſo much admired for theſe things, that when he went to the Olympick Games, the eyes of all men were fixed on him; neither was their diſcourſe of any thing ſo much as of *Empedocles*.

## CHAP. V.

### *His Death.*

His death, (ſaith *Laertius*) is variouſly reported. *Heraclides* having related the ſtory of the breathleſs woman, how much *Empedocles* was admired for raiſing a dead woman to life, adds, that he appointed a Sacrifice in the field of *Piſianax*, and invited thither many of his friends, amongſt whom was *Pauſanias*. After the feaſt was done, the company withdrew themſelves to reſt, but he ſtir'd not out of the place where he lay at Supper. The next morning when they aroſe, he alone was miſſing, which giving them occaſion to enquire after him of the ſervants, they ſaid they knew not what was become of him, only one of them ſaid, that about Midnight he heard a great voice, calling *Empedocles*, whereupon riſing up he ſaw a heavenly light, and a ſplendor of Torches, but nothing elſe. They were all amazed at this accident, and *Pauſanias* going down, ſent forth others to enquire more ſtrictly, but was at laſt perſwaded not to trouble himſelf any further, ſaying that the thing that had fallen out deſerved prayer, and that ſacrifice ſhould be made to him as to a god. *Hermippus* ſaith, that he made the Sacrifice upon the cure he wrought on *Panthea*, and that the Perſons invited were eighty.

*Hippobotus* affirms, that he roſe up from his place and went to *Ætna*, where he leaped into the fire, that he might leave behind him an opinion that he was a god; and that afterwards, it was diſcovered by one of his Sandals, which the fire caſt up again, for his Sandals were of Braſs. But this report *Pauſanias* contradicts.

*Diodorus* the *Epheſian*, having told how he cured the *Selinuntians* of the Plague, adds, that the *Selinuntians* upon a time feaſting by this River, *Empedocles* appeared to them, and they riſing up worſhipped him, and prayed to him as a god: which opinion he deſiring to continue, caſt himſelf into the fire

This relation *Timæus* contradicts, affirming, that he departed into *Peloponneſus*, and never return'd; whereby it came to paſs, that the manner of his death is not known. He likewiſe in his fourth Book expreſly confutes *Heraclides*, for he proveth that *Piſianax* was a *Syracuſian*, and had not any eſtate or field at *Agrigentum*; that *Pauſanias*, upon that report, erected in memory of his friend, either a little Image or Chappel, as to a god, for he was rich. And how, ſaith he, could he caſt himſelf into the flames of *Ætna*, of which being ſo far diſtant, he never makes any mention? Indeed he died in *Peloponneſus*, and it is no wonder that his Tomb is not known, for it hath happened ſo to many others beſides. Thus *Timæus*; adding, that *Heraclides* tells extraordinary things, as among the reſt, the ſtory of a man that fell out of the Moon.

*Hippobotus* affirms, that a Statue of *Empedocles* cover'd, which ſtood firſt at *Agrigentum*, was afterwards plac'd before the Senate-houſe at *Rome* uncover'd, being brought thither by the *Romans*, of which ſaith *Laertius*, there are yet ſome pictures.

*Neanthes* relates, that going in his Chariot to a great ſolemnity at *Meſſena*, he fell and broke his thigh; of which he died being ſeventy ſeven years old. His Sepulcher is at *Megara*: but in the accompt of his years *Ariſtotle* differs, who ſaith he died at ſixty. Yet others affirm, he lived to an hundred and nine years of age. He flouriſhed in the 84*th* Olympiad.

But *Democritus* the *Trœzenian* relates, in *Homer*'s words, that,

*About his neck he knit a rope, and fell*
*From a high cliff; his ſoul went down to hell.*

In the forementioned Epiſtle of *Telauges*, it is ſaid, that being exceeding old he fell into the Sea, and ſo died. Thus much for his death.

## CHAP. VI.

### *His Writings.*

*Ariſtotle* in his Sophiſt affirms, that *Empedocles* firſt found out Rhetorick, *Zeno* Dialectick; and in his Book concerning the Poets, that *Empedocles*'s ſtyle was *Homerical*, and that he was weighty in his expreſſions, uſing Metaphors much, and other Poetical figures; and that having written, among other Poems, the paſſage of *Xerxes* over the *Helleſpont*, and a Hymn to *Apollo*, they were both burnt by a ſiſter, or, as *Hieronymus*, a daughter of his: the Hymn upon miſtake; the *Perſian* Poem wittingly, for that it was imperfect. He adds, that he wrote Tragedies alſo and Politicks: but *Heraclides*, ſon of *Serapion*, aſcribes the Tragedies to another. *Hieronymus* ſaith, he lighted upon forty three of them; *Neanthes*, that he wrote Tragedies when he was young, and that he had a ſight of them. Laert.

Moreover he wrote Books concerning *Nature* and *Luſtrations*, which extended to 5000 verſes, and a *Medicinal Diſcourſe* containing ſix hundred verſes.

His *Luſtrations*, *Clemens* the Rhapſodiſt collected, and ſung at the Olympick Games, as *Phavorinus* ſaith in his Commentaries.

## CHAP. VII.

### *His Opinions.*

He held that there are (a) four Elements, Fire, Air, Water, Earth; and two principal powers, Amity and Diſcord; one unitive, the other diſcretive: for thus he writes: (a) Plut. de phil. l. 3.

To

*To the four roots of all, attention give;*
*The Æther* Jove; Juno, *by whom we live;*
*Next these is* Pluto; Neſtis *laſt, whoſe eyes*
*Afford the mortal fountain freſh ſupplies.*

He calls the Heat and Æther, *Jupiter*; the Air, vital *Juno*; the Earth, *Pluto*; the Water, *Neſtis*, and the Mortal Fountain. *Laertius* cites it thus:

*White* Jove, *and vital* Juno, Pluto *then,*
*And* Neſtis *giving tears to th' eyes of men.*

The Fire, ſaith he, he calls *Jupiter*; the Earth, *Juno*; the Air, *Pluto*; the Water, *Neſtis*. Theſe are in an inceſſant mutation, whereby there is ſuch an eternal production of things; whence he adds.

*Sometimes by Friendſhip all are knit in one,*
*Sometimes by Diſcord ſever'd and undone.*

Plut. pl. 1. (*b*) Before the four Elements, there are certain leaſt fragments, (*c*) as it were Elements of Stob. Ecl. Elements, of ſimilar parts, and round.
phyſ. 1. 17.
Plut. pl. 1. 5. (*d*) The World is one; the World is not the Univerſe, but a little part of the Univerſe; the reſt is ſluggiſh matter.
Plut. 1. 30. (*e*) Nature is nothing but the mixture and ſeparation of the Elements; for ſo he ſaith in the firſt of his Phyſicks:

*We otherwiſe; there's no ſuch thing at all*
*As that which Mortals Death or Nature call.*
*To Mixtion and Diſcretion all we owe,*
*On which the names of Nature men beſtow.*

Plut. 2. 1. (*f*) The World is circumſcribed by the circulation of the Sun, and that is the bound of it.
Plut. 2. 10. (*g*) The right ſide of the World is that which is towards the Summer Tropick, the left that which is towards the Winter Tropick.
Plut. 1. 24. (*h*) He, as all thoſe who held the World to be made of little bodies, introduced Concretions and Diſcretions, but deny'd Generation and Corruption, ſaying, That compounds are not made by quality and alteration, but by quantity and coagmentation.
Plut. 2. 11. (*i*) Heaven is ſolid, being made of air condens'd by fire, like Cryſtal; it containeth a fiery and aerial nature in both Hemiſphears.
Plut. 2. 13. (*k*) The Stars are fiery, conſiſting of that fire which the Æther containing in it ſelf, ſtruck forth in its firſt ſecretion.
Ibid. (*l*) The fixed Stars are faſtned to the Cryſtal of the Heavens, the Planets are looſe.

(*m*) The Sun is a great heap of fire, bigger than the Moon. (*m*) Laert.

(*n*) There are two Suns, one an archetypal fire in the other Hemiſphear of the World, filling this Hemiſphear, which is continually oppoſite to its ſplendor. As for that which we ſee, it is the light in that other Hemiſphear, repleniſhed with air, mixed with heat; and the ſame is occaſioned by refraction from the Earth, that is more round, entring into the Sun, which is of a Cryſtalline nature, and yet is trained and carried away together with the motion of that fire. But to ſpeak more plainly and diſtinctly, this is as much as to ſay, The Sun is nothing elſe, but the reflection of that light of the fire which is about the Earth. (*n*) Plut. 2. 20.

(*o*) He aſcribed the reaſons of the Solſtices, or Tropicks of the Sun, to the Sphear, that containeth him, and hindreth him from paſſing further; as alſo to the two Tropicks. (*o*) Plut. 2. 23.

(*p*) The Moon is in form like a diſh. (*p*) Plut. 2. 27.

(*q*) The Moon is twice as far from the Sun, as ſhe is from the Earth. Laert. (*q*) Plut. 2. 31.

(*r*) Winter cometh when the air is predominant in thickneſs, and is forced upward; Summer, when the fire is in like manner predominant, and is driven downward. (*r*) Plut. 3. 8.

(*s*) The Sea is the ſweat of the Earth, burnt by the Sun, which ſqueezeth the ſweat out of it. (*s*) Plut. 3 16.

(*t*) The ſoul puts on the ſeveral forms of all living creatures, and plants; whence he ſaid of himſelf: (*t*) Laert.

*A Boy I was, then did a Maid become;*
*A Plant, Bird, Fiſh, and in the vaſt Sea ſwom.*

(*u*) The particular ſenſes are affected according to the proportion of their pores and paſſages, namely, as the proper object of each ſenſe is well diſpoſed and fitted. (*u*) Plut. 4. 9.

(*x*) Reſemblances in Mirrours come by the means of certain defluxions gathered together, upon the ſuperficies of the Mirrour, and accompliſhed by the fire that ariſeth from the ſaid Mirrour; and withal, tranſmuteth the air that is before it, into which thoſe fluxions are carried. (*x*) Plut. 4. 14.

(*y*) *Plutarch* ſaith, he mingled the viſual images and beams together, calling that which is made thereof, The rays of a compound image. (*y*) Plut. 4. 13.

(*z*) Hearing is perform'd by means of a wind within the hollow of the Ear, turned in manner of a ſcrew, fitted and framed of purpoſe within the Ear, hanging up, and beaten upon in manner of a Bell. (*z*) Plut. 4. 16.

(*a*) The Hegemonick is the conſiſtence of the blood. (*a*) Plut. 4. 5.

# EPICHARMUS.

Laert.

EPICHARMUS also heard *Pythagoras*. He was of *Coos*, son of *Helothales*. At three months old, he was carried from *Sicily* to *Megara*, and from thence to *Syracuse*, as he himself saith in his *Commentaries*. On his image was this Inscription:

*As Stars exceeded by the radiant Sun,*
*Streams by the Ocean, into which they run;*
*So all by* Epicharmus *are surpast,*
*On whose head* Syracuse *this Garland plac'd.*

He wrote Commentaries, in which he discoursed Physiologically, and Sententiously, and Medicinally: and added little Notes to his Commentaries, by which they are known to be his. He died ninety years old.

ARCHYTAS

ARCHYTAS.

Lam. ARCHYTAS was of *Tarentum*, Son of *Mneſagoras*, or (as *Ariſtoxenus*) of *Heſtyæus*. He alſo heard *Pythagoras*. This was he, by whoſe means *Plato*, when *Dionyſius* had a mind to put him to death, was delivered. He was generally admired for all ſorts of Virtue. He was ſeven times General of his own Country-men, whereas all others were but once, the Law prohibiting, that they ſhould not be oftner. There is extant an Epiſtle of his to *Plato*, to this effect.

*Archytas* to *Plato*, Health.

IT *is well that you are recovered of your ſickneſs; for, beſides what you wrote,* Damiſcus *hath informed us ſo. We took care of the Commentaries, and went to the* Lucanians, *where we diſcourſed with the Sons of* Ocellus. *Part, concerning Laws, and a Kingdom, and Piety, and the Generation of all things, we have; and part, we have ſent; the reſt are not to be found at preſent: As ſoon as we find them, you ſhall have them.*

*Plato* returned this Anſwer:

*Plato* to *Archytas*, Εὐτυχεῖν.

THE *Commentaries which you ſent, we received with much joy, and exceedingly admire the Author, who ſeems to us to be a perſon worthy his Anceſtors, who were* Myræans, *ſome of thoſe* Trojans *who went with* Laomedon, *good men, as the ſtory ſpeaks them. As for my Commentaries, concerning which you wrote, they are not poliſhed, but as they are I have ſent them; as for the cuſtody of them, we are both agreed, ſo that I ſhall need to inquire nothing of you. Farewell.*

*Ariſtoxenus* ſaith, He was never worſted in the Field; but once through the envy of others, reſign'd his Charge, and then all his Soldiers were taken. It appears by * *Horace*, that he periſhed by Shipwrack, who brings in a Mariner Expoſtulating with him upon it, thus:

* Lib. 1. Od. 28.

*Thee the Surveyor of the Sea and Land,*
*And the innumerous ſand,*
*A little ſhare of theſe ſmall duſty grains,*
Archytas *now contains,*
*Hard by the Marine ſhore: It nought avail'd,*
*Since die thou muſt, t'have ſcal'd*
*Th' aerial Orbs, or that thy ſoaring ſoul*
*O're run the wheeling Pole.*

*ARCHYTAS* Anſwers,

*And ſo dy'd* Pelop's *father, at whoſe Feaſts*
*The gods themſelves were gueſts;*
*And* Tithon, *who* Aurora *entertain'd;*
Minos, *whom* Jove *deſign'd*
*Admiſſion to his counſels; and again*
*Dark* Tartara *detain,*
Panthous *ſon, who, by his Target known,*
*And from the ſhrine ta'ne down,*
*Atteſted, that in* Trojan *Wars, he breath'd,*
*And to black death bequeath'd*
*Nothing but skin and nerves, whom thou wilt yield*
*In truth and nature ſkil'd.*
*But all men to one endleſs night are led,*
*And once death's path muſt tread.*

*Some are ſtern* Mars's *Trophies; Seas become*
*The greedy Sailor's Tomb.*
*The fates of young and old together crowd,*
*No head is diſallow'd*
*By mercileſs* Proſerpina; *and me*
*Into th'* Illyrian *Sea*
*The wind, which doth* Orion's *Star purſue,*
*Unruly* Auſter *threw.*
*But grudg not thou, kind Mariner, to ſpread*
*On my unburied head*
*And bones, ſome few of theſe looſe ſands; ſo may*
*Fierce* Eurus *turn away*
*Whatever threatens the* Heſperian *floods,*
*On the* Apulian *Woods,*
*Securing thee from harm; a ſwelling tyde*
*Of wealth on every ſide*
*Flow on thee by great* Jove *and* Neptune *ſent.*
Tarentum's *Preſident*
*If thou neglect, thou maiſt in future age*
*Thy guiltleſs ſons engage*
*In this offence, perhaps fate may return*
*What's due unto thy ſcorn.*
*Vengeance may on my poor petition wait,*
*And thee nought expiate.*
*The ſtop is ſmall, as thou ſail'ſt on, thou maiſt*
*Duſt thrice upon me caſt.*

He invented Cranes and Screws, and made a Pidgeon of wood that flew; but when ſhe once reſted, could not riſe. Of the duplication of a Cube, I have ſpoken formerly in the Life of *Plato*. *Lam.*

Being angry with a Country-man, he ſaid, What would I have done to thee, if I had not been angry? *Cic. de Amic.*

He was very modeſt, and abſtained from obſcene expreſſions; and if there were a neceſſity of any, he wrote it upon the wall. *Æl. var. Hi.*

He ſaid, That if a man ſhould go to heaven, and behold the nature of the World, and beauty of the Stars, he would find, that the admiration of them, otherwiſe the moſt pleaſing thing in the world, would be very unpleaſant to him, if he had not one to communicate it unto.

He ſaid, That it is as hard to find a man without deceit, as a Fiſh without bones.

He ſaid, That the Judg and Sanctuary is one; for he who hath received wrong, flies to both.

He ſaid, That every Commonwealth conſiſts of three things, the Ruler, the Ruled, and the Laws: whereof, the beſt ought to command; the worſt, to be commanded.

*Cicero*, in the perſon of *Cato*, gives an account of an Oration of *Archytas* to this effect: That there is no peſtilence more capital given by nature to men, than corporeal pleaſure, by which they are incited to run head ſtrong and unbridled on, to enjoy the luſt of that greedy pleaſure. Hence proceed betrayings of our Country; hence, ſubverſions of Commonwealths; hence, private Treaties with enemies. In fine, there is no wickedneſs, no miſchief to the undertaking whereof, this luſting after pleaſure will not impel us: Rapes, Adulteries, and all ſuch leudneſs, are provoked by no other allurements, than thoſe of pleaſure. And whereas Nature, or ſome god, hath not beſtowed on man *De Senect.*

man any thing more excellent than a mind, there is nothing ſo contrary to this divine gift, as pleaſure; for, as long as pleaſure rules, there is no place for Temperance, nor can virtue ſubſiſt under the juriſdiction of pleaſure. Which to underſtand the better, he adviſed to fancy to our ſelves ſome man, provoked by corporeal pleaſure the greateſt imaginable; and he conceived, that no man will doubt, but that as long as he took joy therein, he could fix his reaſon, his mind, his thoughts, upon nothing elſe. Wherefore there is nothing ſo deteſtable, nothing ſo peſtilent, as pleaſure; for, if it be great and long, it extinguiſheth all the light of the mind.

There were four of this name: the firſt, this Philoſopher; the ſecond, of *Mytilene*, a Muſician; the third, wrote concerning Agriculture; the fourth, an Epigrammatick Poet. Some add the fifth, an Architect. *Laert.*

# ALCMÆON.

ALCMÆON was of *Crotona*; he alſo heard *Pythagoras*. He was chiefly addicted to Medicine, but ſtudied Phiſiology alſo, ſaying, There are many cauſes of humane things. *Phavorinus* thinks him the firſt that wrote a Phyſical Diſſertation. He aſſerted, that the Moon hath an eternal nature. He was ſon of *Perithus*, as appeareth by the beginning of his Book; Alcmæon *a* Crotonian, *ſon of* Perithus, *ſaith thus to* Brontinus, *and* Leon, *and* Bathyllus, *of inviſible and immortal things, the gods have a certain knowledg; men, conjecture*, &c. He aſſerted the ſoul to be immortal, and that it moveth perpetually like the Sun.

He aſſerted, that the Planets hold an oppoſite courſe to the Fixed Stars, from Weſt to Eaſt.

We hear by the hollow of the Ear; that reſoundeth when the wind entereth into it, becauſe all empty things make a ſound.

By moiſture and warmth in the Tongue, together with the ſoftneſs thereof, all objects of taſte are diſtinguiſhed.

Reaſon, the principal part of the ſoul, is within the Brain, and that by it we ſmell, drawing in ſcents and ſmells by reſpirations.

Why Mules are barren, ſee *Plut. plac. phil. lib.* 5. *cap.* 14.

The Infant in the Womb feeds by the whole body; for it ſucketh and draweth to it, like a ſponge, of all the food, that which is good for nouriſhment. *Plut.* 5. 16.

The head is firſt made, as being the ſeat of reaſon. *Plut.* 5. 17.

Sleep is made by the return of blood into the confluent veins: Waking, is the diffuſion of the ſaid blood; Death, the utter departure thereof. *Plut.* 5. 24.

The equal diſtribution of the faculties of the body, moiſture, heat, drineſs, cold, bitter, ſweet, and the reſt, is that which maintaineth health; the predominance of any of them cauſeth ſickneſs, for the predominance of one is the corruption of all the other, and is the cauſe of indiſpoſition; the efficient, in reſpect of exceſſive heat or cold; the material in reſpect of abundance, or defect of humours; as in ſome there is want of blood or brain; whereas health is a proportionable contemperation of all theſe qualities. *Plut.* 5. 30.

# HIPPASUS.

HIPPASUS was a Metapontine, (or as ſome affirm a *Sybarite*) a *Pythagorean* alſo. * *Jamblichus* ſaith he was drown'd in the Sea, a juſt reward for his impiety, for that he had publiſht the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*.

He aſſerted that fire is the principle of all things, of which all things are made, and into which all things reſolve. All things are made by extinction of this fire: firſt, the groſſer part of it, being contracted becometh Earth, then the Earth being *Laert.*

being looſened by the nature of the fire, becomes water; the water exhaled becomes air. Again the World and all Bodies ſhall be diſſolved in a conflagration; fire therefore is the principle, for all things were made of it; and the end, becauſe all things are reſolved into it.

Likewiſe he held that there is a determinate time of the mutation of the World, and that the Univerſe is bounded and always moved.

*Demetrius* ſaith, he left nothing extant in Writing.

There was another of this name, a *Lacedemonian*, who wrote five Books of the *Lacedemonian* Commonwealth.

# PHILOLAUS.

*PHILOLAUS* was of *Crotona*, a *Pythagorean*: of him it was that *Plato* wrote to *Dion*, to purchaſe ſome *Pythagorean* Books; he was put to death upon ſuſpicion, that he aimed at the Tyranny.

He aſſerted, that all things are made by Neceſſity and Harmony; and was the firſt that ſaid the Earth moveth circularly: which ſome aſcribe to *Hicetus* of *Syracuſe*.

He wrote one Book, which *Hermippus* (citing ſome other Author) affirms that *Plato*, when he went to *Sicily* to *Dionyſius*, purchaſed of the Kinſmen of *Philolaus*, paying for it forty *Alexandrian* Minæ: and out of it took his *Timæus*. Others ſay that *Dionyſius* gave it him, having taken it from a young man, Diſciple to *Philolaus*, whom he freed out of Priſon.

*Demetrius* ſaith, that *Philolaus* firſt publiſhed a *Pythagorick* Diſcourſe concerning nature, beginning thus, *Nature, and the whole World, and all things in it, are aptly connected of Infinites and Finites.*

*Plutarch* relates, that after the *Pythagorean* Aſſociations were expelled the Cities, thoſe who kept ſtill together, being aſſembled in a houſe at *Metapontum*, the * *Cylonians* ſet the houſe on fire, and burnt them all except *Philolaus* and *Lyſis*, who being young men, ſtrong and active, eſcaped through the fire. *Philolaus* fled to the *Lucanians*, where ſome other friends came to him, who gathering themſelves together, over-maſter'd the *Cylonians*. But of this formerly, in the Life of *Pythagoras*.

* So read here, and afterward.

He affirmed, that there is a twofold corruption: one while by fire falling from Heaven: another, by water out of the Moon, poured forth by the circumgyration of the Air; the exhalations whereof become the food of the World.

The ſubſtance of the Sun is, as it were of glaſs, receiving the reverberation of all the fire in the world, and tranſmitting the light thereof to us, as it were through a ſtrainer, as that fiery light in Heaven reſembleth the Sun; then that which proceedeth from it, is in form of a mirrour: and thirdly there is a ſplendor, which by way of reflection from that mirrour, is ſpread upon us; and this we call the Sun, as it were the Image of an Image. *Plut.* 2. 20.

The Earth moveth round about the fire in an oblique Circle, as the Sun and Moon do. *Plut.* 3. 13.

# EUDOXUS.

*Laert.*

*EUDOXUS* was of *Gnidus*, ſon of *Æſchines*: he was an Aſtrologer, Geometrician, Phyſician, and Law-giver: He learnt Geometry of *Archytas*; Medicine, of *Philiſtio*, the *Sicilian*, as *Callimachus* affirms.

*Sotion* ſaith, he heard *Plato* alſo: for being 23 years old, and in a very mean condition, he was invited by the fame of the Socratick Philoſophers to go to *Athens*, with *Theomedon* a Phyſician that maintained, and much affected him. He lived in the *Pyræum*, and went up every day to *Athens*, where he heard the Sophiſts, and return'd. Thus he lived two Months, and then went home; where his friends making a collection of money for him, he travelled to *Ægypt* with *Chryſippus* a Phyſician, carrying along with him Letters of recommendation from *Ageſilaus* to *Nectabis*, who recommended him to the Prieſts. There he lived a year and four months, ſhaving his Eye-brows; and wrote,

wrote, as ſome think, his Hiſtory of eight years. Thence he went to *Cyzicus*, and to *Propontis*, teaching Philoſophy; and to *Mauſolus*. At laſt, having gotten together many Diſciples, he return'd to *Athens*, to vex *Plato*, as ſome conceive, for having formerly rejected him. Some ſay, that *Plato* making a Feaſt, he taught him the way of placing his Gueſts in the figure of a Semicircle.

*Nicomachus* ſon of *Ariſtotle* ſaith, he aſſerted pleaſure to be the chief good.

He was much honoured in his own Country, as appears by the Decree made concerning him. He was very eminent alſo among the *Greeks*, for he gave Laws to ſome Cities, and taught them (as *Hermippus* affirms) Aſtrology and Geometry; and many other excellent things.

He had three Daughters, *Actis*, *Philtis*, and *Delphis*. *Eratoſthenes* affirms, he wrote Κυπῶν διαλόγους; but others, that the *Ægyptians* wrote them in their own Language, and that *Ariſtoxenus* tranſlated them into *Greek*.

From him *Chryſippus* the *Gnidian*, ſon of *Erineus*, received all that he wrote concerning the Gods, and the World, and Meteors.

He left many excellent Writings.

He had a ſon, *Ariſtagoras*, father to *Chryſippus*, the Diſciple of *Aethlius*.

He flouriſhed in the 103 Olympiad, died 53 years old. When he lived in *Ægypt* with *Ichonuphus*, a *Heliopolitane*, an Ox licked his Garment; whereupon the Prieſts foretold that he ſhould be very eminent, but not long-liv'd. Thus *Laertius*.

If therefore he lived about the 103 Olympiad, and in the twenty third year of his age heard *Plato*, *Euſebius* ſeems to be miſtaken, who affirms, he flouriſhed in the beginning of the 97 Olympiad, which was ſeven years after the death of *Socrates*, at what time *Eudoxus* could not have attained any eminence, if he were Diſciple to *Plato*, as *Cicero* alſo affirms he was; *Strabo*, that he went with *Plato* into *Ægypt*; *Suidas*, that he was Contemporary with him.

Of his Writings are mentioned *Octaeteris*; ſee *Cenſorinus*, *de Die Natali*, Cap. 18.

Γῆς περίοδος, cited by *Athenæus* and others; perhaps the ſame *Strabo* calls Τὴν περὶ τὸν Εὔδοξον ἱστορίαν; it conſiſted of many Books, the Seventh cited by *Stephanus* and *Porphyrius*.

*Phænomena*; mentioned by the Anonymous Writer of the Life of *Aratus*.

There were others of this Name; (*a*) one of *Rhodes*, a Hiſtorian; another of *Sicily*, a Comick Poet; another of *Gnidus*, a Phyſician; (*b*) another, of *Cyzicus*. Hitherto of the *Pythagorean Philoſophers*.

(*a*) *Laert.*

(*b*) *Strabo.* & *Plin.* l. 6. c. 7.

PART

PART

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

## The Tenth Part, *Containing the* HERACLITIAN *Sect.*

## HERACLITVS.

### CHAP. I.

*His Country, Parents, Maſters.*

AS the *Ionick* Sect, which was ſo named from the place of its Inſtitution, communicated that denomination in general to all the Sects that were deſcended from it, though founded in other places: So the *Pythagorean* Sect, being from the Country where it was planted termed *Italick*,

all the Sects that ſprung out of it, though ſome of them had their beginning far from *Italy*, were included under the general notion of *Italick*. Of theſe there were four; the *Heraclitian*, the *Eleatick*, the *Sceptick* (or *Pyrrhonian*) and the *Epicurean*.

The Author of the firſt was *Heraclitus*, an *Ephesian*, his Father, by *Laertius* called *Plyſo*, by *Clemens Bauſo*, by *Suidas Bloſſo*, *or Pleuto*, *or* (ſaith he) *as others Heracion*: He had alſo an Uncle, *Heracleodorus*, whom he mentions in his (*b*) Epiſtles.

(*a*) *Cic. Laert. &c. Strom.* 1.

(*b*) *ad Ampl. id.*

(*c*) *Stob. Serm.* 21.

(*c*) *Ariſtonymus* ſaith, That whil'ſt he was yet young, he was the wiſeſt of all men, becauſe he knew that he knew nothing; *Laertius*, that he was admirable from his Childhood; for, whil'ſt he was young, he uſed to ſay, that he knew nothing; and when he was grown up, that he knew all things.

*Laertius* adds, That *he heard no man, but profeſs'd that he himſelf made inquiry, and ſought out all things of himſelf.* But the learned *Caſaubon* juſtly doubts, That *Laertius* miſtakes the meaning of thoſe words, and that they rather refer to a ſtrict enquiry, which he uſed to make into himſelf, according to the *Delphian* Motto, *Know thy ſelf*; to which effect, (*d*) *Plutarch* commends as a memorable ſaying of his, *I have been ſeeking out my ſelf.* And *Laertius* himſelf acknowledgeth, upon the teſtimony of *Sotion*, that *Jeſus affirmed, he heard Xenophanes*; to whom *Suidas* adds, *Hippaſus the Pythagorean.*

(*d*) *Adv. Color.*

(*e*) *Laert.*

(*f*) *Suid.*

(*e*) He flouriſhed about the 69th Olympiad, (*f*) in the time of *Darius Hyſtapis.*

## CHAP. II.

### *How he lived at* Epheſus.

LAertius ſaith, *He was of a high Spirit, contemning others, as appears by a Book of his* (perhaps the Fifth Book of Politick, out of which (*g*) *Clemens* ſeems to cite the ſame Sentence) *wherein he ſaith*, "*Much Learning inſtructs not the Mind, for then it would have inſtructed* Heſiod *and* Pythagoras, *as alſo* Xenophanes *and* Hecataeus, *for there is but one wiſe thing; which is to know when to govern all by all: He alſo ſaid, That* Homer *deſerved to be thrown out of the Schools and beaten, as alſo* Archilochus.

(*g*) *Strom.* 1. where perhaps read πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει.

(*h*) *Laert.* ibid.

As a further (*h*) Argument of the greatneſs of his Spirit, *Antiſthenes* relates, That he gave the Kingdom to his Brother; *Laertius*, That being deſired to take upon him the Supreme Power, he ſlighted it, becauſe the City was prepoſſeſs'd with an ill way of Government; and retiring to the Temple of *Diana*, play'd at Dice there with the Boys, ſaying to the *Epheſians* that ſtood about him, "*Worſt of Men, what do you wonder at! Is it not better to do thus, than to govern you?*

Much offended was he with the *Epheſians*, for that they had baniſhed his Friend *Hermodorus*, in whoſe behalf he reproved them ſharply, writing thus; *The* Epheſians *deſerve to die all Children, and to leave their City to Children, for that they caſt out* Hermodorus, *the moſt excellent amongſt them, ſaying, Let not one of us be more excellent than the reſt; and if there be any ſuch, let him go to another Place, and live amongſt other People.*

*Darius* (*i*) King of *Perſia*, wrote to the *Epheſians*, to repeal the Baniſhment of *Hermodorus*, and to reſtore him to his Patrimony. He wrote alſo to *Heraclitus*, inviting him to come and live with him; the Letter was to this effect:

(*i*) *Epiſt. Gr.*

(*k*) I King *Darius* ſalute *Heraclitus* the *Epheſian*, a wiſe Perſon.

(*k*) *Epiſt. Gr. & Laert.*

*YOU have put forth a Book concerning Nature, hard to be underſtood and interpreted; but by ſo much as I underſtand of it, it ſeems to promiſe the Theory of the whole World, and of the things that depend hereon, which conſiſt in Divine Motion, and by many Queſtions and Doctrines, as well to thoſe who are ſkilful in the* Greek *Learning, as to others vers'd in* Meteorologie, *and other Learning, to doubt what is the true meaning of what you have written. King* Darius *therefore, Son of* Hyſtaſpes, *deſires to participate of your Learning, and of the* Greek *Inſtitution. Come as ſoon as you can to my Preſence, and Royal Palace; for the* Greeks, *for the moſt part, are not obſequious to wiſe men, but deſpiſe the good things which they deliver. With me you ſhall have the firſt place, and daily Honour and Titles; your way of living ſhall be as noble as your Inſtructions.*

But *Heraclitus* refuſed his offer, returning him this Anſwer.

*Heraclitus* to *Darius* the King, Son of *Hyſtaſpes*, Health.

*ALL men living refrain from Truth and Juſtice, and purſue Unſatiableneſs and Vainglory, by reaſon of their Folly; but I, having forgot all Evil, and ſhunning the ſociety of inbred Envy and Pride, will never come to the Kingdom of* Perſia, *being contented with a little, according to my own mind.*

(*l*) *Demetrius* affirms, he ſlighted the *Athenians* alſo, who had a great reſpect for him.

(*l*) *Laert.*

He continually bewailed the wicked lives of men, and *as often as he came abroad amongſt them fell a weeping, conſidering that all things which are done are miſery.*

## CHAP. III.

### *His Retirement.*

AT *the laſt*, ſaith *Laertius*, *growing into a great hatred of mankind, he retired to the mountains and lived there, feeding upon Graſs and Herbs*; the diſlike which he had of the *Epheſians* being much exaſperated by a diſreſpect they ſhewed to him; whence, (*m*) *Demetrius* affirms, that, *the Epheſians ſleighting him, he betook himſelf to a private Life*; the occaſion is related by himſelf in two Epiſtles to *Hermodorus*; the firſt is this,

(*m*) *Laert.*

### *Heraclitus* to *Hermodorus.*

BE not angry any longer in your own Cauſe, *Hermodorus*; *Eurycles*, Son of that *Nycophon* who committed Sacriledge, hath Indict-

ed

ed me of impiety (overcoming me by his ignorance who am excellent in Wisdome) for that upon the Altar by which I stood I wrote my Name, making my self, of a Man, a God. Thus I shall be condemned of impiety by the impious. What think you? I shall seem impious to them for dissenting from them in opinion concerning the Gods. If blind Men were to judg of Sight, they would say that Blindness were Sight: but, O ye ignorant Men, teach us first what God is, that when you declare us to be impious, you may be believed. Where is God, shut up in Temples? O pious Men, who place God in the dark. It is a reproach to a Man to tell him, he is a Stone; but of God you profess, as a truth and in his commendations, he is born of a Rock. You ignorant people! you know not, that God is not made with Hands, neither hath he any Basis from the beginning, nor hath one Circumference; but the whole World, adorned with living Creatures, Plants and Stars is his Mansion. But if you your selves are unlearned, let not my Learning be construed impiety. Learn Wisdom and understand; but you will not, neither do I force you. You grow old with ignorance and rejoyce in your own Vices. *Hercules* was not as *Homer* bely'd him [illegible] a Murtherer of Strangers. What was it that Deified him? his own Integrity and Fortitude, by which he perform'd so many Labours. Am not I then, O ye Men, good also? I was mistaken when I asked you; for though you should say the contrary, yet I am good, and have performed many difficult Labours. I have overcome Pleasures; I have overcome Riches; I have overcome Ambition; I have master'd Cowardice; I have master'd Flattery: Fear hath nothing to object against me, Drunkeness hath nothing to object against me: Sorrow is afraid of me; Anger is afraid of me; I have won the Garland in Fighting against these Adversaries, a task which was imposed on me by my self, not by *Euristeus*. Will you not give over to slander Wisdom, and to press your own Sins and Crimes upon your selves? If you could return to life 500 years hence, you would find *Heraclitus* still alive, but not the least print of your Names. I shall equalize, by reason of my Learning, the Lives of Cities and Nations, I shall never be silenc'd. If the City of the Ephesians were razed to the Ground, and all their Altars destroy'd, yet will the Souls of Men be the places to preserve my memory. I will also marry *Hebe*, not the *Hebe* of *Hercules*, he will always be with her Himself; mine is another. Vertue hath brought forth many, and bestow'd one upon *Homer*, another upon *Hesiod*, and to every good Man one, which is the renown of his Learning. Am not I wiser than *Euthycles*, who alone know God? But thou being bold and impious thy self, think'st him God who is not God: If the Altar of God be not erected, there is not God; but if the Altar of one that is not God be erected, then he is God, as if stones were witnesses of the Gods. His works should bear witness of him, as those of the Sun, Night and Day, bear witness; the four seasons of the year are his witnesses; the whole fruitful Earth is his witness; the Moon is his work, a heavenly testimony.

*

The other Epistle is this.

*To* Hermodorus.

I Understand that the *Ephesians* are about to make a Law against me, most illegally; for it is not a Law which is made for a single person, but Judgment: the *Ephesians* know not that a Judge is different from a Law-giver, and this is so much the better, for that it is uncertain who shall transgress it: But the Judge seeth before his Eyes the Person that is to suffer. They know, *Hermodorus*, that I assisted you in the framing of Laws, and therefore will banish me, but not before they have confuted themselves. They decree, that he who laughs not and hates mankind, shall depart the City before the Sun rise; this is the Law they would make. There is no Man, *Hermodorus*, but laughs, except *Heraclitus*; and so they banish me. O ye Men! Will ye not learn, why I never laugh? It is not that I hate Men, but their Wickedness; write your Law thus, whosoever hateth Wickedness, let him depart the City, and I will be the first that shall go, willing to forsake, not my Country, but the malice of my Country-men. Write your decree over again. But if you grant there is Wickedness and Vice amongst the *Ephesians*, and that I hate you for it, why should not I make a juster Law that they, who through their Wickedness are the occasion that *Heraclitus* never laughs, should depart this life? Or rather let them be fined great Sums, for the loss of Wealth will more afflict you, this is death to you. You have done me wrong in taking away that which God gave me, and banishing me unjustly. Shall I therefore love you? first, for that you have taken all joy away from me, and not ceasing there, oppress me with Laws and Exile; for whilst I live in the City, I am banished from you? With whom do I commit Adulteries? With what company do I commit Murther? With whom am I Drunk? With whom do I joyn in Wickedness? I corrupt none; I injure none; I am alone in the City. You have made it a Desert by your Wickedness. Hath *Heraclitus* made your *Forum* honest? No; but *Heraclitus* would have made you and the whole City good; but you would not. I would do it, and am a Law to others; I am the only Person that ought not to be punished by the City. Do you wonder, that I never laugh? I wonder at you, that you can rejoyce and do wrong; for those that do unjustly ought to have a sowre look. If you would give me an opportunity of laughter, live in peace; and contest not unjustly: You carry Swords in your Tongues, plunder Wealth, ravish Women, poyson Friends, commit Sacriledge, betray the Trust the People repose in you, take away Mens Lives by Torture; every Man is full of a several Wickedness. Shall I laugh, when I see Men do these things? Their Garments, Beards and Heads ordered with unnecessary care; a Mother deserted by a wicked Son, or young Men consuming their Patrimony, or a Citizen whose Wife is taken from him, or a Virgin ravish'd, or a Concubin entertained as a Wife, or one impudent young man courted by the whole City, or deadly Poisons by Unguents; or some at Feasts, filling

their Bellies more with Poiſon than with Dainties, or the People treating of Publick Affairs in the Theatre? Vertue, more rigid than Vice, would ſtrike me blind, if I ſhould laugh at your Wars. By Muſick, Pipes, and Stripes, you are excited to things contrary to all Harmony. Iron, a Metal more proper for Ploughs and Tillage, is fitted for ſlaughter and death. You injure the Gods, warlike *Minerva*, and *Mars*, ſurnamed *Enyalius*: Men, raiſing Armies againſt men, covet to kill one another, puniſh them who forſake the Field, for not being murderous; and honour, as valiant, ſuch as are drunk with blood: But Lyons arm not themſelves againſt one another; Horſes betake not themſelves to Swords; the Eagle buckles not a Breaſt-plate againſt an Eagle. No other Creatures uſe Inſtruments of War, their Limbs are their Weapons. Horns are the Arms of thoſe, Beaks of theſe, Wings of others; Swiftneſs to ſome; Bigneſs, Smalneſs, Swimming to others; to many their Breath; no irrational Creature uſeth a Sword, but keeps it ſelf within the Laws, to which it is deſign'd by Nature; but Man doth not ſo, more blameable, becauſe more underſtanding. You muſt wiſh for an end of your Wars, if you would take me off from this ſeverity. Nor worſe than theſe internal Diſſentions, is, your Depopulations of Cities, tormenting aged Perſons, raviſhing Wives, taking away Children from their Mothers and Nurſes, defiling Beds, vitiating Virgins, abuſing Boys, caſting free Perſons into Bonds, demoliſhing the Temples of the Gods, digging up the Monuments of the Heroes, triumphing in wickedneſs, and offering gratulatory Sacrifices to the Gods for theſe unjuſt actions. About theſe, without laughing, you conteſt in Peace by Argument, and in War with Steel. You force away Juſtice by your Swords. *Hermodorus* is baniſhed for writing Laws; *Heraclitus* is baniſhed for Impiety; the Cities are deſerted of Juſtice, the Deſarts of Injuſtice. The People have built Walls, as Teſtimonies of the wickedneſs of the Inhabitants, ſhutting up your own Lives. You are all fenced with Houſes; there are other walls of wickedneſs, Enemies within you, your own Country-men; Enemies without you, Strangers; All Enemies, no Friends. Can I laugh, ſeeing ſo many Enemies? You think the wealth of other men is your own; you think the Wives of other men are your own. You lay the yoke of ſervitude upon free Perſons; you devour the Living; you violate the Laws; you ratifie wickedneſs by Law; you do violence to all ſuch as conſent not to your Juſtice. Your Laws themſelves convince you of injuſtice; for if they were not, you would go wholly unpuniſhed; whereas now you are a little reſtrained, and, by fear of puniſhment, with-held from the utmoſt injuſtice.

There is a third Epiſtle of his to the ſame Perſon, expreſſing no leſs diſaffection to the *Epheſians*.

*Heraclitus* to *Hermodorus*.

GIve me notice, *Hermodorus*, when you intend to go to *Italy*; may the Gods and Demons of that place receive you kindly. I dreamt, that I beheld all the Diadems of the whole World make their addreſs to your Laws, and, ſhutting their mouths after the *Perſian* manner, adore them, they being ſeated above all the reſt. The *Epheſians* will adore thee, when thou art dead, when thy Laws ſhall bear a general ſway; then neceſſity will force them to uſe them, for God hath taken away the power from them, and they have acknowledg'd themſelves worthy of ſervitude. This I learnt from the more Ancient. All *Aſia* is reduced by the King [of *Perſia*] and the *Epheſians* are ſpoiled. They are not accuſtomed to true Liberty and Dominion, and now it is very likely will be obedient, if they are commanded to lament and accuſe the Gods for not giving them riches. It is the part of blind men, not of a good man, to value the goods of Fortune. The Sibyl frequently hinted this, that from *Greece* there ſhould come a wiſe man into *Italy*. The Sibyl knew thee ſo many ages ſince, *Hermodorus*; even then thou wert in being: but the *Epheſians* will not yet ſee him, whom Truth acknowledged, by the mouth of a Woman, divinely inſpir'd. A teſtimony is given of your wiſdom; but the *Epheſians* diſallow the teſtimony of a God: they ſhall ſmart for their inſolence, and even now do ſmart for it, having an ill opinion of us alſo. God puniſheth not by taking away riches, he rather allows them to the wicked, as an aggravation of their crimes, that, abounding in wealth, their offences may be more notorious to all men; for poverty is a veile. I wiſh fortune may not forſake you, that all men may ſee your wickedneſs. But farewel they; as for you, acquaint me with the time of your departure, for I would by all means meet you, and diſcourſe with you a little, amongſt other things, concerning Laws. I had committed it to writing, but that I thought it fit rather to be conceal'd: nothing is more conceal'd than when one man ſpeaks to another alone, and eſpecially when *Heraclitus* to *Hermodorus*. The ordinary ſort of men differ not from broken Pitchers, which can hold nothing, but let it run out by babling. The *Athenians*, being *Autochtones*, knew the nature of men, that being made of Earth, they have craſie minds, and therefore inſtituted them in a ſecrecy and ſilence of Myſteries, that they might hold their peace through fear, not out of judgement, and that it might be no longer hard for them to practiſe ſilence.

## CHAP. IV.

### *His Sickneſs and Death.*

THe diet which he uſed in the Mountains being nothing but Graſs and Herbs brought him into a Dropſie, whereupon he was conſtrained to return to the City. The account of his ſickneſs receive from himſelf, in * two Epiſtles to *Amphidamas*. The firſt is this. *Laert.* * *Epiſt. Gr.*

*Heraclitus* to *Amphidamas*.

I Am fallen ſick, *Amphidamas*, of a Dropſie. Whatſoever is in us, if it get the Dominion, it becomes a diſeaſe. Exceſs of heat is a Fever; exceſs of cold, a Palſey; exceſs of wind, Co-

lick.

lick. My diſeaſe comes from exceſs of moiſture. The Soul is ſomthing divine, that keeps all theſe in due proportion; the firſt thing is health, nature her ſelf is health; we cannot fore-ſee what is contrary to nature, but after that it happens. I know the nature of the World, I know that of man; I know diſeaſes, I know health; I will cure my ſelf, I will imitate God, who makes equall the inequalities of the World, committing it to the Sun. *Heraclitus* ſhall not dye of this diſeaſe; the diſeaſe of *Heraclitus* ſhall dye by good direction. In the Univerſe moiſt things are dried up, hot things are made cold. My wiſdom knoweth the ways of nature; it knows the cure of ſickneſs: but if my body be over-preſs'd, it muſt deſcend to the deſtin'd place; nevertheleſs my Soul ſhall not deſcend, but being a thing immortal ſhall flye up on high to Heaven. The ætherial Manſions ſhall receive me, and I will accuſe the *Epheſians*. I ſhall converſe, not with *Men*, but with Gods; I ſhall not build Altars to others, but others to me. *Euthycles* ſhall not charge me with impiety; but I, him, of malice. They wonder, that *Heraclitus* look'd always ſad; they wonder not, that men are always wicked. Withhold from your wickedneſs, and perhaps I ſhall ſmile. My ſickneſs is the more gentle to me, for that I am not amongſt men, but alone; and perhaps for that my Soul preſageth ſhe ſhall ſhortly be freed out of this priſon, and looking through her ſhatter'd body, calls to mind her own Country, from whence ſhe came to encompaſs this tranſitory mortal body, which to others ſeems built up of flegme, choler, purulent matter, Blood, Nerves, Bones, and Fleſh; for unleſs paſſions did contrive pains, we ſhould never go out of it.

The ſecond Epiſtle was to this effect.

*To the ſame.*

THE Phyſitians, *Amphidamas*, met together, and were very diligent about the cure of my ſickneſs, but knew neither art nor nature; they would have it to be this, and to be that, but knew neither. They did nothing but ſoften my belly with feeling it, as if it had been a Leather-Bottle; yet ſome of them would have undertaken the cure, but I would not allow it, before I had required an account of the diſeaſe, which they could not give me; neither were they too hard for me, but I for them. How, ſaid I, can you be maſters of piping, when one that is not a piper hath over-match'd you? I ſhall cure my ſelf ſooner than you can, if you will but teach me how a drought may be made of a ſhower; but they, not underſtanding my queſtion, held their peace, and were much at a loſs in their own Science. I have known others cured, not by them, but by chance. Theſe men, *Amphidamas*, do wickedly, profeſſing Arts which they have not, and undertaking the cure of that which they underſtand not, bringing death to men under the pretext and name of Art, doing wrong both to Art and Nature. It is abominable to profeſs ignorance, but more abominable to profeſs an Art, of which we are ignorant. What delight take they in lying, but that by deceit they grow rich? It were better for them to beg, for then they would be pitied, but now they are hated for doing wrong and lying. Other Arts are more fortunate; theſe are eaſily confuted, the better more hardly. Theſe were the men that took compaſſion of me in the City; not a Phyſician amongſt them, but all Couſeners and Impoſtors, who ſell cheats of Art for Mony. They kill'd *Heracleodorus*, my Uncle, and took Mony for it, and were not able to tell me the cauſe of my diſtemper, and how a drought might be made out of an exceſs of moyſture. They are ignorant that God cures the great bodies in the World, reducing their inequality to an even temper, that he makes whole thoſe that are broken, ſtops ſuch as are falling, gathers the diſperſed together into one body, poliſheth the deform'd, thoſe which are taken he puts into Cuſtody, thoſe which flye he perſues, illuminates the dark with his light, terminates the infinite with certain bounds, gives form to thoſe which have none, gives ſight to things void of ſenſe, permeates through all ſubſtance, Striking, Compoſing, Diſſolving, Condenſing, Diffuſing; he diſſolves the dry into moiſt, he condenſeth the looſe Air, and continually moveth the things above, ſetleth thoſe beneath. This is the cure of the ſickly World; This I will imitate in my ſelf; to all the reſt, I bid farewel.

Thus having demanded of the Phyſitians ænigmatically, whether they could of a ſhower make a drought, they not underſtanding him, he ſhut himſelf up in an Oxe-ſtall, hoping that the Hydropical humours would be extracted by the warmth of the dung; but that doing him no good, he dyed, having lived 60 years. *Laert.*

*Hermippus* relates, that he demanded of the Phyſitians, Whether they could ſqueeze the water out of the inward parts of his body; which they acknowledging they could not do, he lay'd himſelf in the Sun, and commanded his Servants to playſter him all over with Cow-dung, in which poſture he dyed the next day, and was buried in the Forum. *Neanthes* of Cyzicum ſaith, that they could not get off the Cow-dung, and not being known in that condition by the Dogs, they tore him to pieces.

But *Ariſto* ſaith, he was cur'd of this dropſie, and dyed afterwards of ſome other diſeaſe, which *Hippobotus* confirms.

*Laertius* reckons five of this Name. This Philoſopher, the *firſt*.

The *ſecond*, a Lyrick Poet, who writ an Encomium of the twelve gods.

The *third*, an Elegiack Poet, of *Halicarnaſſus*; upon whom *Callimachus* hath an Epigram.

The *fourth*, of *Lesbos*, who writ the Macedonick.

The *fifth*, a Jeſter. To whom add, mentioned by *Athæneus*, another of *Mitylene*, a Jugler; and laſtly, one of *Tarentum*, a Luteniſt who play'd at the marriage of *Alexander*.

It is reported of *Heraclitus* the Philoſopher, that he perſwaded *Melancomas* a Tyrant to lay down his Crown. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* 1.

CHAP.

## CHAP. V.

### His Apothegms.

*Laert.* OF his Apothegms, and moral Sentences, are remembred these: He said, That we ought to take more care to extinguish Contumely, than the Hottest Fire; And that a People ought to fight for their Laws, as well as for their Walls.

*El. Cret. in Nazianz. Orat.* Deriding the Sacrifices, whereby they thought that the Gods were pacified; These, saith he, cleanse themselves by polluting themselves with Blood, as if a Man should go into the Dirt to wash himself.

*Suid.* He saith, That he wholly contemned his Body, and esteemed it more vile than Dross; yet would take care for the Cure of it, as long as God should command him to use it as an Instrument.

*Stob. Ser.* 3. Of all the Discourses that ever I heard, none came so far as to prove, That Wisdom is something separate from all other things; A solitary Man is either a God or a Beast.

*Ser.* 4. Even the Eyes and Ears of Fools that have rude Minds are tainted with ill.

*Ser.* 5. It concerneth every Man to know himself, and to govern himself prudently.

*Plut. de Garrul.* Being desired by the Citizens, to make some discourse concerning Concord, he went up into the Chair, and taking a Cup full of water, sprinkled some Meal and Penny-royal into it, and having drunk it off, went away; giving them to understand, That Cities might be preserved in Peace and Concord, if the Inhabitants would be content with a little, and not affect costly Superfluities.

*Stob. Ser.* 18. It is hard to conceal Rudeness at any time, but especially in Wine.

*Ser.* 17. A Drunken Man reels, and is led by a Child; his Soul is wet, and knows not whether she goeth; a dry Soul is the wisest and best.

*Ser.* 102. He said, That the Wit of a Man is his Genius.

*Laert.* Being asked by one, Why he held his peace? he answer'd, That you may speak.

*Plut. de Pyth. Orac.* He said, That the King to whom the *Delphian* Oracle belongs, neither speaks, nor conceals, but gives signs.

*Consol. ad Apollon.* It is all one to be living and dead, waking and sleeping, young and old; for each of these alternately changeth into the other.

*Clem. Strom.* 5. He seemed to blame Generation, saying, That those who are born will live and dye, or rather rest, and leave behind them Children to dye also.

*Strom.* 2. Unless a Man hopeth that which is not to be hoped for, he shall not find that which is inscrutable, and hath no passage whereby he may come at it. This, *Clemens* calls a kind of Paraphrase upon that of the Prophet, (Esay. 6.) *Unless you believe, you shall not understand.*

*Strom.* 6. Reproving some incredulous Persons, he said, They can neither hear nor speak.

*Strom.* 2. How can that Light, which never sets, be hidden or obscured, (meaning God?)

*Strom.* 5. Justice shall seize upon the Framers and Witnesses of false things.

## CHAP. VI.

### His Writings.

THE Treatise (saith *Laertius*) which goeth abroad under his Name, is a continued discourse of Nature; It is divided into three Books; One, concerning the *Universe*; the Second, *Politick*; the Third, *Theologick*. This Book he deposited in the Temple of *Diana*, and, as some affirm, he affected to write obscurely, (whence called σκοτεινὸς, dark) that he might be read only by the more Learned, and not become contemptible, by being read by the Vulgar; which *Timon* implies, saying,

*'Mongst these the great Confounder did arise,*
*Dark* Heraclitus, *he that doth despise*
*The Multitude*———

And perhaps it conduced not a little to the obscurity of his Writings, that, through excess of Melancholy, as *Theophrastus* saith, he began many things, and left them unfinish'd, and many times wrote contrary things.

*Aristo* relates, that *Euripedes* brought this Book of *Heraclitus* to *Socrates* to be read; and asking his opinion of it: "The things, said *Socrates*, which I understand in it, are excellent, "and so, I suppose, are those which I understand "not; But they require a *Delian Diver*, (one "that is able to explain Oracles.) But *Seleucus* the Grammarian, citing one *Croto*, saith, That a certain person, named *Crates*, brought this Book first among the *Grecians*, and said, It required a *Delian Diver*, for only such a one could escape drowning in it. Some entitle it, *The Muses*; others, *Concerning Nature*; Diodotus, *An exact rule to steer Life by*; others, *The Judgment of Manners, the Ornament of one Institution above all.*

Yet *Laertius* gives this judgment of that Treatise, that sometimes he writes so clearly and plainly, that any Man may understand it, and discern the height of his Mind; adding, that his style was very short and sound.

There were many that explain'd and commented upon his Book: of whom were *Antisthenes*, and *Heraclides* of *Pontus*, and *Cleanthes* of *Pontus*, and *Sphærus* the Stoick; as also *Pausanias*, who was firnamed the *Heraclitist*, and *Nicomedes*, and *Dionysius*; and, of Grammarians, *Diodotus*, who denies the Book concerning *Nature* to be his; but admits that of *Politick*, alledging, that what he said of Nature, is only brought in by way of example.

*Hieronymus* saith, that *Scythimus*, an *Iambick* Poet, wrote against him in Verse.

## CHAP. VII.

### His Doctrine.

*Laertius* saith, That his Writings gained so great a Reputation, that the Followers of his Sect were, from him, called *Heraclitians*. His Assertions were these:

Sect.

## SECT. 1.

### *That Fire is the Principle of all Things.*

HE held, that (*a*) Fire is the Principle of all things, for of Fire all things are made, and into Fire all things shall resolve; Or as *Laertius*, That Fire is the Element, and the vicissitude of Fire generates all things by Rarefaction and Condensation, (but he delivers nothing plainly.) That all things are made by Contrariety, and the whole flows like a River. That the Universe is bounded, and that there is one World, which was made of Fire; And shall again be set on Fire, by certain Periods for ever, and that this is done by Fate. That, of the Contraries, that which conduceth to Generation is named War and Contention; That which to Conflagration, Concord and Peace. That Mutation is a way up and down, and that the World is made by it; For the Fire being condensed groweth humid, and settles into Water; the Water condensed turns into Earth, this is the way down. Again, the Earth is diffused, of which is made Water; of the Water, almost all things else, meaning the exhalation out of the Sea; this is the way up. That there are made exhalations from the Earth and from the Sea, some whereof are bright and pure, others dark: the Fire is augmented by the bright, the Water by the rest; but what that is which includes all, he declares not. Hitherto *Laertius*.

(*b*) *Plutarch* delivers it thus: That all things are made by extinction of this Fire; first the grosser part of it being contracted, becometh Earth, then the Earth being loosned by the nature of the Fire, becomes Water; the Water exhaled, becomes Air. Again, the World and all Bodies shall be dissolved in a Conflagration: Fire therefore is the Principle, for all things were made of it; and the End, because all things are resolved into it.

This is further explain'd by (*c*) *Clemens Alexandrinus*, out of the words of *Heraclitus*. That he held, (saith *Clemens*) the Universe to be eternal, is manifest, for that he saith, *the Universe was not made by any, either God or Man, but was, is, and shall be an ever-living Fire, kindling measures, and quenching measures.*

That he held this World was generated, and shall perish, is manifest also from his saying, *The conversions of Fire, first Sea, then the half of Sea, Earth, the Half-Prester, meaning that by the power of that Fire, the Word and God, who governeth all things, turneth by Air into moisture, the seed as it were of the disposure of the World, which he calleth Sea. Of this again is generated Heaven and Earth, and all things that are in them.*

Lastly, how it returns to it's first condition, and becomes Fire again, he shews thus. *The Sea is diffused, and measured according to the same proportion as it was first, before it was Earth, the like happens to the other Elements.* Thus *Clemens*.

Moreover he held, (*d*) that the soul of the World is an exhalation of the humid parts thereof, and that (*e*) the essence of Fate is a reason (or proportion) permeating through the Universe; which Fate is an æthereall body, the seed of the generation of all things; for (*f*) all things are done by Fate. (*f*) *Laert.*

This opinion (that Fire is the Principle of all things) was asserted also by *Hippasus* the *Pythagorean*; whom *Plutarch*, in the account which he gives of it, joins with *Heraclitus*; and it is probable, that *Heraclitus*, being his Disciple, received it from him.

(*g*) *Plutarch* adds, that *he introduced* λογους *certain sharings, the least of things, and not divisible.* (g) *Plac.* 1. 13.

## SECT. 2.

### *Of the Stars, Sun, Moon, Day, Night, &c.*

IN the World (*h*) there are certain *Scaphæ*, things in the fashion of Boats, the hollow sides whereof are turned towards us, in which certain shining Exhalations are crowded, which cause flames. These Flames are the Stars, nourished by Exhalations, arising out of the Earth. Of these, the Flame of the Sun is the brightest and hottest, by reason that the other Stars are more distant from the Earth, and therefore shine and heat less. (*h*) *Laert.*

(*i*) The Sun is just as big as it seems to be, (*k*) his Figure like that of a Boat, the hollow part turned downwards. (*l*) He is in a transparent and unmixt place, (*m*) (that is in the purer Air,) and keeps a proportionable distance from us, by which means he heateth and shineth more than the Moon. (*n*) He happens to be Eclipsed by reason of his Boat-like figure, when the hollow thereof is turned upwards, and the convex part downwards towards us.

(*o*) The Moon is a kind of Earth encompassed with a Mist, (*p*) in form like a Boat; (*q*) she is nighest the Earth, and moved in a place that is not pure, the grosser Air. (*r*) She is Eclipsed, when the hollow part is turned upwards; and the variety of appearances, which she hath in a Month, are caused by the turning of her hollow part upwards by degrees.

(*s*) Day, Night, Months, Hours, Years, Showers, Winds, and the like, are caused by different Exhalations: for a splendid Exhalation, flaming in the circle of the Sun, makes it Day; the contrary, being predominant, makes it Night; the heat of the splendid increasing maketh Summer; the moisture of the dark abounding maketh Winter. Suitably to these he explained the Causes of other things; but of the Earth he said nothing, nor of the *Scaphæ*.

(*i*) *Laert.* (*k*) *Plut. plac.* 2. 24. (*l*) *Laert.* (*m*) *Stob.* (*n*) *Plut. plac.* 2. 24. *Laert.* (*o*) *Plut. plac.* 2. 25. (*p*) *Plut. plac.* 2. 27. (*q*) *Laert.* (*r*) *Plut. p.* (*s*) *Laert.*

## SECT. 3.

### *Of the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea.*

THE Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea is caused by the Sun, which stirreth, raiseth and carrieth about with him the most part of the Winds, which coming to blow upon the Ocean, cause the *Atlantick* Sea to swell, and so make the Flux or High-Water; but when the same are allay'd, the Sea falleth low, and so causeth a Reflux and Ebb. *Plut. plac.* 3. 17.

SECT.

## SECT. 4.

### *Of living Creatures.*

(a) Laert.

(b) Plut. plac. 4. 3. Aristot. de an. 1, 3.

OF the Nature (a) of the Soul, he said, It is so profound, as that it cannot by any means be found out: He only asserted, (b) That it is, as all other things are, an Exhalation; that which is without, and that which is within, being all of one Nature: it is incorporeal and always in fluxion. That it is moved, is evident from it's being moved; (c) Of Souls, the dry is the wisest and best.

(c) Stob.

(d) Man beginneth to be perfect about his second seventh year, at what time the generative vigour beginneth to move: for then Trees begin to be perfect, when they begin to bring forth; for as long as they bear no Fruit, they are immature, and imperfect. Moreover, at that time a Man comes to the knowledge of good and ill, and is capable of being instructed therein.

(d) Plut. 5. 23.

# XENOPHANES.

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

## The Eleventh Part, *Containing the ELEATICK Sect.*

XENOPHANES.

### CHAP. I.

*His Life.*

THE *Eleatick* Sect was denominated from *Elea* a City of *Magna Gracia*, founded in the time of *Cyrus* by a Colony of *Phocæans*; of whom, being beſieged by *Harpagus*, ſome made their eſcape by night and came into this part of *Italy*, where they built a City which they named

*Elea*, *Helea*, or *Hyela*, either from *Elea* the River of that place, or, as (*a*) some conceive, in allusion to the Marshes round about it.

(*a*) *Dionys. Halic.*

Of this City were *Parmenides*, *Zeno*, and *Leucippus*; who being eminent Persons of one Sect, from them the Sect it self was termed *Eleatick*.

But its first Institutor was *Xenophanes*, *The Eleatick Sect*, saith (*b*) Clemens, *was begun by* Xenophanes *the* Colophonian, *who* (*as* Timæus *affirms*) *lived in the time of* Hieron *King of* Sicily, *and of* Epicharmus *the Poet*; *But* Apollodorus, *that he was born in the fourth* Olympiad, *and his life extended to the times of* Darius *and* Cyrus. Parmenides *was Disciple to* Xenophanes; Zeno *to him*; *then* Leucippus; *then* Democritus. *The Auditors of* Democritus *were* Protagoras *the* Abderite, Metrodorus *the* Chian, *and* Diogenes *the* Smyrnæan, *whose Disciple was* Anaxarchus.

(*b*) *Strom.*

(*c*) Xenophanes *was* (as was said) a Colophonian, *Son of* Dexius, *or* (*as* Apollodorus) *of* Orthomenes, *praised by* Timon *who saith of him*,

(*c*) *Laert.*

Xenophanes, *not wholly free from pride*,
*The fictions of old* Homer *did deride.*

*Being banished his Country, he lived at* Zencle *and* Catana *in* Sicily. *Some affirm, he had no Master*; *others*, *that he heard* Botho *the* Athenian; *others* Archelaus, [*which is least probable, for*] *he was* (*as* Sotion *relates*) *contemporary with* Anaximander. *He wrote in verse Elegies and Iambicks against* Hesiod *and* Homer, *reprehending what they deliver'd concerning the Gods. He also wrote the building of* Colophon, *and the bringing of the Colony into* Elea *in* Italy, *which consisted of two thousand verses.* But (*d*) *Strabo*, who affirms *he wrote the Silli in verse*, seemes to have ascribed to him what was indeed written by *Timon* the Sceptick, his mistake perhaps arising from hence, that (*e*) the second and third books of that Poem were written by way of Dialogue, wherein *Timon* questions *Xenophanes* about every thing, who gives answers to all.

(*d*) *Lib.* 14.

(*e*) *Laert. in Timone.*

Xenophanes *sung his own works. It is further said, that he asserted doctrines contrary to* Thales *and* Pythagoras, *and somwhat against* Epimenides. *He flourish'd in the* 60th. Olympiad. Demetrius Phalereus, *and* Panætius *the* Stoick *relate, that like* Anaxagoras *he buried his Sons with his own hands. He lived to a great age, for he saith of himself.*

Sixty seven years in *Greece* I now have told;
And when I came was twenty five years old.

Lucian *therefore reckons amiss, affirming he liv'd ninety one years, for this account of sixty seven and twenty five amounts to ninety two.* (*f*) Censorinus *saith, he lived above a hundred years.*

(*f*) *de die nat. cap.* 15.

(*g*) Empedocles *saying to him, that he could not find a wise man*; *That may very well be, saith he, for you are not capable to know a wise man.*

(*g*) *Laert.*

*He was redeemed by* Parmeniscus *and* Orestades, Pythagoreans, *as* Phavorinus *relates.*

*There was another* Xenophanes *of* Lesbus, *an Iambick Poet.*

## CHAP. II.

### *His Opinions.*

XEnophanes, (*h*) *as* Sotion *affirms, held all things to be incomprehensible, and* (*i*) *reproved the arrogance of those persons, who not capable of knowing any thing durst say, they knew: Nevertheless he did maintain many dogmatical assertions, affirming*;

(*b*) *Laert.* (*i*) *Cic.*

(*k*) Not all at first the Gods to men reveal'd,
But by long search they find out things conceal'd.

(*k*) *Stob.*

Whence it is, that *Timon* the Sceptick calls him ὑπήνορον, *not wholly free from pride*, or dogmatical self-conceit.

He held, that God is one and incorporeal, eternal, (*l*) *in substance and figure round, no way resembling man, that he is all sight and all hearing, but breathes not*; *that he is all things, the mind and wisdom, not generate, but eternal, impassible, immutable, and rational*,

(*l*) *Laert.*

(*m*) Greatest of Gods and men one God, we find
Like mortalls not in body not in mind.

(*m*) *Clem.* *Laert.*

Moreover, (*n*) *he reproved and confuted the fabulous narrations of* Homer *and* Hesiod *concerning the Gods*; *and* (*o*) *the descriptions which the* Grecians *made of them, as that they are of human form, and subject to humane affections*; *every one fancying them after their own likeness, the* Æthiopians *black and flat-nos'd, the* Thracians *ruddy and grey-ey'd*; *and so for their minds or dispositions, the* Barbarians *believed them fierce and cruel, the* Grecians *more mild, yet obnoxious to passions.*

(*n*) *Laert.* (*o*) *Clem.*

Men think the Gods like them begotten were,
And that like them their form, shape, garments, are

(*p*) That this (God, or) One, is all things, the Universe consists of this eternal one. (*q*) Whatsoever is, is eternal; for it is impossible that something should be made of nothing. The World is eternal without beginning or end, [as being ingenerate, for] (*r*) he first asserted, that whatsoever is generated is corruptible.

(*p*) *Cic. Acad. quæst.* 4. (*q*) *Arist. Xenoph.* (*r*) *Laert.*

(*s*) That there are infinite Worlds, and those immutable.

(*s*) *Laert.*

(*t*) That there are four Elements.

(*t*) *Laert.*

(*u*) That the Stars are made of certain Clouds set on fire, which are extinguished every day and kindled again at night: for the rising and setting of the Stars is nothing else, but their enkindling and extinguishing. (*x*) As for those lights which appear about ships, (commonly termed *Castor* and *Pollux*) these are little Clouds set on fire, and shining by reason of some motion; and that all Comets, Falling-stars, and the like, are Clouds kindled by motion.

(*u*) *Plut. Stob.* (*x*) *Plut.* *Laert.* 2. 18.

(*y*) That the Sun consists of a collection of little-fires made by a humid exhalation, or that it is a (*z*) fiery Cloud. (*a*) That the Eclipse of the Sun is caused by extinction, and that there riseth a new Sun in the East. He further avers, that the Sun hath been Eclipsed for a whole Month together.

(*y*) *Plut.* 2. 20. (*z*) *Stob.* 1. *p.* 55. (*a*) *Plut.* 2. 24.

(*b*) That

(b) That the Moon is a close compacted Cloud; *Cicero* (c) saith, he held that she is habitable, containing many Cities and Mountains.

(d) That the Sun is requisite for the generation of the World and living Creatures, but the Moon of no use thereunto.

(e) That there are many Suns and many Moons, according to the several Climates and Zones of the Earth; and that when the Sun goeth sometimes to some part of the Earth unknown to us, he seemeth to be eclipsed; That the Sun goeth forward to infinite, but to us seemeth to move circularly by reason of the great distance.

(f) That the Clouds are a vapour drawn up by the Sun to the Heavens.

(g) That the Earth was first founded and rooted as it were in an infinite depth.

(h) That the Soul is a Spirit, and that there are many things beneath the mind.

(i) *Cicero* saith, that he was the only Philosopher, that believed there were Gods, and yet denied Divination; but (k) *Plutarch* joyns *Epicurus* with him in this Assertion.

# PARMENIDES.

## CHAP. I.

### *His Life.*

PArmenides (a) was of *Elea*, son of *Pyrethus*; he heard *Xenophanes*: *Theophrastus*, in his Epitome, saith, that he heard *Anaximander*. But tho' he heard *Xenophanes*, yet he did not follow him. He conversed also with *Aminias* and with *Diochætes* the Pythagorean, (as *Sotion* saith) a Person indigent, but good and honest, whom he chiefly follow'd, and when he died, built a Temple to him as to an *Heroe*. *Parmenides* being of a noble family, and rich; he was reduced to privacy of life by *Aminias* not by *Xenophanes*.

He flourished in the 69th. Olympiad.

(b) *Athenæus* therefore, not without reason, blames *Plato*, for supposing him contemporary with *Socrates*.

He is also said to have given Laws to his Country-men, as *Speusippus* saith in his Book of Philosophers.

He wrote Philosophy in verse, as did also *Hesiod*, *Xenophanes*, and *Empedocles*.

But *Callimachus* saith, that he wrote not any Poem.

There was another *Parmenides*, an Oratour, who wrote concerning that Art.

## CHAP. II.

### *His Opinions.*

HE (c) asserted, that Philosophy is two-fold, one according to Truth, the other according to Opinion; wherefore he somewhere saith,

*—— All things I would that thou enquire,*
*As well the heart that doth sweet truth pursue,*
*As mens opinions, whose beliefe's untrue.*

That Reason is the Criterie, and that the Senses are not certain, whence he saith,

*Trust not thy self into the various way,*
*Nor thy rash eye, or eare, or tongue obey;*
*But poise with reason every Argument.*

That (d) the Principle of all things is *one*, and that it is immoveable; that One is all, that *Ens* is infinite, whatsoever is besides *Ens* is *non Ens*, and consequently nothing; but *Ens* is One, therefore, whatsoever is besides One is nothing; therefore all is One.

(e) That hot and cold are the Principles, or Elements of things; these he called Fire and Earth; one hath the office of Maker, the other of Matter.

That no things are generated and corrupted, but only seem so to us.

(f) That the Moon is of equal brightness with the Sun, yet borroweth her light from him.

(g) That the Galaxie is a mixture of dense and rare.

(h) He first asserted, that the Earth is round and seated in the midst; and (i) first set out and limited the habitable parts of the Earth, betwixt the cold Zones and the Tropicks.

(k) That the Earth is every way equidistant, and evenly poised; so that there is no reason, she should incline more to one side than to another; yet is she shaken but not removed.

(l) That men were generated of (m) slime, and consist of hot and cold, whereof all things are compounded.

That (contrary to *Empedocles*) men (n) were first produced in the Northern parts of the World, those being most dense; the first woman in the Southern, those being most rare. That (o) Males now are generated on the right side of the Mother; Females, on the left. (p) That the *Hegemonick* is seated in the breast.

(q) *Phavorinus* ascribes to his Invention, the Observation, that Vesper and Lucifer are the same Star; others attribute this to *Pythagoras*.

*Phavorinus* also saith, (r) he used the argument called *Achilles*, by others ascribed to *Zeno*.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of Idea's.*

But the Aſſertion, for which he became moſt eminent, was that of *Ideas*, delivered by *Plato* in a Dialogue, which he entitled *Parmenides*, or *of Idea's*; the ſum whereof is this:

All is One, and Many; One the *Archetype*, *Idea*; Many the Singulars.

There are *Idea's*, that is certain common Natures, which include all Singulars, and are the Cauſes of them, from which they have both their Eſſence and Name. Theſe are ἐιδῶ *Species*; the Many exiſt as they participate of One, in theſe *Species*.

The *Species* ſo include all Singulars, as that they may combine them, and difference them; for there is a twofold power of ſpecifick Differences, Compoſitive and Diſcretive.

The viſible things ſhew the power of this One; all Singulars are reduced to a One, that is, to their reſpective Communities; and ſo particular things can neither ſubſiſt nor be apprehended, but in this community of *Species*; therefore the *Species* is one thing, the *Individua* contained in the *Species*, another.

Theſe *Idea's* ſubſiſt two ways; in our Minds, as Notions; in Nature, as Cauſes. In our Minds they exiſt, as they are variouſly comprehended by us, according to divers manifold reſpects. In Nature they exiſt, as they are Idæal forms, and have the power both of exiſtence and denomination. All Beings are reduced to this unity of *Idea*. Thus are they inſenſible viſible things, and the kinds of them are Similitude, Diſſimilitude, Unity, Multitude, Reſt, Motion, *&c.* Things viſible are, or are denominated Like, inaſmuch as they participate of Similitude, which is the *Idea* of things Like; Great or Little, inaſmuch as they participate of the *Idea* of Greatneſs or Littleneſs, *&c.* The like of Man himſelf, for many Individual Men are ſuch by participation of the *Idea* of Man, (as if we ſhould ſay Homineity) which hath a permanent Subſiſtence, whereas particular Men are in perpetual Fluxion and Mutation.

The ſame power of the one in *Idea's*, is alſo in things comprehended by diſcourſe: they likewiſe have a Form ſubſiſtent by, and of it ſelf, ſo that to know the nature of Intelligibles, they muſt be recalled to the unity of *Idea*. For inſtance; if we would underſtand the nature of Good things, we muſt proceed in ſuch manner as that we may arrive at the *Idea* of Good, which is the very Form of Good, whence all things that participate thereof, are, and are called Good. So that there are two diſtinct things, the Form of things, which ſubſiſts of it ſelf, and the Things themſelves ſenſible or intelligible.

*Idea* is twofold, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, *the fair which is alſo the good*, and all the things which we underſtand as being *Idea's*; The firſt is God, the ſecond the *Species* of things in the order of Nature.

As concerning the ſecond *Idea's*, there is a One, that is the foundation of all Singulars; out of which as from a Thread, the whole Web (as it were) of *Individuum's* is woven.

One and the ſame *Species* in many Individuals, which exiſt ſeparately, is wholly together One, and not ſeparate from it ſelf, but whole in it ſelf.

The Many (that is, Singulars) ſo participate of their *Idea's*, in ſuch manner, as that the *Idea's* are not diviſible, but preſerve their own Eſſence, in themſelves, over and above all the Singulars; that is, they have their Eſſence in themſelves, and not in reference to us.

*Idea's* are notions of the Mind, and ſubſiſt in our Mind; yet ſo, as that primarily, and of themſelves, they exiſt in Nature. So as theſe Notions ſubſiſt no otherwiſe in our Minds, than as they reſemble thoſe eternal Forms of Nature, that is, not as real Beings, but as Similitudes and Images of Beings. So that from theſe *Idea's*, which ſubſiſt of themſelves, a communication is derived to the Notions that are in our Mind; for otherwiſe, if the *Idea's* themſelves or the whole *Species* were in our Minds, Notions would not be Notions, and *Ens non Ens*, foraſmuch as the things themſelves are variouſly perceived by ſeveral Men.

Beſides, there would follow a great confuſion and diſorder in the things themſelves, if there were continually produced new Forms of things at Man's pleaſure; which muſt needs be, if the Mind of Man could form them, and that whatſoever a Man imagined in his Mind, became immediately a *Species*.

Again, by this means, the moſt excellent Science of all things, that is in God, would be denyed to be in Him, whoſe Mind is the Original of all things; ſo as it were a great abſurdity to attribute to Man, a Mind procreative of *Species*, and to deny it to God, who governs all things.

Therefore *Species* have not their dependence on the Mind of Man; on the contrary, they are unknown to human Nature, or Mankind. The *Genus* and Eſſence of every thing is of it ſelf, not exiſting in the Singulars, but the ſupport and foundation of the Singulars.

Moreover, if there were not certain *Species* of things, there would be a great confuſion in all Sciences, they being of Univerſals; for no Man comprehends in his Mind all Individuals; it were infinite and full of diſorder to take that courſe; ſo that all Philoſophy and diſſertation would loſe the truth and certain knowledge of things: whereas, on the contrary, in all Science, the true courſe of Learning is to reduce Particulars to their proper *Species*, whence may appear their Nature and Qualities.

Of the Primary Archetypal *Idea* the Eſſential Properties; and they are theſe.

Firſt, It is not Many, (that is, it is not intermingled with generated Beings, of which it is the Original;) for it is void of Parts and Figure, being infinite.

Secondly, It is void of all Motion and Mutation, remaining always immoveable and the ſame.

Thirdly, It is void of all Age and Time, being eternal, neither elder nor younger, nor any way partaking of Time, ſubject to no circumſtances of Time, all things being always preſent to it.

Fourthly, it partakes not of that Eſſence, by which Singulars are ſaid to be, but communicates the power and faculty of Being to all Singulars, itſelf

itself being beyond all Essence. Essence is distributed amongst the many of Beings, and is not wanting in any Being whatsoever, neither least nor greatest.

Fifthly, The first *Idæa* is so diffused into all things whereto it gives the power and faculty of Being, as that it circumscribes and limits the multiplicity, and almost infinity of Singulars, within the bounds of the *One*: So that the *One*, which of it self is infinite and void of parts, is as it were terminated in Singulars.

Of the secondary *Idæa's* (which are natural Causes, the Works of the primary *Idæa*) the Properties are these.

First, They, as well as the primary *Idæa*, are *One*; for all Singulars comprised within them are determinately reduced to their respective Classes; but in this they differ from the primary *Idæa*, that the *One* in secondary *Idæa's* is truely Finite, having beginning, middle, and end.

Secondly, They consist entire in the Singulars; not as deriving their Essence from them, for they exist in the divine Mind, yet they are conspicuous in Singulars, as if you would know what is Homineity, or the *Species* of Man, you must look upon the Singulars of Men, in which the *Species* it self is visible. The secondary *Idæa's* in sensible things are ἐγμαξισμέναι, figurate.

Thirdly, The secondary *Idæa's* are *the same* and *another*; the same, in Themselves; another, in the Singulars; and consequently both rest and move: Whereas the primary *Idæa* is void of all mutation, amidst the vicissitudes of transient things.

In the order of nature, the *One* in the *Species* is of it self, and derives not it's Essence from Singulars, but is self-subsistent as being a *Species*; by whose power all the Many (*i.e.* Singulars) subsist.

Fourthly, The others (*i. e.* Singulars) proceed from the *One*, but the One, which is seen in the Others, hath it's Essence from a third; that is, Individuals exist by those secondary *Idæa's*, yet so as that the secondary *Idæa's* have from the primary *Idæa* their Essence, and the power by which they give to Singulars a Subsistence.

Fifthly, the secondary *Idæa's* act from contrary Principles, yet so as that those contraries are connected in one tye of similitudes, whence a third thing reflects. To the production of natural things three things concur, two ἄκρα, and the third that ties them together; ἄκρα are Beings mutually touching one another (that is, the natural things themselves.) The third is the Analogy betwixt the other two, the similitude of their proportions. There can be no ἄκρα without two things at the least; nor can they produce any thing without the third, Combination. The ἄκρα must be dissimilar, that *one* and *equal* may be introduced.

Sixthly, The secondary *Idæa's* are not without time, but what they do, they do in time; whereas (as we said) to the primary *Idæa* all things are present. Natural things exist and perish according to time, but their *Species* or *Idæa's* are constant and permanent.

# MELISSUS.

## CHAP. I.

### *His Life.*

MELISSUS was a *Samian*, Son of *Ithagenes*, he heard *Parmenides*, and conversed also with *Heraclitus*, at what time the *Ephesians* had such a misapprehension of him, as the *Abderites* had of *Democritus*. He was a Person conversant in Civil Affairs, and much honoured by his Country-men, who made him their Admiral, and particularly admired him for his virtue. He flourish'd, according to *Apollodorus*, about the 84th Olympiad.

## CHAP. II.

### *His Opinions.*

HE asserted (as *Parmenides*,) That (*a*) the Principle of things is One, which is immoveable; That this *One* is All; That *Ens* is Infinite; arguing thus, That which is made hath a Principle, therefore that which is not made, hath no Principle: But the Universe, or that which is, is not made, therefore it hath no Principle, and therefore no End; Therefore it is Infinite, therefore *One*, for there cannot be more Infinites, therefore immoveable, for it occupates all things, and hath not any thing whereby it may be moved.

(*b*) That the Universe is infinite and immutable, and immoveable, and one like it self, and full. (*c*) He proved that it is immoveable thus, because, if it were moved, there must necessarily be a *Vacuum*, but there is not a *Vacuum* amongst Beings.

(*d*) That there is not Motion, but that it only seems to be; And (*e*) that things are not generated and corrupted, but only seem so to us.

(*f*) As for the Gods, he said, That we ought not to assert any thing concerning them, forasmuch as we have not any knowledge of

(*b*) *Laert.*

(*c*) *Aristot. Phys.* 4. 8.

(*d*) *Laert.*

(*e*) *Arist. de Cæl.* 3. 1.

(*f*) *Laert.*

ZENO.

# ZENO.

## CHAP. I.

### *His Life.*

(a) *Laert.* (b) The Text ſeems to require, to be thus ſupplied.

(a) ZENO was of *Elea*; *Apollodorus* ſaith, he was Son of *Pyrethus*; (b) but *Pyrethus* indeed was Father to *Parmenides*. *Zeno* was by nature Son of *Teleutagoras*; by adoption, Son of *Parmenides*, whom he heard and was much beloved of him. *Plato* ſaith, he was tall, and calls him the *Eleatick Palamedes*. He was a Perſon excellent, as well for Philoſophy as Politicks; his Writings being full of much Learning.

(c) Lib. 3. c. 3.

(c) *Valerius Maximus* ſaith, he forſook his own Country, where he could not enjoy ſecurity and freedom, and went to *Agrigentum*, which at that time was oppreſſed with miſerable ſervitude, out of a confidence, that by his own wit and courage, he might deliver the People there from the ſavage tyranny of the Tyrant *Phalaris*; and perceiving, that he was carried on more by a cuſtomary way of rule, than ſound Counſel, he excited in the young men of the City, a deſire to free their Country: which being diſcovered to the Tyrant, he called the People together into the *Forum*, and began to torture him ſeveral ways, demanding of him, Who were privy to the conſpiracy, beſides himſelf? *Zeno* would not diſcloſe them, but names one that was moſt in favour with the Tyrant, and reproving the *Agrigentines* for their cowardice and timidity, raiſed ſuch a ſuddain courage in them, that they immediately fell upon the Tyrant, and ſtoned him to death. Thus not a ſuppliant Prayer, nor pitiful Crying out, but the valiant Exhortation of an old Man, ſtretch'd upon the Rack, chang'd the minds and fortune of the whole City.

(d) *Laert.*

But others relate this after a different manner. (d) *Satyrus*, in his Epitome of *Heraclides*, ſaith, that, conſpiring againſt *Nearchus*, or, as others, *Diomedon*, a Tyrant, he was taken, and being queſtion'd concerning the Conſpirators, and the Arms he had convey'd into *Lipara*, he named all ſuch as were friends to the Tyrant, as privy to the Plot, that thereby he might leave him deſtitute of Aſſiſtants; and further, telling him that he had ſomething to ſpeak in his ear, he bit him by the ear, and would not let go his hold, till they run him thorough, ſuffering in the ſame manner as *Ariſtogiton*, who ſlew *Hipparchus* the Tyrant of *Athens*. *Demetrius* affirms, he bit off his Noſe; *Antiſthenes* relates, that, having named all the Tyrant's friend's, and being demanded by him, Whether there were any more? anſwered, Yes, Thou, that art the deſtruction of the City. And then turning to the ſtanders by, ſaid, I wonder at your Cowardice, that you can endure to be ſlaves to a Tyrant, onely through fear of ſuffering what I now ſuffer; which ſaid, he bit off his Tongue, and ſpit it in the Tyrant's Face: whereupon the Citizens unanimouſly fell upon the Tyrant and ſtoned him. Theſe relate the ſtory after this manner; but *Hermippus* ſaith, he was bray'd to death in a ſtone-Mortar.

Beſides his other Virtues, he had a magnanimous contempt of great Perſons, as well as *Heraclides*, and therefore preferred his own Country *Elea*, firſt named *Hyela*, a Colony of the *Phoceans*, a little Town, only for that it brought forth honeſt Men, before the pride and glory of the *Athenians*, never travelling thither, but living for the moſt part at home.

It is reported of him, that being reviled, he appeared much troubled at it, anſwering one that reproved him for it, If I ſhould be pleaſed with reproaches, I could not delight in praiſes.

He flouriſhed in the 79th. *Olympiad*.

## CHAP. II.

### *His Invention of a Dialectick.*

ARiſtotle (cited by *Laertius*, and (a) *Sextus Empiricus*) *affirms, that* Zeno *Eleates was the Inventer of Dialectick, as* Parmenides *of Rhetorick*; which (b) *Galen* likewiſe confirms, ſaying, Zeno *is remembred as Author of the Eriſtick Philoſophy.* But the names of *Eriſtick* or *Dialectick* ſeem to have been later; for, as (c) *Laertius* deſcribes the ſucceſſion of it, *Euclid* [who was of *Megara*] *learning the* Parmenidean *Philoſopoy, his Diſciples were called* Megaricks, *afterwards* Eriſticks, *laſtly* Dialecticks; *which name* Dionyſius *the* Carthaginian *firſt gave them, for that they made diſſertations by way of Queſtion and Anſwer*; that, by *the Parmenidean Philoſophy*, he means no other than *Dialectick*, may be evinc'd from *Sextus Empiricus*, who alledgeth, that *Parmenides ſeemeth not to have been ignorant of* Dialecticks, *for that, as* Ariſtotle *conceives*, Zeno, *his Diſciple, invented it.* Hence perhaps may *Cicero* be explain'd, who, for this reaſon ſeems to include the *Eleatick* Philoſophers, under the title of (d) *Megaricks, who had*, ſaith he, *a noble Diſcipline, of which, as I find it written, the Prince (or Author) was* Xenophanes *lately mentioned. Then did* Parmenides *and* Zeno *follow him, ſo they were named* Eleatick *Philoſophers, from theſe. Afterwards* Euclid, *Diſciple of* Socrates, *a* Megarean, *from whom the ſame were called* Megaricks, *who held, That only to be good, which is one and the ſame, and like, and always. Theſe alſo borrowed much from* Plato, *being called, from* Menedemus, Eretriacks, *for that he was an* Eretrian. Thus *Cicero.*

(a) adv. Mat. (b) Hiſt. Phil. (c) in Euclid. (d) Acad. q.

He

## CHAP. III.

### His Opinions.

(a) Ariſtot. Zenon.

HE held, (a) That it is impoſſible, that if there be any thing, it can be generated, or made; aſſerting this of God: For it is neceſſary, that whatſoever is generated, is generated either of things like, or of things unlike; but neither of theſe is poſſible: For a thing like may as well generate its like as be generated of it, foraſmuch as amongſt things equal and alike, all things are in a like reſpect to one another. But neither can an unlike be generated of a like; for whether a ſtronger be made of a weaker, or a greater of a leſſer, or a worſe of a better; or on the contrary, the better be made of the worſe, of a *non Ens* will be made ſomething, which can no way be. For this Reaſon, He aſſerted God to be Eternal: And if God be that which is the moſt excellent of all things, it is requiſite, ſaith he, That he be *One*; for if there were two or more, he could by no means be the moſt excellent of all, foraſmuch as every God of them, being like him, would be ſuch as he. Now God, and the power of God is ſuch, as that it governs, but is not governed; it governs all things, ſo that if there were any thing better than he, he could not be God. If therefore there were many, and of theſe ſome were better, others worſe, they could not be Gods, for God cannot be inferior, or ſubjected, or governed. Neither if they were equal, could God be more excellent than all things elſe; for what is equal muſt neither be better nor worſe than that to which it is equal, therefore if there be a God, and He be ſuch, this God muſt be Onely One; otherwiſe, he could not do all things that he would; becauſe, if there were more, the one could not be of abſolute power. Now God being one, he further affirms, That he is every way like himſelf, as to ſeeing, and hearing, and all other ſenſes; for otherwiſe, the parts of God would not be moſt excellent, but exceeded by one another, which is impoſſible. Now being every way alike, he muſt be round, for he muſt not be partly of one faſhion, partly of another. Thus being eternal, and one, and round, he is neither finite nor infinite; infinite he is not, for that hath neither middle nor beginning, nor end, nor any other part, but an *Ens* cannot be ſuch as is a *non Ens*. If there were many, they would bound one another; but *One* is neither like to a *non Ens*, nor to many, for *One* hath nothing whereby it may be bounded. Moreover, God being ſuch an *One*, is neither moved nor immoveable, for that which is immoveable is *non Ens*. Neither can any thing paſs into it, nor it into another. Again, the Things which are moved are more than one; for a Thing muſt be moved into another; now if that which is not, is not moved, foraſmuch as that which is not, is no where; and thoſe things which are moved, muſt be more than one; hence he affirmeth, That thoſe which are moved are two, or more than one; and that *non Ens* reſts, for it is immoveable, but *One* neither reſts nor moveth, foraſmuch as it is neither *non Ens*, nor many. Thus he aſſerted, That God is Eternal, and One, and Like, and Round; neither Infinite, nor Finite; neither Quieſcent, nor Moveable.

(b) Laert.

(b) Moreover he aſſerted, That there are many Worlds; That there is no *Vacuum*; That the Nature of all things conſiſts of Hot and Moiſt, and Cold and Dry, mutually interchanged; That Man was made of Earth, and his Soul contemperated of thoſe Four, neither of them being predominant.

(c) Ariſtot. Phyſ. 6.

(c) Againſt Place he argued thus; If every *Ens* be in a Place, there muſt be a Place of that Place, and ſo to Infinite.

Againſt Motion, he alledged four Arguments: The firſt, that Nothing is moved; for whatſoever makes a Progreſſion, muſt come to the Middle, before it comes to the End. The ſecond is that, which is termed *Achilles*, that a ſlow Thing will never be overtaken by a ſwift; for the Thing which followeth muſt neceſſarily come to the place from which that which went before departed, therefore that which went before makes a continual Progreſſion as well as the other. The third, if every thing reſts when it is in its juſt place, and, in every moment, every thing is in its juſt place, an Arrow flying is immoveable. The fourth, that if Things were moved, as for Example, if equal Bulks were moved, one from the Beginning of the Race, another from the Middle, alike ſwiftly, it would come to paſs, that the Half of Time would be equal to the Whole.

## LEUCIPPUS.

# LEUCIPPUS.

Laert.

LEucippus was of *Elea*, or, as ſome ſay, an *Abderite*, or, as others, a *Melian*: He heard *Zeno*.

His Aſſertions are thus delivered by *Laertius*; That all Things are Infinite, and tranſmutated into one another; That the Univerſe is *Vacuum* and Full, (that is, little Bodies, or Atoms.) That the Worlds are made by the falling of theſe Bodies into the *Vacuum*, and intangling with one another, from which Motion, by Coagmentation of them, the Stars were made. That the Sun is moved in a greater Circle about the Moon. That the Earth is moved about the Centre, and is in figure like a Drum. He firſt aſſerted Atoms to be the Principles of all things. This is the Sum of his Doctrine, the Particulars theſe.

He held, That the Univerſe, as we ſaid, is Infinite; one part of it is Full, the other Vacuous; theſe are the Elements of which infinite Worlds are made, and reſolve into them. The Worlds were generated after this manner: Out of the Infinite there were carried, by a kind of Abſciſſion (from the reſt,) into a great *Vacuum* many Bodies of all ſorts of Figures, which being crowded up together cauſed a Circumgyration, by which means hitting againſt one another, and rolling about all manner of ways, thoſe which were alike ſeparated themſelves from the reſt, and joined with their equal like; but being of equal weight, and not able, by reaſon of their multitude, to move round; thoſe of them which were rare, leaped forth to the exterior *Vacuum*, the reſt ſtayed together, and entangled themſelves by running one within another, and made a firſt Compound round. This was like a kind of Membrane or skin containing all kinds of Bodies, which Bodies moving round about the middle, the Membrane that encloſed them became more thin, there flowing together continually more Bodies unto thoſe in the middle, and engaging themſelves in their motion. By this means was the Earth made, thoſe which went to the middle being ſetled together. Moreover, the outer Circumference or Membrane, as it were, was continually increaſed by the acceſſion of new Bodies from without, and, as it turned about, got hold of all that came at it. Some of theſe, entangling with one another, firſt made a Humid, and, as it were, a dirty kind of Maſs; but being dried, in their motion together with the whole, and afterwards enkindled, the Stars were made of them. The outmoſt is the Orb of the Sun, that of the *Moon* is next the Earth, the reſt are betwixt theſe; the Stars are kindled or ſet on fire by the ſwiftneſs of their motion, the Sun by the Stars, the *Moon* borrows a little fire from the Sun. The Sun and *Moon* happen to be eclipſed, by reaſon that the Earth inclines towards the South; the Northern Parts are continually oppreſs'd with Snow and Froſt; the Sun is ſeldom eclipſed, the *Moon* continually, becauſe their Orbs are not equal. In the ſame manner as the World was made it increaſed, will diminiſh and periſh, by a certain kind of neceſſity. Hitherto *Laertius*. What is more to be ſaid of his Opinions, we ſhall inſert amongſt thoſe of *Democritus*, who borrowed moſt of them.

# *DEMOCRITUS.*

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

DEMOCRITVS.

## CHAP. I.

### *His Country, Parents, Brethren, Time.*

(a) Laert. (b) Laert.

DEmocritus (a) is by ſome ſuppoſed to have been a *Mileſian*, but the more general Opinion is, that (b) he was of *Abdera* a Town of *Thrace*, noted for the (c) ſimplicity of the Inhabitants, which grew even to a Proverb. He was of a Noble Family (d) being deſcended from the Brother

(c) Cic.

(d) Abderit. Ep. ad Hippocr.

(a) Laert. Suid. Brother of *Hercules*. His Father is by (a) ſome called *Hegeſiſtratus*; by others *Athenocritus*; by others (b) *Damaſippus*. *Democritus* was the youngeſt of three Sons; the other two, (c) *Herodotus* and *Damaſus*, or (as (d) *Suidas*,) *Damaſtes*.

(b) Laert. Ælian 4. 20.
(c) Laert. Plin. 18. 35.
(d) in Democr.

(e) Democritus *was born* (*according to* Apollodorus *in his Chronology*) *in the* 80th. *Olympiad*; which is confirmed by what (f) he ſaith of himſelf in his little *Diacoſmus*, *that he was young when* Anaxagoras *was old*, *being forty Years younger than he*. *Anaxagoras* was born in the firſt year of the 70th. Olympiad; the 40th. year after it, excluſively, falleth upon the firſt of the 80th. Olympiad. *Thraſyllus* therefore is not to be followed, (g) who *affirms*, *he was born in the third year of the 77th. Olympiad*, *being a year elder than* Socrates.

(e) Laert.
(f) Laert.
(g) Laert.

(h) *Pliny* and (i) *Agellius* affirm, he flouriſhed chiefly in the time of the *Peloponneſian* War; *Pliny* ſaith, after the building of *Rome* 300 years; *Agellius*, 323 years; by which it appears that *he was contemporary*, as *Agellius* adds, *with Socrates*, and perhaps (as *Laertius*) *with* Achelaus *the Diſciple of* Socrates, *and with* Oenipodes, *for he mentions him*, *as likewiſe the opinion of* Zeno *and* Parmenides *concerning* One, *as Perſons moſt eminent in his time*, *and* Protagoras *the* Abderite, *whom all acknowledge* (ſaith he) *to have been in the time of* Socrates. That he is ſaid to have written his little *Diacoſmus* 730. years after the taking of *Troy*, agrees with this accompt. For, according to *Eratoſthenes*, from the taking of *Troy* to the firſt Olympiad are 407 years, to which add 323. years (to make up 730.) and it falls upon the 84th. Olympiad.

(h) Lib. 30 Cap. 1.
(i) Lib. 17 Cap. 21.

## CHAP. II.

### *His firſt Education and Maſters.*

(k) Lib. *Democritus*, (ſaith (k) *Valerius Maximus*,) *may well be reckoned amongſt the rich*, *for his Father was able to entertain the Army of* Xerxes. *Laertius* adds, from the teſtimony of *Herodotus*, *that the King in requital left with him ſome* Magi *and* Chaldæans, *referring perhaps to* (l) *that Text of* Herodotus, *where he relates*, *that* Xerxes, *in his return to* Aſia, *came to* Abdera, *and was entertained by the* Abderites, *and beſtowed on them a golden Scimitar*, *and the Tiara embroidered with Gold*; *and*, *as the People there affirm*, *this was the firſt place where he untied his zone*, *ſince he fled from* Athens (*which I believe not*,) *ſo great was his fear*. Abdera *is nearer to the* Helleſpont *than the Bay of* Strymon, *ſo that he took Shipping from hence*. Thus *Herodotus* From theſe *Magi* and *Chaldæans*, *Democritus* firſt received Learning, (m) *of whom*, *whilſt yet a Boy*, *he learnt Theology and Aſtronomy*.

(l) Lib. 8.
(m) Laert.

(n) He next applied himſelf to *Leucippus*. (o) *Some affirm*, *he was Diſciple alſo to* Anaxagoras; *but* Phavorinus, *in his various Hiſtory*, *relates*, *that* Democritus *ſaid of* Anaxagoras, *that thoſe opinions which he delivered concerning the Sun and Moon were not His*, *but more Ancient*, *and that he ſtole them*. *He likewiſe undervalued his Aſſertions*, *concerning the Fabrick of the Univerſe*, *and the Mind*; *How then* (*ſaith* Phavorinus) *was he*, *as ſome hold*, *his Diſciple?*

(n) Laert.
(o) Laert.

No leſs doubted is the Report of his going to *Athens*, where (p) *Valerius Maximus* ſaith, *he dwelt many years*, *making uſe of every moment of time*, *towards the perception and exerciſe of Learning*. *He lived unknown in that City*, *as he himſelf atteſts in one of his Books*. Laertius *adds*, *he kept himſelf undiſcover'd out of a contempt of Glory*, *and knew* Socrates, *but was not known to him*; *whereupon he ſaid of himſelf*, "*I went to* Athens, *and* "*no man knew me*. *If the Rivals* (*ſaith* Thraſyllus) *be a genuine Dialogue of* Plato; *this is the Anonymous Perſon there*, *who*, *beſides the two who were buſied concerning* Oenipodes *and* Anaxagoras, *diſcourſeth concerning Philoſophy with* Socrates, (q) *to whom he ſaid that a Philoſopher reſembles a Pentathlus*, (a perſon skilful in five exerciſes) *and indeed he was*, (*continues* * Thraſyllus) *a Pentathlus in Philoſophy*, *for he was skilful in Phyſick*, *Ethick*, *Mathematick*, *the liberal Sciences*, *and all Arts*. *But* Demetrius Phalereus, *in his Apology for* Socrates, *ſaith*, *he never went to* Athens; *and this* (*ſaith* Laertius) *is far greater*, *that he could deſpiſe ſo eminent a City*, *deſiring rather to give honour to a place*, *than to receive it from a place*.

(p) Lib. 8. c. 7.
(q) Reading φασὶν, as Menagius makes it, and paraphraſes the place. Plato, who makes it manifeſt. Whom Magnesia meant, who relates this ſpoken by Anaxagoras Socrates to Democritus, Democr. reading pag. 28. I know not. * The word ſeem to his.

More certain it is, that he heard ſome *Pythagorean* Philoſopher. (r) Thraſyllus *affirms*, *that he imitated the* Pythagoreans, *and mention'd even* Pythagoras *himſelf*, *admiring him in a Treatiſe*, *bearing his Name*. *He ſeems to have taken all from him*, *and might be thought to have heard him*, *but that the times agree not*. *But* Glaucus *of* Rhegium, *who lived at the ſame time*, *affirms*, *he heard one of the* Pythagoreans. Apollodorus *of* Cyzicus *conceives him to have been contemporary with* Philolaus. (s) Duris, *that he heard* Arimnæſtus, *Son of* Pythagoras.

(r) Laert.
(s) Porph. Pythag.

So ſtudious was he even from his youth, that (t) *Demetrius* affirms, "he retir'd to a little "Summer-houſe belonging to the Orchard, and "ſhut himſelf up; and on a time his Father "bringing thither an Ox to be ſacrific'd, and "tying it there, he knew nothing of it a good "while, until his Father rouſed him up, and told "him the Buſineſs concerning the Ox.

(t) Laert.

## CHAP. III.

### *His Travels.*

His Father dying, the three Brothers divided the Eſtate. (u) Democritus, *the youngeſt*, *made choiſe of that part which conſiſted in Mony*, *as being*, *though the leaſt ſhare*, *yet the moſt convenient for Travel*. *And notwithſtanding it was the leaſt*, *yet were they jealous of him*, *as if he had an intention to defraud them*. Demetrius *affirms*, *his Portion amounted to an hundred Talents*, *and that he ſpent it all*, not gave it (as *Valerius Maximus* relates) to his Country. Hence is it that *Cicero* ſaith, *he neglected his Patrimony*, *left his Fields untilled*, *ſeeking nothing elſe but a happy Life*.

(u) Laert.

(x) *Laertius*, (citing *Demetrius*, and *Antiſthenes*) relates, that *he travelled to* Egypt *to the Prieſts*, *to learn Geometry*, *to* Perſia *to the* Chaldæans, *and went to the* Red-Sea; *ſome affirm*, *he converſed with the* Gymnoſophiſts *in* India, *and travell'd to* Æthiopia, *and* (y) *learnt the ſeveral Wiſdomes of each of theſe Nations*: (z) With the *Ægyptians* he lived (as he himſelf affirms) 80 years.

(x) So Eſtienne. Lib. Cap 20.
(y) Suid.
(z) Clem. Alex. Strom.

For

*For these things (saith (a) Ælian) Theophrastus commends him, because by his Travels he collected better things than either* Menelaus *or* Achilles; *for they went up and down no otherwise than like* Phœnician *Merchants; they gathered money, and that was the occasion of their Travels by Sea and Land.* Not without reason therefore was it, that he said of himself, (b) *Of any Man in my time, I have been the greatest Traveller, and made the furthest Enquiries, and seen most variety of Air and Earth, and heard the most Learned Persons, and in making Demonstrations by Lines, none yet hath gone beyond me, no not those* Ægyptians, *who are called* Arpedonaptæ.

(a) lib. 4. c. 20.

(b) Clem. Strom.

## CHAP IV.

*How he lived at* Abdera, *after his return from Travel, and governed there.*

Laertius saith, that, *at his return from Travel, he was in a very mean condition, having spent all his Estate; whereupon his Brother* Damasus *(in regard of his indigence,) received him kindly, and maintain'd him. But after that he had foretold some things, which fell out accordingly, people from thence forward, honour'd him as a God: moreover, there being a Law, that whosoever had consumed his patrimony, should not be allow'd burial in his own Country:* Antisthenes *relates, that to prevent being liable to some envious Persons and Sycophants, he read to the people his Book entituled the great* Diacosmus, *which was the most excellent of all his Writings, and for it was rewarded with* 500. *Talents; and not only so, but with brasen Statues also.* Hitherto *Laertius.*

Of these Predictions, (a) *Pliny* gives two instances. *It is reported,* saith he, *that* Democritus, *who first understood and demonstrated the correspondence betwixt Heaven and Earth the most wealthy of the Citizens despising this his pains, foreseeing a future dearth of Olives, from the future rising of Pleiades, (after the same manner as we have mentioned, and shall declare more fully hereafter) with extraordinary profit, by reason of the expectation of Olives, bought up all the Olives in that Country, to the admiration of all those, who knew he chiefly affected Poverty, and the quiet of Learning. But assoon as the reason appeared together with the great gain of money, he restor'd the Bargain to the anxious and greedy repentance of the Owners, contenting himself to have thus proved, that he could easily be Rich, whensoever he pleased.*

(a) Lib. 18. c. 27.

The other is this: (b) *His Brother* Damasus *being employ'd about Reaping in an extraordinary hot day, he desired him to let the rest of the Corn alone, and to Cock that which was already Reaped as fast as he could: within few hours, a terrible Tempest ratify'd his Prediction.* (c) Clemens *adds, that he fore-told it by some Stars; and that they, giving credit to him, cock'd their Crop, for, it being Summer, (d) it was not yet Inned in the Barn; but the rest lost theirs by the great and unexpected Rain.*

(b) Plin. 18. 35.

(c) *By these (and the like) Predictions, he gained so great esteem amongst the People, that from thence forward they honoured him as a God;* Clemens saith, they called him σοφία, *Wisdome;* Ælian, *Philosophy;* as *Protagoras* was termed *Logos,* Discourse. (f) *So much indeed was he reverenc'd for his extraordinary Wisdome, that they conferred the Supream Government of* Abdera *upon him.*

(c) Strom. 6. p. 631. d.

(d) Reading ἡ ἀλωὴν ἐν τοῖς ἄνω τόποις.

(e) Laert.

(f) Suid.

## CHAP. V.

*His Retirement.*

But being naturally more inclined to contemplation, than delighted with publick honours and employments, he withdrew himself from them, and (a) "endeavored, as *Antisthenes* "relates, to make several Tryals of Phantasies (meaning the impressions of things appearing to the Phantasy, not the Phantasy it self) "often (b) φιλοσοφ. "living alone and in Sepulchres. (b) *Lucian* adds, "that shutting himself up in a Tomb without the Gates of the City, he continued there "writing and composing Night and Day: And "that some young Men intending to deride and "fright him, attired themselves like Ghosts, in "black Garments, with Vizards like Deaths-"heads, and came about him dancing and skip-"ping, wherat he was nothing moved, nor would "so much as look on them, but continued to "write, Leave fooling, saith he; So firmly, did "he believe, that Souls are nothing after they "are out of the Bodies.

(a) *Lucr.*

Such places he made choice of, as were most conducing to contemplation, by reason of their (c) *Lib.* Solitude and Darkness. And (c) *Agellius* reports, "out of the Monuments of the Greek History "now not extant, that for the same reason he "put out his own Eyes, because he conceived "the cogitations and meditations of his Mind, "in contemplating the reasons of Nature, would "be more vigorous and exact, if free from the "allurements of Sight and impediments of the "Eyes: which act, together with the manner "whereby he easily procured Blindness, by a most "subtle ingeniousness, *Laberius* described; feigning another cause of his voluntary Blindness, "converting it to his own purpose.

*Democritus,* the *Abderite,* well skill'd
In natural Philosophy, a Shield
Plac'd to *Hyperion's* rising opposite,
And with the Sun's beams thus put out his sight;
That bad and impious Men he might not see,
Triumphant in their full prosperity.

The former Reason given by *Agellius* (that he might study Philosophy the better) is alledged also by (d) *Cicero, Plutarch,* and others. "For though, saith *Cicero,* having lost his Eyes "he could not discern Black and White, yet could "he Good and Ill, Just and Unjust, Honest and "Dishoneſt, Profitable and Unprofitable, Great "and Little; he might live happy without the "variety of Colours, but he could not without "the knowledge of things. Thus he conceived, that the acuteness of the Mind was obstructed by the sight of the Eyes. (e) *Tertullian* alledgeth another Reason, *because he could not look on Women without inordinate desires.* But *Cicero* (f) elsewhere speaks doubtfully concerning the truth of the thing it self, and not without reason, since the contrary appears manifest by this following Narration.

(d) *Tusc. quæst.* 5.

(e) *Apolog. Adv. gent.*

(f) *De finib.* 3.

## CHAP. VI.

### *His Communication with* Hippocrates.

(a) *Epist. Grac.*

*Democritus* (a) thus neglecting all outward things, living Day and Night privately in Caves and solitary places, the *Abderites* imagined that he was melancholy even to Madness; which suspicion was confirmed by his continual Laughing upon all occasions whatsoever. Hereupon they sent *Amelesagoras*, one of the chief Persons of their City to *Hippocrates*, that most eminent Physitian who lived at *Cos*, with this Epistle.

*The Senate and People of* Abdera *to* Hippocrates, *Health.*

Our City, *Hippocrates*, is in very great danger, together with that Person, who, we hoped, would ever have been a great Ornament to it. But now, O the Gods! it is much to be feared, that we shall only be capable of envying others, since he, through extraordinary Learning and Study, by which he gained it, is fallen sick, so as it is much to be feared, that if *Democritus* become mad, our City *Abdera* will become desolate; for, wholly forgetting himself, watching Day and Night, laughing at all things Little and Great, and esteeming them as nothing, he after this manner leadeth his whole Life. One marries a Wife; another Trades; another Pleads; another performs the Office of Magistrate; goeth on Embassy, is chosen Officer by the People, is put down, falls sick, is wounded, dyes; he laughs at all these, beholding some to look discontented, others pleas'd. Moreover, he enquireth what is done in the Infernal places, and writes of them, and affirms the Air to be full of Images, and that he understands the Language of Birds, and often rising in the Night singeth to himself, and saith, That he sometimes travels into the Infinity of Things, and that there are innumerable *Democritus's* like him; thus, together with his Mind, he destroyeth his Body. These are the Things which we fear, *Hippocrates*; These are those which trouble us. Come therefore quickly, and preserve us by your Advice. And despise us not, for we are not inconsiderable; And if you restore him, you shall not fail either of Money or Fame: And though you prefer Learning before Wealth, yet accept of the later, which shall be offered to you in great abundance.

To restore *Democritus* to health, if our City were all of Gold, we would give it. We think our Laws, *Hippocrates*, are sick; Come, then, Best of Men, and cure a most excellent Person. Thou wilt not come as a Physitian, but as a Founder of all *Italy*, to encompass us with a sacred Wall. Thou wilt care not a Man, but a City, a languishing Senate, and prevent it's Dissolution, this becoming our Lawgiver, Judge, Magistrate, and Preserver. To this purpose we expect thee, *Hippocrates*, all these (if you come) you will be to us. It is not a single obscure City, but all *Greece*, which beseecheth thee to preserve the Body of Wisdom. Imagine that Learning Her self comes on this Embassy to Thee, begging, that Thou wilt free Her from this danger. Wisdom certainly is nearly allied to every one, but especially to us who dwell so near Her. Know for certain, that the next Age will own it self much obliged to Thee, if thou desert not *Democritus*, for the Truth which he is capable of communicating to all. Thou art allied to *Æsculapius* by thy Family, and by thy Art; he is descended from the Brother of *Hercules*, from whom came *Abderus*, whose name, as you have heard, our City bears; wherefore even to him will the cure of *Democritus* be acceptable. Since therefore, *Hippocrates*, you see a whole People, and a most excellent Person falling into Madness, hasten we beseech you to us. It is strange, that the exuberance of Good should become a Disease; *Democritus*, by how much he excelled others in acuteness of Wisdom, is now in so much the more danger of falling mad, whilst the ordinary unlearned People of *Abdera* enjoy their Wits as formerly; and even they, who before were esteemed foolish, are now most capable to discern the indisposition of the wisest Person. Come therefore, and bring along with you *Æsculapius*, and *Epione*, the Daughter of *Hercules*, and her Children who went in the Expedition against *Troy*; bring with you the Receipts and Remedies against Sickness; the Earth plentifully affords Fruits, Roots, Herbs, and Flowers to cure Madness, and never more happily than now, for the recovery of *Democritus*. Farewel.

*Hippocrates* returned this Answer.

Hippocrates *to the Senate of* Abdera, *Health.*

Your Countryman *Amelesagoras* arrived at *Cos* the same day on which with us was Celebrated the Susception of the Rod, which, as you know, is an annual Convention, and great Solemnity amongst us, held at a Cypress Tree, which are born by those who are particularly consecrated to the God.

But finding both by the Words and Countenance of *Amelesagoras*, that your Business required much haste, I read your Letter, and much wondred to find your City no less troubled for one Man, than if the whole City were but one Man. Happy indeed are the People who know, that wise Men are their Defence; not Walls or Bulwarks, but the sound Judgments of wise Persons. I conceive, that Arts are the dispensations of the Gods; Men the works of Nature: and be not angry, ye Men of *Abdera*, if I conceive, that it is not you, but Nature her self which calls me to preserve her work which is in danger of failing.

Wherefore, obeying that which is the invitation of Nature and of the Gods, rather than yours, I shall make haste to cure the Sickness of *Democritus*, if it be a Sickness, and not, as I hope, an Error in you. And it would be yet a greater Testimony of your Good-will, if you were troubled only upon Suspicion. Neither Nature nor the Gods have promised me any thing for my coming, and therefore (Men of *Abdera*) do not you force any thing upon me, but suffer the works of a free Art to be free. They who take Rewards compel Sciences to servitude, and make them Slaves, bereaving them of

of their former freedom. Besides, it is possible that such may dissemble, in a great disease, and deny in a little; and when they have promised, not come; and come, when they are not sent for. Miserable indeed is Human Life, for that the unsatiate desire of Wealth continually invades it, as a Winter-Wind. I wish, that all Physitians would rather joyn together to cure it of this Disease, which is worse than Madness, notwithstanding it is thought happy, but indeed a pestilentiall Sickness. All distempers of the Mind, are, as I conceive, High-madness, for they stir up in the Reason strange Opinions and Fantasies, which Reason must be purifi'd and cur'd by Vertue. As for me, if at all I made it my design to be Rich, I would not, ye men of *Abdera*, come to you for ten Talents, but would rather have gone to the great King of *Persia*, where there are vast Cities full of all kind of wealth, there I would have practis'd Physick. But I refused to cure a Nation which are Enemies to *Greece*, and, to the best of my power, have my self opposed the *Barbarians*. I thought it a dishonour to accept of the wealth of a King, Foe to our Country, by which means I might become a destroyer of *Greece*. To get Wealth by all means, is not to be Rich; the Rites of Vertue are sacred and just. Do you not think it an equal offence to cure our Enemies, as to take Money for the cure of our Friends? But this is not my Custom; I raise not Gain out of Sickness; nor did wish, when I heard that *Democritus* was Mad, that it might prove so indeed; if he be Well, he is a Friend; if he happen to be cured of his Sickness, more a Friend. I understand that *Democritus* is a person of firm and settled parts, the Ornament of your City.

In order to this Voyage, he sent to his Friend *Dionysius*, that he would take care of his Family in his absence; to *Damagetus*, that he would provide a Ship for him; to *Cratevas*, that he would furnish him with Simples. The day before he arrived at *Abdera*, he dreamt that *Æsculapius* appear'd to him, and told him, that he would have no need of his assistance, but only of the direction of a Woman, whom he brought along with him; and having presented her to him, departed. The Woman promised, that she would meet him on the morrow at *Democritus's* house; he asked her Name, she told him, she was called *Truth*; and, pointing to another Woman that followed her, added, that her Name was *Opinion*, and that she lived with the *Abderites*. This was the Dream of *Hippocrates*. How he was received the next day at *Abdera*, he gives this account to his Friend *Damagetus*.

To *Damagetus*, Health.

It was, as I conjectur'd, *Damagetus*: *Democritus* is not mad, but is extraordinary Wise, and hath taught us Wisdom, and by us all men. I have sent back, with many thanks, the *Æsculapian* Ship, on the Prow whereof, to the Picture of the *Sun*, may be added *Health*, for we made a quick Voyage, and arrived the same day that I had sent word, I would be there, at *Abdera*. I found all the people flocking together at the Gate, in expectation, as it should seem, of our coming; not only the Men, but the Women, the Old, the Young; and, by *Jove*, the very Children: so much were they troubled at the Madness of *Democritus*, who, at that time, was seriously employ'd in Philosophy. As soon as they saw me, they seemed a little to be comforted, and to have some hope. *Philopœmen* offer'd to conduct me to my Lodging, as all of them likewise desired; but I told them, "Men of "*Abdera*, I will do nothing till I have seen *Demo*-"*critus*; which as assoon as they heard, they applauded and rejoyc'd, and brought me immediately along the *Forum*; some following, others running before, crying out, Great King *Jupiter*, help, heal; I advised them to be of comfort, for that it being the season of the *Etesian* Winds, I was confident that there was not any Sickness that would continue long; and in saying thus, on I went. The House was not far, nor indeed the City; we went to it, it being next the Walls, whither they brought me quietly. Behind the Tower there was a high Hill, very full of tall Poplars, from whence we beheld the habitation of *Democritus*. *Democritus* himself sat under a thick, but low, Plane-Tree, in a thick Gown, all alone, squalid, upon a seat of Stone, wan and lean, with a long Beard, at his right hand ran a little Brook down the Hill, upon the Hill there was a Temple consecrated, as it should seem, to the Muses, encompassed round about with Vines, which grew there naturally. He sat very composedly, having a book upon his knees, and round about him lay other books, and the Bodies of many living Creatures dissected. Sometimes he wrote hastily, sometimes paused, seeming to revolve things within himself. Soon after he rose up and walked, and looked intently into the dissected Creatures; then laid down again, and return'd to his seat. The *Abderites*, standing about me, and hardly refraining from Tears, said, "You see, *Hippocrates*, the life of *Democritus*, "how mad he is, and knoweth not either what "he would have, or what he doth. One of them, that would have given me a farther description of his Madness, on the sudden fell a sobbing, and howled like a Woman at the death of her Son, and then began to lament like a Traveller robb'd of his Goods: which *Democritus* hearing, sometimes smiled, sometimes laughed, not writing any longer, but often shaking his head. "Men of *Abdera*, "(*said I*) stay you here, whilst I go nigher to him, "that, by hearing him speak, and observing his "Constitution, I may judge the truth of his Di-"stemper; and in so saying, I went gently down; the place was very steep, so that I could hardly keep my self from falling. At such time as I came nigh him, it hapned, that he was writing somthing as in a Rapture, earnestly; whereupon I made a stand, waiting when he would give over. It was not long ere he did so; and seeing me coming towards him, said, "Hail, Stranger; I answer'd, "Hail also, *Democritus*, the Wisest of Men. He, as I imagine, a little troubled that he had not saluted me by Name, reply'd, "What may I call "you? for my Ignorance of your Name is the "Reason that I styled you, Stranger. "My Name, "*said I*, is *Hippocrates*, a Physician. "You are, *re*-"*ply'd he*, the glory of the *Æsculapians*, the fame "of whose Worth, and knowledge in Physick, "is arrived as far as to me. What Business hath "brought you hither? but first sit down. This "seat you see, is pleasant, green, and soft, better

"than

"than high Thrones which are subject to the en-
"vy of Fortune. Assoon as I was set, Is it a pub-
"lick or private business, *saith he*, which brought
"you hither? Tell me freely, and we shall to our
"utmost power assist you. I answer'd, It is for
"your sake that I came hither, to be acquainted
"with you, a wise Person, the occasion being af-
"forded me by an Embassy from your Country.
"He reply'd, Then let my House entertain
"you.

Having thus made Trial of him several ways, and not finding any thing of madness in him, "You "know, *said I*, *Philopœmen*, one of this Town. "Exceeding well, *answer'd he*; you mean the Son "of *Damon*? He lives near the *Hermæan* Fountain. "The same, *reply'd I*; he hath been my old Ac-"quaintance, and received me for his Guest. But "you, *Democritus*, I intreat to afford me a better "entertainment, and first tell me, What it is that "you are writing? *He after a little pause answer'd*, "Concerning Madness. "Good *Jupiter*, said I, "you write seasonably against the City! What "city, *Hippocrates*, *answer'd he*? I replied, that I "only spoke at random. But what is this that "you write of Madness? What else, said he, "but, What it is, and How it comes to be ingen-"dred in Man, and How it may be cured? These "Creatures which you behold, I have dissected for "that end; not as *hating* the Works of the Gods, "but to make inquiry into the nature and seat of "Choler; for you know, that where this abounds "too much, it most commonly causeth Madness "in Men. It is in every Nature, but in some less, "in others more; its excess causeth diseases, as "being a matter partly good, partly bad. By "Jove, *said I*, *Democritus*, you speak truly and "wisely; and I judge you happy, who can enjoy "such quiet, as I cannot partake of. And why "cannot you, *saith he*? I answer'd, because either "Travel, or Children, or Estate, or Sicknesses, or "Deaths, or Servants, or Marriages, or the like, "intercept my leisure.

Hereupon he fell into his usual passion, and laughed a while exceedingly, giving over dis-course. "Why, *said I*, *Democritus*, do you laugh? "Whether is it, that I have spoken well or ill? Hereat he laughed more than before, which the *Abderites*, who stood aloof off, seeing, some beat their own Heads, others their Fore-heads, others tore their Hair; for, as they afterwards said, they observed him to laugh at that time more than ever he had done. "*Democritus*, Thou best of "wise men, *continued I*, I desire to know the rea-"son of this Passion, wherein that which I said "seems ridiculous? That if it proves such, I may "reform it, but if otherwise, that you may desist "from this unseasonable Laughter. By *Hercules*, "said he, If you can convince me, *Hippocrates*, you "will perform a Cure greater than any you have "yet done. And why, *said I*, should you not be "convinced? Know you not, that you do absurdly "in laughing at the Death of a Man, or at Sick-"ness, or Madness, or Murther, or any thing that is "worse than these; and on the other side at Mar-"riages, at Assemblies, at the Birth of Infants, "at Solemn Rites, at Magistracies, at Honors, "and generally at every thing that hath the "Name of Good? At those things which de-"serve to be pitied, you laugh; and at those "things for which we should rejoyce, you laugh "also; insomuch that you seem not to put any "difference betwixt Good and Bad. *Then he*, "You say well, *Hippocrates*, but you are not ac-"quainted with the reason of my Laughing, "which assoon as you know, I am confident, you "will prefer it before the Cause for which you "came hither, and carry it along with you as "a Medicine to your Country, thereby impro-"ving both your self and others: and in requi-"tal of it, perhaps will think your self oblig-"ed to teach me Physick, when you shall un-"derstand what pains all Men take for things "that deserve not pains, but are of no value, "and consume their Lives unprofitably, in per-"suit of things that deserve only to be laugh'd "at. What, *said I*, Is all the World sick, and "knows it not? If so, they can send no whither "for help; for what is beyond it? *He repli'd*, "There are infinite Worlds, O *Hippocrates*! "Have not so mean an esteem of the Riches of "Nature. Teach me this, *said I*, *Democritus*, "at some other time: for I am afraid, that if "you begin to talk of this Infinity, you will fall "again into your Fit of Laughter; but now, tell "me the Reason, why you Laugh at the accidents "of Life.

Then, looking stedfastly upon me, "You think, "*saith he*, there are two things, which occasion "my Laughter, Good and Ill, whereas indeed I "laugh but at one thing, Men, full of Folly, "destitute of right Actions, playing the Child "in all his Designes, undergoing great Toils "for no Benefit, travelling to the ends of the "Earth, and sounding bottomless Depths, to "get Silver and Gold, never ceasing to hoard "them up, and with their store increasing his "own Troubles, lest, if he should want them, "he might be thought not happy. He digs in-"to the Bowels of the Earth, by the hands of "Slaves, whereof some are buried by the Earth "falling upon them, others dwell there, as if it "were their Native Soil, searching for Gold and "Silver, sifting one Sand from another, cut-"ting and tearing their Mother Earth, which "they both admire and tread on. How ridi-"culous is this, that they should love that part "of the Earth that lies hid, and contemn that "which lieth open unto them? Some buy Dogs, "others Horses; some delight in having large "Possessions, which they may call their own, and "would command many others, when they are "not able to command themselves. They marry "Wives, and in a short time put them away; "they love, and then hate; they take delight "in their Children, and when they are grown "up, disinherit them; They War, and despise "Quiet; they conspire against Kings; they "murther Men; they dig the Earth to find "Silver; with the Silver, which they have found, "they buy Land; what the Land which they "have bought yields, of Corn or Fruits, they "sell, and receive Silver again. To what chan-"ges and mischances are they subject? When "they have not Riches, they desire them; when "they have they hide or scatter them; I laugh "at their Ill-designed Actions, I laugh at their "Misfortunes. They violate the Laws of "Truth, by Contention and Enmity with one "another; Brethren, Parents, and Country-"men, fight and kill one another for those Pos-

* "sessions.

"ſeſſions, of which, after Death, none of them "can be Maſters. They purſue an unjuſt courſe "of Life; they deſpiſe the poverty of their "Friends and Country; Mean and Inanimate "things they account for Riches; they will part "with a whole Eſtate to purchaſe Statues, be-"cauſe the Statue ſeems to ſpeak, but thoſe who "ſpeak indeed they hate. They affect things "hard to be got; they, who dwell in the Con-"tinent, covet the things of the Sea; they "who dwell in the Iſlands, the things of the "Continent, perverting all things to their own "depraved deſires. In War they praiſe Va-"lour, whilſt they are daily ſubdued by Luxury, "Avarice, and all Paſſions, and in the courſe "of his Life every man is a *Therſites*. Why "did you, *Hippocrates*, reprove my Laughter? "No Man laughs at his own Madneſs, but at "the Madneſs of another. They who think "themſelves to be Sober, laugh at thoſe who "ſeem to them to be Drunk; ſome laugh at "Lovers, whilſt they themſelves are ſick of a "worſe diſtemper; ſome, at thoſe who travel "by Sea; others, at thoſe who follow Husban-"dry, for they agree not with one another, nei-"ther in Arts nor Actions. All this, *ſaid I, De-"mocritus*, is true, neither is there any Argu-"ment that may better prove the unhappy Eſ-"tate of Man: but theſe Actions are preſcribed "by Neceſſity, by reaſon of the government of "Families, the building of Ships, and other "civil Offices, wherein a Man muſt neceſſarily "be employ'd, for Nature did not produce him "to the end he might reſt Idle. Again, Height "of Ambition cauſeth many Men to go aſtray "who aim at all things, as if there were nothing "amiſs in them, not being able to foreſee the "darkneſs that attends them. For, *Democritus*, "what Man is there, that, when he marries, "thinks of Divorce or Death? Who is there, "that whilſt he bringeth up his Children, think-"eth of loſing them? The like in Husbandry, "Navigation, Dominion, and all other Offices "of Life. No Man foreſees that it may go "amiſs with him, but every one flatters him-"ſelf with hopes of good ſucceſs, and does not "look upon the worſt. Why therefore is this "ridiculous?

*Democritus replied*, "You are yet far from "underſtanding me, *Hippocrates*, neither per-"ceive, through want of knowledge, the bounds "of Indiſturbance and Perturbation. For if "they did order theſe things prudently, they "might be eaſily diſcharged of them, and "evade my Laughter; whereas now they are "blind as to the Offices of Life, and, with "Minds void of reaſon, are carried on by in-"ordinate Appetites. It were enough to make "them wiſe, if they would but conſider the "mutability of all things, how they wheel "about continually, and are ſuddenly changed; "whereas they looking upon theſe, as if they "were firm and ſettled, fall into many incon-"veniences and troubles, and coveting things "harmful, they tumble headlong into many "Miſeries. But if a Man would rightly con-"ſider and weigh in his mind all things that "he attempts, underſtanding himſelf and his "own Abilities, he would not let his deſires "run to Infinite, but follow Nature; out of "whoſe ſtore all are plentifully nouriſhed and "ſupplyed. As a fat Body is in greateſt danger "of ſickneſs, ſo an high Eſtate is in greateſt "danger of falling; great minds are known in "Extremities. Some there are, who, taking "no warning at that which hapneth to others, "periſh by their own ill Actions, minding things "Manifeſt no more than as if they were not "Manifeſt, whereas yet they have a large Pre-"cedent by which to guide their Life, of things "done and not done, by which we ought to "foreſee the future. This is the occaſion of "my Laughter, Fooliſh Men puniſhed by their "own Wickedneſs, Covetouſneſs, Luſt, En-"mity, Treachery, Conſpiracy, Envy. It is "a hard thing to give a name to many of theſe "Ills, they being innumerable, and practiſed ſo "cloſely. Their Behaviour, as to Vertue, is "yet worſe; they affect Lies, they follow Plea-"ſure, diſobeying the Laws; my Laughter con-"demns their Inconſiderateneſs, who neither "ſee nor hear, whereas the Senſe of Man only, "of all others, is able to foreſee Futures. They "hate all Things, and then again apply them-"ſelves to them; they condemn Navigation, "and then they put to Sea; condemn Husban-"dry, and then fall a Ploughing; they put away "their Wives, and then marry others; they bury "their Children, and beget more, and bring them "up; they wiſh to live long, and when old Age "comes are grieved at it; never remaining con-"ſtant in any Eſtate whatſoever. Kings and Prin-"ces commend a private Life; private Perſons, a "publick; he that ruleth a State praiſeth the "Tradeſman's life, as free from danger; the "Tradeſman his, as full of Honor and Power. For "they regard not the direct, ſincere and ſmooth "way of Vertue, in which none of them will en-"dure to walk; but they take crooked and rough "Paths, ſome falling down, others running them-"ſelves out of breath to overtake others. Some "are guided by incontinence to the Beds of their "Neighbours; others are Sick of a Conſumption "through unſatiate Avarice; ſome by Ambi-"tion carried up into the Air, and by their own "wickedneſs thrown down headlong. They pluck "down, and then they build; they do good and "oblige others, and then, repenting of it, break "the laws of Friendſhip, and do wrong, and fall "at enmity, and fight with their neareſt Relati-"ons; of all which, Avarice is the cauſe. Where-"in do they differ from Children that play, whoſe "Minds, being void of Judgment, are pleaſed with "every thing they light on? In their Deſires they "differ not much from brute Beaſts, only the "Beaſts are contented with that which is enough. "What Lyon is there, that hides Gold under "ground? What Bull fights for more than he "needs? What Leopard is unſatiately greedy? "The Wolf, when he hath devoured as much as "ſerves for his neceſſary nouriſhment, gives over. "But whole Nights and Days, put together, are "not enough for Men to feaſt and riot. All brute "Beaſts have their yearly ſet-times of Coition, "and then leave; but Man is continually tran-"ſported with Luſt. How can I, *Hippocrates*, but "laugh at him that laments the loſs of his Goods? "And eſpecially, if without regard to Dan-"gers, he travels over Precipices, and on the

"Sea;

"Sea; how can I forbear to laugh exceedingly? "Shall I not laugh at him, who drowns a Ship by la- "ding it with rich Merchandize, and then blames "the Sea for drowning it? If I seem wrongfully "to laugh at these, there is at least in them some- "thing that deserves to be lamented. These "stand not in need of the Physick or Medi- "cins of your Predecessor *Æsculapius*, who, pre- "serving Men, was himself requited with Thunder. "Do you not see, that I also am partly guilty of "Madness, who, to enquire into the causes of Mad- "ness, dissect these several living Creatures, "whereas indeed I ought to search for it in "Man himself? Do you not see, that the whole "World is full of Inhumanity, stuffed as it were "with infinite hatred against Man himself? All Man "is from his very Birth a disease: when first born "he is useless, and sues for relief from others; when "he grows up, foolish, wanting Instruction; at full "growth, wicked; in his decaying Age, misera- "ble, toyling throughout all his time imprudent- "ly; such is he from the Womb. Some being of "furious angry dispositions are continually enga- "ged in Broyls, others in Adulteries and Rapes, "others in Drunkenness; others in coveting the "Goods of their Neighbours; others in con- "suming their own; so that if the Walls of all "Houses were transparent, we should behold "some Eating, others Vomiting, others Wrong- "fully Beaten, others mixing Poisons, others "Conspiring, others Casting Accounts, others "Rejoycing, others Weeping, others Plotting a- "gainst their Friends, others Raving mad with "Ambition. Some actions there are more remote "within the Soul, some young, some old, suing, "denying, poor, rich, starved, luxurious, sordid, "impriton'd, murther'd, buried, despising what "they Enjoy, and aiming at what they have not; "impudent, niggardly, insatiate, vain-glorious; "some setting their minds on Horses, others on "Men, others on Dogs, others on Stone or Wood; "some affect Embassy, others the Command "of Armies, others sacred Rites; some wear "Crowns, others Armour; some fight at Sea, "others at Land, others Till the Ground, some "plead in the Forum, others act on the Theater, "every one is severally employ'd, some affect "Pleasure and Intemperateness, others Rest and "Idleness, how then can I but laugh at their Lives? "And it is to be feared, that your Art of Phy- "sick will nothing please them, for Intemperance "makes them froward, and they esteem Wis- "dom madness, and I doubt much that many "things in your Art are openly reproached, either "through Envy or Ingratitude; for the Sick, as- "soon as they are cured, ascribe the Cause either "to the Gods, or to Chance; and many are of "such a disposition, as to hate those that have ob- "liged them, and can hardly refrain from being "angry if they need their help; many also, being "themselves ignorant, prefer Ignorance before "Science; Fools give their Suffrages, neither "will the Sick commend, nor they who are of the "same Art give their approbation, through En- "vy. And it cannot be, but that you must have suf- "fered wrong in this kind, for I know very well, "that you have been often treated unworthily, "and reproached by Malice and Envy.

There is no knowledge nor attestation of Truth. In saying this, he smiled and seemed to put on a Divine Look, casting off that which he had before. "*Then I*, Excellent *Democritus*, I shall "carry back with me to *Cos* the great Gifts of "your Hospitality, full of your wise Instructions. "I shall return to proclaim your Praises, for that "you have made enquiry into human nature and "understood it; I shall go away cured in Mind, "it being requisite that I take care for the Cure "of the Bodies of others. To morrow, and after- "wards, we shall meet here again.

Which said, I arose, and he readily accompani- ed me. A man came to him, from whence I know not, to whom he delivered his books. When I came to the *Abderites*, who all this while stayed for me; "Men of *Abdera*, *said I*, I return "you many Thanks for the Message you sent me, "for I have seen *Democritus*, the wisest of Men, "who only is able to reduce men to sound under- "standing. This (*Damagetus*) is all, which I had "to relate unto you with joy, concerning *De- "mocritus*. Farewel.

This Account *Hippocrates* gives of *Democritus*; neither did their Acquaintance and Friendship end here, but continued after the departure of *Hippocrates* to *Cos*, as appears by the Correspon- dence of two Letters betwixt them. The first, from *Democritus* to *Hippocrates*, in these words.

You came to us, *Hippocrates*, as to give *Hellebore* to a mad Man, at the instigation of foolish Peo- ple, who think Study madness; I was at that time busied in writing concerning the Fabrick of the World, and the Poles and the Stars of Heaven, assoon as you understood the nature of these things, how excellently they are framed, and how far from madness, you commended my Employ- ment, and condemned Them as stupid and mad. All those things which pass to us through the Air by Images, and are seen in the World, and succeed one another, my Mind, making a scrutiny into these, hath clearly found out the Nature of them, and brought it to light, witness the Books that I have written. You ought not therefore, *Hippocra- tes*, to converse with such men, whose Minds are wavering and inconstant; For if, as those men desired, you had given me *Hellebore*, as being mad, you had, of Wise, made me Mad indeed, the Guilt whereof would have layn upon your Art; for *Hellebore*, administred to Sound Persons, clouds their Understanding, but to the Mad, it doth good. I believe, that if you had found me not writing, but lying down or walking, revolving things in my mind, sometimes laughing, and not minding such Friends as came to me, but wholly taken up with Contemplation of something, you would have inferred from what you beheld, that I was Mad. A Physitian therefore must not judge of the Affections or Passions by the sight only, but by the Actions themselves, and observe, whether they are in their Beginning, or in the Middle, or in the End, and to consider the difference of Time and Age, before he undertake to cure the Body; for by all these, the Disease will be discovered.

To

*To which* Hippocrates *return'd this Answer.*

In the art of Physick, that which happens Successefully, men for the most part commend not, but commonly ascribe to the Gods; but if any thing happen amiss in it, so as that the Patient dyeth, they let the Gods alone, and accuse the Physician. And indeed, I perceive, that I gain more blame than credit by my art; for, tho' now very old, I have not yet arrived at the height of Medicine, neither did *Æsculapius* himself who invented it, as appears in that he many times dissents from those who have written hereupon. Your Letter to us condemnes the administration of Hellebore; I was sent for indeed, *Democritus*, to cure a Madman, neither at that time could I guess in what condition you were: But assoon as I had conversed with you, I knew you to be far from madness, and worthy of all respect. I acknowledged you to be the most excellent Interpreter of Nature, and the World; and judged those that sent for me, mad, and to stand in need of Physick. But since this Accident hath begot an acquaintance betwixt us, you will not do amiss in writing oftner, and in communicating your works to me. I have sent you a Treatise concerning the use of *Hellebore*. Farewel.

Hence it is, that some held *Hippocrates* to have been the Disciple of *Democritus*, as *Cornelius Celsus* affirms; indeed, that *Hippocrates* learnt much Philosophy of him, as well by his Discourse, as communication of his Writings, is manifest from the precedent *Epistles*.

## CHAP. VII.

### His Death.

(a) Cic. de fin. (a) de div. nat. (a) Laert.

HE (*a*) lived to a great age; *Laertius* saith, *above* 100. *years*; *Phlegon* and *Lucian* more expressely, 104. (*b*) *Censorinus*, 108. (*c*) *Hipparchus*, 109. *Laertius* saith, *he died of age*; *Phlegon*, for want of food; the manner related thus by *Hermippus*. Being very old and drawing nigh his end, his Sister was extreamly troubled, that he should dye within the time of the Festival of *Ceres*, but he bad her be of good comfort, and bring him every day some hot Bread, which holding to his nose he prolonged his life, till the days of the Festival were past, which were three: and then without any pain gave up the Ghost, (*d*) and was buried at the publick Charge.

(d) Laert.

## CHAP. VIII.

### His Writings.

(a) Laert.

THrasyllus, (*a*) who disposed the Writings of *Plato* according to Tetralogies, digested also those of *Democritus* into order, thus;

### ETHICK.

*Pythagoras.*
*Of the Disposition of a wise man.*
*Of the things that are in the Intellect*, to which perhaps the *Abderites* alluded in their Epistle to *Hippocrates*.
*Tritogenia*; That all human things consist of Three.
*Of Goodness*, or *Virtue*.
*Amalthæa's Horn.*
*Of Tranquillity of mind.*
*Commentaries*, or, of *Houses*, *Oeconomical*.
*Felicity* (Θυίῃ) not extent in the time of *Thrasyllus*.

### PHYSICK.

*The great Diacosmus* consisting of 12 Books, *Theophrastus* ascribes it to *Leucippus*: but *Antisthenes* affirms, *Democritus* recited it in publick as his own; and as His is it cited by *Epicurus*, in his Epistle to *Herodotus*. To this Work it was perhaps, that *Cicero* alludes, saying, *What shall I say of* Democritus? *Whom can we compare with him, who durst begin thus*, Hæc loquor de Universis? *He excepts nothing, whereof he professeth not to treat; for what can be beyond all things?*

*The little* Diacosmus.
*Of the Planets*; in which Treatise he proved that there are more than Seven.
*Of Nature*, the first.
*Of the Nature of Man*, or *of flesh*; the second, dedicated to *Hippocrates*.
*Of the Mind. Of the Senses*; these two, some put together, and entitle, *Of the soul.*
*Of Sapours.*
*Of Colours.*
*Of Different figures* (ἰνσμοὶ.)
*Of the reciprocation of figures.* This and the fore-going Treatise, perhaps tended to shew the nature of Qualities, which according to him arise from the various disposure of Atoms, according to their particular figures.
Κεφαλήρια, or *Of the mixtures of the things afore-said.*
*Of an Image*, or *Of fore-sight.*
*Of Pestilences* (*Gassendus* reads περὶ λογικῶν, *Of Logicks.*) Canon. 1, 2, 3.
*Of Effluxions.*

### EXTRAORDINARY.

*Celestial Causes.*
*Aerial Causes.*
(*b*) *Plain superficial Causes*; perhaps, what things are made of plaine Atoms; for that which immediately followeth, is opposite to it.
(*b*) Magnenus. *planæ causæ*; *See, his interpretation. pag.* 16.
*Causes of Fire and things in Fire*; these consist of round Atoms.
*Causes of Sounds.*
*Causes of Seeds and Plants and Fruits.*
*Causes of Animals, three.*
*Mixt Causes.*
*Of Stone.*

### MATHEMATICK.

Περὶ διαζωσῆς γνώμης, or, *of the contact of a Circle and a Sphear.*
*Of Geometry.*
*Geometrick.*
*Numbers.*
*Of surd lines, and solid*, two.
Ἐκπτώσματα.
*The great year*, or, *Astronomy.*

*Parapegma*; *Salmasius* makes this all one with the other, reading, *The great year, or Parapegma of Astronomy. Parapegma* is a Table describing the rising and setting of the Stars, equinoxes, solstices, and the like.

*The contention or examination of the Hour-glass.*
*Uranography.*
*Geography.*
*Pology.*
*Allinography.*

*MUSICK.*

*Of Rythms and Harmony.*
*Of Poetry.*
*Of the neatness of Verses.*
*Of sweet-sounding, and harsh-sounding Letters.*
*Of* Homer, *or of right-versifying and speaking.*
*Of Songs.*
*Of Words, a Dictionary.*

*MECHANICK*, or concerning *ARTS.*

*Prognostick.*
*Of Diet*, or *Dietetick*, or a *Medicinal rule.*
*Causes of things seasonable and unseasonable.*
*Of Agriculture*, or *Geometrick.*
*Of Painting.*
*Tactick*, and, *of Armes.*

*To which some, out of his Commentaries, annexe these;*

*Of the sacred Letters in Babylon*; to which perhaps (*c*) *Clemens Alexandrinus* alludes. *Democritus*, saith he, writ Babylonian Moral discourses, for he is said to have inserted into his own Writing the sense of the Pillar of *Acicarus.*

(*c*) Strom. 1.

*Of the things that are at* Meroe.
*A voyage on the Ocean.*
*Of History.*
*A discourse of Chaldaea.*
*A discourse of Phrygia.*
*Of the Feaver and Cough in sickness.*

*Chernica, or Problems.* Perhaps the same which (*d*) *Pliny* terms *Chirocineta*, (*e*) *Vitruvius*, *Chirotoniton*, adding, that *in it he made use of a ring, and drew the figures of the experiments in wax and red-lead.*

(*d*) 24. 17.
(*e*) 9. 3. 5.

*The rest* (saith *Thrasyllus*) *that go under his name, are partly made out of his Writings, partly acknowledged to be the Writings of other men.* Of which kind perhaps is his Book *of the virtue of herbs*, mentioned by (*f*) *Pliny*, and that of (*g*) *Commentaries upon Apollonides, Caprideues, and Dardanus*, from whence he argues *Democritus* to have been skilful in Magick: But (*h*) *Agellius* much blames him for ascribing to *Democritus* such *prodigious fables.*

(*f*) 25. 3.
(*g*) 30. 1.
(*h*) 10. 12.

(*i*) *Aristoxenus* affirms, that *Plato* had an intent to have burned all the writings of *Democritus*, and for that end had made a Collection of a great many of them: But was diverted by *Amyclas* and *Clinias*, Pythagoreans.

(*i*) Laert.

## CHAP. IX.

*Physick.*

HE compleated the *Eleatick* Sect and brought it to Perfection, insisting upon and improving the Principles of those that went before, but most particularly those of *LEUCIPPUS*. His Assertions these.

### SECT. I.

*Of the Principles of things, Atoms and Vacuum.*

THe Principles of all things are Atoms (*a*) (solid, (*b*) full) and Vacuum, (*c*) whereof one is *Ens*, the other *Non-ens*. (*d*) *Ens* is full and solid; *Non-ens* is Vacuous and rare; *Ens* participates no more of Being than doth *Non-ens*, nor of Body more than doth Vacuum. These are the causes and matter of beings.

(*a*) Arist. Ph. 1. 6.
(*b*) Cic. Ac. 4. Arist. Met. 4.
(*c*) Arist. de cit:
(*d*) Arist. Met. 14.

(*e*) Bodies must either consist of Atoms, or of nothing; for if every body be divisible, let us suppose it actually divided, and then there will remain either Atoms or nothing; but of nothing, nothing is made, and nothing goes away into nothing.

(*e*) Arist.

(*f*) Neither of these Principles is made of the other, but the common body it self is the Principle of all things, differing only in magnitude and the figure of its parts.

(*f*) Arist. Ph. 3. 4.

They are both infinite: Atoms (*g*) *in number*, Vacuum in Magnitude.

(*g*) Arist. de gen. & cor. 1. & de cœlo, 4. Laert.

(*h*) The Properties of Atoms are two, Figure and Magnitude; (*i*) as to Figure, they are infinite; (*k*) Angulous, not-angulous, strait, round; (*l*) some are smooth, others rugged; some pointed, some crooked, and as it were hooked.

(*h*) Arist. de gen. & cor. 1.
(*i*) Laert.
(*k*) Arist. Ph. 1. 6.
(*l*) Cic. nat. deor.

As to their Magnitude, (*m*) *they are by reason of their littleness, invisible*; (*n*) *by reason of their solidity, indivisible*, (*o*) *impassible, and unalterable.*

(*m*) Plin. l. Plut.
(*n*) Cic. de fund. 1.
(*o*) Plut. ph. 1. 15. Laert. Magnes interpret of the vulgar Elements, fire, water, earth, pag. 41. 42. ing as an exposition of Democritus, Atoms, mutabilis species figuras, and proves it out Aristotle, as strongly, p. 42.

To these two Properties ascribed to Atoms by *Democritus*, (*p*) *Plutarch* saith, that *Epicurus* added a third, weight; but (*q*) *Aristotle* affirms, that Democritus *held one Atome to be heavier than another, according as it exceeded that other in bigness.*

(*p*) Plut.
(*q*) De gen. 1. 8.

Of all other qualities they are destitute; having neither native whiteness, nor blackness, nor sweetness, nor bitterness, nor heat, nor cold, nor any other quality,

(*r*) *Cicero*, who calls *Democritus* the Inventor and Author of this assertion of Atoms, elsewhere ascribes it to *Leucippus*, adding, that (*s*) Democritus *herein followed him, but was far more full in the rest.* But neither seems it to have been invented by *Leucippus*, for *Posidonius* the Stoick ascribes it to *Moschus* a Phœnician; whom *Strabo* affirms to have lived before the Trojan War. But perhaps the Eleatick Philosophers derived it from *Pythagoras*: of which opinion (*t*) *Aristotle* seems to be; *In some manner*, saith he, *they make all things that are, Numbers, and to consist of Numbers: for tho' they say it not expressely, yet this is their meaning.* Whence perhaps it is, that (*u*) *Automedon* gives them the Pythagorick denomination, *Monads.*

(*r*) de fato.
(*s*) Acad. 4.
(*t*) de Cœlo 4.
(*u*) Asclep.

SECT II.

## SECT. II.

*Of the motion of Atoms in Vacuum, whereby all things are made.*

THese (*a*) Atoms, or first bodies, are continually moved in the infinite (*b*) Vacuum, in which there is neither high, nor low, nor middle, nor last, nor extream.

This motion had not any beginning, but was from all eternity.

(*c*) *This motion is but of one kind, oblique.* Herein *Epicurus* dissents from him, asserting a two-fold motion, direct and declining.

The little bodies being carried in this region or space are entangled with one another, or hit against one another, or rebound, or separate, or associate with one another, by whose concussions and complications all things are made. Thus (*d*) whatsoever is or is made, is or is made by natural weights or motions.

Thus (*e*) *all things are done by a necessity, the rapid motion of the Atoms (which he called necessity) being the cause of the production of all things.* (*f*) This necessity is fate, and justice, and the providence which made the World, which is no other than (*g*) the resistence, lation, and percussion of matter.

## SECT. III.

*Of the Generation, Corruption, Alteration, and Qualities of compounds.*

THe (*a*) *Elements* (as we said) *or Principles of all things are two, Full and Vacuum. One is* Ens, *the other* non Ens; *the full and solid is* Ens, *the Vacuous and rare* non Ens. Ens *participates not more of being than* non Ens, *nor a body more than Vacuum. These are the causes and matter of beings.*

"And (*b*) as they who assert a subject to be "one, in substance, various as to its affections, "make rare and dense to be the Principles of "those affections; in like manner, they (*Leucippus and Democritus*) affirm, that the differences "are the causes of all the rest. These differences "they hold to be three, figure, order, and position; for they say that *Ens* differs only ῥυσμῷ "and διαθιγῇ and τροπῇ. ῥυσμὸς is figure, διαθιγὴ "order, τροπὴ position: A. and N. differ in figure; A. N. and N. A. in order; Z. and N. in "position.

"Thus (*c*) they suppose figures of which "they make Alteration and Generation: Generation and Corruption, by Congregation and "Segregation (*of Atoms*;) Alteration, by Order "and Position.

"Now (*d*) forasmuch as they conceived, "that what is apparent to sense is true, seeing "that apparent things are contrary to one another, and infinite in number, they conceived "that there are infinite figures, (*of Atoms*) so "that by several transmutations of the compound, the same thing seemeth contrary to another, and so another thing; and by immixture of some small thing to be transumtated, "and to appear quite different; and being transmutated, one thing to appear to be quite "another thing; for a Comedy, and Tragedy, "are made of the same Letters.

"*Hence is it, that* (*e*) Plutarch *and others* "*affirm*, he did reject Qualities, asserting that co- (*e*) *adv. Colot. lib.* 1.
"lour is νόμῳ, white νόμῳ, sweet νόμῳ, hot νόμῳ, cold νόμῳ, and all other qualities; νόμῳ εἶναι *is here commonly expounded* (*after the usual acception of the word*) lege esse, to be by Law. (*f*) *Magnenus* (*f*) *Democr. revivi. pag.* "*interprets it*, that by a certain Law and pro- 436.
"portion betwixt the Agent and Patient, the same "thing is sweet to one, which is bitter to an- "other. (*g*) *The learned* Gassendus, *Metaphorical-* (*g*) *Anim. adv.* "*ly, that* as the justice, injustice, decency, inde- *pag.* 231.
"cency, laudability, culpability, &c. of human "actions, depend on the constitutions of Laws; "so the whiteness, blackness, sweetness, bitter- "ness, heat, cold, &c. of natural things, de- "pend on the various positions and ordinations "of Atoms. Whence you see, (*saith he*) how "in *Laertius* is to be understood, Ἀρχὰς εἶδ τὴν ὅλων ἀτόμους καὶ κένον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα νενομίδαι,

That Atoms and Vacuum are the Prin- "ciples of all things, *cætera omnia lege sanciri.* "*Thus* Gassendus.

But νόμῳ, which, (as *Suidas* saith) is πολυώνυμος λέξις, *a word of various significations*, seems here to be taken in opposition to ἐτῇ, in which sense *Laertius* explicates it by νενομίδαι, (from whence it seems derived) and νενομίδαι by δοξάζεδαι, for so perhaps should the Text be distinguish'd, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα νενομίδαι δοξάζεδαι, *cætera omnia censeri vel existimari*, the later being only a Gloss and exposition of the former. So that in the sense of *Democritus*, (who affected a particular use of words, as appears by ῥυσμὸς, διαθιγὴ, τροπὴ, σὺν &c.) νόμῳ is no other than δόξῃ. Thus he seems to have opposed ἐτῇ and νόμῳ, as the Schools *Ens reale* and *rationis*; as if he should say, there is nothing really existent but Atoms and Vacuum, all things else are onely *quoad nos*, viz. *in opinion*. This may be further confirmed by a noted place of (*h*) *Galen*, who dilates upon it in this manner. (*h*) *lib.* 1. *de Elem. cap.* 1.

"The first Element of things is void of Qua- "lity, having not in its own nature whiteness, "nor blackness, nor sweetness, nor bitterness, "nor heat, nor cold, nor any other quality; "colour is (νόμῳ) in opinion; bitterness is in "opinion, sweetness is in opinion; but Atoms "and Vacuum are indeed, saith *Democritus*, con- "ceiving that all sensible Qualities are made by "the concussion of Atoms, according as they "are, as to us, who have the sense of them; but "that nothing is by nature white, or yellow, or "red, or bitter, or sweet. By νόμῳ he means "as it were νομισῇ, by opinion, and as to us; not "in the nature of the things themselves, for that "on the other side he calls ἐτῇ, making the word "from ἐτὸν, which signifies True. The whole "meaning of the sentence is this, Men do opi- "nionate or think (νομίζοσι) that white is "something, and black, and sweet, and bitter; "but truly and indeed (ἐν) One, and (μηδὲν) "Nothing are all. All Atoms are little bodies, "void of Qualities, Vacuum is a region or space "in which all these bodies are carried upwards "and downwards everlastingly, or are intangled "within one another, or hit against one ano- "ther, or rebound, or separate from, or asso- "ciate with one another, whereby they make all "com-

"compounds, and especially our bodies, and "their passions and senses. *Hitherto* Galen.

(*i*) *Aristot. gen.* 1. 7. *Democritus* (*i*) alone, contrary to the rest of the Philosophers, Asserted, that the Agent and the Patient must be the same and like; for he conceived it not to be possible, that things different and divers can suffer from one another: and if any different things act upon one another, this happens to them not as being different, but as they have something in them, that is the same.

(*k*) *Arist. de cœlo.* 4. 6. Broad (*k*) iron swims on the Water, because the atoms of heat, which ascend out of the Water, uphold the broad atoms even of things that are weighty; but the narrow slide down, because these which resist them are but few. But then, objects he, This will be done much more in the Aire; whereto he Answers, that the *Soum* is not carried one way, meaning by *Soum* the motion of bodies ascending.

(*l*) *Arist. de gen. & cor.* 1. 5. Things (*l*) become liquid or concrete, by conversion, or contaction.

## SECT. IV.

### *Of the World.*

(*a*) *Plut. plac.* 2. 1. (*b*) *Cic. Acad. quæst.* 4. (*c*) *Laert.* (*d*) *Plut.* (*e*) *Stob. Phys.* 1. 18. (*f*) *Stob. Phys.* 1. 21. (*g*) *Laert.* (*h*) *What Magnenus means, I know not, when he saith, page.* 42. *aeris ab eo non fit mentio tanquam de Elemento propriè dicto; non which the whole second Chapter of his first disputation is founded.*

THERE (*a*) are infinite Worlds in the infinite space, according to all circumstances; (*b*) some of which are not only like to one another, but every way so perfectly and absolutely equal, that there is no difference betwixt them. (*c*) These all are generated and corrupted.

The World is (*d*) inanimate (*e*) round, (*f*) compassed about with a coat as it were, interwoven with Stars.

(*g*) *The atoms being* (as we said) *rapidly carryed through the Universe; by this means all things were made, Fire, Water,* (*h*) *Aire, Earth.*

To (*i*) the fire, He and *Leucippus* ascribed a round figure; but Air, Water, and the rest, he distinguished only by greatness and littleness, because their nature is the Pan-spermia, or universal dissemination of the Elements of atoms.

(*i*) *Aristot. de cœlo.* 3. 4.

## SECT. V.

### *Of the Heavens.*

(*a*) *Laert.* (*b*) *Plac.* 2. 20. THE (*a*) Sun and Moon consist of smooth little bodies which are carried round. (*b*) *Plutarch* affirms, He held, with *Anaxagoras*, that the Sun is a burning plate or stone; *Laertius* adds, *he said of Anaxagoras, that those opinions which he delivered concerning the Sun and Moon were not his, but more ancient, and that he had stolen them.*

(*c*) *Cic. de finib.* 1. (*c*) He conceived the Sun to be very big: for, adds *Cicero*, he was exceeding skilful in Geometry.

(*d*) *Plut. plac.* 2. 25. (*d*) The Moon is a fiery Firmament; containing Plains, Mountains, Valleys.

(*e*) *Plut. plac.* 2. 15. (*e*) He placed the Stars in this order; first, the fixed Stars, then the Planets, then the Sun, *Lucifer*, and the Moon.

(*f*) *Plut. plac.* 2. 16. (*f*) All the Stars move from East to West.

(*g*) *Lucret.* (*g*) Those which are neerest to the Earth are less apt to be carried about by the rapid circumvolution of Heaven. Whence, it comes to pass, that the Sun and the inferiour Stars, especially the Moon, move much slower than the rest.

(*b*) *Arist. Meteor.* 1. 6. (*b*) He held, as *Anaxagoras*, that Comets are the co-apparition of Planets, which coming neer one another seem to be all one.

## SECT. VI.

### *Of Aire, Earth, Water.*

(*a*) *Senec. quæst.* 55. WHen (*a*) in a narrow Vacuum there are many little bodies, there followeth wind; and contrary, the Air is quiet and calm, when in a great Vacuum there are but a few little bodies. For, as in a Market-place or street, as long as the people are but few, they walk without any trouble, but when they run into some narrow place, they justle and quarrel with one another; so in this space which encompasseth us, when many bodies crowd into one place they must necessarily justle one another, and be thrust forward and driven back, and entangled, and squeezed, of which is made the Wind, when they which contested yield, and, having been long toss'd up and down uncertainly, shrink; but when a few bodies stir up and down in a large space, they can neither drive, nor be driven impetuously.

(*b*) *Plut.* (*b*) The Earth at first wandred up and down, as well by reason of its smalness as lightness; but in time growing thick and heavy, it setled down immoveable. (*c*) *Arist. Cœl.* 2. 13. (*d*) *Plut.* Its breadth is the cause of its setledness, for (*d*)) [*it is of the fashion of a dish, hollow in the midst, and* ] it divides not but covers the Air which is beneath it, as appeares in broad bodies, which are not easily stirred by the Winds, but stick fast; Thus doth the Earth, by reason of its breath, to the Air; and the Air, not having a place whereto it might go, sufficient to receive it, resteth underneath, as water within vessels which cover it. That the Air can uphold a great weight, they demonstrate many ways.

(*e*) *Plut.* 3. 12. (*e*) Now by reason that this Air is weaker towards the South, the Earth, as it groweth and increaseth bendeth to that side: for the Northern parts are intemperate, the Southern temperate, whence they produce more and fairer fruits.

(*f*) *Plut.* 3. 15. (*g*) *Arist. Meteor.* 2. 1. (*f*) He imputed the cause of Earth-quakes to water: for (*g*) the Earth being full of water, and receiving to it much rain-water, this causeth the Earth-quake: For, there coming more, because it is not able to receive it, forcing its caverns it maketh it shake, and being dryed and attracted into empty places from the more full, in its passage causeth that motion.

(*b*) *Arist.* (*b*) The Sea continually decreaseth and at last will dry up.

(*i*) *Plut.* 3. 1. (*i*) The over-flowing of *Nilus* is caused by the melting and diffusion of the Snow in the Northern parts under the Summer-Tropick; from the vapours Clouds are condensed, which being driven towards the South and to *Ægypt* by the Etesian winds, they are dissolved into great and vehement showers, wherewith are filled as well the Lakes, as the River *Nilus*.

SECT. VII.

## SECT. VII.

### *Of the generation of living Creatures.*

MEN (*a*) were first generated of water and mud; from which opinion *Epicurus* little differs.

(*b*) The distinction of sexes, Male and Female, is made (*c*) in the womb, not by reason of heat or cold, but according to that party of the Two, whose seed proceeding from the part which distinguisheth Male and Female, is predominant; or of that party whose seed first takes up the place.

(*d*) The Infant in the womb is nourished at the mouth, wherefore assoon as it is born, it layeth the mouth to the dug.

## SECT. VIII.

### *Of the Soul.*

*Democritus* (*a*) held, That the Soul is a kind of Fire and Heat; (*b*) for there being infinite Figures of Atoms, he saith, the round make Fire, and the Soul, because that Figure is most capable to permeate through the Universe, and to move the Rest, the Soul it self being moved also. Thus he and *Leucippus* held, the Soul to be that which giveth motion to living Creatures. Hence it comes to pass, that Respiration is the bound of Life, for when that which encompasseth the Bodies compresseth them, and queezeth out those Figures which give motion to living Creatures, forasmuch as they never rest, there is a relief by the coming in of others of the same kind through Respiration; for this hinders those which are in the Animals from being squeezed out, they driving forward together that which compresseth and fastneth. All Animals [*breath and they*] live as long as they can do thus.

(*d*) The Soul is corruptible and perisheth with the Body.

(*e*) The Soul hath Two parts; the rational, seated in the Breast; the irrational, diffused through the whole Body: but (*f*) the Soul and Mind are all one.

(*g*) There are more than five Senses of irrational Animals, God, and Wise Men.

(*h*) Sensation and Intellection are made by the insinuation of Images from without, which flow from solid Bodies and certain Figures. (*i*) So the Image in a Looking-glass is made also.

He conceived, as *Aristotle* saith, that *all Sensibles are Tangibles*, that all Sensation is caused by a touch or stroak upon the Organ; and further affirmed, that (*k*) *Whiteness is Smoothness*, [the Light being reflected from a smooth Superficies upon the Eye, exhibits a white colour.] (*l*) *Blackness is roughness*; [the same light reflected from a rough Superficies, exhibits Blackness;] In like manner (*m*) *He referred Sapours to Figure*; (*n*) the round Atoms, and such as are of a bulk suitable [to the contexture of the Organ] make a *sweet* Sapor; the great, a *sower*; the Multangulous and Nothing-round, a *harsh*; the Acute, Conical, Crooked, not slender nor round, a *sharp*; the Round slender, angulous, crooked, an *acrimonious*; the Angulous distorted equicrural, a *salt*; the Round, light distorted small, a *bitter*; the slender round small, a fat or *luscious*.

(*o*) The Mind is the same with the Soul, consisting of smooth little Bodies. (*p*) The *Hegemonick* is seated in the whole Head. (*q*) Cogitation is made by incurrence of Images; (*r*) so also are Dreams.

## SECT. IX.

### *Of the Gods.*

*Democritus* (saith (*a*) *Cicero*,) in my opinion, wavers, and seems uncertain, concerning the nature of the Gods; for sometimes he conceives, that there are Images indued with Divinity in the Universe; sometimes he calleth the Principles and Minds in the same Universe, God; sometimes animate Images, which use either to profit or to harm us; sometimes certain vast Images, so great, that they extrinsecally embrace the whole World.

(*b*) *Sextus Empiricus* delivers his Opinion, thus: There are certain Images which come to Men, some of which do good, others hurt; whence he wisheth, that he might light upon good Images; these are large and extraordinary vast, not easily perishable, nor absolutely unperishable. They foretel events to Men by Discourse and Speech, the Antients having received an Impression of these in their Fantasies, from thence imagined that there is a God, whereas besides these there is no God, or a Nature that is not subject to Dissolution.

(*c*) He approved the Pre-sension of future things, that is Divination; and Conceived, that (*d*) the Ancients did wisely institute, that the entrails of sacrificed Victims should be looked into; from the Constitution and Colour whereof may be perceived signs of Health or Pestilence; sometimes also what Death or Plenty shall follow.

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## CHAP. X.

### *Ethick.*

HE (*a*) asserted, the chief end or good to be εὐθυμία: not placing it in Pleasure, as some have misunderstood him; but in a serene, secure state of Mind, not distracted with any fear, or superstition, or any other passion.

Of his Moral Sentences these have been preserved by *Stobæus* and others.

*'Tis easie wickedness to circumvent:* Ser. 2.
*For whilst on gain alone it is intent,*
*It blindly strayes, and any way is bent.*

It is easy to praise what we ought not, and to blame; but both are signs of a depraved disposition. Ibid.

Wisdom not admiring any thing, merits all things, being most Honourable. Ser. 3.

The bounds of profitable and unprofitable are, pleasant and unpleasant. Ibid.

It is the work of Prudence to prevent an injury; of Indolence, when done, not to revenge it. Ibid.

There ariseth a great delight from beholding good actions. Ibid.

From

(*a*) Censor. de die. nat. 4.
(*b*) Arist. de gen. anim. 5. 1.
(*c*) Perhaps reading μετ' ἐκ.
(*d*) Plut. plac. 5. 6.
(*a*) Arist. de anim. 1, 2.
(*b*) Perhaps reading ἀπ' ἀτόμων δὲ σφαιρικῶν τὸ πῦρ. See Arist. de resp. & cor. c. 4. cited above in the first Section.
(*c*) Arist. de sens. cap. 2.
(*d*) Plut. plac. 7.
(*e*) Plut. plac. 4.
(*f*) Arist. de an. 1, 2.
(*g*) Plut. plac. 20.
(*h*) Plut. plac. 8.
(*i*) Plut. plac. 4. 4.
(*k*) Arist. de sens. cap. 4.
(*l*) Arist. loc. cit.
(*m*) Arist. loc. cit.
(*n*) Theophrast.
(*o*) Laert.
(*p*) Plut. plac. 4. 5.
(*q*) Cic. de fini. 1. Plut. plac. 4. 8.
(*r*) Plut. plac. 5. 2.
(*a*) de nat. deor. 1.
(*b*) adv. Mathem.
(*c*) Cic. de divinat. 1.
(*d*) Cic. de divinat.
(*a*) Laert.
Ser. 2.
Ibid.
Ser. 3.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Ser. 4. From good things ariſe ill to Men, if they know not how to manage or bear the good.

Ser. 5. To yield to the Law, the Magiſtrate, and a wiſe Perſon, is decent.

Ibid. Temperance augments things that are pleaſant, and maketh the pleaſure it ſelf greater.

Ser. 6. Sleeps in the day ſignify either diſtemper of the Body, or grief of the Mind, or ſloth, or dulneſs.

Ibid. Coition is a ſhort Apoplexy; One man is ſtruck out of another.

Ser. 7. Not he only is valiant who vanquiſheth his Enemy, but he alſo who ſubdueth Pleaſure; yet ſome there are, who Command Cities, and are ſlaves to Women.

Ser. 9. It is good not only to do no harm, but not ſo much as to will it.

Ser. 10. Where ill Actions acquire Wealth, the Infamy is the greater.

Ibid. Hope of ill gain is the beginning of loſs.

Ser. 12. We ought to ſpeak Truth, where it is beſt.

Ser. 17. It is better to blame our own faults, than thoſe of others.

Ibid. Freedom of Speech is proper to generoſity, but the difference of occaſions render it dangerous.

Ser. 14. To praiſe good things is good, but to praiſe the ill is proper to a counterfeit deceitful Soul.

Ser. 17. He is well diſpoſed who grieves not for what he hath not, and rejoyceth for what he hath.

Ibid. Of pleaſant things, thoſe which we have moſt ſeldom, delight moſt.

Ibid. If a Man exceeds moderation, the ſweeteſt things prove the moſt bitter.

Ibid. He is valiant who vanquiſheth, not Enemies only, but pleaſures.

Ibid. They who indulge to the pleaſures of the Belly, conſuming the time in eating, drinking, or wantonneſs; in all theſe there are ſhort pleaſures, which laſt as long as they are eating and drinking, but many griefs: For they are in a continual deſire of theſe things, and when they have obtain'd them, the pleaſure paſſeth away, and there is nothing in them but a momentany titillation; the pleaſure is ſhort, and they ſoon need the ſame again.

Ser. 20. To reſiſt Anger is difficult, but to vanquiſh it is proper to an underſtanding Perſon.

Ser. 22. He who contends with his Superior, ends in Infamy.

Ser. 28. Wicked Men, after they have eſcaped the danger, keep not the Oaths which they had made in their extremity.

Ser. 29. More are made good by Exercitation, than by Nature.

Ibid. All Labours are ſweeter than Reſt, when Men obtain that for which they labour; but if a Man be fruſtrate of his deſignes, there is one remedy, if all things are alike troubleſome and difficult.

Ser. 31. Neither ſay nor do ill, though alone; learn to ſtand more in awe of thy ſelf than of others.

Ser. 36. It is a defrauding of others, To deſire to ſpeak all, and to hear nothing.

Ser. 37. A Man muſt either be good, or ſeem ſuch.

Ibid. They whoſe Manners are orderly, their Life is orderly.

Ibid. A good Man cares not for the reproofs of ill Men.

Ibid. The Laws would not have prohibited every Man from living according to his own Will, if one were not injurious to another; for Envy cauſeth the beginning of Sedition.

Ser. 38. To live in forreign Countries teacheth Frugality; Maza, and a graſſy Bed are ſweet Cures of Hunger and Labour.

Ibid. Every Country is pervious to a wiſe Man; for the whole World is the Conntry of a wiſe Soul.

Ser. 41. The Law requires, that the Life of Man ſhould do good to others; this may be done if they will ſuffer, for it declares its own Virtue to the Obedient.

Ibid. Civil War hurts both Parties; the harm is equal to the Victor, and to the Vanquiſhed.

Ibid. By Concord, beſides other great things, War may be undertaken by Cities; without it, not.

Ser. 42. It is better for the Unwiſe to be Governed, than to Govern.

Ibid. It is Juſtice to do thoſe things which ought to be done; Injuſtice not to do them, but to decline them.

Ibid. As concerning the killing and not killing of Animals, the buſineſs ſtands thus: Thoſe who do, or would do injury, he who killeth is blameleſs; nay, ſuch ought rather to be killed, than not.

Ibid. We ought to kill all that do Injury and Injuſtices; and he who kills them ought to have, throughout the whole World, eſteem and priviledge of his Deſire, and Juſtice, and Courage, and Poſſeſſion.

Ibid. As it is written concerning Beaſts and Serpents, that are in enmity with us, ſo alſo in my Opinion may we do with Men. According to the Laws of our Country, an Enemy may be kill'd in any part of the World, where no Law forbiddeth it; but Law forbiddeth ſometimes, and they have ſacred Rites, Covenants, and Oaths.

Ibid. Any Man that either kills with his own hand, or cauſeth to be killed by Command or Vote, a Thief; is to be eſteemed innocent.

Ser. 43. It is a grievous thing to be ruled by a worſe Perſon.

Ser. 44. They who ſuffer Injuries are to be defended to the utmoſt, and not to be deſpiſed; for this is juſt and good the other, unjuſt and ill.

Ser. They who commit any thing deſerving Baniſhment, or Bonds, or any other puniſhment, ought not to acquitted, but condemned; if any Man ſhould acquit them either for Gain or Favour, he doth unjuſtly.

Ser. He hath the greateſt part of Juſtice and Virtue, who Honors thoſe that are Worthy.

Ser. Stand not more in awe of other Men than of thy Self, nor commit more offences, though no Man were to know it, than if all Men: Imprint this Rule in thy Mind; and do no ill.

Ser. Men are more mindful of Wrongs than of Benefits, and it is but juſt it ſhould be ſo; as he who reſtores a *Depoſitum*, deſerves no Commendation; but he who detains it, Blame and Puniſhment. The ſame caſe it is in a Ruler, who is choſen not to do ill but good.

Ser. 46. To be naturally fitted for Command, is proper to the moſt excellent Perſons.

Ser. 49. Boldneſs is the beginning of an Action, the end is guided by Fortune.

Make uſe of Servants, as of the parts of your own

own Body; appoint to each a several Office.

She that is belov'd, easily forgiveth the Offence of her Lover.

A Woman is sharper-witted for mischief than a Man.

To speak little becomes a Woman; plain Attire adorns her.

To obey a Woman is the greatest Ignominy to a Man.

I approve not the having of Children, for I see the troubles of them are many and great; the Comforts and Pleasures few and small.

A rich Man, in my opinion, shall do well to adopt the Son of some Friend; for, by this means, he may have such a one as he hath a mind to; for he may chuse where he pleaseth, and take such a one as may best agree with him. There is a great difference betwixt these two; he who Adopts a Son, hath the liberty to make choice out of many that are good, and will please him; he that Begets one, runs the hazard whether he will prove such, or no.

The begetting of Children seemeth to come from a most antient Institution, and instinct of Nature, as is manifest even from brute Beasts, who beget young ones, though without hopes of receiving any advantage by them; As soon as they are brought forth, they feed and bring them up, and are solicitous for them, even in the least things: and if they come to any hurt, they grieve at it. Such is the disposition of all Animals, how much more of Man, who hopes for a benefit from his Off-spring.

The excellency of Sheep consisteth in being fat; of Men, in being virtuous.

As of Wounds, the worst is that which Gangrenes; so, of the Diseases of the Mind, is insatiate Avarice.

A prudent use of Mony conduceth to the practice of liberality and relief of others, he that useth Mony foolishly, makes it the Prey of all Men.

To get Mony, is not ill; but to get it unjustly, is the worst of ills.

Poverty and Riches are the Names of Want and Sufficiency: He, who wants, ought not to be called Rich; nor He, who wants not, Poor.

If you desire many things, many things will seem but a few.

To desire little, makes Poverty equal with Riches.

Good things are hardly obtained by those that seek after them; the ill come without seeking.

We must consider that the Life of Man is brittle, and momentany, involved in many troubles.

He is happy who is chearful, though possessing little; he unhappy, who is troubled amidst much wealth.

He that will lead a secure quiet life, must not engage himself in many things, neither publick nor private; nor attempt any thing above his own Ability and Nature; but have such regard to himself, that he decline any exuberance of Fortune that is offer'd him, assuming no more than he is well able to bear; for the convenience of what we enjoy is more excellent than the largeness of it.

A publick calamity is greater than a private, for it affords no hope of relief. Ser. 102.

The hopes of Wise Men may come to pass, but those of Fools are impossible. Ser. 109.

The hopes of Fools are beyond reason. Ibid.

They who rejoyce in the misfortunes of their Neighbours know not that Fortune is common to all, and that they have not a Propriety in joy. Ser. 111.

Strength and Beauty are the Goods of the Body; Temperance and Prudence the Crown of old Age. Ser. 112.

It is certain, that the Old Man was once young, but whether the Young Man shall ever come to be Old, is uncertain. A good thing that is complete is better than that which is to come, it being uncertain. Ibid.

Old Age is a universal imperfection; it hath all things, and yet wants all things. Ser. 115.

Some Men, not understanding the nature of moral Dissolution, and being conscious of their own ill actions in Life, are, during the whole course of their Lives, miserably distracted with Fears, fancying and feigning to themselves many things that are false, as if they were to happen after death. Ser. 119.

(a) *His also was this saying,* (b) *Speech is the shadow of Action*;

(c) He held, that from publick Offices, and the favour of great Persons, accrue many Ornaments which Grace and set off this Life.

(d) He said, that Nature thrust down Truth, and hid her quite in the bottom.

(e) He said, that none can be a great Poet without Madness.

To his Moral Sentences may be added, what is related of him by (f) *Julian* the Emperor, That not being able by Discourse to comfort *Darius*, who was extremly afflicted at the death of his beautiful Wife, he promised him to restore her to Life, if he would supply him with such things as were requisite for performance thereof. *Darius* bad him not to spare any thing, which he thought might help him to bring it to pass: Soon after he came to *Darius* and told him, that he had furnished himself with all things, except only one which he could not get, but that He, who was King of all *Asia* might haply procure it with little difficulty. *Darius* demanding what it was, that no Man could get but the King himself; *Democritus* told him, that if he could write on her Tombe the Names of three Persons that have never grieved, she would return to Life. *Darius* perplexed hereat, there being no Man to whom some occasion of Grief hath not happened; *Democritus*, after his usual manner laughed, saying, Can you then, the most unreasonable of all Men, Weep with such confidence, as if you were the only Person that ever suffer'd affliction, and yet are not able to find out, through all the ages of Mankind, one Person that hath not received some particular Cross?

(a) *Laert.*
(b) *Magnenus* mistakes it for the Title of a Book; but the contrary is manifest from *Plutarch de ieduc. liberis.*
(c) *Plut. non posse suav. viv.*
(d) *Cic. Acad. quæst.* 4.
(e) *Cic. de divinat.* 1.
(f) *Epist.*

# PROTAGORAS.

## CHAP. I.

*His Country, Father, and the occasion upon which he studyed Philosophy.*

Laert. PRotagoras, was an Abderite, Son of *Artemon*; or as *Apollodorus* and *Dinon*, of *Meandrius*; but *Eupolis* saith, he was a *Teian*.

He was first a Porter, as *Epicurus* relates, and by that occasion came into favour with *Democritus*: Being young, saith *Agellius*, he was constrained, for his sustenance, to take upon him the Office of a Porter; and, from some places adjoyning carried burthens of Wood to *Abdera*, of which City he was. *Democritus*, who was also of the same City, a person eminent for his Virtue and Philosophy, going abroad into the fields, saw him coming nimbly along loaden with one of his usual burthens; and when he came neer him, observing that the Wood was neatly placed and handsomly bound up, spoke to him to rest himself a little; which he did, and *Democritus* in the mean time, took great notice of the bundle, that it was tyed up as it were Geometrically. He asked him, who put his Wood in that order, and he answering that it was he himself had done it, *Democritus* desired him to unty it, and put it into the same order again, which he did. *Democritus* admiring the ingenuity of a person wholly void of Learning; Young man, *saith he*, seeing you have the wit to know how to do well, there are better and greater things which you may do with me; and immediately carrying him home, kept and maintained him, and made him that which afterwards he was.

## CHAP. II.

*His Opinions, and Writings.*

Laert. HE first said, that every thing hath two reasons or arguments, one contrary to the other; which way of arguing he first used.

He began one of his Books thus; *Man is the χρημα των παντων, the measure of all things; of beings as they are, and of not beings as they are not.* By χρημα he means the criterie or κριτηριον of things; which is as much as to say, Man is the Criterie of all things, of Beings as they are, of not Beings as they are not. Hereupon he asserts the Phænomena's to be particular to every one.

He saith, That ayer is fluid, and being in perpetual fluxion, appositions are made instead of substractions; and the senses are transmutated and changed, according to the several ages and constitutions of the body.

He saith also, the reason (or powers) of all Phænomena's are subjected in Matter; so that Matter in it self, is all things which it appears unto all. But men at different times perceive things different, by reason of their different habits. He whose Constitution is sound, of the things which are in Matter, perceiveth those which are capable of appearing to such persons: They who are otherwise disposed, perceive the things which are capable of appearing to persons of a contrary Constitution. The same reason there is in the difference of ages, in sleeping and waking, and in all kinds of habits. Man therefore is the Criterie of things that are, for all things which appear to men, are; those which appear not to any man, are not.

He held, that the Soul is nothing more than the senses, as *Plato* in his *Theætetus* affirms, and that all things are true.

Another of his Books he began thus; *Of the Gods I know nothing, neither that they are, nor that they are not; for there are many things which hinder us from this knowledge, the blindness and shortness of humane life.* For the beginning of this Book he was banish'd by the *Athenians*, and his Books burnt in the open Market-place, after that they had been diligently exacted of all that had any of them, by the publick Cryer.

He was the first, that took a hundred Minæ for a gratuity. He, and *Prodicus* the *Teian*, got Mony by reciting Orations in publick.

He first defined the parts of time, and explained the power of opportunity, and instituted disputations by way of contest; and proposed sophisms to the disputants, slipping beside the sense, and playing upon the word, introducing the light, superficial, eristick way, whence *Timon* saith of him,

Protagoras, *well in contention read.*

He first abrogated the Socratick way of disputation, and first examined the argument of *Antisthenes*, whereby he endeavours to demonstrate, that it could not be contradicted, as *Plato* saith in his *Euthydemus*; and first produced Epicheirems against Positions.

He first divided an Oration into four parts, Request, Interrogation, Answer, Command: Some say into seven, Narration, Interrogation, Answer, Command, Enunciation, Request, Appellation; which parts he called the foundations of Orations. But, as *Alcidamus*, four; Affirmation, Negation, Interrogation, Appellation.

He first recited his discourse concerning the Gods (the beginning whereof we formerly mentioned) at *Athens*, in the House of *Euripides*, or, as some say, of *Megaclides*: Others say, in the *Lyceum*, and that *Euthagoras*, his Disciple, Son of *Theodotus* spoke it for him. He was accused by *Pythodorus* Son of *Polycritus*, one of the 400 Senators; but *Aristotle* saith, that *Evathlus* accused him.

His

His Writings which are now extant, saith *Laertius*, are these;

*The Eristick Art.*
*Of Wrastling.*
*Of Mathematicks.*
*Of Politicks.*
*Of Ambition.*
*Of Vertues.*
*Of Settlement of Government.*
*Of the things in the Inferi.*
*Of the things that are done amiss by men.*
*Preceptory.*
*Judgement upon reward.*
*Antilogicks.* 2.

These were His Books. *Plato* wrote a Dialogue and intituled it by his Name.

## CHAP. III.

### *His Death.*

*Philochorus* relates, that, as he was sayling to *Sicily*, the Ship wherein he went was cast away; and this, he saith, is confirmed by *Euripides* in his Ixion. Others relate, that he dyed by the way, having attained to ninety years; *Apollodorus* saith, to 70. and that he had been a Sophist, forty years; and that he flourish'd about the 74th. Olympiad. *Laertius* hath this Epigram upon him. *Laert.*

*And thee,* Protagoras, *flying, they say,*
*From* Athens, *death did seize on by the way;*
*Thou might'st escape from* Pallas *and her Town,*
*But* Pluto *would not lose what was his own.*

# ANAXARCHUS.

*Anaxarchus* was an Abderite; he heard *Diomenes* of *Smyrna*; or, as others, *Metrodorus* of *Chios*, who said, he did not know so much as this, that he knew nothing; *Metrodorus*, as some say, heard *Nessus* a *Chian*; as others, *Democritus*. *Anaxarchus* lived with *Alexander*, and flourish'd about the 110th. Olympiad, and was a great Enemy to *Nicocreon* King of *Cyprus*; insomuch that *Alexander* at a Feast demanding what he thought of the entertainment, he Answered; All things, great King, are very Magnificent; only there is wanting the head of some Satrapa, reflecting upon *Nicocreon*. After the King's death, *Nicocreon* bearing this Injury in mind laid hold of *Anaxarchus*, (who against his will was cast upon the shore of *Cyprus*) and caused him to be put into a Mortar, and pounded with iron Pestles: whilst he, despising the pain, often repeated this celebrious Speech, *Pound the case of* Anaxarchus, Anaxarchus *himself you shall not.* Hereupon, the Tyrant commanding them to cut out his Tongue, he bit it off, and spit it in his Face.

He, from his Apathy and the Tranquillity of his life, had the attribute of *fortunate* bestow'd on him. He likewise had an excellent faculty in reducing others to Moderation; as he reformed *Alexander*, who would conceit himself a God by pointing to his finger when it bled, and saying, That is Blood, and not

*The juyce that from immortal Gods doth flow.*

Yet *Plutarch* relates, that *Alexander* himself said this to his friends.

Another time, *Anaxarchus* drinking to him, pointed to the Cup, saying,

*A mortal hand one of the Gods shall wound.*

When *Alexander* came near *Babylon*, the *Chaldeans* dissuaded him from entring the City, affirming, that if he did, it would be fatal to him; whereupon he passed by and went to *Bursia*, a City on the other side of *Euphrates*. But *Anaxarchus* and other Greeks perswaded him by Philosophical reasons to contemn the prediction of the Magi, as false and uncertain; whose advice he following brought back his Army to *Babylon*, where he died.

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

## The Twelfth part, *Containing the* SCEPTICK *Sect.*

PYRRHO.

### CHAP. I.

*His Country, Parentage, Time, Masters.*

OUT of *Elia* there sprung another Sect, no less Eminent than the former, its Author was (*a*) *Pyrrho*, an *Elian*. His Father, as *Diocles* affirms, was named *Pistarchus*, of obscure and mean Quality, for such (*b*) *Antigonus* relates *Pyrrho* himself at first to have been; his Sister *Philista*, a Midwife.

(*a*) *Laert.*

(*b*) *Laert. Suidas*

*Suidas* saith, He was in the time of *Philip* King of *Macedon*, about the 101 Olympiad: But this seems rather to have reference to the time of his Birth, than to that wherein he flourished; for *Anaxarchus* (his Master) was Contemporary with *Alexander* the Son of *Philip*, and is, by *Laertius*, said to have flourished in the 110*th* Olympiad; for which Reason perhaps it is, that *Suidas* adds, (*And thence forward.*) (c) He was first (as *Apollodorus* relates) a Painter; *Aristocles* saith, An ill one; But (d) *Antigonus* affirms, That in the *Gymnasium* at *Elis*, was preserved a very good piece of his doing, representing Torch-bearers.

(e) Afterwards (saith *Apollodorus*) he applied himself to Philosophy, *Aristocles* saith, he lighted upon some Writings of *Democritus*. *Alexander* in his Successions, That he heard *Bryso* Son of *Stilpo*, whom *Suidas* terms *Bryso*, adding, He was Disciple to *Clinomachus*, a Dialectick, Contemporary with *Stilpo*.

(f) Next he addicted himself to *Alexander*, Disciple of *Metrodorus* the Chian, whose Master was *Metrodorus* the *Abderite*.

(g) Afterwards he heard *Anaxarchus*, [the *Abderite*] whom he followed every where, insomuch as he conversed with the *Gymnosophists* in *India*, and with the *Magi*.

## CHAP. II.

### *His Institution of a* Sect.

'HE seemeth (saith (a) *Ascanius* the *Abderite*) to have found out a noble way of 'Philosophizing, introducing Incomprehension, 'and the way of Suspension. For he asserted 'nothing, neither honest nor dishonest, just nor 'unjust, and so of every thing. That there is 'nothing indeed such, but that Men do all things 'by Law and Custom; That in every thing, *this* 'is not rather than *that*.

(b) This was called the *Zetetick* Philosophy, from its continual enquiry after Truth; *Sceptick*, from its continual Inspection, and never finding; *Ephectick*, from the Affection which follows upon this Inquisition, Suspension; *Aporetick*, from doubting of all dogmatical Opinions; (c) *Pyrrhonian*, from *Pyrrho*. But *Theodosius*, in his *Sceptick* Summary, saith, That the *Sceptick* Philosophy ought not to be called *Pyrrhonian:* For if the motion of another's Intellect be incomprehensible to us, we cannot know how *Pyrrho* was affected; and, not knowing it, we cannot be called *Pyrrhonians*. Besides, neither was *Pyrrho* the first that found out *Scepticism*, *to assert no Doctrine*. It should rather be called, *like the course of* Pyrrho. Thus *Theodosius*.

On the other side, *Numenius*, (and he *onely*, as *Laertius* observes) affirmed, *That* Pyrrho *dogmatizeth*; But of this more hereafter.

## CHAP. III.

### *His Manner of Life.*

CONformable (a) hereunto was his manner of Life; he shunned nothing, nor took any heed, but went straight on upon every thing; Chariots, if it so hapned, Precipices, Dogs, and the like, not turning out of the way, nor having any regard to Sense, being saved, as *Antigonus* saith, by his Friends that followed him. But *Æneſidemus* affirms, That though he discoursed Philosophically upon Suspension, yet all his Actions were not inconsiderate.

(b) He used to walk forth solitary, seldom shewing himself to those of his Family. This he did upon hearing a certain *Indian* reproach *Anaxarchus* for teaching, That no Man but himself was Good, and yet in the mean time he frequented the Courts of Princes.

(c) He was always in the same state, insomuch that if any Man in the midst of his Discourse went away, he nevertheless continu'd his Discourse till he had ended it. Though in his Youth he were fickle, he took many Journies, never telling any whither he went, and chose such Company as he pleased.

(d) *Anaxarchus*, falling into a Ditch, he went on, not offering to help him; which when some blamed, *Anaxarchus* himself commended his Indifference, and want of Compunction.

(e) Being found talking to himself, and demanded, Why he did so? *I study*, saith he, *how to be good.*

(f) In Arguments he was slighted by none, forasmuch at he had an extraordinary way of speaking to the Question; with which he took *Nausiphanes*, being a very young Man. He said, that his Affection ought to be *Pyrrhonian*, his Words his own. *Epicurus*, often admiring the Conversation of *Pyrrho*, continually question'd him concerning himself; so much was he honor'd by his Country, as that they made him chief Priest, and, for his sake, made a Decree of Immunity for all Philosophers. He had many that imitated his Unconcernedness, whence *Timon* saith of him in his *Pytho*, and *Silli*;

*How learnd'st thou (aged* Pyrrho*) to untye*
*The slavish bands of empty Sophistry?*
*The Air of* Greece *thou mind'st not, nor to know*
*Whence things are made, and into what they go.*

And again in *Indalmis*,

Pyrrho, *I long to be inform'd by Thee,*
*How Thou, a Man, liv'dst like a Deity?*

*Diocles* (cited by *Laertius*) affirms the *Athenians* made him free of their City, for killing *Cotis* the *Thracian*; But this, as the learned *Causabon* hath observed, seems to be a mistake, occasion'd by the nearness of the Names; for it was *Pytho*, Disciple to *Plato*, who slew *Cotis*, as is manifest from *Plutarch*.

(g) *Eratosthenes* relates, That he lived piously with his Sister, and often carried to Market, Birds; or, as it hapned, Pigs to sell, and managed his Houshold Affairs with the like indifference, insomuch as he is reported to have washed a Sow.

(h) But as once *Philista*, his Sister, was sacrificing, (who being disappointed by a Friend, who promised to give her things for the Sacrifice, *Pyrrho* himself was constrained to buy them) he

(a) Laert.
(b) Laert.
(c) Laert.
(d) Laert.
(e) Laert.
(f) Suid.
(g) Laert.
(a) Laert.
(b) Laert.
(c) Reading διάφωνος. Sext. Emp. Hypoc. l. 3.
(a) Laert.
(b) Laert.
(c) Laert.
(d) Laert.
(e) Laert.
(f) Laert.
(g) Laert.
(h) *Aristocles*, it is mention'd also by *Laertius*.

he was very angry, and fell out with her for it; whereupon one of his Friends saying, "That "his Actions were not answerable to his Dis-"course, nor such as his profession of Apathy, "or Indifference, required; He answer'd, *Indif-"ference is not to be shewn towards Women.*

(i) *Aristocles, and Laertius.* (i) On a time, a Dog flying upon him, he was troubled at it, [and got to a Tree] for which they who were by deriding him, and cavilling at it, he said, It is hard to put off "Man quite, yet we must first strive as far as "possible, with action against things, and if not "so with reason.

(k) *Laert.* (k) They say, that, upon occasion of some Wound, he underwent corrosive Medicines, Incision and Cauterising. His greatness of Courage is attested by *Timon*.

*Philo* the *Athenian*, who was his Disciple, saith, He mentioned *Democritus* with greatest respect, and next him *Homer* with much admiration, continually saying,

*Just like the race of Leaves, is that of Men*;

and for that he compared Men to Flies, and Birds. He used also to repeat these Verses,

*But dye, my Friend, why should'st thou thus lament?*
Patroclus *dy'd too, who Thee far out-went*,

And all things whatsoever that declar'd the Inconstancy, Vanity, and Childishness of Mankind.

*Posidonius* relates of him, That, being at Sea in a Storm, his Companions dejected, he, with a quiet mind, shewed them a Pig feeding in the Ship, saying, *A wise Man ought to be setled in such Undisturbance.*

## CHAP. IV.

### *His Death, and Disciples.*

HE (a) dyed 90 years old, (b) leaving nothing behind him in writing. (a) Laert. (b) Laert.

(c) Of his Disciples, some were very eminent, of which number were these. (c) Laert.

*Eurylochus*, of whom is related this Extravagance: On a time he was so far transported with Fury, that, snatching up the Spit with the Meat upon it, he pursued the Cook into the *Forum*: And at *Elis*, being weary of those that disputed with him, he threw off his Cloke, and swam cross the River, *Alpheus*. He was a great Enemy to the *Sophists*, as *Timon* saith.

*Philo*, [an *Athenian*] who frequently talked to himself; whence *Timon* of him,

*Or private, talking with himself alone,*
*Not minding Glory, or Contention.*

*Hecataus* of *Abdera*.

*Timon*, the *Phliasian*, who writ the *Silli*.

*Nausiphanes*, a *Teian*, whom, they say, *Epicurus* heard.

These all were called *Pyrrhonians* from their Master; *Aporeticks*, and *Scepticks*, and *Ephecticks*, and *Zeteticks*, from their (as it were) Doctrine.

THE

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

TIMON.

## CHAP. I.

### *His Life.*

APollonides the *Nicean*, in his First Book of Commentaries upon the *Silli*, Dedicated to *Tiberius Cæsar*, saith, that the Father of *Timon* was named *Timarchus*, by Country a *Phliasian*; and that *Timon*, whilst in his Youth, taught to Dance; but afterward changing his Mind, he took

took a Journey to *Megara*, to see *Stilpo*, and having had converſation awhile with him, returned home and Married. Then he went to *Elis* to ſee *Pyrrho*, taking his Wife along with him, who, during the time of his being there, bare him Sons; the Elder he called *Xanthus*, whom he taught Phyſick, and left him his Succeſſor in the courſe of Life he himſelf had led.

*Sotion* in his Tenth Book affirms, he was very eminent. Wanting neceſſary Proviſions, he went to the *Helleſpont*, and *Propontis*, and profeſſing Philoſophy at *Chalcedon*, was exceedingly honour'd. From thence having now gotten a good ſtock, he went to *Athens*, and lived there to his end, except that once he made a ſhort journy to *Thebes*. He was known to *Antigonus* the King, and *Ptolomæus Philadelphus*, as he himſelf atteſts in his Iambicks.

He was, as *Antigonus* ſaith, a lover of Muſick, and gave himſelf much diverſion from Philoſophical Studies, as appears by his Writings.

He took much delight in Gardens and Solitude, as *Antigonus* reports; whereupon *Hieronymus* the Peripatetick ſaid, That *as the* Scythians *ſhoot both when they flye and when they purſue ſo of Philoſophers, ſome get Diſciples by running after them, others by running from them*, as Timon.

He was of an acute apprehenſion, and quick in deriding, a great lover of Writing, very skilful in Compoſing Poetical Fables, and Drama's. In his Tragedies he had much of *Homer*, and of *Alexander*. When Servants or Dogs diſturb'd him, he gave over, aiming above all things at a quiet life.

*Aratus* demanding of him, by what means he might procure an uncorrupt Copy of *Homer*? he anſwer'd, If you can light upon old Copies, not thoſe that have been lately corrected.

His own Poems were thrown up and down confuſedly, and many times torn; inſomuch that when *Zopyrus* the Orator read ſomething of his, he made it up out of his own Memory, and when he came to the midſt, there was a great gap, which he was ignorant of.

He was ſo indifferent, that he obſerved no time for Dinner.

Seeing *Arceſilaus* walking amongſt Flatterers, He ſaid, What do you here, where we Freemen are?

Of thoſe who judge by the Senſes, and Mind, he continually ſaid, *Attagas* and *Numenius* are met.

(b) Laert. (b) He often uſed to ſport after this manner; To one that admired all things, *Why then*, ſaith he, *do'ſt thou not admire, that we, being but three, have four Eyes*; for he, and *Dioſcorides* his Diſciple, had each of them but one Eye, [ (c) whence he uſed to call himſelf *Cyclops* ] the other to whom he ſpoke had two. And on a time, being demanded by *Arceſilaus*, Why he came from *Thebes* to *Athens*, he ſaid, *That I might laugh to ſee you flye*. But though in his *Silli* he abuſeth *Arceſilaus*, yet in his Treatiſe entituled, *The funeral Banquet of* Arceſilaus, he commends him.

(c) Laert.

## CHAP. II.

### *His Death and Writings.*

HE Died almoſt 90 years of age, as *Antigonus*, and *Sotion* in his 11th Book affirm. Laert.

*There was another* Timon, *the Man-hater*; of whom, ſee *Lucian* and *Suidas*.

He writ *Poems*, and *Verſes*, and *Tragedies*, and *Satyrs*, *Comical Drama's* 30. and *Tragical* 60. and *Silli* and *Cinadi*. There were alſo ſeveral Writings of his in *Proſe*, amounting to 20000 Paragraphs.

Of his *Silli* there are Three Books, in which, as a Sceptick, he reproached and derided all the Dogmatiſts: The *Firſt* written in his own Perſon, in a continued way; The *Second* and *Third* by way of Dialogue. He queſtioned *Xenophanes* the *Colophonean* about every thing, who anſwers to all. In the *Second*, He Treats of the more Ancient; In the *Third*, of the Later Philoſophers, whence ſome entitle it the *Epilogus*. The *Firſt* Book contains the ſame things, only delivered in another way, the Poem having but One Perſon, It begins thus;

*Now buſie Sophiſts all, come follow me.*

## CHAP. III.

### *Succeſſion of the School.*

ALthough, as Diſciples of *Timon*, are mentioned by *Laertius*, *Xanthus* his Son, and *Dioſcorides*; and, by *Suidas*, *Pyrrho* a *Phliaſian*, Son of *Timarchus*; yet (a) *Monodotus* affirms, (a) Laer.
"That *Timon* had no Succeſſor, but that the Inſtitution was intermitted, until *Ptolomy* a *Cyrenean* renew'd it; whoſe Auditors (according to *Hippobotus* and *Sotion*) were *Dioſcorides* a *Cyprian*, *Niolochus* a *Rhodian*, *Euphranor* a *Seleucian*, and *Praylus* of *Troas*, who was of ſo ſetled a conſtancy, that being accuſed of Treaſon, he choſe rather to undergo the puniſhment unjuſtly, than to plead to his Countrymen.

"*Eubulus* an *Alexandrian*, heard *Euphranor*; him, "*Ptolomy*; him, *Sarpedon* and *Heraclides*, Diſciple "to *Heraclides* was *Æneſidemus* a *Gnoſſian*, [ who "flouriſhed, as *Ariſtocles* ſaith, at *Alexandria* ] he "wrote eight Books of *Pyrrhonian* Diſcourſes. "Him, *Zeuxippus* of *Polis* heard; Him, *Zeuxis*, ſir"named [illegible]; him, *Antiochus*, a *Laodicean* of *Lycus*; him, *Menodotus* of *Nicomedia*, an "*Empirical* Phyſician, and *Theodas* of *Laodicea*. "Diſciple to *Menodotus* was *Herodotus* of *Tarſis*, "Son of *Arieus*; to *Herodotus*, *Sextus Empiricus*, *whoſe Ten Books of Sceptick Philoſophy are extant, and other excellent Treatiſes*. [ This *Sextus* may probably be eſteemed that *Sextus Chæroneuſis*, Nephew of *Plutarch*, whom *Marcus Aurelius* the Emperor ſo honoured, that he admitted him to ſit in Judicature with him. ] "Diſciple to "*Sextus* was *Saturninus* a *Cytheneæan*, who was "alſo Sirnamed *Empiricus*. Hitherto *Laertius*.

*Having*

'HAving ſpoken of the Author of the *Sceptick* Philoſophy, and its Succeſſion, our 'Method leads us to ſet forth the Doctrine it-'ſelf; which being already excellently handled 'by *Sextus Empiricus*, I think it would be more 'for the Reader's advantage, to have it deli-'vered in his Words than in my own. The 'Treatiſe, I confeſs, may ſeem long; and in-'deed, I had ſome Thoughts of abridging it: 'But when I conſidered, how difficult it were 'ſo to prune it, as to pleaſe all Perſons, and 'that itſelf was intended but as a Summary; 'and that if it had been my caſe to have recei-'ved it from ſome other hand, I ſhould rather 'have deſired to have it entire, of what length 'ſoever, than mangled even by a skilful Artiſt: 'I hope I ſhall be excuſed, if I ſo deal with the 'Reader, as I ſhould deſire to have been dealt 'withall my ſelf. Neither can I ſuppoſe it will 'be unpleaſant to thoſe, who have been conver-'ſant in the more ſevere and knotty Diſquiſiti-'ons of the Schools; for the Author is Learned 'and Acute, even beyond the Subject he han-'dles, and hath many paſſages of the Antients, 'which are not elſewhere to be had. But if any, 'who have accuſtomed themſelves only to light-'er Studies, ſhall think it tedious; it is no great 'pains to turn over ſome Leaves, and ſee if 'they can find ſomething elſe more accepta-'ble.

THE

# A SUMMARY OF SCEPTICISM.

*Sexti Empirici, Pyrrhoneæ Hypotypoſes.*

## THE FIRST BOOK.

### CHAP. I.

*The Three Differences of Philoſophers in General.*

IT is likely, that they who ſeek, muſt either find, or *deny that they have or can find*, or *perſevere in the enquiry*. Hence (it may be) ſome of thoſe who profeſs Philoſophy, declare, they have found the Truth; others hold it impoſſible to be found; others ſtill enquire. They who ſuppoſe they have found it, are called *Dogmatiſts*; ſuch are the *Peripateticks*, the *Epicureans*, the *Stoicks* and others; they who think it incomprehenſible are *Clitomachus*, *Carneades*, and other *Academicks*; they who ſtill enquire are the *Scepticks*. So as there ſeemeth to be three kinds of Philoſophy, *Dogmatick*, *Academick*, *Sceptick*. The two firſt we leave to others, intending a ſummary of the *Sceptick*: profeſſing before hand, that we are not ſure any thing we ſay is abſolutely ſo, as we affirm; but we ſhall plainly diſcourſe on every thing, as it appeareth to us for the preſent.

### CHAP. II.

*The Parts of* Scepticiſm.

OF *Sceptick* Philoſophy there are two parts, *General* and *Special*; The General is that, wherein we explain the Character of *Scepticiſm*, declaring (1) the Signification of it; (2) the Principles; (3) the Reaſons; (4) the Criterie, (or Inſtrument of Judication;) (5) the End; (6) the Common places of Suſpenſion; (7) how the Sceptical Phraſes are to be underſtood; (8) the difference of *Scepticiſm* from thoſe Philoſophies, that are moſt like it.

The *Special* is that, wherein we contradict every part of that which is called Philoſophy. But firſt of the *General*.

### CHAP. III.

*The Names of* Scepticiſm.

THE *Sceptick* Inſtitution is called alſo *Zetetick*, (*Inquiſitive*) from the Act of Enquiring; *Ephectick*, (*Suſpenſive*) from the Affection rais'd by enquiry after things; *Aporetick*, (*Dubitative*) either (as ſome ſay) from doubting of, and ſeeking after all things, or from being in doubt whether to aſſent or deny; *Pyrrhonian*, in as much as *Pyrrho* delivered it to us more ſubſtantially and clearly than thoſe before him.

### CHAP. IV.

*What* Scepticiſm *is.*

SCepticiſm *is a faculty oppoſing* Phænomena's (Appearances) *and Intelligibles, all manner of ways; whereby we proceed through the Æquivalence of contrary Things and Speeches, firſt to Suſpenſion, then to Indiſturbance.*

We call it a *Faculty*, from the power thereof; by *Phænomena's* we underſtand Senſibles, which we oppoſe to Intelligibles. Theſe words, *all manner of ways*, may be referred to Faculty, taking the word Faculty, (or Power) ſimply. (*a*) It may likewiſe be applyed to the oppoſition betwixt *Phænomena's* and Intelligibles, ſince we oppoſe them ſeveral ways, *Phænomena's* to *Phænomena's*, or Intelligibles to Intelligibles, or One to the Other. Wherefore, to include all Oppoſitions, we ſay, *all manner of ways*. Or, all manner of ways, of *Phænomena's* and Intelligibles not enquiring how *Phænomena's* ſeem, or how Intelligibles are underſtood, but taking them ſimply. By *contrary Speeches*, we mean not only Affirmation and Negation, but ſimply thoſe which are Repugnant. *Æquivalence* we call an equality as to Belief or Unbelief; ſo as neither of the repugnant Speeches is preferred as more credible than the other. *Suſpenſion* is a ſettlement of the Intellect, whereby we neither affirm nor deny any thing. *Indiſturbance* is a compoſure and tranquillity of Mind: how Indiſturbance is induced by Suſpenſion, we ſhall diſcourſe when we come to ſpeak of the End.

A *Pyrrhonian* Philoſopher is wholly addicted to the *Sceptick* Inſtitution; for he is ſuch an one as participates of this Faculty.

(*a*) Καὶ ... M. S. ... read ...

CHAP.

## CHAP. V.

### *The Principles of* Scepticism.

THe final Cauſe ( *End* or *Aim* ) of *Scepticiſm* we hold to be, Hope of *Indiſturbance*: for Man's Mind being troubled at the unſetledneſs in things, and doubting what to aſſent unto, enquireth what is true and what falſe, that by determination thereof it may be quiet. But the chief ground of *Scepticiſm*, is, *that to every Reaſon there is an oppoſite Reaſon equivalent*, which makes us forbear to dogmatize.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Whether the* Sceptick *dogmatizeth, and hath a Sect, and treats of Phyſick.*

WE ſay, *The Sceptick doth not dogmatize*: Not underſtanding *Dogma* as ſome do in the general acception, an *aſſent to any thing* (for the *Sceptick* aſſenteth to thoſe Affections [ or Impreſſions ] which are neceſſarily induced by Phantaſie, as ( being hot or cold ) he will not ſay, *I think I am not heated or cool'd*; ) but we ſay, he doth not dogmatize in their ſenſe who take *Dogma*, for an *Aſſent to any of thoſe non-manifeſt things which are enquired into by Sciences*. For a *Pyrrhonian* Philoſopher aſſents to nothing that is not manifeſt; neither doth he dogmatize when he pronounceth the *Sceptick* Phraſes concerning things not manifeſt, as, *Nothing rather*, or, *I aſſert nothing*, or any of the reſt; of which hereafter. For he who dogmatizeth, aſſerteth the thing, which he is ſaid to dogmatize, to be ſuch; but a *Sceptick* uſeth theſe expreſſions not as poſitive, for he conceiveth that this Propoſition, *All things are falſe*, ( amongſt the reſt ) declareth it ſelf alſo to be falſe; in like manthis, *Nothing is true*; ſo this, *Nothing rather*, ( amongſt others ) implies itſelf is nothing rather to be credited; ſo as ( together with the reſt ) it circumſcribeth it ſelf. The ſame we hold concerning the reſt of the *Sceptick* Phraſes. Now if he who dogmatizeth, aſſerteth that which he dogmatizeth to be ſuch; but the *Sceptick* delivers his expreſſions in ſuch manner as they may be circumſcribed by themſelves, he cannot be ſaid to dogmatize. Moreover, in theſe Expreſſions he ſpeaketh that which appeareth ſo to him, and declareth how he is affected without engaging his Opinion, ( or Judgment ) but aſcertaining nothing concerning external objects.

The ſame courſe we obſerve, being demanded *Whether the* Sceptick *hath a Sect*; If a Man underſtand *Sect*, to be an inclination to many Dogma's or Tenents, which have a mutual conſequence, and likewiſe *Phænomena's*, and take *Dogma* to be an aſſent to ſomething not manifeſt; we ſay he hath not a *Sect*. But taking *Sect* to be an Inſtitution, which, according to the *Phænomenon*, adhereth to ſome kind of Reaſon, that Reaſon ſhewing how to live rightly ( meaning rightly, not only according to Virtue, but more ſimply, and tending to Suſpenſion of Aſſent, ) we ſay, he hath a *Sect*; for we follow ſome certain reaſon according to the *Phænomenon*, which ſheweth how to live according to the Rites, Laws, and Inſtitutes of our Country, and our own Affections.

The like we ſay to thoſe who enquire, *Whether the* Sceptick *treats of Phyſick*; as to Aſſention grounded on a firm belief of any Phyſical dogm, we have nothing to do with Phyſick: But, as to equal oppoſition of all Speeches, even in Phyſick, we obtain Indiſturbance, and thus alſo we deliver the *Logick* and *Ethick* parts of that with is called Philoſophy.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Whether the* Scepticks *take away* Phænomena's.

THey who ſay, *the Scepticks take away* Phænomena's, ſeem not to underſtand what we have ſaid: For we ſubvert not thoſe Patheticks in Phantaſy, which force us againſt our Wills to an Aſſent, ( as we ſaid before, ) Such are *Phænomena's*; For, when we enquire whether the Subject be ſuch as it appears, we grant that it appears; but we enquire (not of the *Phænomenon*, but) of that which is ſaid concerning the *Phænomenon*. For inſtance, Honey ſeemeth to us to be Sweet; this we grant, for we find it ſuch to our Senſe; but whether Sweet come within the reach of Reaſon, we doubt: this is not the *Phænomenon*, but that which is ſaid concerning the *Phænomenon*. Moreover, when we raiſe queſtions concerning the *Phænomenon*, we endeavour not to ſubvert the *Phænomena's* (theſe we preſuppoſe) but only to diſcover the Temerity of the Dogmatiſts. For if Reaſon be ſo fallacious, that it almoſt takes away *Phænomena's* from our Eyes, how can we but miſtruſt it in things not manifeſt, rather then precipitately follow it.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *The Criterie of* Scepticiſm.

THat we acquieſce in *Phænomena's*, is manifeſt from what we ſay concerning the Criterie of the *Sceptick* Inſtitution. *Criterie* is underſtood two ways; *One is*, that whereby we believe a Thing to be, or not be, ( of this hereafter, when we come to refel the Opinions of others concerning it; ) the *other* is of Action, whereby we judge in the courſe of Life what things are to be done, what not; this laſt is that, of which we now ſpeak. We ſay the Criterie of *Scepticiſm* is the *Phænomenon*; ſo call we Phantaſie in power; for when it proceeds to Perſwaſion and coactive Paſſion, it is not queſtionable. As to the appearance, whether the ſubject be ſuch or ſuch, perhaps none doubteth; but whether it be ſuch as it appeareth, is queſtioned. Thus acquieſcing in *Phænomena's*, we live ( without engaging Opinions or Judgments, ) according to the ordinary courſe of life, in regard we cannot be free from acting [as we may from aſſenting.]

This courſe of Life ſeems to be four-fold; converſant partly in *natural Inſtruction*, partly in the *Impulſion of Paſſions*, partly in *giving Laws and Cuſtoms*, partly in *teaching Arts*. In *Natural Inſtruction*, by which we are naturally endued with Senſe, and

Intellect; in *Impulſion of Paſſions*, as Hunger leads us to meat, Thirſt to drink; *in giving Laws and Cuſtoms*, by which we learn that to live Vertuouſly is Good, to live Vicioufly, ill; in *teaching Arts*, by which we are not idle in thoſe Arts which we receive. All this we ſay, without engaging our Opinion (or Judgment.)

## CHAP. IX.

### *The End of* Scepticiſm.

IT follows that we treat of the *End* of *Scepticiſm*. The End is, *That for which all things are acted or comtemplated, but it ſelf is not for any other*; or, *the laſt of things appetible*. We ſay that the End of the *Sceptick* is ἀταραξία, *Indiſturbance*, in whatſoever belongs to Opinion, and μετριοπάθεια *Moderation*, in whatſoever belongs to Compulſion. For beginning to ſtudy Philoſophy, that he may diſcern and comprehend which Phantaſies are True, which Falſe, and by that means not be diſquieted, he lights upon an equivalent Contrariety, of which not being able to judge, he ſuſpends; and whilſt he is accidentally in this Suſpence, there follows it an Indiſturbance as to things Opinionative: For he who is of Opinion there is ſomething Good or Bad in its own nature, is continually diſturbed; when thoſe things which ſeem to him good, are not preſent, he imagineth himſelf (*a*) tormented with things Ill in their own nature, and purſueth that he conceives to be Good; which having obtained, he falleth into more Troubles. For being unreaſonably and immoderatly tranſported, and fearing a change, he uſeth all endeavour that he may not loſe thoſe things which he conceives Good. Whereas he who defines nothing concerning Things naturally Good or Bad, neither flyeth nor purſueth any thing eagerly, ſo that he remains undiſturbed.

(*a*) Perhaps πεπλανῆσθαι

Thus it happens to the *Sceptick*, as to *Apelles* the Painter, who having drawn a Horſe, and trying to Paint his Fome, it ſucceded ſo ill, that in Deſpair he threw the Spunge, wherewith he uſed to blot out Colours, at the Picture; which lighting upon the place, made an exact repreſentation of Fome. In like manner, the *Scepticks* hoped to obtain Indiſturbance by judging of the Unſetledneſs in *Phænomena's* and Intelligibles; which not being able to do, they ſuſpended, and whil'ſt they were in Suſpence, as it were accidentally, Indiſturbance overtook them, as a Shadow follows the Body.

Yet we conceive not the *Sceptick* to be abſolutely free from trouble; we grant, he is troubled by external Impulſions, he ſuffers Cold, Thirſt, and the like. But in theſe, the ordinary ſort of men are doubly Affected, firſt with the Paſſions themſelves; and again, no leſs that theſe things are naturally ill: whereas the *Sceptick*, taking away the opinion that they are naturally ill, undergoes them more moderately. Hence we ſay, that the *Sceptick's* end is, in Opinionatives, Indiſturbance; in Impulſives, Moderation; to which ſome eminent *Scepticks* add, *Suſpenſion in diſquiſitives*.

## CHAP. X.

### *The general Ways (or Places,) of* Scepticiſm.

IN Diſturbance following Suſpenſion, it is requiſite that we declare how we attain Suſpenſion.

It ariſeth, (to ſpeak generally) from the oppoſition of things; we oppoſe either *Phænomena's* to *Phænomena's*, or *Intelligibles* to *Intelligibles*, or the former to the later. *Phænomena's* to *Phænomena's*, as when we ſay, the ſame Tower ſeemeth afar off, round, near, ſquare: *Intelligibles* to *Intelligibles*, as when to him, who from the order of the Celeſtial Bodies, argues, there is a Providence, we oppoſe, that Good Men are often Unfortunate; Bad Men, Fortunate, and thence infer, there is no Providence: *Intelligibles* to *Phænomena's*, as *Anaxagoras*, to *Snow is white*, oppoſed that *water is Snow concrete*; but Water is black, therefore Snow is black.

Again, we ſometimes oppoſe things *Preſent* to the *Preſent*, as thoſe we laſt inſtanced; ſometimes the *Preſent* to the *Paſt*, or the *Future*, as when an Argument is propoſed, which we are not able to reſolve, we ſay; 'As before the Author of the 'Sect, to which you addict your ſelf, was born, 'the reaſon thereof did not ſeem ſound, and yet 'the thing was the ſame in nature; ſo it is likely, 'that a Reaſon (or Argument) contrary to this 'which you have alledged, may be ſubſiſtent in 'Nature, and not yet appear to us; wherefore 'we ought not to aſſent to any Argument, how 'convincing ſoever it ſeems.

To ſhew theſe Oppoſitions more exactly, I will lay down the Common places by which Suſpenſion is collected, not aſſerting any thing of their Number or Power; for it is poſſible, they may be of no force, or more in Number than we reckon.

## CHAP. XI.

### *The ten Common places of Suſpenſion.*

THE ancient *Scepticks* have delivered ten Moods, whence Suſpenſion ſeems to be collected, which they call alſo *Reaſons* and (*a*) *Places*. They are theſe; the Firſt, from the *variety of living Creatures*; the Second, from the *difference of Men*; the Third, from the *difference of the Organs of ſenſe*; the Fourth, from *Circumſtances*; the Fifth, from *Poſitions, and Diſtances, and Places*; the Sixth, from *Commiſſions*; the Seventh, from *the quantities and conſtitutions of Subjects*; the Eighth, from *Relations*; the Ninth, from *rare Accidents*; the Tenth, from *Inſtitutions, Cuſtoms, Laws, Fabulous Perſwaſions, and Dogmatical Opinions*.

(*a*) Reading perhaps τρόπους for ſo Latius, γράφει δὲ τρόπους τούτους.

This is the Order which we lay down; but there are three Moods which comprehend the reſt; Firſt, from the thing *judging*; Secondly, from the thing *judged*; Thirdly, from *both*. Under that of the thing judging, are comprehended the firſt *four*, the thing judging is either an Animal, or a Man, or Senſe, or in ſome circumſtance; under the thing judged, the *Seventh*, and the *Tenth*; under that which conſiſts of both, the *Fifth*, the *Sixth*, the *Eighth*, and the *Ninth*. Again, theſe

these three are comprehended in the Mood of *Relations*; so as the most *general* is, that of Relations; the *Special*, the other three, under which are comprehended the ten. Thus much we probably hold as to their Number; now as concerning their Power.

## CHAP. XII.

### *The first Common place.*

THe first Common place we hold to be that whereby, *through the difference of living Creatures*, Phantasies not the same are derived from them. This we collect both from the difference of their *Generations*, and from the difference of the *Constitutions* of their Bodies. Of their *Generations*, because of living Creatures, some have their Being *without Coition*; others *by Coition*. Of those which are produced *without Coition*, some come of Fire, as the Crickets in Chimneys; some of *Corrupted Water*, as Gnats; some of *soure Wine*, as Snipes; some of *Earth*, whereof some of *Slime*, as Frogs; some of *Dirt*, as Worms; some of *Ashes*, as Beetles; some of *Plants*, as Caterpillars; some of *Fruits*, as Maggots; some of *putrify'd Animals*, as of *Bulls*, Bees, and of *Horses*, Wasps.

Of those which are produced *by Coition*, some are begotten by creatures of the *same Species*, such are the greatest part; others by Creatures of *different Species*, as Mules. Again, of living Creatures, some are brought forth *alive*, as Man; others come from *Eggs*, as Birds; some from a *lump* of Flesh, as Bears. It is therefore probable, that the Dissimilitudes and Differences of these Generations effect great Antipathyes, receiving thereby contrary Temperament, Discordance, and Repugnance.

Moreover the *difference of several parts* of the Body, (especially of those which Nature made for Judgment and Sense) may cause a great repugnance of Phantasies, according to the diversity of living Creatures. Those things which to us seem White, they who have the *Yellow Jaundice* affirm to be Yellow, and they who have a *Hyphosphagme* in their Eyes, Red. As therefore, of living Creatures, some have Eyes Bloud-red, others Whitish, others of other Colours, it is likely they perceive Colours after different manners. Even to us, if we gaze a while upon the Sun, and immediately after, look upon a Book, the Letters will seem of Gold, and as if they moved round.

Forasmuch also, as some living Creatures have naturally a certain *Brightness* in their Eyes, and emit from them a quick rare light, so as they can see in the Night, we think it probable, that External Objects incur not into *their* Sense, like what they seem to *ours*.

Again, Juglers, by anointing Candles with a Liquor made of the rust of Brass, or with the Blood of the Fish *Sepia*, cause the Standers by to seem either *of the Colour of Brass, or Black*, by that little insperson of Unguent; Much more (*a*) likely is it, that the humours, mixed in the Eyes of living Creatures, being different, they have different Phantasies, from the same Object.

(*a*) M.S. ἰγλε-βουν.

Again, if we pinch the Eye, the Forms and Figures of visible things seem *long* and *narrow*: It is therefore likely, that all living Creatures which have Eye-balls oblique and narrow, (as Goats, Cats, and the like) have a peculiar phantasie of Objects, different from those which have round Balls.

Looking-glasses, according to their several Forms, sometimes represent the Object *less*, as when they are concave; somtimes *oblong and narrow*, as the convex: some there are that represent the head of the beholder *downward*, and his feet *upward*. As therefore of the Organs of Sight, some are extuberant, some hollow, some plain; it is likely the Phantasies are different, and that Dogs, Fishes, Lions, Men, Lobsters, behold not things as great, or in the same Form, as they are in themselves; but according to the various Impression which the sight suffereth from the Object.

It is the same in other senses; for how can we say, That Creatures covered with Shells, with Flesh, with Prickles, with Feathers, with Scales, are alike affected as to the Touch? Or, that they which have the hole of their Ear narrow, and they which have it wide; those which have Ears full of hair, and those which have smooth Ears, receive sound alike? Seeing that we our selves, (*b*) pressing the Ear, hear it different from that which it seems otherwise.

(*b*) Perhaps ἀκούονται.

Moreover, the *Smelling* may differ according to the difference of living Creatures; for, since we our selves are affected one way, when we have caught Cold, and are oppress'd with Flegm; another way, when the Parts of, and near the Head, abound with Blood, (disliking those Scents which to others seem sweet, and thinking our selves, as it were, hurt by them:) And since of living Creatures, some are naturally flegmatick, others sanguine; some cholerick, others melancholick, it is possible, that from thence, Scents seem different to them.

The like, as to the *Taste*; some have a Tongue rough and dry, others very moist, (even we our selves having our Tongues drier than ordinary in Feavors, think, that such things as are given us taste earthy, unsavoury, or bitter.) This we suffer, through the different prevalence of Savours in us. Since therefore in living Creatures, the organs of Taste are different, and abound with different Humors; hence they may in Taste receive different Phantasies from the same Objects.

For, as Meat digested turns here into Veins, there into Arteries; here into Bone, there into Sinewes, and so of the rest; manifesting a different power, according to the difference of the parts which receive it. And as Water, one and the same specifically, being infus'd into Trees, here turns into Leaves, there into Boughs; here into Fruit, Figs, Pomgranats, and the rest. And as one and the same blast of a Musitian in a Pipe, here is Flat, there Sharp: and the touch of the hand upon the Lute, makes sometimes a high, somtimes a low sound: so is it likely, that external Objects are differently apprehended, according to the different constitutions of the living Creatures, to which the phantasies occur.

This we learn more evidently from the Appetite, and Aversion of living Creatures. Unguents seem sweet to Men, but to Beetles and Bees are intolerable; Oyl is wholsom to Men, but kills

Wasps and Bees, if sprinkled upon them: Sea-water, to Men, is unpleasant of taste and unwholsom; to Fishes, sweet and potable. Swine delight more to wallow in filthy Mire, than in pure Water.

Moreover, of living Creatures, some eat Herbs, some Boughs, some Sperm, some Flesh, some Milk; some love putrifi'd Meat, some fresh; some raw, some rosted. Generally, what is pleasant to some, is to others unpleasant, distastful, and poysonous; as, Hemlock fattens Quails, Henbane Swine, Swine delight also to eat Salamanders, as Stags do Serpents, and Swallows Cantharides: Pismires and Snipes are unpleasant and unwholsom for Men to take down; but the Bear, if he fall sick, recovers his strength by feeding on them. The Viper, if it touch a Bough of a Beach Tree, is taken with a Giddiness; so the Bat, if it touch the Leaf of a Plane-tree; the Elephant flies from the Ram; the Lion from the Cock; Whales, from the crackling of bruised Beans; the Tiger from the sound of a Drum. We might instance many more, but, not insist too long hereupon; If the same things are to some pleasant, to others distastful; but pleasant and distastful, consist in Phantasie; then different Phantasies are arrived to several living Creatures, from the same Object. Now if the same things seem different to several Creatures, what the Object appears to *us*, we can say, but as to what it is in its *own* Nature, we will suspend; for we are not competent Judges betwixt our own and other Creatures Phantasies, our selves being parties in the difference, and consequently requiring a Judge, rather than being in a capacity of of judging.

Again, neither without Demonstration can we prefer our own Phantasies, before those of irrational Creatures, nor with Demonstration; for, to prove that there is no Demonstration, perhaps the Argument or Demonstration will either be apparent to us, or not apparent; if not apparent, we shall not entertain it with belief; but if apparent, seeing the question is concerning (*Phænomena's*) things apparent to living Creatures, and the Demonstration seems apparent to us, who are in the number of living Creatures, the Demonstration it self will be questioned, (forasmuch as it is apparent) whether it be true. But it is absurd, to endeavour to prove a thing in Question, by a thing which is likewise in Question, for so the same thing shall be Credible and Incredible; Credible, as used in Demonstration; Incredible, as requiring to be demonstrated. We shall not therefore find a Demonstration, whereby to prefer own Phantasies before those of other living Creatures, called Irrational. Now if Phantasies be different, according to the variety of living Creatures, and it be impossible to judge of them, it is necessary we suspend as to the external Objects.

## CHAP. XIII.

### *Whether the Creatures, commonly termed Irrational, have Reason.*

WE will (over and above) compare the Creatures termed Irrational, with Men, as to their Phantasie, that we may, after the more serious Reasons, sport with the self-conceited Opinion of the *Dogmatists*. Most of our party conser Irrational Creatures in general, simply with Men; but because the *Dogmatists* cavil hereat, we the better to deride them, will insist only upon one Creature the *Dog*, than which none seemeth more contemptible. By this means we shall know, that the Creatures of which we now discourse, are nothing inferior to us, as to credit of *Phænomena's*.

Now that this Creature excelleth us in Sense, is acknowledged by the *Dogmatists*; it is of a much quicker Scent, whereby it pursueth beasts unseen; it discovers them sooner by the Eye than we, and is likewise more acute of Hearing.

Come we therefore to discourse, which is twofold, *Internal* and *Enunciative*. Let us first examine the *Internal*; This, according to (our greatest Adversaries amongst the Dogmatists) the *Stoicks*, seemeth to be conversant in these things; in Election of things convenient, and Evitation of their Contraries; in knowledge of the Arts conducing hereto; in comprehension of the Vertues belonging to their nature concerning Passions. Now the Dog, in whom we instance, chooseth things convenient, and flieth the hurtful; he pursueth his Food, and runneth away from the Whip; he hath likewise the Art of acquiring things proper for him. Neither is he destitute of Vertue; Justice being distributive to every one according to their merit, the Dog, who fawneth upon his Friends and Benefactors, and revengeth himself upon his Enemies, by whom he is injur'd, is not void of Justice. And if he hath this Virtue, all the Virtues being linked together, he hath all the rest, which the wisest allow not the ordinary sort of men. We see he is Valiant, in revenging Wrong; Prudent, by the testimony of *Homer*, who makes *Ulysses*, not discovered by any of his Friends, owned by *Argus* the Dog; not deceived, either by the alteration in the Body of the Man, swerving from his own comprehensive Phantasie, which (it is manifest) he hath in a degree above Man. But, according to *Chrysippus*, (who oppugns irrational Creatures with most eagerness) he partakes of their so much cryed up *Dialectick*; for he saith, When the Dog cometh into a way divided into three, he makes choice of the third by several (*a*) Indemonstrables; for having scented the two ways by which the Beast did not pass, he runs strait upon the third, without scenting it; which is as much (saith the old Philosopher) as to discourse thus; *The Beast passed either this way, or this way, or this way; but neither this way, nor this way, therefore this way.*

(*a*) What Indemonstrables are, see afterwards, *Lib.* 2. *cap.* 13.

Moreover, he apprehends and cures his own Sickness: If a Splinter get into his Foot, he presently strives to get it out, by rubbing his Foot against the Ground, and with his Teeth. If he be Wounded, (Wounds that are kept clean being easily cur'd, the putrid not easily) he continually licks the Hurt. He likewise strictly observes the rule of *Hippocrates*, the Cure of the Foot consisting in rest; he, if hurt in that part, holds it up, and stirs it as little as he can. If he be troubled with ill Humors, he eats Grass; by which means, vomiting up that which disagreed with him, he is cured. Now if this Creature can choose what is convenient for him, and fly what is inconvenient; if he hath the art of acquiring things proper

per to him, and can apprehend and cure his own Sickneſs, and is not void of Virtue, in all which conſiſts the perfection of intrinſecal Diſcourſe, the Dog muſt be Perfect, as to that. For which (b) The Cynick. Reaſon, as I conceive, (b) ſome Philoſophers choſe to be called by name of that Creature.

As to *Enunciative* diſcourſe, it is not neceſſary to examine it; for there are (c) ſome Dogmatiſts (c) Pythagoras. who condemn it, as contrary to Virtue; whence they kept ſilence all the time of their Inſtitution. Beſides, though we ſhould ſuppoſe a Man to be Dumb, yet none will ſay, he is void of Diſcourſe, (irrational;) and on the other ſide, we ſee many living Creatures which have the ſpeech of Man, as Pyes, and the like. To omit which, though we underſtand not the Voices of Creatures (termed) Irrational, it is nevertheleſs likely they diſcourſe among themſelves. We underſtand not the Language of Foreigners, it ſeems a continued Sound without variety. But we hear that the Voice of the Dog is different; of one kind, when he aſſaults, of another, when he howls; of another, when he is beaten; of another, when he fawns. In a word, he who examines it curiouſly, will find a great variety of Voice, not only in this Creature, but in others, according to the diverſity of Accidents. So that the Creatures, called Irrational, may juſtly be ſaid to participate of Enunciative Diſcourſe; and if they come not ſhort of Men, in acuteneſs of Senſe, nor in Intrinſecal Diſcourſe, nor in Enunciative, (though that be not neceſſary) certainly they are no leſs creditable, as to Phantaſy, than we.

It is poſſible, perhaps, to ſhew the ſame diſcourſe in all other Creatures; as, who will deny Birds to have a Sagacity, and Enunciative diſcourſe, ſeeing they know not only things Preſent, but the Future, which they declare to ſuch as are able to comprehend it, (amongſt many other (d) Augury. ways) by (d) Voice. But this Compariſon is added, as I ſaid before, more than neceſſary, without which, we have ſufficiently, I conceive, declared, That our own Phantaſies are not to be preferred before the Phantaſies of Irrational Creatures. Now if Irrational Creatures are no leſs creditable than we, in dijudication of Phantaſies, and Phantaſies are different, according to the variety of the Creatures; what every object *appeareth* to me, I am able to ſay; but what it *is* in itſelf, (for the Reaſons alledged) I Suſpend.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *The ſecond Common place.*

THE ſecond Common place of Suſpenſion we hold to be, *from the Diverſity of Men*; for, though we ſhould grant, It were more reaſonable to ſtand to the judgment of Men, than of any other living Creature; yet ſhall we find ſo much difference amongſt our ſelves, as may well induce Suſpenſion. Man, they ſay, conſiſts of two parts, *Soul* and *Body*, in both theſe we differ one from another; in *Body*, by *Form* and *Conſtitution*; The Body of a *Scythian* differs in Form from the Body of an *Indian*. This difference ariſeth, as we ſaid, from the different prevalence of Humors, and from the different prevalence of Humors ariſe Phantaſies, as we ſaid upon the firſt ground; whence in Election and [illegible]tation of external things, there is great difference among them. *Indians* delight in ſome things, we in others; but to delight in ſeveral things, argueth a reception of different Phantaſies from the ſame Objects.

We differ alſo in *Conſtitution*; there are ſome who can digeſt Beef eaſier than Anchovies; ſome, upon drinking of *Lesbian*-Wine, are troubled with Choler. It is reported of an old *Athenian* Woman, That ſhe drank four drams of Hemlock without any hurt; And *Demophon*, *Alexander*'s Sewer, whilſt he was in the Sun-ſhine, or in a Bath, was cold; in the Shade, was hot. *Athenagoras*, the *Argive*, felt no Pain at the biting of Scorpions, or Phalangies. The People called (a) *Pſylli*, never take Hurt by the biting of Serpents or Aſps. (b) The *Tintyrite* of *Ægypt* take no Hurt by Crocodiles. The *Æthiopians* that live oppoſite to *Meroe*, along the River *Hydaſpes*, eat Scorpions, Snakes and the like, without danger. *Ruſinus* of *Chalcis*, when he drunk *Hellebore*, never vomited, nor was purged any way by it, but digeſted it as ordinary drink. *Chriſermus*, the *Herophillian*, if at any time he eat Pepper, was taken with *the Paſſion of the Heart*, even to hazard of his Life. In *Soterius* the Chyrurgion, the ſmell of the Fiſh *Silurus* excited Choler. *Andron* the *Argive* was ſo little ſubject to Thirſt, that when he travelled through the Deſerts of *Lybia*, he did not need Drink. *Tiberius Ceſar* ſaw in the dark. *Ariſtotle* mentions a (c) *Thaſian*, who thought, the Apparition of a Man went always before him. Now there being ſo great diverſity in the *Bodies* of Men, (it is ſufficient that we inſtance theſe few, out of the multitude acknowledged by the *Dogmatiſts*) it is probable, that Men differ from one another in *Soul* alſo, for the Body is a kind of Image of the Soul, as the Phyſiognomy-Science ſheweth. But the greateſt evidence of the infinite difference of Men, as to Intellect, is the diſcordance amongſt them in Election and Evitation, rightly expreſſed by the Poets; as *Pindar*,

(a) *Procop.* Hiſt. Mir. 19.
(b) The Text is defective; but *Franciſcus Mirandula* renders it thus, *Qui Tintiritæ dicuntur, incolæ Ægypti, inter Crocodilos impunè verſantur.* de vanit. Gent. *Lib.* 2. *cap.* 23.
(c) *Antipheron Oretanus.*

*Some joy in ſwift-heel'd Courſers; ſome,*
*In living wantonly at home;*
*And others, on the Ocean roam.*

And the Poet,

*In ſeveral Actions, ſeveral Men delight.*

The *Tragedians* are full of this, as

*If all Men what is Good did ſee*
*Alike, they would not Diſagree.*

And again,

*Alas! that ſome Men take delight*
*In things which grieve another's ſight.*

Since therefore Appetition and Averſion conſiſt in Pleaſure and Hatred, but Pleaſure and Hatred conſiſt in Phantaſy; and ſince the ſame things are purſued by ſome, ſhunned by others; we may infer this Conſequence, that they are not alike affected by the ſame things, otherwiſe

they would all alike desire or shun them. Now if these things affect differently, according to the diversity of Men, there may justly be induced Suspension, since what every subject appeareth, every one perhaps according to his particular Apprehension may express, but what it is in its own Nature, we cannot assert. For we must either give Credit to all Men, or to some few; if to All, we undertake Impossibilities, and admit Repugnancies; if to some Few, let them tell us, which those Few are. The *Platonists* will say, we must assent to *Plato*; the *Epicureans*, to *Epicurus*; and by their confused Disagreement, reduce us again to Suspension. If any Man alledg, we ought to assent to the greater Number; he argues Childishly, since None can over-run all Men, and examine what every one thinks best, and it is possible that in Countries unknown to us, what things are rare to us, are there frequent; and what happens frequently to us, happens there very seldome. As for instance, in such a Country there are many who receive no Harm by the Biting of Phalangies, Few who receive Harm thereby. And so in all other Constitutions: wherefore it is also necessary to induce Suspension, by reason of the diversity of Men.

## CHAP. XV.

### *The third Common-place.*

FOrasmuch as *Dogmatists* are so self-conceited, as to affirm, That their Judgment in things ought to be preferred before all others; though we know how absurd this Postulation is, (for they are Parties in the Controversie, and having first pre-judged themselves, if then they judge *Phænomena's*, even before they begin to judge, they seize on the *Phænomena's* as already judged:) yet that, in our Dispute, fixing the Discourse upon one Man (that wise Man they dream of) we may arrive at Suspension, let us examine the third Common-place.

This we derive *from the difference of the Senses*. That the Senses differ from one another is manifest. *Pictures* seem to the Eye rising and falling, but not such to the Touch. Many esteem *Honey* pleasant to the Tongue, unpleasant to the Eye; whence it is impossible to say, whether it is simply pleasant, or unpleasant. The like of *Unguents*, they please the Smell, displease the Taste. *Euphorbium* is hurtful to the Eyes, but not to any other part of the Body; therefore, whether it be simply hurtful to the Body, we cannot say. *Rain-water* is good for the Eyes, but frets the Arteries and Lungs; as Oyl doth also, though it smooths the Skin. The *Sea-Tortoise*, applied to the extream parts of the Body, causeth Numbness, but laid to any other part makes no alteration. Thus, what each of these things is in it's own nature we cannot affirm, but how it appears to others, we may. We might instance more; but, not to insist longer hereon, than our design permits, let us say, Every sensible *Phænomenon* seemeth to incur a several way into our Senses, as an Apple smooth, fragrant, sweet, yellow. It is therefore unmanifest, whether it really hath these qualities, or whether it hath but one quality, which seemeth different, according to the diversity of the Senses; or whether it hath many more qualities, some of which incur not to our Senses. For, that it hath but one quality, may be argued from what was said before, concerning the Nutriment of living Creatures, the growth of Trees by Rain, the unequal sound of the Breath in Pipes, and other Instruments. It is therefore possible, the Apple may have but one quality, and yet be looked upon as different, by reason of the difference of the Organs of Sense, by which it is apprehended. Again, That it is possible, the Apple may have more qualities than appear to us, we argue thus: Let us suppose a Man, endued from his Birth with Touch, Smell, and Taste; but wanting Sight and Hearing, he will think there is nothing Visible, nothing Audible: So it may be, that we having Five Senses, of all the qualities of an Apple, perceive only those, whereof ourselves have the apprehensive Faculty; yet in the mean time, it may have other qualities, incident to other Organs of Sense, which we have not. Therefore neither can we perceive what their sensible Operations are.

But Nature, may Some object, hath equally commensurated the Senses according to the Sensibles. What Nature? there being so confused a disagreement amongst the *Dogmatists*, concerning her Essence? For if any Man judge what Nature is, if he be one of the Unlearned, he is, according to them, not worthy Credit; if a Philosopher, he is interess'd in the Difference, being one of the Parties to be judged, not the Judge. Now if it be nothing absurd to say, The Apple hath all the qualities we seem to apprehend, and more than these; or, on the contrary, that it hath not even those which incur to our Senses, it will be unmanifest to us, how the Apple is qualited. The same of other Sensibles. And if the Senses comprehend not External Objects, neither can the Intellect comprehend them. Thus Suspension may be induced from External Objects.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *The fourth Common-place.*

THat as well over-running in our Discourse every Sense, as receding from Sense, and receding from Sense, we may arrive at Suspension, we come to the fourth ground.

This is said to be *from Circumstances*. By περιστάσεις, (Circumstances) we understand Dispositions; we say it consists in being according *to Nature*, (sound;) or *contrary to Nature*, (unsound;) in *Waking* or *Sleeping*, in difference of *Age*, in *Motion* or *Rest*, in *Hate* or *Love*, in *Want* or *Satiety*, in *Drunkenness* or *Thirst*; in *Predispositions*, in *Courage* or *Fear*, in *Joying* or *Grieving*. According as we are Sound or Unsound, things occur variously to us; Frantick, and Divinely-inspired Persons, think they hear Spirits, we not; and those kind of Persons often say, they smell Perfumes of Storax or Frankincense, when we smell none. Again, the same water poured upon any Part that is Inflamed

flamed ſeems ſcalding, to us, lukewarm: The ſame Garment to thoſe that have a Hypoſphagm in their Eyes, ſeems bloody, to me not: The ſame Honey to me is ſweet, to thoſe that are troubled with the over-flowing of the Gall, bitter. If any ſhall alledge, that the admiſtion of ſome humors, in thoſe who are unſound, excites Phantaſies not conformable to their Objects; we anſwer, Foraſmuch as they, who are in health have commixed Humors, thoſe Humors may cauſe external Objects (which perhaps appear to thoſe who are unſound, ſuch as they are indeed in themſelves,) to appear to the healthful, ſuch as they are not in themſelves. For, to attribute the power of changing Objects to the Humors of the one, and not to thoſe of the other, is vain; ſince as they who are in health, are according to the nature of the healthful, but contrary to the nature of the ſick; ſo they who are ſick, are contrary to the nature of the heathful, and according to the nature of the ſick: So that theſe alſo are to be credited, as being according to Nature.

From *Sleep* and *Waking*, ariſe alſo different Phantaſies; we have not the ſame Phantaſies ſleeping, which we have waking; nor the ſame waking, which we have ſleeping; therefore their exiſtence is not ſimple, but relative. Thus in Sleep we ſee things, which, when we wake, are inexiſtent; not that they are inexiſtent in themſelves, for they exiſt in ſleep, as well as theſe things which are ſaid to exiſt when we are awake.

From *different Ages*; the ſame Air to old Men ſeems cold, to the youthful temperate; the ſame meat to old Men heavy, to the young light. So the ſame voice to ſome ſeemeth low, to others loud. In like manner are they, who differing in age, differently incline to deſire, or abhor things. Children delight in Whips and Tops; they who come to Man's eſtate, prefer other things; old Men, others. Whence may be inferr'd, That different Phantaſies are derived from the ſame Object, according to the difference of Ages.

From *Motion* or *Reſt*, things appear unlike; that which ſeems unmoved to us, while we ſtand ſtill, when we ſail, we think it moves.

From *Love* or *Hate*; ſome abhor Swines fleſh, which others eat with much delight. Many that have deformed Miſtreſſes, think them beautiful.

From *Hunger* or *Satiety*: The ſame meat to an hungry Man, ſeems pleaſant; to a Man that is full, unpleaſant.

From *Drunkenneſs* and *Sobriety*; Things, which when we are ſober, we eſteem undecent; drunk, ſeem not ſuch to us.

From *Prediſpoſitions*; The ſame Wine to ſuch as have eaten Dates or Figs a little before, ſeems ſowre; to ſuch as have eaten Nuts or Pulſe, ſweet. The **Paraſtas* of a Bath warms thoſe that go in, cools thoſe who go out, if they have ſtay'd any while in it.

* *Vitruv. Architect. lib. 5. cap. 10.*

From *Courage* or *Fear*; the ſame thing to a timorous Man ſeems dreadful, to a Valiant, nothing ſo.

From *Sorrow* and *Joy*; the ſame things which trouble the ſorrowful, delight the joyful.

Now there being ſo great difference and diſproportion of Habits, and Men being conſtituted ſometimes in one Habit, ſometimes in another, what every Object *ſeems* to any, perpaps it is eaſie to declare; but what it *is*, is not eaſie, ſince the difference is indijudicable. For he that judgeth it, either is converſant in one of the forementioned Habits, or in none: To ſay he is in none, that is, he neither is Well nor Sick, neither moveth nor reſteth, nor is of any age, and wholly void of the other habits, is moſt abſurd: On the other ſide, if, being in any of theſe habits, he judgeth Phantaſies, he is himſelf a Party in the Controverſie, and conſequently cannot be a ſincere Judge of external Objects, being infected with the habits in which he is. For he who is awake cannot compare the Phantaſies of thoſe who are aſleep, with the Phantaſies of thoſe who are awake; nor he, who is in health, compare the Phantaſies of the ſound and the ſick: For we ſooner aſſent to ſuch things as are preſent, and move us, than to things not preſent.

Moreover, the difference of ſuch Phantaſies is indijudicable another way. He that prefers one Phantaſie before another, and one circumſtance (or habit) before another, either doth it without judgment and demonſtration, or upon judgment and demonſtration. Not without, for then he is of no credit; nor with, for if he judge Phantaſies, he muſt do it by a Criterie, this Criterie muſt be either the true or falſe; if falſe, neither is it to be credited; if he ſay it is true, he affirms it, or with demonſtration, or without. If without demonſtration, it will be uncreditable; if with demonſtration, it is abſolutely neceſſary that the demonſtration be true, otherwiſe neither will that be creditable. He will therefore ſay, the Demonſtration, alledged to prove the Judicatory creditable, is true. Whether doth he affirm this, as having judged, or not judged? If not having judged, he is not to be credited; if as having judged, he muſt acknowledge he hath judged it by a Criterie, of which Criterie we ſhall require a Demonſtration, and then of that Demonſtration a Criterie. Thus the Demonſtration will continually require a Criterie to confirm it, and the Criterie, a Demonſtration to ſhew it is true: Therefore the Demonſtration cannot be true, unleſs a true Criterie precede it; nor can the Criterie be true, unleſs the Demonſtration be firſt credited. Thus the Criterie and the Demonſtration fall into the *Alternate Common Place*, wherein both will be found not creditable; for either wants credit, till the other afford its aſſiſtance to confirm it.

If therefore we cannot prefer one Phantaſie before another, neither without a Demonſtration and Criterie, nor with them, the Phantaſies, which different Habits produce, will be indijudicable. Thus, Suſpenſion is induc'd from the nature of external Objects.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *The fifth Common place.*

THe fifth Common place is, from *Poſitions*, *Diſtances*, and *Places*: for through any of theſe, the ſame things ſeem different: the ſame Walk, to him that is entring into it, ſeems nar-

row

row at the further end, to him, who is in the middle, equally broad. The ſam Ship, at a diſtance, ſeems little and fixt; near, great and in motion. The ſame Tower ſeems a far off, round, near, ſquare. This for *Diſtance*.

From *Place*; the light of a Candle in the Sunſhine ſeems dim; in the dark, bright: The ſame Oar under water, ſeems broken; above water, ſtreight. An Egg in the Fowle is ſoft; in the Air, hard. The *Lyncurium* [a ſtone concrete of the *Lynx* his urine,] in the *Lynx* is humid, in the Air, hard. Coral is ſoft in the Water, hard in the Air. A voice ſounds diverſly through a Pipe, through a Flute, and in the open Air.

From *Poſition*; the ſame Image, laid flat, ſeems ſmooth, but inclining, ſeems to have Extuberances and Cavities; the Neck of a Pidgeon, as it is variouſly turned, ſeems to have a different colour.

Since then all *Phænomena's* are ſeen in ſome *Place*, at ſome *Diſtance*, and in ſome *Poſition*, every one of which (as we ſaid) cauſeth a great alteration in Phantaſies, we ſhall be hereby reduced to Suſpenſion. For he, who would prefer one of theſe Phantaſies before another, attempts an impoſſibility; for, if he aſſert it of them ſimply, without Demonſtration, he ſhall not be credited; if he would uſe Demonſtration, and acknowledge that Demonſtration to be falſe, he confutes himſelf: If he ſay, it is true, it will be required he bring a Demonſtration to prove it true, and a third to prove the ſecond, becauſe that alſo muſt be true, and ſo to infinite; but to alledge infinite Demonſtrations, will be impoſſible. Therefore one Phantaſie cannot be preferred before another by Demonſtration. And if the aforeſaid Phantaſies can neither be judged with Demonſtration, nor without it, there muſt be inferred Suſpenſion; ſince what every thing *ſeems* according to this *Poſition*, this *Diſtance*, or in this *Place*, we may indeed affirm; but what in it ſelf it *is*, (for theſe Reaſons) we cannot.

## CHAP. XVIII.

### *The Sixth Common Place.*

THe Sixth Place is, from *Commixtions*: Whence we infer, That no Object incurreth into our Senſe ſimply, but together with ſome other; what this Miſtion *is*, as well from the external Object, and from that together with which it is ſeen, it is perhaps poſſible to ſay, what it ſeems to us; but what the external Object is, purely in it ſelf, we cannot ſay: For no external thing incurreth into our Senſe, purely of it ſelf, but with ſome other; whence, as I conceive, it ſeems different to beholders. Our Complexion ſeems of one colour in warm air, of another in cold; neither can we ſay what our colour is naturally, but what it ſeemeth with theſe Circumſtances. The ſame voice ſeems different in a thin Air, and in a thick. Perfumes are of ſtronger ſcent in a Bath, or in the warm Sun, than in the Cold; a Body ſurrounded with Water, is light; with Air, heavy.

Moreover, (ſetting aſide external Commiſtion) even our eyes have in themſelves tunicles and humors. Viſible objects therefore, becauſe we cannot ſee without theſe, are not perhaps perceived exactly and purely, for we perceive them with Admiſtion. Hence to thoſe who have the Jaundice, all things ſeem yellow; to thoſe who have a Hypoſphagm, red. And foraſmuch as the ſame voice ſeemeth different, in open and ſtrait places, from what it ſeems in narrow and crooked; in calm Air, from what it ſeems in tempeſtuous; it is probable, we perceive no Voice purely. For our Ears have narrow oblique holes, and are ſaid to be troubled and prepoſſeſs'd by vapors from the parts next the Head.

Likewiſe by our Noſtrils, and the Inſtruments of Taſte, when Objects are preſented, we perceive their Smell, and Taſte, but not purely. Wherefore what external Objects are exactly in themſelves, the Senſes cannot perceive, by reaſon of Commiſtions. Neither can the Intellect, becauſe the Senſes, her Guides, err. Perhaps alſo, the Intellect alters that which it receiveth from the Senſes, by intermixing ſomething of its own. For in the parts wherein the Hegemonick, according to the Dogmatiſts, is placed; we ſee there are certain humors, as in the Brain, or the Heart, or what part ſoever they ſhall place it in. Thus, by this Common-place, ſeeing that we can determine nothing concerning the Nature of the external Objects, we Suſpend.

## CHAP. XIX.

### *The Seventh Common Place.*

THe Seventh Place is, *from the Quantities and Conſtitutions* of Subjects, generally ſtyled *Compoſitions*. That we are inforced upon this ground to Suſpenſion, concerning the nature of things, is manifeſt; as, the ſhavings of Goats-horn ſeems white, but in the Horn it ſelf black; filings of Silver ſeem black, but in the whole white; the pieces of the *Tænarian* Stone poliſh'd ſeem white, the whole ſeems yellow; Sands taken ſingly ſeem rugged; altogether in a heap, ſmooth; *Ellebore* eaten young and downy, ſuffocates, but at full growth it doth not; Wine drunk moderately, ſtrengthens; exceſſively, weakens: Meat commonly ſhews a different power, according to the quantity; exceſs thereof, for the moſt part, oppreſſeth the Body with crudities, and Cholerick humors. Now as to theſe, we are able to ſay, What the thin parts of the Horn ſeem ſeparated, and what they ſeem compacted; what the minute parts of Silver, and what the whole conſiſting of thoſe parts; what a little piece of the *Tænarian* Stone, and what the whole: So likewiſe in Sands, *Hellebore*, Wine, Meat, we can expreſs what they are relatively; but the nature of the things themſelves we cannot, by reaſon of the difference which happens in compoſition. Generally, healthful things are hurtful, if we take too much of them; and hurtful things hurt not, if we take but little of them. This is moſt evident in Medicine; a juſt meaſure in their Compoſition is beneficial; but ſometimes, to put in ever ſo little more or leſs, is not only not beneficial, but deſtructive, and often deadly. Thus Quantities and Compoſitions confound the exiſtence of external Objects, whereby we are juſtly reduced to Suſpenſion, not being able to affirm any thing of the external Object.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XX.

### *The Eighth Common Place.*

THe Eighth Place is, *From Relation*; for every thing having relation to ſome other, what they are ſimply in their own Nature, we ſuſpend from affirming. (The term [*Is*,] here and elſewhere we uſe improperly for Seems; which is as much as to ſay, Every thing ſeems to have relation to ſome other.) This is ſaid to be two ways; one is to the thing judging, for the External Object appeareth ſuch to the thing judging; the other is to the things which are conſidered together with it, as Right to Left.

That all things are relative, we argued before, as well *to the thing judging*; for the appearance of a thing is what it ſeems to this Animal, to that Man, to ſuch a Senſe, to ſuch a Habit: As likewiſe *to the things ſeen together with it*; for every thing appears by ſuch a Commiſtion, ſuch a Manner, ſuch a Compoſition, ſuch a Quantity, ſuch a Poſition.

That all things are Relative, may alſo be argued thus: Whether are different things different from Relatives, or not? If not different, then they are Relatives; if different, ſince every thing that differs from another is relative, (as implying a relation to that from which it differs) they are relative by difference.

Again, of things, ſome, according to the Dogmatiſts, are Supream Genus's; others, moſt Special *Species*; others, *Genus's* and *Species*: But all theſe are Relative, therefore there is nothing that is not Relative.

Moreover they ſay, that of things, ſome are manifeſt, ſome unmanifeſt. The manifeſt (*Phænomena's*) ſignify the unmanifeſt; the unmanifeſt are ſignify'd by the *Phænomena's*, for they hold *Phænomena's* to be the ſight of the unmanifeſt things; but the ſignificant and the ſignificate are relatives, therefore all things are relative.

Beſides, of things, ſome are like, ſome unlike; ſome are equal, others unequal; but theſe are relatives, therefore all things are relative.

Even he who ſaith, *All things are not relative*, confirmeth, that they *are relative*: For by the Arguments wherewith he oppugns us, he ſheweth, that this Aſſertion, *All things are relative*, hath reference only to us, but not to all in general.

Thus all things being relative, what every object is in its own nature we cannot ſay, but only what it appears in relation: Whence it follows, that, as to the nature of the things, we ſuſpend.

## CHAP. XXI.

### *The Ninth Common Place.*

This Ninth in Laertius is that Phavorinus reckons the eighth, and Ænesidemus the ninth; and that also in the Edit. of M. Ss. of Sextus, is the ninth the ſame as with Laertius; the tenth is with Laertius the fifth.

THe (*a*) Ninth Place is, *from frequent or rare Contingence*, thus deduced: The Sun is certainly much more wonderful than a Comet; yet, becauſe one is ſeen every day, the other ſeldom, the Comet makes us wonder ſo much, as to think ſome ſtrange thing is portended thereby, the Sun not ſo. But if we ſhould imagine the Sun to appear but ſeldom, and aſſoon as he had enlightned all things, preſently to withdraw, and leave all in darkneſs, we ſhould therein find much cauſe of wonder. Earthquakes trouble us far more at firſt, than when we are us'd to them. How doth a man admire the Sea at firſt view? Even corporeal Beauty ſtrikes us much more at the firſt ſight, than after we have been accuſtomed and acquainted with it. Moreover, things that are ſcarce are eſteemed, the common not eſteemed. If Water were hard to be got, how much would it be prized above all things, which we now value at ſo high rates? If Gold were as common as Stones, who would hoard it up? Since therefore the ſame things are ſomtimes eſteemed wonderful or precious, ſomtimes not ſuch, according to their ſcarcity or commonneſs, we infer, that, How things ſeem according to their frequent or rare Contingences, we may perhaps ſay; but ſimply, what theſe external Objects are in themſelves, we cannot; and therefore ſupend.

## CHAP. XXII.

### *The Tenth Common Place.*

THe Tenth Place chiefly concerns *Morals*, as being drawn from *Inſtitutions*, *Cuſtoms*, *Laws*, *Fabulous Perſuaſions*, and *Dogmatick Opinions*.

*Inſtitution* is the election of a courſe of life, or any other thing, which is done by one or many; as by *Diogenes*, or the *Lacedemonians*.

*Law* is a covenant written by the Magiſtrate, which whoſoever tranſgreſſeth is puniſhed.

*Cuſtom* (ἔθος or συνήθεια, they differ nothing) is the approbation of ſomthing by the common conſent of many, which he who tranſgreſſeth is not puniſhed; as, it is a Law, that we commit not Adultery; a Cuſtom, that we lie not with our Wives in publick.

*Fabulous Perſuaſion* is the approbation of feigned things which never were; ſuch are the ſtories of *Saturn*, which yet ſome believe true.

*Dogmatick Opinion* is the approbation of ſomthing, which ſeems to be confirmed by ſome Reaſon or Demonſtration; as that Atoms, Homoiomeria's, Leaſt-parts, or the like, are the Elements of things.

Of theſe, we oppoſe ſomtimes *one of the ſame kind to another of that kind*; ſomtimes *one kind to another*. For example, *Cuſtom* to *Cuſtom*, thus; Some *Æthiopians* paint the skins of their children, we do not ſo. The *Perſians* think it decent to wear Garments ſtained like Flowers, we think it undecent. Some *Indians* lie with their Wives in publick, moſt people think it unſeemly.

*Law* to *Law*, thus: Amongſt the *Romans*, he who quits his Inheritance, doth not quit his Fathers name; amongſt the *Rhodians*, he is forced to quit it. At *Tauris* in *Scythia* there was a Law, That ſtrangers ſhould be ſacrific'd to *Diana*; amongſt us, it is prohibited to put a Man to death in a Temple.

*Inſtitution* to *Inſtitution*; as, that of *Diogenes* to that of *Ariſtippus*; that of the *Lacedemonians* to that of the *Italians*.

*Fabulous Perſuaſion* to *Fabulous Perſuaſion*; as, when we ſay, that *Jupiter* is ſomtimes called Father of Men and Gods; ſomtimes the Ocean is ſo called, as,

*Ocean the Sire of Gods, Tethys the Mother.*

*Dogmatick Opinions, one to another*; as when we say, Some assert one Element, others infinite; and some hold the Soul to be mortal, others immortal; some hold the World to be governed by Providence, others not.

Again, we oppose *Custom* to something of different kind, as to *Law*, when we say, Adultery is forbidden amongst us, used among the *Massagetes*, as a thing indifferent, according to *Eudoxus* the *Gnidian*, in his first book. It is prohibited amongst us to lie with our Mothers; in *Persia*, nothing so frequent as to marry them. The *Ægyptians* marry their Sisters, which we are forbidden by Law.

To *Institution*: As there are very few, who will lie with their Wives in publick; yet *Crates* did so with *Hipparchia*. *Diogenes* wore his upper Coat continually; it is not our use to do so.

To *Fabulous Persuasion*: As it is fabled, That *Saturn* eat his Children; but with us, it is a custom to bring up our Children. Again, we use to worship the Gods, as good, not subject to ill; but the Poets feign them to be wounded, to envy, and the like.

To *Dogmatical Opinion*: It is a custom with us, to pray to the Gods for good things; but *Epicurus* denies the Gods take any care of us. Again, *Aristippus* thought it an indifferent thing to wear a Woman's garment, we think it undecent.

We oppose *Institution* to *Law*, thus. There is a Law, that no Man shall strike a Free person; yet Wrestlers strike one another, following the institution of their life. *Homicide* is forbidden, yet *Gladiators* kill one another, upon the same ground.

*Fabulous Persuasion* to *Institution*; as when we say, Fables tell us that *Hercules* served *Omphale*, spun, and did other actions of a most effeminate person; but *Hercules*, his institution of life was generous.

To *Dogmatick Opinion*; as Wrestlers addicted to the pursuit of Glory, as of a good thing, chuse a laborious kind of life; but many Philosophers assert Glory to be an ill thing.

We oppose *Law* to *Fabulous Persuasion*: as, The Poets introduce the Gods committing Adulteries, and the like; but with us, the Law prohibits such things.

To *Dogmatick Opinion*; as, *Chrysippus* holds it a thing indifferent, to lie with Mothers, or Sisters; the Law forbids it.

We oppose *Fabulous Persuasions* to *Dogmatick Opinion*. As, the Poets say, *Jupiter* came down on earth to lie with mortal Women; but the Dogmatists think this impossible. Again, the Poets say, that *Jupiter*, through excessive grief for *Sarpedon*, let fall drops of Blood, upon the earth; but it is a Tenent of Philosophers, that the Gods are not subject to any Passion. Likewise the *Dogmatists* take away *Hippocentaures*, instancing them as examples of Inexistency. Many other Presidents might be alledged, but let these serve.

Now there being so great difference, (as appeareth also by this place) what the Subject *is*, in its own Nature, we cannot say; but only what it *seems*, as to that Institution, this Law, this Custom, *&c.* Wherefore, upon this ground also, we suspend concerning the nature of External Objects.

## CHAP. XXIII.

### *The Five Common places.*

THe (*) later *Scepticks* deliver Five Common places of Suspension; the First *from Disagreement*; the Second *reducing to Infinite*; the Third *from Relation to something*; the Fourth, *Hypothetick*; the Fifth, *Alternate*.

* Laertius ascribes this to Agrippa.

The First place, *from Disagreement*, is that, by which we find an indetermined disagreement, concerning the thing in the practice of life, and amongst Philosophers; whence, not being able to prove or disprove either side, we are reduced to Suspension.

The Second place, *from infinite*, consisteth in this; whatsoever is alledged in proof of the thing proposed, we say, requireth something else whereby that may be proved; and that likewise something else, and so to infinite: So that, not having a ground whereon to fix our Beginning, we suspend.

The Third, *from Relation*: Of this place, we have treated already.

The Fourth, *Hypothetick*, is when the *Dogmatists*, perceiving themselves reduc'd to Infinite, begin upon some ground which they prove not, but would have it simply granted without Demonstration.

The Fifth, *Alternate*, is When that, by which we should prove a thing, requireth it self to be proved by that thing; then, because we cannot assume either to maintain the other, we suspend.

That all questions may be reduced to these places, we shew briefly thus. Whatsoever is propounded, is either sensible or intelligible; but which soever it be, there is disagreement concerning it. Some hold that Sensibles only are true, some that Intelligibles only; others, that some Sensibles, and some Intelligibles. Whether will they say, the controversie is dijudicable, [capable of decision] or indijudicable? If indijudicable, it is fit, we suspend; for, in things indijudicably repugnant, it is not possible to assert: But if dijudicable, we ask, How it shall be judged? As a Sensible, (for we will first take that for instance) whether by a Sensible or by an Intelligible? If by a Sensible, forasmuch as we disagree concerning Sensibles; even that Sensible will require another for its proof; which other, if it be Sensible, will require another, and so to infinite: But if a Sensible require to be determined by an Intelligible, forasmuch as Intelligibles also are controverted, that (as being Intelligible) will require adjudication and proof; which way shall it be proved? If by an Intelligible, they run, as before, into Infinite. If by a Sensible, forasmuch as Intelligible was assumed for proof of a Sensible, and a Sensible for proof of an Intelligible, the *Alternate common place* is brought in.

But if, to avoid this, the Disputant would assume something, as granted, without demonstrating it, whereby to demonstrate the Consequent, *the hypothetical Place* occurs, which is inextricable. For if he be creditable in things which he requires to be granted and supposed, we likewise

wiſe may be creditable, in requiring their Contraries to be granted. If that be true which he ſuppoſeth, he renders it ſuſpitious by ſuppoſing (not proving) it; if falſe, his foundation is unſound. Further, if ſuch a ſuppoſition conduce any thing to proof, let him ſuppoſe the thing in queſtion, rather than another thing by which he would prove it. If it be abſurd to ſuppoſe the thing controverted, it is alſo abſurd, to ſuppoſe the ground upon which we build it. That all Senſibles are *Relatives*, is manifeſt, for (as ſuch) they relate to thoſe who have Senſe. It is therefore evident, that whatſoever Senſible thing is propoſed to us, may eaſily be reduced to one of theſe five Places.

So likewiſe we argue concerning Intelligibles. If the Controverſie be indijudicable, we ſhall be allowed to ſuſpend; if dijudicable by an Intelligible, it runs into *Infinite*; if by a Senſible, we drive them to *the Alternate place*: For the Senſible being Controverted, as not capable of being judged by itſelf becauſe of running into Infinite, will require an Intelligible, as the Intelligible the Senſible. He who hereupon would aſſume any thing as granted, is as fooliſh on the other ſide. Further, an Intelligible is relative, for it is ſuch in reference to the Intelligent; and if it were indeed ſuch as it is named, it would not be controverted. Thus we reduce Intelligibles alſo to theſe five Places. Whereupon we are neceſſitated to ſuſpend our Aſſent upon any propoſition. Theſe are the five Places introduced by the later *Sceptick*s, not to exclude the other Ten, but more variouſly to refel the Temerity of the *Dogmatiſts*.

## CHAP. XXIV.

### *The two other Common places.*

THey likewiſe deliver two Places more of Suſpenſion; for, ſeeing that whatſoever is comprehended, ſeems to be comprehended (or underſtood) either *through it ſelf*, or *through ſome other*; they ſeem to introduce an abſolute Inextricability of all things. That nothing is comprehended *through it ſelf*, they ſay, is manifeſt, from the Controverſie amongſt Natural Philoſophers, concerning (I think) all Senſibles and Intelligibles: which Controverſie is indijudicable, (not to be determined) by Reaſon, that we cannot uſe either a Senſible or an Intelligible Criterie; for, which ſoever we take, it will be uncreditable, as being controverted.

For the ſame Reaſon they conceive, that nothing can be comprehended *through ſome other*; for if that, through which it is comprehended, will continually require to be comprehended through ſome other, they run into *the Alternate place*, or into *Infinite*. But if a man will aſſume any thing as comprehended through itſelf, by means whereof he would comprehend ſome other thing, to this it is repugnant, that nothing can be comprehended through itſelf, for the reaſons before alledged. But how that which it repugnant can be comprehended, either through itſelf, or any other, we doubt, ſince there appeareth no Criterie of Truth or Comprehenſion; but, without Demonſtration, ſigns are deſtroy'd, as we ſhall prove hereafter. Hitherto of the Places of Suſpenſion.

## CHAP. XXV.

### *The Places for Confutation of Ætiologicks.*

IN like manner, as we have delivered theſe places of Suſpenſion, ſome have laid down others, particularly againſt Ætiologies, (Allegations of Cauſes or Reaſons) becauſe the Dogmatiſts pleaſe themſelves exceedingly therein. *Æneſidemus* delivers eight Places, whereby he conceives all Dogmatick Ætiology may be refelled, as defective.

The *Firſt*, for that the kind of Ætiology, which is converſant in things not apparent, hath not an acknowledged proof from apparent things.

The *Second*, for that there are many great Reaſons to induce an Inclination, and but one alledged.

The *Third*, for that of things done orderly, Reaſons are given that ſhew no order.

The *Fourth*, for that taking *Phænomena's* as they are, they think they comprehend things not apparent, as they are likewiſe; for things not apparent are perhaps effected the ſame way as *Phænomena's*, perhaps ſome other peculiar way.

The *Fifth*, for that all (very nigh) give Reaſons, according to their own particular ſuppoſed Grounds, not according to the general and univerſally receiv'd ways of diſputation.

The *Sixth*, for that they often take for granted ſuch things as are eaſily comprehenſible; but omit their Contraries, tho' equally probable.

The *Seventh*, for that they alledge Reaſons not only repugnant to *Phænomena's*, but even to their own Suppoſitions.

The *Eighth*, for that the things which appear, and thoſe which are controverted, being equally dubious, they would prove their opinion concerning doubtful things, by things as doubtful.

He addeth, that it is poſſible, in Ætiologicks ſome may err by other places dependent upon theſe.

But perhaps, the five places of Suſpenſion are ſufficient againſt Ætiologicks. For a man muſt either alledge a Reaſon which agreeth with all Sects of Philoſophy, and with *Scepticiſm*, and with *Phænomena's*, or not: But to alledge ſuch a Reaſon is impoſſible, for all *Phænomena's* and not-apparents diſagree; and diſagreeing, it will be required, that a cauſe or reaſon thereof be given. Now if he alledge a *Phænomenon*, for reaſon of a *Phænomenon*, or a not-apparent for reaſon of a not-apparent, he runs into *Infinite*. If he prove one kind by the other, he incurs *the Alternate place*. If he make a ſtand any where, or ſay, that the cauſe (or reaſon) is ſuch, as that it conſiſts with the thing by him alledged, he falleth into the place of *Relation*, taking away that which is according to the proper nature of the thing; or if he aſſume ſomthing by way of ſuppoſition, we ſhall diſallow it. Thus alſo may the Temerity of the *Dogmatiſts* in Ætiology be confuted.

## CHAP. XXVI.

### *The Phraſes of the* Scepticks.

FOraſmuch as in uſing theſe places of Suſpenſion, we expreſs ourſelves by ſome particular Phraſes, which declare the Sceptical affection and our own paſſion, as, *Not more*, *Not to be defined*, and the like, it follows, that we treat of theſe.

Let us begin with this, *Not more*, for which ſometimes we ſay, *Nothing more*; not uſing (as ſome conceive) *not more*, in particular queſtions; and *nothing more*, in the general; but both promiſcuouſly. We therefore will treat of them both under one. It is an imperfect expreſſion, as when we ſay διπλῆ, we imply ἴσα διπλῆ; and when πολλαπλασία, we imply πολλαπλασία ὁμοίως; ſo when we ſay, *Not more*, it is as much as to ſay, *Not more this than that*, upwards nor downwards. There are ſome Scepticks, who for the Interrogation ὅ, uſe τί; *Which more, this or that?* taking τί caſually, as if they ſhould ſay, διὰ τί, *Why more this than that?* Interrogations are commonly uſed for * Axioms, as,

* What Axioms are, ſee in the doctrine of the *Stoicks*.

*Tombut Man is the Wife of* Jove *unknown?*

and Axioms for Interrogations, as, *I would know where* Dion *dwells?* and, *I demand for what cauſe a Poet is admir'd.* *Menander* uſeth τί for διὰ τί, as, Τί γὰρ ἐγὼ πλείονων.

This Phraſe, *Not more this than that*, declareth likewiſe our affection, by which we are brought, by reaſon of the equivalence of contrary things, to ἀφασία; we mean *Equivalence*, in that which appeareth probable to us. Contraries are thoſe, which generally oppugn one another; Ἀφασία is an enclining to neither. Now this Phraſe, *Not more*, though it ſeem to imply aſſent or denial, we uſe not that manner, but indifferently and improperly, either by way of queſtion, or for, *I know not to which of theſe I ſhould aſſent, and to which I ſhould not aſſent.* But, being required to declare what ſeemeth to us, we uſe the Phraſe by which we declare it indifferently. Know likewiſe, that when we ſay, *Not more*, we aſſert not that the doubt is true, but only expreſs what appeareth to us.

The next is *Aphaſia*; *Phaſis* is taken two ways, generally and particularly: generally for any ſpeech, declaring aſſertion or denial, as, *It is day*, *It is not day*: particularly, for Aſſertion only; in which acception, the Negatives are not called φάσεις. *Aphaſia* therefore is a renunciation of *Phaſis*, in the general ſignification, which comprehends both Affirmation and Negation. It is that affection, by which we neither aſſert a thing, nor deny it. We aſſume *Aphaſia*, not becauſe the nature of things is ſuch, as neceſſarily move it, but declaring, that at preſent we are thus affected, as to theſe or thoſe queſtions. Always remember, that we neither aſſert nor deny any thing unapparent, but yield to thoſe which move us pathetically, and neceſſarily compel us to aſſent.

Theſe Phraſes, πάντα ἢ οὐ πάντα, ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐνδέχεται ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, *Perhaps*, and *Not Perhaps*, we uſe for, *perhaps it is*, *perhaps it is not*. Thus, for brevity, we take, *not perhaps*, for, *perhaps it is not*. Here again we conteſt not about words, nor enquire what they naturally ſignifie, but take them indifferently. Theſe Phraſes declare an *Aphaſia*, for he who ſaith, *Perhaps it is*, implies its contrary to be as probable, becauſe he aſſents not that this is. The ſame of the reſt.

Ἐπέχω, *I ſuſpend*, we take for, *I cannot ſay, whether I ought to believe or diſbelieve the thing propoſed*, declaring, That the things ſeem equal to us, as to Belief and Unbelief; whether they are equal in themſelves, we aſſert not, but ſpeak of the *Phænomenon*, as it incurs into our Senſe. Ἐποχὴ, *Suſpenſion*, is ſo called, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπέχειν τὴν διάνοιαν, *from the mind's being held in Suſpence*, betwixt aſſerting and denying, through equivalence of the thing queſtioned. The ſame we ſay concerning,

Οὐδὲν ὁρίζω, *I determine nothing*; ὁρίζειν we conceive to be, not ſimply to ſpeak a thing, but to pronounce an unmaniſeſt thing with aſſent. Thus perhaps the *Sceptick* will be found to determine nothing, not ſo much as this, *I determine nothing*. For it is not a Dogmatical Opinion, (that is, an aſſent to ſomthing not maniſeſt) but a Phraſe declaring our affection. When therefore the Sceptick ſaith, *I determine nothing*, he meaneth, *I am ſo affected at the preſent, as not dogmatically to aſſert or deny any of the things controverted.* This he ſaith, as expreſſing how they appear to him, not pronouncing it enunciatively with perſuaſion.

Ἀοριστία is a paſſion of the mind, whereby we neither aſſert nor deny things dogmatically controverted, that is, not-maniſeſt. When therefore the *Sceptick* ſaith, *All are undefinable*, he taketh *are* for *appear* ſo to him; he ſaith *all*, not, *beings*, but thoſe *not-maniſeſt*, controverted by the *Dogmatiſts*. *Indefinable*, that is, *Not to be preferred before their Contraries, or common repugnants by belief or diſbelief.* And as he who ſaith, *Ambulo*, implieth, *Ego ambulo*; ſo he who ſaith, *All things are indefinite*, implieth, *as to us*, or, *as it ſeemeth to me.* The Meaning therefore is this, *All things controverted by the* Dogmatiſts *appear ſo to me, as that I think none of them more worthy belief than its contrary.*

The ſame is our Meaning when we ſay, *All are incomprehenſible*; we take [*all*] in the ſame ſenſe, and imply [*to me*;] as if we ſhould ſay, *All things controverted among the* Dogmatiſts *ſeem to me incomprehenſible.* We affirm not, they are incomprehenſible in their own nature, but declare our own affection, that we conceive we underſtand them not, by reaſon of the equivalence of Contraries.

Likewiſe the Phraſe, ἀκαταληπτῶ, and ἀκαταλαμβάνω, declares our own affection, by which the *Sceptick*, for the preſent, neither aſſerts nor denies any of the things not-maniſeſt that are in Controverſie. This is evident from what hath been ſaid upon the other Phraſes.

When we ſay, *To every Speech an equal Speech is oppoſite*, we mean, to every Speech that we have examined. *Speech*, we take not ſimply, but for that which aſſerteth ſomthing dogmatically, that is, of a thing not maniſeſt, not only by premiſes and concluſion, but any other way. *Equal*, we take not ſimply, but as to belief and diſbelief. *Is oppoſite*, we take generally for, is repugnant, implying, *as I think.* When therefore we ſay, *To every Speech, there is an equal Speech oppoſite*; the meaning is, *To every Speech*

*this*

*that I have examined, which asserteth any thing dogmatically, there seemeth to me to be opposite another Speech, asserting likewise dogmatically equal to it, for belief or disbelief.* Thus this Expression is not dogmatical, but the signification of an human affection, which is that which appeareth to the person affected. Some there are who pronounce it thus, *To every Speech, to oppose an equal Speech*, laying this down as a Precept, That to every Speech dogmatically asserting any thing, we should oppose the Speech which dogmatically asserteth its contrary. Thus addressing their words to the *Sceptick*, they use the Infinitive for the Imperative, *To oppose*, for, *Let us oppose*. They advis'd the *Sceptick*, not to be deceived by the *Dogmatists*, nor to give over his Inquisition, for the indisturbance which they conceive accompanies those who suspend their assent in every thing, as we said before.

It is not necessary to alledge more of these Phrases, even of these alledged some might have been spared, but take it for a Rule, In all the Sceptical Phrases, we affirm not that the Phrases themselves are true; for we say, that some may be taken away by others, and are circumscribed by those very things of which they are spoken, as purgative Medicines expel not only Humors, but, together with the Humors, themselves out of the Body. Moreover, we say, that we use them not, as properly signifying the thing, to which they are applyed, but indifferently, or (if they will so call it) improperly; for, it becomes not the *Sceptick* to contest about words. This we may the better do, in that the words are said not to signifie any thing purely in themselves, but relatively, and therefore as well in reference to the *Scepticks*. Furthermore, it must be remembred, that we pronounce them not generally of all things, but of the not-manifest, and those which are dogmatically controverted. The *Phænomenon* (that which appeareth to us) we declare, but of the nature of the external Object, we affirm nothing. By what hath been said, I conceive, that all Sophisms brought against the Sceptical Phrases may be resolved.

## CHAP. XXVII.

*Wherein* Scepticism *differs from those Philosophical Sects, which are most like it; and first wherein it differs from the Philosophy of* Heraclitus.

HAving declared the *signification* of Scepticism, its *Parts*, its *Criterie*, its *End*, its *Places of Suspension*, its *Phrases*, and its *Character*; it followeth that we explicate briefly, *wherein it differs from those Sects, which seem most like it*, that by this means we may the better understand it.

We will begin with the Philosophy of *Heraclitus*. That this differs from our Institution, is evident; for *Heraclitus* asserted dogmatically, concerning many things not-manifest, which (as I said before) we do not. But forasmuch as the followers of *Æneſidemus* said, the *Sceptick* Institution is the way to the *Heraclitian* Philosophy, Because that *Contraries appear in the same Thing*, is precedent to *Contraries are in the same Thing*: But the *Scepticks* say, *Contraries appear in the same Thing*, and the *Heraclitians* go on farther, affirming *Contraries are in the same Thing*; We answer, That Contraries appear in the same Thing, is not a Doctrine of the *Scepticks*, but a thing evident by Sense, not to the *Scepticks* only, but to all other Philosophers, and Men; as none dare deny, but Honey to the Sound is Sweet, to such as have the overflowing of the Gall, Bitter. Hereupon, the *Heraclitians* begin from the common Prænotion of men, as we do also, and perhaps other Sects: Wherefore if they had taken this sentence, *There are Contraries in the same thing*, as from this saying, *All are Incomprehensible*, or from, *I determine nothing*, or some other of that kind, perhaps they might collect rightly what they say; but since they have some Principles incident not only to us, but to other Philosophers, and even to the course of Life itself, why should any say, our Institution is preparative to the Philosophy of *Heraclitus*, more than to any other Sect, or to the course of Life itself, seeing all of us use these in common? Neither know I whether the *Sceptical* Institution divert not from the Philosophy of *Heraclitus*, rather than conduce to it; since the *Sceptick* reprehends, as temerarious, all that *Heraclitus* asserted dogmatically, contradicting his *Conflagration*, contradicting also his Tenent, *That there are Contraries in the same Thing*; and to every Doctrine of *Heraclitus*, (deriding the temerity of the *Dogmatists*) he saith, *I comprehend not, I determine not*, (as before,) which oppugns the *Heraclitians*. But it is absurd to say, That an Institution, which oppugns another, is the way preparative to the Discipline it oppugns. Therefore it is absurd to say, That the *Sceptical* Institution is the way to the *Heraclitian* Philosophy.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

*Wherein* Scepticism *differs from the Philosophy of* Democritus.

IN like manner, the Philosophy of *Democritus* is said to be all one with *Scepticism*, in that it seems to use the same matter; for from the appearance of Honey, to some Sweet, to some Bitter, *Democritus* argued, that in itself, it is neither Sweet nor Bitter, and thereupon used to say, *not more*, a Sceptick-phrase. But this Phrase, *not more*, is taken by the *Scepticks*, and by the *Democritians*, after a different manner. The *Democritians* signifie by it, that *neither is*, but we, *that we know not whether both of the* Phænomena's *are, or whether neither is*: Herein we dissent from them. But far greater is the difference in that *Democritus* saith, *Atoms, and Vacuum, truly are*; That herein, he differs from us, (though he begin with the inequality, and disagreement of *Phænomena's*) I conceive it needless to prove.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXIX.

*Wherein* Scepticism *differs from the* Cyrenaick *Sect.*

SOme affirm the *Cyrenaick* Sect, to be the ſame with *Scepticiſm*, for as much as it holds, *that the Affections themſelves only are comprehended.* Nevertheleſs it is different from *Scepticiſm*, for it holds *Pleaſure, and a light motion of the Fleſh* to be the *End*; we, *Indiſturbance*, to which the End they propoſe is contrary. For whether Pleaſure be preſent or abſent, he who aſſerts it to be the End, is diſturbed, as we ſaid * before. Beſides, we ſuſpend, only from aſſerting any thing concerning external Objects; but the *Cyrenaicks* affirm, they are of an incomprehenſible Nature.

* *Chap. 7.*

## CHAP. XXX.

*Wherein* Scepticism *differs from the Inſtitution of* Protagoras.

PRotagoras will have Man to be πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον, *the meaſure of all things; of Beings, as they are, of not Beings, as they are not.* By μέτρον, he means the Criterie, by χρημάτων, πραγμάτων, *of things*, which is as much as to ſay, *Man is the Criterie of all things; of Beings, as they are; of not Beings, as they are not.* Hereupon, he aſſerts the *Phænomena's* to be particular to every one, and thus brings in the *relative Common-place*, whereby he ſeems to have community with the *Pyrrhonians*; But he differs from them, as we ſhall eaſily find in explicating his Opinion. He ſaith, *Matter is fluid, and being in perpetual Fluxion, Appoſitions are made inſtead of Subſtractions, and the Senſes are tranſmutated and changed, according to the ſeveral ages and conſtitutions of the Body.* He ſaith alſo, *The Reaſons* (or Powers) *of all* Phænomena's *are ſubjected in Matter; ſo that Matter*, in itſelf, is all things which it appears unto all. *But Men at different times perceive things different, by reaſon of their different Habits; He, whoſe Conſtitution is ſound, of the things which are in Matter, perceiveth thoſe which are capable of appearing to ſuch Perſons; they who are otherwiſe diſpoſed, perceive the things which are capable of appearing to Perſons of a contrary Conſtitution. The ſame Reaſon there is in the difference of Ages, in Sleeping and Waking, and in all kinds of Habits. Man therefore*, according to him, *is the Criterie of things that Are: For all things which appear to Men, Are; thoſe which appear not to any Man, Are not.* Thus we ſee, he dogmatically aſſerted, *that Matter is fluid*, and that *the Reaſons of all Phænomena's are ſubjected in it*, wherein we, as being things not manifeſt, ſuſpend our aſſent.

## CHAP. XXXI.

*Wherein* Scepticism *differs from the* Academick *Philoſophy.*

SOme hold the *Academick* Philoſophy to be the ſame with *Scepticiſm*, let us therefore examine it. It is ſaid, there were more than three *Academies*; One, the moſt *Ancient*, inſtituted by *Plato*; the Second, and middle *Academy*, by *Arceſilaus*, Diſciple of *Polemon*; the Third, and new *Academy*, by *Carneades* and *Clitomachus*; there are who reckon a Fourth, inſtituted by *Philo*, and *Charmides*; ſome alſo a Fifth, by *Antiochus*. We will begin with the moſt *Ancient*. Some hold *Plato* to be *Dogmatick*, others *Aporematick* (dubitative;) others in ſome things, *Dogmatick*, in ſome, *Aporematick*. For in his Gymnaſtick Diſcourſes, where *Socrates* is introduced, deriding, or diſputing with the *Sophiſts*, they ſay, he hath a *Gymnaſtick*, and *Aporematick* Character; but when he declareth his own Opinion in the Perſon of *Socrates*, *Timæus*, or the like, a *Dogmatiſt*. As for thoſe, who ſay he is a *Dogmatiſt*, or in ſome things *Dogmatick*, in others *Aporematick*, we ſhall not need to meddle with them; for they acknowledg, that he diſſents from us. Whether he be purely *Sceptick*, we diſcourſe at large in our *Hypomnemata*: We ſhall now only examine it briefly, according to *Permedonius*, and *Æneſidemus*, (for they chiefly undertook this Task) who ſay, that *Plato*, when he aſſerteth *concerning Idæa's*, or that *there is Providence*, or that *Life joined with Virtue, is to be preferred before Life joined with Vice*: If he aſſent to theſe as exiſtent, he averreth dogmatically; if he aſſent as to the more probable, he differs from the *Sceptick* Character, in preferring one before the other, as to Beleif and Diſbeleif, as is manifeſt from what hath been ſaid already. Nor though he pronounce things *Sceptically* in his *Gymnaſticks*, is he therefore a *Sceptick*, for he who aſſerteth any one thing dogmatically, or preferreth any Phantaſie before another, for Beleif, or Diſbeleif, of a thing not manifeſt, followeth the *Dogmatick* Character, as *Timon* ſheweth, ſpeaking of *Xenophanes*: For (having often commended him, inſomuch that he writes his *Silli* in his Perſon) he maketh him to complain, and ſay;

*I with my Soul were ſubtle, and her Eye*
*So ſharp, as might * both ſides at once deſcry!* * M.S. [illegible]
*Loſt in the doubtful way, I long have ſtraid;*
*Even though (grown Old) I had with care eſſayd*
*Every opinion, ſearch'd all Theory,*
*For unto which could I my mind apply?*
*All into one reſolve, and this one ever*
*Drawn into one like Nature, doth perſever.*

Whence alſo he calls him ὑπόπτον, and not abſolutely, ἄπτωτον *void of Pride*, thus;

* *Xenophanes, not wholly free from Pride,* * Laert. [illegible]
*The fixions of old* Homer *did deride;* φαίνε.

*And*

*And fram'd a God, * whose Figure doth dissent*
*From Men, equal each way: Intelligent.*

He calls him ὑπόπτερον, as being not quite ἄπτερον; and Ὁμηροπάτην ἐπισκώπτων, for that he reproached and blamed the † fabulous way of *Homer*. Now *Xenophanes* asserted, besides *prænotions* (as others also) that the *Universe is one*, and that *God is of the same Nature with all things*; that *He is Spherical, Impassible, Immutable, and Rational*; Whence it is easie to shew that *Xenophanes* differs from us. Moreover, from what we said, it is manifest that *Plato*, though of some things he doubt, yet because in others he asserts, concerning the Essence of things not-manifest; and of things not-manifest, prefereth some before others, is no *Sceptick*.

Those of the *new Academy*, though they say *all things are Incomprehensible*, differ from the *Scepticks*, perhaps in saying that all things are Incomprehensible; for they assert this, but the Sceptick *admits it possible, that they may be comprehended*. But more apparently they differ from us, in the dijudication of Good and Evil. For the *Academicks* say, that something is Good and Ill, not after our manner, but as being persuaded, it is more probable, that what they call Good is Good, than the contrary: Whereas we say not that any thing is Good or Ill, as thinking what we say is probable, but without Opinion, we follow the ordinary course of Life, or otherwise we should do nothing. Moreover we hold Phantasies to be equal, as to Belief and Dis-belief; but they, that some are *Credible*, others *Incredible*. The *Credible* also, they subdivide into many kinds, some they hold to be *Credible* only, some to be *Credible* and *Circumcurrent*; some to be *Credible*, and *Circumcurrent*, and *Undistracted*; as, a Rope lying loose in a dark Room, a Man receives a *Credible* Phantasie from it, and runs away; another considering it more exactly, and weighing the circumstances, as that it moves not, that it is of such a colour, and the like, to him it appears a Rope, according to *Credible* and *Circumcurrent* Phantasie. *Undistracted* Phantasie is after this manner. It is reported, that *Hercules* brought *Alcestis* back from the *Inferi*, after her Death, and shew'd her to *Admetus*. He received a true and *circumcurrent* Phantasie of *Alcestis*, but remembring she was Dead, his Phantasie was distracted from assent, and inclined to Dis-belief. Now the new *Academicks*, before Phantasie which is simply *Credible*, prefer that which is *Credible* and *Circumcurrent*; and before both, that which is *Credible* and *Circumcurrent* and *Undistracted*. For though, both *Academicks* and *Scepticks* say, they believe some things; yet herein is a manifest difference between their Philosophies: *To believe*, is taken several ways; somtimes for *not to resist*, as a Boy is said to believe his Master; somtimes for *assenting to another, with an earnest resolute desire of the thing*, as a Prodigal believes him, who persuades him to live sumptuously: Now *Carneades* and *Clitomachus* using the word *Believe*, and *Credible*, as with vehement inclination, we only for yeilding without propensity to any thing; herein also we differ from them.

We differ likewise from the *new Academy*, as to what belongs to the *End*: They use in the course of Life, what is *Credible*, we following Lawes, Customes, and natural Affections, live without engaging our Opinion. We might add more instances of the difference between us, if it were not too large for our design.

But *Arcesilaus*, Institutor and President of the *middle Academy* seems to me to participate so much of the *Pyrrhonian* Reasons, as that his Institution and Ours is almost the same. For neither is he found to assert concerning the Existence or Inexistence of any thing, neither doth he prefer one thing before another for Belief or Disbelief, but in all things he suspends, holding *Suspension* to be the *End*, which, as we said, brings us to *Indisturbance*. He likewise holds particular Suspensions to be good, particular Assertions to be ill. But if we may believe what is related of him, they say, at first sight he appears a *Pyrrhonian*, but was indeed a *Dogmatist*; and that making trial, by doubts, of his Disciples, whether they were capable of *Plato*'s Doctrine, he was thought to be Aporetick, but that to his more ingenious Friends he taught the Doctrine of *Plato*, whence *Ariston* of him;

Pyrrho *behind*, Plato *before*,
*And in the middle*, Diodore.

For, though a *Platonick*, he used the Dialectick of *Diodorus*.

*Plato* saith, *As to (the Stoical Criterie) comprehensive Phantasie, things are incomprehensible; as to the natures of the things themselves, comprehensible. Antiochus* transferred the *Stoick* Sect into the *Academick*; whence it was said of him, That he taught the *Stoick* Doctrine in the Academy, for he shewed, that the *Stoical* Tenents were in *Plato*. Hereby it appears, the *Sceptick* Institution is different from the fourth and fifth *Academy*.

## CHAP. XXXII.

*Whether Empirical Medicine be the same with* Scepticism.

Some hold *Empirical Medicine* to be the same with the *Sceptick Philosophy*; but we must know, (notwithstanding it holds, that things not-manifest are incomprehensible,) it is not the same with *Scepticism*, neither is this Sect fit for a *Sceptick*, who, in my opinion, ought rather to persue that which is called *Methodick*; which alone, of all the Sects of Medicine, seems to behave itself not temeariously in things not-manifest, nor arrogantly to determine, whether they are comprehensible or incomprehensible; but following *Philinnena's*, it takes from them what seemeth profitable, according to the course of the *Scepticks*. For, as we said before, the common life of a *Sceptick* consists of four parts, conversant in the *Instruction of Nature*, in the *Impulsion of Passions*, in the *Constitutions of Lawes and Customs*, and in the *Tradition of Arts*. As a *Sceptick* therefore, by the Impulsion of Passions, is brought from Thirst to Drink, from Hunger to Meat, and the like; so a Methodick Physitian is guided by the Passions, to that which is

is convenient, from Conſtriction of the Pores to Relaxation, as when we ſhun the condenſation of Cold, by going into the Sun-ſhine; from Relaxation of the Pores to Conſtriction as when ſweating immoderately in a Bath, we retire to the cooler Air. That the things contrary to Nature lead him to thoſe that are agreeable to Nature, is manifeſt even from a Dog, who having got a Thorn in his Foot, endeavors preſently to get it out. Not to reckon up every thing, which were to exceed the ſcope of a Summary, I conceive, that all things ſaid in this manner by the Methodicks, may be referred to the impulſion of our Paſſions, as well thoſe which are agreeable to Nature, as thoſe which are not. Herein indeed theſe two Inſtitutions agree, both diſclaim Opinion, and both uſe words indifferently; as the *Sceptick*, *I deſign nothing*, *I comprehend nothing*; the Methodick, κοινότης, διάκειν, and the like. The word ὕπαξις alſo he takes without Opination, for an Action, whereby we are deduced from apparent Paſſions, Natural and Preternatural, to thoſe which ſeem convenient, as I ſhewed in Thirſt and Hunger. The Methodicks therefore are nearer ally'd to the *Scepticks* than any other Medicinal Sect, as appears by comparing them. Thus having diſcourſed of thoſe, which are of neareſt reſemblance to the *Sceptick* Inſtitution, we conclude the general part of *Scepticiſm*, and the firſt Book of our Summary.

THE

# Of Dialectick.

## THE SECOND BOOK.

### CHAP. I.

*Whether a Sceptick can examine and diſpute againſt Aſſertions?*

HAVING undertaken an inquiſition of the Dogmatiſts, we will briefly, and by way of Summary, examine every part of that which they call Philoſophy. But firſt, let us Anſwer them who cry, *A Sceptick is not capable to examine, or comprehend Dogmatick aſſertions.* They argue thus; *A Sceptick either comprehends aſſertions, or not; if he comprehend them, how can he doubt of that, which by his own confeſſion he comprehends? If he doth not comprehend them, he cannot diſcourſe upon that which he comprehends not. For, As he who knows not (for example) what is τὸ κατ' ὁ συμπερασμάτιον, a* Theorem by two Topicks, *is not able to ſay any thing of them: So, he who knows not the particular aſſertion of the Dogmatiſts, cannot diſpute againſt that, of which he knows nothing; therefore a Sceptick cannot examine or diſpute againſt the aſſertions of Dogmatiſts.*

Who argue thus, Let them ſay, in what ſenſe they uſe the word [*comprehend,*] whether ſimply, for *to underſtand without affirming ought, concerning the beings of the things whereon we diſcourſe*; or not onely to underſtand, but to *grant the being of thoſe things.* If they ſay, To *comprehend*, is *by diſcourſe to aſſent to comprehenſive phantaſie*, foraſmuch as comprehenſive phantaſie proceeds from a thing that hath being, impreſſed and ſealed according to the being thereof, in ſuch manner as cannot be derived from that which hath no being, perhaps even they themſelves will not be capable of examining or diſputing, againſt that which they comprehend not: As when the *Stoick* diſputes againſt the *Epicurean*, who affirms, that *Subſtance is divided*; or, that *God orders not the World by providence*; or, that *Pleaſure is a good*; Doth he comprehend or not? If he *comprehend*, he, in ſaying theſe things *are*, wholly ſubverts the *Stoick* Doctrin; if he comprehends not, neither can he ſay any thing againſt it. The ſame may be objected to thoſe of all other Sects, when they offer to diſpute againſt opinions, which they conceive heterodox; ſo as none of them can diſpute againſt another, upon any pretence whatſoever. Beſides, (not to trifle) in a word, all their Dogmatick learning will be ſubverted, and the Sceptick Philoſophy firmly eſtabliſhed, if it be granted, that none can diſpute of any thing, which is not thus comprehended. For whoſoever aſſerts Dogmatically concerning a thing not certain, aſſerts, either as having comprehended it, or not; if he hath not comprehended it, what he ſaith will not be creditable; if he hath comprehended it, he muſt ſay, that he did it either through the very thing it ſelf, and by ſome act incident to it, or by ſome inquiſition and examination. If *through itſelf by ſome act incident to it* a thing not-manifeſt be comprehended, it cannot be ſaid to be not-manifeſt, but equally apparent to all, granted and not controverted. But concerning every thing not-manifeſt, there is an irreconcilable difference amongſt them; wherefore the Dogmatiſt, who aſſerts concerning the being of a thing not-manifeſt, doth not comprehend it through itſelf, and by an Act incident to it. But, if *by ſome inquiſition*, how is he capable of enquiring or diſputing, before he comprehends the thing itſelf, according to the hypotheſis propoſed? For inquiſition requiring, that the thing after which we enquire be exactly comprehended; and on the other ſide, the comprehenſion of the thing whereof we enquire, requiring firſt inquiſition, by the *alternate Common-place* of Suſpenſion, it will be impoſſible for them to enquire and aſſert Dogmatically, concerning things not-manifeſt. If they would begin from *comprehenſion*, we object, that they muſt firſt enquire before they can comprehend; if from *inquiſition*, that they muſt comprehend before they can enquire. Wherefore they can neither comprehend, nor poſitively affirm concerning things not-manifeſt. So that this fooliſh *Dogmatick*-flouriſh will be taken away, and, as I conceive, the *Ephectick* Philoſophy come in of itſelf.

Now if they ſay, They conceive it not neceſſary, that ſuch comprehenſion precede inquiſition, but ſimple intellection onely; it is not impoſſible but they, who ſuſpend as to things not-manifeſt, may diſpute alſo; for the Sceptick, as I think, is not excluded from intellection, which ariſeth from Phænomena's that occur, and actually affect us. Neither doth this neceſſarily infer, that intelligibles are exiſtent; for we underſtand not onely things exiſtent, but the inexiſtent; whence the Ephectick, whether enquiring or underſtanding, continueth in his Sceptick Inſtitution. For, that he aſſents to things that occur to him by paſſive phantaſie, as they appear to him, his manifeſt.

Let us now ſee, whether the Dogmatiſts themſelves are not excluded from Inquiſition. It is not Incongruous, that they who confeſs themſelves ignorant of the nature of things, ſhould yet enquire after them, but that they who think they know them exactly ſhould do ſo; for theſe are arrived, as they think, at the end of Inquiſition, the others ſtill retain the ground of Inquiſition, *to think they have not found.* We ſhall briefly

briefly inquire into every part of that which they call Philoſophy. And foraſmuch as there is great controverſie among the Dogmatiſts, concerning the parts thereof, ſome aſſerting one, others two, others three, (which it is to no purpoſe here to enlarge,) we will explain the opinion of thoſe, who ſeem moſt perfectly converſant therein, and accommodate our diſcourſe to that.

## CHAP. II.

*From whence the Inquiſition againſt Dogmatiſts ſhould begin.*

THe Stoicks and ſome others ſay, The parts of Philoſophy are three, *Logick*, *Phyſick*, *Ethick*; they begin with the Logick, teaching that firſt (yet there is no little controverſie, which of them they ſhould begin withal.) Theſe we ſhall follow, without engaging our opinion. And becauſe the aſſertions in theſe three parts require judgment and a Criterie, and the diſcourſe concerning the Criterie ſeemeth to belong to Logick, we will begin with the Logical part, and firſt of the Criterie.

## CHAP. III.

*Of the Criterie.*

WHereas they call a Criterie, *that whereby eſſence and exiſtence* (as they ſay) *are judged*; as alſo, *that wherein we acquieſce in the courſe of life*: Our purpoſe now is to diſcourſe of that which they call, *The Criterie of truth*; for of Criterie in the other ſenſe, we diſcourſed formerly * in the firſt Book.

* *Chapt.* 8.

The *Criterie* of which we now diſcourſe is taken three wales, *Commonly*, *Properly*, *Moſt properly*. *Commonly, for every meaſure of comprehenſion; in which ſenſe, Naturals alſo are called Criteries, as, Sight. Properly, for every artificial meaſure of comprehenſion; as, a Ruler, a pair of Compaſſes. Moſt properly, for every artificial meaſure of comprehenſion of a thing not manifeſt; in which ſenſe, thoſe things which belong to the actions of life, are not called Criteries, but the rational onely, and thoſe which Dogmatick Philoſophers alledge for invention of truth.* Our deſign is, as we ſaid, to diſcourſe of the *rational Criterie*; and of this alſo there are three kinds, *in which, by which, according to which*; as, *in which*, the man; *by which*, the ſenſe, or the intellect; *according to which*, the application of the phantaſie, according to which a man attempts to judge by one of the fore-named. This it was neceſſary firſt to lay down, for underſtanding the ſubject of the queſtion. It remains we confute thoſe, who unadviſedly affirm, they comprehend the Criterie of truth; we will begin with that.

## CHAP. IV.

*Whether there be any Criterie of Truth.*

OF thoſe who have diſcourſed concerning the Criterie, ſome hold, that it is, as the Stoicks and others; ſome; that there is none, as (among the reſt) *Xeniades* of *Corinth*, and *Xenophanes* of *Colophon*, who ſaith.

——— *in every thing opinion's fram'd.*

But we ſuſpend, whether there be, or be not. This controverſie they muſt hold to be either dijudicable, (that is, determinable) or indijudicable, (indeterminable.) If indijudicable, they grant, we ought to ſuſpend in it; if dijudicable, let them ſay whereby it ſhall be judged, whenas we have not a Criterie acknowledged by all, neither know we whether there indeed be one, but enquire.

Moreover, to judge this controverſie of the Criterie, it is requiſite we have a Criterie acknowledged, by which we may judge it; and to have a Criterie acknowledged, it is neceſſary, that the controverſie concerning the Criterie be firſt judged. The diſpute thus incurring *the alternate Common place*, it cannot be reſolved, whether there be a Criterie or no. For we grant them not a Criterie by ſuppoſition; and if they judge a Criterie by a Criterie, we force them to go on *into infinite*.

Again, Demonſtration requiring a Criterie demonſtrated, and the Criterie a Demonſtration dijudicated, they fall into the *alternate Common place*.

This we conceive ſufficient to confute the confidence of the Dogmatiſts, in what they aſſert concerning a Criterie. It is not from the purpoſe to inſiſt longer hereon, and to ſhew ſeveral other ways, whereby they may be confuted; but we ſhall not mention all their particular opinions herein, (for it cannot be expreſſed, how much they differ among themſelves concerning it; and this would put us out of the right method in our diſpute.) Becauſe therefore the Criterie after which we enquire ſeems threefold, *in which, by which, according to which*, we ſhall examine every one of theſe apart, and ſhew its incomprehenſibility. Thus our diſcourſe will be moſt Methodical and perfect. We will begin with that *in which*, for the reſt ſeem in ſome manner dubious by reaſon of it.

## CHAP. V.

*Of the Criterie, in which.*

NOw *Man*, (in my opinion) by what the Dogmatiſts ſay, is not onely not to be comprehended, but not to be underſtood; for we hear *Socrates* (in *Plato*) plainly confeſſing, *he knows not whether he is a man or ſome other thing*. And when they would declare the notion of *man*, they firſt diſagree among themſelves, next they ſpeak fooliſhly; for *Democritus* ſaith, *Man it that which we all know*; by which we cannot know what Man is; for we know a Dog, and

and according to this, a Dog ſhould be a man; ſome men we know not, and therefore they ſhould not be men. But indeed, according to this notion there will be no man at all; for if it be neceſſary that a man be known by all, there is no man known to all men, and conſequently there is no man at all. That we ſay not this ſophiſtically, but as a conſequence to his Doctrin, is apparent; for he holds that, *nothing really exiſts but Atoms and Vacuum, which* (he ſaith) *exiſt not in Animals onely, but in all compounded things*; by theſe we cannot underſtand the property of Man; for they are common to all, but there is in theſe nothing elſe within our capacity; we have nothing therefore, whereby we may diſtinguiſh Man from other Creatures, and underſtand him ſimply.

*Epicurus* ſaith, that *Man is ſuch a kind of figured animate Being*; Now according to this, ſeeing Man is onely ſuch a kind of Being, as is ſhewn, (by him, who thus deſcribes him) that perſon who is not ſuch, as is thus ſhewn, is not a man: and if a man (in deſcribing man after this manner) ſhew a Woman, the man himſelf will not be a man; or if a woman ſhew a man, the woman will not be of mankind; The ſame we may argue from the difference of *circumſtances*, mentioned in the fourth Common place of Suſpenſion.

Others ſay, *a man is an Animal, Rational, Mortal, capable of Underſtanding and Science*: now having ſhewn in the *firſt Common place* of Suſpenſion, that no Animal is irrational, but that all are capable of Underſtanding and Science, by their own confeſſion, we know not what they mean. Again, the accidents which are inſerted into a definition, are meant either actual or potential. If actual, he is no man who hath not attained perfect Science, and hath not perfect Science or diſcourſe, and is not in the ſtate of death, for that is to be mortal actually. If potential, he who hath perfect reaſon, and hath attained Underſtanding and Science, is no man, which were more abſurd than the former.

*Plato*, who will have a man to be *an Animal without feathers, with two feet, with broad nails, capable of political Science*, dares not affirm this poſitively. For if a man be, * as he holds, one of thoſe things which are generated, but indeed are not: It is impoſſible, (as he acknowledgeth) to affirm poſitively, concerning things that are not. Neither doth *Plato* himſelf lay down this poſition as certain, but diſcourſing, as he uſeth, according to the moſt probable.

But though we ſhould grant, that man May be underſtood, we ſhall nevertheleſs find that he cannot be comprehended. For we conſiſt of Soul and Body, but neither Soul nor Body (perhaps) can be comprehended, therefore not Man. That *the body is not comprehended*, appears from this; the accidents of a thing are diſtinct from the thing, to which they are accidents, now when colour, or the like, preſents it ſelf to us, the accidents of the Body are preſented to us, but not the Body it ſelf. A Body, they ſay, hath three dimenſions; we muſt therefore, to comprehend the Body, comprehend the length, bredth, and depth, but if this did preſent it ſelf to us, we might diſcern ſilver that is guilt: Therefore the Body cannot be comprehended.

Beſides this, a Man ſhall be found to be incomprehenſible, becauſe *his ſoul is incomprehenſible*. That his Soul is incomprehenſible, is manifeſt, thus. Of thoſe who have diſcourſed concerning the Soul, (to omit the great undetermined conteſt amongſt them) ſome ſaid, that *there is no Soul*, as the followers of *Dicæarchus* the Meſſenian; others that *there is*; others *ſuſpended*. This controverſie, therefore, if the Dogmatiſts acknowledge to be indijudicable, they grant the incomprehenſibility of the Soul; if dijudicable, let them ſay, by what they judge and determin it. By Senſe they cannot, for they hold the Soul to be intelligible; if by Intellect, we object, the Intellect is the moſt unmanifeſt thing in the Soul, as they ſhew, who agree in the exiſtence of the Soul, but diſagree concerning her Intellect. If therefore they would comprehend the Soul, and determin the controverſie concerning her by Intellect, they would determin that which is leſs in controverſie, by that which is more in controverſie, which is abſurd. Therefore neither by Intellect can the queſtion concerning the Soul be judged and determined, therefore, by nothing; therefore it is incomprehenſible, and conſequently, Man cannot be comprehended.

But tho' we ſhould grant, that Man may be comprehended, yet perhaps it cannot be proved, that things ſhould be judged (and determined) by him. For he who ſaith, that things ſhould be judged by Man, ſaith it either without demonſtration or with demonſtration. Not with demonſtration, for demonſtration ought to be true and adjudged; but, we knowing none, who by the conſent of all, is able to judge the demonſtration, (for the Criterie *in which* is in queſtion) we are not able to judge the demonſtration, and conſequently cannot demonſtrate the Criterie *in which*, the ſubject of our diſcourſe. If it be ſaid, that things may be judged by Man without demonſtration, it will be incredibtable, becauſe we have not any thing whereby to aſcertain, that the Criterie *in which* is Man. From what ſhall it be judged, that the Criterie *in which* is Man? For if they ſay it without judgement and determination, it will not be admitted; if as determined by Man, the queſtion is begged; if, as by any other Creature, how can any ſuch be allow'd, to determin that Man is the Criterie? If without determination, it is of no credit; if with determination, that Criterie muſt again be judged by ſome other, to be capable of determining; If by it ſelf, the abſurdity continues, for the thing in queſtion is determin'd by the thing in queſtion. If by Man, the *alternate Common place* comes in. If by any other beſides theſe, we ſhall again require a Criterie *in which*, and ſo to infinite. Therefore, we cannot ſay, things are to be determined by man.

But if it be granted, that Man ought to determin things, yet ſeeing there is ſo great diſſention amongſt men, the Dogmatiſts muſt agree among themſelves, what one Man they ought to follow before they impoſe it upon us. Otherwiſe, if,

*As long as ſtreams ſhall flow, and tall Trees bloome,*

they are like to diſagree upon this, why do they preſs us ſo earneſtly to aſſent to any one perſon?

* So Plato diſtinguiſheth often, eſpecially in Timæo, where he at large explaineth τὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἢ τὸ ἀπολλύμενον, & τὶ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὄν δ' οὐδὲν.

If ſay they, We muſt believe a wiſe man; we ſhall ask, What kind of wiſe Man, whether an *Epicurean*, or a *Stoick*, or a *Cynick*? They cannot agree Which. If any require us to lay down this queſtion concerning the wiſe Man, and ſimply to believe him who is wiſer than all others; firſt, they will herein alſo diſagree, Who is wiſer than the reſt; and, tho' they could agree in ſome one perſon, acknowledging him wiſer than all that are, or ever were, yet neither will he be worthy to be credited; for there being a great, and, almoſt infinite intenſion and remiſſion, as to Wiſdom, we ſay, it is poſſible, there may be another wiſer than this Man, whom they hold to be wiſer than all, that either are or were. As therefore they require of us to give credit to him, that is ſaid to be wiſer than all that are or ever were, in reſpect of his Wiſdom; ſo, if one comes after him wiſer than he, this laſt is to be believed before him; and whil'ſt this ſecond lives, we may hope for another wiſer than he; after whom, another; and ſo to infinite. Now whether theſe will agree with one another, no Man knows. So that tho' it were granted, that there is one Man wiſer than all that are, or ever were; yet becauſe we cannot affirm, there ſhall never be any one wiſer than he; (for that is uncertain,) we ought always to expect the judgment of that future wiſeſt perſon, and not aſſent to him who is wiſeſt at preſent.

But tho' we ſhould grant, that there is not, was not, nor ever ſhall be, any perſon wiſer than him whom they ſuppoſe, yet neither it is convenient to believe him; for wiſe perſons affect moſt (in the conſtruction of things) to maintain Paradoxes, making the unſound ſeem ſound and true. When therefore the ſagacious perſon ſaies any thing, we cannot tell whether he ſpeaks it according to the nature of the thing it ſelf, or alledgeth a falſity as if it were a truth, perſwading us to believe it, he being wiſer than all Men, and therefore we not able to contradict him. Thus ought we not to aſſent to him, as judging things rightly, becauſe we may imagine, The things which he ſaith are not true, but repreſented as ſuch, by the extraordinary advantage he hath over us in ſagacity. For theſe reaſons, we ought not in the judgment of things to believe him, who ſeemeth the moſt ſagacious of all Men.

If any ſhall ſay, We ought to believe the agreement of many. We anſwer, That to do ſo is fooliſh; for firſt, Truth perhaps is rare, and therefore one may be wiſer than many. Again, every Criterie hath more adverſaries, than thoſe who agree in defence thereof. For all thoſe who maintain any other Criterie whatſoever, oppoſe them who agree in the defence of one, and are therefore of much greater number than the others. Beſides, they who agree, either are in different affections, or in one. In different they are not, at leaſt as to this, for then they would not agree in it. If in one, ſeeing that he who affirmeth any thing, different from this which they agree in, hath one affection, and all they who agree in it have but one; as to the affections which we follow, there is no advantage in the number: Wherefore we ought not to follow many rather than one. As alſo, becauſe the difference of judgments, as to their multitude, is incomprehenſible, as we ſhewed from the *fourth Common place* of Suſpenſion; for there are infinite Men, if we conſider them ſingly, neither are we able to examine the judgments of all, and ſo to ſay what the greater part holds, what the feweſt. It is therefore in this reſpect abſurd alſo, to prefer ſome Judges before others, becauſe of their number. And if the judgment of all in general is not to be followed, neither ſhall we find any at all by whom things may be judged, tho' we ſhould grant never ſo much otherwiſe. Wherefore by all this, the Criterie *in which* all things are judged, appears to be incomprehenſible; and the other Criteries being circumſcribed by this, (for each of them is either a part, or a paſſion, or an action of Man) it followeth, * we need not perhaps ſpeak of them, having here diſcourſed of them already. But leſt we ſhould ſeem to decline the confutation of every one in particular, we will ſay ſomething over and above of them; and firſt of the Criterie called, *By which.*

* reading ἐκάστου αὐτῶν.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of the Criterie*, By which.

GReat, almoſt infinite, is the diſagreement amongſt the Dogmatiſts concerning this; but we, obſerving our firſt method, ſhall only ſay; Foraſmuch as, according to them, Man is the Criterie *in which* things are judged, but he hath nothing *by which* he can judge (as they all agree) beſides Senſe and Intellect; if we ſhew he cannot judge neither by *Senſe* alone, nor by *Intellect* alone, nor by *both* together, we ſhall compendiouſly refute all their particular Aſſertions.

Let us begin with the *Senſes*. Whereas ſome hold, that *the affections of the Senſes are vain*, (and that none of thoſe things which we think that we perceive, are ſubjected to them.) Others, that *all the things by which the Senſes think they are moved, are ſubjected to them*. Others, that *ſome of them are ſubjected to the Senſes, others not*. We know not to which of theſe we ſhould aſſent, for we cannot determine the controverſie, neither by Senſe, (for the queſtion is, whether that be vainly affected, or comprehend truly) nor by any other; for there is no other Criterie whereby it ought to be determined, (according to the Hypotheſis) it will therefore be indeterminable and incomprehenſible, whether Senſe be vainly affected, or comprehendeth any thing. Whence it followeth, that we ought not to relye wholly upon Senſe in the determination of things, when as we cannot ſay, that it comprehendeth any thing.

But let us grant the Senſes to be comprehenſive, yet will they be found to be nothing the leſs uncreditable, as to determination concerning external Objects. The Senſes are contrarily moved by externals, as the taſte by the ſame Honey is ſometimes affected ſweetly, ſometimes bitterly. The Sight thinketh the ſame colour ſometimes red, ſometimes white. Neither doth the ſmell agree with it ſelf. He who hath ſome kind of obſtructions in the Head, thinketh Unguents not to be ſweet; he who hath not, ſaith they are ſweet. Perſons Divinely inſpired, and Fa-

* natick,

natick, imagine they hear others discoursing with them, whom we hear not. The same water to those who are troubled with an Inflammation seems excessive hot, to others moderately warm. Now whether shall we say, All these phantasies are true, or all false; or some false, some true? To say, that all are false is impossible, for we have not any Criterie uncontroverted, whereby to determine that which we prefer; neither have we any true determined demonstration, seeing that the Criterie of Truth, whereby true demonstration ought to be determined, is still in question. For this reason, he who conceiveth, we ought to give credit to those who are well, and not to those who are not, speaks absurdly; for saying this without demonstration, he shall not be believed; but a true adjudged demonstration, he cannot have, for the reasons alledged.

But though we should grant, that the phantasies of those who are well, are creditable, others not; nevertheless it will be found, that external Objects cannot be judged by the Senses only. The Sight, in persons that are well, judgeth the same Tower sometimes to be round, sometimes square; the Taste judgeth the same Meats upon Repletion Sower, in Hunger pleasant; the Hearing perceiveth the same voice in the night loud, in the day low; the smell, what most Men declare to be stinking, in Tanners commonly denies it; the same touch when we enter a Bath is warmed by the Parastas, when we come out cooled by it. Wherefore seeing the Senses of such as are well, disagree amongst themselves, and their disagreement is indeterminable, (for we have not any thing universally acknowledged, whereby they may be determined) the doubt must necessarily be insolvable. Many other things might be alledged out of the Common places of Suspension. Thus perhaps it is not true, that Sense alone can judge of external Objects.

Let us now come to *Intellect*. They who conceive, that Intellect only is to be followed in the judication of things; First, they cannot demonstrate it to be comprehensible, that there is Intellect; for *Gorgias*, in saying, *There is nothing*, saith, that there is not Intellect. Others assert, *It exists*. How will they determine this controversie? Not by Intellect, (for that were to beg the question) nor by any other; for they say, there is no other (according to the Hypothesis) by which the things may be judged. It remains therefore indeterminable and incomprehensible, whether there be Intellect or not. Whence it followeth, that we ought not to relye upon Intellect only, in the dijudication of things, being itself is not yet comprehended.

But let us admit Intellect to be comprehended, and grant by way of supposition, that it exists; notwithstanding, I say, it cannot determine of things; for if it seeth not it self exactly, but disagreeth concerning its own Essence, and the manner of its Generation, how then can it exactly comprehend other things? Besides, though we grant Intellect to be capable to determine of things; yet we shall not find how to determine by it. For there being much difference as to Intellect; one Intellect of *Gorgias*, according to which he saith, *Nothing is*; another of *Heraclitus*, according to which he saith, *All things are*; another of those who affirm, *Somthings are, others are not*: We shall not find any way to dijudicate these differences of Intellects, nor be able to say, This Intellect is to be preferred before that, or that not to be preferred before this. For, if we would judge it by any Intellect, we yield to Parties in the difference, and beg the Question: if by any other than by Intellect, we are deceived, because we ought to judge things by Intellect only. Moreover, from what we said upon the Criterie *by which*, may be demonstrated, that we can neither find a Sagacity exceeding the Sagacity of others: Nor if we could find an Intellect more Sagacious, than any ever had, or have been; yet, (forasmuch as it is uncertain, whether there will not be one more Sagacious than it) we ought not to follow it. And though we should suppose an Intellect more Sagacious, than any shall ever be hereafter, yet ought we not to follow him who judgeth by it; lest, alledging some false reason, he perswade us by the acuteness of his Wit, that it is True. Therefore, neither doth Intellect only judge things.

It remaineth we say, that things are judged *by both*, which likewise is impossible; for the Senses are so far from guiding the Intellect to comprehension, that they contradict one another. Honey seems sweet to some, bitter to others; *Democritus* held, *it is neither sweet nor bitter*; *Heraclitus*, that *it is both*. 'Tis the same in other Senses, and other Sensibles. So as the Intellect, impelled by the Senses, is constrained to affirm things different and repugnant. But such a kind of Criterie is far from comprehensive.

Moreover, they must say, That they judge things either by all the Senses, and all * Intellects; or, by some. By all, it is impossible; there appearing so great controversie amongst several Senses and Intellects, (likewise the Intellect of *Gorgias* declaring, that *neither the judgment of Sense or Intellect ought to be followed*, the argument will be retorted:) If by some, Who can judge, that we ought to adhere to the Senses, and this Intellect, and not to those, not having an acknowledged Criterie, by which to judge different Senses and Intellects. If we say, that they judge Senses and Intellects by Intellect and Sense, † they beg the question, which is, Whether we can judge by these.

Again, either he judgeth Senses and Intellects by Sense; or Senses and Intellects by Intellect; or Senses by Sense, and Intellects by Intellect; or Intellects by Sense, and Sense by Intellect. If they say, they judge these by Senses or Intellect, they judge not by Sense and Intellect, but by one of them, which they make choice of, and consequently incur the difficulties alledged formerly, If Senses by Sense, and Intellects by Intellect, there being so great repugnance of Senses to Senses, and Intellects to Intellects, which soever they take of the repugnant Senses to judge the rest of the Senses, they beg the question; for they assume part of the difference, as creditable, for dijudication of things equally controverted with it. It is the same in Intellects. If they judge Intellects by Senses, and Senses by Intellects, the *alternate Common place* occurs, shewing, that to judge Senses we prejudge Intellects, and

* read here and after, *διανοίας*.

† Betwixt *κεκρῖσθαι* & *πάλιν*, there is a breach and defect, in the *M. Ss.* of Mr. *Casaubon* and Sir *Henry Savile*; which the printed Edition not taking notice of, confounds the sense.

and to examin Intellects we muſt prejudge Senſes. Wherefore ſeeing that Criteries of one kind cannot be judged by Criteries of the ſame kind, nor, both kinds by one kind, nor reciprocally one kind by the other kind; nor can we prefer Intellect before Intellect, or Senſe before Senſe; it followes, That we have not any thing whereby to judge. For, if we cannot judge by all Senſes and Intellects, nor know by which we ought to judge, and by which not to judge, we ſhall not have any thing by which to judge things. Wherefore there is no Criterie *by which*.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of the Criterie* According to which.

LEt us next examine the Criterie *according to which* things are judged. In the firſt place we may hold, that phantaſie is unconceivable; for they ſay, *Phantaſie is an impreſſion in the Hegemonick part of the Soul.* Seeing therefore that the Soul and the Hegemonick is a Spirit, or ſomething more ſubtle than Spirit, as they themſelves hold; no Man can conceive, that there is in himſelf an impreſſion, either by extuberance and depreſſion, as we ſee in Scales; or by the wonderfully invented Heteræotick, for he could retain in memory ſo many Theorems, as make up an Art, becauſe by ſucceeding Heterœoſes, the precedent would be defaced.

But, tho' there were ſuch a thing as Phantaſie, yet would it be incomprehenſible, for it is a paſſion of the Hegemonick; the Hegemonick, as we ſhew'd, is not comprehended; therefore neither can we comprehend its affection.

Moreover, tho' we ſhould grant, that phantaſie is comprehended, yet things cannot be judged according to it; for it doth not (ſay they) apply it ſelf to externals, and conceive Phantaſies in it ſelf, but by the Senſes. Now the Senſes comprehend not the external objects, but their affections onely; For Honey, and my being ſweetly affected, are not all one thing; neither is Wormwood the ſame with my being bitterly affected; they differ. But if the affection differ from the External object, the Phantaſie will not be of the External object, but of ſome other thing different from it. Therefore if the Intellect judge according to the Phantaſie, it will judge amiſs, and not according to the object; whence it is abſurd to ſay, External objects are judicated according to the Phantaſie.

Neither can it be ſaid, that the Soul comprehends ſenſible objects by ſenſible affections, becauſe the affections of the Senſes are like their External objects; for how can the Intellect know, whether the affections of the Senſes are like the ſenſible objects, when as itſelf meddles not with External objects, neither do the Senſes declare the natures of them to her, but onely their own affections, as we argued in the *Common places of Suſpenſion.* For as he who knowes not *Socrates*, if he look upon his picture, knows not whether it be like *Socrates*; ſo that Intellect, beholding the affections of the Senſes, but not ſeeing the External objects themſelves, cannot tell, whether the affections of the Senſes are like their External objects. Therefore neither by aſſimilation can it judge thoſe things according to the Phantaſie.

But let us grant, that the Phantaſie can not onely underſtand and comprehend, but is able alſo to judge things of it ſelf, (tho' we have proved the contrary) it followes, that either we muſt believe all Phantaſies, (one whereof ſaith, that all Phantaſies are incredibile, by which means the argument will be retorted, that all Phantaſies, by their own acknowledgment, are not capable to judge things) or if we muſt believe onely ſome, How ſhall we judge, Which Phantaſies are to be believed, which not? If without Phantaſie, then they grant, that Phantaſie is not requiſite to the judgment of things, in as much as they ſay, they can judge things without it. If with Phantaſie, How will they aſſume that Phantaſie, by which they mean to judge all other Phantaſies? Or again, they will need another Phantaſie to judge the Phantaſie, by which they judge all Phantaſies, and another to judge that, and ſo to infinite; but it is impoſſible to judge to infinite; therefore it is impoſſible, to find what Phantaſies ought to be uſed as Criteries, what not. Since therefore, which way ſoever we grant that things ought to be judged according to Phantaſies, the argument will be retorted, whether by all, or by ſome onely. We conclude, that Phantaſies ought not to be uſed as Criteries, to judge things.

This may ſerve for an Anſwer by way of Summary, to the Criterie *according to which*: But take notice, that our purpoſe is not to prove, there is no Criterie of truth exiſtent, (for that were Dogmatical) but becauſe the Dogmatiſts ſeem probably to have evinced, that there is a Criterie of truth, we have propoſed arguments that ſeem probable againſt them; not that we think them true, or more probable than the contrary; but foraſmuch as theſe arguments, and thoſe of the Dogmatiſts, ſeem alike probable, we are driven to Suſpenſion.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of True and Truth.*

THough we ſhould grant, (by way of ſuppoſition) that there is ſome Criterie of truth, yet will it be uſeleſs and vain, if we prove, (even out of what the Dogmatiſts themſelves ſay) that truth is not, neither can it be, We ſhew it thus: *True, is ſaid to differ from Truth three wayes; by Eſſence, by Conſtitution, by Power. By Eſſence, for True is Incorporeal, (as being an axiome and a dicible) but Truth is a Body, as being the enunciative Science of all true things; but Science is the Hegemonick after ſuch a manner, as the fiſt is the hand after ſuch a manner; but the Hegemonick is a Body, for (according to them) it is a Spirit.*

*By Conſtitution, for True is ſomething ſimple, as, I diſcourſe; but Truth conſiſts of the knowledge of many True things.*

*By Power, for Truth adhereth to Science, True doth not abſolutely; whence they ſay that, Truth can onely be in a wiſe perſon, but True in a wicked; for a wicked man may ſpeak ſomething that is True.* Thus the Dogmatiſts.

But

But we continuing our first design, will discourse onely concerning *True*: For *Truth*, which is said to be *the Science of the knowledge of things True*, is included therein. Again, forasmuch as of arguments, some are general by which we take away the substance of True; others particular, whereby we shew that Truth is neither in speech, nor in a dicible, nor in the motion of the Intellect, we conceive it sufficient to use onely the General. For, as when the foundation of a Wall is taken away, all the superstructures fall; so the subsistence of True being taken away, the particular conceits of the Dogmatists are thereby excluded also.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Whether True be something in nature.*

THere being a disagreement amongst the Dogmatists concerning Truth, (some holding, that True is something, others that it is not) the controversie is not capable to be judged. For he who saith, that *True is something*, if he say it without demonstration, will not be credited, because of the disagreement; if he alledge a demonstration, and acknowledge it to be false, he is uncreditable; if he say, that it is True, he runs into the *alternate Common place*. It will be required of him, that he produce a demonstration to demonstrate that to be True, and another to prove this, and so to infinite; but it is impossible to demonstrate infinities, therefore it is impossible to know whether *True* be *something*.

Again, this *something*, which they hold to be the most General of all things, is either True or false, or neither True nor false, or both True and false. If they say, it is false, they confess that all things are false: For as because an Animal is something Animate, therefore every Animal in particular is Animate; in like manner, if this *something*, being the most General of all things, be false, all things in particular will be false and nothing true. Whence also may be inferred that *nothing is false*, for this proposition *all things are false*, this other *something is false*, including all things, will be false. And if something be True, all things will be True, and consequently nothing will be True; for this proposition, *Nothing is True*, will be True.

If something be both True and false, every thing in particular will be both True and false, whence it will follow, that nothing is in its own nature True; for that which is True in its own nature, cannot by any meanes be false.

If something be neither True nor false, they confess, that all things in particular being said to be neither True nor false, are not True, and therefore it is not manifest to us whether this be True.

Moreover, either things manifest onely are True, or onely things not manifest, or of True things, some are manifest, others not manifest; But neither of these, as shall be proved; therefore nothing is True. If onely things manifest are True, they must say that all the manifest are True, or some onely; if *all*, the argument will be retorted, saying *it is manifest, that nothing is True*; if *some*, none can say, without dijudication, *this is True, that false*. If he use a Criterie, he must grant it to be either manifest or unmanifest; not unmanifest, for the manifest onely are now supposed True; if manifest, we demand, Which manifest things are True, which false? The thing manifest, assumed to judge things manifest, will itself require another Criterie, and that another, and so to infinite; but it is impossible to judge to infinite; therefore it is impossible to comprehend, which manifest things onely are True.

He who saith, *onely unmanifest* things are True, holdeth not that all things are True, (for he will not say, *that the Stars are even and that they are odd, is alike True*) if *some*, by what shall we judge that these unmanifest things are True, those False? Not by any thing manifest, and if by any thing unmanifest, that unmanifest thing will require another to judge, and this another, and so to infinite. Wherefore, neither are onely things unapparent True.

It remains, that we say of the True, some are manifest, others unmanifest, which also is absurd. For either all things, both manifest and unmanifest, are True, or some of the manifest, and some of the unmanifest. If all, the argument will be retorted, granting it to be True, that *nothing is True*. He likewise grants it to be True, *that the Stars are even, and that they are odd*. If of the manifest some onely are True, and of the unmanifest some onely, by what shall we judge that of the manifest, these are True, these False; if by a thing manifest, we run into infinite: If by an unmanifest, forasmuch as the unmanifest requires dijudication also, by what shall that unmanifest be judged? If by a manifest, the *alternate Common place* occurs; if by an unmanifest, the Common place of *infinite*. The same may be said of the unmanifest, for he who undertakes to judge it by an unmanifest, is forc'd to run into infinite; he who by a manifest, either assuming a manifest, runs into the Common place of *infinite*, or passing to an unmanifest, into the *alternate*. It is therefore false to say, that of the True some are manifest, others not manifest.

Now if neither the manifest onely are True, nor onely the unmanifest, nor some of the manifest, and some of the unmanifest, then nothing is True; and if nothing be True, the Criterie conducing to the judgment of Truth, would be useless and vaine, tho' we should grant it had a being. Now if we must suspend concerning this question, *whether True be something*, it will follow, that they who say, *Dialectick is the Science of things True, False, and Neuter*, speak rashly; since the Critery of Truth appears to be undeterminable; neither can we affirm any thing, either concerning those things which seem *evident* as the Dogmatists call them, or concerning the unmanifest; For since the later, (as the Dogmatists conceive) are comprehended by the former, if we are inforced to suspend concerning the Evident, how dare we assert concerning the Unmanifest?

But we shall (over and above) alledge our Arguments against particular things; and forasmuch as these seem to be comprehended by *Sign*, and *Demonstration*, we shall shew that we ought to

to ſuſpend our Aſſent concerning Sign and Demonſtration. We will begin with *Sign*, for Demonſtration is a ſpecies of Sign.

## CHAP. X.

### *Of Sign.*

OF *things* (according to the Dogmatiſts) *ſome are* manifeſt, others unmanifeſt. *Of the unmanifeſt, ſome are* abſolutely unmanifeſt, *others* unmanifeſt for a time, *others* unmanifeſt by nature. *Manifeſt they hold to be thoſe things which of themſelves come into our knowledge, as* it is day. *Abſolutely unmanifeſt, thoſe which come not within the reach of our comprehenſion, as, that the number of the Stars is even. Unmanifeſt for a time, thoſe which are manifeſt in their own nature, but by reaſon of ſome external circumſtances, they are for a time not manifeſt to us, as the City of* Athens *is to me at this preſent. Unmanifeſt by nature are thoſe, which have a nature not ſubject to be manifeſt to us, as Pores; for theſe never appear to us of themſelves; but are comprehended from ſome others, as by ſweat or the like. Manifeſt things, ſay they, require not a ſign, (for they are comprehended of themſelves) neither thoſe which are abſolutely unmanifeſt, for they are no way to be comprehended; but the unmanifeſt for a time, and the unmanifeſt by nature, are comprehended by ſigns, yet not by the ſame; the unmanifeſt for a time, by the Hypomneſtick (admonitive) the unmanifeſt by nature, by the Endictick (indicative.) Of Signes therefore, ſome are according to them, Hypomneſtick, others Endictick. A Hypomneſtick ſign, they call that which being obſerved to be together with a ſignificate, evident, aſſoon as ever the ſign evidently incurreth to our ſenſe, tho' the ſignificate appear not, yet it cauſeth us to remember that which was concomitant to it, tho' at preſent not evident, as ſmoak and fire.*

*An Endictick ſign, (ſay they) is that, which is not obſerved together with an evident * ſignificate, but of its own nature and conſtitution ſignifieth that whereof it is a ſigne; thus the motions of the body are ſignes of the Soul.*

* M. S. συμπαρατηρηθεν.

Hereupon they define Signe thus, *Signe is a demonſtrative axiome, antecedent in a ſound connex, detective of that which followeth.*

Of theſe two kinds of ſigns, we oppoſe not both, but onely the Endictick, as ſeeming to be forged by the Dogmatiſts; the Hypomneſtick is creditable in the courſe of life; for whoſoever ſees ſmoak, knows that Fire is ſignified, and ſeeing a ſcar ſaith, it had been a wound. So as we not onely not contradict the common courſe of life, but maintain it, aſſenting inopinionatively to that in it which is creditable, but oppoſing what is particularly forged by the Dogmatiſts. Thus much it was requiſite to ſay for explication of the queſtion. We now proceed to confutation, not endeavouring to ſhew that the Endictick ſign is wholly inexiſtent, but the apparent equivalence of arguments on both ſides, for its exiſtence and inexiſtence.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Whether there be any Endictick Sign.*

A Sign therefore, by what the Dogmatiſts ſpeak of it, is unintelligible. The *Stoicks*, who have diſcourſed with moſt exactneſs hereupon, to ſhew the notion of ſign, ſay, "A Sign "is an Axiome antecedent in a ſound Connex, "detective of that which follows. Axiome, *they ſay*, "is a Dicible, Self-perfect, Enunciative "as it is within it ſelf. A ſound Connex is that "which beginneth not from true, and endeth "in falſe; for a Connex either beginneth from "true, and endeth in true; as, if it is day, it is "light; or it beginneth from falſe, and endeth "in falſe, as, if the Earth flyeth, the Earth "hath wings: Or it beginneth from true, and "endeth in falſe; as, if the Earth is, the Earth "flies: Or it beginneth from falſe, and endeth in "true; as, if the Earth flyeth, the Earth is. Of "theſe, they hold that only to be unſound, which "beginneth from true, and endeth in falſe, the "reſt are all true. Antecedent they call that, "which goeth foremoſt in a Connex, beginning "from true, and ending in true; it is Detect-"ive of that which followeth, for in this Con-"nex, If ſhe hath Milk, ſhe hath Conceived; "Theſe words, She hath conceived, are decla-"red by thoſe, She hath Milk. *Thus they.*

Now we firſt ſay, That it is uncertain whether there be a *Dicible*: For ſeeing that of the Dogmatiſts, the *Epicureans* ſay there is no *Dicible*; the *Stoicks*, that there is; when the *Stoicks* ſay, that a *Dicible* is ſomthing, either they uſe Aſſertion only, or Demonſtration alſo. If Aſſertion only, the *Epicureans* will oppoſe it with the contrary Aſſertion, that a *Dicible* is nothing. If by Demonſtration, foraſmuch as Demonſtration conſiſts of Dicible Axioms, nothing that conſiſts of *Dicibles* can be aſſumed to prove that a *Dicible* is ſomething. For he who allows not a *Dicible* to be, How will he grant a collection of *Dicibles to be*? Thus, whoſoever ſhall endeavour by a collection of *Dicibles* to prove that there is a *Dicible*, goes about to prove a thing controverted, by a thing controverted. If therefore neither ſimply, nor by Demonſtration it cannot be proved, that there is a *Dicible*, it is not manifeſt that there is a *Dicible*, and conſequently that there is an Axiome; for, an Axiome is a *Dicible*.

Yet, though by way of ſuppoſition we ſhould grant, that there is a *Dicible*; an Axiome will be found notwithſtanding to be inexiſtent, which conſiſts of *Dicibles* not coexiſtent with one another. As for example in theſe, *If it is day, it is light*, when I ſay, *it is day*, I have not yet ſaid *it is light*; and when I ſay *it is light*, I had before ſaid that *it is day*. If therefore whatſoever is compounded of any thing cannot exiſt unleſs its parts coexiſt with one another, but the parts whereof an Axiome is compounded coexiſt not with one another, therefore an Axiome will not exiſt.

But beſides all this, *a ſound Connex* will be found to be incomprehenſible. For *Philo*, ſaith, *That is a ſound Connex which beginneth not from True and endeth in Falſe, as (it being day and I*

*diſputing*

*disputing*) *this*, *If it is day*, I *dispute*. *But* Diodorus *saith*, *That beginning from True it neither could nor can end in False*, *according to whom that Connexion seemeth to be False*, *for it being Day*, *and I being silent*, *it will begin in True and end in False*. *But this is a True one*, *If the Elements of things are not indivisible*, *the Elements of things are indivisible*, *for beginning always from False* (*the Elements of things are not indivisible*) *it will end in True*, *the Elements of things are indivisible*. *But they who introduce Synarteſis*, *ſay*, *That is a ſound Connex*, *when that which is contrary to that which ends in it*, *is contrary to that which is antecedent in it*, *according to whom theſe Connexes which we have inſtanced are unſound*, *but this a True one*; *If it is day*, *it is day*. *They who judge by Emphaſis*, *ſay*, *That is a true Connex whoſe Conſequent is potentially contained in the Antecedent*, *according to whom this*, *If it be day it is day*, *and every reduplicate connex'd Axiome perhaps will be falſe*, *for a thing cannot contain it ſelf*. Thus this controverſie ſeems indeterminable, for neither ſhall we be creditable, if we prefer any of the fore-mentioned Propoſitions without Demonſtration, nor with Demonſtration: For the Demonſtration ſeemeth then to be ſound, when its concluſion followeth the conjunction of its Sumptions or Premiſes, as the Conſequent the Antecedent. As thus; If it is day, it is light, but it is day, therefore it is light. But if we demand how the conſequence of the conſequent to the antecedent ſhall be judged, they incur *the alternate* common place; for to demonſtrate the Dijudication of the Connex, the Concluſion as we ſaid muſt follow the Sumptions of the Demonſtration. Again, that this may be credited, the Connex and the Conſequence ought to be determined, which is abſurd. Therefore a ſound Connex is incomprehenſible.

Likewiſe the antecedent is undeterminable. For *the antecedent*, (ſay they,) *is that which goeth foremoſt*, *in ſuch a Connex as beginneth from True and endeth in True*. Now if it be a ſign detective of the Conſequent, either the Conſequent is manifeſt or unmanifeſt; if manifeſt, it needs no detective, for it will be comprehended together with the other, neither is it a ſignificate, and therefore this is not its ſign; if unmanifeſt, foraſmuch as there is an undetermined Controverſie concerning things not manifeſt, which of them is true, which falſe, and whether any of them be true, it will be unmanifeſt whether the Connex ſpeak true; whence it followeth, that it is alſo unmanifeſt, whether the antecedent in it precede (rightly.)

But beſides this, Though there be a ſignificate to the ſign, yet it cannot be detective of the Conſequent even for this reaſon, becauſe it is comprehended together with it: For Relatives are comprehended together, as Right cannot be comprehended before Left, as, being right in relation to left, not on the contrary Right without Left. The like in all other Relatives; ſo it is impoſſible that the ſign can be comprehended before the ſignificate; but if the ſign be not comprehended before the ſignificate; it cannot be detective of it, the ſignificate being comprehended together with it, and not after it. Thus from their diſagreeing Opinions, we may gather that a ſign is untelligible, for they ſay that it is relative, and detective of the ſignificate to which it is relative; whence it followeth, That if it be relative to the ſignificate, it muſt neceſſarily be comprehended together with the ſignificate, as right with left, upwards with downwards, and the like: But if it be detective of the ſignicate, it is neceſſary that it be comprehended before it, that, being firſt known, it may bring us to the notion of the thing which is known by it; but it is impoſſible to underſtand a thing which cannot be known but by the fore-knowledge of another thing which cannot be known before it. Therefore it is impoſſible to underſtand any thing which is not only relative to, but detective alſo of, that to which it is relative: But a ſign, ſay they, is both relative to, and detective of the ſignificate, therefore it is impoſſible to underſtand the ſign.

Moreover, it was a controverſie before our time, ſome affirming that there is an Endeictick ſign, others that there is none; now he who ſaith that there is an Endeictick ſign, either affirmeth it barely without demonſtration, or with demonſtration. If with bare affirmation, he will not be creditable; if he would demonſtrate it, he begs the Queſtion. For the Genus of demonſtration being ſign, when we queſtion whether there be ſign, we queſtion whether there is demonſtration, as, if we queſtion whether there be an Animal, we queſtion whether there be a Man, for Man is an Animal; but to demonſtrate a thing controverted by a thing controverted or by itſelf, is abſurd; therefore it cannot be demonſtrated that there is a ſign. And if it can neither be affirmed ſimply nor demonſtratively, it is impoſſible to frame a comprehenſive enunciation of it. Now if ſign be not exactly comprehended, neither can it be ſaid to be ſignificant of any thing, it not being acknowledged itſelf; therefore there will be no ſign. Whence according to this argument, ſign is unexiſtent and unintelligible.

Again, Signs either are apparent only, or unapparent only, or ſome apparent, others unapparent, but none of theſe is true, therefore there is no ſign. That ſigns are not unapparent is ſhewn thus. What is unapparent is not manifeſted by itſelf according to the Dogmatiſts, but occurreth to us through ſome other, a ſign therefore if it be unapparent will require another ſign, which alſo will be unapparent (for according to the propoſed Hypotheſis, no ſign is apparent) and that another, and ſo to infinite: But it is impoſſible to take infinite ſigns, therefore it is impoſſible to comprehend a ſign, it being unapparent. For which reaſon it will be inexiſtent, not capable to ſignify any thing, as to be a ſign, becauſe it cannot be comprehended. On the contrary, If all ſigns are apparent, foraſmuch as the ſign is relative to the ſignificate, and relatives are comprehended together with one another, the ſignificate being comprehended together with the apparent, will be alſo apparent. For as right and left incurring to us together, right is not ſaid to be more apparent than left, or left than right; in like manner the ſign and the ſignificate being comprehended together, it cannot be ſaid that the ſign is more apparent than the ſignificate: But if the ſignificate be apparent, it is not a ſignificate, as not needing any to ſignifie and detect it. Whence, taking away right, we take away left alſo; ſo

taking away the ſignificate, the ſign cannot exiſt. Thus the Sign will be found to be inexiſtent, if we ſay that Signs only are apparent. It remains, we ſay, that of Signs, ſome are apparent, ſome unapparent, but this alſo incurs the ſame difficulties; for the Significates of apparent Signs will be apparent, as we ſaid, not requiring any thing to ſignifie them, and conſequently they will not be Significates. Whence neither will the other be Signs, as ſignifying nothing; The unmaniſeſt Signs requiring ſomthing to detect them. If they ſay, they are ſignified by Unmaniſeſt, the Argument running into Infinite, they will be found to be Incomprehenſible, and conſequently Inexiſtent, as we ſaid. If by apparent, they will alſo be apparent, as being comprehended together with their apparent ſigns, and conſequently will alſo be inexiſtent, for it is impoſſible a thing ſhould be by nature apparent and unapparent; but the Signs, of which our diſcourſe is, being ſuppoſed unapparent, will be found to be apparent, by retorting the Argument. If therefore neither all Signs be apparent, nor all unapparent, nor ſome apparent, others unapparent, and that there be nothing more than this, as they acknowledge, what they call Signs will be inexiſtent. Theſe few Arguments, alledged out of many, may ſuffice to ſhew, that there is no Endeictick Sign.

Let us now lay down the Arguments of thoſe who hold a Sign to be, that we may ſhew the equivalence of contrary Reaſons. Either the words alledged againſt Sign ſignifie ſomthing, or they ſignifie nothing; if inſignificant, how can they take away the exiſtence of Sign? If they ſignifie what Sign is, they are demonſtrative againſt Sign, or not demonſtrative; if not demonſtrative, they do not demonſtrate that Sign is not; if demonſtrative, demonſtration being a *Species* of Sign, detective of its concluſion, Sign will be. Whence is argued thus, If Sign be ſomthing, there is Sign; and if there be not Sign, there is Sign; for that there is no Sign muſt be proved by demonſtration, which is a Sign. Now either Sign is, or it is not, therefore it is not.

Upon this Argument followeth another in this manner; If there be not ſome Sign, there is no Sign: and if a Sign be that which the *Dogmatiſts* hold it to be, it is no Sign; for the Sign of which we diſcourſe, according as it is underſtood, and as it is relative to, and detective of, the ſignificate, is found to be inexiſtent, as we ſhewed before. Now either Sign is, or it is not; therefore it is not.

As concerning the words which are ſpoken of Sign, let the *Dogmatiſts* anſwer, Whether they ſignifie any thing, or not; if they ſignifie nothing, they prove not that there is Sign; if they ſignifie, the Significate followeth them, which is, there is Sign; whence it followeth, as we ſhewed, that there is Sign, by retorting the Argument. Since therefore Reaſons equally probable may be alledged, to prove there is Sign, and that there is not Sign, we ought not to ſay either rather than the other.

## CHAP. XII.

### *Of Demonſtration.*

FRom what hath been ſaid, it is manifeſt that neither is Demonſtration a thing acknowledged. For if we ſuſpend as to ſign, and Demonſtration be a Sign, we muſt neceſſarily ſuſpend as to Demonſtration: For we ſhall find that the Arguments alledged againſt Sign will ſerve alſo againſt Demonſtration: It ſeemeth to be Relative to, and detective of, its Concluſion, upon which will follow almoſt all that we alledged againſt Sign. But if ſomthing muſt be ſaid of Demonſtration in particular, I will compriſe the Diſcourſe in a narrow Compaſs, firſt laying down what Demonſtration, according to them, is.

'Demonſtration (as they ſay) is a Reaſon 'which, by Collection of acknowledged (indubi-'tate) Sumptions, detecteth a thing unmaniſeſt. '*But clear will it ſeem by this that followeth*, Reaſon '(or *Argument*) is that which conſiſts of Sumpti-'ons and a Concluſion; its Sumptions are ſaid to 'be the Axioms taken ſuitably for conſtruction of 'the concluſion concordantly.

'Inference or Concluſion is the Axiom framed 'out of the two Sumptions; as in this, If it is 'Day, it is Light, but it is Day, therefore it is 'Light; Therefore it is Light, is the Concluſion, 'the reſt are the Sumptions. Of Reaſons, ſome 'are concluſive, others not concluſive: Conclu-'ſive, when the Connex, beginning from Com-'plication of the Sumptions of the Argument, 'and concluding in the Inference thereof, is 'ſound; as the inſtanced Reaſon is Concluſive, 'becauſe to this Complication of its Sumptions, 'It is Day, and, if it is Day, it is Light, it is *con-'ſequent*, it is Light, in this Connex, if it is Day, 'and if it is Day, it is Light. Not concluſive 'are thoſe, which are not after this manner.

'Of the Concluſive, ſome are true, others not 'true: True, when not only the Connex, as to 'Complication of the Sumptions and the Infe-'rence, is, as we ſaid, ſound, but the Concluſion, 'and that which is a Complication of the Sumpti-'ons is true, which is the Antecedent, and the 'Connex. 'A *true* Complication is that which 'hath all true, as, It is day, and, if it is Day, it 'is Light. 'Not true, is, when they are not 'thus; for this reaſon, if it is Night, it is dark, 'but it is Night, therefore it is dark, is indeed 'concluſive, becauſe the Connex is ſound, if 'it is Night, and, if it is Night, it is dark; but 'it is not true, for the conſequent complicate is 'falſe, it is Night, and if it is Night, it is dark, 'it containing this falſity, for it is a falſe compli-'cate whatſoever containeth in itſelf a falſity. 'Whence they ſay, A true reaſon it that, which 'from true Sumptions, inferreth a true Conclu-'ſion.

'Again, of true Reaſons, ſome are (*Apodeictick*) 'demonſtrative, others not demonſtrative. 'Demonſtrative, are thoſe which from things 'manifeſt collect ſomthing not manifeſt; not 'Demonſtrative, are thoſe which are not ſo, 'as this reaſon, If it be Day, it is Light, but it is 'Day, therefore it is light, is not demonſtra-'tive, for its concluſion, it is light, is manifeſt. 'But this, if Sweat pierce through the Skin, there

are

'are Pores intelligible, but Sweat pierceth 'through the Skin, therefore there are Pores 'intelligible, is demonstrative, for its conclusion, 'therefore there are Pores Intelligible, is unmani-'fest.

'Again, of those which collect something un-'manifest, some bring us by the Sumptions to 'the Conclusion inductively only, others indu-'ctively and detectively. Inductively, those which 'seem to depend upon Belief and Memory, as 'this; if one tell you, that such a Man shall grow 'rich, he shall grow rich; but this god (as sup-'posing *Jupiter*) tells you, that such a man shall 'grow rich, therefore he shall grow rich. We as-'sent to the conclusion not somuch for any neces-'ty of the Sumptions, as for that we believe what 'the God saith. Others not only inductively, 'but detectively also lead us to the Conclusion; 'If Sweat issue through the Skin, Pores are intelli-'gible, but the first, therefore the second; for 'this, Sweat issueth forth, is detective of the 'other, there are Pores; forasmuch as we precon-'ceive, that moisture cannot penetrate through 'a body not porous.

'Thus Demonstration must be a Reason con-'clusive and true, and have an unmanifest Con-'clusion detective by the power of the Sumptions, 'and therefore Demonstration is said to be a 'Reason, having indubitate Sumptions, and by 'Collection detecting an unmanifest Inference. By this we may understand the Notion of De-monstration.

## CHAP. XIII.

### *Whether there is Demonstration.*

THat Demonstration is not, may be argued from what they themselves say, by over-throwing every Particular that is included in the Notion. For Example; A Reason or Argument consists of Axioms, but a compound thing cannot exist, unless the things whereof it is compounded coexist one with another (as a Bed, and the like:) But the parts of a Reason are not coexistent one with another; for whilst we are speaking the first Sumption, the other Sumption nor the In-ference do not yet exist; and while we are speak-ing the second, the first is no longer existent, and the Inference exists not yet; and when we pro-nounce the Inference, the Sumptions are no longer existent. Thus the parts of a Reason are not coexistent with one another, and there-fore the Reason itself seemeth not to exist.

Besides, *A conclusive Reason* is incomprehensi-ble; for, if it be judged from the consequence of the Connex, but the consequence of the Con-nex be undeterminably controverted, and per-haps is incomprehensible, (as we shewed in our discourse concerning a Sign;) conclusive Rea-son will also be incomprehensible.

Moreover the *Dialecticks* say, that 'A not-con-'clusive Reason is made either by Incoherence, 'or by Defect, or by being in an ill Figure, or by 'Redundance. By incoherence, when the Sum-'ptions have no coherence with one another nor 'with the Inference, as, If it is Day, it is light, 'but Corn is sold in the Market, therefore *Dion* 'walks.

'By Redundance; when there is found some 'redundant Sumption superfluous to collection of 'the Reason, as, If it is day, it is light, but it is 'day and *Dion* walks, therefore it is light.

'By being in an ill Figure; for these are as they 'call them *Syllogisms*. *If it is Day, it is Light,* 'but it is Day, therefore it is Light; And *If it is not* 'Light, it is not Day; *But it is not Light, therefore* 'it is not Day; But this is an inconclusive reason, 'If it is Day, it is Light, but it is Day, therefore 'it is Light; because the Connex promising that 'its Consequent is in its Antecedent, the Antece-'dent being assumed, the Consequent is also as-'sumed; and the Antecedent being taken away, 'the Consequent is also taken away; for if the 'Antecedent be, the Consequent must be also. But 'assuming the Consequent, the Antecedent is not 'always assumed also; for the Connex doth not 'promise that the Antecedent shall follow upon 'the Consequent, but only the Consequent upon 'the Antecedent. Hereupon a Reason, which 'collects the Consequent from the Connex of 'the Antecedent, is said to be Syllogistick; and 'that which from the Connex, and from the con-'trary of the Consequent collects the contra-'ry of the Antecedent: But that which from the 'Connex and the Consequent collects the An-'tecedent, is inconclusive, as we said before. 'Whence its Sumption being true, it collects a 'Falsity, if it be spoken in the Night-time by the 'light of a Candle: for this, If it is Day, it is 'Light, is a true Connex; and so is this Assum-'ption, But it is Light; but the inference, There-'fore it is Day, is false.

So supply the Text.

'By defect, a Reason is faulty, when there is 'omitted something of those which are requisite 'to Collection of the Conclusion, as this Reason, 'being, as they conceive, sound, Riches are either 'good or ill, or indifferent; but neither ill nor 'indifferent, therefore good. This other is un-'sound by Defect, Riches are either good, 'or ill, or indifferent; but not ill, therefore 'good.

Now if I shall shew, that, according to them, no difference of inconclusive Reasons can be judg-ed by the Conclusive, I shall have cleared, that the Conclusive Reason is Incomprehensible, and that all their Ostentation in Dialectick is folly. I prove it thus, *A Reason Inconclusive by Incohe-rence, is said to be known from it's Sumptions, not having any coherence one with another, and with the Conclusion*; now forasmuch as the knowledge of coherents must precede the judgment of the Connex, the Connex will be indijudicable, (ac-cording to our usual Argument) and conse-quently so will the Reason, *Inconclusive by Inco-herence*, be also. For he who saith, That a Rea-son is Inconclusive by Incoherence, if he do it by simple Enunciation, we oppose the contrary Enunciation; if he demonstrate it by a Reason, we shall tell him, he must first demonstrate that Reason to be Conclusive, and afterwards prove the sumptions of a Reason defective by Inco-herence, to be Incoherent; but whether his Rea-son be demonstrative, we cannot know, not ha-ving a generally acknowledg'd Judgment of the Connex, whereby to judge, whether the Con-clusion cohere with the Complication of the sumptions in the Reason. Therefore we have not whereby to judge the difference betwixt

the Concluſive Reaſon, and the Defective by Incoherence.

The ſame we object to him who ſaith, that a Reaſon is faulty by *being in an ill Figure*: For he who goeth upon this Ground, that there is ſome Figure ill, will not have a acknowledged concluſive Reaſon, whereby to collect what he ſaith.

In the ſame manner may thoſe be confuted, who ſay, that a Reaſon is *Inconcluſive by defect*; for if the Perfect be indijudicable, the Defective muſt be ſo alſo. Again, he who would prove by ſome Reaſon, that there is ſomthing wanting to Reaſon, unleſs he hath an acknowledged judication of the Connex, whereby he may judge the Coherence of the Reaſon which he aliedgeth, he cannot judiciouſly and rightly ſay, that the other is defective.

Likewiſe that Reaſon which is ſaid to be faulty by Redundance, is not dijudicable by the Demonſtrative; for as to Redundance even thoſe very Reaſons, which the *Stoicks* cry up as *Indemonſtrable*, will be found to be inconcluſive, which if they ſhould be taken away, all Dialectick will be overthown. Theſe are they, which (they ſay) need not Demonſtration to eſtabliſh them, but by them are demonſtrated the other Concluſive Reaſons. That theſe are redundant, will appear plainly if we lay them down and diſcourſe upon them. They dream, 'that there are many Indemonſtrables, but aſ-'ſert chiefly Five, whereto all the reſt ſeem to 'be referred. The Firſt, from the Connex and 'the Antecedent, collects the Conſequent, as, 'If it is Day, it is Light, but it is Day, therefore 'it is Light. The Second, from the Connex 'and the contrary of the Conſequent, collects 'the contrary of the Antecedent, as, If it is 'Day, it is Light, but it is not Light, therefore 'it is not Day. The Third, from the nega-'tive Complicate, and one of the Parts of the 'Complicate, collects the contrary of the other 'Part, as, It is not day and Night alſo, but it 'is Day, therefore it is not Night. The Fourth, 'from the Disjunct and one of the Conjuncts, 'collects the contrary of the other, as, Either 'it is Day, or it is Night, but it is Day, there-'fore it is not Night. The Fifth, from the 'Disjunct and the contrary of one of the Con-'juncts, collects the other, as, Either it is Day 'or it is Night, but it is not Day, therefore it 'is Night. Theſe are the Reaſons which they cry up as Indemonſtrable; but they all ſeem to me Inconcluſive by Redundance. For to begin with the Firſt; Either it is ackowledged [as undoubted] that this part, *it is Day*, followeth upon this other, *it is Light*, which is the Antecedent in this Connex, *if it is Day, it is Light*; or, it is not Manifeſt: If Unmanifeſt, we ſhall not allow the Connex as acknowledged, but if it be manifeſt that if this be, *it is Day*, this other muſt neceſſarily be alſo, *it is Light*, in ſaying, *it is Day*, we collect the other, *it is Light*, and this Connex, *it is Day, it is Light*, is Redundant.

The ſame may be ſaid of the *ſecond Indemonſtrable*, for either it is poſſible the Antecedent may be, the Conſequent not being, or it is not poſſible. If poſſible, it is not a ſound Connex; if not poſſible, as ſoon as ever the word *Not* is ſpoken in the Conſequent, it declareth the *Not* in the Antecedent, ſo as this is a redundant Connex, *It is not Light, therefore it is not Day.*

The ſame may be ſaid of the *third Indemonſtrable*; either it is manifeſt, that thoſe which are in the Complication cannot poſſibly coexiſt, or not manifeſt; if not manifeſt, we ſhall not allow the Negative of the Complication; if manifeſt, as ſoon as one is laid down, the other is taken away, whereby the Negative of the Complicate is redundant thus, *It is Day, therefore it is not Night.*

The like we ſay of the *fourth and fifth Indemonſtrables*; either it is manifeſt, that in the Diſjunct one is true, the other falſe, with perfect oppoſition, (as the Disjunct promiſeth,) or it is not manifeſt. If unmanifeſt, we ſhall not grant the Disjunct; if manifeſt, as ſoon as one is laid down, the other is taken away, and one being taken away, it is manifeſt that the other is, as, *It is Day, therefore it is not Night*; *It is not Day, therefore it is Night.*

The like may be ſaid of the *Categorick Syllogiſms* uſed chiefly by the *Peripateticks*, ſuch as this, *Juſt is Honeſt, Honeſt is Good, therefore Juſt is Good*; either it is manifeſt that Honeſt is Good, or it is doubted and unmanifeſt; If unmanifeſt, it will not be granted upon this Argument, and conſequently the *Syllogiſm* will not convince; if it be manifeſt, that *whatſoever is Honeſt is Good*, in ſaying it is Honeſt, is implied it is Good alſo; ſo that this were enough, *Juſt is Honeſt, therefore Juſt is Good*; and the other Sumption, in which *Honeſt* is ſaid to be *Good*, is redundant. The like in this Reaſon, Socrates *is a Man, every Man is a living Creature, therefore* Socrates *is a living Creature.* If it be not manifeſt in itſelf, that whatſoever is Man is alſo a living Creature, the univerſal firſt Propoſition will not be acknowledged, neither ſhall we grant it in the Argument. But if from being a Man it followeth, that he is a living Creature, and therefore the firſt Propoſition, *Every Man is a living Creature*, is acknowledged true, then, as ſoon as ever *Socrates* is ſaid to be a Man, it is imply'd, that he is *a living Creature*; and therefore the firſt Propoſition is redundant, *Every Man is a living Creature.* The like method may be uſed againſt all Categorical Reaſons, not to inſiſt longer hereon: Seeing therefore theſe Reaſons whereupon the Dialecticks ground their Syllogiſms are redundant, as to Redundance all Dialectick will be ſubverted, we not being able to judge the redundant inconcluſive Reaſons, from the concluſive, called Syllogiſms. And if any will not allow *Monolemma*'s Reaſons, (that have but one Sumption,) they will not be more creditable than *Antipater*, who allows them.

Thus a true Reaſon is impoſſible to be found, as well for the Cauſes alledged, as becauſe it ought to end in true; for the Concluſion which is ſaid to be true, muſt be either apparent or unapparent; not apparent, for then it would not require the Sumptions to detect it, it being of itſelf manifeſt to us, and no leſs apparent than the Sumptions themſelves; If unapparent, foraſmuch as there is an undeterminable Controverſie concerning Unapparents, (as was ſaid formerly) it is therefore incomprehenſible. Thus the Concluſion of the Reaſon which they call true, will be incomprehenſible, and if that be incompre-

incomprehensible, we shall not know whether that which is collected be true or false, therefore we shall not know, whether the Reason be true or false; and consequently the Reason which they call *true* cannot be found.

Moreover, that Reason which collects a thing unmanifest from a manifest, cannot be found out; for if the Inference follow the Complication from its Sumptions, that whith followeth [the consequent] is relative to the antecedent; but relatives are comprehended together with one another, as we said before. If therefore the conclusion be unmanifest, the Sumptions will also be unmanifest: If the Sumptions are manifest, the Conclusion will also be manifest, as being comprehended together with the manifest, (Sumptions.) So as nothing unmanifest can be collected from what is manifest. Hereupon the Inference cannot be detected by the Sumptions, whether it be unmanifest and not comprehended, or manifest and not needing detection. Now if *Demonstration* be said to be *a Reason according to Connexion*, that is, *conclusive by some acknowledged true thing, detecting an unmanifest Inference*; and we have proved, that it neither is a Reason nor Conclusive, nor true, nor by some things manifest collecting an unmanifest, nor detective of the Conclusion; it appeareth there is no such thing as Demonstration.

Likewise we shall other ways find Demonstration to be inexistent and unintelligible: For he who saith, there is Demonstration, asserts either general Demonstration or particular, but neither general nor particular Demonstration are possible, (as we shall prove;) and besides these, there is no other can be understood; therefore no Man can assert Demonstration to be existent.

That there is no general Demonstration, we prove thus. Either it hath Sumptions and an Inference, or it hath not; if it hath not, it is no Demonstration; if it hath, forasmuch as every thing that is demonstrated, and also that which doth demonstrate is particular, it will be a particular demonstration, therefore there is no general demonstration.

But neither is there any particular demonstration. For either they must say, it consists of Sumptions and an Inference, or of Sumptions only, but neither of these, therefore there is no particular demonstration. That which consists of Sumptions and an Inference, is not a demonstration; First, as having one part unmanifest (the Inference) it will be unmanifest, which were absurd; for if the demonstration be unmanifest, it rather will require to be demonstrated by somthing, than be capable to demonstrate by somthing. Again, forasmuch as they say, the demonstration is relative to the Inference, and Relatives, as they also say, are different, from one another; the thing demonstrated must be different from the demonstration. If therefore the conclusion be the thing demonstrated, the demonstration will not be understood together with the conclusion. For either the conclusion conferreth somthing towards demonstrating itself, or not; if it confer, it will be detective of itself; if it confer not, but be redundant, it will be no part of the demonstration, for such a demonstration will but fortifie redundance. Neither is that which consists of Sumptions only a demonstration; for, who will say that this, *If it is day it is light, but it is day, it is light*, either is a reason or indeed inferreth any thing? Wherefore neither is that which consists of Sumptions only a demonstration; whence it follows, that there is no particular demonstration. Now if there be no particular demonstration nor no general, and besides these is no demonstration intelligible; there cannot be demonstration.

Moreover, the inexistence of demonstration may be proved this way; If there be demonstration, either an apparent detects an apparent, or an unmanifest an unmanifest, or an unmanifest an apparent, or an apparent an unmanifest; but none of these can be understood; it is therefore unintelligible. For if an apparent detect an apparent, the thing detecting will be at once apparent and unmanifest; apparent, or being supposed such; unmanifest, as requiring somthing to detect it, and not manifestly of itself incurring to us. If an unmanifest an unmanifest, itself will require somthing to detect it, rather than be capable of detecting another, which is inconsistent with the nature of a demonstration. Neither can an unmanifest be the demonstration of a manifest, nor a manifest of an unmanifest, for this reason, because they are relative. Relatives are comprehended together with one another; if that which is said to be demonstrated be comprehended together with the manifest demonstration, it is manifest itself. Thus the reason will be retorted, and it will not be found, that the manifest can demonstrate the unmanifest. If therefore there be not demonstration, neither of an unmanifest by an unmanifest, nor of an unmanifest by a manifest, nor of a manifest by an unmanifest, and more than these, they say, there is not any, we must say, that demonstration is nothing.

Moreover, there is controversie concerning demonstration; some say, that it is not, as they who hold, that there is none; others, that it is as most of the Dogmatists; we say *neither rather* that it is, or that it is not. Again, demonstration must necessarily contain some Doctrine, but every Doctrine is controverted, and therefore every Demonstration must be controverted. For if, for example, the demonstration to prove Vacuum being acknowledged, Vacuum also be acknowledged, it is manifest, that they who doubt whether there be Vacuum, doubt also the demonstration thereof. It is the same in all other demonstrated Doctrines. Thus all demonstration is doubted and controverted. Since therefore demonstration is unmanifest, as appears by the controversie concerning it, (for things controverted, inasmuch as controverted, are unmanifest) it is not evident in itself, but must be evinced to us by demonstration. Now an acknowledged indubitate demonstration to prove demonstration, there cannot be, (the Question being, Whether there be any demonstration at all?) but if it be controverted and unmanifest, it will require another demonstration, and that another, and so to infinite; but it is impossible to demonstrate Infinites, therefore it is impossible to prove, there is Demonstration.

Neither can it be detected by a sign; for it being questioned whether there be a Sign, and the

the Sign consequently requiring a demonstration of itself, it runs into the *Alternate* common place; the demonstration requiring a sign, the sign a demonstration, which is absurd. Neither can the controversie concerning sign be judged, because dijudication wanteth a Criterie, it being controverted, as we shewed, whether there be a Criterie, and the Criterie consequently requiring a Demonstration to prove that there is a Criterie, it runs again into the Alternate place. If therefore neither by Demonstration, nor by Sign, nor by Criterie, it can be proved, that there is Demonstration, and it be not manifest of itself, as we have shewn, it will be incomprehensible, whether there be Demonstration; therefore Demonstration is inexistent: For it is understood by demonstrating, but not being comprehended it cannot demonstrate, therefore there will be no Demonstration. This, by way of Summary, may serve against Demonstration.

But the Dogmatists, on the other side, say, The Reasons alledged against Demonstration, either are demonstrative, or not demonstrative; If not demonstrative, they are not able to prove there is no Demonstration; If demonstrative, they themselves, by Retortion, prove the subsistence of Demonstration. Hereupon they argue thus, If there is Demonstration there is Demonstration, if there is not Demonstration there is Demonstration, therefore there is Demonstration. Upon the same grounds they also propose this Reason, That which followeth from Contraries, is not only True, but Necessary, but, there is Demonstration, and, there is not Demonstration, are opposite one to another, from both which it followeth, that there is Demonstration, therefore there is Demonstration.

But this may be contradicted, as for Example, if we say thus; Forasmuch as we conceive that there is not any Reason demonstrative, neither do we conceive that the Reasons alledged against Demonstrations are absolutely demonstrative, but that they seem probable to us; but Probables are not necessarily demonstrative, therefore if the Demonstratives are (which we allow not) necessarily true, but true Reasons collect true from true, their Inference is not true, and if not, it is no Demonstration; therefore (by way of Retortion) there is no Demonstration. Besides, as purgative Medicines expel themselves, together with the Humors which they purge, it is possible that these Reasons may exclude themselves, together with those which are said to be Demonstratives. For this is not absurd, seeing that this Sentence, *That there is nothing True*, not only takes away all other things, but itself amongst the rest. Moreover, this Argument (If there be Demonstration there is Demonstration, if there is not Demonstration there is Demonstration, but either there is, or there is not, therefore there is) may many ways be shewn to be Inconclusive; but, for the present, we shall be contented with this Epicherem. If this Connex (If there is Demonstration there is Demonstration,) be not faulty, the contrary of its Consequent (that is, there is not Demonstration) must be repugnant to its Antecedent, there is Demonstration, for that is the Antecedent of the Connex: But, according to them, it is impossible that a Connex can be sound, if it consists of contrary Propositions, for a Connex promiseth, that if its Antecedent be, its Consequent is also; but in Opposites quite contrary, which of themsoever is, the other must not be. Therefore if this be a true Connex, If there is Demonstration, there is Demonstration, this other cannot be true, If there is not Demonstration, there is Demonstration.

Moreover, If we grant by Supposition, that this is a sound Connex, If there is not Demonstration, there is Demonstration, this part, if there is not Demonstration, may coexist with the other, there is Demonstration: But if it may coexist with it, it cannot be repugnant to it, so that in this Connex, If there is Demonstration, there is Demonstration, the contrary of the Consequent is not repugnant to the Antecedent, therefore it is not sound. Again, If this Connex, which, by way of Concession, is laid down for sound, and this part, there is no Demonstration, be repugnant to that part, there is not Demonstration, neither will this be a good Disjunct, either there is Demonstration, or there is not Demonstration; for a good Disjunct promiseth that one of its parts is true, and that the other is false and repugnant. Or if the Disjunct be sound, this, if there is not Demonstration, there is Demonstration, will again be found to be faulty, a Connex consisting of Repugnants. Wherefore the Sumptions in the foresaid Reason are not inconsistent, and destroy one another, therefore the Reason is not sound. But neither can they shew that somthing followeth upon Repugnants, not having a Criterie of the Consequents, as we argued before. But this is said over and above. Now if the Reasons for Demonstration be probable, and the Reasons against Demonstrations be probable also, we must suspend, saying no more, that there is Demonstration, than that there is not.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *Of Syllogisms.*

CConcerning those which they call *Syllogisms*, perhaps it were superfluous to discourse, as well for that they are subverted by taking away Demonstration, (for if there be no Demonstration, there is no Demonstrative Reason) as also, forasmuch as what we have already said may serve for Confutation of them, whenas we over and above delivered a Method, to shew, that all the Demonstrative Reasons of the *Stoicks* and *Peripateticks* are inconclusive, But perhaps it would not be amiss to say somthing in particular concerning these, especially, seeing they have a high conceit of them. But whereas many things might be alledged, to shew, they cannot exist; yet we, pursuing our design of a Summary, will use our first Method.

Let us first speak of Indemonstrables; for if they be taken away, all other Reasons are overthrown, as being by them demonstrated to be Conclusive. Now this Proposition, *Every Man is a living Creature*, is inductively proved by particulars; because from *Socrates*'s being a Man, and a living Creature, and so *Plato*'s and *Dion*'s, and

and every one in particular, it ſeemeth poſſible to be proved, that every Man is a living Creature. For if there be but one particular, which ſeemeth contrary to the reſt, the univerſal Propoſition will not be found. As for Example; Although the greateſt part of living Creatures move the lower Jaw, only the Crocodile the upper, this Propoſition is not true; all living Creatures move the lower Jaw. When therefore they ſay, *Every Man is a living Creature*, Socrates *is a Man*, *therefore* Socrates *is a living Creature*; intending from this univerſal Propoſition, *Every Man is a living Creature*, to collect this particular Propoſition, *therefore* Socrates *is a living Creature*; this being one of thoſe, by which the univerſal Propoſition was (as I ſaid) inductively proved, they fall into the *Alternate Common Place*, proving the univerſal Propoſition by the Particulars, and the Particular by the Univerſal. In like manner in this Reaſon, Socrates *is a Man*; *but no Man is Four-footed*, *therefore* Socrates *is not Four-footed*. This Propoſition, *No Man is Four-footed*, endeavoring to prove inductively by Particulars, and to prove every Particular ſyllogiſtically out of this, they run into the *Alternate Common Place* inextricably.

In like manner, let us examine the reſt of the Reaſons, which the *Peripateticks* call Demonſtrable; for this, *If it be Day, it is Light*, they ſay, is concluſive of this, *it is Light*; and again, this, *it is Light*, together with the other, *It is Day*, is confirmative of this, *If it is Day, it is Light*: For the aforeſaid Connex would not be thought ſound, if the firſt part, *It is Light*, were not always coexiſtent with, *It is Day*. If therefore it muſt firſt be comprehended, that when there is Day, there is neceſſarily Light, for the framing of this Connex, *If it be Day, it is Light*, hence is inferred, that in theſe, *When it is Day, it is Light*; this Connex, *If it is Day, it is Light*, (as far as concerns the preſent indemonſtrable Reaſon) proving the coexiſtence of this, *It is Day*, and of this, *It is Light*; and reciprocally their exiſtence, confirming the Connex here again, by the *Alternate Common Place*, the exiſtence of Reaſon is ſubverted.

The ſame may be ſaid of this Reaſon, *If it is Day, it is Light*; *but it is not Light*, *therefore it is not Day*; For, inaſmuch as there cannot be Day without Light, this is conceived to be a ſound Connex, *If it be Day, it is Light*: But if we ſhould ſuppoſe ſome Day to be, and Light not to be, it will be ſaid to be a falſe Connex. Now as to the foreſaid Indemonſtrable, that, *If there is not Day, there is not Light*, is collected from this, that, *If there is Day, there is Light*; ſo as either is requiſite to the proof of the other, and incurs the *Alternate Common Place*.

Likewiſe, Foraſmuch as ſome things are inconſiſtent one with the other, as Day and Night, and the Negative of the Complicate, (*It is not Day, and it is not Night*,) and the Disjunct is thought to be ſound; but that they are inconſiſtent, they conceive to be proved by the Negative of the Complicate, and by the Disjunct, ſaying, *It is not Day and Night both*; *but it is Night*, *therefore it is not Day*. Or thus, *Either it is Day or Night*; *but it is Night*, *therefore it is not Day*. Or, *but it is not Night*, *therefore it is Day*. Whence we again argue, that if to Confirmation of the Disjunct, and of the Negation in the Complicate, it be neceſſary that we firſt comprehend the Axioms contained in them to be Inconſiſtent; but that they are Inconſiſtent, ſeems to be collected from the Disjunct, and the Negative of the Complicate, they run into the *Alternate Common Place*, ſeeing that we can neither credit the foreſaid Modals, unleſs we firſt comprehend the Inconſiſtence of the Axioms that are in them, nor can affirm their Inconſiſtence, before we can affirm the Coargution of the Syllogiſms which is made by the Modals. Wherefore not having whereupon to ground our Belief firſt, (they being Reciprocal) we muſt ſay, that neither the Third, nor Fourth, nor Fifth, of the Indemonſtrables (as far as appeareth by this,) have Subſiſtence. Thus much for Syllogiſms.

## CHAP. XV.

### *Of Induction.*

*Induction*, as I conceive, may eaſily be overthrown; for, ſeeing that by it they would prove an Univerſal from Particulars, either they muſt do it, as having examined all Particulars, or only ſome. If ſome only, the *Induction* will not be valid, it being poſſible, that ſome of the omitted Particulars may be found contrary to the Univerſal Propoſition. If they would examine all, they attempt Impoſſibles, for Particulars are infinite, and undeterminate. Thus it happens, that Induction cannot ſubſiſt either way.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of Definitions.*

Foraſmuch as the *Dogmatiſts* are highly conceited of themſelves, as to the framing of *Definitions*, (which they rank under the Logical part of Philoſophy) let us diſcourſe a little hereupon. The *Dogmatiſts* ſay, that *Definitions* conduce to many things, but perhaps all their neceſſary uſe may be reduced to two general Heads; for they ſhew, that *Definitions* are neceſſary, either to Comprehenſion, or to Inſtruction. Now if we prove they are uſeful to neither, we overthrow their vain Labor. We argue thus: If he who knoweth not that which is defined, cannot define that which he knoweth not; and he who knoweth firſt, and afterwards defineth, comprehends not, by the Definition, that which is defined, but applies the Definition to that which he already comprehends; then Definition is not neceſſary to the Comprehenſion of things. And foraſmuch as if we would define all things, we cannot define any, becauſe we ſhall run into Infinite; and if we ſay, that ſome things may be comprehended without Definitions, we ſhew, that Definitions are not neceſſary to Comprehenſion: As thoſe which are not defined are comprehended, ſo we might comprehend all the reſt without Definitions, either we ſhall define nothing at all, becauſ

cauſe of proceeding to Infinite, or we alledge Definitions not neceſſary.

For the ſame Reaſons ſhall we find, that neither are they neceſſary to Inſtruction: For, as he who firſt knoweth a thing, knoweth it without Definition; in like manner, he who teacheth it, may teach it without a Definition.

Moreover, from the things defined they judge Definitions, ſaying, Thoſe are faulty Definitions, which include ſomthing which is not in the things defined, either in all, or in ſome. So as if we ſay, *A Man is a living Creature, Rational, Immortal*; Or, *A living Creature, Rational, Mortal, Learned*, foraſmuch as there is no Man Immortal, and that there are ſome Men not learned, they ſay it is a faulty Definition. Therefore Definitions, perhaps, are indijudicable, by reaſon of the Infinity of the Particulars, by which they ought to be judged. Beſides, they cannot make us comprehend and learn the things of which themſelves are dijudicated, inaſmuch as they are already known and comprehended. Is it not therefore ridiculous to ſay, That Definitions conduce to Comprehenſion, or Inſtruction, or Declaration, when they involve us in ſuch obſcurity? As for Example, (to ſport a little) If one Man meaning to ask another, Whether he met a Man on Horſeback, with a Dog following him, ſhould do it after this manner. *O Living Creature, Rational, Mortal, capable of Intellect and Science, Didſt thou not meet a Living Creature, Viſible, Broad-nail'd, capable of Political Science, mounted upon a living Creature that hath the faculty of Neighing, leading a four-footed living Creature that hath the faculty of Barking.* Who would not laugh to ſee a Man, that knows the things themſelves, puzzled by their Definitions? We muſt therefore acknowledge Definitions to be unneceſſary, whether it be a Speech, which, by a ſhort Explication, brings us to knowledge of the thing, meant by the words, (which, by what we have ſaid, it appeareth, that it doth not) or whether it be a Speech declaring what a thing is, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, or even what they pleaſe. For when they go about to ſhew what Demonſtration is, they fall out among themſelves irreconcileably, of which, for Brevity's ſake, we will not take Notice.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *Of Diviſion.*

FOraſmuch as ſome of the Dogmatiſts ſay, That Dialectick *is a Science Syllogiſtick, Inductive, Definitive*; after our diſcourſe of the *Criterie*, and of *Demonſtration*, and of *Syllogiſms*, and of *Inductions*, and of *Definition*, we will come to ſay ſomthing of *Diviſion*, conceiving it not to be from our purpoſe.

They ſay, That of *Diviſion, there are four kinds*; *Of the Word into Significations*; *Of the Whole into Parts*; *Of the* Genus *into* Species; *Of the* Species *into Individuals*. But that there is not a diviſive Science of any of theſe, I think may eaſily be ſhewn, by examining them ſeverally.

## CHAP. XVIII.

### *Of the diviſion of a Word into Significations.*

THE Sciences they hold to be by Nature, not by Impoſition; and juſtly, for Science muſt be a thing ſtable and unmoveable: But thoſe things which are by Impoſition, are very ſubject to Mutation, being varied according to the diverſity of Impoſitions which are in our power. Now foraſmuch as words ſignifie by Impoſition, and not by Nature, (otherwiſe all Men would underſtand all Languages, both *Greeks* and *Barbarians*, beſides it is in our power to declare our meaning by other words) how is it poſſible there ſhould be a diviſive Science of the word into Significations? Or how can *Dialectick* be (as ſome conceive,) the Science of Significants, and Significates?

## CHAP. XIX.

### *Of Whole, and Part.*

COncerning *Whole* and *Part*, we ſhall diſcourſe in that which they call *Phyſick*; at preſent, we ſhall only ſpeak of the diviſion of the Whole into its Parts. We ſay thus, When the *Decad* is ſaid to be divided into *One*, and *Two*, and *Three*, and *Four*, it is not divided into theſe, for as ſoon as the firſt part (granting this by the way of ſuppoſition) is taken away, (as the *Monad*) there is no longer the *Decad*, but the *Ennead*, a thing quite different from the *Decad*; therefore the ſubſtraction and diviſion of the reſt concerns not the *Decad*, but other Numbers according to the ſeveral Subſtractions.

Let us now ſee, Whether it be poſſible to divide the Whole into thoſe things, which they ſay are its Parts. If the Whole is divided into its Parts, the Parts before the diviſion either are contained in the Whole, or not contained: To uſe our firſt Example, the *Decad*; They ſay, that 9 is one of its Parts, for it is divided into 1. and 9. ſo is 8 alſo, for it is divided into 8. and 2. So alſo is 7. and 6. and 5. and 4. and 3 and 2. and 1. Now if all theſe are contained in the *Decad*, and compounded with it, they making 55. the *Decad* muſt contain 55. which is abſurd. Therefore are not the Parts, as they call them, contained in the *Decad*; neither can the *Decad* be divided into them, as a Whole into Parts, ſince they are not to be found in it. The ſame may be objected againſt Magnitudes, as if we ſhould divide a Magnitude into ten Cubits; perhaps therefore it is not poſſible to divide the Whole into Parts.

## CHAP. XX.

### *Of Genus and Species.*

IT remains to treat of *Genus* and *Species*, of which elſewhere we ſhall ſpeak more largely, but now compendiouſly. If *Genus and Species* are Notions, the Arguments which we brought againſt the Hegemonick, and Phantaſie, ſubvert

vert them; but if they allow them to have a peculiar subsistence, what will they answer to this? If there are *Genus's*, either there are as many as there are *Species*, or there is one common *Species*, or *Genus*, in all those which are called *Species*. If there be as many *Genus's*, as there *Species*, of them there will not be one common *Genus*, which is divided into them; but if it be said, there is one *Genus* in all its *Species*, then every *Species* must participate of the Whole *Genus*, or of Part thereof; but not of the Whole, for it is impossible, for one thing contained at once, in one, and another, to be wholly in one. If of Part only, first, the whole *Genus* will not follow the *Species*, as they conceive it doth, for man will not be a living Creature, but part of a living Creature, as a substance, but neither animate nor sensible. Again, either all the *Species* will be said to participate of the same Parts of their *Genus*, or some of some Parts, others of others. That they should participate of the same is impossible, for the Reason aforesaid. If some of some, others of others, the *Species* will not be like to one another, according to their *Genus*, (which they will not admit) and besides, every *Genus* will be infinite, being divided into infinite, not only as to *Species*, but as to Particulars, in which it is consider'd with those *Species*; for *Dion* is not only said to be a Man, but a living Creature. But if these things be absurd, neither do the *Species* participate of Part of their *Genus*, it being one; but if neither doth every *Species* paaticipate of its *Genus* in Whole, nor in Part, how can one *Genus* be said to be in all its *Species*, so as to be divided into them. None sure can say any thing hereto, unless he frame some kind of Images; and yet even those will be subverted, according to the Sceptical Method, by their own indeterminate consequences.

We shall add this, *Species's* are either such or such, their *Genus's* are either such and such, or they are such and they are not such, or they are neither such nor such. As for Instance; Forasmuch as of these or those, some are Corporeal, others Incorporeal, and some True, others False, and some peradventure White, others Black, and some very Great, others very Little: This word *Thing*, for example, which some say is most general, will either be All, or Some, or Nothing; but if it be absolutely Nothing, neither will it be *Genus*, and so there is an end of the Controversie. If they say it is All, besides that it is impossible it should be so, it must be all the *Species*, and every particular in them. For because an Animal, as they say, is an Animate, Sensitive Substance, therefore each of its *Species* is said to be both a Substance, and Animate, and Sensitive: So if *Genus* be both Body, and Incorporeal, and False and True, and Black and White, and Little and Great, and all the rest, each of its *Species* and particulars will also be All; which we do not find to be so; therefore this also is False. But if it be only some, then that which is the *Genus* of those, will not be the *Genus* of the rest; as if *Thing* be Body, it will not be the *Genus* of Incorporeals; and if living Creature be Rational, not of Irrationals; so that neither will an Incorporeal be a Thing, nor Irrational a Creature. Therefore *Genus* is neither such and such, nor such and not such, nor neither such nor such: And if so, neither is *Genus* any thing at all.

If any shall say, that *Genus* is all Potentially; we answer, that what is any thing Potentially, must be somthing Actually also; as none can be a *Grammarian* Potentially, if he exist not Actually; now if *Genus* be all things Potentially, we demand of them what it is Actually, and thereupon occur the same inextricable difficulties, for it cannot be all Contraries Actually. Again, neither can it be some Actually, others Potentially, only as a Body Actually, Incorporeal Potentially; for a thing is Potentially, such as it may be Actually, but what is Actually a Body cannot be Actually Incorporeal; so as, for example, If it be a Body actually, it is Incorporeal Potentially, and on the contrary. Wherefore we cannot say that *Genus* is some things Actually, others Potentially, only. Now if Actually it be nothing at all, it exists not; and therefore the *Genus*, which they affirm to be divided into its *Species*, is nothing.

This likewise is worthy consideration, That as because *Alexander* and *Paris* are the same, therefore it is impossible, if it be true that *Alexander* walks, it should be false that *Paris* walks. In like manner, If to be Man, be the same thing in *Theon*, and in *Dion*, this Appellation, *Man*, alledged in the framing of any Axiom will make the Axiom either True or False in both, but this we find not to be so, for when *Dion* sitteth, and *Theon* walketh, this Axiom, *a Man sitteth*, spoken of one, is True; of the other, False; wherefore this Appellation, *Man*, is not common to both, nor one and the same in both, but proper to each.

## CHAP. XXI.

### *Of Common Accidents.*

THe like may be said of *Common Accidents*. For if one and the same accident belong to *Dion* and *Theon*, for example, *Seeing*; if *Dion* die, and *Theon* survive and see, either they must say, that the sight of *Dion* is not subject to perish, which is absurd, or that the same sight is perished, and not perished, which is irrational also: Therefore the sight of *Theon* is not the same with the sight of *Dion*, therefore proper to each. For if the same Respiration happen to *Dion* and *Theon*, it cannot be that it should be in *Theon*, and not in *Dion*; but one may die, and the other survive, therefore it is not the same. But of these, let what we have briefly said suffice.

## CHAP. XXII.

### *Of Sophisms.*

IT will not haply be absurd to insist a little upon *Sophisms*, in regard that they who cry up *Dialectick* so much, say, It is necessary for the Solution of them. For, say they, *If it discern Speeches True and False, and Sophisms be false Speeches; it is dijudicative of these, which corrupt Truth with an apparent likelihood.* Wherefore the *Dialecticks*, as assisting and underdropping the failing course of life, with much labour, teach the Inferences,

and Solutions of Sophiſms, ſaying, *A Sophiſm is a Reaſon probable and deceitful; ſo as it receives an Inference, either Falſe, or like to Falſe, or Uncertain, or, otherwiſe not to be received. Falſe, as in this Sophiſm,*

*No man giveth a Categorem to be Drunk,*
*But this, to Drink Worm-wood, is a Categorem,*
*Therefore, No man giveth Worm-wood to be Druuk.*

*Like to Falſe, as in this;*

*That which could not be, nor cannot be, is not abſurd,*
*But this, a Phyſician, as a Phyſician, kills; neither could, nor can be,*
*Therefore his [Propoſition,] a Phyſician, as a Phyſician, kills, is not abſurd.*

*Uncertain, as this;*

*I did not ask thee ſomthing firſt, and the Stars are not even in Number,*
*But I did ask thee ſomthing firſt;*
*Therefore, the Stars are not even in Number.*

*Not otherwiſe to be received, as thoſe Speeches which are called Soloeciſms, as,*
*That which thou ſeeſt, is,*
*But thou ſeeſt him Mad,*
*Therefore he is Mad.*

*Again,*

*That which thou ſeeſt, is,*
*But thou ſeeſt many Houſes burning,*
*Therefore many Houſes are burning.*

Then they endeavour to ſhew their Solutions, ſaying, That 'in the firſt Sophiſm, one thing is 'granted by the Sumptions, another inferred; it 'is granted that a Categorem is not Drunk, and 'that to drink Wormwood is a Categorem, but 'not the Wormwood itſelf. So that, whereas the 'Inference ought to be, Therefore no Man drinks 'this [Categorem,] To drink Wormwood; 'which is true, it inferreth, Therefore no Man 'drinketh Wormwood, which is falſe, and is not 'collected from the granted Premiſes.

'As to the Second, It ſeems to lead to Falſe, (in'ſomuch as they who mind it not well, doubt 'whether they ought to aſſent to it or not,) but 'it collects Truth, therefore this is not abſurd. 'A Phyſician, as a Phyſician, killeth, for no Pro'poſition is abſurd; but this, A Phyſician, as a 'Phyſician, killeth, is a Propoſition; therefore 'it is not abſurd.

'That which leadeth to Uncertainty, is, they 'ſay, of the Nature of reciprocal Reaſons; for 'if nothing were asked before, then the Nega'tive of the Connex were true, the Connex it'ſelf being falſe, *becauſe this*, [I asked thee ſom'thing firſt] which is falſe, is inſerted into it; but 'after asking, (the Aſſumption being true, [I 'asked thee firſt] by reaſon the asking was before 'the Aſſumption) the Negative of the Connex is 'falſe, ſo that a Concluſion cannot any way be 'gather'd, the Negative of the Connex being 'inconſiſtent with the Aſſumption.

'The laſt kind being by Soloeciſm, (ſome 'ſay,) infers abſurdly, and contrary to common 'uſe.

Thus ſome *Dialecticks* diſcourſe of *Sophiſms*, (others otherwiſe) which may perhaps tickle the Ears of the lighter ſort of Perſons, but are indeed ſuperfluous, and forged by themſelves to no purpoſe. This perhaps may be obſerved, from what was ſaid formerly; for we ſhewed, that neither True nor Falſe can be comprehended, according to the *Dialecticks*, as many other ways, ſo particularly, by overthrowing Demonſtration, and indemonſtrable Reaſons, the props of their Syllogiſtick faculty. Many other things might be alledg'd againſt the Subject in hand, of which we ſhall only ſay briefly thus.

Of all thoſe *Sophiſms*, which *Dialectick* ſeems properly to confute, the Solution is unprofitable, but thoſe, the Solution whereof is profitable, it is not within the power of a *Dialectick* to ſolve, but of thoſe who are converſant in the particular Arts of each ſeveral thing. As for inſtance, If this *Sophiſm* were propounded to a Phyſician, 'In the remiſſion of a Diſeaſe, there ought 'to be variety of Diet, and Wine allowed; But 'on the third day, there uſually happens a Re'miſſion; Therefore before the third day, there 'ought to be variety of Diet, and allowance 'of Wine. A *Dialectick* can ſay nothing to all this, but the Phyſician can ſolve the *Sophiſm*, knowing that Remiſſion is taken two ways, either of the whole Diſeaſe, or for any particular inclination towards amendment. Before the firſt third day it happens for the moſt part, that there is a Remiſſion of ſome particular Intenſeneſs; now we approve not variety of Diet in this Remiſſion, but in the Remiſſion of the whole Diſeaſe. Whereupon he will ſay, That one of the Sumptions of the Argument is disjoyned from the other, *viz.* that which concerns the whole Diſeaſe, from the other which concerns part; Again, to this Argument concerning an intenſe Feaver, 'Contraries are the 'remedies of Contraries; but Cold is contrary 'to the Heat of the Feaver, therefore cold things 'are convenient for the Cure of it; a *Dialectick* will not know what to ſay; but the Phyſician, knowing that ſome are Affections adherent to the Diſeaſe, others Symptoms of thoſe Affections, will anſwer, that the Queſtion is not to be underſtood of the Symptoms, (for it uſually happens that Heat is encreaſed by pouring on cold things,) but of the adherent Affectedneſs, and that Conſtipation is an adherent Affection, which requires not Condenſation, but rather Opening; but the Heat which follows upon it, is not primarily adherent, wherefore that which is Cold is not convenient to be applied. Thus to Sophiſms, whoſe Solution is profitable, the *Dialectick* will not know what to ſay; but to ſuch as theſe, 'If thou haſt not large Horns, and haſt 'Horns, thou haſt not Horns; but thou haſt not 'large Horns, and haſt Horns; therefore thou 'haſt not Horns. *And*, If a thing be moved, either 'it is moved in the place wherein it is, or in that 'wherein it is not; but neither in that wherein 'it is, (for there it reſts;) nor in that wherein it 'is not, (for it cannot act, where it is not;) there'fore nothing is moved: *And*, Either that which 'is generated, or that which is not, but that 'which is not generated (for it is already) nor 'that which it is not; for that which is gene'rated

'rated ſuffers ſomthing, that which is not, ſuffers 'not; *Again*, Snow is water congeal'd, but water 'is black, therefore Snow is black. And a great many ſuch fooleries gathering together, he knits his Brows, and produceth his *Dialectick*, and with a great deal of gravity, endeavours to ſhew us by Syllogiſtick Demonſtrations, that ſomthing is generated, and that ſomthing is moved, and that Snow is white, and that we have not Horns; when perhaps, if he did only oppoſe the evidence of the contrary to them, it would ſuffice to overthrow their *Theſes* by the teſtimony of their Contraries, which are manifeſt. Whence a Philoſopher, to whom the Argument againſt Motion was objected, ſaid nothing, but walked. And Men, in the ordinary courſe of Life, travel by Sea and Land, build Ships and Houſes, and beget Children, never minding the Arguments againſt Motion and Generation. There is alſo a facete Apophthegm of *Erophilus* the Phyſician, (contemporary with *Diodorus*, who introduc'd into his fooliſh Logick many ſophiſtical Arguments, as about other things, ſo particularly concerning Motion,) *Diodorus* having put his Shoulder out of joynt, *Erophilus* coming to ſet it, derided him, ſaying, 'Either the Bone ſlipt out of the place in 'which it was, or out of that in which it was not; 'but neither out of that in which it was, nor out 'of that in which it was not, therefore it is not 'ſlipt. So as the *Sophiſt* was fain to intreat him to let his Arguments alone, and to betake himſelf to the Cure. For it is ſufficient (I conceive) to live experimentally, and inopiniatively, according to common obſervations and aſſumptions, ſuſpending our aſſent in all dogmatical Superfluities, and eſpecially thoſe, which are beſides the uſe of life. If therefore *Dialectick* cannot ſolve thoſe *Sophiſms*, whoſe Solution is uſeful; and of thoſe which ſome think it doth ſolve, the Solution is unuſeful, *Dialectick* is of no benefit in ſolving *Sophiſms*.

Moreover, even from what the *Dialecticks* themſelves ſay, it may be proved, that their Art concerning *Sophiſms* is ſuperfluous; they ſay, That they applied themſelves to *Dialectick*, not only to learn what may be gathered from it, but propoſing to themſelves chiefly, to know how to judge true and falſe by demonſtrative Reaſons. Whence they affirm *Dialectick* to be the Science, of True, and Falſe, and Neuters. When therefore they aſſert that to be a true Reaſon, which by true Sumptions collects a true Concluſion, as ſoon as any Reaſon, which hath a falſe Concluſion, is brought againſt us, we ſhall know it is falſe, and therefore will not aſſent to it; for of neceſſity, the Reaſon muſt either be not concluſive, or not have true Sumptions, which is manifeſt from hence. The falſe Concluſion which is in the Reaſon, is either conſequent to the Connexion made by its Sumption, or not Conſequent; if not Conſequent, the Reaſon is not Concluſive; for they ſay, a Concluſive Reaſon is that which followeth the Connexion made by it Sumptions; if Conſequent, the Connexion which is made by its Sumptions muſt neceſſarily be falſe, by their own Rules; for they ſay, Falſe is conſequent to Falſe, but not True. Now that a Reaſon which is neither concluſive nor true, is, according to them, not demonſtrable, is manifeſt from what was formerly ſaid. If therefore a Reaſon being propounded, in which there is a falſe Concluſion, we know even by itſelf, that it is neither True nor Concluſive, foraſmuch as it hath a falſe Concluſion, we will not aſſent to it, though we do not know where the Fallacy lies. For, as we believe not the Tricks of Juglers to be true, but know that they deceive, though we know not which way they do it; ſo neither do we credit falſe Reaſons, which ſeem true, though we know not which way they are fallacious.

Or becauſe *Sophiſms* lead us not only to one Falſity, but to many Abſurdities beſides, we may argue more generally thus: The Reaſon propoſed either leadeth us to ſomthing unexpected, or to ſomthing that we muſt have expected; if to the later, we ſhall not do abſurdly in aſſenting to it; if to ſomthing beyond our expectation, we ought not to aſſent to an Abſurdity raſhly, upon a Probability; but they rather ought to withdraw their Reaſon, which compelleth aſſent to an abſurdity, if they intend not to trifle childiſhly, but to make a ſerious enquiry into the Truth, as they profeſs. For if there be a way leads to ſome Precipice, we will not run upon the Precipice, becauſe there is a way that leads to it, but rather go out of the way, becauſe of the Precipice: In like manner, if there be a Reaſon which bringeth us to ſomthing, acknowledged to be abſurd, we muſt not aſſent to the Abſurdity, becauſe of the Reaſon, but reject the Reaſon becauſe of the Abſurdity. When therefore a Reaſon is objected to us, we will ſuſpend to every Propoſition; and then, when the whole Reaſon is laid down, we will bring in that which appeareth to us. For if the Followers of *Chryſippus*, being *Dogmatiſts*, upon a *Sorites* propoſed, ſay, They muſt put a ſtop to the Progreſs of the Reaſon, and ſuſpend their Aſſent, leſt they fall into an Abſurdity; certainly we, who are *Sceptick*s, and jealous of Abſurdities, ought much more to take heed, leſt we be betray'd by Sumptions, and therefore ſuſpend upon every one, until we hear the whole Argument. Beſides, we, without Opinion, being only informed by the common obſervations of Life, thus avoid fallacious Reaſons: But the *Dogmatiſts* cannot diſcern a *Sophiſm* from a true Reaſon, ſeeing they are conſtrained to judge dogmatically, whether the form of the Reaſon be concluſive, and whether the Sumptions be true or not; but we have formerly ſhewn, that they cannot comprehend what Reaſons are Concluſive, nor judge Truth in any thing, as having neither a Criterie nor Demonſtration, which we proved from their own words. Hence it appears, that the artificial forms of *Sophiſms*, ſomuch cry'd up by the *Dialecticks*, are ſuperfluous.

## CHAP. XXIII.

### *Of Amphibolies.*

WE ſay the ſame concerning diſtinction of *Amphibolies*. For, if *Amphiboly* be a word which ſignifies two or more things, and words ſignifie by Impoſition, it is fit they be diſtinguiſhed by Thoſe, who are of the ſeveral Arts to which they belong, they having had experience of the poſitive uſe of the words, which they applied to the things that they ſignified; but a

*Dialectick* hath not, as in this *Amphiboly*; *In the Remiſſion of Diſeaſes, variety of Diet, and Wine is allowed.*

Moreover, we ſee, that in Common Life, even Children diſtinguiſh thoſe *Amphibolies*, the diſtinction whereof ſeemeth uſeful to them. For if a Man, having two Servants of the ſame Name, ſhall bid a Child, call *Manes*, to him, (let us ſuppoſe that to be the name of both) the Child would ask, Which? And if one having ſeveral ſorts of Wine, ſhall bid a Child, Fill him ſome Wine, the Child will ask, Of which Sort? Thus in all things experience of that which is uſeful introduceth Diſtinction; but thoſe *Amphibolies*, which come not within the experience of Life, and are perhaps only in the ſayings of the *Dogmatiſts*, and nothing uſeful to living without opinion, the *Dialectick* being particularly employ'd in theſe, will be neceſſitated even in them to ſuſpend after the *Sceptical* way, according as they are annexed to things uncertain, or incomprehenſible, or inexiſtent. But of theſe we ſhall diſcourſe again. Now if any *Dogmatiſt* attempt to ſay any thing againſt this, he confirms the *Sceptick* reaſon, and by the allegation of Arguments on both ſides, and their indeterminable Difference, will ſettle *Suſpenſion* as to the thing controverted: Having ſpoken thus much concerning *Amphibolies*, we cloſe our Second Book of *Hypotypoſes*.

OF

# Of Physick.

## THE THIRD BOOK.

HItherto by way of Summary we have spoken of the *Logical* part of Philosophy; we shall observe the same course in examining the *Physical* part; not confuting every particular, but endeavouriug to overthrow the more general, wherein the others are comprehended. We will begin with the *Principles*; And forasmuch as the greatest part hold, that some of them are Material, others Efficient, we will first speak of the Efficient, those being said to be Principles more properly than the Material.

### CHAP. I.

### *Of GOD.*

NOw seeing that most of the Dogmatists hold *God* to be the most Efficient cause, let us first enquire concerning *God*; professing, that, following the course of Life, we say, (without engaging our Judgment) that there are gods, and we worship the gods, and we say, that they have Providence. Only, to confute the temerity of the Dogmatists, we say as followeth.

Of the things which we understand, we ought to consider the Substances, as, whether they are Bodies, or Incorporeal; likewise their Forms. For none can understand a Horse, if he hath not first learnt what the Form of a Horse is. Likewise, that which is understood, must be understood as being somwhere. Now forasmuch as, of the Dogmatists, some say, That God is a Body; others, Incorporeal; some, that he hath a Human form; others, not; some, that he is in place; others, that he is not in place: And of those who say, he is in place, some, that he is in the World; others, that he is beyond it. How can we have a notion of God, not having an indubitate knowledge of his Substance, nor of his Form, nor of the Place wherein he is. Let them first agree amongst themselves, What God is? and then they may represent him to us, and require, that we receive such a notion of God; for, while they disagree irreconcileably amongst themselves, we cannot receive any thing from them as undoubtedly true. But, say they, conceive with yourself somthing incorruptible and blessed, and think God to be such. This is foolish. For, as he who knoweth not *Dion*, cannot know the Accidents that are competent to him, as *Dion*; so, not knowing the Substance of God, neither can we know his Accidents.

Moreover, let them tell us what is Blessed: Whether that which acts according to Virtue, and hath a providence over the things subordinate to it; or that which is unactive, and neither hath any business itself, nor affords business to any other. For, differing irrreconcilably even about this, they shew, that what they call Blessed is not to be found out, and consequently not God himself.

But though we should admit the notion of God, yet is it necessary we suspend, whether he is, or he is not, even from what the Dogmatists say, because it is not manifest that there is a God; for, if that were self-evident, the Dogmatists would have agreed, Who, and What, and Where he is; whereas on the contrary, there is an undeterminable controversie amongst them, whereby we see, that his Being is unmanifest to us, and requireth Demonstration. Now he who saith, that there is a God, must either demonstrate it by a thing manifest, or by an unmanifest; not by a thing manifest, for if that were manifest which demonstrates there is a God, forasmuch as that which demonstrateth is relative to that which is demonstrated, and consequently is comprehended together with it, (as we have formerly proved) that there is a God will be manifest also, as being comprehended together with the unmanifest thing that demonstrates it. But this is not-manifest, therefore neither can it be demonstrated by a manifest thing.

But neither by an unmanifest; for the unmanifest that should demonstrate there is a God, will require a Demonstration. If demonstrated by a manifest, it will no longer be unmanifest, but manifest, that there is a God. Therefore the unmanifest demonstrative cannot be demonstrated by a manifest. But neither by an unmanifest; for he who saith so, will be driven into *infinite*, we continually requiring a Demonstration of the unmanifest, that is alledged for Demonstration of the thing proposed. Therefore it cannot be demonstrated from any other, that there is a God; and if it neither be manifest in itself, nor demonstrable from any other, it will be incomprehensible whether there be a God.

Moreover, he who saith there is a God, holds either, that he is provident over the things in the world, or not provident. If provident, either over all, or over some. If over all, there would be no ill or wickedness in the World; but all things (as they confess) are full of ill; therefore God cannot be said to be provident over

over all. If over ſome only, why is He provident over theſe, and not over thoſe? For either He both will, and can be provident over all; or He will, but cannot; or He can, but will not; or He neither will nor can. If He both will and can, then He would be provident over all; but He is not, as is manifeſt from what we laſt alledged; therefore that He both will and can provide over all, is not ſo. If He will, but cannot, His Power is exceeded by that Cauſe, which hinders Him from being provident over the things over which He is not provident; but it is abſurd, to imagine God to be weaker than ſome other. If He can be provident over all, and will not, He may be thought envious: If He neither will nor can, both envious and infirm; which to affirm of God, were impious. Therefore God is not provident over the things of the world; and if He is not provident over them, neither performeth any Work or Effect, none can ſay by what means He comprehends there is a God, ſeeing that it neither is manifeſt in itſelf, nor comprehended by any Effects. For theſe Reaſons therefore it is Incomprehenſible, Whether there be a God or No.

Hence we alſo argue, That perhaps they who ſay there is a God, cannot be excuſed from Impiety; for in affirming, That He is provident over all things, they ſay, that God is the Author of Evil; and in ſaying, that He is provident over ſome, and not over all, they will be forced to confeſs, That God is either Envious or Infirm; which cannot be ſaid, without manifeſt Impiety.

## CHAP. II.

### *Of Cauſe.*

BUt that the *Dogmatiſts*, not being able to extricate themſelves out of theſe difficulties, may not charge us with Blaſphemy, we will in general examine *Efficient Cauſe*, firſt, endeavouring to lay down the Notion thereof.

From what the *Dogmatiſts* ſay, none can underſtand what *Cauſe* is. Some hold it to be a Body; others, Incorporeal. It ſeems to be, according to their moſt general Opinion, *That by which the Effect is operated*; as the Sun, or the Sun's heat is Cauſe, that the Wax is melted, or Cauſe of the Liquefaction of the Wax; for even here they differ. Some will have the Cauſe to be of the Abſtract, as Liquefaction; others of the Concrete, as to be Liquefied. Thus, as I ſaid, according to the moſt general and received Opinion, a Cauſe is that by which the Effect is operated.

*Of theſe Cauſes, they hold ſome to be Continent (or Solitary); others, Con-cauſal; others, Co-operative. Solitary are thoſe, which being preſent, the Effect is preſent; and being taken away, the Effect is taken away; and being Diminiſhed, the Effect is Diminiſhed. Thus, the knitting a Halter about the Neck, is the cauſe of Suffocation. Con-cauſal, is that which joineth with another Concauſal, towards production of the ſame Effect; thus, Every one of the Oxen that draw the Plough, is cauſe of the drawing thereof. Co-operative is that which affords Aſſiſtence, but very little to the Effect; as when two Men carry a Burthen, and a third helps them a little.*

Some ſay, That things preſent are impulſive Cauſes of the future, as the vehement heat of the Sun is of a Feaver; but ſome will not admit theſe, for that a Cauſe, being relative to its Effect, cannot, as Cauſe, precede it.

## CHAP. III.

### *Whether there be any Cauſe of a Thing.*

IT is probable, there is ſuch a Thing as Cauſe; For how can Augmentation, Diminution, Generation, Corruption, Motion of natural and ſpiritual Agents, in a word, the ordering of the whole World be, if not from ſome Cauſe? For, If none of theſe be really ſuch in their own Nature, we muſt ſay, That they ſeem to us, by reaſon of ſome Cauſe, to be ſuch as indeed they are not. Again, All Generations would be promiſcuous, if there were no Cauſe; Horſes, of Mice; Elephants, of Piſmires. At *Thebes* in *Egypt*, there would be great ſhowers of Rain and Snow; in the Southern Parts none, unleſs there were ſome Cauſe that produced extraordinary Cold in the Southern Parts, and made the Eaſtern dry and hot.

Again, he who ſaith, There is no Cauſe, is confuted either way: If he ſay it ſimply, without a Cauſe, (or Reaſon) he is not worthy credit; if upon any Cauſe, let him ſhew a Cauſe why there is no Cauſe, and by that very reaſon he will prove that there is a Cauſe.

That they likewiſe ſpeak probably who deny Cauſe, we ſhall ſhew, by alledging ſome Reaſons out of many; As thus: It is impoſſible to underſtand the Cauſe, before we comprehend the Effect as its Effect; but neither can we comprehend the Effect of the Cauſe as its Effect, if we comprehend not the Cauſe of the Effect as its Cauſe; for then we ſeem to know that it is its Effect, when we comprehend the Cauſe as its Cauſe. Now if to underſtand the Cauſe, it be neceſſary that we firſt know the Effect; and to know the Effect (as I ſaid) it be neceſſary, that we firſt know the Cauſe, the *Alternate Common Place* comes in, to ſhew, that neither of them can be known; not the Cauſe as Cauſe, nor the Effect as Effect; for each of them requiring the other to its credit, we ſhall not know upon which to ground our knowledge firſt. Wherefore we are not able to aſſert, that there is any Cauſe of a Thing.

But though we ſhould grant there is a Cauſe, yet will it appear to be Incomprehenſible, from the Controverſies about it. For he who ſaith, That there is Somthing Cauſe of Somthing, either ſaith it ſimply, not moved by any Cauſe or Reaſon, or elſe is moved to this Aſſent by ſome Cauſe. If ſimply, he will be nothing the more creditable, than he who ſimply ſaith, There is no Cauſe of any Thing. If he alledge any Cauſe, why he thinks there is a Cauſe, he endeavoureth to prove that which is in Queſtion by that which is in Queſtion. For the Queſtion being, Whether there be any Cauſe of a Thing, he takes it for granted that there is a Cauſe,

when he alledgeth a Cauſe, why there is a Cauſe. Moreover, the Queſtion being concerning the Exiſtence of Cauſe, if we prove it by any Cauſe, it will be requiſite to alledge another Cauſe to prove that, and ſo to Infinite; but to alledge infinite Cauſes, is impoſſible. It is therefore impoſſible to aſſert, That there is ſomthing Cauſe of another.

Moreover, a Cauſe produceth the Effect, either when it already is, and exiſts as Cauſe, or when it is not a Cauſe; not the later, and if when it already is, it muſt firſt exiſt, and be a Cauſe, and then produce the Effect, which is ſaid to be the Effect thereof, the Cauſe already exiſting. But Cauſe being relative to the Effect, it is manifeſt, that, as Cauſe, it cannot exiſt before it. Therefore a Cauſe, even when it is already a Cauſe, cannot produce that whereof it is Cauſe. And if it produceth not any Thing, neither when it is not a Cauſe, nor when it is a Cauſe, then there is no Cauſe at all; for a Cauſe cannot be underſtood as Cauſe, unleſs it produce ſomthing.

Whence ſome argue alſo thus; A Cauſe muſt exiſt either together with the Effect, or before it, or after it; now to ſay, that the Cauſe begins to exiſt after the production of the Effect, were ridiculous. Neither can it exiſt before it, as being underſtood in relation to it; but Relatives, as Relatives, coexiſt, and are underſtood together; but neither can it coexiſt with the Effect, for if it be its Efficient, and that whatſoever is effected, muſt be effected by ſome other that hath a Being, it is neceſſary, that a Cauſe firſt be a Cauſe before it produce the Effect. Therefore if a Cauſe exiſt not either together with, or before, or after the Effect, it exiſts not at all.

Moreover, the Notion of a Cauſe may haply be overthrown thus. For if we cannot underſtand a Cauſe (foraſmuch as it is relative,) before its Effect; and, to underſtand it as Cauſe of the Effect, it be neceſſary to underſtand it, as being before the Effect: But it be impoſſible to underſtand any thing to be before that, before which we cannot underſtand any thing to be, then it is impoſſible to underſtand that there is Cauſe.

Hence we argue thus; Foraſmuch as the Reaſons by which we proved, that there muſt be a Cauſe, are probable; and thoſe alſo are probable on the other ſide, which prove there is no Cauſe; and of theſe Reaſons we cannot poſſibly know, which ought to be preferred, ſince we neither have a Sign, nor Criterie, nor Demonſtration, acknowledged indubitate, (as we ſhewed formerly.) Therefore we muſt neceſſarily ſuſpend, as to the Exiſtence of Cauſe, ſaying, That from what the *Dogmatiſts* affirm of it, it appears *nothing rather* to be, than not to be.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Of Material Principles.*

HItherto of the *Efficient*; we ſhall next ſpeak briefly of thoſe which are called *Material Principles*. That theſe are incomprehenſible, is manifeſt, from the diſagreement of the *Dogmatiſts* about them. *Pherecides* the *Syrian*, aſſerted Earth to be the Principle of all Things; *Thales*, the *Mileſian*, Water; *Anaximander*, his Diſciple, Infinite; *Anaximenes* and *Diogenes Appollionates*, Air; *Hippaſus*, the *Metapontine*, Fire; *Xenophanes*, the *Colophonian*, Earth and Water; *Enopides*, the *Chian*, Fire and Air; *Hippo*, of *Rhegium*, Fire and Water; *Onomacritus*, in his Orphicks, Fire, Water, and Earth; not to ſpeak of Matter void of quality, (which ſome have prodigiouſly fancied, but not underſtood;) the Followers of *Ariſtotle* (the *Peripaticks*,) a circular moving Body conſiſting of Fire, Air, Water, and Earth; *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, Atoms; *Anaxagoras*, the *Clazomenian*, Homoiomeria's; *Diodorus Cronus*, leaſt and indiviſible Bodies; *Heraclides*, of *Pontus*, and *Aſclepiades*, of *Bithynia*, uncompounded Bulks (or little Bodies;) the *Pythagoreans*, Numbers; the *Mathematicians*, the Terms of Bodies; *Strato*, the Naturaliſt, Qualities.

Such, (or, yet greater) being the Controverſy amongſt them concerning the Material Principles, we muſt either aſſent to all their Opinions, or to ſome. To all is impoſſible, for we cannot hold with *Aſclepiades*, that they are tangible and qualited, and with *Democritus*, that they are Atoms, and void of quality; and with *Anaxagoras*, who aſcribes all ſenſible qualities to his *Homoiomeria's*. But if we muſt of our own judgments make choice of ſome of theſe Opinions, we muſt do it either without Demonſtration, or with Demonſtration. If without Demonſtration, it will not be credited; if with Demonſtration, that Demonſtration muſt be true: But it will not be granted to be true, unleſs it be judged and determined by a true Criterie, but the Criterie muſt be proved to be true by an adjudged Demonſtration. If therefore, to prove that which preferreth one Opinion before the reſt to be true, it be requiſite that its Criterie be demonſtrated; and, to demonſtrate that the Criterie is true, it be requiſite that its Demonſtration be firſt adjudged, it runs into the *Alternate Common Place*, which will ſuffer the Argument to proceed no further, the Demonſtration continually requiring a Criterie; and the Criterie, adjudged Demonſtration: But to judge a Criterie by a Criterie, and a Demonſtration by a Demonſtration, were to run into Infinite. Now if we cannot aſſent to all Opinions concerning the Elements, nor to ſome of them, we muſt neceſſarily ſuſpend.

This perhaps is ſufficient to ſhew the Incomprehenſibility of the Elements and Material Principles. But to refute the *Dogmatiſts* more fully, we will inſiſt longer hereupon. Their Opinions concerning Elements are ſo many, that to examine every one in particular is more than our deſign will allow, but what we ſhall alledge may ſerve to confute all: For ſeeing that in all Controverſies concerning the Elements they are held either to be Bodies or Incorporeal, we conceive it ſufficient to prove, that both Bodies and Incorporeals are incomprehenſible; for thence it will follow, That the Elements muſt be Incomprehenſible.

## CHAP. V.

### *Whether Bodies be incomprehenſible?*

A *Body* (ſome of them ſay,) *is that which* (they think) *doth, or ſuffereth*: But according to this notion it is incomprehenſible, as we have ſhewn. For not being able to ſay whether there be a Cauſe, we cannot ſay whether there be a Patient, for the Patient ſuffers from the Cauſe; Thus both the Cauſe and the Patient being incomprehenſible, a Body alſo muſt be incomprehenſible.

Some ſay, A Body is that which hath a triple dimenſion and reſiſtence: For a point, (they ſay) is that which hath no part, a line is a length without breadth: Now when theſe have received depth alſo, and reſiſtence, it then becomes the Body we ſpeak of, conſiſting of length, breadth, depth, and reſiſtence. But theſe are eaſily diſproved; for, either they muſt ſay, that a Body is nothing but theſe, or that it is ſomthing elſe different from theſe: * That it is ſomthing elſe different from theſe, we cannot conceive; for we cannot conceive that there is a Body, where there is not length, breadth, depth, and reſiſtence. But if a Body be theſe, and we prove that theſe are not exiſtent, we take away Body; for the Whole, if you take away all its Parts, is taken away alſo. Theſe may be confuted ſeveral ways, of which we ſhall only alledge this; If there are terms, either they are Lines, or Superficies, or Bodies; if they ſhall ſay, that there is Line or Superficies, they muſt grant that each of them can exiſt by itſelf, or is conſidered only in the Bodies. That a Line or Superficies exiſts by itſelf, none perhaps is ſo fooliſh as to imagine: If they ſay, that they exiſt not by themſelves but in the Body; Firſt, they muſt grant that Bodies are made of them, for then they muſt firſt have had a ſubſiſtence by themſelves, and afterwards concur to the making of a Body. Again, neither do they exiſt in the things which are called Bodies, as, (to omit other Inſtances) we ſhall ſhew from Contact only: For if the Bodies which are clapt together, touch one another mutually, they muſt touch mutually by their terms, that is, by their Superficies; But the Superficies touch not each other in whole, for then they would be united one to the other by the act of touching, the touch would confound the ſubſtances; ſo as to divide two things that touch one another, would be a Divulſion. Neither doth a Superficies by ſome parts touch the Superficies of the Body which is applyed to it, and by others is united to the Body, whoſe term it is; certainly no Man can conſider this to be without depth, and conſequently, not a Superficies but a Body; In like manner, if we ſuppoſe two Superficies, laid one upon the other, according to their terms or bounds; It follows, that, according to that which is called their length, (that is, according to their lines,) thoſe lines, by which the Superficies are ſaid to touch one another, ſhall not touch one another totally, for then they would be confounded; Neither doth any one line of them touch, by ſome parts, the line to which it is applyed, and by others is united to the Superficies, whoſe bound it is, for then it would not be without breadth, and conſequently no Line: Now if in a Body there is neither Line nor Superficies, there is neither length, breadth, nor depth in a Body.

If any ſhall ſay theſe Terms are Bodies; they may be confuted briefly thus: If length be a Body, it is divided into its three Dimenſions, and each of thoſe being a Body, is again divided into its three Dimenſions, and ſo into Infinite. Thus a Body will be of infinite Magnitude, being divided into Infinite; but that is abſurd: Therefore the foreſaid Dimenſions are not Bodies: And if neither Bodies nor Lines, nor Superficies, it may well be conceived that they are not at all.

Reſiſtence likewiſe is not to be comprehended or underſtood; for if it might be comprehended, it would be comprehended from the Touch. Now if we ſhew that the Touch itſelf is incomprehenſible, it will appear that it is impoſſible to comprehend Reſiſtence; That Touch is incomprehenſible, we collect thus; Whatſoever things touch one another, either touch one another mutually by their Parts; or the Whole, the Whole. Not the Whole, the Whole; for that were not to touch, but to be made one; neither the Parts, the Parts; for thoſe Parts, though in reſpect of their Wholes they are Parts, yet in reſpect of their own Parts are Wholes, for they have Parts within themſelves. But Wholes touch not Wholes, for the reaſon alledged; and conſequently neither do Parts touch Parts; theſe Parts, in reſpect of their own Parts, being Wholes. Now, if we cannot comprehend, that Touch may be made either by Whole, or by Parts; Touch muſt be incomprehenſible, and conſequently ſo muſt a Body; for if it be nothing more than theſe three Dimenſions and Reſiſtence, and we have ſhewn that each of theſe is incomprehenſible, Body alſo is incomprehenſible. Thus therefore, as to the notion of Body itſelf, it is incomprehenſible, whether there is a Body.

Moreover, of Bodies, ſay they, ſome are ſenſible, others intelligible; theſe are comprehended by Intellect, thoſe by the Senſes. The Senſes are ſimply paſſible, but the Intellect cometh to the comprehenſion of intelligible things, through comprehenſion of Senſibles. If therefore a Body be ſomthing, it muſt either be ſenſible or intelligible: Senſible it is not, for it ſeemeth to be comprehended by collection of length, and breadth, and depth, and reſiſtence, and colour, and ſuch like, together with which it is conſidered; but the Senſes they hold to be ſimply *paſſive*. If they ſay, a Body is Intelligible, there muſt be ſomthing in the nature of Senſible things, by which Bodies, being intelligible, may be underſtood: But there is nothing beſides Body and Incorporeal, whereof the Incorporeal is itſelf intelligible, the Body therefore is not ſenſible, as we proved; and there not being in the nature of things any Senſible, by which Body might be underſtood, neither will Body be intelligible; and if neither ſenſible nor intelligible, and there be nothing beſides theſe, we may ſay, a Body is nothing. Wherefore oppoſing theſe Reaſons, which prove there is no Body, to

* The Text ſeems defective, and to be thus ſupplied out of his Chapter concerning Body, *adverſus Mathematicos*. Page 368.

to those which prove that there is a Body, we Suspend.

Now, from the incomprehensibility of Body, will be inferred also, that Incorporeal is incomprehensible; for privations are understood to be the privations of Habits, as, of Sight, Blindness; of Hearing, Deafness; and the like. Wherefore to comprehend the Privation, we must first comprehend the Habit, whereof it is a Privation; for, he who understands not what Sight is, cannot say, This Man hath not Sight, that is, he is blind. If therefore the Privation of a Body be Incorporeal, and the Habits being incomprehensible, it be impossible to comprehend their Privations; But Body, as we have shewn, is incomprehensible; Incorporeals also will be incomprehensible. For, either it is sensible, or intelligible; if Sensible, it is incomprehensible, by reason of the difference of living Creatures, and of Men, and of Senses, and of Circumstances, and by reason of Commixtion, and the like, mentioned in the ten Common-places of Suspension; if Intelligible, there not being granted a comprehension of Sensible things, by which we may be carried to Intelligibles; neither will there be granted a Comprehension of things Intelligible, and consequently not of an Incorporeal. Besides, he who saith, that he comprehends an Incorporeal, must say, that he Comprehends it either by Sense or by Reason; not by Sense, for the Sense seemeth to perceive sensible things, by intromission and insinuation; as the Sight, (whether it be made by a conick impression, or by emission, or immission of Species, or by effusion of Raies and Colours) and the Hearing, (whether it be that the Air is struck, or that the parts of the Voice are carried to the Ear, and strike the Sense, so as to cause a perception of the Voice,) likewise Odours to the Nostrils, and Sapours to the Tongue, and tangible things are derived to the touch in the same manner. But Incorporeals are not capable of receiving such impressions, therefore they cannot be comprehended by Sense. But neither by Discourse (or Reason;) for if Discourse be a Dicible and Incorporeal, (as the Stoicks hold) He, who saith Incorporeals are understood by Discourse, begs the Question; For when we demand, Whether an Incorporeal can be comprehended, He, taking Incorporeal simply, would thereby shew the Comprehension of Incorporeals; whereas Discourse itself, if it be Incorporeal, is a part of the thing controverted. How then can any shew that this Incorporeal (Discourse) is comprehended first? If by any Incorporeal, we shall require a demonstration of its Comprehension, and so to Infinite. If by a Body, the comprehension of Bodies is the thing in question. By What then shall we demonstrate, that a Body is comprehended, which is assumed to demonstrate the comprehension of Discourse and Incorporeal? If by a Body, we run into *Infinite*; If by an Incorporeal, we run into the *Alternate common place*. Thus Discourse being, If Incorporeal, Comprehensible; none can say, that an Incorporeal may be comprehended by it. But if Discourse be a Body, forasmuch as there is Controversie concerning Bodies, whether they are comprehended or not, because of the continual effluxion (as they call it) of them; in respect whereof, they neither can admit Demonstration, nor are conceived to be; insomuch as *Plato* termeth Bodies, γενόμενα, ὄντα δ' οὐδέπω, *Generated, Not being*. Hereupon I doubt which way the Controversie concerning Body determineth, since neither by a Body, nor by an Incorporeal, for the inconveniences alledged. Therefore neither is it possible to comprehend Incorporeals by Discourse, but if they neither incur to Sense, nor are comprehended by Discourse, they cannot be comprehended at all. Now if we can neither assert the existence of a Body, nor of an Incorporeal, we must suspend as to the Elements; and perhaps we must suspend also concerning those things, which are after the Elements; if, of them, some are Corporeal; others, Incorporeal, and both these are controverted. Moreover, seeing we ought to suspend concerning Efficient and Material Principles, for the precedent Reasons, the whole Discourse concerning Principles will be inextricable.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of Temperament.*

BUT, setting this aside, how can they say, that Temperaments are made of the first Elements, whenas there is not any Touch, nor Contact, nor Temperament, nor Mixture at all? That Touch is nothing, we shewed lately, in discoursing concerning the Existence of Bodies. And that Temperament also, from what they say, is not possible, we shall briefly declare. They speak much concerning it, and almost innumerable are the controversies of the Dogmatists about it, so as from the Indijudicableness of the Controversie may be argued the Incomprehensibility of the Subject. To confute them all in particular, would be beyond our Design; this which we shall say, we conceive, may suffice.

All contemperated things consist, as they say, of Substance and Qualities. They must therefore either hold, that either the Substances are mingled, and not the Qualities; or the Qualittes but not the Substances; or neither with the other; or both with one another. But if neither Substance nor Qualities are mingled one with the other, Temperament will be unintelligible; for how can one Sense be made of the things tempered, if the things tempered be not mingled together, by any of the foresaid ways? If they say, that the Qualities are simply adjacent one to another, but the Substance is mingled; this also is absurd, for we comprehend not Qualities in Temperaments, as separate, but we feel them as made one by the things tempered. If they say, that the Qualities are mingled, but not the Substances; it is impossible, for the subsistence of the Qualities is in the Substance. Wherefore it is ridiculous to say, that the Qualities are separated from their Substances, and so mingled with one another, and the Substances left deprived of their Qualities. It remains to say, that the Qualities and Substances of things tempered pass through one another, and being mingled, make the Temperament, which is

more absurd than the former; for such a Temperament is impossible. For example, If with Ten pints of Water there be mixed one pint of Hemlock, the Hemlock will be said to be commixed with all the Water; for if a Man take never so little of this mixture, he will find it full of the power of the Hemlock. Now if the Hemlock be mixed with every part of the Water, and co-extended with it, the whole with the whole, by mutual Permeation of the Substances and Qualities one through another, that so the Temperament may be made; and things, co-extended with one another in every part, take up equal place, and consequently, are equal to one another, the pint of Hemlock shall be equal to the Ten pints of Water; so that the mixtion must either be Twenty pints or Two pints, according to this Hypothesis of the manner of Temperament. And again, One pint of Water being put to Twenty pints of Water, according to this Hypothesis, must make the measure either of Forty pints, or of Two only; because we may either conceive the pint to be Twenty pints, as being co-extended with so many; or the Twenty pints to be that One, with which they are co-equaliz'd. In like manner, a Man adding but one pint, may argue, that the Twenty pints, which we see, ought to be Twenty thousand, or more, according to this Hypothesis of Temperament, and that the same are but two only; than which, nothing is more absurd; Therefore this Hypothesis of Temperament is absurd. Now if Temperament neither be by mixing the Substances only, nor Qualities only, nor both, nor either; and besides these, nothing can be imagined; the manner of Temperament, and of all mixtures, is not to be understood. Wherefore if those things which are call'd Elements, are not capable of making Contemperations, neither by touching one another, nor by being blended or mingled, the Physiology of the Dogmatists, as to this thing, is unintelligible.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of Motion.*

BEsides, what hath been said, the Physiology of the Dogmatists may be conceived to be impossible, by discoursing upon Motions; for all Commixtions must be made by some Motion of the Elements, and the Efficient Principle. If therefore we prove, that there is no generally acknowledged Species of Motion, it will be manifest, that, though all which we formerly opposed, should, by way supposition, be granted; yet that, which the Dogmatists call Physick, serves to no purpose.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of Local-Motion.*

THey who seem to have discoursed most exactly of Motion, say, there are six kinds thereof. Local-Motion, Alteration, Augmentation, Diminution, Generation, and Corruption. We shall examine each of these particularly, beginning with Local motion. This, according to the Dogmatists, is that, by which that which moveth, passeth from place to place, either according to its Whole, or according to Part; according to its Whole, as in them who walk; according to Part, as in a Sphear that moves about its Center; for the Whole remaineth in the same place, the Parts only change place.

Three, as I conceive, are the principal Controversies concerning Motion. *Bion*, and some other Philosophers, hold, that there is Motion; *Parmenides*, *Melissus*, and others, that there is not Motion; the Scepticks *nothing rather* that it is, than that it is not. For as to the Phænomena's, it appeareth that there is Motion; but as to Philosophical Discourse, that there is not. If therefore, upon examination of the Arguments on both sides, we shall find them to be of equal weight, we shall not assent to either. Let us begin with those who hold, that it is.

These insist most upon Evidence: For if, they say, there is no Motion, How doth the Sun appear now in the East, anon in the West? or How doth he make the seasons of the year, which are according as he is nearer to, or further from us? Or How do Ships put off from one Port, and reach another far distant? Or How does he, who denies Motion, go abroad and come home? These they conceive cannot be answered, and therefore one of the Cynicks, an Argument being propounded to him to take away Motion, made no Answer, but rose up and walk'd, shewing by action and evidence, that there is Motion. Thus they endeavour to silence the contrary Party.

But they who take away the existence of Motion, argue thus. If a thing be moved, it must be moved either by itself, or by some other; but neither by itself, nor by any other. For that which is said to be moved nor by itself, must be moved either by some Cause, or by none; by no Cause they say nothing is done; if by some Cause, the Cause by which it is moved, will be its Mover, and so they will run into Infinite, according to our usual way of Argument. Again, if that which moveth, effects, and that which effects, is moved, that will also require another to move it, and this a Third, and so to Infinite; so that Motion shall be without any Principle of first beginning, which is absurd. Therefore every thing that moveth, is not moved by another. But neither by itself; for every thing that moveth, either impelleth forward, or draweth backward; or upward, or downward; therefore whatsoever moveth itself, must do it after one of these ways. If by Impelling forward, it must be behind itself; if by drawing back, before itself; if upwards, below itself; if downwards, above itself. But for a thing to be either above, or before, or below, or behind itself, is impossible; it is therefore impossible for any thing to be moved by itself. But if neither by itself, nor by any other, then nothing at all is moved. If any recur to Appetite and Election, we must let him know, that the Question is concerning *that which is in our power*, and that this Question is indeterminable, forasmuch as we have not yet found a Critery of Truth.

Again,

Again, if a thing be moved, it is either moved in the place in which it is, or in which it is not; but not in the place wherein it is; for if it be in it, it continues in it. Nor in the place in which it is not, for where a thing is not, there it can neither act nor suffer. This was the Argument of *Diodorus Cronus*. But it is answered several ways, of which we shall only alledge those which we conceive to be of greatest force, together with the Judgment which appeareth for the present to us. Some say, that a thing may be moved in the place where it is, for the Sphears which roll about their Centers are moved, and yet continue in their place. In Answer to whom, the Argument should be transferred to the several parts of the Sphear, and we must shew by this Argument, it is not moved as to its parts, if we will prove that nothing is moved in the place wherein it is.

The same Answer may be made to those, who say, that a thing moved must touch two places, that wherein it is, and that to which it goes; We shall ask them, seeing, that what is moved is carried from the place wherein it is to another, Whether this be when it is in the first place, or when it is in the second? But whilst it is in the first, it passeth not to another, for it is yet in the first; and when it is not in this, it passeth not out of it: Besides this, the Question is begged. For in the place wherein it is not, it cannot act; for no Man will grant simply, that it is carried to any place, who grants not that it is moved.

Some there are, who distinguish thus: Place is taken two ways, largely, as my House; strictly, as the Air, which encloseth the Superficies of a Body. Now when a thing that is moved, is said to be moved in Place, we mean not Place in the large Sense, but in the strict. To these may be answered, by subdividing Place largely taken; that in one part thereof, the Body is said to be moved properly, as being its exact Place; in the other, not so, this being the rest of the parts of Place largely taken. Then inferring, that nothing can be moved, neither in the Place wherein it is, nor in the Place wherein it is not, conclude, that neither in Place at large, improperly taken, can any thing be moved. For it consists of two Parts, of that wherein the thing exactly is, and of that in which exactly it is not; in neither of which can any thing be moved, as was proved.

It may be argued also thus: If any thing be moved either it is moved from some part of the space, and then another; or it is moved all at once, over the whole divisible Interval: But neither can any thing be moved from some first part of the space, and then another, not all at once, over the whole divisible Interval, therefore nothing is moved. That nothing is moved from some first part of the space, is manifest from hence; for that, if the Bodies, and the Places, and the Times, in which those Bodies are said to be moved, be divided into Infinite, there will be no Motion, it being impossible to find in Infinites a First, from which First (Part) that which is said to be moved shall be moved. But if the things aforesaid end in an indivisible, and every thing that is moved pass the first divisible Part of its Place, in like manner as the first indivisible Part of its Time, all things will be of equal Celerity; as the fleetest Horse, and a Tortoise; which is absurder than the former. Therefore Motion is not made from some first part of the space. But neither all at once over the whole divisible Interval: For if apparent things must, as they say, clear things unapparent; when a Man should go the space of a Stadium, it is requisite that he first perform the first part of the Stadium, and then the second, and so the other parts in order. So every thing that is moved according to the First, must first be moved; for if that which is moved be said to pass at once over all the parts of the place, in which it is moved, it will be in all its parts at once; and if one part of the place be cold, another hot; or one black, another white, so much as to qualifie the things that are in it, that which moveth will be at once hot and cold, and black and white. Besides, let them say, how much of the Place at once that which is moved passeth. If they say it is Indefinite, they grant, that somthing may be moved over the face of the whole Earth at once; if they deny that, let them define the quantity of the place; for to endeavour exactly to define such a place, than which the thing moved cannot pass, at once, any (though never so little) greater distance, besides that it is absurd and ridiculous, will perhaps incur the former inconvenience; for all things will be swift alike, seeing that every thing passeth alike through determinate places. But if they shall say, that what is moved all at once, is moved through a little, but not exactly determinate; Place, we shall confound them by a Sorites, continually adding to the supposed Magnitude, another very little Magnitude of Place. For if at any time they make a stand, then they fall into their former determination of the Place, and strange Conceits; but if they admit an increase, we shall force them to Grant, that a thing may be moved all at once over the whole Earth. Wherefore neither are those things which are said to be moved, moved at once over the whole divisible Interval; and if neither all at once, nor from some part, then nothing is moved. This and much more is alledged by those who take away local Motion: But we (not being able to disprove either these Arguments, or the Phænomenon which they follow, who say there is no Motion, as to the opposition betwixt the Phænomenas and the Arguments) suspend, Whether there be Motion or not.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Of Augmentation and Diminution.*

UPon the ſame Ground we ſuſpend as to *Augmentation* and *Diminution*: For, Evidence ſeems to prove that they are, but Diſcourſe (or Reaſon) to overthrow them; As thus: That is augmented, being already an *Ens* and Subſiſtent, muſt be moved further as to quantity (for if any ſhall ſay that by Appoſition of one thing another is augmented, he ſpeaketh falſly:) Since therefore Subſtance never is at a ſtand, but always in fluxion, and ſome are inſinuated into others, that which is augmented hath not its firſt ſubſtance with the addition of ſome other, but a Subſtance wholly new; As therefore (for Inſtance,) If there being a piece of Wood three Foot long, ſome Man putting to it a piece ten Foot long, ſhould ſay he hath augmented the piece of three Foot, he ſhall ſay falſly, (foraſmuch as this is wholly another thing from the other:) So in every thing that is ſaid to be augmented, the former matter flowing out, and new matter flowing in, if that be added which is ſaid to be added, none will ſay that this is Augmentation, but Alteration of the Whole.

The ſame may be ſaid of Diminution; for how can that which ſubſiſts not, be ſaid to be diminiſhed? Beſides, If Diminution be made by Detraction, Augmentation by Addition; But neither Detraction nor Addition be any thing, neither is Diminution nor Augmentation any thing.

## CHAP. X.

### *Of Detraction and Addition.*

THat Detraction is Nothing, they argue thus: If Somthing be detracted from another, either an Equal is detracted from an Equal, or a Greater from a Leſſer, or a Leſſer from a Greater: But none of theſe; therefore Detraction is not poſſible. That Detraction is not made by any of theſe ways, is manifeſt: That which is detracted from another, before it is detracted, muſt be contained in that from which it is detracted, but an Equal is not contained in an Equal, as Six in Six; for that which containeth, ought to be greater than that which is contained; and that from which ſomthing is detracted, ought to be greater than that which is detracted, that after the Detraction there may be ſomthing remaining, for herein Detraction ſeems to differ from quite taking away. Neither is the Greater contained in the Leſſer, as Six in Five; that were abſurd. Neither is the Leſſer contained in the Greater; for if Five were contained in Six, as the fewer in the more, by the ſame Reaſon, in Five will be contained Four, and in Four, Three, and in Three, Two, and in Two, One; thus Six ſhall contain Five, Four, Three, Two, One, which being put together, make Fifteen, which muſt be contained in Six, if it be granted that the Leſſer is contained in the Greater. In like manner, in the Fifteen which is contained in Six, will be contained Thirty five; and ſo, by Progreſſion, infinite Numbers: But it is abſurd to ſay, that infinite Numbers are contained in the Number Six; therefore it is abſurd to ſay, that the Leſſer is contained in the Greater. If therefore it be requiſite, that what is Detracted from another, be contained in the thing from which it is Detracted; but neither Equal is contained in Equal, nor the Greater in the Leſſer, nor the Leſſer in the Greater; Nothing certainly is Detracted from any Thing.

Again, if Somthing be Detracted from Somthing, either the Whole is Detracted from the Whole, or Part from Part, or the Whole from the Part, or Part from the Whole. But to ſay, That the Whole is Detracted from the Whole or from Part, is abſurd; it remains therefore to ſay, That the Part is Detracted from the Whole, or from Part, which is abſurd alſo. We will inſtance (not to change our Example in Numbers, as being moſt perſpicuous,) in the Number Ten, and let us ſuppoſe One to be ſubſtracted from it. This One cannot be ſubſtracted from the whole Ten, nor from the remaining part of it, Nine, as I ſhall prove; therefore is it not ſubſtracted. For if One be ſubſtracted from the whole Ten, foraſmuch as Ten is nothing elſe but Ten Unites, not any one of the Unites, but a Combination of all, this Unity, to be ſubſtracted out of the whole Ten, muſt be ſubſtracted out of every Unite: But firſt, from an Unite nothing can be ſubſtracted, for Unites are indiviſible, and therefore One cannot be ſubſtracted from Ten in this manner. But if we grant an Unite may be taken from every Unite, an Unite will have Ten Parts, and having Ten Parts, will be an Unite; now there being Ten other Parts remaining, from which were ſubſtracted the Ten Parts of that which is called an Unite, thoſe Ten will be Twenty: But it is abſurd to ſay, that One is Ten, and that Ten is Twenty, and that what is Indiviſible (according to them) is divided, therefore it is abſurd to ſay, That an Unite is ſubſtracted from the whole Number Ten. But neither is the Unite ſubſtracted from the remaining Number Nine, for that from which a Thing is ſubſtracted remaineth not intire, but the Nine remaineth intire after the Subſtraction of the Unite. Beſides, the Nine being nothing elſe but nine Unites, if the Unite be ſaid to be taken away from the Whole, the Nine itſelf will be taken away; if from a part of the Nine, as from Eight, the ſame Abſurdities will follow: If from an Unite, which is the laſt, they muſt ſay that an Unite is diviſible, which is abſurd; therefore the Unite is not ſubſtracted out of the Nine. Now if it neither be ſubſtracted from the whole Ten, nor from a Part thereof, neither can a Part be ſubſtracted from the Whole, nor from a Part. If therefore neither Whole can be ſubſtracted from Whole, nor Part from Whole, nor Whole from Part, nor Part from Part, Nothing is ſubſtracted from another.

Likewiſe Addition is reckoned by them amongſt Things impoſſible: For, ſay they, That which is added, is either added to itſelf, or to ſome Subject præexiſtent, or to that which conſiſts of both; but none of theſe is true, therefore

fore nothing is added to another. For Inſtance, ſuppoſe the quantity of four Pints, and thereto let be added one Pint, I demand, To what it is added? To itſelf it cannot, for that which is added, is diverſe from that to which it is added, but nothing is diverſe from itſelf. But neither is it added to that which conſiſts of both, the meaſure of four Pints and one Pint, for how can any thing be added to that which is not yet? Beſides, if to the four Pints, and to the one Pint, be added a Pint, it will make up ſix Pints, from the quantity of four Pints, and the one Pint, and the additional Pint. Now if to the four Pints only, be added one Pint, foraſmuch as that which is coextended with another, muſt be equal with that to which it is coextended; if one Pint be coextended with four Pints, it will double the quantity of the four Pints, ſo as the whole meaſure will be eight Pints, which we ſee to be otherwiſe. If therefore that which is ſaid to be added, be neither added to itſelf, nor to ſome other Subject, nor to that which conſiſts of both theſe, and, beſides theſe, there be nothing; certainly there is no addition of one thing to another.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of Tranſpoſition.*

TRanſpoſition comes within the compaſs of Addition, and Detraction, and Local Motion, for it is Detraction from one thing, and Addition to another, tranſiently.

## CHAP. XII.

### *Of Whole and Part.*

THE like may be ſaid of Whole and Part, for the Whole ſeemeth to be made by convention, and addition of the Parts; but by detraction of any one, or more of them, it leaveth to be Whole.

Beſides, If there be a Whole, either it is a thing diverſe from its Parts, or its Parts are the Whole, but it ſeems not to be diverſe from its Parts; For, the Parts being taken away, nothing remaineth whereby we may think that the Whole is any thing beſides them. Now if the Parts are the Whole, the Whole is only a word, and an empty name, but hath no proper ſubſiſtence, as Diſtance is nothing more than things diſtant, and Contiguity nothing but things contiguous; Therefore the Whole is not any thing. But neither the Parts alſo; for if there are Parts, either they are Parts of the Whole, or Parts of one another, or each is Part of itſelf. Not of the Whole, for that is nothing more than the Parts themſelves. Beſides, the Parts would then be Parts of themſelves, becauſe every Part is completive of the Whole. Neither of one apother, for a Part ſeemeth to be contained in that whereof it is a Part, and it were abſurd to ſay, that the Hand (for example) is contained in the Foot. Neither is each of them a Part of itſelf, for then, as containing, and contained by itſelf, a thing will be greater, and leſs than itſelf. Now if thoſe which we call Parts, neither be Parts of the Whole, nor of themſelves, nor of one another, they are not Parts of any thing, and if Parts of nothing, neither are they Parts, for Relatives are taken away together. This, by way of digreſſion; for we treated of Whole and Part once before.

## CHAP. XIII.

### *Of Alteration.*

SOme alſo deny that there is any Alteration or natural Mutation, (as they term it,) arguing thus. If Somthing be changed, either that which is changed is a Body, or Incorporeal; but neither of theſe is determinable, therefore Alteration itſelf is indeterminable. If any thing alter by operating as a Cauſe, it alters as being the Patient; and the ſubſiſtence of it, as Cauſe, is ſubverted, together with which the Patient alſo is ſubverted, not having a thing from which to ſuffer, therefore nothing is altered.

Moreover, If there be Alteration, it is either of a Being, or of a Not-being; but a Not-being is inſubſiſtent, and can neither ſuffer nor act, therefore it is not capable of Alteration. If that which is changed be a Being, it is either changed as a Being, or as a Not-being. As a Not-being it is not changed, for Not-beings are not. If it be changed as a Being, it becomes different from a Being, that is, it will not be a Being: But to ſay that a Being is a Not-being, is abſurd. Therefore a Being is not changed. Now if neither a Being be changed, nor a Not-being, and beſides theſe there is nothing, it remains to ſay, that nothing is changed.

Some argue thus: That which is changed, muſt be changed in ſome time, but neither is any thing changed in the time paſt, nor in the future, nor in the preſent, (as we ſhall ſhew;) therefore nothing is changed. In time paſt or future, nothing is changed; for neither of theſe is preſent, but it is impoſſible for any thing to act or ſuffer in a non-exiſtent and not-preſent time. But neither in the preſent, for perhaps the preſent alſo is inexiſtent. This τὸ νῦν, *Now*, is indiviſible: But it is impoſſible to imagine that Iron (for Example) can be changed from hard to ſoft, or that any other Alteration can be made in indiviſible time, for they ſeem to require Succeſſion. Now if nothing be changed either in the time paſt, nor in the preſent, nor in the future, nothing at all is changed.

Moreover, If there be Alteration, † either it is ſubject to Senſe, or to Intellect; not to the Senſes, for they receive only ſingle Notions, but Alteration hath a twofold Reſpect, both to that out of which the Alteration is, and to that into which it is. If they ſay, It is Intelligible, foraſmuch as there is an indeterminable Controverſie concerning Intelligibles, as we have already ſaid, we cannot aſſert the Being of Alteration.

† *The Text requires to be ſupplied to this effect.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *Of Generation, and Corruption.*

GEneration, and Corruption, are ſubverted together with Addition, and Detraction, and Alteration; for without theſe, nothing can be generated, nor corrupted: As for Example: Of the corruption of the Number Ten, ſay they, is generated the Number Nine, by Subſtraction of One; and of Nine corrupted is generated Ten, by addition of One; and Canker, (by alteration) of Braſs corrupted; therefore the forenamed Motions being taken away, perhaps it neceſſarily followeth, that Generation and Corruption are alſo taken away.

Moreover, ſome argue thus. If *Socrates* were generated, he was generated either when he was not *Socrates*, or when he was *Socrates*: If when he was, he muſt have been generated twice; if when he was not, he was, and was not, at the ſame time. He was, as being generated; he was not, according to the *Hypotheſis*. Again, if *Socrates* Dyed, either he Dyed when he Lived, or when he was Dead; not when he Lived, for ſo the ſame Perſon ſhould be both Dead and Alive; neither when he was Dead, for ſo he ſhould Dye twice. Therefore *Socrates* Died not. By this Argument, upon every thing that is ſaid to be generated, or corrupted, Generation and Corruption may be ſubverted.

Some argue thus: If there be Generation, that which is generated, is either a Being, or a Not-Being; not a Not-Being, for to that, which *is not*, nothing can happen, not ſo much as to *be*. Neither a Being, for if a Being be generated, it is generated either as it is a Being, or as it is a Not-Being. As it is a Not-Being, it is not generated, and if it be generated as a Being, foraſmuch as a thing is generated of ſomthing different from it, that which is generated muſt be different from a Being, that is, a Not-being. Therefore that which is generated ſhall be a Not-being, which is abſurd. Now if neither a Being, nor a Not-being be generated, nothing at all is generated.

Upon the ſame grounds alſo nothing is corrupted. For if Somthing be corrupted, it is either a Being, or a Not-Being; not a Not-Being, for that which is corrupted muſt ſuffer Somthing; not a Being, for either it is corrupted, as continuing in the ſtate of a Being, or as not continuing. If as continuing in the ſtate of a Being, the ſame will be at once a Being and a Not Being; becauſe it is not corrupted as a Not-Being, but as it is a Being; and as it is corrupted, it is different from a Being, and conſequently a Not-Being. But it is abſurd to ſay, the ſame thing is a Being and a Not-Being; therefore a Being is not corrupted whilſt it continueth in the ſtate of a Being. But if a Being be corrupted, not whilſt it is in the ſtate of a Being, but firſt reduced to a Not-Being, and afterwards corrupted; it is not a Being, but a Not-Being, that is corrupted; which (as we ſaid before) is impoſſible. If therefore neither a Being is corrupted, nor a Not-Being, and beſides theſe there is Nothing, Nothing is corrupted. This may ſerve, by way of Summary, to ſay of Motions; whence it followeth, That the Phyſiologie of the *Dogmatiſts* is inexiſtent, and unintelligible.

## CHAP. XV.

### *Of Reſt.*

IN like manner ſome doubt as to the Nature of Reſt, ſaying, That whatſoever Moves, Reſts not; but every Body continually Moveth, according to the Opinions of the *Dogmatiſts*, who ſay, That Subſtance is Fluid, and hath continual Evacuations and Recruits; (Whence the *Platonicks* chuſe rather to call Bodies, Things generated, than Beings; and *Heraclitus* compared the Mobility of our Matter, to the rapid courſe of a River.) Therefore no Body reſts.

Again, that which is ſaid to reſt, ſeemeth to be contained by the things that are about it; that which is contained ſuffers, but there is no Patient; for, as we proved before, there is no Cauſe, therefore nothing Reſts. Some argue thus: That which Reſts Suffers, that which Suffers is moved; therefore that which is ſaid to Reſt is moved, and if moved, it Reſts not. Hence alſo it is manifeſt, That an Incorporeal Reſts not; for if that which Reſts Suffers, and to ſuffer be proper to Bodies, and not to Incorporeals, no Incorporeal either Suffers or Reſts; therefore nothing Reſts.

Now foraſmuch as none of the fore-named are underſtood without *Place* or *Time*, we muſt proceed to Diſquiſition of theſe; and if we prove, that theſe Exiſt not, the others will appear to be Inexiſtent upon that account alſo. Let us begin with *Place*.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of Place.*

PLace is taken two ways, Properly, and Improperly; Improperly for Place at large, as a City; Properly, for that in which we are exactly contained. We inquire of Place in the proper exact Senſe; ſome have aſſerted it, others deny'd it, others ſuſpended. Of theſe, they who aſſert it, recur to Evidence: For who is there, ſay they, who will affirm, there is not Place, when they behold the parts of Place, as, Right, Left; Upwards, Downwards; Before, Behind? and that the ſame Perſon is at ſeveral Times in ſeveral Places? and that where my Maſter taught, there do I now teach? They argue alſo, That there is Place, becauſe things are naturally light or heavy; and for that the Antients ſaid, *Chaos was firſt*; for they hold, That Chaos is Place, becauſe it contained all things that were made in it. And if a Body be any thing, ſay they, ſo is Place alſo; for without this, there will be no Body: And if there be a *from which*, there is alſo an *of which*, and an *in which*, that is, Place. The firſt is in either, the ſecond therefore in both.

But neither do they who take away Place grant, that the Parts of Place are; for Place is nothing elſe but it's Parts: And he who aſſerts

that Place is, if he takes for granted that it's Parts are, endeavours to make good the thing in Question, by itself. In like manner they do foolishly, who say, That something is in a Place, when as Place itself is absolutely deny'd to be: They take away together with it the existence of Place, which of itself is not granted, and the *of which*, and the *from which*, are proved to be inexistent, as well as Place; and disallow *Hesiod*, as not a competent Judge in Philosophy. And thus overthrowing the Arguments alledged, for the existence of Place, they, with greater subtlety, prove it to be inexistent, converting to their own use those Opinions of the *Dogmatists* concerning Place, which seem of greatest weight; as that of the *Stoicks*, and that of the *Peripateticks*, in this manner: The *Stoicks* say, *Vacuum is that which is capable of being contained by a Being, but is not contained: Or a Distance void of Body: Or a Distance not contained by a Body. But Place is a Distance which is contained by a Being, and is adæquate to that which containeth it; they call a Body a Being; the Distance, which is partly contained by the Body, partly not contained, Region.* Whereas others by Region understand the Place of a great Body, so as *Place* and *Region* differ in Magnitude. Now it's objected, when they say, *Place is the Distance contained by a Body*; how do they mean it to be a Distance, (or Dimension) whether the Length of a Body, or the Breadth, or the Depth only, or whether all three together? If they mean but one of these, the Place will not be adæquate to that whose Place it is. Besides, that which containeth will be part of that which is contained, which were absurd. If all the three Distances, forasmuch as in that which is called Place, there is not *Vacuum*, nor any other Body that hath Dimensions; but that Body which is said to be in the Place, consists not of Distances, (for that is Length, and Breadth, and Deprh, Resistence also comes within these) the Body itself will be it's own Place, and that which containeth will be the same with that which is contained, which were absurd. There is not therefore any Distance of the Place, and consequently Place is nothing.

There is also an Argument to this effect. Forasmuch as in a thing that is said to be in Place, there are not seen double Dimensions, but one Length, and one Breadth, and one Depth; Whether are these Dimensions of the Body only, or of Place, or of both? If of Place only, then the Body will have no proper Length, Breadth, or Depth, and consequently it will not be a Body, which is absurd. If of both, forasmuch as *Vacuum* hath no subsistence besides the Dimensions, and those of the *Vacuum* subjected to the Body; of whatsoever Dimensions the Body consists, of the same will the *Vacuum* consist also. For of the existence of Resistence, nothing can be positively asserted, as we formerly shewed. Now seeing that the Dimensions which belong to the *Vacuum*, and are the same with the *Vacuum*, appear only in the Body, which is visible, the Body will be *Vacuum*, which is absurd. If the Dimensions are of the Body only, then there will be no Dimension of Place, and consequently no Place; if therefore the Dimension of Place be not found by any of the foresaid ways, there is no Place.

This is likewise alledged: When a Body enters into a *Vacuum*, which thereby becomes a Place, either the *Vacuum* suffers, or yields, or is destroyed; but if it suffers, the same will be full and vacuous; if it either yields, being * moved locally, or is destroy'd by Motion, *Vacuum* will be a Body, for these are proper Affections of a Body. But it is absurd to say, the same is vacuous and full, or that *Vacuum* is a Body; therefore it is absurd to say, that a *Vacuum* may be occupated by a Body, and become Place. Whence it is also found, that *Vacuum* is absolutely inexistent, if it cannot be occupated by a Body, so as to become Place; for *Vacuum* was said to be that, which may be occupated by a Body.

* reading χινεωμενον.

Hereby also is subverted *Region*, for either it is a great Place, or is circumscribed with the Place; but if it be partly occupated by Body, and partly a vacuous distance or dimension, it is taken away with both. This, and much more, is alledged against the Opinion of the *Stoicks* concerning Place, wherein they dissent from others.

But the *Peripateticks* say, that *Place is the term* (or inmost *Superficies*) *of that which containeth, inasmuch as it containeth*; so that my Place is the *Superficies* of the air which incloseth my Body: But if this be Place, the same will be and not be; for when a Body is about to go into some Place, forasmuch as nothing can be in that which is not, it is necessary that Place first exist, and then that Body be in it; so that there must be Place, before there can be a Body that is said to be in Place. But inasmuch as Place is made, by accommodating of the *Superficies* of the thing containing, to the thing contained, Place cannot exist before there be a Body in it, and therefore will not have been before. But it is absurd to say, that the same is Somthing, and is not; therefore Place is not the term of a thing continent, inasmuch as it containeth.

Moreover, If Place be somthing, it is either Generate or Ingenerate; not Ingenerate, for they say it is made, whilst it is conformed to the Body which is in it; but neither is it Generate, for either when the Body is in Place, then is made the Place, in which that which is in Place, is now said to be; or when it is not in it: But neither when it is in it, (for it is already the Place of the Body that is in it) seeing that which containeth is adapted, as they say, to that which is contained, and so becometh Place. But nothing can be adapted round about that which is not in it. Now if Place be neither made when the Body is in it, nor when it is not in it; and besides these, we know not any way, then Place is not generated; but if it be neither Generated nor Ingenerated, it is not at all.

More generally may be argued thus: If there be Place, it is either a Body, or Incorporeal; but both these are doubtful, as we discoursed formerly, therefore Place itself is doubtful. Place is understood with reference to the Body whereof it is Place; but that which is alledged concerning the existence of a Body is uncertain, therefore that which is said of Place. The Place of every particular thing is not eternal,

nal, but if it be ſaid to be Generated, it will be found to be Inexiſtent, foraſmuch as Generation itſelf is not. Much more might be ſaid, but not to inſiſt longer hereon, we ſhall, from what hath been ſaid, infer, That the *Scepticks* ought not to aſſent to any thing, that is ſaid by the *Dogmatiſts* concerning Place, but to Suſpend.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *Of Time.*

THe ſame we do in the Queſtion concerning *Time:* For by *Phænomena's*, Time ſeemeth to be ſomthing; but by that which is ſaid of it, it ſeems to have no Being; for ſome affirm, That Time is the Interval of the motion of Time, (by Time underſtanding the World;) others, That it is the motion of the World. *Ariſtotle*, or, as ſome, *Plato*, that it is the number of *Prius & Poſterius* in motion. *Strato*, or, as ſome, *Ariſtotle*, that it is *the Meaſure of Motion and Reſt*. *Epicurus*, (as *Demetrius* the *Lacedemonian* ſaith) that it is an Accident of Accidents, accompanying Days, and Nights, and Hours, and Affections, and Apathies, and Motions, and Reſts. As to its Eſſence, ſome affirm it is a Body, as the Followers of *Æneſidemus*; for they hold, it differs nothing from Being, and from the firſt Body; others, that it is Incorporeal. Now therefore, either all theſe diſſonant Opinions are true, or all are falſe; or ſome are true, ſome falſe. But all cannot be true, for moſt of them are repugnant to one another; neither will the *Dogmatiſts* yield that all are falſe. Beſides, if we ſhould grant it to be falſe, that Time is a Body; and falſe likewiſe, that it is Incorporeal, it muſt immediately be granted, that Time is not at all; for beſides theſe, there can be nothing. Neither is it poſſible to comprehend which are true, which falſe, by reaſon of the equivalence of the Arguments on both ſides, and the uncertainty of the Criterie and the Demonſtration. For theſe Reaſons therefore, we cannot aſſert any thing concerning Time. Moreover, ſeeing that Time exiſts not without Motion or Reſt, if Motion and Reſt be taken away, Time alſo is taken away. Nevertheleſs, ſome bring theſe Arguments againſt Time.

If Time be, either it is Determinate, or Infinite; if Determinate, it began from ſome Time, and will end in ſome Time; and conſequently there was once a Time, when Time was not, that is, before it began to be; and there will be a Time, when Time ſhall not be, that is, when it ſhall have ceas'd to be, which is abſurd; Therefore Time is not Determinate. Now if it be Infinite, foraſmuch as one is ſaid to be Paſt, another Preſent, another Future; the Future and Preſent either are or are not; but if they are not, ſeeing there only remains the Preſent, than which nothing can be ſhorter, Time will be Determinate, and conſequently there will ariſe the ſame difficulties as at firſt. But if the Paſt exiſt, and the Future exiſt, they muſt both be Preſent; but it is abſurd to ſay, That that which is Paſt and Future is Preſent, therefore Time is not Infinite. Now if it be neither Infinite nor Determinate, it is not at all.

Moreover, if Time be, 'tis either Diviſible or Indiviſible; Indiviſible it is not, for it is divided, as they ſay, into Preſent, Paſt, and Future; but neither is it Diviſible, for every Diviſible is meaſured by ſome part of itſelf, that which meaſureth being applied to every part of the thing meaſured, as when we meaſure a Cubit with a Digit. But Time cannot be meaſured by any part of itſelf; for if the Preſent (for example) meaſureth the Paſt, it muſt be in the Paſt, and conſequently Paſt; and, if the Future, it muſt be in the Future, and conſequently Future. In like manner the Future, if it meaſure the others, muſt be Preſent and Paſt; and the Paſt muſt be Future and Preſent, which is a Contradiction; therefore it is not Diviſible. Now, if it be neither Diviſible nor Indiviſible, it is not at all.

Again, Time is ſaid to have three Parts, the Paſt, the Preſent, and the Future; of which, the Paſt and Future are not, (for if the Paſt and Future were now, each of them would be the Preſent) neither is the Preſent alſo. For if the Preſent Time be, it is either Indiviſible or Diviſible; Indiviſible it is not, for things that are changed, are ſaid to be changed in preſent Time; but nothing is changed in indiviſible Time, as, I am ſoftned, or the like. Therefore the preſent Time is not indiviſible. But neither is it diviſible; it cannot be divided into Preſents; for by reaſon of the ſwift fluxion of things in the world, the Preſent is imperceptibly changed into the Paſt. Neither is it divided into Paſt and Future, for then it were inexiſtent, as having one part no longer exiſtent, the other not yet exiſtent. Whence neither can the Preſent be the end of the Paſt, and Beginning of the Future, for ſo it will be, and not be; it will be, as it is Preſent; and not be, becauſe its parts are not: Therefore it is not diviſible. Now if the Preſent be neither diviſible nor indiviſible, it is not at all. But if there be neither Preſent, nor Paſt, nor Future, Time is not; for that which conſiſts of what is not, itſelf is not.

Againſt Time, is alſo brought this Argument: If Time is, it is either generate and corruptible, or ingenerate and incorruptible. Ingenerate and incorruptible it is not, for Part is Paſt, and hath no longer Being; Part is Future, and hath no Being yet: But neither is it generate and corruptible; for things that are generated, are generated of ſome Being, and Things that are corrupted, are corrupted into ſome Being, according to the Tenent of the *Dogmatiſts*. If therefore it be corrupted into the Paſt, it is corrupted into a Not-Being; and if it be generated of the Future, it is generated of a Not-Being, for neither of theſe is. But it is abſurd to ſay, that a Thing is generated of a Not-Being, or corrupted into a Not-Being; therefore Time is not generate and corruptible. Now if Time be neither ingenerate and incorruptible, nor generate and corruptible, it is not at all.

Moreover, foraſmuch as every thing that is generated, ſeems to be generated in Time; if Time be generated, it is generated in Time; it is therefore either generated in itſelf, or one time

time in another: But if in itſelf, the ſame will be and not be; for ſince that in which any thing is generated, muſt be pre-exiſtent to that which is generated in it; Time generated in itſelf, if it be generated, is not yet; and if it be generated in itſelf, it is already. Wherefore Time is not generated in itſelf. But neither is one Time generated in another; for if the Preſent be generated in the Future, the Future muſt be Preſent; and if in the Paſt, the Paſt. The ſame may be ſaid of other Times; therefore one Time is not generated in another. Now if Time be neither generated in itſelf, nor one Time in another, it is not generate at all. But that it is not ingenerate, we ſhewed alſo. Therefore ſeeing it is neither generate nor ingenerate, it is not at all; for every Being muſt either be generate or ingenerate.

## CHAP. XVIII.

### *Of Number.*

FOraſmuch as Time ſeemeth not to be conſidered without *Number*, it will not be from the purpoſe, to ſpeak ſomthing briefly concerning Number. As to common Converſation, we ſay, without opinion, that we number ſomthing; and allow it to be ſaid, that Number is ſomthing: But the ſuperfluous curioſity of the *Dogmatiſts* urgeth us to diſpute againſt it. The *Pythagoreans* aſſert Numbers to be the Elements of the World, for they ſay, that *Phænomena's* muſt conſiſt of ſomthing, but the Elements muſt be ſimple, therefore the Elements are unapparent. Now of things unapparent, ſome are Bodies, as Vapors, and little Bulks; others Incorporeal, as Figures, and Idea's, and Numbers, of which bodies are compounded, conſiſting of Length, Breadth, Depth, Reſiſtence, and Gravity. The Elements therefore are not only unapparent, but incorporeal. Moreover, Number is conſidered in every incorporeal, for it is either one, or two, or more; whence is gathered, that the Elements of all things are Numbers, which are unapparent and incorporeal, and conſider'd in all things; and this not ſimply, but by the *Monad*, and the * indefinite *Duad*, made by compoſition of the *Monad*, by participation whereof, all particular *Duads* are *Duads*. Of theſe are made the other Numbers, which are conſidered in things numerate, and, they ſay, frame the World. For the Point is correſpondent to the *Monad*, the Line to the *Duad*, (for it is conſidered, as lying betwixt two Points) the *Superficies* to the *Triad*, (for they ſay, it is the fluxion of a line into breadth to another point over againſt it.) The body of the *Tetrad* to the *Tetrad*, for it is made by elevating the *Superficies* to a point over it. Theſe Fictions they make of Bodies, and of the whole World, which they affirm to be governed according to the harmonical Propoſitions; the *Diateſſaron*, which is *Seſquitertia*, as 8 to 6; the *Diapente* which is *Seſquialtera*, as 9 to 6; and the *Diapaſon*, which is duple, as 12 to 6. Theſe things they dream, aſſerting Number to be ſomthing diſtinct from the things numbred, arguing thus: If an Animal be in its own proper reſpect One, a Plant, not being an Animal, will not be One; but a Plant is One, therefore an Animal is not One * in its own proper reſpect, but according to ſomthing extrinſecal that is conſidered in it, whereof every thing partakes, and is made One by it. And if Number be the things numbred, foraſmuch as the things numbred are (for example) Men, and Oxen, and Horſes, Number muſt be Men, Horſes, and Oxen; and Number muſt be white, and black, and bearded, if the things numbred happen to be ſuch; but this is abſurd, therefore Number is not the things which are numbred, but hath a peculiar exiſtence diſtinct from them, according to which it is conſider'd in the things numbr'd, and is alſo an Element.

* Inſerting χωρὶς τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς λόγων.

The *Pythagoreans* having thus collected, that Number is not the things numbred, there comes in the inſoluble doubt concerning Number; for Number is ſaid to be Number, therefore is either the things numbred, or ſome extrinſecal thing diſtinct from them; but neither is Number the things numbred, as the *Pythagoreans* have demonſtrated; nor is it any thing diſtinct from them, as we * ſhall declare; therefore Number is nothing. That Number is nothing extrinſecal, diſtinct from the things numbred, we ſhall prove, inſtancing in the Monad, for the better explication hereof. For if the Monad be Somthing in itſelf, by participation whereof, every thing that participates of it becomes One, either the Monad itſelf is but One, or it is as many as there things which participate of it; but if it is One, Whether doth each of thoſe Things which are ſaid to participate of it, participate of the Whole, or of Part thereof? For if one Man (for example) hath the Whole Monad, there will be no more Monad, whereof one Horſe, or one Dog, or any of thoſe things which we affirm to be One, can communicate. For, ſuppoſing one Garment to be amongſt many naked Men, if one of them put it on, the reſt muſt remain naked, and without any Garment; now if every one participates of part thereof, firſt, a Monad will have a part, and conſequently infinite Parts into which it is divided, which were abſurd. Again, as a part of the Decad (as a Duad) is not a Decad, ſo neither will a part of the Monad be a Monad, and therefore nothing participates of the Monad: Therefore there is not one Monad, of whoſe Parts all ſingulars participate. Now if the Monads are equal in number to all numerate things, of which the word *One* is predicated, by participation of which Monads every Particular is ſaid to be One, there will be infinite Monads thus participated. And theſe either participate of a tranſcendent Monad, or of Monads which are of equal Number with them, and are for that reaſon Monads; or they participate not, but are Monads, without any Participation. If theſe can be Monads without Participation, every Senſible Thing may in like manner be One without Participation; and then the Monad, which is conſidered in itſelf, is overthrown. But if theſe Monads alſo are by Participation, either they all participate of One, or there is One peculiar to each; if all parti-

* Reading ἀφ' ὑπομνήσομεν.

* Read ἀόριστος.

cipate of One, each participates of Part thereof, or of the Whole; whereupon follow the former Abſurdities: But if each hath a peculiar to itſelf, we muſt conſider over each of theſe another Monad, and over each of thoſe another, and ſo to Infinite. If therefore to comprehend, that there are ſome Monads in themſelves, by participation whereof every thing that is is One, it be requiſite to comprehend infinitely infinite intelligible Monads; but it is impoſſible to comprehend infinitely infinite intelligible Monads; by conſequence it is impoſſible to aſſert, that there are certain intelligible Monads, and that every Being is One, being made One by participation of its proper Monad. Therefore it is abſurd alſo to ſay, there are as many Monads as there are things participant of them. Now if that which is ſaid to be Monad in itſelf, neither is One, nor ſo many as are the things which participate of it, there is no ſuch thing as a Monad in itſelf. In like manner, neither will there be any of the other Numbers in itſelf; for the ſame Argument which we have brought againſt the Monad, will hold againſt them all. But if Number be neither in itſelf, as we have ſhewn; nor Number be the things numbred, as the *Pythagoreans* approved; and beſides theſe, there is nothing; we muſt ſay, that Number is not.

Moreover, How do they, who conceive Number to be Somthing extrinſecal, diſtinct from the Things numbred, affirm, That the Duad is generated of the Monad? For when we add a Monad to another Monad, either Somthing extrinſecal is added to the Monads, or is ſubſtracted from them, or is neither added nor ſubſtracted; but if nothing be added or ſubſtracted, there will be no Duad. For neither will the Monads, being ſeparate from one another, have a Monad conſidered as above them, according to their peculiar reſpects; neither is any thing added to them from without, (nor taken away, according to the *Hypotheſis*.) So that the addition of a Monad to a Monad, there being no Addition nor Subſtraction from without, will not make a Duad; but if there be Subſtraction, there will not only be no Duad, but the Monads themſelves will be diminiſhed; and if from without a Duad be added to them, that of the two Monads there may be made a Duad, ſeeming to be Two they will be Four; for there is firſt laid down one Monad, and another Monad, to which a Duad from without being added, the number Four is made. It is the ſame as to all other Numbers, which are ſaid to be made by Compoſition. If therefore thoſe Numbers which are ſaid to be compounded of tranſcendent Numbers, are made neither by Subſtraction nor Addition, nor without Subſtraction and Addition, the generation of that Number, which is ſaid to be by itſelf, and about numerate things, will be inſubſiſtent. But that the Numbers which are by Compoſition, are not ingenerate, they themſelves declare, affirming, That they are compounded, and made of thoſe which are tranſcendent, as of the Monad, and indefinite Duad; therefore Number hath not a ſubſiſtence of itſelf. And if Number hath not a Subſiſtence, neither conſidered in itſelf, nor in things numbered, Number is not any thing, according to the ſuperfluous curioſity of the *Dogmatiſts*. Thus much may ſerve for a brief Account, as to that which is called the *Phyſical* Part of Philoſophy.

## CHAP. XIX.

### *Of the Ethical part of Philoſophy.*

THere remains the *Ethical* part, which ſeemeth converſant about *Goods*, and *Ills*, and *Indifferents*. That therefore we may treat of this alſo, by way of Summary, we will inquire into the exiſtence of Goods, Ills, and Indifferents, having firſt explained their Notions.

## CHAP. XX.

### *Of Goods, Ills, and Indifferents.*

THe *Stoicks* ſay, that *Good is Profit*, or, *that which differeth not from Profit*, calling *Profit*, Virtue; and virtuous Action, *that which is not different from Profit*, a virtuous Man, and a Friend; for Virtue being the *Hegemonick* part of the Soul, conſiſtent after ſuch a manner; and virtuous Action, being an Operation according to Virtue, is plainly Profit; and a virtuous Man and a Friend, is not different from Profit. For Profit is a part of virtuous, as being the *Hegemonick* thereof; now the Wholes, they ſay, are neither the ſame with their Parts, (for a Man is not a hand;) nor different from their Parts, for they ſubſiſt not without their Parts: Wherefore they ſay, the Whole is not different from it's Parts, conſequently, a virtuous Man being the Whole in reſpect of it's *Hegemonick* (which they ſay is Profit) is not different from Profit.

## CHAP. XXI.

### *That Good is taken Three ways.*

HEnce, *Good*, they ſay, is taken Three ways: *One way, Good is ſaid to be that from which Profit cometh; this is the moſt principal, and the Virtues: The Second, is that by which Profit cometh, as Virtue and virtuous Actions. The Third, is that which is able to Profit, as Virtue, and virtuous Actions, and a virtuous Man, and a Friend, and the Gods, and good Damons: Thus the Second Signification includes the Firſt; and the Third, both Firſt and Second.*

*Some ſay, Good is that which is expetible for itſelf; Others, that which aſſiſteth to Felicity, or compleateth it. Felicity, according to the* Stoicks, *is* Εὐροια βίου, *a good current of Life.*

Theſe things are ſaid to explain the Notion of Good; but whether a Man ſaith, Good is that which profiteth, or that which is expetible in itſelf, or that which co-operates towards Felicity, he declareth not what Good is, but ſomething accident to it, which is frivolous. For the foreſaid are either Accident to Good only, or to other things alſo. If to other things alſo, they are not Characteriſticks of Good, foraſmuch

much as they are made common. If to Good only, we cannot by theſe underſtand Good; for as he who underſtands not what a Horſe is, knoweth not what Neighing is, nor can by that come to the Notion of a Horſe, if he firſt light not upon a Horſe Neighing: So, he who enquireth what is Good, foraſmuch as he knoweth not what Good is, he cannot know what properly and ſolely belongs to it, that thereby he might come to underſtand Good itſelf. For firſt he muſt learn the Nature of Good itſelf, and then underſtand, that it profiteth, and that it is expetible for itſelf, and that it is effective of Felicity. But that the foreſaid Accidents are not ſufficient to declare the Notion and Nature of Good, the *Dogmatiſts* manifeſt in Effect. For, that Good profiteth, and that it is expetible, (whence called ἀγαθὸν qu. ἀγωγὸν) and effective of Felicity, all perhaps grant: But being demanded, What that is, to which theſe are Accident? they run into an incredible conteſt, ſome ſaying that it is Virtue, others Pleaſure, others Indolence, others ſomthing elſe; whereas, if by the foreſaid Definitions it were determined what Good is, they would not fall out among themſelves, as ignorant of its Nature. Thus the moſt Eminent among the *Dogmatiſts* differ concerning the Notion of Good. They likewiſe differ about Ill, ſaying, that Ill is Hurt, or not different from Hurt; others, that which is avoidable for itſelf; others, that which is effective of Infelicity; whereby perhaps declaring not the Eſſence of Ill, but ſome of the things accident to it, they fall into the foreſaid Inextricability.

## CHAP. XXII.

### *Of Indifferent.*

*INdifferent is taken Three ways: Firſt, for that which moveth neither Appetite nor Averſion; as, that the Stars or the Hairs of our Head are of even Number. Secondly, for that which moves the Appetite or Averſion not one more than the other, as in two Tetradrachmes nothing different, when one of them is to be choſen. There is an Appetite to chooſe one of them, but not this more than that. The Third kind of Indifferent is, that which conduceth neither to Felicity nor Infelicity, as Health, Wealth; for that which ſomtimes may be uſed Well, ſomtimes Ill, this, they ſay, is Indifferent. Concerning this laſt chiefly they diſcourſe in* Ethicks.

What to conceive of this Notion, is manifeſt from what we ſaid before from Goods and Ills. They bring us not to the Notion of each of theſe things; but it is not ſtrange, that they fail in things inexiſtent. That nothing by Nature is Good, Ill, or Indifferent, ſome argue thus.

## CHAP. XXIII.

### *Whether there is any thing naturally Good, Ill, or Indifferent.*

FIre being Hot by Nature, appeareth to all to be heating; Snow being Cold by Nature, appeareth to all to be cooling; all things which affect by their Nature, affect all that are according to Nature or well, after the ſame manner; but none of thoſe which are called Good, affect all Men as Good (as we ſhall ſhew) therefore there is nothing Good by Nature. That none of thoſe which are called Goods, affect all Men alike, is manifeſt; for (to paſs by the ordinary People, whereof ſome think a good habit of Body to be Good; others, venereal Pleaſures; others, Eating; others, Drinking; others, Dicing; others, Riches; others, ſomthings worſe than theſe.) Some Philoſophers, as the *Peripateticks* ſay, There are Three kinds of Goods, *ſome in the Soul, as the Virtues; ſome in the Body, as Health and the like; others, external, as Friends, Wealth, and the like.* The *Stoicks* alſo affect Three kinds of Goods, *ſome in the Soul, as the Virtues; ſome external, as a virtuous Man, and a Friend; ſome, neither in, nor without the Soul, as a virtuous Man as to himſelf.* But thoſe which are in the Body or external, which the *Peripateticks* account Goods, they deny to be Goods. Some there are who hold Pleaſure to be a Good; others on the contrary ſay, it is an Ill: Whence one of the Philoſophers cried out, *I had rather be Mad, than be Pleaſed.* Now if all things, which move (or affect) by Nature, move all Men alike, but by thoſe which are called Goods, all Men are not affected alike, nothing is good by Nature, For neither can we believe all the foreſaid Opinions, by Reaſon of their Repugnance, nor ſome one of them; for he who ſaith we muſt believe this Sect, and not that, ſeeing he is oppoſed by the Reaſons of the other ſide, becomes a Party in the Controverſy, and will himſelf need a Judge, but ſhall not judge others. Now there neither being an acknowledged Criterie, nor a Demonſtration, by Reaſon of the indijudicable Controverſy concerning theſe, he muſt come to Suſpenſion, and hereupon will not be able to aſſert what is good by Nature.

Moreover ſome argue thus. Good is either the deſire itſelf, or that which we deſire: The deſire itſelf is not Good, in itſelf; for then we would not endeavour to obtain that which we deſire, leſt having obtained it we loſe the deſire. For example; if to deſire Drink were Good, we would not endeavour to get Drink; for, aſſoon as ever we have obtained it, we leave to deſire it. 'Tis the ſame in Hunger, Love, and the like; therefore the deſire is not a thing expetible in itſelf; rather on the contrary, perhaps troubleſom. For he who is Hungry, endeavours to obtain Meat, that he may be freed from the trouble of Hunger; the like doth he who Loves, and he who Thirſts. Neither is that which is deſired the Good itſelf; for either it is without us, or above us If without us, either it cauſeth in us ſome pleaſing Motion, and ſuch a Conſtitution as we willingly embrace, and conſequently is a delightful Affection, or it affects us not at all; but if it be not delightful, it is not Good, nor can incite us to it's Appetition, nor can be any way expetible. If there be ingenerate about us extrinſecally ſome delightful Conſtitution and Affection, which we willingly embrace, that which is without us, ſhall not be expetible in itſelf, but for the Affection which is raiſed in us

through it; but neither about us, for then it must either be about the Body, or about the Soul, or about both. If about the Body only, we cannot know it, for all knowledge they attribute to the Soul; the Body they say in itself is Irrational. Now if it be said to proceed as far as the Soul, it will seem to be expetible to the Comprehension of the Soul, and to it's delightful Affection: For that which is judged to be expetible, is judged (according to them) by the Intellect, not by the irrational Body. It remains therefore to say, that Good is about the Soul only, but even this, according to the Grounds of the *Dogmatists*, is impossible; for perhaps the Soul itself is not existent, or if it exist, it is not (from what they themselves say) comprehended, as we have proved in the discourse concerning the Criterie. But how will any venture to say, that something is produced in a thing, which comprehends it not?

Besides all this, How do they say that Good is in the Soul? If *Epicurus* say, That Pleasure is the End, and that the Soul (for so do all things,) consists of Atoms, how Pleasure, and an assent or judgment, that this is expetible and good, that avoidable and ill, can be in a heap of Atoms, is not possible to be resolved?

## CHAP. XXIV.

### *What that is, which is called Art about Life.*

AGain, the *Stoicks* say, *That the Goods in the Soul are certain Arts, the Virtues. Art, they say, is a System of coexercised Comprehensions; Comprehensions are made in the Hegemonick.* Now, how in the Hegemonick, which, according to them, is a Spirit, there is a storing up of Comprehensions, and a Coacervation of them, so as to make an Art, is not possible to be understood; forasmuch as the later impression still defaceth the foregoing, since they say it is a Spirit, and moved totally, according to every impression. For to say that *Plato's* ἀνεπιλογιστίνως can demonstrate Good, I mean that temperament of divisible and indivisible substance, and of the nature of Alterity and Identity, or Numbers, is meerly to trifle; whence neither can Good be in the Soul. Now if neither the desire be the Good, nor the extrinsecal Subject which is expetible for itself, nor in the Body, nor in the Soul, as I have proved, there is nothing naturally Good; and for the same Reasons, neither is there any thing naturally Ill. For those things which to some seem Ill, are persued by others for Good, as Lasciviousness, Injustice, Covetousness, Intemperance, and the like. Whence if those which are naturally Good, affect all Men alike; and those which are said to be Ill, affect not all alike, there is nothing Ill naturally.

Neither is there any thing naturally Indifferent, by reason of the Controversie about Indifferents, as for example: The *Stoicks*, of Indifferents, say, That *some are preferred, others rejected; others neither preferred, nor rejected. Preferred are those, which have a sufficient dignity, as health, riches; rejected, those which have not a sufficient dignity, as poverty, sickness. Neither preferred nor rejected; as to stretch, or bend the finger. But some hold, that, of Indifferents, none is absolutely preferred or rejected; for every Indifferent, seemeth sometimes preferred, sometimes rejected, according to various circumstances.* For if, say they) a Tyrant plots against the Rich, whil'st the Poor are suffered to live quietly, there is none but had rather be poor than rich; so as Riches in this case will be in the number of the rejected. Thus each of these which are called Indifferents, is by some held to be good, by others to be ill; but if it were Indifferent by nature, all men would alike conceive it to be Indifferent. Therefore there is nothing Indifferent by Nature. Again, if some shall argue, that Courage is expetible by nature, because Lyons, and Bulls, Cocks, and some men are naturally inclined to it, we reply, that for the same reason timidity ought to be reckoned amongst things expetible in their own nature; for Harts, and Hares, and many other Creatures are addicted to it by nature. Even a great part of Mankind are such. For it seldom happens, that a man gives up himself to dye for his Country, or, couragiously attempts some bold Action, as being with-held by effeminate timidity; the greater part of men decline all these. Whence the *Epicureans* conceive it to be proved, that pleasure is expetible in its own nature; for living Creatures, say they, as soon as they are born, being yet unperverted, desire pleasure, and decline pain. To these may be objected, That whatsoever causeth ill, cannot be good by nature, but pleasure causeth ill, for to all pleasure is annexed pain, which, according to them, is ill in its own nature; For example. A Drunkard hath pleasure in drinking; a Glutton in eating, a Luxurious person in wantoning; but these cause Poverty and Sickness, which are painful and ill, as they conceive; therefore pleasure is not good in its own nature. *Besides*, that which causeth good, cannot be naturally ill, but pains cause pleasures; by Labour we attain Science and Riches; by Labour a man obtains the enjoyment of his Love, by *Pain* is acquired Health; therefore Labour is not ill naturally. For if *Pleasure* were good in its own nature, and Labour or Pain ill in its own nature, all men would be alike affected with them: *But* we see many *Philosophers* embrace Labour and *Pain*, and contemn *Pleasure*.

In the same manner may they be overthrown, who say, that a Life conjoined with Virtue is good by nature, because some *Philosophers* have made choice of a voluptuous life; so as by the disagreement amongst them, is subverted, that a thing is such or such in its own nature.

It will not perhaps be from our purpose, to propose briefly some more particular opinions of things honest and dishonest, of the lawful and unlawful, Laws, and Customs, and devotion to the Gods, and piety to the dead, and the like; for by this means we shall find a great difference amongst things to be done, and not to be done. With us ἀρρησιμξία is held dishonest and unlawful; with the *Germans*, not dishonest, but an allowed custom. Neither did the *Thebans* of old esteem it dishonest; and *Merione* the *Cretan*, they say, was so called, by Emphasis of the *Cretan* Nation. Some also refer to this *Achilles's*

les's fervent friendship to *Patroclus*. And no wonder, when the *Cynicks*, and *Zeno* the Cittiean, and *Cleanthes*, and *Chrysippus* say, It is an Indifferent. Again, for a Man to lie with his Wife in publick, though we esteem it unseemly, yet some in the *Indies* do not so, for they make no distinction of places therein; as *Crates*, the Philosopher, is also said to have done. For Women to prostitute themselves, with us, is dishoneſt, and shameful, but with many of the *Egyptians* honourable; for it is said, that those who have lay'n with many Men, used to wear a Bracelet about their Ancles, as a mark of Honour. Moreover, amongst them, Virgins before Marriage gain'd a Dowry by prostituting themselves. The *Stoicks* say, That it is no shame to cohabit with a common Woman, or to be maintained by what she gets. To be stigmatized, with us, is shameful and dishonourable; but many of the *Egyptians* and *Sarmatians* stigmatiz'd their Children. For men to wear Ear-Rings, is, with us, accounted shamful; but with some *Barbarians*, as with the *Syrians*, it is a mark of Nobility; insomuch as some extending this mark of Nobility, bore holes in the Nostrils of their Children, in which they hang Rings of Silver or Gold, which none amongst us do. As neither to wear a Mantle stain'd and dy'd with Flowers, for though the *Persians* esteem this an Ornament, we think it undecent. When at a Feast made by *Dionysius* Tyrant of *Sicily*, such a kind of Robe was offered to *Plato*, and to *Aristippus* the Philosophers; *Plato* refus'd, saying,

*I will not with a Femiale Robe myself disgrace,*
*Who am a Man, and of a Manly Race.*

But *Aristippus* took it, with these words;

*If she come pure, a* Bacchanalian *Feast*
*Never corrupts a modest Woman's breast.*

Thus even of the wise Men, to some it seemed Decent, to others Indecent. With us it is Unlawful to marry our Mother, or Sister; but the *Persians* (and of them the *Magi*, who make greatest profession of Wisdom) marry their Mothers, and the *Ægyptians* their Sisters, and all; as the Poet,

Jove *to his Wife and Sister* Juno, *said.*

*Zeno* the Cittiean saith, That it is not dishoneſt, τὸ μέλον ἢ μητρὸς ἧς ἑαυτῷ μόριον πεῖναι, no more than if it were to rub any other part of the Body. *Chrysippus*, in his Treatise of Policy, asserts, That the Father may lye with the Daughter, and the Mother with the Son, and the Brother with the Sister. But *Plato* more universally saith, That all Wives ought to be in common. With us it is detestable, * ἀσχεσίαν *Zeno* approves it; and we are informed that some there are, who use this Evil as a Good. To eat Man's Flesh with us is unlawful; whereas amongst the *Barbarians*, there are whole Nations which use it as a thing indifferent. What need we instance *Barbarians*, when *Tydeus* himself is said to have eaten the Brains of his Enemy? and the *Stoicks* say, it is not unfitting to eat not only the Flesh of other Men, but our own. Moreover to defile the Altar of God with Blood, with most People, as with us, is held impious; but the *Lacedæmonians*, at the Altar of *Orthosia*, and *Diana*, whipp'd themselves cruelly, so as much Blood run down upon the Altar of the Goddess. Besides, some sacrifice a Man to *Saturn*, as the *Scythians* do Strangers to *Diana*; but we, on the contrary, think the Temples are defiled with human Blood. With us, there is a Law for punishment of Adulterers; but some hold, that to lie with other Mens Wives, is a thing Indifferent: Even some Philosophers say, that, to lie with other Mens Wives, is Indifferent. With us, Children are bound by Law to take care for their Parents; the *Scythians*, when they exceed Threescore years, cut their Throats. And what wonder, when *Saturn* himself with a Sickle emasculated his Father; *Jupiter* threw down *Saturn* into *Tartarus*; *Minerva* joined with *Jupiter*, and *Neptune*, to fetter her Father; *Saturn* devoured his own Children. Moreover, *Solon* the *Athenian* made a Law concerning indemnate persons, whereby any Man was permitted to kill his Son; but with us, the Laws forbid to kill our Sons. The *Roman* Lawgivers order the Children to be under the power of the Parents, and to be their Servants, and the Children not to be Masters of their own Estates, but the Parents, until they are manumitted after the same manner as purchased Slaves. Others reject this Custom as Tyrannical. There is a Law to punish Homicides, but *Gladiators*, when they kill a Man, are many times honoured for it. The Laws forbid to strike a free Person, but Wrastlers, beating Freemen, somtimes killing them, are rewarded with Honors and Garlands. The Law commands every Man to have but one Wife; but amongst the *Thracians* and *Getulians*, a People of *Lybia*, every one hath many. To rob, is with us, held unlawful and unjust; but with many of the *Barbarians*, not so: On the contrary, the *Cilicians* esteem it honorable; whereupon such as die in Robbing, they judge worthy of Honor. *Nestor* in the Poet, after he had kindly received those who were with *Telemachus*, sayes,

*——Do you uncertain stray*
*As Thieves?*

But if to Rob had been dishonorable, he would not have entertained Persons, that might be suspected for Thieves, with so much Humanity. Besides, to steal, is, with us, unjust and unlawful; but those who say *Mercury* is a Thievish God, do not conceive it unjust; for how can a God be wicked? Some also say, That the *Lacedæmonians* punish'd Thieves, not for Stealing, but for being Taken. A Coward that throws away his Shield, is in many Countries punished by Law, (whence the *Lacedemonian* Woman giving her a Son a Shield, said to him, * *Thou Son, or this, or upon this,*) but *Archilochus* brags, that he had thrown away his Shield, and run away, writing of himself in his Poems thus:

* Either Bring it home, or, Be brought home dead upon it.

* With *Laertius*, in the Life of *Diogenes*.

*Some*

*Some* Sajan *doth perhaps himſelf adorn*
*Now with the Shield which once by me was born*
*And left behind (though ſore againſt my will)*
*To ſave my life* ———

The *Amazons* maim their Male-children, that they might not be fit for War, and they themſelves underwent all Military Buſineſs; whereas we think the contrary to be the beſt order. The Mother of the gods admits Eunuchs, which a god would never do, if it were ill by nature, not to be perfectly virile. Thus concerning things juſt and unjuſt, and virility, there is great diſagreement

Likewiſe, concerning Devotion, and the gods, there is much Controverſie; the greater part hold, that there are gods; but ſome, that there are none, as the Followers of *Diagoras* the *Melian*, and *Theodorus*, and *Critias* the *Athenian*. Of thoſe who affirm there are gods, ſome worſhip the gods of their Country, others thoſe which the Sects of Dogmatiſts have framed; as, *Ariſtotle* held God to be incorporeal, the boundure of Heaven; the *Stoicks*, a Spirit, penetrating even through things horrible to behold; *Epicurus*, of human Form; *Xenophanes*, an impaſſible Sphere; ſome, that he is provident over our Affairs; others, that he is not provident over them; For that which is bleſſed and incorruptible, ſaith *Epicurus*, neither hath any trouble itſelf, nor cauſeth any to others. Whence alſo, of thoſe according to life, ſome ſay, that there is one God; others, that there are many, and of different Forms; ſo as they run into the opinions of the *Egyptians*, who conceived the gods to be faced like Dogs, and formed like Hawks, and Oxen, and Crocodiles, and what not. Whence alſo there hapned a great difference as to Sacrifices, and the worſhip of the gods. Things that are ſacred in ſome Temples, are profane in others; whereas this could not be, if there were any thing ſacred or prophane in its own nature. For example, None ſacrifice a Swine to *Serapis*, but to *Hercules* and *Æſculapius* they ſacrifice them. 'Tis unlawful to ſacrifice a Sheep to *Iſis*, but to her who is called the Mother of the gods, and to other gods, they are ſacrificed. To *Saturn* they ſacrifice a man, which to moſt is impious. In *Alexandria* they ſacrifice a Cat to *Hero*, a Moth to *Thetis*, which amongſt us none do. To *Neptune* a Horſe is ſacrificed, but to *Apollo* the *Didymean* eſpecially, this Creature is abominable. To ſacrifice Goats to *Diana* is pious, but not to *Æſculapius*. Many others might be alledged, which, for brevity, I omit. Now if there were any Sacrifice pious or impious in its own nature, all perſons would have the ſame opinion of it.

Like to theſe we ſhall find the things that concern the diet of men, as to worſhip of the gods. A *Jew* or an *Egyptian* Prieſt will dye, rather than eat Swine's fleſh; a *Lybian* thinks it moſt unlawful to eat the fleſh of Sheep; ſome of the *Syrians*, that of a Pidgeon; others, of Victims; in ſome Temples, it is lawful to eat Fiſh; in others, unlawful. Of thoſe who amongſt the *Egyptians* were thought to be wiſe, ſome conceived it abominable to eat the head of a Creature; others, the ſhoulder; others, the foot; others, other parts. None eat *Onions*, who are initiated in the Rites of *Cacian Jupiter*, at *Pelluſium*. The Prieſt of *Lybian Venus*, never eats Garlick. In ſome Temples, they abſtain from Mint; in others, from Marjoram; in others, from Smalladge. Some affirm it better to eat the heads of our own Parents, than Beans; others hold the eating of theſe indifferent. We think it abominable to eat the fleſh of Dogs, but ſome among the *Thracians* are reported to feed thereon; perhaps alſo it was in uſe amongſt the *Grecians*, whence *Diocles*, following the *Æſculapians*, preſcribed to ſome ſick perſons the fleſh of Puppies. There are, who, as I ſaid, eat Man's fleſh indifferently, which we think unlawful. Now if theſe Rules of worſhip and things unlawful were by nature, all Men would have the like opinion of them.

The ſame may be ſaid concerning Piety towards the Dead: Some cover the Bodies of the Dead with earth, thinking it impious to ſhew them to the Sun; The *Egyptians*, drawing out the Entrals, embalm them, and keep them amongſt them above ground. Amongſt the *Æthiopians*, the *Ichthyophagi* throw them into Ponds, to be eaten by the Fiſhes; the *Hircanians* give them to be devoured by Dogs; ſome of the *Indians* to Vultures. It is reported, that the *Troglodytes* bring the dead Body to a hillock, tye it head and heels together, and throw ſtones at it, laughing; with which when they have covered it, they depart. There are ſome *Barbarians*, who ſacrifice and eat thoſe who out-live threeſcore years; but ſuch as dye young, they bury in the Ground. There are who burn their Dead, of whom, ſome gathering their Bones, preſerve them, others caſt them away. The *Perſians*, it is reported, hang up their Dead, and Embalm them with Nitre, and then wrap Cloaths about them. We ſee with what Mourning ſome follow the Dead; ſome eſteem Death horrible, and to be ſhunned; others, nothing ſuch. *Euripides*,

*If Life be Death who know,*
*And Death a Life below?*

And *Epicurus* ſaith, *Death concerns us not. For what is diſſolved is inſenſible, but what wants Senſe, concerns us not. They ſay moreover, If we conſiſt of Soul and Body, and Death be a Diſſolution of the Soul and Body, then when we are, Death is not, for we are not diſſolved; and when Death is, we are not; for this Compoſition of Soul and Body conſiſting no longer, neither are we. Heraclitus* ſaith, *That to Live is to Dye, and that whilſt we Live we are Dead; for whilſt we Live, our Souls are Dead and Buryed in us; but when we dye, our Souls revive and live.* There are who conceive, that to dye is better than to live; whence *Euripides*,

*We New-born Infants rather ſhould lament,*
*Pitying the miſeries to which they'r ſent.*
*But him who Dies, ſet from all Labours free,*
*Bear to the Grave with Joy triumphantly.*

To the ſame effect, is alſo this;

Of

*Of wretched Mankind, the moſt happy ſtate*
*Were never to be Born nor ſee the day:*
*Next which, as ſoon as Born to paſs the Gate*
*Of* Pluto, *and their Bones in duſt to lay.*

We know the Story of *Cleobis* and *Biton*, related by *Herodotus*, concerning the *Argive* Prieſteſs. It is ſaid, that amongſt the *Thracians* there are ſome that mourn over a Child as ſoon as it is born. Therefore ought not Death to be reckoned amongſt things horrible in their own nature, nor Life amongſt things good in their own nature? Nor is there any of the forementioned things, ſuch or ſuch in their own nature, but all are ſuch by Opinion and Reference. The ſame kind of Argument we might deduce from many other things, which, for brevity, we omit. And if we cannot immediately inſtance a contrariety to ſomthing, we may ſay, It is poſſible, that in ſome Nations which we know not, there may be a different Opinion. For if we did not (for example) know, that the cuſtom of the *Ægyptians* is to marry their Siſters, we might falſly affirm, that it is a thing acknowledged by all, that we ought not to marry our Siſters. In like manner, in ſuch things as have not a difference known to us, it is not fit to affirm, that there is no Controverſie concerning them, it being, as I ſaid, poſſible, that ſome other Nations which we know not, may hold the contrary.

Hereupon the *Sceptick* obſerving ſo great difference of things, ſuſpends as to what is Good or Bad in it's own Nature, or what is abſolutely to be done or not to be done; herein declining the temerity of the *Dogmatiſts*; but he follows the common courſe of Life without being poſitive; whence it comes, that in things Opinionative, he remains void of Paſſion; in things Compulſive, he is moderately affected: As being a Man, ſenſible, he ſuffers; but not taking the Opinion, that what he ſuffers is ill in it's own Nature, he is moderately affected; for to have ſuch an Opinion is worſe than the ſuffering itſelf, inſomuch as they who ſuffer the amputation of ſome Limb or the like, many times bear it well, whil'ſt the ſtanders by, out of an opinion that is ill, faint. For doubtleſs, he who propoſeth to himſelf that ſomthing is good or ill in its own nature, and to be done or not to be done, is troubled many ways. When the things are preſent, which he conceives ill by nature, he ſeems to be tormented, and when he poſſeſſeth thoſe which ſeem to him good, through his being exalted in mind for it, and his fear of loſing it, and care leſt he ſhould fall again into thoſe things which he conceives ill by nature, he is involv'd in no ſmall trouble. For thoſe who ſay, that Goods cannot be loſt, are to be ſilenced by the Inſolubility of the Queſtion. Hence we argue, If what cauſeth ill be ill, and to be avoided; but the Perſuaſion, that ſome things are ill, ſome good, in their own nature, cauſeth troubles; then that Perſuaſion is ill, and to be avoided. Thus much of Goods, Ills, and Indifferents.

## CHAP. XXV.

### *Whether there be an Art about Life.*

FRom what hath been ſaid it is manifeſt, That there is not an Art about Life; for if there be ſuch an Art, it is converſant in the Contemplation of Goods, Ills, and Indifferents, but theſe being inexiſtent, the Art about Life will be inexiſtent alſo. Beſides, the *Dogmatiſts* not agreeing concerning this Art about Life, ſeveral of them being of ſeveral Opinions, they are ſubject to the Controverſie and Argument from *Diſagreement*, which we alledged in the Diſcourſe concerning Good.

But though we ſhould ſuppoſe all to agree in one Art about Life; as for example, That celebrated Prudence which the *Stoicks* dream of, and ſeem to preſs more than the reſt, many Abſurdities will nevertheleſs follow. For ſeeing that Prudence is a Virtue, and *a wiſe Man only hath Virtue*, the *Stoicks* not being wiſe, will not have the Art about Life. And ſeeing, according to them, the Art cannot ſubſiſt, there will be no Art about Life, if we follow what they ſay. For they affirm, *Art to be a Syſtem of Comprehenſions*, *Comprehenſion to be an aſſent to comprehenſive Phantaſie*; but comprehenſive Phantaſie cannot be found, for neither is all Phantaſie comprehenſive, nor can it be known, what Phantaſies are comprehenſive, and what not; but needing comprehenſive Phantaſie to diſcern what Phantaſie is comprehenſive, we run into *infinite*, another comprehenſive Phantaſie being required, for the diſcernment of the comprehenſive Phantaſie which we aſſumed. The *Stoicks* give ſuch a notion of comprehenſive Phantaſie, as is not right; for, ſaying, *comprehenſive Phantaſie is that which ariſeth from a Being, and a Being is that which is able to move comprehenſive Phantaſie*, they run into the *Alternate Commonplace*. If therefore, that there be an Art about Life, it is firſt requiſite, that there be an Art; and that there be an Art, it is firſt requiſite, that there be Comprehenſion; and that there be Comprehenſion, it is firſt requiſite, that there be an Aſſent to comprehenſive Phantaſie; but comprehenſive Phantaſie cannot be found; therefore the Art about Life cannot be found.

Again, every Art ſeems to be comprehended from thoſe things which it properly delivers; but there is no work proper to that Art which is about Life; for whatſoever work ſhall be inſtanced, it will be found common with the Vulgar, as, to honour Parents, to reſtore a *Depoſitum*, and the like; therefore there is no Art about Life. Neither, as ſome maintain, from that which ſeemeth to be ſaid or done through a prudent habit of mind, can we know what is the work of Wiſdom; for a prudent habit of mind itſelf is incomprehenſible, it neither being manifeſt in and by itſelf ſimply, nor by its works, for thoſe are common with the Vulgar. And to ſay, that we comprehend him who hath the Art about Life, by the equability of his actions, is to ſpeak above human nature, rather to be wiſhed than aſſerted:

Fal-

*For every man's endu'd with such a mind,*
*As several dayes are by the Gods assign'd.*

It remaineth to say, That this Art about Life is comprehended from their Writings; which being many, and all of one kind, we shall instance only some few. The Prince of their Sect, *Zeno*, in his *Exercitations concerning the Institution of Children*, amongst other things, saith thus, 'To 'distinguish nothing more or less, Childish or 'not Childish, Masculine or Feminine; for there 'is no difference between (*manners*) Childish 'and not Childish, Masculine and Feminine, the 'same become both. *Also*, of Piety towards 'Parents, *he saith*, *speaking of* Jocasta *and* Oedi-'pus, That it was not abominable, &c. *With 'this agrees* Chrysippus, *in his Treatise of* Poli-'cy, *saying*, These things in my Judgment 'ought to be ordered, as they are used not 'amiss with some; that the Mother should have 'Children by the Son, and the Father by the 'Daughter, and the Brother by the Sister. *In 'the same Book he alloweth* to eat Man's Flesh; '*for he saith*, If any part be cut off from a Bo-'dy Living, which is fit for Food, we should 'not bury it, nor carelessly throw it away; but 'so consume it, that it may become another 'part of us. *In his Books of* Office, *treating of 'the Burial of Parents*, *he expressly saith*, When 'our Parents are dead, we must provide for 'them the most simple Tombs; for the Body '(no more than Nails, or Teeth, or Hair) 'pertaining nothing to us, we need not to have 'any respect or care of it. If the Flesh be 'sound, it may be converted into Aliment, (in 'like manner, as if some Limb of our own Bo-'dy, were cut off, as the Foot) but if unsound, 'it is to be buried, or burnt, or thrown away 'without any regard, as our Nails and Hair. Much more of this kind is said by Philosophers, which they could not have the heart to do, unless they had been brought up among the *Cyclopes*, and the *Lestrigones*. Now if they do none of these, but their Actions are common with the vulgar, there is no particular work proper to them, who are thought to have the Art about Life. If therefore it be absolutely necessary, that Arts be comprehended from their proper works; but there is no work proper to the Art about Life, it is not comprehended. Wherefore none can say, that it is existent.

## CHAP. XXVI.

*Whether there is in Men an Art about Life.*

NOW if there be in Men an Art about Life, either it is ingenerate in them by Nature, or acquired by Discipline and Doctrine. If by Nature, either it is ingenerate in them as they are Men, or as they are not Men. Not as they are not Men, for they are Men; If, as they are Men, this wisdom would be in all Men, insomuch that all Men would be prudent, virtuous, and wise: but the greater part of Men, they say, are evil; therefore the Art which is according to Life is not in them, as they are Men, and therefore not by Nature. Besides, forasmuch as they hold an Art to be a System of coexercised Comprehensions, they seem rather to conceive both this and other Arts, to be comprehended by Experience and Discipline.

## CHAP. XXVII.

*Whether the Art about Life can be taught.*

NEither is it understood by Doctrine and Discipline; for before these are, there must be three things acknowledged, the Thing taught, the Teacher, and He who learneth the manner of Discipline; but none of these are, therefore not the Doctrine.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

*Whether there be any thing taught.*

FOR what is *taught*, is either true or false. If it be false, it cannot be taught, for that which is false, is not; that which is not, cannot be taught. But neither, if it be said to be true; for, that true is inexistent, we proved in our Discourse concerning the Criterie. If therefore neither false nor true is taught, and besides these there is nothing docible, (for these not being docible, no man will say that things indeterminable are docible) nothing is taught.

Again, that which is taught is either manifest, or unmanifest; if manifest, it needs not be taught, for things manifest are alike manifest to all. If unmanifest, forasmuch as things unmanifest, by Reason of the indijudicable Controversie concerning them, are incomprehensible, they cannot be taught; for how can any man learn, or teach, that which he comprehends not? Now if neither that which is manifest, nor that which is unmanifest is taught, nothing at all is taught.

Besides, that which is taught, is either a Body or Incorporeal; but neither of these, whether manifest or unmanifest, can be taught, for the foresaid Reasons; therefore nothing can be taught.

Moreover, either that which is, is taught; or that which is not. If that which is not, be taught, forasmuch as Doctrines are conceived to be of things true, that which is not, will be true, and if true, it will be existent, for Truth, they say, is that which exists, and is opposed to some thing. But it is absurd to say, that which is not, exists, therefore that which exists not, cannot be taught. Neither can a Being be taught. For if a Being be taught, it must either be taught as a Being, or according to some other thing. If, as it is a Being, it is docible, it is a Being, and consequently not docible; for Doctrines must be made of things indubitate and indocible, therefore a Being, as a Being, is not docible. But neither according to some other thing, for a Being hath nothing accident to it, which is not a Being. Therefore if a Being be not taught, as it is a Being, neither can it be taught according to any other thing, for whatsoever is accident to it, is a Being. Besides, whether the Being which they say is taught, be manifest, or unmanifest, it appears by the foresaid difficulties to be indocible. Now if neither that which is, nor that which is not, be taught, nothing is taught.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XXIX.

*Whether there be a Teacher, and a Learner.*

BY the foreſaid difficulties are alſo ſubvert-the *Teacher* and the *Learner*; nevertheleſs, we will queſtion them more particularly. Either the Artiſt, teacheth the Artiſt; or the Ignorant, the Ignorant; or the Ignorant, the Artiſt; or the Artiſt, the Ignorant. The Artiſt teacheth not the Artiſt, for, both being Artiſts, neither needs Teaching. The Ignorant cannot teach the Ignorant, no more than the Blind can lead the Blind. The Ignorant cannot teach the Artiſt, that were ridiculous. It remains to ſay, that the Artiſt teaches the Ignorant, which likewiſe is impoſſible. For there can be no ſuch thing as an Artiſt, ſeeing that no Man is an Artiſt naturally, and Born ſuch; neither is an Artiſt made of one, that is not an Artiſt: For either one Theoreme, and one Comprehenſion is ſufficient to make an Artiſt of him that was not an Artiſt, or not; but if one Comprehenſion can make an Artiſt of him that was not an Artiſt, Firſt, we may ſay, that Art is not a Syſtem of Comprehenſions; for he that before knew nothing at all, if he have learnt one Theorem of Art, may thus be ſaid to be an Artiſt. Next, if any ſhall ſay, that he who hath attained ſome Theorems of Art, but as yet wanteth one, and therefore being not an Artiſt, ſhall, as ſoon as he hath attained that one, be made an Artiſt of a Not-Artiſt, he holds that it is compleated by one Comprehenſion. But if he come to particulars he cannot ſhew a Man that is yet no Artiſt, but ſhall be an Artiſt as ſoon as he hath attained one Theorem more; for no Man can number the Theorems of every Art, ſo as having numbred the Theorems known, he ſhall be able to ſay, how many there are behind to compleat the number of the Theorems of the Art: Therefore the knowledge of one Theorem maketh not a Man an Artiſt, who was not an Artiſt before. But if this be true, Foraſmuch as a Man comprehends not all the Theorems of Arts together, but one by one, (as muſt be granted) he who attaineth every Theorem of Art diſtinctly by itſelf, cannot become an Artiſt, for we have ſhewed, that the knowledge of one Theorem cannot make him an Artiſt, who was not an Artiſt; therefore he, who is not an Artiſt, cannot be made an Artiſt. So as from hence it appeareth, that there is no Artiſt at all, and conſequently no Teacher.

But neither can he who is ſaid to Learn, not being an Artiſt, Learn and Comprehend the Theorems of Art, whereof he is ignorant: For as he who is blind from his Birth, as being blind, cannot comprehend Colours; nor he who is Deaf from his Birth, Sounds; So neither can he who is not an Artiſt, comprehend the Theorems of Art, whereof he is ignorant. Otherwiſe, the ſame Perſon might be both an Artiſt, and ignorant of Art; Ignorant of the Art, for he is ſuppoſed to be ſuch; An Artiſt, for he comprehends the Theorems of the Art. Wherefore neither doth an Artiſt teach him, who is not an Artiſt: Now if neither the Artiſt teacheth the Artiſt; nor the Ignorant, the Ignorant; nor the Ignorant, the Artiſt; nor the Artiſt, the Ignorant; (and beſides theſe there is nothing) neither is there a Teacher, nor a Learner; and there being neither a Teacher nor a Learner, the way of Learning likewiſe is ſuperfluous.

## CHAP. XXX.

*Whether there is a Way of Learning.*

NEvertheleſs, againſt this alſo are raiſed Doubts: For the way of Teaching is either by Evidence, or by Diſcourſe; But neither by Evidence, nor by Diſcourſe, as we ſhall prove; therefore the way of Teaching is inextricable. Learning is not acquired by Evidence; for Evidence is of things ſhewn, but that which is ſhewn is apparent to all, that which is apparent, inaſmuch as it is apparent, is perceptible by all; that which is commonly perceptible by all, is not to be Learned; therefore nothing is to be Learn'd by Evidence.

But neither is there any thing learnt by Diſcourſe; For Diſcourſe either ſignifies ſomthing, or ſignifies nothing; but if it ſignify nothing, it teacheth nothing. If it ſignifies ſomething, it ſignifies it either by Nature, or Impoſition; By Nature it ſignifies not, for all Men underſtand not all Men, as *Greeks Barbarians*, and *Barbarians Greeks*: If it ſignifieth by Impoſition, it is manifeſt, that the makers of theſe Words, firſt comprehending the things to which they accommodated them, underſtand them, not, as being taught by theſe Words the things which they knew not, but, as being put in mind of the things which they knew. Now, they who have need to learn that which they know not, not knowing to what things the Words are accommodated, will underſtand nothing at all: Wherefore, there can be no way of Learning. For the Teacher ought to inſinuate into the Learner, an underſtanding of the Theorems of the Art, which is to be learnt, that ſo he, comprehending the Collection of them all, may be made an Artiſt. But Comprehenſion, as we ſhewed already, is nothing, therefore there cannot be a way of Teaching. Now if there be nothing Taught, nor a Teacher, nor a Learner, nor a way of Teaching, there will neither be any Diſcipline nor Doctrine. Theſe Arguments are in general alledged againſt Diſcipline and Doctrine.

Another difficulty may be raiſed againſt that, which is called, The Art concerning Life, thus. The thing Taught, that is, Wiſdom, we have formerly proved inſubſiſtent; The Teacher likewiſe, and the Learner are inſubſiſtent: For either the Wiſe teacheth the Wiſe, the Art concerning Life; or the Fooliſh the Fooliſh, or the Fooliſh the Wiſe, or the Wiſe the Fooliſh; but none of theſe teacheth another; therefore the Art concerning Life is not taught. To ſpeak of the reſt were ſuperfluous. But if the Wiſe teach the Fooliſh Wiſdom, and Wiſdom be the Science of Good, and Ill, and Indifferent; the Fooliſh, not having Wiſdom, will be Ignorant of the things Good, and Ill, and Indifferent; and, being Ignorant of them, whilſt the Wiſe teacheth

him things Good, Ill, and Indifferent, he can only hear the Things he ſaith, but not know them. For if he did underſtand them whilſt he is in his Folly, Folly alſo might contemplate things Good, Bad, and Indifferent: But according to them, Folly contemplates not theſe, (otherwiſe a Fooliſh Perſon were Wiſe) therefore the Fooliſh underſtand not by Learning the things ſaid or done by the Wiſe: but if he underſtands not, he cannot be taught by him any way, but by Evidence and Diſcourſe, as we ſaid before. Now if that which is called the Art concerning Life, is neither communicated by Learning and Diſcipline, nor by Nature, it is not to be found out by the Philoſophers, who cry it up ſo much.

## CHAP. XXXI.

*Whether the Art concerning Life be profitable to him who hath it.*

MOreover, though we ſhould grant, that the Art which they dream of concerning Life, may be communicated, yet will it rather appear hurtful and troubleſome to thoſe that have it, than beneficial. We will take but one inſtance for brevity. The Art concerning Life may be profitable to a Wiſe Man in giving him Continence in Appetition of Good, and Averſion from Ill. For he, whom they call Continent, is ſaid to be ſuch, either for that he hath no Appetition to Ill, nor Averſion from Good; or for that he hath ill Appetitions and Averſions, but maſters them by Reaſon: But as far as he is not in ill Judgments, he is not Continent; for he is not Continent in that which he hath not. And as no Man ſaith, an Eunuch is Continent in Venereal Pleaſures; Or, he who hath no Appetite, Continent in Eating, (for they have not thoſe things, that by Continence might be ſubdued) in like manner, a Wiſe Man cannot be ſaid to be Continent, becauſe he hath not in himſelf the Paſſion whereof he ſhould be Continent. But if they will ſay, He is Continent, for that he is in ill Judgments, but overmaſters them by Reaſon: Firſt, they muſt Grant, that Wiſdom hath profited him nothing; foraſmuch as he is ſtill in trouble, and needeth help: Next he will be found to be more unfortunate than thoſe, who are ſaid to be bad. For if he hath an Appetite towards any thing, he is wholly diſturbed; if he overmaſters it with Reaſon, he containeth the Ill within himſelf, and thereupon is more troubled than the ill Perſon, who ſuffereth not this; for if he hath an Appetite to any thing, he is troubled; but if he obtain his Deſire, the Trouble ceaſeth. A Wiſe Man therefore, either is not Continent as to Wiſdom; or if he be, he is of all Men the moſt unhappy; ſo that the Art concerning Life affords him not Benefit, but extraordinary Trouble. Now that he, who conceiveth that he hath the Art concerning Life, and thereby knoweth what things are Good and Ill in their own Nature, is exceedingly troubled, as well when the Good are preſent as when the Ill, we ſhewed heretofore. We muſt therefore ſay, If the ſubſiſtence of things Good, Ill, and Indifferent, be not undoubtedly a Knowledge, and the Art concerning Life be perhaps inſubſiſtent alſo; and though it were granted by ſuppoſition to ſubſiſt, yet would it bring no profit to thoſe who have it, but on the contrary, great Trouble; the Dogmatiſts look Superciliouſly, and take pride in vain, in the Ethical part of that which they call Philoſophy. And with this Diſputation (not to exceed the limits of a Summary,) we ſhall cloſe our Third Book of *Pyrrhonian Hypotypoſes*, adding only this.

## CHAP. XXXII.

*Why the Sceptick, ſomtimes on ſet purpoſe, alledgeth weak Arguments.*

THe *Sceptick*, by reaſon of his great Humanity, endeavours with Diſcourſe to remedy, as far as in him lies, the Arrogance and raſh Inſolence of the Dogmatiſts. As therefore Phyſicians, in Corporeal Diſeaſes, have Remedies of different ſorts, applying violent to thoſe who are violently ſick, but gentle to thoſe whoſe Diſeaſe is more gentle; In like manner, the Arguments propoſed by the *Sceptick* are not all of equal force; but the more ſolid, which are beſt able to overthrow the affection of the Dogmatiſts, he uſeth againſt thoſe who are moſt violently affected therewith, the lighter againſt thoſe who have it more lightly and ſuperficially; ſo as that they may be overthrown by lighter probabilities. Whence it happens that the *Sceptick*, ſomtimes, alledgeth ſtronger Probabilities and Arguments; ſomtimes, on ſet purpoſe, weaker, as often perceiving them ſufficient to compaſs his Deſign.

THE

# THE HISTORY of PHILOSOPHY.

## The Thirteenth Part, Containing the EPICUREAN Sect.

EPICVRVS.

### CHAP. I.

*His Country, Parents, Brethren.*

EPicurus is by some conceived to have been a Samian; for *Timon* (in (a) *Laertius*) saith, he was the last of the Natural Philosophers that came out of *Samus*. And (b) *Constantinus Porphyrogeneta* conceives, that he derived his Original from *Samus*, as well as *Pythagoras*. But the

(a) Lib. 10.

(b) Lib. 1. *de Thematt.*

the occasion of this was, for that he passed the first part of his younger years at *Samus*, with his Father and Brethren; for thither came his Father, *Agripeta*, as (c) *Cicero* terms him, (that is, one who claimeth a portion in the division of Lands.) Upon the like ground (d) *Strabo* conceives him a *Lampsacene*, for he lived at *Lampsacum*, and conversed with the chief Personages there. But *Epicurus* indeed was by Country an *Athenian*, as (e) *Laertius*, (f) *Suidas*, and infinite other Writers affirm; whence (g) *Laertius*, about to praise him, begins thus.

(c) De Nat. deor. Lib. 1.
(d) Lib. 13.
(e) Loc. Cit.
(f) In voce *Epicurus*.
(g) Lib. 6.

*First* Ceres-*gifts to Human-Indigence,*
*Renowned* Athens *did long since dispense,*
*And Mens disordered ways by Laws redrest,*
*And first our Life with greatest Comfort Blest,*
*When it produc'd a Person of such Worth,* (*forth.*
*Whose Breast contain'd, whose Lips all Truth brought*

Now forasmuch as the *Athenian* People, being distinguished by Tribes, were dispersed into τῆς Χώρας, the adjacent Towns, which were made free Corporations, even from the time of *Theseus*; *Epicurus* was Born at *Gargettus*, a Town (as (b) *Hesychius* and *Phavorinus* describe it) belonging to the *Ægean* Tribe, where (saith (i) *Plutarch*) *Theseus* overcame the *Pallantidæ*, who conspired against him and *Ægeus*; and where *Eurystheus* (as (k) *Stephanus* relates) was buried. For this reason, he is said, by (l) *Laertius*, to have been δῆμον Γαργήττιον; by (m) *Statius* termed, the *Gargettick Author*, and the *Gargettick old Man*; by (n) *Cicero* (o) *Ælian*, and others, simply the *Gargettian*.

(b) In *Lexicis*.
(i) In *Theseo*.
(k) De Urb.
(l) Loc. Cit..
(m) *Silv.* Lib. 1. & 2.
(n) Lib. 15. Ep. 16.
(o) Var. Hist. 4.

*Laertius* (p) (out of *Metrodorus*, in his Treatise of *Nobility*) writes, that *Epicurus* was, *of the Family of the Philaidæ*; the *Philaidæ* were denominated from *Philæus*, the second Son of *Ajax*, who dwelt in *Melite*, and is mentioned by (q) *Plutarch*, who adds, that *Pisistratus* also was of the *Philaidæ*. Of this Family was the Father of *Epicurus*, (according to (r) *Laertius* and others) named *Neocles*, his Mother *Chærestrata*. He is also frequently cited, after the Greek fashion, *Epicurus Neoclis*, sometimes simply termed *Neoclides*, as when compared by (s) *Menander* with *Themistocles*, whose Father was named *Neocles* also. I omit, that his Father was (according to (t) *Strabo*) one of the Two thousand Citizens, whom the *Athenians* sent to *Samus* to share the Land by Lots, whither they had before sent *Pericles* and *Sophocles*, who strictly besieged the revolted *Samians*. I omit also, that he was a Schoolmaster, which (besides *Strabo*) (u) *Cicero* observes, when proceeding to reproach him, *But his little Farm*, saith he, *not being sufficient to maintain him, as I conceive, he became a Schoolmaster.*

(p) Out of *Metrodorus*, in his Treatise of *Nobility*
(q) In *Solone*.
(r) Loc. Cit.
(s) In *Anthol.* Lib. 3.
(t) Lib. 14.
(u) De Nat. deor. Lib. 1.

(w) *Suidas* mentions only two Brethren of *Epicurus*, *Neocles* and *Chæredemus*; but (x) *Laertius* (out of *Philodemus* the *Epicurean*) adds a third, *Aristobulus*, whom (y) *Plutarch* sometimes seems to call *Agathobulus*. By what care and benevolence *Epicurus* gained their Reverence and Affection, is excellently declared by (z) *Plutarch*, who conceives it worthy Admiration, how he came so to win them, and they to be won. That all these died before *Epicurus*, may be inferred from his Will, wherein he ordereth nothing, either to them, or of them, as alive; but only appointed a day to be celebrated for his Brethren in the Month *Posidæon*. And though of *Chæredemus* there is no further Testimony, yet of *Aristobulus* it is more apparent from (a) *Plutarch* who writes, that *Epicurus* was wholly taken up about *Metrodorus*, *Polyænus*, and *Aristobulus*, Tending them in their Sickness, and Mourning for them when they Dyed. But of *Neocles* it is most manifest, from the same (b) *Plutarch*, relating, that *Epicurus* broke forth into a kind of Joy, mixt with Tears, upon the remembrance of the last Words of *Neocles*. Of how great and painful Sicknesses they died, is sufficiently aggravated by (c) *Plutarch* and (d) *Suidas*.

(w) In voc. *Epicur.*
(x) Loc. Cit.
(y) Adv. *Colot.* Lib. 2.
(z) De Amor. Frat.
(a) Adv. C...
(b) Ibid.
(c) Ibid.
(d) Loc. Cit.

## CHAP. II.

### *The Time of his Birth.*

*Epicurus* was born (as (a) *Laertius* relates out of the Chronology of *Apollodorus*) in the 3d year of the 109th Olympiad, the 7th day of the Month *Gamelion*; at whose Birth, (b) *Pliny* saith, the Moon was Twenty days old. *Hecatombæon* (the First Month) this Year falling in the Summer of the Year 4372. of the *Julian* Period, (now used by Chronologers) it is manifest, that *Gamelion* the same Year, being the 7th Month from *Hecatombæon*, fell upon the beginning of the year 4373. which was before the ordinary Computation from Christ, 341 compleat Years. Now forasmuch as in *January*, in which Month the beginning of *Gamelion* is observ'd to have fallen, there hapned a new Moon in the Attick Horizon, by the Tables of Celestial Motions, the Fourth Day, in the Morning, (or the Third Day, according to the *Athenians*, who, as (c) *Censorinus* saith, reckon their Day from Sun-set to Sun-set) and therefore the Twentieth day of the Moon, is co-incident with the Three and twentieth of *January*; It will follow, that *Epicurus* was Born on the 23 day of *January*, if we suppose the same Form of the Year extended from the time of *Cæsar*, upwards. And this in the old Style, according to which the Cycle of the Sun, or of the Dominical Letters for that Year, (it being Bissextile) was *B. A.* whence the 23 Day of *January* must have been Sunday. But if we suit it with the Gregorian Account, which is Ten days earlier, (now in use with us) we shall find that *Epicurus* was Born on the 2d of *February*, which was Sunday, (for the Dominical Letters must have been *E. D.*) in the Year before Christ, or the Christian Computation, 341. and consequently in the 1974th Year, compleat, before the beginning of *February* this Year, which is from Christ 1634. Some things here must not be passed by.

(a) Lib. a.
(b) Lib. 2.
(c) De Di...

First, that (d) *Laertius* observes *Sosigenes* to to have been Archon the same Year, wherein *Epicurus* was Born, and that it was the 7th Year from the death of *Plato*. Moreover, it was the 16th of *Alexander*, for it was, as the same (e) *Laertius* affirms, the Year immediately following that, in which *Aristotle* was sent for to come to him, then 15 Years old.

(d) Lib. 12.
(e) Lib. 5.

Secondly,

Secondly, That (f) *Eusebius* can hardly be excused from a Mistake, making *Epicurus* to flourish in the 112th Olympiad; for at that time, *Epicurus* scarce had pass'd his Childhood, and *Aristotle* began but to flourish in the *Lyceum*, being returned the foregoing Olympiad out of *Macedonia*, as appears from (g) *Laertius*.

Thirdly, That the Error which is crept into (b) *Suidas*, and hath deceived his Interpreter, is not to be allowed, who reports *Epicurus* Born in the 79th Olympiad. I need not take Notice, how much this is inconsistent, not only with other Relations, but even with that which followeth in *Suidas*, where he extends his Life to *Antigonus Gonotas*; I shall only observe, that, for the number of Olympiads, *Suidas* having doubtless set down ϛθ, which denote the 109th Olympiad, the end of the ϛ was easily defaced in the Manuscript, so as there remained only ., by which means of .θ, was made the 79th Olympiad.

Fourthly, That it matters not that the *Chronicon Alexandrinum*, *Georgius Syncellus*, and others, speak too largely of the time wherein *Epicurus* flourished, and that we heed not the Errors of some Persons, otherwise very Learned, who make *Aristippus* later than *Epicurus*, and somthing of the like kind. Let us only observe what (i) *St. Hieron* cites out of *Cicero*, *pro Gallio*; A Poet is there mentioned, making *Epicurus* and *Socrates* discoursing together, *Whose Times*, saith *Cicero*, *we know were disjoyned; not by Years, but Ages.*

Fifthly, That the Birth-day of *Epicurus*, taken from *Laertius* and *Pliny*, seems to argue, That amongst the *Athenians* of old, the Civil Months and the Lunary had different Beginnings. This indeed will seem strange, unless we should imagine it may be collected, that the Month *Gamelion* began only from the Full Moon that went before it; For, if we account the 14th day of the Moon to be the 1st of the Month, the 1st of the Moon will fall upon the 7th of the Month. Not to mention that *Epicurus* seems in his Will to appoint his Birth-day to be Celebrated on the First Decad of the days of the Month *Gamelion*, because he was Born in one of them; and then ordaineth somthing more particularly concerning the 20th of the Moon, for that it was his Birth-day, as we shall relate hereafter. Unless you think it fit to follow the * Anonymous Writer, who affirms, *Epicurus* was Born on the 20th Day of *Gamelion*; but I know not whether his Authority should out-weigh *Laertius*. Certainly, many Errors, and those very great, have been observed in him, particularly by *Meursius*. I shall not take Notice, that the εἰκάδες of *Gamelion* might perhaps be understood of the 20th of the Moon, hapning within the Month *Gamelion*, from *Cicero*, whose Words we shall cite hereafter. But this by the way.

## CHAP. III.

*Where he lived in his younger time.*

*Laertius*, (a) out of *Heraclides*, in his Epitome of *Sotion* relates, that a Colony being sent by the *Athenians* to *Samus*, *Epicurus* was bred up there till the 18th year of his Age, in which he went to *Athens*; *Xenocrates* living in the Academy, *Aristotle* at *Chalcis*. (b) *Strabo* adds, that being first brought up, partly at *Samus*, partly at *Teos*, he spent the first part of his Youth at *Athens*, growing up together with *Menander*, the Comick Poet. (c) *Laertius* further relates, That *Alexander* dying, and the *Athenians* being oppress't by *Perdiccas*, he went to *Colophon* to his Father, (about the 23 year of his age) and that he lived awhile there. And adds afterwards out of *Apollodorus*, that from the 32 year of his Age to the 37th he lived partly at *Mitylene*, partly at *Lampsacum*, (whither he made a dangerous voyage, as (d) *Plutarch* observes.) (e) *Suidas* sets down, how much time he bestowed in each of these places, One Year at *Mitylene*, Four at *Lampsacum*. *Laertius* adds, that he returned to *Athens*, when *Anaxicrates* was Archon. Now forasmuch as *Anaxicrates* (who succeeded *Charinus*, in the year of whose Magistracy, as (f) *Seneca* notes, *Epicurus* writ to *Polyænus*) was Archon in the 2d Year of the 118th Olympiad, and consequently the 36th of *Epicurus*'s Age, there must necessarily be here a Metachronism of one Year.

(a) Lib. 10. (b) Lib. 14. (c) Loc. Cit. (d) Adv. Col. Lib. 2. (e) In *Epic.* (f) Epist. 18.

Hitherto of the places where *Epicurus* lived in his younger times, partly Learning, partly Teaching, before he setled at *Athens*, where he instituted a Sect.

## CHAP. IV.

*His Masters.*

As for the Masters which he had, we read in (a) *Laertius*, that some relate, *Epicurus* was Auditor of *Pamphilus* the Platonick; (b) *Suidas* saith the same; (c) *Cicero* also mentions *Epicurus*, himself acknowledging, that he heard him at *Samus*, but exceedingly slighted his Doctrine. Others also report the same.

(a) Lib. 10. (b) In *Epic.* (c) De Nat. deor. 1.

Moreover, (d) *Clemens Alexandrinus* and others, report *Nausiphanes* the *Pythagorean*, Disciple of *Pyrrho*, to have been his Master, though (e) *Sextus Empiricus* writes, That he himself deny'd he had been Disciple to *Nausiphanes*. *Apollodorus*, in his Chronology, reports, That *Epicurus* heard *Lysiphanes* and *Praxiphanes*; but this, saith (f) *Laertius*, he doth not himself acknowledge, in his Epistle to *Euridicus*.

(d) *Strom.* Lib 1. (e) Adv. *Mat.* 1. (f) Loc. Cit.

He might indeed have heard *Xenocrates*, and *some there are* (saith (g) *Cicero*) *who think, he did hear him*, (as *Demetrius* the *Magnesian* in *Laertius*) but *Epicurus* himself will not allow it.

(g) De Nat. deor. Lib. 1.

I would mention *Democrates*, with whom, (h) *Plutarch* saith, *Epicurus* contested *about Syllables and Accents*; but that I suspect *Democrates* to be falsly read instead of *Democritus*, even from this, that *Plutarch* adds, That *Epicurus* stole all his Opinions from him, which was the common Objection

(h) Adv. *Col.* 2

Objection concerning *Democritus*, as ſhall be ſhewn hereafter.

(k) Eccl. Phyſ. I ſhould mention alſo *Metrodorus*, whom (k) *Stobæus* calls, συγγραφέα, his Interpreter; *Doctorem, the Maſter* of *Epicurus*; and ſhould ſuſpect

(l) Cap. 1. he were the ſame with him, whom (l) *Solinus* makes contemporary with *Diogenes* the Cynick; did not the Opinion, attributed to him of the Infinity of Worlds, and of Atoms, argue, that this was *Metrodorus* the *Chian*, Diſciple of *Democritus*, whom *Epicurus* might have, not as *Doctorem*, a Teacher by word of Mouth; but as *Ductorem*, a *Leader*, by Writing.

'Thus alſo is *Lucian* to be taken, when he ſaith ſportingly, that *Epicurus* was Diſciple to *Democritus*, making him to be Diſciple of *Ariſtippus* alſo, by reaſon of his Opinion of Pleaſure, wherein yet there was a great difference between them, as we ſhall ſhew in its due place. But

(m) Locis citatis. notwithſtanding all we have alledged, (m) *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, *Empericus*, and others, write, that *Epicurus* uſed to boaſt, That he never had any maſter, but was αὐτοδίδακτος, his own Teacher; and attained Philoſophy by his own Wit and Induſtry. And though they ſeem to mention this, not without ſome diſparagement of him, yet it will eaſily be granted, that he found out many things of himſelf, ſince this was that wherein he took moſt delight at his laſt end; and withal, ſeeing he writ ſo many Books, filled only with his own Sayings, as we ſhall ſhew here-

(n) Apud *Laert.* Lib. 10. after. And indeed (n) *Athenæus*, delivering in an Epigram an excellent Sentence of his, concludes, as if *Epicurus* learnt it not from an other, than from the Muſes and *Apollo*. Hither alſo conduce theſe commendations of *Laertius*:

*Diſpenſing Gifts acquir'd by his own Breaſt.*

And,

*He rouz'd his Soul to break the narrow Bonds,*
*Which fetter Nature.*

And others of the ſame kind.

As for thoſe whom *Epicurus* particularly

(o) Loc. Cit. eſteem'd, (o) *Laertius* (citing *Diocles*) affirms, he was chiefly addicted to *Anaxagoras*, (though in ſome things he contradicted him) and *Archelaus*, who was Maſter to *Socrates*. Of *Democritus* we ſhall ſpeak hereafter. I only add, that *Epicurus* much admiring the converſation of *Pyrrho*, continually queſtion'd his Diſciple *Nauſiphanes*

(p) Lib. 9. concerning him; as (p) *Laertius* ſaith, in the Life of *Pyrrho*.

## CHAP. V.

*When, and upon what occaſion, he addicted himſelf to Philoſophy, and inſtituted a Sect.*

SUidas (a) ſaith, That he began to apply himſelf to Philoſophy in the 12th Year of his Age, which is confirmed by others, who wrote his Life, as (b) *Laertius* relates. But *Epicurus* himſelf (alledged by the ſame (c) *Laertius*) atteſteth, That he did not addict himſelf to Philoſophy till he was Fourteen Years old. *Hermippus* (in (d) *Laertius*) ſaith, that, lighting accidentally upon the Books of *Democritus*, he betook himſelf to Philoſophy; but *Apollodorus* the *Epicurean*, in the Firſt Book of the Life of *Epicurus*, affirms, he applied himſelf to Philoſophy upon diſlike of the Sophiſts and Grammarians, for that they could not explain what *Heſiod* meant by *Chaos*. (e) *Sextus Empiricus* having related this more fully, it will not (e) Adv. Phyſ. Lib. 2. be amiſs to tranſcribe his Words. Having propoſed ſome Doubts concerning theſe Verſes of *Heſiod*,

*Firſt*, Chaos, *next broad-Breaſted Earth was made,*
*The ſeat of all* ———

He adds, and ſome affirm, That this was the occaſion of *Epicurus*'s ſudden applying himſelf to Philoſophy; for being yet very young, He asked a Grammarian who read to him [*Chaos* was firſt made:] Of what was *Chaos* made, if it was firſt made? The other anſwering, That it did not belong to him to Teach ſuch things, but to thoſe who were called Philoſophers. Then, ſaith *Epicurus*, I muſt go to thoſe, for they are the Perſons that know the Truth of Beings.

To omit, what ſome affirm, that he was, as *Hermippus* (*f*) *in Laertius*) relates, before he (f) Loc. addicted himſelf to Philoſophy, a Schoolmaſter: And though the (g) *Stoicks*, who were much his (g) Ibid. Enemies, reproached him, that with his Father he taught Boys for a ſmall ſtipend, and that with his Mother he went from Houſe to Houſe reading expiatory Prayers; I obſerve, that after he had applyed himſelf to Philoſophy, he inſtituted a School, being Thirty two years old, as (b) *Laertius* relates, and this firſt (b) Ibid. at *Mitylene*, afterwards at *Lampſacum*, as may be collected from the relation of *Suidas*, but had Diſciples alſo from *Colophon*, as (i) *Laertius* re- (i) Ibid. lates,

Returning to *Athens* in the 36th, or 37th Year of his Age, *He awhile Diſcours'd* (ſaith (k) (k) Lib. 1. *Laertius*) *of Philoſophy in publick with others, but afterwards inſtituted a Sect in private, denominated from him.* At firſt indeed, admiring the Doctrine of *Democritus*, he profeſſed himſelf a Democritian, as *Plutarch* (*l*) relates; but afterwards, (l) Ad. Col. for that he changed or added many things, his Followers were from him called *Epicureans*.

## CHAP. VI.

*His School.*

WHereas other Profeſſors of Sects made choice of particular places in *Athens*, as the *Academy*, the *Lycæum*, and the like, he purchaſed a very pleaſant Garden, for Fourſcore *Minæ*, where he lived with his Friends and Diſciples, and taught Philoſophy. Thus, amongſt others, (a) *Laertius* citing *Apollodorus*. (b) *Pliny* (a) Loc. Cit. writes, that *Epicurus* firſt brought into *Athens*, (b) Lib. 19. the cuſtome of having under the name of *Hortus* a Garden, the Delights of Fields and Country Manſions within the City itſelf, whereas, until his Time, 'twas not the faſhion to have thoſe kinds of Manſions (*Rura*) in Towns.

Hence we may conjecture, that this was the (c) In Attic. place which (c) *Pauſanias* reports to have been called, even in his time, *the Gardens*, adding, That there was in it a Statue of *Venus*, made by *Alcamenes*,

*Alcamenes*, one of the most eminent things in *Athens*, (as may be gathered also from (d) *Lucian*) and that the Temple of *Venus*, with the Statue of Celestial *Venus*, did joyn to it. This Garden is often mentioned in the Plural number by (e) *Cicero*, (f) *Juvenal*, and others, and sometimes diminutively, *Hortulus*, as *Virgil*; But, howsoever it be us'd, it is commonly taken for the Sect or Doctrine delivered in that place by *Epicurus* and his Scholars. Whence *Sextus Empiricus* calls the *Epicureans*, the *Philosophers of the Garden* (as the Stoicks, the Philosophers of the *Stoa* or *Cloister*,) and *Apollodorus* being in his time the Master of the Garden, was, as *Laertius* affirms, called κηπότυραννος *the Garden King*.

Besides this Garden, which, with Houses belonging to it, joyned upon the City, *Epicurus* had a House in *Melite*, which was a Town of the *Cecropian* Tribe, as (g) *Suidas* affirms, inhabited by *Philaus*, one of the Ancestors of *Epicurus*, as was formerly said, having (according to (h) *Phavorinus*) a famous Temple Dedicated to *Hercules*. Hither *Epicurus* sometimes retired with his Disciples, and at last bequeathed it to his Successors, as we shall declare hereafter.

(d) In Imag.
(e) Ad Attic. l. 2. 24.
(f) Sat. 14.
(g) In Lexic.
(h) In Lexic.

## CHAP. VII.

### *How he lived with his Friends.*

*Epicurus* after his return to *Athens*, at what time *Anaxicrates* was Archon, went only twice or thrice to *Ionia* to visit his Friends, but lived all the rest of his time at *Athens*, unmarried, nor would ever forsake his Country, though at that time reduc'd to great extremities, as (a) *Laertius* observes. The worst of which was, when *Demetrius* besieged *Athens*, about the 44th Year of *Epicurus*'s Age. How great a Famine at that time oppress'd the City is describ'd by (b) *Plutarch*. But it is observable, that having related a Story of the Contest between a Father and his Son, about a dead Mouse which had fallen from the top of a House; He adds, *They say, that* Epicurus *the Philosopher sustain'd his Friends with Beans, which he shared equally amongst them.*

*Epicurus* therefore lived all the rest of his time at *Athens*, together with so many Friends and Disciples, whom he conversed with, and instructed, as that whole Cities were not sufficient to contain them (they are the words of (c) *Laertius*,) who resorted to him, not only from *Greece* but all other parts, and lived with him in his Gardens, as he cites out of *Apollodorus*; but especially from *Asia*, and particularly from *Lampsacum*, and from *Ægypt*, as may be collected out of (d) *Plutarch*. Of the Temperance and Frugality of his Diet we shall speak hereafter. As to his living with his Friends, it is remarkable what *Diocles*, in *Laertius*, and others, relate, That *Epicurus* did not, as *Pythagoras*, who said the Goods of Friends ought to be in common, appoint them to put their Estates into one joint Stock, (for that imply'd a Distrust, not a Friendship) but that any one upon occasion should be freely supply'd by the rest. This will appear more manifest hereafter. In the mean time, we must not omit an eminent place of (e) "*Cicero*; Neither (*saith he*) did *Epicurus* approve "Friendship in Discourse only, but much more "by Life, Actions, and Manners, which how "great a thing it is, the Fables of the Ancients "declare. For amongst the many various Sto- "ries repeated from utmost Antiquity, there "are hardly found three pair of Friends, from "*Theseus* his Time down to *Orestes*. But how "many great companies of Friends, and how "unanimously Loving did *Epicurus* keep in one "House, and that very little? Which is done "even unto this day by the *Epicureans*. *Thus* Cicero.

(a) Lib. 10.
(b) In Demetr.
(c) Loc. cit.
(d) De occ. viv.
(e) P. De fin. Lib.

Amongst the rest of his Friends, (f) *Laertius* mentions *Polystratus*, who seems to be the same, of whom together with *Hippoclides* another *Epicurean*, (g) *Valerius Maximus* gives a strange account. I shall insert the Words of *Valerius*, the rather because they will serve to illustrate part of *Epicurus*'s Will hereafter, concerning Communication of the Goods of his Disciples: They are these. "Hither may aptly "be referred *Polystratus* and *Hippoclides*, Philo- "sophers, who, born the same day, Followers "of the Sect of the same Master, *Epicurus*, joyn- "ed together in the common possession of Estate "and Maintenance of that School, died very "old, in the same moment of time. So equal "a Society of Fortune and Friendship, who "thinks not to have been begotten, bred, and "ended, in the bosome of Celestial Concord? *Thus be.*

(f) Loc. Cit. Cap. 8.
(g) Lib. 1. Cap. 8.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *His Friends and Disciples.*

Being now to give a Catalogue of the chiefest of his Friends and Disciples, we must not in the first place pass by the Three Brethren of *Epicurus*, mention'd in the beginning, for they by his advice studied Philosophy with him, as *Philodemus* (in (a) *Laertius*) affirms. (b) *Plutarch* adds, That they took in the Philosophy of their Brother, as greedily as if they had been Divinely inspired, Believing and Professing from their first Youth, That there was not any Man wiser than *Epicurus*. The most eminent of the Three was *Neocles*: He declaring from a Boy, That his Brother was the wisest of Mortals; added, as a wonder, That his Mother could contain so many and so great Atomes, as, by their Convention, made up such a wise Man; as (c) *Plutarch* relates. Hence it appearing that *Neocles* followed not any Philosophy of his own, but that of his Brother, I know not why (d) some affirm, that he introduced a Sect like that of his Brother, unless perhaps they ground it upon that place of (e) *Suidas*, where he saith, that *Neocles* writ concerning his Sect: But who sees not, it may be understood, that he writ concerning the Sect which he himself professed, but was instituted by another, especially for that there is nothing said any where of the Sect of the *Neoclidæ*?

(a) Lib. 10.
(b) De Amor. Fra.
(c) Adv. Col. 2.
(d) As Genebr. Lib. 2. Chronol.
(e) In Epic.

Observe by the way, that this Saying (λάθε βιώσας, *Live closely*,) which (f) *Plutarch* oppugnes, and is brought in (g) amongst the Proverbial

(f) Lib. de Co.
(g) Erasm. Chil. 2. Centu. 10.

Proverbial Speeches) did belong to this *Neocles*, as the ſame (*b*) *Suidas* affirmeth.

(*b*) In Neocl.

To his Three Brethren, may be added thoſe Three Friends who, (as we read in (*i*) *Seneca*) became great Perſons, through the Converſation of *Epicurus*.

(*i*) Epiſt. 6.

*Metrodorus* is to be firſt nam'd; for he was, as (*k*) *Cicero* ſaith, almoſt another *Epicurus*. (*l*) *Strabo* plainly declareth, he was of *Lampſacum*. For whereas *Laertius* ſeems to ſay he was an *Athenian*, the place is very corrupt; eſpecially ſeeing it is manifeſt he was not an *Athenian*, from this Antitheſis of (*m*) *Cicero*, *How much was* Epicurus *happier for being in his Country, than* Metrodorus *for being at* Athens; becauſe *Athens* was not the Country of *Metrodorus*: The Text of (*n*) *Lacrtius* is this, "He had many Diſciples "but the moſt eminent were *Metrodorus* Ἀθηναῖον "and *Timocrates*, and *Sandes* a *Lampſacene*, who "from his firſt acquaintance with the Man, ne-"ver left him, &c. For my part I am of opinion, that theſe words Ἀθηναῖον, καὶ Τιμοκράτην, καὶ Σάνδην ſhould be quite expunged, for if you take them away, the reſt joyns together very well; if you admit them, they will not hang together: for it was *Metrodorus* that was indeed a *Lampſacene*, and with whom all the reſt that follows agreeth, not *Sandes*, whom, beſides other things, it is falſe, that *Epicurus* ſhould mention in his Will. And though (*o*) *Caſaubon* conceives, that Ἀθηναῖον may be the proper name of a Man, yet is it ſtrange that we hear nothing elſewhere, as well of *Athenæus* as of *Sandes*, as *Epicureans*; Since *Laertius* in this place reckons up his moſt eminent Diſciples; but taking theſe away, the Three, *viz. Metrodorus*, *Polyænus*, and *Hermachus* are deſcribed in a continued Series; who, as we ſaid, are put together by *Seneca*, as moſt eminent. As for *Timocrates*, he is mentioned afterwards by the way, when he comes to name *Metrodorus* as his Brother, and ſeems here to be inſerted amiſs. The occaſion upon which theſe Names crept into the Text I ſuſpect to be, that perhaps, ſome Tranſcriber had noted in the Margent, that what was delivered in the Text, was confirmed alſo by *Athenæus* (Author of the *Deipnoſophiſtæ*: For in him there is ſomthing concerning the *Epicureans*) and by *Timocrates* (for he alſo is cited by *Laertius*,) and by one *Sandes* (perhaps *Suidas*, or ſome other.) That many things have heretofore been inſerted out of the Margents into the Texts themſelves, by careleſneſs of the Tranſcribers, is moſt manifeſt.

(*k*) De fin. Lib. 2.

(*l*) Lib. 13.

(*m*) Loc. Cit.

(*n*) Lib. 10.

(*o*) In Not. ad Laert.

*Metrodorus* therefore was by Country a *Lampſacene* (not the ſame with that Friend of *Anaxagoras*, whom (*p*) *Laertius* mentions of the ſame Name) born in the 12th Year of *Epicurus*'s age; for, dying in the 53 Year of his age, (the coherence of the Words and Senſe makes me think it ſhould be read Μητροδώρῳ ἀγονίᾳ) and that being the 7th before the death of *Epicurus*, who lived to the 72 Year, it is evident, that the Year of his Birth muſt fall upon the 12th of *Epicurus*'s. From the firſt time that *Metrodorus* became acquainted with *Epicurus*, (which might happen in the 22 Year of his age, at what time *Epicurus* lived at *Lampſacum*) he never (as we began to ſay out of *Laertius*) parted from him, but one ſix Months, in which time he was abſent at home, and thence returned to *Epicurus*. He had a Siſter, *Batis*, whom he Married to *Idomeneus*, and a Concubine named *Leontium*. He had Children, whom *Epicurus* recommended in his Will, and in the Epiſtle which he writ dying; and particularly a Son, named *Epicurus*. He was a very good Man, undaunted with Troubles, or Death itſelf, as *Epicurus* himſelf, in *Laertius* atteſts. He had the Dropſie; (*q*) for *Cornelius Celſus* writes, That whilſt he was ſick of that Diſeaſe, and could no longer abſtain, as was convenient, from Drinking; he uſed, after he had forborn a great while, to Drink, and caſt it up again. But whether it was of this Diſeaſe, or of ſome other, that he died; is not certain. The Books which he writ, are by *Laertius*, reckned be theſe; *Againſt Phyſicians* III. *Of the Senſes, to* Timocrates. *Of Magnanimity. Of the Infirmity of* Epicurus. *Againſt the Dialecticks. Againſt the Sophiſts* IX. *Of the way to Wiſdom. Of Alteration. Of Riches. Againſt* Democritus. *Of Nobility.* Beſides which, (*r*) *Plutarch* cites his Books, *Of Philoſophy. Of the Poets. Againſt* Timarchus. Likewiſe (*ſ*) *Clemens Alexandridus* cites a Treatiſe, *That the cauſe of Felicity which comes from ourſelves is greater than that which comes from other things.* But of *Metrodorus*, enough.

(*p*) Lib. 2.

(*q*) Lib. 3. Cap. 21.

(*r*) Adv. Col.

(*ſ*) Strom. 2.

*Polyænus* was Son of *Athenodorus*, a *Lampſacene* alſo. He was *a great Mathematician*, (*t*) to uſe the words of *Cicero*, and (to comprize much in little) Modeſt and Amiable, as *Philodemus* (in (*u*) *Laertius*) ſaith.

(*t*) Acad. 3.

*Hermachus* was Son of *Agemorchus*, a *Mityleneian*, his Father of mean quality. At firſt he ſtudied Rhetorick, but afterwards became ſo knowing in Philoſophy, that *Epicurus* dying, committed the Government of the School to him. He dyed at *Lyſias*. There is great mention of him in *Epicurus*'s Will. His Writings, which *Laertius* commends for excellent, theſe. *Epiſtolicks, concerning* Empedocles, XXII. *Of Diſciplines*, (for *Caſaubone* well reads not Μαθητῶν, but Μαθημάτων) *Two Books. Againſt* Plato. *Againſt* Ariſtotle.

(*u*) Lib. 10.

To theſe muſt be added *Leontius*, a *Lampſacene*, whom (*w*) *Plutarch* calleth one of the moſt eminent Diſciples of *Epicurus*; adding, That this was he who writ to *Lycophron*, that *Epicurus* honoured *Democritus*.

(*w*) Adv. Col. l. 1.

Moreover, *Colotes* and *Idomeneus*, *Lampſacenes* alſo. Of the former we ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak oftner, eſpecially, becauſe of the Two Books which *Plutarch* writ againſt him. (*x*) *Laertius* elſewhere writes, that *Menedemus* the Cynick was his Diſciple, (unleſs perhaps there were ſome other *Colotes* of *Lampſacum*.) The ſame *Colotes* it is, who, cited by (*y*) *Macrobius*, argues, that *Plato* ought not to have invented the Fable of *Erus*, becauſe no kind of Fiction agreeeth with the Profeſſors of Truth. The later, *Idomeneus*, *Epicurus* deſign'd to make famous by his Letters, as indeed he did, which appears from (*z*) *Seneca*: "I will alledge, *ſaith he*, *Epi-*"*curus* for an example, who writing to *Idome-*"*neus*, (then a Miniſter of State employ'd in "great Affairs) to perſuade him, from a ſpe-"cious kind of Life, to true ſetled Glory. If, ſaith he, you affect Glory, my Epiſtles will make you more famous, than all thoſe things which

(*x*) Lib. 6.

(*y*) In Somn. Scip. Lib. 1.

(*z*) Epiſt. 21.

'which you esteem, and for which you are 'esteemed. Who would have known *Idomeneus*, if *Epicurus* had not graved his Name in his 'Letters? All those Magistrates and Princes, 'even the King himself, from whom *Idomeneus* 'derived his Title, are now suppressed by a deep 'Oblivion. *Thus be*, And these (saith *Laertius*) 'were the more eminent Disciples.

But to these may be added two out of *Valerius*, already mentioned, *Polystratus* and *Hippoclides*; especially seeing *Laertius* reckons *Polystratus* as Successor to *Hermachus*, unless the *Polystratus* who is joined to *Hippoclides*, were not the same with him that succeeded *Hermachus*.

We might add *Timocrates* of *Lampsacum*, Brother of *Metrodorus*; but he seems to have fallen off, not brooking the Reprehensions of his Brother. We shall therefore rather join to these *Mus*, the Servant of *Epicurus*, who, as *Laertius* affirms, became an eminent Philosopher, not omitted by (*a*) *Agellius*, and (*b*) *Macrobius*, in reckoning up those, who, of Servants, became famous for Philosophy.

(a) Lib. 1. cap. 12.
(b) Saturn. 1. 10.

To omit *Apelles*, somwhere derided by *Plutarch*, we must here mention three Women, who together with others of the same Sex, learnt Philosophy of *Epicurus*. One *Leontium*, who studyed Philosophy under *Epicurus*, as (*c*) *Athenæus* recites, and may also be collected from (*d*) *Cicero*, who saith, she wrote a Book against *Theophrastus*, in an elegant Style, and in the *Attick* Dialect. The second, *Themista*, Daughter of *Zoilus*, a *Lampsacene*, Wife of the forementioned *Leontius*. Of her, besides the Testimonies which we shall hereafter alledge, (*e*) *Clemens Alexandrinus* taketh express notice. The third, *Philenis*, whom (*f*) *Athenæus* affirms to have written many things; adding that the obscene Books ascribed to her, were put forth under her Name, by *Polycrates* the Sophist, to discredit the Woman.

(c) Lib. 13.
(d) De Nat. Deor.
(e) Strom. lib. 4.
(f) Lib. 8. and 10.

To these may be added *Herodotus*, to whom *Epicurus* writ a little Epitome of Physick, extant in *Laertius*; and who amongst other things, according to the same *Laertius*, writ a Book *Of the youth of* Epicurus.

*Pithocles*, to whom *Epicurus* writ of Superior things; extant in *Laertius*, and who affirmed, that when he was but 18 years old, he had not his equal for Ingenuity in all *Greece*, as *Plutarch* relates.

*Menœceus*, to whom *Epicurus* writ that Epistle concerning *Morality*, which is extant in *Laertius*; it's beginning recited also by *Clemens Alexandrinus*.

*Timocrates*, Son of *Demetrius*, a *Potamian*, and *Amynomachus*, Son of *Philocrates* of *Bate*, whom *Epicurus* made the Executors of his Will.

*Nicanor*, whom *Epicurus* recommended to the care of the said Executors.

*Eurydicus*, one of those to whom, as *Laertius* saith, he writ Epistles.

*Dositheus*, and his Sons *Pyrrho*, and *Hegesinax*, to whom *Epicurus* wrote a consolatory Letter, upon the death of their Father, as we find in *Plutarch*.

I omit *Polymedes*, *Antidorus*, and others, to be mentioned hereafter in treating of his Books.

## CHAP. IX.

### *How much he wrote.*

NEither did *Epicurus* spend the time in giving his Disciples only Oral Instructions, but bestowed much pains in composing several Books. But to understand how much he labour'd herein, by comparison with other Philosophers, hear but *Laertius* in his (*a*) Preface; *Many things*, saith he, Zeno *writ*; *more*, Xenophanes; *more*, Democritus; *more*, Aristotle; *more*, Epicurus; *more*, Chrysippus. Where we see that *Epicurus*, as to multitude of Writings came short only of *Chrysippus*. But observe, that elsewhere (*b*) *Laertius*, to shew he may be thought to have exceeded *Chrysippus* herein, cites *Apollodorus* the *Athenian*, *who*, saith he, *to shew that what* Epicurus *writ of himself, not borrowed from any other, did far exceed the Books of* Chrysippus, *saith expresly thus: If a Man should take out of the Books of* Chrysippus, *the things which he hath borrowed of others, the Paper will be left blank.* But that this may not seem strange, the same (*c*) *Laertius* elsewhere relates, that *Chrysippus*, for his emulation of *Epicurus* in writing much, was called by *Carneades*, the *Parasite of his Books*, because, *if* Epicurus *writ any thing*, (read γεγράφει, not γεγράφας) *he would affect to write as much. Whence it came to pass, that he often wrote the same things over again, and whatsoever came next to hand, and presently thrust it in for haste, without correction; and brought in so many Testimonies of other Writers, that his Books were filled up only with them, as may be found in* Zeno *also, and* Aristotle. Thus *Laertius* of *Chrysippus*, but of *Epicurus* not so: For (*d*) he relates, that his Volumes amounted to Three hundred, *in which*, saith he, *there is no testimony of any other Author, but they are all the very words of* Epicurus. Which I observe, to shew (seeing *Epicurus* wrote so many things, (*e*) *a great Writer*, as he terms him, and exceeding for multitude of Books, so as (*f*) *Origen* charging *Celsus* with temerity, objects as a thing he conceives impossible, *There is not any of us, who*, saith he, *knows all that* Epicurus *writ*) his fluent Vein, and how he was chiefly employ'd.

(a) Lib. 1.
(b) Lib. 17.
(c) Lib 10.
(d) Ibid.
(e) Ibid.
(f) Adv. Celsum lib. 7.

## CHAP. X.

### *What Writings of his are particularly mentioned by Authors.*

HEre it is fit we give a kind of Catalogue of his Books, not of all he wrote, but of those whose Titles are extant in other Authors. I say their Titles, for the Books themselves have so miscarried by the injury of time, that besides some few Compendiums preserv'd by *Laertius*, and some Fragments scatter'd up and down amongst several Writers, there is not any thing of them remaining, at least, as yet known to us.

To begin with those, which *Laertius* accounts the best, they are ranked thus.

*Of Nature*, XXXVII. They are ſomtimes cited ſimply, *Of Nature*, ſomtimes with the number of the Books, as when *Laertius* hereafter in his Life, cites the I. the XI. XII. XIIII. XV. (a) *Galen* alſo mentions the Title and number of the Books.

(a) *Comment. in 1. lib. Hipp. de nat. hom.*

*Of Atoms* and *Vacuum*, ſo uſually cited, (b) *Cleomenes* ſeemeth to mean the ſame under another name, *Of the Principles of all things.*

(b) *lib. 2. cap. 1.*

*Of Love.*

*An Epitome of things appertaining to Natural Philoſophers.* This Epitome was twofold, Great and Little; both are cited by *Laertius*; the Leſſer, that which is written to *Herodotus*.

*Againſt the Megarick* (or Dialectick) *Philoſophers, Doubts.* Theſe *Doubts* ſeem chiefly to have concerned certain Moral Arguments, as concerning Juſtice, Marriage, and Dower: For this ſeems to be the ſame, which *Laertius*, and (c) *Plutarch* cite under the name of *Doubts*, without adding, *To the Megarick*.

(c) *Adv. col. lib. 1.*

Κύριαι δόξαι, *Maxims*, or, as (d) *Cicero* interprets, *Maximæ rata Sententiæ*, *because*, ſaith he, *they are Sentences briefly expreſs'd, which conduce exceedingly to living happily. He* (f) *elſewhere calls them ſelect, and ſhort Sentences.* (g) Sextus *ſeems to call them Memorable Sayings. Laertius* hath put them at the end, and (h) *Lucian* ſomwhere commends them, as (i) *Cicero* the Book of *Craxtor, which is*, ſaith he, *not Great indeed, but Golden, and, as* Panætius *adviſed* Tubero, *to be gotten by heart.* He was in Opinion different from *Suidas*, who calls them *wicked Notions.*

(d) *De fin. lib. 2.*

(f) *De nat. deor 2.*

(g) *Adv. Phyſ. lib 2.*

(h) *In Pſeudom.*

(i) *Lib. 4. Acad.*

Περὶ αἱρέσεων, *Of Elections*, ſo I conceive it ought rather to be rendred than of Sects; becauſe in this Book *Epicurus* ſeems not to deſign a Hiſtory of Sects, but Moral Inſtitution, which is converſant about the Choice of things, as *Laertius* declares at the end of *Epicurus*'s Epiſtle to *Menæceus*. Not to mention, that he teacheth the Ethick kind to conſiſt only of Election and Avoidance. For which reaſon, the Book, which is ordinarily and next to this cited,

Περὶ φυτῶν, *Of Plants*, ought rather to be entituled, Περὶ φευκτῶν, *Of things to be avoided*; as well for coherence of the Title, as for that *Epicurus*, almoſt wholly taken up with Moral Philoſophy, ſcarce treated of any particular ſubject in Phyſick, unleſs they were ſuch as conduced to take away vain terrours from the minds of Men; of which kind, this of *Plants* could not be. Moreover, becauſe in Manuſcripts, this Title is connexed to the former by the Conjunction ἢ, we may conjecture, that the Inſcription was, Περὶ αἱρέσεων ἢ περὶ φυγῶν; or under a ſingle Title, Περὶ αἱρέσεων, ἢ φυγῶν; *Of Election and Avoidance.* Yet might the Inſcription have been in the Plural number, foraſmuch as it is afterwards ſaid, *Elections and Avoidances are dijudicated from Pleaſure and Grief.*

*Of the End*; So this Book is generally cited, as amongſt others, by (k) *Plutarch*. Neither doth *Cicero* ſeem to mean any other, though he cite a Book *Of the ends of Good and Evil.*

(k) *Adv. col. 2.*

*Of the Criterie, or the Canon*; or, as (l) *Cicero* tranſlates it, *Of the Rule, and of Judgment.* But if inſtead of Judgment we render it Judicatory, the force of the word will be more fully expreſs'd.

(l) *De nat. deor. 1.*

*Charedemus*; or, *Of the Gods.* This is one of thoſe Books, which *Epicurus* entituled by the Names of his Brethren and Friends, that, being dead, their Names might not be forgotten, as (m) *Plutarch* obſerves.

(m) *De occ. viv.*

*Of Sanctity, or, Hegeſianax.* This perhaps is he, whom (n) *Plutarch* terms, *Hegetoanax*, concerning whoſe Death, *Epicurus* wrote to his Parents; unleſs perhaps it were he who wrote Hiſtories, and *Troica*, cited by (o) *Athenæus*; for he was of *Alexandria*, and *Epicurus* had Friends out of *Ægypt*.

(n) *Adv. Col. 2.*

(o) *Lib. 3. & 9.*

*Of Lives* IV. Which is all one as if the Inſcription had been, *Of Life and Manners.* Neither doth *Epicurus* ſeem in theſe Books to relate the Story of ſome eminent Perſons, as *Plutarch* and *Laertius* have done in their Books of Lives; but to give Rules, whereby to lead a quiet Life, as may plainly enough be collected from the Catalogue of the Moral Treatiſes, and the Places cited out of this by *Laertius*. The word *Lives* ſeems here to be taken in the ſame Senſe, as with (p) *Plutarch*, when he ſpeaketh of *the difference of Lives and Politicks*, which the Interpreter well renders, *Of Manners and Publick Inſtitutes.* Of theſe Books, are hereafter cited by *Laertius* the firſt and ſecond.

(p) *In Lycurgo.*

*Of Juſt Action.*

*Neocles* to *Themiſta.* This ſeems to have been that *Neocles* who was Brother to *Epicurus*, not his Father; for in like manner he called other of his Books after the Names of his Brothers.

*The Banquet*, cited by (q) *Plutarch*, (r) *Athenæus*, and others, (ſ) *Plutarch* mentions Queſtions handled in it, concerning the heat of Wine, the time of Coition. *Laertius*, concerning troubles about Marriage, &c.

(q) *Symp. queſt. l. 1.*

(r) *Deipn. 5.*

(ſ) *Adv. Col. Symp. queſt. 3. 3.*

*Eurylochus* to *Metrodorus.* I gueſs, that this *Eurylochus* was the ſame with that *Eurydicus*, to whom, as we ſaid formerly, *Epicurus* writ; but the thing is uncertain.

*Of Seeing.*

*Of the Angle, which is in the Atome.*

*Of Touching*; or perhaps, *Of the tangibility of Atoms*: for (t) *Epicurus* called *Vacuum* τὸ ἀναφὲς, *that which cannot be touched.*

(t) *Apud Laert.*

*Of Fate.*

*Of Paſſions. Sentences to* Timocrates.

Προγνωστικὸν, *Præcognitorium*; ſo I render it, becauſe he ſeemeth in this to have diſcourſed of the Precognitive Faculty.

*Protreptick*, (Exhortatory) that is, *Diſcourſe*; for ſo *Iſocrates* and *Clemens*, expreſly.

*Of Images*, εἴδωλα, *Simulacra*, *Imagines*, *Species*, *Formæ*, *Spectra*; ſo ſeveral Perſons variouſly interpret them, which are now commonly termed *Intentional Species.*

*Of Phantaſie*, or the Impreſſion thereof, which appeareth in the knowing Faculty; for neither did *Epicurus*, nor moſt of the ancient Philoſophers, underſtand by this word, as we now for the moſt part do, the Faculty itſelf.

*Ariſtobulus*; this Book bears the Name of *Epicurus*'s third Brother.

*Of Muſick*; viz. as it conduceth to Manners; for this may be collected from (u) *Plutarch* and (w) *Empiricus*.

(u) *Adv. Col.*

(w) *Adv. Mus.*

Of

*Of Gifts* and *Gratitude*, mentioned by (x) *Empiricus*, who cites ſomthing Grammatical out of it. (x) Adv. Gram.

*Polymedes*, heſeems to have been ſome Friend or Diſciple of *Epicurus*.

*Timocrates*, III. Whether meaning the Brother of *Metrodorus*, or the Executor of his Will, or ſome other. Hence I ſhould believe, that by *Laertius* was cited the third Book of *Timocrates*, or written by *Timocrates*; but that inſtead of Τιμοκράτης, I ſuſpect it ſhould be written Τιμοκράτει, relating to the third Book, which, by *Epicurus*, was ſo entitled. This the Text ſeems to confirm.

*Metrodorus*, V. That this was the ſame *Metrodorus*, of whom we have ſpoken formerly, cannot be doubted. From the firſt Book, cited by *Laertius*, may be collected, that *Epicurus* related the Story of *Metrodorus*'s Life.

*Antidorus*, II. This *Antidorus* is mentioned by (y) *Plutarch*, and perhaps by (z) *Laertius* alſo, in the Life of *Heraclides*, if we there read *Antidorus* for *Autodorus*. (y) Adv. Col. 1. (z) Lib. 5.

Περὶ νόσων δόξαι πρὸς Μιθρην, *Of the South-winds, Sentences to* Mithres. But perhaps the Title ought rather to be read, περὶ νόσων, *Of Diſeaſes*, as well for the reaſons alledged about the Title, περὶ φύτων, as for that theſe Sentences ſeem not to have been ſeveral Opinions, concerning ſome particular Winds, as Moral Sentences to moderate the pain of Diſeaſes. This ſeems to be the ſame *Mithres* a *Syrian*, whom *Metrodorus* relieved, as (a) *Plutarch* hath ſeveral times delivered; and the ſame, whom (b) *Laertius* relates to have been the Steward of *Lyſimachus*'s Houſe; adding, that *Mithres* ſaying to *Theodorus*, Thou ſeemeſt not only not to acknowledge Gods, but Kings alſo. *Theodorus* repli'd, How can I but acknowledge Gods, who think thee an Enemy to the Gods? (a) Adv. Col. (b) Lib. 10.

*Calliſtolas*; who, it may be preſumed, was ſome Friend of *Epicurus*'s.

*Of a Kingdom*, mentioned by (c) *Plutarch*. (c) Adv. Col. 2.

*Anaximenes*; perhaps the ſame *Lampſacene* who is mentioned by (d) *Strabo*, and whom both (e) *Plutarch* and (f) *Laertius* ſeem to mean; for, though he were one of *Alexander*'s Maſters, yet did he ſurvive him, (for he wrote his Actions,) and was, according to *Suidas*, Diſciple to *Diogenes* the *Cynick*, and conſequently younger than he; whereas *Diogenes* dyed in the Eighteenth year of *Epicurus*'s Age, *viz.* in the beginning of the 114th Olympiad. (d) Lib. 14. (e) in Pub. (f) Lib. 2.

*Epiſtles*. Of theſe, four are extant in *Laertius*; one, to *Herodotus*, which was, as we ſaid, the leſſer Epitome, and under that Name cited by (g) *Achilles Tatius*, *Of Natural things*. The ſecond, to *Pythocles*, *Of Meteors*, or Superior things, as well Celeſtial, as all others above the Earth. The third, to *Menaceus*, *Of Manners*. The laſt is very ſhort, which he writ Dying, to *Idomeneus*. That, beſides theſe, he writ innumerable others, may be collected from (h) *Plutarch*, (i) *Laertius*, and others. For *Plutarch*, for example, cites an Epiſtle of his, *To Anaxarchus*; (k) *Laertius* his Epiſtle, *To Ariſtobulus*; alſo an Epiſtle, *To his Friends at* Mytilene. This ſeems to be the ſame with that, which (l) *Sextus Empiricus* cites thus; *To the Philoſophers at* Mytilene. But *Laertius* implyeth, there were more (g) in Phæn. (h) Adv. Col. 1. (i) Lib. 7. (k) Lib. 10. (l) adv. Math.

which bore that Inſcription, ἐν ᾧ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μιτυλήνῃ φιλοσόφους; ſo as there might be one of them, Suppoſititious. In the ſame rank may be reckoned his Epiſtles, concerning ſeveral Inſtitutions of Life, hinted by (m) *Laertius*, cited by (n) *Athenæus* and (o) *Euſebius*. I omit, that the ſame (p) *Athenæus* mentions his Epiſtles to *Hermachus*; and not to enquire after any more, the higheſt in repute were thoſe written to *Idomeneus*, as we may underſtand from (q) *Seneca*, who alſo citeth ſomthing excellent out of his Epiſtles to *Polyænus*. Amongſt thoſe to *Idomeneus* was that, out of which (r) *Michael Apoſtolius* cites a Fragment, containing the Original of the Proverb, *Theſe ſhall be to thee both* Pythian *and* Delian, apply'd to thoſe that ſhall dye within a ſhort time; though *Eraſmus* affirms the Proverb itſelf to be cited out of *Menander*. (m) in Protag. Lib. 9. (n) Deipn. 8. (o) De Præpar. Lib. 15. (p) Deipn. 13. (q) Epiſt. 18. (r) Cent. 16. Parœm. 95.

As to the Epiſtles, we ſhall by the way obſerve, that *Epicurus* uſed to write, by way of Salutation in the beginning of his Epiſtles, ſomtimes, χαίρειν, *Joy*; ſomtimes εὖ πράττειν, *well to do*; ſomtimes εὖ διάγειν, ſomtimes σωδιλώς ζῆν, *well to live*; ὑγιαίνειν, *Health*. For that which we read in (ſ) *Laertius*, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐπιστολαῖς ἀντὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εὖ πράττειν ἢ σωδιλώς ζῆν ἄριστον, is defective, there ſeems ſome word wanting to the Sentence; neither doth the word ἄριστον ſeem to belong to the form of Salutation. And beſides, theſe words, ἀντὶ τοῦ, exclude χαίρειν from the *Epicurean* form of Salutation; whereas this word is not only put before his Epiſtles, extant in *Laertius*, but it is rendred by (t) *Cicero* alſo, when he alledgeth that which he wrote at his Death. For this reaſon, when heretofore I would, in the room of theſe two words, have put ἐπίσχη, (as a leſs Alteration, than if I ſhould have ſubſtituted πρὸ ὕπνου, or the like) the learned *Puteanus* approved it; but withall conceived, ἄριστον ought to be retained; but the excellent *Menagius* was of Opinion, that ſince a word is wanting, for ἄριστον ſhould be read ἔγερσιν, uſed on the like occaſion by *Laertius*; but that ἀντὶ τοῦ ought to be retained, foraſmuch as *Epicurus* ſeemeth not to have uſed the word χαίρειν, it being mentioned as proper to *Cleon*, both by (u) *Lucian* and (w) *Laertius* himſelf. Or whether inſtead of ἄριστον might we not put ἀρίστηται, or, with the leaſt alteration, ἄρεσον, ſignifying, that for Salutation, he was beſt pleaſed with thoſe words, εὖ πράττειν, and σωδιλώς ζῆν; or might not ἀντὶ τοῦ be retained, implying, that he did not quite caſt aſide the word χαίρειν, but inſtead of it ſomtimes uſed the other two, as if πότε were either wanting or imply'd. Indeed, (x) *Lucian* ſeems not obſcurely to hint as much, when relating, that *Epicurus* was extreamly delighted with the word χαίρειν, he adds, that ſomtimes he uſed other words, and that ſomtimes in his more Accurate and Profound Epiſtles, (which yet, he ſaith, were not many,) or when he writ to his moſt intimate Friends, he chiefly uſed ὑγιαίνειν. *Laertius* therefore attributing the word εὖπράττειν to him, may as well be thought to have intended χαίρειν, as uſed by him: Since, attributing εὖ διάγειν to him alſo, he makes εὖ πράττειν as peculiar to *Plato*, as χαίρειν to *Cleon*. (t) De fin. 2. (u) De lapſ. in Salut. (w) Lib. 3. (x) Ibid.

This Catalogue of his Books is compiled by *Laertius*; but beſides theſe, there are others,

cited both by *Laertius* himſelfe, and other Writers. *Laertius* formerly cited his Book, *Of Rhetorick*, mentioned alſo by the Scholiaſt of *Hermogenes*. But that which is cited, *Of Perſpicuity requiſite to Diſcourſe*, belongs to *Canonick*, which he ſubſtituted in the room of *Dialectick*.

He likewiſe ſeems to cite his Προηγέμενα, *Antecedentia*, or *Præcipua*; things precedent or preferred, in the Senſe of the *Stoicks*. I ſhould think it meant of ſome of the Books before cited, if amongſt them there were any, wherein that which is alledged were written by *Epicurus*.

There are cited alſo *Stœcheioſes*, *Inſtitutions* or *Elements*, XII.

There ſeems alſo to be cited, *Of Worlds*, XII. For, deſcribing ſeveral Worlds, he is ſaid to have done it in the XII th περὶ τούτου, or, as the Manuſcripts, περὶ ὧν, upon this very Subject; the rather, becauſe it ſeems not meant of thoſe XXXVII which are conſtantly cited, *Of Nature*.

I ſhould add his *Phyſical Problems*, and *Ethical Doctrines*; but that under theſe Names may be compriſed, all that *Epicurus* wrote concerning *Nature* and *Morality*.

Moreover, (y) *Cicero* cites his Book, *Of the chief Good*; unleſs it be the ſame with that, *Of the End*, already mentioned.

(y) *Tuſc.* 3.

By the (z) ſame alſo is cited his Book, *Of Pleaſure*; this perhaps *Laertius* meant, when he ſaid, It was objected by ſome againſt *Epicurus*, that he uſurped the Treatiſe of *Ariſtippus* concerning Pleaſure, as if it had been his own.

(z) *De divin.* 2.

Beſides theſe, **Cicero* cites his Book, *Of Piety towards the Gods*, diſtinct, as it ſeems, from that *Of Sanctity*, reckoned by *Laertius*. *Of Sanctity*, ſaith he, *Of Piety towards the Gods*, he wrote Books.

(*) *De nat. deor.* 1.

Again, *Plutarch* declares, that he wrote Books againſt *Theophraſtus*: for the ſecond of them, he ſaith, contained a diſcourſe concerning Colours. Hitherto of his Books.

## CHAP. XI.

### *His Will.*

EPicurus having employed his Life in Teaching and Writing, and being now grown old, made, as the cuſtom was, his Will, which being preſerv'd entire by (a) *Laertius*, we ſhall not need to have recourſe to thoſe Fragments of it, which lie diſperſedly in *Cicero*, and other Writers. It was in this Form.

(a) *Lib.* 10.

'Thus I bequeath: I give all my Eſtate to 'Amynomachus, Son of *Philocrates*, of *Batis*, (a 'Town of the *Ægean* Tribe, as (b) *Heſychius* 'deſcribes it) and to *Timocrates* Son of *Deme-* 'trius, a *Potamian*, (of *Potamus*, a Town be- 'longing to the *Leontian* Tribe, (c) *Phavorin.*) 'according to the donation which hath already 'been made, and is Recorded among the Deeds 'in the *Metroum*, (a Temple of the great God- 'deſs at *Athens*, ſeated upon the Haven, in 'which the Lawes, Judgments, and other Acts 'were preſerved, as *Athenæus*, *Suidas*, and 'others affirm) with this condition, that they 'beſtow the Garden, and all that belongs to it, 'on *Hermachus*, Son of *Agemarchus*, a *Mityle-* 'nean, and thoſe that ſhall ſtudy Philoſophy 'with him; and on thoſe whom *Hermachus* 'ſhall leave his Succeſſors in Philoſophy, and to 'thoſe who ſhall ſucceed us in the Profeſſion of 'Philoſophy, for ever. And that it may be 'preſerved with all poſſible care, I aſſign the 'School to *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates*, and to 'their Heirs, according to the ſureſt form of 'Law, that they may keep the Garden, and de- 'liver it to thoſe who ſhall profeſs Philoſophy 'after us. The Houſe which is at *Melite*, let 'Amynomachus and *Timocrates* deliver to *Herma-* 'chus, and to thoſe that ſtudy Philoſophy with 'him, to dwell in it as long as he ſhall live. Of 'the Revenues made over by us to *Amynomachus* 'and *Timocrates*, let them ſet apart as much as 'ſhall be ſufficient (adviſing with *Hermachus*,) 'to celebrate the Exequies of my Father, Mo- 'ther, and Brethren; and to keep, as they have 'done hitherto, my Birth-day, in the firſt De- 'cad of the month *Gamelion*; as alſo to provide 'a Feaſt for Entertainment of all thoſe who ſtu- 'dy Philoſophy with us, every month on the 'twentieth day of the Moon, in Commemora- 'tion of us, and of *Metrodorus*. Let them alſo 'keep a day in Memory of my Brethren in the 'month *Poſideon*, as we uſed to do; and another 'to *Polyænus*, in the month *Metagitnion*. Let 'Amynomachus and *Timocrates* take care of 'Epicurus, Son of *Metrodorus*, and of the Son of 'Polyænus; and let them ſtudy Philoſophy, and 'live with *Hermachus*. In like manner, let them 'take care of the Daughter of *Metrodorus*, and 'ſo ſoon as ſhe ſhall be marriageable, beſtow 'her upon him of the Students of Philoſophy, 'whom *Hermachus* ſhall chuſe, provided ſhe be 'modeſt, and obedient to *Hermachus*. Let *Amy-* 'nomachus and *Timocrates*, out of our Revenues, 'beſtow yearly ſo much as ſhall be ſufficient 'for their Maintenance, with the conſent of 'Hermachus. For let them ſo eſteem *Hermachus*, 'having an equal ſhare in our Revenues, and 'grown old in ſtudying Philoſophy under us, 'and left by us Guide of thoſe that ſtu- 'died Philoſophy under us, that all things 'be done by his advice. As for her Por- 'tion, when ſhe ſhall come to be Marriage- 'able, let *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates* take 'as much as they ſhall think convenient, with 'the conſent of *Hermachus*. Likewiſe, let them 'take the ſame care of *Nicanor* as we did, that 'all they, who, ſtudying Philoſophy with us, have 'communicated the uſe of their Eſtates, and 'expreſſing all Friendſhip have choſen to grow 'old with us in Philoſophy, want not any neceſſa- 'ries to the utmoſt of our Power. All my Books 'I bequeath to *Hermachus*; but if any thing of 'mortality happen to *Hermachus*, before the 'Children of *Metrodorus* arrive at full Age, let 'Amynomachus and *Timocrates* take care, that 'all neceſſaries be decently provided for them, 'as much as ſhall be neceſſary, out of the Reve- 'nues left by us. Let all the reſt be ordered as 'we have appointed, as much as is poſſible. I 'manumit of my Servants, *Mus*, *Licus*, *Lycon*; 'Phædria alſo I ſet free.

(b) *In Lex.*

(c) *In Lex.*

## CHAP. XII.

### *The Manner of his Death.*

AS concerning his laſt Sickneſs and Death, we muſt know that *Epicurus* was of a Conſtitution not very ſtrong. This is implied even by the Title of the Book, written by (a) *Metrodorus*, *Of the Infirmity* (or Unhealthfulneſs) of *Epicurus*. It is implied alſo by the envious exaggeration of (b) *Suidas*, that *Epicurus* could not endure to put on his Cloaths, nor to riſe out of Bed, nor to look upon the Sun, and the Fire, and the like. Theſe may at leaſt perſuade, that *Epicurus* was of a Complexion not ſtrong, and as in the whole courſe of his Life, he had not a conſtant health, ſo at laſt he died of a painful Diſeaſe, the Stone, whereof it is probable he had many Fits. (c) *Laertius*, out of *Hermachus*, in his Epiſtles, relates that he died of the Stone, ſtopping his Urine, having lain ſick 14 days.

(a) Laert. lib. 10.

(b) In Lex.

(c) Loc. cit.

It is memorable, that being near death, he writ that Epiſtle which *Laertius* mentions, as written to *Idomeneus*; (d) *Cicero*, to *Hermachus*; perhaps it was ſent to both, becauſe of the τὸ ὑμῶν: or to *Idomeneus*, rather than to *Hermachus*, becauſe the Children of *Metrodorus* were ſufficiently recommended to *Hermachus*, by his Will. Moreover, it is not likely that *Hermachus*, his next Succeſſor, was abſent at that time, eſpecially ſeeing he ſent a relation of *Epicurus*'s death in Letters; not to preſs, that he from his Youth was more addicted to Rhetorick, than Philoſophy, as appeareth from *Laertius*. The Epiſtle is this.

(d) De fin. lib. 2.

'Leading a moſt happy life, and withal dying, 'we writ this to you, ſeized by the Strangury and 'Dyſentery beyond expreſſion; but all theſe were 'counterpoized by the joy of mind, which I con-'ceived in remembring our Diſcourſes and In-'ventions. But thou, as becomes the good will 'which thou haſt had from thy Youth to me, and 'Philoſophy, take care of the Children of *Me-'trodorus*.

(e) Loc. cit.

(e) *Laertius* adds, (out of *Hermippus*) that *Epicurus* went into a Bath of warm water, called for Wine, drunk it off, and exhorting his Friends to be mindful of his Doctrine, whil'ſt he was diſcourſing, died. Upon which *Laertius* hath this Epigram:

*Farewel, and bear my Doctrine in your minds;*
*Sai'd dying* Epicurus *to his Friends:*
*Into a warm Bath going, Wine he quaft,*
*And then from* Pluto *took a colder draught.*

## CHAP. XIII.

### *The time of his Death.*

EPicurus died in the 2d year of the 127th Olympiad, *Pytharatus* being *Archon*. After Δάπεδον ἵστω, which (a) *Laertius* cites out of *Apollodorus*'s Chronology, *Caſaubon* rightly reads ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ εἰκοστῇ καὶ ἑκατοστῇ Ὀλυμπιάδι; for in the ordinary reading εἰκοστῇ being wanting, who could imagine that *Epicurus*, born in the 109th Olympiad, could die in the 107th. And indeed, the 72d year of *Epicurus*, in which he is ſaid to have died, falls upon the 127th Olympiad.

(a) Lib. 10.

The month and day of the year, in which *Epicurus* died, is told by (b) *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who ſaith, that *Antilochus*, from the time of *Pythagoras* to the death of *Epicurus*, reckoned 312 years, adding, that the death of *Epicurus* hapned on the 10th day of the month *Gamelion*. Where obſerve, if the time of *Pythagoras* be reckoned from the 60th Olympiad, in which *Laertius* ſaith, he flouriſhed; there will be found to be but 270 years from thence to the death of *Epicurus*, and conſequently the account of *Antilochus* will fall ſhort 42 years. Wherefore this ἡλικία muſt be taken from the birth of *Pythagoras*, who began to flouriſh in the 40th year of his age.

(b) Strom. lib. 1.

Now whereas *Apollodorus* ſaith, that *Epicurus* lived 72 years, which is confirmed alſo by (c) *Cicero*, ſaying, *It always was true, that* Epicurus *ſhall dye, having lived 72 years*; *Pytharatus* being *Archon*, (whence ſome conjecture, *Epicurus* died in his Climacterical year, which is commenſurated by 9.) the laſt, or 72d year, is not to be underſtood as compleat; for *Epicurus* had but newly entred into it, there being but three days over and above the 71 years; for he was born on the 7th. and dy'd on the 10th. of the month *Gamelion*, there being, between the time of his Birth, and his Death, 18 complete Olympiads, except one year. Wherefore, this is in the ſame manner, as when (d) *Pliny*, (e) *Lucian*, and (f) *Cenſorinus* affirm the *Sicilian* (or *Leontine*) *Gorgias* did live 108 years, whereas (g) *Cicero*, and (h) *Valerius Maximus* ſay, he compleated but 107. Here is obſervable, the compariſon which (i) *Plutarch* makes between *Epicurus*, and *Gorgias*; for after he had ſaid that *Alexis*, the Comick Poet, (Son of *Menander*, and Father of *Stephanus* the Comick Poet, as (k) *Suidas* relates) lived double the time of *Metrodorus*, that is 106 years, *Metrodorus* living according to (l) *Laertius*, 53. he adds, that *Gorgias* the Sophiſt outlived *Epicurus*; πλέον ἢ ὀγδοηκοντα, more than one third; for if we take the number 36, it will be the ſame which *Epicurus* lived double, *Gorgias* treble; and whereas *Plutarch* ſays *more*, perhaps he reflected upon the Opinion which (m) *Quintilian* and (n) *Suidas* afterwards followed, that *Gorgias* lived 109 years.

(c) De fato.

(d) Lib. 7. cap. 48.

(e) In Macrob.

(f) De die nat.

(g) In Cat. Majore.

(h) Lib. 8 cap. 13.

(i) De orat. def.

(k) In Lex.

(l) Lib. 10.

(m) Lib. 3. cap. 1.

(n) In Lex.

I ſee not, why the (o) Interpreter of *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſhould render Gamelion *October*; for though there be ſome Controverſie about the order of the *Greek* months, yet ſhall we not find any but make *Gamelion* the 6th, 7th, or 8th, from *Hecatombæon*; which ſeeing it cannot begin higher than *June*, certainly *Gamelion* will be far diſtant from *October*. But ſince by many Arguments it is evinced, that *Gamelion* is the 7th from *Hecatombæon*, it ought rather to be reduced to *January*. Now becauſe the 2d year of the 127th Olympiad began in Summer, in the 4443d year of the *Julian* period, the *Gamelion* of that year muſt fall upon *January*,

(o) Hervetus.

ary, in the beginning of the 4444th. year of the *Julian* Period. Upon what day of *January*, the 10th of *Gamelion* might fall, it is not easie to determine. But if we may make *Gamelion* commence (as is done in the time of the Nativity,) from the 14th Moon, or from the 7th Full Moon after the Summer Solstice, forasmuch as the new Moon hapned upon the 30th of *December*, and consequently the 14th Moon upon the 12th of *January*; Hereupon if we make that the 1st of *Gamelion*, the 10th will fall upon the 21st of *January*, upon which the death of *Epicurus* might fall. Where we must further observe, That whereas *Epicurus* is said to have lived 72 years, it must be understood of the *Grecian* years, not *Julian*, for so it would fall short two Days, it being already proved, he was Born the 23d of *January*. Now, to reduce the Death of *Epicurus* to our Account, is easie: For if we substract Ten Days, and for the Cycle of the Sun that Year which is 20. And, for the Dominical Letter D. according to the Old Style, put G. according to our own, it will appear that *Epicurus* died the 31st of *January*, it being the 4th day of the week, or Wednesday, before the computation of Christ, 270 Years.

## CHAP. XIV.

*How dear his Memory was to his Followers.*

IT remains, that we briefly tell how the Memory of *Epicurus*, after his death, was respected by his Followers. For, to omit, that his Country honoured him with brazen Statues, as (*a*) *Laertius* writes; I observe, that the Set-days and Ceremonies appointed in his Will, were punctually kept by his Followers. (*b*) *Pliny*, (writing 350 years after upon this thing) *On his Birth-day*, saith he, *the twentieth Moon, they Sacrifice, and keep Feasts every Month, which they call Icades*; whence it may be conceived, that the *Epicureans* were by Greek Writers, as (*c*) *Athenæus*, termed ἰκαδίζοντες, from observing ἰκάδας as *Rhodiginus* also takes notice. Although (*d*) some there are who think, they were called *Icadistæ*, from ἴκων an Image, because there was not one of them, but had the Picture of *Epicurus*. And of these Images, (*) *Pliny* also thus; *They keep* (saith he) *the Countenance of* Epicurus *in their Chambers, and carry it up and down with them*; And (*e*) *Cicero*, in the Person of *Atticus*, "Neither, *saith he*, can we forget *Epicurus* of "any Man; whose representation we have not "only in Pictures, but in Cups, and Rings also. (*f*) There are who add, that "some took great "care to have Pictures of *Epicurus*, not only in "Rings, but in Cups, as conceiving it a fortunate "Omen, to the Nation, and their own Name. As for the affection which they bare to him, hear *Parro, Honour*, saith (*g*) *Cicero*, "Office, Right "of Wills, the Authority of *Epicurus*, the Attestation of *Phædrus*, the Seat, House, Foot-"steps of excellent Persons, he saith, that he "must preserve; *but especially* (*b*) Torquatus, "Owe we not much to him, *saith he*, who, as if "he had heard the voice of Nature her self, did "so firmly and soundly comprehend her, as that "he brought all ingenious Persons into the way "of a peaceful, calm, quiet, happy Life? And (*i*) again, "Who, saith he, I think only saw "Truth, and freed the Minds of Men from the "greatest Errors, and delivered all things ap-"pertaining to well and happy living.

(a) Lib. 10.
(b) Lib. 35. Cap. 2.
(c) Lib. 7.
(d) Rivier.
(*) Loc. Citat.
(e) De fin. 1.
(f) *Alex.* ab *Alex.* 2. 19.
(g) Epist. 15. 1.
(h) De fin. 1.
(i) Ibid.

And because *Epicurus* dying, advised his friends to be mindful of his Doctrines, (*k*) *Cicero* saith, that all of them got by heart his *Maxims*, and some there were who learned without Book all his Doctrines, as particularly *Scyro*, mentioned in his Academicks. But let it suffice, to alledge some few Verses of (*l*) *Lucretius*, by which we may perceive how affectionate they were to the Memory and Doctrines of their Master. He begins his Third Book, thus.

(k) De fin. 2.
(l) Lib. 4.

*Who first from Darkness could'st a Light so clear*
*Strike forth, and make Life's Benefits appear,*
*Great Ornament of* Græcia, *I am lead*
*By thee, and in thy Sacred Foot-steps tread:*
*Not to contend, but kindly imitate.*
*For how can chatt'ring Swallows emulate*
*The Swan? Or tender Kids keep equal pace (race?*
*With the stout well-breath'd Steed's impetuous*
*From thee, O Father, every thing receives*
*Invention, thou giv'st Precepts, from thy Leaves,*
*As Bees skip up and down and sweetly suck*
*In flow'ry Groves, we Golden Sayings pluck:*
*Golden, deserving an Eternal Life.*

And again;

*By these a Pleasure I receiv'd from Thee*
*Divine; withal, a Reverence, to see*
*That Nature every way thou hadst unvail'd.*

And afterwards,

*Great* Epicurus *died, his Lives race run,*
*Whose Wit Mankind exceeded, as the Sun*
*Eclipseth by his Rising all the Stars.*

## CHAP. XV.

*With what Constancy and Unanimity, the Succession of his School flourished.*

IT deserves to be taken notice of, not only that the succession of his School was constant, but that his Successors and Followers did always so agree, as was indeed wonderful. As concerning the Constancy, it is known that the Presidents of the Gardens, or Masters of the School, from the death of *Epicurus*, to the times of *Julius Cæsar*, and *Augustus*, succeeding one another in a continued Series, were, according to (*a*) *Suidas*, XIV. and that for 237 years: In which later times, How many *Epicureans* there were, eminent Persons, and of great account in the State, appears from *Cicero*. (*b*) *Lucian* also writes, that in his time there was a stipend allowed to the *Epicureans*, by the Emperor, no less than to other Philosophers; adding, that when any one of them died, he, whom they most approved of, was substituted in his room. (*c*) *Laertius* who lived after *Lucian*, declares, that whereas the Successions of the other Philosophers did almost quite fail; yet the Succession of *Epicurus* did constantly persevere, so many succeeding one another in government of the Disciples, as could not be reckoned up. *Numenius* (cited by (*d*) *Eusebius*) adds, that this Succession lasted till his time, and that so perfectly, as it was likely to endure a great while after. After these (*e*) *Lactantius*; *The Discipline of* Epicurus, saith he, *was much more celebrious.* In a word, as long as Learning flourished in *Greece*, and *Rome* was preserved from the *Barbarians*, the School and Discipline of *Epicurus* continued eminent.

(a) In Epic.
(b) In Eun.
(c) Lib. 10.
(d) Præp. Lib. 14.
(e) Lib. 3. Cap. 17.

As

As for their unanimity, to omit that of *Cicero*, "*I will maintain the* Epicureans *who are so many, my Friends, Men that are so loving to one another*, and the like places; and shall rather observe, that whereas other Sects almost at their very beginning were distracted with intestine dissentions; the *Epicureans* was far from suffering any such thing. For (*g*) *Themistius* writes, that *the Opinions of* Epicurus *were kept by all the Epicureans, as Laws of* Solon *or* Lycurgus. And, as if they had all one Soul amongst them, saith (*h*) Seneca, *Whatsoever* Hermachus *affirm'd, whatsoever* Menodorus, *is referr'd to one. All things that any Man delivers in that Society, go under one Man's name.* This will appear more plainly, if we alledge the words of *Numenius*, the *Pythagorean*, in (*i*) *Eusebius*; who after he hath complain'd, that the Successors of *Plato* did not preserve that Unanimity, for which the *Pythagoreans* were esteemed, adds, "After this manner the *Epicureans* being instituted (though unworthy,) seeming not in any thing to dissent from *Epicurus*, and professing to have the same Tenents with their wise Master, have not unjustly attained their scope. Hence it hath hapned to the *Epicureans* for a long time, that they never, in any thing worth notice, contradicted either one another, or *Epicurus*. Amongst them it is an Offence, or rather Impiety, and Sin, to bring in any Innovation; wherefore none dares attempt it. Hence, by reason of their constant agreement among themselves, they enjoy their Doctrines peaceably and quietly; and this Institution of *Epicurus* resembles the true state of a perfect Common-wealth, which being far from Sedition, is governed by one Joynt Mind and Opinion. For which reason, there have not, nor are not, nor, in likelyhood, will be wanting, those, that shall willingly follow it, but amongst the Stoical Faction, *&c.* One would think there were nothing wanting to this Testimony, but, to say of all the *Epicureans*, as (*k*) *Valerius* (before cited) did of two of them, that "Such a Society might be thought to have been begotten, "nourish'd, and terminated in the bosom of Celestial Concord.

(*g*) Orat. 4.
(*h*) Epist. 35.
(*i*) Præp. lib. 14.
(*k*) Lib. 1. cap. 8.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *The Successors and Followers of* Epicurus.

IT remains, that we give a Catalogue of those who were eminent in that Sect, after the death of *Epicurus*. We have already said, that *Hermachus* succeeded *Epicurus*, and *Polystratus Hermachus*. It also is manifest from *Laertius*, that *Dionysius* succeeded *Polystratus*; and *Basilides*, *Dionysius*. But who those ten Successors were from *Basilides*, to him who govern'd the School in the time of *Augustus*, we cannot easily say. Perhaps after *Basilides*, succeeded *Protarchus Bargyleites*, whom (*a*) *Strabo* terms an Illustrious Person. The same *Strabo* saith, That Disciple to *Protarchus* was *Demetrius*, surnamed *Lacon*, who is mentioned also by (*b*) *Laertius*, and was, as (*c*) *Sextus Empiricus* saith, eminent amongst the Followers of *Epicurus*. Perhaps after him succeeded *Diogenes* of *Tarsus*, Author of the *Select Schools*, whereof *Laertius* mentions XX Books. He also cites an Epitome of Moral Doctrine, written by the same Person. *Laertius* mentions also (but whether they belong to this Series of Successors, is uncertain,) Two *Ptolomies* of *Alexandria*; whether from differences of Complexion, or some other Respect, one Sirnamed Black, the other White. He mentions also *Orion*, and seems to mention one *Democritus*, who, in his *Timocrates*, takes notice of Pleasure after *Epicurus*'s Doctrine.

(*a*) Lib. 14.
(*b*) Lib. 10.
(*c*) Adv. Log. 2.

There follow Two out of the rank, named by (*d*) *Athenæus*; The First, *Diogenes* of *Seleucia* near *Babylon*, whom he describes to have been Eloquent, but of an ill Life; The other, *Lysias*, who, as he saith, Governed at *Tarsus*, and being chosen by the Country, *Stephanophorus* (Priest of *Hercules*) he enjoy'd the Supream Government, and wore Regal Ornaments. This is he, who distributed the Estates of the Rich amongst the Poor, and put many of them to death for refusing to part with them. At what time he lived, we cannot certainly determine; But *Diogenes* being contemporary with *Alexander* King of *Syria*, and *Antiochus* his Successor, may be referred to the 155th Olympiad.

(*d*) Deipn. 3.

About the same time seemeth to have flourished *Eucratidas*, to whom belongs this Inscription, recited by *Janus Gruterus*; *At* Brundusium, *before the Gate of* Diomedes Athenæus, *a Physician, on the Basis*; EUCRATIDAS *Son* OF PISIDAMUS, A RHODIAN, AN EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHER. THIS PLACE APPOINTED FOR BURIAL BY THE SENATE OF BRUNDUSIUM.

Not long after seems to have flourished in the School that *Apollodorus*, whom *Laertius* termeth *eminent*, κατ' ἐξοχὴν, for that (as I conceive) he bore such sway in the Garden, as *Demosthenes* is said to have done in Courts of Judicature. He wrote above 300 Books, amongst which were some concerning the Life of *Epicurus*, cited by *Laertius*. It may be conjectured, that he was the same, whose Chronology is cited by *Laertius*, and others.

Auditor of *Apollodorus* was *Zeno* the *Sidonian*, according to (*e*) *Laertius*, who adds, that he wrote much, and that he was famous both for Philosophy and Rhetorick; whence I conjecture, it is the same *Zeno*, of whom (*f*) *Cicero* saith, He spoke Distinctly, Gravely, and Neatly; and that he was Chief of the *Epicureans*; unless both He and *Apollodorus* lived earlier: which if it were so, this other belongs to the Times of the Emperors, for (*g*) *Cicero* heard him, and writing concerning him to (*h*) *Atticus*; *Zeno*, saith He, *I love as well as thou dost.*

(*e*) Lib. 7.
(*f*) De Nat. deor. 1.
(*g*) Ibid.
(*h*) Epist. 5. 11.

## CHAP. XVII.

### Laertius, *his Vindication of* Epicurus.

DIotymus the Stoick, much maligning *Epicurus*, traduced him exceedingly, producing Fifty Epistles, very lasciviously, as written by *Epicurus*; to which he added, as *Epicurus*'s also, the short Epistles, commonly ascribed to *Chrysippus*. No less disaffected to him were *Posidonius* the Stoick, and *Nicolaus*, and *Sotion*, in the 12th of his Dioclean Confutations, (which are in all XXIV.) and *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*. For they say, he went from House to House with his Mother reading expiatory Prayers; and that

'that with his Father he taught Children for a 'ſmall ſtipend; that one of his Brothers was a 'Pander; that he himſelf uſed the company of 'Leontium, a Curtezan; that he aſcribed to him-'ſelf the Books of *Democritus* concerning Atoms, 'and of *Ariſtippus* concerning Pleaſure; that he 'was not a true Native of the City, as *Timo-'crates* acknowledgeth, and *Herodotus*, in his Book 'of the Youth of *Epicurus*; That he baſely flat-'tered *Mithres* Steward of *Lyſimachus*, calling 'him in his Epiſtles, *Apollo* and *King*; That *Ido-'meneus*, *Herodotus*, and *Timocrates*, who pub-'liſhed ſome obſcure Pieces of his, did commend 'and flatter him for the ſame: That in his Epi-'ſtles, he writes to *Leontium*, thus; O King '*Apollo*, my dear little *Leontium*; How were we 'tranſported and filled with Joy at the reading 'of thy Letter! To *Themiſta* Wife of *Leontius*, 'thus; If you come not to me, I ſhall roll to you 'whitherſoever you call me. And to *Pithocles*, 'a handſom Youth; I conſume in expectation 'of your Amiable and Divine company. And 'again, writing to *Themiſta*, he thinks to per-'ſuade her: As *Theodorus* affirms, in his Fourth 'Book againſt *Epicurus*. That he wrote to ma-'ny other Curtezans, eſpecially to *Leontium*, 'with whom *Metrodorus* alſo was in love. That 'in his Book concerning the *End*, he writes thus, 'Neither know I what is this Good, If we take 'away the pleaſures of the Taſte; If we take 'away thoſe of Coition; If we take away thoſe 'of Hearing; If we take away thoſe of the Sight. 'That in his Epiſtle to *Pithocles* he writes; Hap-'py Youth, fly as faſt as thou canſt from all Di-'ſcipline. *Epicurus* calls him, *Cinædologum*, and 'rails at him exceedingly. *Timocrates*, Brother 'of *Metrodorus*, who was a while a Diſciple of *Epi-'curus*, but at laſt forſook the School, ſaith; 'That he vomited twice a day, upon overchargh-'ing his Stomach; and that he himſelf had much 'ado to get away from their Nocturnal Philoſo-'phy, and Converſation in ſecret. That *Epi-'curus* was ignorant of many things belonging 'to Diſcourſe, but much more of thoſe which 'belonged to Life. That he was of ſuch a miſe-'rable Conſtitution, that he was not able of him-'ſelf for many years, to get out of Bed, or riſe 'out of the Chair in which he was carried. That 'he ſpent every day a Mina at his Table, as he 'himſelf writeth in his Epiſtle to *Leontium*, and 'in his Epiſtles to the Philoſophers at *Mitylene*. 'That he and *Metrodorus* alſo uſed the company of 'Curtezans; amongſt others, *Marmarium*, *Hedia*, '*Erotium*, *Nicidium*. That in the Thirty Books 'which he writ concerning Nature, he ſaith moſt 'of the ſame things over and over; and that in 'them he writes againſt many Perſons, and, 'amongſt the reſt, againſt *Nauſiphanes*, and that 'in theſe very words; But this Man, if ever any, 'had a way of teeming a Sophiſtick brag, like ma-'ny other Slaves. And that in his Epiſtles, he 'writes thus concerning *Nauſiphanes*; This ſo 'far tranſported him, that he railed at me, and 'called himſelf my Maſter. Likewiſe, that he 'called himſelf *Nauſiphanes*, Lungs (as ſenſleſs,) 'and unlearned, and deceitful, and laſcivious. 'The Diſciples of *Plato*, *Dionyſius*'s Paraſites; '*Plato* himſelf, Golden; *Ariſtotle*, a Prodigal, 'that, having waſted his Patrimony, was fain to 'turn Soldier, and Apothecary; *Protagoras*, a 'Basket-carrier, an *Amanuenſis* to *Democritus*, and 'a High-way Schoolmaſter; *Heraclitus*, κυκήτλω, 'a cauſer of Confuſion; *Democritus*, Ληρόμετρον, 'Purblind; *Antidorus*, Ζωιλόμηρος, a fawner up-'on Gifts; the *Cyrenaicks*, Enemies to *Greece*; 'the *Dialecticks*, Envious; *Pyrrho*, Unlearned 'and Unmanner'd.

But theſe Men are mad; for, of the excellent Candor of *Epicurus* towards all Men, there are 'many witneſſes; his Country, which honoured 'him with Statues of Braſs; his Friends, who 'were ſo many, that whole Cities could not con-'tain them; his Diſciples, who were alſo taken 'with his Sirenical Doctrine, except *Metrodorus* 'the *Stratonicean*, who, perhaps over-burdened 'with his exceſſive Goodneſs, revolted to *Car-'neades*; the Succeſſion of his School, which, 'when all the reſt were almoſt quite worn out, 'remained conſtant, and ordained ſo many Ma-'ſters one after another, as cannot be numbred; 'his Piety towards his Parents, his Kindneſs to-'wards his Brethren, his Meekneſs towards his 'Servants, (as may appear by his Will, and their 'ſtudying Philoſophy with him, amongſt whom, '*Mus* formerly mentioned was moſt eminent;) 'and, in general, His Humanity towards all, His 'Devotion to the Gods, and Love to his Coun-'try, was beyond expreſſion. He would not ex-'cept of any publick Office, out of an exceſſive 'Modeſty; and, in the moſt difficult trouble-'ſom times, continued in *Greece*, where he lived 'conſtantly; except that twice or thrice he made 'a Journey to his Friends on the borders of *Ionia*. 'But to him they reſorted from all parts, and 'lived with him (as *Apollodorus* relates) in the 'Garden which he purchaſed with 80 Minæ. '*Diocles* in his Third Book, *De Incurſione*, ſaith, 'They uſed a moſt frugal ſpare Dyet, for they 'were contented with a pint of ſmall Wine, and 'for the moſt part they drunk nothing but Wa-'ter. And that *Epicurus* would not have them 'to put their Eſtates into one common ſtock, as '*Pythagoras* ordained, ſaying, The Goods of 'Friends are common; for this argued diſtruſt, 'and where there is diſtruſt, there is no friend-'ſhip. As for himſelf in his Epiſtles, that he 'was contented with Water only, and courſe 'Bread; And ſend me, ſaith he, a little Cythe-'ridian Cheeſe, that I may Feaſt my ſelf when I 'have a mind. Such was he, who profeſſed, that 'Pleaſure is the End, or chief Good; for which, '*Athenæus* in an Epigram, thus commends him:

*Man's moſt unhappy Race for worſt things toils,*
*For Wealth (unſatiate) raiſeth Wars and Broils.*
*Nature to Wealth a narrow bound aſſign'd,*
*But vain Opinions ways unbounded find.*
*Thus* Neoclides; *whom the Sacred Quire*
*Of Muſes, or* Apollo *did inſpire.*

*But this we ſhall underſtand better from his own Doctrine and Words.* Hitherto *Laertius* in vindication of *Epicurus*; which Subject is more fully and Rhetorically handled by the Learned *Gaſſendus*, *De Vita & Moribus Epicuri*, in the ſix laſt Books.

THE

# THE DOCTRINE OF EPICURUS.

## *Of PHILOSOPHY in General.*

PHiloſophy (*a*) (or the love of Wiſdom,) "is an exerciſing of the Reaſon; by "which, in Meditating and Diſcourſing, 'it acquireth happy Life, and enjoyeth it. *For* '(*b*) Philoſophy hath this propriety above other 'Arts, that its end is the end alſo of Reaſon 'which ſo tends to it, that it may reſt in the en-'joyment of it.

(*a*) Sext. Emp. adv. Eth.

(*b*) Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 1.

Now happy Life conſiſting in the tranquillity of the Mind, and indolency of the Body, but eſpecially in the former, (in regard, the Goods of the Mind are better than thoſe of the Body, and the Ills thereof worſe;) it comes to paſs, that Philoſophy is chiefly the Medicine of the Mind, in regard it both makes and preſerves it ſound, its Soundeſs or Health being nothing elſe but its tranquillity.

*Hence it followeth*, (*c*) *That* "neither ought a 'young Man to delay Philoſophizing, nor an old 'Man to be wearied therewith; for, to rectifie 'and cure his Mind, no Man is too young; and 'he who pretends, that the time of Philoſophi-'zing either is not yet, or is paſt, doth, as he 'who ſaith, the time to live well and happily 'either is not yet come, or is quite gone.

(*c*) Laert.

'Both young and old therefore muſt Philoſo-'phize; the one, that whilſt he is growing old, 'he may perſevere to advance himſelf in good 'things to continue the excellence of his former 'actions; the other, that, though aged in years, 'he may yet be youthful in Mind, remaining ſe-'cure from future eminent harms.

For it is Philoſophy alone, which breeds in its Followers an aſſuredneſs and an immunity from all vain fears; whence we ought to devote ourſelves to it, that we may be truly free.

Happy they, who are of ſuch a diſpoſition of Body or Mind, or Born in ſuch a Country, as they can either of themſelves, or by the inſtigations of others, addict themſelves to Philoſophy, and perſue Truth; by attainment whereof, a Man is made truly free or wiſe, and abſolute Maſter of himſelf.

They who apply their Minds hereto, are of three ſorts; Some addreſs themſelves to enquire after Truth, without the aſſiſtence of any; ſome require help, and would not go, if none had gone before, but follow well; ſome may be compelled to the Right, who need not ſo much a Leader, as an Aſſiſtent, and, as I may call it, a Driver.

The Firſt are moſt to be commended; yet the ingenuity of the Second is excellent likewiſe; and the Third not to be contemned. Of the Second was *Metrodorus*; Of the Third *Hermachus*. As I highly praiſe the fortune of the former, ſo I no leſs admire and value the later; but although both of them arriv'd at the ſame end, yet he deſerv'd the greater praiſe, who, their performances being equal, broke through the greater difficulties.

Now whereas to a Philoſopher nothing ought to be more valuable than Truth, let him proceed to it in a direct way, (*d*) and neither feign any thing, nor admit any thing that is feign'd by another, for no kind of Fiction beſeemeth Profeſſors of Truth. Neither is that perpetual Irony of (*e*) *Socrates* to be approved, whereby he extolled to the Skies *Protagoras*, *Hippias*, *Prodicus*, *Gorgias*, and the reſt, but pretended himſelf rude and ignorant of all things.

(*d*) *Laert.*

(*e*) Cic. in Brut.

(*f*) How much leſs was it becoming a (*g*) Philoſopher to have feign'd that Fable concerning *Erus Armenius*: For why (if he had an intent to teach us the knowledge of Celeſtial things, and the diſpoſition of Souls,) did he not perform this by naked plain inſtruction, but rather choſe to introduce a Perſon; by which carriage the newneſs of the Invention, and the formal Scene of a Fiction, repreſented on the Stage, contaminated the very way of ſeeking Truth with a Falſhood?

(*f*) Macro. in Somn. lib. 1. Cap. 2.

(*g*) Viz. *Plato*, in Rep. Sib. 10.

For this reaſon (*h*) a Wiſe Man will neither hearken to the Fables of Poets, nor will himſelf labour in compoſing fabulous Poems; nay rather, (*i*) he will have an averſion from the juggling tricks and ſophiſtications of Orators: And as he exacts no more from Grammar than Congruity, ſo neither will he exact more from Rhetorick than Perſpicuity of Speech, but will uſe a plain familiar Style; whether he profeſs to Teach or Write Books, or explicate to the multitude any thing already written, he will be wary that he do it not Panegerycally and Hyperbolically.

(*h*) *Tacit.*

(*i*) *Laert.*

But ſeeing that of Philoſophers there are ſome, who aſſert nothing of Truth, but doubt of all things; others, who imagine they know all things,

and assert without any distinction: A wise Man ought not to behave himself so, as that he assert not all, but (k) only maintain some positive Maxims which are indisputable.

(k) Laert.

For when there are divers ways whereby some things may be performed, as the Eclipses of the Stars, their Rising, Setting, and other Superior things, so to approve one way as to disapprove the rest, is certainly ridiculous. But when we speak of things that cannot be any way but one, (such as are these Maxims) *Of nothing is made nothing*; *the Universe consists of Body and Vacuum*; *The Principles of things are indivisible*, and the like; then is it very absurd not to adhere firmly to them.

Hence, it is proper for a Wise Man to maintain both the manifold ways in those, and the one single way in these, and not to stagger nor recede from Science once obtained; not like those, who, as if prescribed by a Law, Philosophize concerning Nature, not in such manner as the things themselves require; but go out of the right way and run into Fables; never considering that to vent, or vainly boast our own Opinions, conduceth nothing to happy Life, but disturbeth the Mind.

(l) Senec. Epist.

Now whereas, (l) the principal parts of Philosophy are held to be Two; One *Physick*, consisting in contemplation of Nature; the other *Ethick*, which treats of directing of Manners in order to Happy Life, it is manifest, either that *Ethick* comprehends all Philosophy, or that *Physick* comes to be a part therefore; only inasmuch as it conduceth to Happy Life.

(m) Laert.

'For (m) if those things which we suspect 'and dread from the Superior Bodies, and even 'from death it self, breed no disturbance in us, 'as things unconcerning our condition; if also 'we could sufficiently comprehend what are the 'just bounds of our Desires, and to what degree 'the Grief which springs from them is to be as-'swaged, there were no need of Physiology, or 'the explication of Nature.

But because (n) it is not possible we should arrive at so great a Good, without having first surveyed the nature of things; but, (o) as Children in the dark tremble, and are afraid of every thing; so we miserably groping in the darkness of Ignorance, fear things that are fabulous, and no more to be dreaded than those which Children fear in the dark, and fancy to themselves will happen. It is therefore necessary, that this terror and darkness of the Mind be dispelled, not by the beams of the Sun, but by impressions from Nature and Reason, that is by Physiology. Whence all Physick is to be esteemed a part of Philosophy.

(n) Laert.

(o) Lucr. Lib. 2. v. 53.

*Dialectick*, which some add as a third Part, is to be rejected, because as ordinarily taught it doth nothing but beget thorny Questions, being an empty bubbling and Forge of Cavils. Moreover, because it is superfluous to that end which they propose, that is, to the Perception and Dijudication of the Reasons of Naturalists: For there needs no more thereto, than, like the natural Philosophers themselves, to use terms ordinary and perspicuous.

If, besides this, there may seem any thing of use, it can be nothing but a collection of some few *Canons* or *Rules both concerning terms*, and the Criteries whereby we use to dijudicate.

Thus may this short Canonick, or Treatise of Rules, serve instead of a laborious and prolix Dialectick, and be reputed either a distinct part of Philosophy (though least considerable,) *Or*, (p) *an addition to Physick*, by way of Introduction.

(p) Senec. Ep. 89.

THE

# The First Part OF PHILOSOPHY.

## *CANONICK of the CRITERIES.*

FOrasmuch as (*a*) every question in Philosophy is either of the Thing or of the Word, to Solution whereof many Canons may be given; hence the First part of Philosophy which compriseth them, may be termed *Canonick*.

But because, of the Word, nothing more is sought than the Use or *Signification*; but of the Thing, the Truth, which is of an abstruse Nature; therefore we will, in the Second place, comprehend in a few Canons all that belongs to the use of the Words: But in the first place lay down those of Truth, and its Criteries (which in number exceed the other,) premising some few Notes concerning them.

### CHAP. I.

#### *Of Truth and its Criteries.*

FIrst then Truth is Twofold, one of *Existence*, the other of *Enunciation* or Judgment.

Truth of *Existence* is that, whereby every thing which exists in the nature of things, is that very thing which it is, and no other. Whence it comes to pass, that there is no Falsity opposite to this Truth (for *Orichalcum*, for example, is not false Gold, but true *Orichalcum*,) and therefore *it is all one, whether we say a thing is Existent, or True.*

Truth of *Enuntiation*, or Judgment, is nothing else but a conformity of an Enunciation pronounced by the Mouth, or of a Judgment made in the Mind, with the thing Enunciated or Judged.

This is that Truth to which Falshood is opposite; for as (*b*) *it is true that the thing is so as it is said to be*, so *is it false that it is not so as it is said to be.*

As for that which they call a future Contingent, (*c*) *those Disjunctions which are made of Contraries* (or rather those Complexions which are made by disjunctive Particles,) *are true*; as if we should say, (*d*) Either *Hermachus* will live to Morrow, or will not live; but (*e*) *neither of the parts in this disjunctive Proposition, taken singly, is true*: for neither is there any necessity in Nature, that *Hermachus* shall live to Morrow; nor, on the contrary, that he shall not live.

Moreover, because as the thing, whose Truth is sought, belongs either to Speculation only, or to Action, (the first of which appertains to Physick, the later to Ethick;) we must for this reason have a Criterie, or instrument of Judging, whereby it may be examined, judged, and discerned, in order to both these.

But forasmuch as natural things affect the *Sense* or *Intellect*, and moral things the *Appetite* or *Will*; For this reason, Criteries are to be taken from both these.

From the *Sense*, nothing can be taken more than its Function, Sensation, which likewise is called Sense.

From the *Intellect*, forasmuch as besides the Function which it hath, whil'st like the Sense it contemplateth the thing, as if it were present and apparent, (whence the perception of a thing appearing, which appeareth to be as well to the Intellect, as to the Sense, is called a Phantasie, or Appearance;) forasmuch, I say, as besides this Function, it is proper to the Intellect to ratiocinate or discourse; there is therefore required a Prænotion or Anticipation, by looking upon which, something may be inferred.

Lastly, From the *Will* or *Appetite*, whose Property it is to persue or shun something, nothing else can be taken, but the Affection or Passion itself; and that either *Allective*, as Pleasure; or *Aversive*, as Pain or Grief.

(*f*) There are therefore in all three Criteries; Sense, or Sensation; Prænotion, or Anticipation; and Affection, or Passion. Concerning each of these, some Canons are to be prescribed.

(*f*) *Laert. Cic. Acad.* 4.

### CHAP. II.

#### (*a*) *Canons of Sense, the First Critery.*

TO begin with the Canons which concern Sense; of these there may be laid down Four.

#### CANON I.

(*b*) *Sense is never deceived; and therefore every Sensation, and every Perception, of an Appearance is true.*

This is proved, First, because (*c*) 'All Sense 'is void of Ratiocination, and wholly incapable 'of Reminiscence. For neither being moved by 'itself, nor by any other, is it able to add or 'detract any thing; or to joyn or disjoyn by 'enunciating or concluding, so as thereby it 'might think any thing, and be mistaken in that 'Thought. The Intellect indeed can do this, but

(*a*) *Quales* Epicurus *videtur posse instituisse*; collected by *Gassendus, ne Canonica censeatur id nomen haud jure adepta.* pa. 157.

(*b*) From *Lertius* and *Plutarch adv. Col.*

(*c*) *Laert.*

but the Senſe cannot, (*d*) *whoſe property it is onely, to apprehend that which is preſent, and moveth it; as the ſight, colour preſented to it: but not to diſcern, that what is here preſented is one thing; what there, another.* Now where there is a bare apprehenſion, not pronouncing any thing, there is no error or falſhood.

(d) Sext. Emp.

(e) Laert. Next, becauſe (*e*) 'there is nothing that can 'refel or convince the Senſes of Falſhood, (for 'neither can Senſe of a like kind refel 'Senſe of a like kind; as, the ſight of the 'Right Eye the ſight of the Left, or the ſight of *Plato* the ſight of *Socrates*; and this, 'by reaſon of the equality of their credits) or 'that there is the ſame reaſon for both. For a pur-blind man doth not leſs ſee that which he ſees, than *Lynceus* ſeeth that which he ſeeth. 'Neither can that which is of an unlike kind 'refel that which is of an unlike kind, as the Sight the Hearing, and the Taſte the Smelling; 'becauſe they have different objects, and ſerve 'not to give judgment of the ſame things. Nei-'ther can one ſenſation of the ſame Senſe refel 'another, becauſe there is not any ſenſation 'wherewith we are not affected; and to which, 'whil'ſt we are affected with it, we do not ad-'here, and aſſent: as whil'ſt we ſee a Staff one while ſtrait, out of the water; another time, part under water, crooked, for we cannot by any means ſee it crooked in the former condition, or ſtrait in the later. Laſtly, 'neither 'can Reaſon or Ratiocination refel the Senſes; 'becauſe all Ratiocination depends upon pre-'vious Senſes, and it is neceſſary the Senſes firſt 'be true, before the reaſon which is founded on them can be true.

This is confirmed; foraſmuch as Senſe is the firſt of the Criteries, to which we may appeal from the reſt, but itſelf is ſelf-evident, and of manifeſt truth. For (*f*) if you ſay every Senſe is deceived, you will want a Criterie to determine and make good even that very ſaying upon any particular Senſe; or, (*g*) if ſome one onely, you will entangle yourſelf in an intricate Diſpute, when you ſhall be demanded, Which Senſe, how, and when it is deceived, or not deceived? So as the Controverſie not being determinable, you muſt neceſſarily be deprived of all Criterie. Whence may be inferred, that, if any appearance to Senſe be falſe, nothing can be perceived, or, (to expreſs it in other terms) unleſs all appearances and bare perceptions of a thing be true, there were no credit, conſtancy, and judgment of truth. For, (*h*) 'they who 'alledge the contradiction of appearances one 'with another, can never prove even this con-'tradiction of them, or, that ſome are true, 'others falſe; they cannot prove it by any 'thing that is apparent, for the Queſtion is of 'things apparent; nor by any thing unapparent, 'for that which is unapparent is to be demon-'ſtrated by ſomthing elſe that is apparent.

(f) Laert.

(g) Lacrt.

(h) Sext. adv. Log. 2.

Again, this is confirmed; becauſe, taking away the certainty of the Senſes, and by that means the genuine knowledge of things, we take away all rule of Life and Action. (*i*) For as in a Building, if the firſt Rule be amiſs, the Square untrue, the Plummet faulty, all things muſt neceſſarily be defective, and awry, and diſproportioned; ſo muſt all things in life be prepoſterous, and full of trouble and confuſion, if that which is to be eſteemed, as it were, the firſt Rule, Square, and Plummet, for the diſcerning things good and bad, done or not to be done, be unſincere or perverſe, that is, if it want the certainty which is, as it were, its rectitude. Whence it cometh to paſs, that though Reaſon (for example,) cannot explain the cauſe why things near at hand are ſquare, but ſeem round afar off; yet is it better to heſitate and alledge ſome wrong cauſe, rather than to overthrow the firſt faith and foundations whereon the conſtancy and ſecurity of life is ſo grounded, that unleſs you dare credit Senſe, you will not have any way to ſhun precipitation and deſtruction.

(i) Lucret. lib. 4.

Thirdly, (*k*) 'Becauſe the truth of the Sen-'ſes is manifeſt even from this, in that their 'functions exiſt in nature, or really and truly 'are. For that we ſee and hear, is as truly ſom-'thing indeed exiſting, as our very feeling pain; 'and there is no difference (as even now we 'ſaid,) between ſaying, a thing is exiſtent, and 'true.

(k) Laert.

To ſpeak more fully, (*l*) 'As the firſt Af-'fections, Pleaſure and Pain, depend upon ſome 'Cauſes which produce them, and are by rea-'ſon of thoſe Cauſes exiſtent in Nature, (that 'is, Pleaſure depends on pleaſant things, Pain on 'painful, and it neither cometh to paſs, that, 'what produceth Pleaſure is not pleaſant, nor 'that what cauſeth Pain is not painful, but that 'which produceth Pleaſure, muſt neceſſarily be 'pleaſant; that which Pain, painful and offen-'ſive to Nature,) in like manner, as to the af-'fections of the appearances produced in us, 'whatſoever is the efficient Cauſe of them, is 'undoubtedly ſuch as makes this appearance; 'and being ſuch, it cannot come to paſs, that 'it can be any other than ſuch as that is con-'ceived to be, which makes this appearance: 'The ſame is to be conceived of all the reſt in 'particular, for that which is viſible not only 'ſeems viſible, but is ſuch as it ſeems; and that 'which is audible, not only ſeems audible, but 'is indeed ſuch, and ſo of the reſt: Wherefore 'all appearances are true, and conformable to 'Reaſon.

(l) Sext Emp. Adv. Log.

(*m*) 'Hence it is manifeſt, that the Phan-'taſies even of thoſe who doat and dream, are, 'for this Reaſon, conceived to be true, for that 'they truly and really exiſt, ſeeing that they move 'the Faculty, whereas, that which is not can-'not move any thing. So that there is a neceſ-ſity in Nature, that the *ſpecies* of things which are received in the Intellect, or Imagination, being in this manner moved, mingled, and diſturbed, that ſuch Phantaſies cannot but be, whatſoever Opinion follows them, whereby things are judged to be ſuch in themſelves, of which we are to ſpeak next.

(m) Lart.

## CANON 2.

(*n*) *Opinion follows upon Senſe, and is ſuperadded to Senſation, and capable of Truth or Falſhood.*

(n) From Lertius.

This is proved, becauſe when a Tower (for example) appeareth round to the Eye, the Senſe indeed is true, for that it is really affected with the

the *species* of roundneſs, which *species* is truly ſuch, and hath a neceſſary cauſe for which it is ſuch, at ſuch a diſtance; and withal it is not deceived, for it does not affirm that the Tower is ſuch, but only behaves itſelf paſſively, receiving the *species*, and barely reporting that which appeareth to it. But Opinion, or the Mind, whoſe Office it is to conceive or judge, inaſmuch as it adds, as it were from itſelf, that what appeareth to the Senſe is a Tower, or that the Tower, really and in itſelf, is round; Opinion, I ſay, is that which may be true or falſe.

(o) Sext. Emp. adv. Log. 1.

Whence may be inferred, that (o) 'all Phantaſies (or Senſations,) whereby *Phænomena*'s '(things apparent,) are perceived, are true; but 'Opinions admit a difference; for ſome are true, 'others falſe, inaſmuch as they are our own 'Judgements ſuperadded to the Appearances; 'and we judge ſome things aright, others amiſs, 'by reaſon that ſomthing is added, and imputed 'to the Appearances, or ſomthing detracted 'from them: And generally Senſe which is in'capable of Ratiocination charged with fal'ſhood.

'But ſome are deceived by the diverſity of 'thoſe Appearances, which are derived from 'the ſame ſenſible Object, as in a thing viſible, '(for example) according as the Object ſeem'eth to be either of another Colour, or of ano'ther Figure, or ſome other way changed; for 'they conceive, that of contrary Appearances, 'one muſt neceſſarily be true, and the other 'which is oppoſite thereto falſe. Which cer'tainly is very fooliſh, and proper to ſuch men 'as conſider not the nature of things. For (to 'continue our inſtance of things viſible,) it is 'not the whole Solid, or the whole Solidity of 'the Body which we ſee, but the colour of the 'ſolid Body. Now of the colour, that which is 'in a ſolid Body, and appeareth in thoſe 'things which are ſeen nigh at hand, is one; 'that which is without the ſolid Body, as a '*Species*, or Image flowing from it, and is re'ceived into places ſcituate one beyond another, 'ſuch as appeareth in thoſe things which are be'held at a great diſtance, is another. This 'later being changed in the intermediate ſpace, 'and aſſuming a peculiar Figure, exhibits ſuch an 'appearance as itſelf indeed is.

'Whence, neither the Sound which is in the 'Braſs that is ſtruck, nor the Voice which is in 'the Mouth of him who cryeth aloud, is heard, 'but that ſound of Voice which lights upon our 'Senſe; for the ſame thing cannot be in two 'diſtant Subjects. And as no Man ſaith, that 'he hears falſly, who perceiveth the ſound to be 'but ſmall at diſtance, becauſe coming nigher, 'he perceiveth it as if it were greater; ſo nei'ther can we ſay, that the Sight is deceived, 'for that afar off it ſeeth a Tower, little and 'round; near, great and ſquare; but rather that 'it is true. For when the ſenſible Object ap'peareth to it little, and of ſuch a Figure, it is 'in that place little indeed, and of ſuch a Fi'gure, the extremities of thoſe Images being 'broke off, whilſt they are conveighed through 'the Air, and thereupon coming into the Eye 'in a leſſer Angle. And again, when it appear'eth great and of another Figure, there it is 'great and of another Figure, it not being the 'ſame in both places; for here the extremities 'of the Images are more entire, and come into 'the Eye in a greater Angle: but it is a great 'miſtake to think, that it is the ſame thing which 'appeareth to Sight, and affecteth the Eye near 'and afar off.

(p) Lucret.

(p) Neither can we ſay, that the Sight is deceived, when we ſee a Shadow in the Sunſhine to move, to follow our Footſteps, and imitate our Geſtures. For Shadow being but Air deprived of Light, and the Earth, as we go, being now here, now there, ſucceſſively deprived of the Sun's Light, and ſucceſſively recovering that whereof it was deprived, it comes to paſs that the Shadow ſeems to change place, and to follow us; but the Eyes are not therefore deceived, it being only their office to ſee the Light, and to ſee the Shadow in whatſoever place it is. But to affirm, that the very Light or Shadow which is here, is the ſame, or diſtinct from that which even now was there, this belongs not to them, but to the Mind, whoſe office it is to determine and judge. So that whatſoever of Falſity happens to be here, it is to be attributed to Opinion, not to Senſe.

(q) Lucret. loc. cit.

(q) The ſame Anſwer may be given to a thouſand other Objections, as of a Ship which ſeems to ſtand ſtill, and the Land to move; of the Stars, which ſeem to reſt; of Mountains far aſunder, which yet ſeem to be nigh; of Boys, who, having made themſelves giddy by turning, think the Roof itſelf runs round; of the Sun appearing to be near the Mountains, when as ſo great Spaces divide them; of the appearance of a Space under Water, as large, as from above it to the Sky; of a River, which to thoſe who paſs over it, ſeemeth to flow back towards the Spring; of a Gallery, which ſeems narrow at the further end; of the Sun, who ſeems to riſe out of the Water, and to go down into the Water; of Oars, which ſeem crooked or broken; of Stars in the Night, which ſeem to glide over the Clouds; of Things, which, by drawing the Eye on one ſide, ſeem double.

## CANON 3.

(r) From Sext. Emp.

(r) *All Opinion atteſted, or not contradicted by the evidence of Senſe, is True.*

Evidence of Senſe, I here call that kind of Senſation, or Appearance, which, all things obſtructive to Judgment being removed, as diſtance, motion, indiſpoſition of the Medium, and the like, cannot be contradicted. Whence to this Queſtion, Whether a thing be ſuch as it appears? We ought not to give a ſudden Anſwer, but to obſerve (s) that which I call περιμένον *expectable*, in regard that we muſt ſtay, until the thing be fully examined and ſifted out, according to all the ways that it can poſſibly happen.

(s) Laert.

(t) Sext. Emp.

'(t) Atteſtation I call Comprehenſion, made 'by Evidence, that the thing conceivable is ſuch 'as we before conceived it; as *Plato* coming to'wards me, from afar off; I conjecture, and 'think, as far as I can gueſs at ſuch a diſtance, 'that it is *Plato*; but when he draws nigher, and 'the diſtance is taken away, by the evidence of 'the thing, then, is there made an Atteſtation 'that it is *Plato*. 'Not-

'Not contradiction is said to be the finding 'out of a thing not manifeſt, which we ſuppoſe, 'and conceive by reflecting on ſomthing manifeſt 'or evident; as when I ſay, there is *Vacuum*, 'which indeed is unmanifeſt, I am induced there- 'to by ſomthing manifeſt, that is, by Motion; 'for if there were no *Vacuum*, there would be 'no Motion, ſeeing the Body that ſhould be mo- 'ved, would not have any place to go into, all 'things being full, and cloſe pack'd together. 'Whence that which is apparent or manifeſt 'doth not contradict that which is unmanifeſt, 'ſince indeed there is Motion.

Thus Atteſtation and Not-contradiction is the Criterie, whereby a thing is proved to be true.

## CANON 4.

(a) Out of Sext. Empir.

(a) *An Opinion, contradicted or not atteſted by evidence of Senſe, is falſe.*

(b) Sext. Ibid.

In which words, (b) Contradiction is ſom- 'thing oppoſite to Not-atteſtation, it being the 'joint deſtruction of a manifeſt thing together 'with another ſuppoſed unmanifeſt; as for in- 'ſtance, Some affirm, there is not *Vacuum*; but 'together with this ſuppoſition muſt be ſubverted 'a thing manifeſt, *viz.* Motion. For if there be 'no *Vacuum*, Motion likewiſe cannot be, as we 'have already ſhewed.

'In like manner, Contradiction is oppoſed to 'Atteſtation; for it is a ſubverſion, whereby it 'appeareth that the thing conceivable is not ſuch 'as it was conceived in the opinion; as a Man 'coming towards us from afar off, we at that 'diſtance gueſs he is *Plato*, but the diſtance being 'taken away, it appeareth to us by evidence that 'he is not *Plato*. This is contradiction, for the 'thing manifeſt contradicts the preconceived 'Opinion. Thus an Atteſtation and Not-con- 'tradiction is the Critery, by which a thing is 'proved to be true; ſo Contradiction and Not- 'atteſtation is the Critery by which a thing is 'evinced to be falſe; Evidence being the Baſis and Foundation upon which all right Opinion of True and Falſe is grounded.

To omit, that Evidence is ſomtimes had by one Senſe, as about ſome proper Senſible; ſom- times by many, as when the Senſible is common, as Magnitude and Figure, Diſtance and Poſiti- on, Reſt and Motion, and ſuch like, which may be perceived both by the Sight and Touch, and become manifeſt, if not to one Senſe, at leaſt to the other. Whereupon it ſomtimes happens, that by reaſon of ſeveral Qualities, ſeveral Sen- ſes may be ſummoned, that the Evidence which cannot be got by one, may be obtained by the other; as when we cannot diſcern by Sight, whe- ther the Bread that is offer'd us be true or coun- terfeit, we may ſummon our Taſte, whereby it will evidently appear, which of the two it is.

But this I adviſe, that, after we have exactly conſidered all, we adhere to thoſe things which are obvious to us; uſing our Senſes, either the common about common Senſibles, or the proper about the proper. Since we muſt hold generall- ly to all Evidence which is freely preſented to us by every Critery, but eſpecially by this: 'and 'tenaciouſly ſtick to it, as to an infallible Princi- 'ple, leſt either the Criteries which are eſta- 'bliſhed by Evidence be overthrown, or Error, 'being eſtabliſhed as ſtrong as Truth, turn all 'things upſide down.

I need not repeat or give particular Advice, what is to be done about the Inſtance alledged of a Tower, which at diſtance ſeems Round, but nearer, Square: for, from what is deduced it is manifeſt, that before we aſſert any thing, we muſt expect or pauſe, and approach nigher, and ex- amine and learn, whether the Tower be ſuch when we come at it, as it appeared far off.

I ſhall only give this general Rule. That un- leſs (the truth of the Senſes being preſerved after the manner aforeſaid,) you diſtinguiſh that which is opinable or conceivable into that which is expectable or requireth time, before it be aſſerted what it is, as being not yet duely per- ceived, and into that which is preſent and pro- poſed to us, and throughly examined, it will come to paſs, that you will perpetually be diſ- quieted with deceitful or vain Opinions. But if, when the things opinable are agitated in your Mind, you firmly eſteem all that is here called expectable as ſuch indeed, and paſs not lightly by it, as if that which is falſe, not ha- ving the Atteſtation of any Evidence, were firm and allowable; in this Caſe you will behave your ſelf as one that is cautious of all Ambigu- ity, and ſolicitouſly takes heed to every Judg- ment, which is rightly or falſly paſſed of an opinable thing.

## CHAP. III.

*Canons of Prænotion or Anticipation; the Second Criterie.*

OF Prænotion or Anticipation may be gi- ven Four Canons;

## CANON 1.

(a) Out of Laert.

(a) *All Anticipation or Prænotion, which is in the Mind, depends on the Senſes, either by Incurſion, or Proportion, or Similitude, or Compoſition.*

I mean, that the Notion (or Idea, and Form as it were, which being anticipated is called Prænotion) is begotten in the Mind by *Incurſion* (or Incidence,) when the thing incurreth into the Senſe directly and by itſelf, as a man juſt before our eyes. By *Proportion*, when the Præ- notion is amplified or extenuated, but the Num- ber, Scituation and Figure of the Parts, with a convenient bigneſs of each, is retain'd; as when having ſeen a Man of due magnitude, we from thence form in our mind the *Species* of a Giant, by Amplification; or of a Pigmy, by Extenua- tion. By *Similitude*, when according to a thing firſt perceived by the Senſe, we fancy another like it; as when we imagine a City unſeen, like to ſome that we have ſeen. Laſtly, by *Compo- ſition*, when we put as it were into one the di- ſtinct Notions which we have of two or more things; as when we ſo unite the Notions of a Horſe and a Man, as that the Notion of a Cen- taure ariſeth out of them, but (b) *not without ſome aſſiſtence of Ratiocination.* (b) Laert.

CANON

## CANON 2.

*Anticipation is the very Notion, and (as it were) Definition of the Thing; without which, we cannot Enquire, Doubt, Think, nor ſo much as Name any Thing.*

For *by the word Anticipation*, or Prænotion, *I underſtand a Comprehenſion of the Mind, or a ſuitable Opinion or Underſtanding fixed in the Mind, and, as it were, a certain Memory or Monument of that Thing which hath often appeared from without*, (which the Mind hath repreſented in itſelf after ſome one of the forementioned manners:) *Such for example is the Idea, or Form and* Species, *reflecting upon which, we ſay to our ſelves, that Thing is Man. For aſſoon as ever we hear this word* Man *pronounced, immediately the Image of a Man is underſtood, according to the Anticipation formed in the Mind by the foregoing Senſations.*

'Wherefore that Thing which is primarily 'and chiefly meant by and coucht under every 'word, and ſo apprehended by the Mind, is ſom-'thing perſpicuous and manifeſt: For when we 'enquire after any thing, or doubt of it, or think 'ſomthing; we ſhould not do it, unleſs we al-'ready had a Prænotion of that thing; as when 'we enquire, whether that which appeareth afar 'off, be an Horſe or an Oxe, it is requiſite that 'we ſhould firſt have ſeen and known by Antici-'pation the Figure of an Horſe and Oxe. In-'deed we could not ſo much as name any thing, 'unleſs we firſt had ſome image thereof known 'by Anticipation.

Hence it comes to paſs, that, if it be demanded what any thing is, we define or deſcribe it in ſuch manner as it is, according to the Anticipation thereof which we have in our Mind: Neither do we thus only, being demanded, what ſome ſingular thing is, as what *Plato* is; but alſo, what an Univerſal is, as Man, not this or that, but conſidered in general; this is brought to paſs according as the Mind, having ſeen many Singulars, and ſet apart their ſeveral Differences, formeth and imprinteth in her ſelf the Anticipation of that which is common to them all, as an Univerſal Notion, reflecting upon which, we ſay, Man (for example) is ſomthing animate, and endued with ſuch a Form.

## CANON 3.

*Anticipation is the Principle in all Diſcourſe, as being that to which we have regard, when we infer that one is the ſame or divers, conjoined with or disjoined from another.*

For, (*d*) *whil'ſt we conceive any thing*, either by Enunciation or Ratiocination, *it depends upon ſomthing firſt evident, unto which thing we having regard, and referring our thought, infer that thing of which the Queſtion is, to be ſuch, or not to be ſuch*; that is, the ſame, or another; coherent, or not coherent with it. Thus, if we are to prove that this thing which we behold is a Man, we ſo look back upon the Prænotion which we have of Man, as that without any ſtop we ſay, Man is ſomthing animate and endued with ſuch a Form; this, that I ſee, is animate and endued with ſuch a Form, therefore this that I ſee is Man; Or, it is not animate, nor endued with ſuch a Form, therefore it is not Man.

(d) Laert.

But it is not neceſſary to confirm all things with exquiſite Reaſons or Arguments, and ſcrupulous forms of Reaſoning, which are cried up by the Dialecticks: For there is this difference betwixt an Argument and the Concluſion of the Reaſon, and between a ſlender Animadverſion and an Admonition; that in one, ſome occult, and (as it were,) involved things are unfolded and opened; in the other, things ready and open are judged. But where there are ſuch Anticipations as ought to be, then what will follow or not follow from them, or what agrees or diſagrees with them, is perſpicuouſly diſcerned, and naturally inferred, without any Artifice, or Dialectick Conſtruction; wherefore we need only take care, that the Anticipation which we have of Things be clear and diſtinct.

## CANON 4.

*That which is Unmanifeſt ought to be demonſtrated out of the Anticipation of a Thing Manifeſt.*

This is the ſame we ſaid even now, That the Anticipations of Things from which we infer Somthing, and thinking upon which we make Sumptions or Propoſitions, which are Maxims or Principles, by which that which is inferred or concluded is conceived to be demonſtrated, be perſpicuous and manifeſt. For, (*e*) *Demonſtration is a Speech, which collecting by granted Sumptions (or Propoſitions,) brings to light a Truth not manifeſt before.* Thus to demonſtrate that there is *Vacuum*, which is not manifeſt, ſuppoſing the Anticipation of *Vacuum*, and the Anticipation of a manifeſt thing (Motion,) theſe Sumptions are premiſed, If there is Motion, there is *Vacuum*, but there is Motion, and then is inferred, therefore there is alſo *Vacuum*.

(e) Sext. Emp.

In this place, Motion is taken for the Argument, *Medium*, or Sign, which properly ought to be a ſenſible thing: For the ſenſe is that, according to which it is neceſſary to make a conjecture by Ratiocination, ultimately to that which is unmanifeſt, although ſuch a Sign or *Medium* hath not always a neceſſary Connexion with that which is inferr'd, but is ſomtimes only contingent, or probable, and might be otherwiſe.

Of this kind are many, from which we argue chiefly in ſuperior things, thoſe being ſuch, as may be brought to paſs not one way only, but many, as was hinted formerly.

Hither alſo may be (*f*) referred that which I uſe to term ἰσονομίαν, Equivalence, by which it is inferred, that one of the contraries being, the other alſo muſt be; and when I argue thus, if the multitudes of Mortals be ſo great, that of Immortals is no leſs; and if thoſe things which deſtroy be innumerable, thoſe which preſerve ought alſo to be innumerable.

(f) Cic. de nat. 1.

Againſt thoſe who deny there is any Demonſtration, may be brought this Argument: (*g*) Either you underſtand what Demonſtration is, or you underſtand it not; if you underſtand and have the Notion thereof, then there is Demon-

(g) Sext. Emp.

ſtration; but if you underſtand it not, Why do you talk of that, whereof you have nor any knowledge?

(b) Lucret. lib. 4. (b) They who take away the Credit of the Senſes, and profeſs that nothing can be known being in the ſame Ranks, do they not, when they confeſs that they know nothing, imply they know not this very thing, Whether any thing can be known? We ſhould not therefore contend againſt them, that they walk backwards upon their Head: Yet if they affirm they do, and I thereupon grant, that this is known by them, I have a fair occaſion to ask them, how, ſince before they ſaw nothing true in the things themſelves, they came to underſtand what was to know, and what to be ignorant?

## CHAP. IV.

*Canons of Affection or Paſſion; the Third Criterie.*

LAſtly, concerning Affection (or Paſſion,) which is, as I ſaid, Pleaſure and Pain, there may be Four (a) Canons.

(a) Out of Laertius.

### CANON 1.

*All Pleaſure, which hath no Pain joined with it, is to be embraced.*

### CANON 2.

*All Pain, which hath no Pleaſure joined with it, is to be ſhunned.*

### CANON 3.

*All Pleaſure, which either hindreth a greater Pleaſure, or procureth a greater Pain, is to be ſhunned.*

### CANON 4.

*All Pain, which either putteth away a greater Pain, or procureth a greater Pleaſure, is to be embraced.*

Of theſe we ſhall ſpeak more largely in the *Ethicks*. In the mean time, I ſhall give this general Advertiſement concerning Pleaſure: Pleaſure is deſirable of itſelf, becauſe it is Pleaſure; Grief or Pain is alwayes abhorred and avoidable, becauſe it is Pain; whence I conceive, a wiſe Man will have an Eye to this exchange or recompence, that he ſhun Pleaſure, if it procure a Pain greater than itſelf; and undergo Pain, if it produce a greater Pleaſure. As for my own part, I ſhould forſake Pleaſure, and covet Pain, either if Remorſe were annexed to the Pleaſure, or a leſſer Pain might be taken inſtead of a greater.

## CHAP. V.

*Canons concerning the uſe of Words.*

I Shall add ſomthing concerning the uſe of Words, (which I deſign'd to ſpeak of laſt) and eſpecially that which concerns Diſcourſe; for which, two Canons may ſeem ſufficient, one for the Speaker, the other for the Hearer: They are theſe;

### CANON 1.

*When thou ſpeakeſt, make uſe of Words Common and Perſpicuous, leſt either thy Meaning be not known, or thou unneceſſarily waſte the time in Explication.*

### CANON 2.

*When thou hearеſt, endeavour to comprehend the Power and Meaning of the Words, leſt either their Obſcurity keep thee in Ignorance, or their Ambiguity lead thee into Errour.*

Above all, (a) 'we muſt know what Things 'the Words ſignifie; that we may have ſom- 'thing, reflecting upon which, we may ſafely 'diſcern whatſoever we either conceive, or ſeek, 'or doubt; otherwiſe, if all things ſhould eſ- 'cape us undetermined, they who would de- 'monſtrate any thing to us, will proceed to in- 'finite, and we ourſelves gain nothing by our 'Diſcourſe, but Words and empty Sounds. For 'it is neceſſary, we have regard to the Notion 'and primary Signification of every Word, and 'that we need not any Demonſtration to under- 'ſtand that thing, in caſe we can pitch upon 'any thing, to which we may refer that point, 'about which our Enquiry, Doubt, or Opinion 'are buſied.

(a) Lart.

Hence it is, that the Method of enquiring after Truth, which is performed by a certain orderly Procedure, ought firſt to preſcribe certain Rules, by which that Affair may be performed, that ſo the Diſcourſers may agree, what it is concerning which they diſcourſe. So that if any Man ſhall not firſt agree to this, but hath a mind rather to cavil and trifle in wordiſh Equivocation, he is not to be diſcourſed with, or ſtill to be preſt to explain himſelf, what 'tis he would be at; for by this means his Juggling will be diſcovered, and his Cavils will ſolve themſelves: Nor will he be able to intangle his Adverſary, but rather diſcover himſelf a ridiculous Sophiſter.

THE

# The Second Part OF PHILOSOPHY.

## PHYSICK or of NATURE.

WE now come to *Physick*: Which I usually term *Physiology*, for that it is a Discourse and Ratiocination about the nature of things, in the contemplation whereof it is wholly employ'd.

We have already said our scope to be, that, through Perspection of the nature of things, nothing of disturbance, either from Meteors, or from Death, or from the unknown ends of Desires, or any other way, may arise unto us. Now the things which this Contemplation fathoms being so many, and so various, it seems very profitable, that (some being engag'd in the more profound Study of the liberal Disciplines, or, through some other business, not having leisure to know every thing particularly and exactly,) we have ready at least (*a*) 'some proper com-Lert.
'pendium of the whole Science of Nature, that 'whensoever they will apply their Minds to the 'chief arguments of things, they may be assistent 'to themselves, according to the measure of their 'Knowledge, in contemplation of Nature.

'Besides, to those who have made a greater 'progress in the speculation of all things, where-'of Physiology treateth, it is very useful, by 'some compendious Idea, to preserve the memo-'ry of the things themselves digested under heads. 'For it often happens, that we need a general 'inspection of things, but not a particular dis-'quisition. This way therefore is to be obser-'ved, and this kind of study continually used in 'exercising the Memory, that our attention to 'things may be constant and ready, and in the 'forms of things or notions, generally compre-'hended and imprinted in the Mind, and else-'where throughly examined, according to the 'first Principles, and the terms whereby they are 'explained; if any thing be particularly enqui-'red, it may be found, for where such a con-'stancy and readiness is gotten, and the Mind is 'endu'd with a general and exquisite Informati-'on, we are able to understand of a suddain 'whatsoever we please. I add, *according to the 'words*; Forasmuch as it is not possible, that a co-'herent sum of general heads can be frequently 'repeated by Heart, unless it so contain every 'thing, as that it may be explicated in few words, 'even if any thing come to be examined particu-'larly.

'Hence it is, this course being most profitable 'to those, who are inclined and addicted to Phy-'siology, that I would advise them therein, (espe-'cially if they enjoy a happy Life,) that they 'frame to themselves some such Epitome, and 'Information by general heads. But if they are not able of themselves, that they get one elsewhere, of which kind we have freely composed, for the benefit of the studious; hoping, that if what we have laid down be exactly remembred, as much as possible, although a Man runs not out into all particular Arguments that may be discussed, yet shall he obtain a copious knowledge of Physiology, incomparably beyond other Men; for he will of himself understand many things in the more general work, and, committing those to Memory, will help himself, and continually profit.

For these are of such a kind, that such as have made no little discussion of particulars, and addicted themselves perfectly to these contemplations, may thereby be enabled to raise and compleat more dissertations of all Nature; and whosoever of them are throughly vers'd in these, revolving them tacitly within themselves, may be able in a moment, and quietly, to over-run whatsoever is most considerable in Physiology.

But not to stay longer in the entry, there being so many (as I say,) and various things contained in Physiology, it will be convenient to divide them into some principal *Sections*, which may afterwards be persued particularly; and every thing, which especially belongs to any one of them, may be referred to it.

These Sections may be four. The first, of the *Universe*, or the nature of things, which comprises this World, and all other things that are beyond it. The Second, of the *World*, this wherein we are, and by which we may conjecture of the innumerable others. The Third, of *Inferior things*, the Earth, to which we adhere, and of the things in it. The Fourth, of *Sublime things*, which are seen and produced above the Earth, and upwards from it.

### SECT. I.

### *Of the Universe, or the Nature of things.*

TO begin then with the *Universe*, it is manifest, that it is so named, forasmuch as it containeth all things, even others besides this World; Whence it is also termed, *the Whole*, and, *the All*; And we usually call it, the Sum of things, and the Nature of things.

We muſt firſt ſpeak generally of *the things whereof the Univerſe conſiſts*; Next, of what *the ſo many things in the Univerſe are made*; Thirdly, *By what they are made*; Fourthly, *What kind they are of, when made*; Fifthly, *How they are made*; Laſtly, *How they periſh*.

## CHAP. I.

*That the Univerſe conſiſts of Body, and* Vacuum, *or Place.*

(a) Laert. (b) Laert. Firſt therefore, (a) *The Univerſe conſiſts of Body and* Vacuum (b); neither can there be conceived any third Nature beſides theſe.

(c) Sext. Emp. adv. Phyſ. Now, (c) *Body is underſtood by conceiving a certain vaſt heap (as it were) of Magnitude* (or Bigneſs,) *likewiſe of Figure, Reſiſtence*, (that is, Solidity, and Impenetrability) *and gravity*; withall, to be ſuch, as it only can touch and be touched.

(d) Laert. (d) *Emptineſs, or* Vacuum; which is oppoſed to Body, and *only*, or properly, and in it ſelf, *is incorporeal*, is underſtood by Negation of theſe, and chiefly from being of an intactile Nature, and void of all Solidity, and *can ſuffer nor act any thing, but only affords a moſt free motion to Bodies paſſing through it.*

(e) Plut. plac. 1. 20. For this is (e) *that Nature which being deſtitute of Body, is called* Vacuum; *taken up by a Body, Place*; *paſſed through by a Body, Region*, conſidered as diffuſed, Interval or Space.

(f) Laert. (f) *That there are Bodies in the Univerſe, Senſe atteſts; whence it is neceſſary to deduce Conjecture from other Principles, to that which is unmanifeſt, as I formerly touched.* Certainly, all theſe things which we behold, which we touch, which we turn up and down, which we ourſelves are, are nothing but Bodies.

*But that there is* Vacuum *alſo, is hence manifeſt, that if it were not in Nature, Bodies would neither have where to be, nor any way to perform their Motions; whereas that they are moved, is evident.*

(g) Lucret. lib. 1. (g) Doubtleſs if all were full, and the matter of things crouded, as it were, together, it could not be, but that all things muſt be immoveable; for neither would any thing be moved, but it muſt thruſt forward all things; nor would there be place left, whereinto any thing might be thruſt. For whereas ſome anſwer, that Fiſhes therefore can move, becauſe they leave a place behind them, into which the Waters, being thruſt forward, and giving place, are received; they obſerve not, that the firſt impulſion forwards could never begin, becauſe there is not yet any place, neither behind, nor beſide, whereinto the Water may be received. So as it is neceſſary, there ſhould be little empty intervals of ſpace within things, eſpecially the fluid, into which the little Particles being driven may be ſo received, that, by the compreſſion, place may be made, towards which, the impelling Body may be moved forward, and, in the interim, leave place behind, into which the compreſſed fluid may dilate it ſelf, and, as it were, flow back.

(h) Lucret. loc. cit. (h) I paſs by other Arguments, as, That Thunder or Sound were not able to paſs through Walls, nor Fire to penetrate into Iron, Gold, and the reſt of Metals, unleſs in theſe there were ſome vacuous little Spaces intermingled. Beſides, forasmuch as Gravity is proper to Bodies, the weight of things could not be made greater or leſſer, if it were not according to their having more or leſs Vacuity intermixed.

Now *Vacuum*, being incorporeal, is ſo penetrated by Bodies, whether exiſting in it, or gliding by it, that it remains unchang'd, and preſerves the ſame Dimenſions to which it is adequate. Whence a ſtreight Line, taken in *Vacuum*, is indeed ſtreight, but not ſo, that it becomes crooked with the Body which fills it, becauſe *Vacuum* is neither moveable in whole nor in part.

Whence it comes, that whereas the Notion of place is, to receive the things placed to be coextended with it; not to be moved with it, nor to forſake it; leſt either the Body be moved, yet not change place; or change place, yet not be moved: It therefore is only competible to *Vacuum*, to have the nature of place, forasmuch as it only, both by its corporeal Dimenſions, length, breadth, and depth, is coextended with the thing placed in length, breadth, and depth, and exactly adjuſted to it. Beſides it is ſo immoveable, that whether the Body come to it, or go from it, or ſtay in it, it continueth the ſame and unvariable.

That I ſaid, (i) *No third Nature beſides can be conceived*, it is for this reaſon, that whether we take to be conceived *comprehenſively*, (in which manner the things, which, by themſelves and directly, fall into our knowledg are perceived,) *or comparatively to thoſe things which are conceived*, (after which manner thoſe things are underſtood, which are known only by proportion, as was ſaid about Anticipation,) whatſoever it be that is conceived, either it hath ſome Bulk and Solidity, and ſo is a Body; or it is void of all Bulk and Solidity, and ſo it is *Vacuum*; which is to be underſtood, *in caſe you conceive it a certain by it-ſelf exiſtent, ſubſiſtent, coherent Nature; and not as ſome adjunct or accident thereof.* (i) Laert.

For ſince (k) an Adjunct is a property, which cannot be taken from the thing to which it belongs, without deſtruction of the thing; as Tactility from Body, Intactility from *Vacuum*; and in a more familiar Example, as weight from a Stone, heat from Fire, moiſture from Water: But an Accident is that, whoſe preſence or abſence violates not the integrity of the Nature, as Liberty and Servitude, Poverty and Riches, War and Peace, &c. Therefore they conſtitute not ſome third Nature, diſtinct from corporeal and incorporeal, but only are as ſomthing appertaining to one of theſe. (k) Lucret. l. 1. v. 450.

## CHAP. II.

*That the Univerſe is Infinite, Immoveable, and Immutable.*

Now (a) *the Univerſe*, conſiſting of *Vacuum*, and Body, *is Infinite*; *for that which is Finite hath a Bound, that which hath a Bound, is ſeen from ſome other thing*; or may be ſeen from out of an interval beyond, or without it. *But the Univerſe is not ſeen out of any other things beyond it*; for there is no Interval, or Space, which it containeth not within it ſelf, otherwiſe it could not be an Univerſe, if it did not contain all Space; (a) Laert.

Space; *therefore neither hath it any Extremity. Now, that which hath no Extremity hath no End, and that which hath no End doubtleſs is not Finite, but Infinite.*

(b) Lucret. I. This is confirmed; (*b*) for if you imagine an Extremity, and ſuppoſe ſome Man placed in it, who with great force throwes a Dart towards it's utmoſt Surface, the Dart will either go forward, or not, but be forced to ſtay. If it go forward, there is place beyond, wherefore the Extremity was not there, where we deſign'd it: If not, therefore there is ſomthing beyond, which hinders the Motion, and ſo again, the Extremity was not in the fore-deſigned place.

(c) Lucret. 968. Moreover, (*c*) *this infinity belonging to the Univerſe is ſuch, both in the multitude of Bodies, and the magnitude of* Vacuum; nay, in Infinites thruſting themſelves forward mutually, alternately, or in order. 'For if *Vacuum* were Infinite, 'and Bodies Finite, then Bodies, *which are in 'perpetual Motion*, (*as we ſhall anon declare,*) 'would reſt no where, but be diſperſedly carried 'through the infinite *Vacuum*, as having no-'thing to ſtop them, and reſtrain them by va-'rious Repercuſſions. But if the *Vacuum* were 'Finite, the Bodies Infinite, then there would 'not be place large enough for the Infinite Bo-'dies to exiſt in.

(d) Lucret. '*Hence* (*d*) we ought not ſo to attribute to 'the *Univerſe*, or Infinite Space, the being above 'or below, as if there were any thing in the 'Univerſe higheſt, or any thing loweſt; the 'former, by conceiving the ſpace over our Head, 'not to be extended to Infinite; the later, by 'imagining that which is under our Feet not to 'be of Infinite extent, as if both that which is 'above, and that which is below, were termi-'nated with ſome one and the ſame point, as it happens with us, or the middle of this World, one of its extream parts being imagin'd higheſt, the other loweſt; for in Infinite, which hath neither extreams nor middle, this cannot be imagin'd.

'Wherefore it is better to aſſume ſome one 'Motion, which may be underſtood to proceed 'upwards into Infinite, and in like manner ano-'ther which downwards; although that mova-'ble, which from us is carried up towards the 'places over our Heads, meet a thouſand times 'the Feet of thoſe who are above, *and* (*con-'ceiting other worlds,*) *think it comes from below*; 'or which from us is carried towards that quar-'ter, which is under our Feet, to the Heads of 'thoſe who are below us, *and who are thence apt 'to imagin, that it comes from above*: Notwith-'ſtanding which Imagination of theirs, either 'of theſe oppoſite Motions, taken intirely, is 'rightly conceived to be of infinite extent.

(e) Lucret. To theſe is conſentaneous, 'that (*e*) the Uni-'verſe was ever ſuch as it now is, and ſuch as 'it now is, ſhall ever be, for there is nothing 'into which, *loſing the Nature of the Univerſe*, 'it may be changed; and beſides the Univerſe, '*which containeth all things*, there is nothing, 'which by aſſaulting it, can cauſe an alteration 'in it.

(f) Euſeb. Rightly therefore is the Univerſe eſteemed as (*f*) *immovable, there being no place beyond it, into which it may be moved:* So alſo Immutable, foraſmuch as it admits neither Decreaſe nor Increaſe, and is void of Generation and Corruption, and therefore is eternal, not having beginning, nor end of Duration.

And indeed, many things in it are moved and changed, but whatſoever Motions and Mutations you conceive, they bear no proportion, if compared with the immenſity of the Univerſe itſelf. Nor is therefore the whole Univerſe either moved into any other place, or changed into any other thing; does it therefore not perſevere to be ever the ſame, which it ever was? For the Motions and Mutations in it were always alike, ſo as it may be ſaid, *that* (*g*) *there is nothing new done in the Univerſe, more than what was already done in the infinity of time.* (g) Euſeb. præp.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of the Divine Nature in the Univerſe.*

BUt before we ſpeak of things in the Univerſe, which are generated and corrupted, and of the Principles whereof they are made, it is fit to premiſe, and put, as a By-diſcourſe, a Treatiſe concerning Divine Nature; as well for the Excellency of that Nature, as for that, although it be of the ſame with corporeal Nature, yet is it not ſo much a Body, as a certain thing like a Body, as having nothing common to it with other Bodies, that is, with tranſitory, or generated, and periſhable things. Now it firſt being uſually queſtion'd concerning the Divine Nature, whether there be any in the Univerſe, yet the thing ſeems as if it ought not at all to be called in queſtion, foraſmuch as Nature herſelf hath imprinted a Notion of the Gods in our Minds. For what Nation is there, or what kind of Men, which without Learning have not ſome Prænotion of the Gods?

Wherefore, ſeeing it is an Opinion not taken up by any Inſtitution, Cuſtom, or Law, but the firm conſent of all Men, none excepted, we muſt neceſſarily underſtand, that there are Gods; becauſe we have the knowledg of them ingrafted, or rather innate in us. But that, concerning which the Nature of all men agreeth, muſt neceſſarily be true; therefore it is to be acknowledged, that there are Gods.

(a) Lucret. (*a*) Indeed men may ſeem, when they beheld the courſe of the Heavens, and the various Seaſons of the year, to wheel about, and return in certain order, and were not able to know by what Cauſes it were performed, to have recurr'd to this Refuge, to attribute all things to the Gods, and make them obey their Beck, placing them withall in Heaven, for that they beheld in Heaven the Revolution of Sun, Moon, and Stars; but how could they attribute theſe to the Gods, unleſs they had firſt known, that there were Gods?

(b) Sext. Emp. adv. Math. (*b*) 'Did they not rather derive a knowledg 'of the Gods from the Apparitions of Dreams? 'certainly, they might by ſome great Images 'incurring to them under human Forms, by 'Dreams, conceive that there are indeed ſome 'Gods endued with ſuch a human Form; they might, I ſay, not ſo much in Sleep, as when Awake, they called to mind, that thoſe excellent Images had appeared to them in Sleep, ſo

Majeſtick, of ſo ſubtle a compoſure, and ſo well proportion'd in ſhape, conceive that there is no repugnance, nay, that there was a neceſſity, that ſomwhere there ſhould be things of like nature with theſe, capable alſo of Senſe or Underſtanding, (c) becauſe they fancied them moving their Limbs, and ſpeaking: And thoſe alſo immortal, becauſe their ſhape was always preſent to their apprehenſions becauſe their Form remain'd ſtill the ſame, and was of ſuch grandeur, that they ſeem'd not eaſily convincible, but there were ſuch; moreover Bleſſed, forasmuch as they neither fear death, nor take any pains in effecting their Works.

(c) Lucret.

(d) Cic. de nat. deor. 1.

(d) They might alſo by diſcourſe uſe that ἰσονομία, or *æquivalence*, by which when we treated of the Criteries, we affirmed it was concluded, that *if the multitude of Mortals were ſo great, that of Immortals was not leſs, and if thoſe things which deſtroy be innumerable, thoſe which preſerve ought alſo to be innumerable.*

(e) Cic. de nat. deor. 1.

(e) Which way ſoever it came, we have this certainly by Prenotion, That we think the gods are bleſſed and immortal: 'For the ſame Nature 'which gave us information of the gods themſelves, imprinted alſo in our Minds, that we 'eſteem them Bleſſed and Eternal; Which if it be

(f) Laert.

ſo, our Opinion is truly laid down, (f) 'What 'is Eternal and Bleſſed, neither is troubled with 'any buſineſs itſelf, nor troubles any other; 'therefore not poſſeſſed with Favour or Anger; 'for all ſuch are weak.

And if we ſought no further than to worſhip the gods piouſly, and to be free from Superſtition, what we have ſaid were ſufficient; for the excellent Nature of the gods is worſhipped by the Piety of Men, as being Eternal, and moſt Bleſſed. For to whatever is excellent, Veneration is due; and all Fear, proceeding from the Power and Anger of the gods, would be expelled; for it is underſtood, that Anger and Favour are far ſeparate from a Bleſſed immortal Nature; which being removed, no fears hang over us as to the gods. But for confirmation of this Opinion, the Soul enquires after the Form and the Life, and the action of Mind, and agitation in God.

(*) Cic. de nat. deor. 1.

(*) 'As to the Form, Nature partly inſtructs 'us, partly Reaſon; for by Nature, all of us, of 'all Nations, have no other Form, but Human, 'of the gods. For what other Forms ever occur 'to any Man, waking or ſleeping? But not to 'reduce all things to their firſt Notions, Reaſon 'itſelf declares the ſame. For ſeeing it is proper to the moſt excellent Nature, either becauſe 'it is Bleſſed, or becauſe it is Sempiternal, that it 'be moſt beautiful, What compoſition of Limbs, 'What conformity of Lineaments, What Figure, 'What Form can be more beautiful, than the Human?

'Now if the Figure of Men excelleth the Form 'of all things Animate, and God is Animate, certainly he is of that Figure which is the moſt 'beautiful of all. And forasmuch as it is manifeſt, 'that the gods are moſt Bleſſed, and none can be 'Bleſſed without Virtue, nor Virtue conſiſt without Reaſon, nor Reaſon conſiſt in any Figure 'but that of Man; we muſt acknowledge, that 'the gods are of Human Form.

But when I ſay, that the gods are of the Form of a Man, and of an animate Being, Do I therefore attribute ſuch a Body to them, as ordinarily Men and animate Beings have? By no means; For 'God is not a thing, as *Plato* ſays, meerly In'corporeal; becauſe what kind of thing that is, 'cannot be underſtood, for then he muſt neceſ'ſarily want Senſe, he muſt want Prudence, he 'muſt want Pleaſure; all which we comprehend 'together with the Notion of the gods. But neither is he therefore a groſs Body, no not the moſt ſubtle that can be coagmentated of Atoms; but he is altogether a Body of his own kind, which indeed is not ſeen by Senſe, but by the Mind; nor is he of a certain Solidity, nor compoſed of Number, but conſiſts of Images, perceived by Compariſon; and which, compared with thoſe that ordinarily occur, and are called Bodies, may be ſaid 'to be (not Body, but) as before I ſaid, 'reſemblance of Body, and (for example) not 'to have Blood, but a certain reſemblance of 'Blood.

In the mean time, I muſt intimate by the way, (g) that (g) he is not ſuch a kind of Body as is coagmentated of Atoms, for then he could not be Sempiternal, and upon his Generation would follow Corruption; upon his Concretion, Diſſipation, and ſo he could not be Sempiternal. Thus, there are four things to be eſteemed *Eternal* and *Incorruptible*; the *Univerſe*, which hath no place into which it can fall; *Vacuum*, which cannot be touch'd, nor receive any blow; the *Matter* of things, which unleſs it did ſubſiſt unchanged, thoſe things which are diſſolved would go away into nothing; and the *Divine Nature*, which is inconcrete, and, by reaſon of its Tenuity, cannot be touched nor ſtruck.

(g) Laſtant.

(g) Laert.

Hence one of the Natural Philoſophers was in a great error, when he ſaid, That the Nature of the gods is ſuch, as to diffuſe, and ſend forth Images out of itſelf; for in this manner, ſomwhat might be ſo taken out of it, as that it might be admitted diſſolvable. But (h) ſome have miſinterpreted our meaning, when, upon our admitting many Worlds, and ſaying, that there are *Intermundia*, that is, Intervals between the Worlds, they affirm we place the gods in the *Intermundia*, leſt they ſhould receive any injury by the Worlds ruines. For, as (i) *Vacuum*, ſo is the nature of the gods more ſubtle, than to fear any harm from Bodies; which if it did fear, in no place were it more to be feared than in the *Intermundia*, when the World ſhould come to be diſſolved.

(h) Seneca de ben. f. 4. 19.

(i) Lucret. 5.

(i) Laert.

Neither can we deſign in what places the gods live, ſeeing that this our World is not a ſeat worthy of them; but we can only ſay in general, ſuch as the Poets deſcribe *Olympus*, ſuch are, whereſoever they be, the bleſſed and quiet Seats of the gods.

(k) *Where Showers not fall, nor Winds unruly blow,*
*Where neither blaſting Froſt, nor hoary Snow*
*Riſe the place; but Heaven is ever bright,*
*Spreading his Glorious Smiles with chearful Light.*

(k) Lucret. 3.

(l) 'Hereupon it being further demanded, 'what kind of Life that of the gods is, and what 'ſtate of age they enjoy, it may be anſwered, 'That certainly, than which nothing be more 'Happy, nothing more abundant in all Goods,

(l) Cic. loc. Cit.

'can

'can be imagined. For God doth nothing, he is 'not intangled in any Employments, he under-'takes no Works, but joyeth in his own Wisdom 'and Virtue. He knows for certain that he shall 'ever be in Pleasures, both Greatest and Eternal. 'This God we justly style Blessed, who ourselves 'place a blessed Life in security of Mind, and in 'disengagement from all Business; but not, such 'as others do describe him, Laborious, involved in great and troublesome Employments.

## CHAP. IV.

*Of First Matter, or, of the Principles of Compound things in the Universe.*

NOw to resume and persue our Discourse, forasmuch as in the first place 'tis manifest by Sense, that in Nature many things are generated, and many corrupted; therefore we must conclude, that hereto is required Matter, of which things may be generated, and into which they may be resolved; For (*a*) *of nothing, nothing is made; and into nothing, nothing goes away. For if something were made of nothing, every thing might be produced from any thing, as not requiring Seeds; and if that which perisheth did go into nothing, all things would perish absolutely, there not remaining those things into which they were dissolved.*

Besides, forasmuch as we affect to know the nature of any thing, generated or made, it is first demanded, whether it be some thing one and simple, or compounded of some things which themselves are simple and precedent. It is manifest, that nothing generated or made can be one and simple, seeing that it hath parts of which it was made up, and into which again it may be dissolved, which therefore are precedent and more simple; and if they still be compounded, they may be conceived to consist of those, which at length are the first and most simple.

Thus again it appears, *that* (*b*) *of Bodies, some are Concretions*, or (if you like it better,) concrete or compounded Bodies; *others, of which Concretions*, or compounded Bodies, *are made*. These, if first and simple, are the first matter of things, and are termed Principles, and, by the later Authors, Elements also.

These *Principles*, or first things of all, must be simple uncompounded Bodies, (or rather Atoms) and *indivisible*, or not resolvable by any force, and consequently *immutable*, or in themselves void of all mutation. I mean, *if it shall so come to pass*, as that in the dissolution of Compounds, *all things go not into nothing, but that there consist and persevere a certain Nature, full, or void of vacuity*, and therefore solid; *which*, being such, *it cannot in any part, or by any means, admit a diversion, and so be dissolved.*

*Wherefore it is necessary, that those which are called the Principles of* compounded *Bodies, be*, as *of a Nature*, full, solid, and *immutable*, so wholly *indivisible*; whence we use to call them *Atoms*. We term it an Atom, not as being the least, that is, as it were a Point, (for it hath a Magnitude) but for that it cannot be divided, it being incapable of suffering, and void of vacuity. So that he who saith, *Atom*, names that which is free from a blow, and can suffer nothing; and which is invisible indeed by reason of its littleness, but indivisible by reason of its Solidity.

## CHAP. V.

*That there are Atoms in Nature, which are the Principles of Compound Bodies.*

THat (*a*) there are Atoms, the Reason alledgeth sufficiently convinceth; For, seeing that Nature makes nothing of nothing, and reduceth nothing to nothing, there must remain in the dissolution of compound Bodies something that is incapable of further dissolution. Certainly if you say that it is still dissolvable, or divisible, it will be necessary, by subdividing, to come at last to something that is solid, and incapable of division; since that neither Nature itself doth dissolve things infinitely, but stays in some last thing; nor can Body admit of an infinite division. (*a*) Laert.

(*b*) 'In a finite Body, doubtless there can-'not be parts of infinite either multitude or 'magnitude; wherefore there cannot be under-'stood to be performed in it not only that di-'vision into infinite which is made into less, or 'by parts always lesser, and proceeds ever ob-'serving the same proportion of division; but 'also that progression into infinite, which is 'made by proceeding not always by lesser, but 'by equal, or those which are called determinate 'parts. For since infinite parts must needs be admitted to serve for an infinite division, how can there be infinite of them in a finite Body? (*b*) Laert.

'He certainly who once hath said, that in eve-'ry thing there are parts infinite in number, is 'not able further to understand and declare how 'that magnitude, whereof he speaks, comes to 'be finite. For whether the parts that a divi-'sion or progression may be made into infinite 'be determinate, (that is, equal among them-'selves,) or indeterminate, (that is, always les-'ser) it is manifest that the magnitude, whose 'parts they are, and which consists and is com-'pounded of them, must indeed be infinite.

'And since on the other side, a finite mag-'nitude manifestly hath an extreme *or last* part, *easie to be perceived and shewn*, 'unless this part 'may be seen by itself, and as the last, we cannot, *although we should subdivide it*, 'understand any 'other part, which should be thought the last *rather than this*; *for that with as much reason will be divisible*. 'Whence *it will come, that* by pro-'ceeding *further*, and consequently towards an 'extreme part into infinite, we can never ar-'rive, not even by thought, to that part which 'is the last, *nor be able to over-run, by progression, even the least space.*

(*c*) Add to this, That unless in Dissolutions there did remain little Bodies so solid, as that they cannot be dissolved by any force, the difference between Body and *Vacuum* could not be sufficiently understood, inasmuch as nothing of Body, by infinite attenuation, would be capable to resist; by which means too all things would become weak or soft, and nothing could be made hard, seeing that Solidity only is the foundation of hardness. Neither need we scruple, as if be- (*c*) Lucret.

cause

cause Atoms are solid, soft things cannot be made of them, for they may be made soft by intermission only of *Vacuum*, into which the compressed parts retire, and yield to the touch.

(d) Lucret. loc. cit.

(*d*) Add also the diverse sorts of constancy in nature, as in carrying on Animals always to certain bounds of strength, augmentation and life, in imprinting always the same distinctions and marks of every particular kind; which she could not do, if she did not use Principles certain and constant, and therefore not obnoxious to Dissolution and Mutation.

## CHAP. VI.

*Of the Properties of Atoms; and first, of their Magnitudes.*

Although all Atoms, by reason of this solidity, may seem to be of one and the same nature, yet have they some Adjuncts or Properties, and certain (*a*) *Qualities*, by which they may differ among themselves, such only are *Magnitude, Figure, and Weight, and if there be any beside which are necessarily ally'd to Figure*, as roughness, and smoothness; for *Colour*, *Heat*, *Cold*, and the rest of the Qualities, *are not such as are proper to Atoms*, but to Compounds, and arising partly out of the Adjuncts, partly the Accidents of Atoms, of which we shall speak hereafter.

(a) Lacrt.

(b) Lucret. 2.

This in brief, at present; (*b*) If Colour (for example) were in the Atoms themselves, it would be as intransmutable as they are; and so the things consisting of Atoms, that are of one Colour, could not change that, and appear under another; whereas we observe the contrary happens, for the Sea foaming looks white, it being otherwise of a green Colour, which doubtless if it were in it by reason of green Atoms, could not be changed into a white Colour. For whereas some say, That Contraries are made of Contraries, it is so far from being so, that White will sooner be produced out of no Colour at all, than out of Black. Better they, who conceive the matter of things, that it may undergo variety of Colours, and other Qualities, ought to be void of them; as we chuse that Oil which is most free from any scent to make Perfumes of.

But to touch a little every property of the Atoms: Whereas in the first place I attribute magnitude to them, I mean not any magnitude; for the largest Atom is not so great as to be perceptible by sight, but that magnitude which, although it be below the reach of Sense, yet is of some bigness, (for if Atoms were points void of all magnitude, no body of any magnitude could be made up of them.) Whence I use to say of an Atom, that it is some small thing, thereby, as it were, not excluding all magnitude from it, but the larger size only.

(c) Lucret.

(*c*) Neither can it be objected, That the magnitude of Atoms is not perceived by the Senses, since we must necessarily confess, there are innumerable things invisible; for can we see the Wind, Heat, Cold, Odor, Sound, or the little Bodies, by whose arrival to the Sense these are perceived? Can we see the little Bodies of moisture, by which Garments hung by the Water-side are moistned, yet being spread abroad are dried? Can we see those which are rubb'd off from a Long Ring-worm, from a Wheel that turns round, from a Plough share in ploughing, from a Stone which a drop hollows, which a Tread diminisheth, or those by which a Plant or Animal grows in its youth, decays in its old age, and the like?

(*d*) 'Yet we must not think that all Atoms 'are of the same magnitude, it is more consonant to Reason, that amongst them there be 'some greater, others lesser; and, this admitted, a Reason may be given of most things that 'happen about the passions of the mind, and 'about the senses.

(d) Lucr.

(*e*) That there may be an incomprehensible variety of Magnitudes beyond the reach of Sense, may also be understood even from this, forasmuch as there are some little Animals, whose third part, if we imagine them divided, would be invisible; nevertheless, to the composition of them an incomprehensible number of parts is necessary. For how many must there be to make the Entrails, the Eyes, the Joints, the Soul; to constitute all parts, without which we cannot understand there should be any living, sensitive, moving Animal?

(e) Lucret.

Whether may not (to use a gross example,) this variety be comprehended from those dusty motes which the beams of the Sun coming in at a Window discover? For whereas without such beams all things are alike dark, yet they coming in, there appeareth an innumerable company of little bodies, in such manner, as that there is an evident difference between the greater and the lesser; nevertheless, I say not, (as some conceive) that these kinds of little Bodies are Atoms, for in the least of them are contained many Myriads of Atoms, I only use them by way of comparison, that whereas the whole Nation (as it were,) of Atoms is impervious, and dark, even to the sharpest sight, yet we may understand it to be so illustrated by the beams of Reason, that the Atoms may be perfectly seen by the mind, and that we may conceive there are several degrees of magnitudes in them.

(*f*) Hence it happens, that as in a great and measurable magnitude we take something, which, that it may be the common measure, must have the proportion of the least, as a Foot, a Digit, a Barly-corn; and in sensible magnitude, we take also something which is accounted the least as to Sense, as the little Creature called *Acaris*; so in intelligible magnitude, such as is that of the Atom, we may take something which in it is esteemed (as it were,) the least; such as in an Atom may be conceived, the very point in which a sharp angle is terminated.

(f) Lucr.

(*g*) But this difference there is between the least, under the notion of measure, and the least of those which are sensible and intelligible, that the former, by its repetition, may be understood to be adæquated to the whole magnitude; but these later are conceiv'd as certain individual points, which either are bounds of magnitudes, or certain Connexures (as it were,) so interpos'd between the parts, as that they have only certain respects to the parts, connected on each side, though they are such, that a beginning of men-

(g) Lucr. l.

menſuration cannot be made from them. For nothing hinders but that we may, by the mind, frame ſome dimenſions in an Atom.

Although, when as we ſay, there are parts or connexures in an Atom, it is not ſo to be underſtood, as if at any time they were disjoined, and afterwards united; but we do it, to declare that in an Atom there is a true magnitude conſiſting of parts, though withal they have that difference from compound things, that their parts can only be diſtinguiſhed by deſignation, not by ſeparation; foraſmuch as they cohere by a natural, indiviſible, and perpetual Connexion.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of the Figure of Atoms.*

(a) Lucret. l. 2.

AS (a) concerning *Figure*, which is the bound of magnitude, it is firſt neceſſary, that in Atoms it be manifold; or, that Atoms amongſt themſelves be variouſly figured. This is proved, foraſmuch as all natural things framed of them, Men, Beaſts, Birds, Fiſhes, Plants, *&c.* are variouſly figured, not only in reſpect of their *Genus*, but of every particular *Species* or *Individuum*; for there are not any two ſo like one another, but that if you mind them exactly, you will find ſome differences by which they are diſtinguiſhed.

(b) Lucr.

Again, (b) *Foraſmuch as the kinds of Figures in Atoms are incomprehenſible for number*, for they are round, oval, lenticular, flat, gibbous, oblong, conical, hooked, ſmooth, rough, briſtly, quadrilateral, *&c.* as well regular as irregular, without any determination poſſible to the Intellect, yet are they not to be eſteemed ſimply infinite in number: *For there would not be ſo many and ſo great differences in concrete things, if in the Atoms, of which they are compounded, there were ſuch a diverſity of Figure as could be comprehended by the mind. Yet the diverſities of Atoms cannot be abſolutely infinite, unleſs a man conceive in Atoms a magnitude*, which is not only ſo ſmall as to eſcape Senſe, but is in reality infinitely little: *For in magnitude*, or the *ſuperficies* of magnitude, *which is finite, cannot be underſtood diverſities, which are infinite.*

But thirdly, although the kinds of Figure be not infinite, *yet are there in every Figuration, or kind of Figure, Atoms ſimply infinite in number*; that is, there are infinite round Atoms, infinite oval, infinite pyramidal; *for otherwiſe the Univerſe would not be infinite in multitude of Atoms*, as was already declared, *unleſs the Atoms which are like to one another in Figure, were abſolutely infinite in number.*

(c) Plut. p'ac. l. 4. Lactan. inſtit. l. 3. 17.

(c) But take notice, That though there are Atoms corner'd and hooked, yet can they not be conceived to be worn away or broken, becauſe both the corners and hooks, as alſo the middle little bodies themſelves are of one nature, and kept together with equal ſolidity and neceſſity, inſomuch as no force whatſoever can compreſs an Atom, either as to the whole, or as to its parts, even to its very points.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of the Gravity (or Weight,) and manifold Motions of Atoms.*

LAſtly, I attribute to Atoms *Gravity*, or Weight; for, whereas they are perpetually in motion, or ſtriving to move, it is neceſſary that they be moved by that internal Impulſe which is called Gravity, or Weight.

(a) Lucret.

(a) There firſt preſents itſelf to us in the Atoms a twofold motion, one of the gravity or weight itſelf, whereby the Atom is carried after its own way; the other, by percuſſion or reflection, whereby one Atom, being driven upon another, is beaten back again. And as for the motion of gravity or weight, that motion is firſt conceived, whereby the Atom is carried on in a *ſtreight* or perpendicular line. By this motion are all heavy things moved. But becauſe if all Atoms ſhould be moved in a ſtreight line, or downwards, and, as it were, ſtreight on, it ſhould come to paſs, that one could never overtake the other; It is therefore neceſſary, that Atoms ſhould go a little *aſide*, the leaſt that may be, that ſo may be produced the complications, and adheſions, and copulations of Atoms to one another, of which may be made the World, and all the parts of the World, and all things in it.

(b) Lucret. ib.

(b) When I ſay, That otherwiſe the Atoms would not overtake one another, and conſequently not meet, the reaſon is, That the Univerſe being infinite, hath no middle or centre towards which they may tend, and ſo meet; but only there may be conceived, according to what hath been ſaid, ſome Region above, out of which, without any beginning, all Atoms, by their Gravity, would deſcend like drops of Rain, that is, by motions in themſelves parallel; the other below, into which all, without any bound, would be carried by the ſame motions.

(c) Plut. plac. l. 12.

(c) Motion from reflection may be underſtood to be made, as well when the Atom rebounds by great leaps, as when being impell'd and repell'd within ſhort ſpaces, it doth, as it were, quake and tremble. Whence alſo (d) *it comes to paſs, that while it hapneth that the Atoms run into certain meetings and complications* of many obviating to, and entangling one another, (which is chiefly done in thoſe Compounds where they ſeem to reſt,) yet then they are ſtill unquiet, and, as much as they can, *and according as they are further from, or nearer to one another, they get an agitation, or kind of palpitation, being bent down, or repreſſed by the reſt, which make up that aſſociation.*

(d) Lacrt.

*The cauſe of this* not only longer rebounding, but alſo ſhorter agitation, or, as it were, inward palpitation, continuing ſtill in thoſe Compounds, is partly the nature of *Vacuum*, which, being intercepted even within the moſt compact Bodies, plucks all the Atoms aſunder from one another, either in whole or in part, not having power to ſtay or fix them; partly the Solidity connatural to the Atoms, which by colliſion and repercuſſion cauſe a trembling, as much as that complication will ſuffer that motion to be kept ſtill continued by the ſtroke of the deſcending Atoms.

Atoms. Now since Weight or Gravity is a certain Vigour, or Energy, as it were ingenerate in Atoms; and as I said, an Impulsion, whereby they are fitted for Motion, we must therefore take it for certain, *that* (*) *Atoms are moved* (even with both kinds of Motion, of Weight, and Reflection,) *continually, and through all eternity*, because there is no first instant, since which they began to be made; not only Atoms, but also *Vacuum*, which serves for both Motions, being eternal.

(*) Lucr.

(†) Lucr. We must also take it for certain, 'that † 'that Motion of Atoms, to which nothing occurs, which may divert it by beating against 'it, is of so great swiftness, as it over-runs any 'imaginable Space, *in a moment, that is* in time 'unimaginably short; *for they ought in Velocity to 'out-run those Beams of the Sun, which make not 'their Course through pure Vacuum: I say, to 'which nothing occurs that beats it back*; for otherwise, this frequent Reverberation makes a 'kind of Slowness, as want of Reverberation 'makes a kind of Swiftness.

Ibid. 'Yet doth not hereupon the Atom, which 'suffers several Repulsions, arrive at divers places in such times as may be discerned by the 'Mind, for to discern those times is not within 'the power of the Mind. Besides, it may so 'happen, that the same Atom, though diverted 'by several Repulses, may be so carried, as that 'from whencesoever it comes, out of that immensity of Space, we shall not be able to assign 'any place or term, which in that time it hath 'not over-passed. For the Repercussion may be 'such, (*that is, so little frequent, and so little 'diverting*,) that it may in some measure equal 'the Swiftness of that Motion which is free from 'Repercussion.

Lucr. 'We must lastly take it for certain, That 'Atoms are equally swift, forasmuch as they are 'carried through *Vacuum*, neither is there any 'thing that resists their Progress: For neither 'are the heavy carried on more swiftly than 'those which are conceived light, seeing nothing 'occurs that may hinder either; nor the lesser 'more than the greater, forasmuch as the passage is equally free to all, according to their 'several magnitudes. Neither do the Motions 'which are made, either upwards, or obliquely 'by Collisions, or downwards by their natural 'Gravity, differ in Swiftness; since an Atom, 'as long as it is not thrust on either side, so 'long keeps on its way, and that by a Swiftness equal to thought, untill being driven on, 'either extrinsecally, or by its own Gravity, it 'meets with the Resistence or Assault of the 'Atom that strikes it.

Ibid. 'Moreover, as concerning compound Bodies, 'forasmuch as Atoms are in their own Nature 'equally swift, therefore one cannot be said to 'be swifter than another; as if the Atoms that 'are in compounds, and hurried away by the 'common Motion of them, were carried away, 'sometimes into one place by a sensible Motion, 'and that continuous, and in successive time, as 'whilst such Motion is slow; sometimes whether into one or more places, they should be 'carried in times so short, as can only be conceived by reason, as when the Motion is most 'rapid. But we shall only say, that which way 'soever the Atoms are carried with the compounds, they are all the while exagitated with 'intestine, most frequent, or rather innumerable, and therefore not-sensible, Repercussions; 'untill the Perpetuity or Succession of the Motion of the whole Body come to be such, as 'that it may fall under the reach of Sense.

Ibid. 'For what we fancy concerning the imperceptible Motion of Atoms, as if times conceived by reason might reach the most swift 'Succession of their Parts, is no way true; but 'rather, whatsoever our Mind, attending to 'the very Nature of the thing, apprehends, 'that is to be esteemed true.

## CHAP. IX.

*That Atoms (not the vulgar Elements or Homoiomera's,) are the first Principles of things.*

THis premised concerning Atoms, we now must shew how they are the Principles, or first Matter of things; but because that cannot be done without Treating at the same time of Generation and Corruption; and that cannot be performed, unless we first speak of the Qualities of things, and even before that, of the first Causes which produce these; it is sufficient in this place to take notice, that Atoms are the Principles and first Matter of things, because they are that first and most simple, of which all generated things are compounded; as also the last and most simple, into which all corruptible things are resolved.

I say, the first and the last; for besides other greater Bulks, of which that which is generated may more nearly be compacted, and into which that which is corrupted may be resolved, there are little Lumps, or certain small thin Compounds, which being made by some more perfect and indissoluble Coalitions, are, as it were, long durable Seeds of things; so that things may also be said to be generated of Seeds, not as of first Principles, because even these Seeds are generated of things precedent, that is, of Atoms. And likewise things may be said to be resolved into Seeds, but not ultimately, because even these may still further be dissolved into Atoms.

In like manner, the four vulgar Elements commonly admitted, Fire, Air, Water, Earth, may be called Principles, but not the first; they may also be called Matter, but not the first Matter, forasmuch as they have Atoms precedent to them, of which even they themselves are compounded. Lucret. lib. 1.

And they, who assign one Element only for Principle, will, that of it, by Rarefaction and Condensation, the three other be made, and of these afterwards, the rest of things. But how if it be one, and nothing mixt with it, can any thing be generated? For of Fire, (for instance,) rarefied, nothing else will be produced, but a more languid or a stronger Fire. Ibid.

And besides, that they who teach this, admit not *Vacuum*, without which, neither Rarefaction nor Condensation can be made, they seem not to observe, that Fire cannot be said to be changed by Extinction into some other thing; Ibid.

because

becauſe that which is ſimple cannot be changed, unleſs by going away into nothing. Or at leaſt, if they admit that ſomthing common remains, which is firſt Fire, afterwards Air; ſince this ſomthing is the firſt and common Matter, the firſt Matter is not of itſelf, either Fire or Air, but rather thoſe Atoms which being put together on one Faſhion, may make Fire; being put together after another Faſhion, may make Air.

They who admit many, or all things, to be equally firſt, run moreover into this inconvenience, that making them contrary to one another, they by conſequence make them ſuch, as either can never join to make one Compound, or, if they do, muſt deſtroy one another.

There was a natural Philoſopher, who conceived that all things are generated of tenuious little Bodies, which he called *Homoiomera's*, *ſimilar*, or *like Parts* (as it were,) *viz.* to the things generated; ſo as thoſe (for Example,) of which hot things are made, are hot; thoſe of which fleſhy things, fleſhy; thoſe of which bloody things, bloody; and ſo of the reſt. But if Principles were of the ſame Nature with the things generated, they might, as well as they, be altered and loſe their Qualities, and ſo be changed, and being of a ſimple Nature go into nothing.

Not to preſs, that if the things, whereby ſomthing is made hot, muſt be hot; as if things alike be not generated but of their like; there muſt alſo be things laughing, that a laughing Animal may be made of them; and things weeping, that a weeping Animal; and the like.

## CHAP. X.

### *Of the firſt and radical Cauſe of Compounds, that is, of the Agent, or Efficient.*

IT followeth, That we ſpeak of *Cauſes*, ſince to the making of any thing is neceſſary, not only Matter, *of which*, but a Cauſe, *by which* it may be made; wherefore to ſay a Cauſe is no other, than to ſay, that which in the production of a thing is the Agent, or Efficient.

Now of the things that are made, no other firſt and radical Cauſe is to be required, than the ſame Atoms themſelves as they are endued with that vigour, by which they are moved, or continually tending to Motion. Neither is it abſurd to make Matter active, it is rather abſurd to make it unactive, becauſe they, who make it ſuch, and yet will have all things to be made out of it, cannot ſay, from whence the things that are made, have their Efficient power, ſince they cannot have it elſewhere than from Matter.

Therefore, as the firſt little Compounds made up of Atoms have in themſelves a certain Energy, or power to move themſelves, and to act, conſiſting of the vigours of each ſeveral Atom, but variouſly modifi'd; as ſome of them mutually entangling one another are carried hither, others thither; ſo the greater Compounds made up of the leſſer have ſome power alſo, and that modified according to their Variety; and every natural Body conſiſting of thoſe greater and leſſer Compounds, and Atoms, have a particular Energy, or power of moving themſelves, and acting, modified by a certain Reaſon. Thus, Motion or Action aſcends to and proceeds from it's very Principles.

Yet we muſt obſerve, That though all Atoms are moved alike ſwiftly, yet within the Compounds themſelves, thoſe which are more corner'd and hooked, are intangled and hindred, and ſo made as it were more ſluggiſh and dull, than the ſmoother and rounder. Wherefore the Energy, or power of acting, which is in compound Bodies, chiefly comes of theſe. And becauſe thoſe, of which Fire, the Soul, and thoſe which are more generally termed Spirits, conſiſt, are of this nature, hence it comes, that the chiefeſt Energy in Bodies, is from thoſe very Spirits; which, as they have Liberty of running up and down, ſo they have alſo Dominion within thoſe Bodies.

But foraſmuch as all Effection, or Action, whereby ſomthing is made, is either from an internal, or external Principle, it is manifeſt, that artificial things whoſe Nature is ſluggiſh, and meerly paſſive, owe all their Production to the Efficient, or external Agent. But natural things, although they borrow ſome part of themſelves, or ſome Principle of acting from an extrinſecal Cauſe, yet they owe their Production to the Principles contained within themſelves, as from which intrinſecally, according to all their Parts, they are ordered and co-apted. *Lucret.* 2. 133.

Moreover, the very Action of the external Agent is from its own internal Principles, which always ſo turn and direct the Action, as that it may with greater Strength ſuſtain the Violence of moſt things. For even in ſenſitive Creatures, where there is a kind of voluntary Action, it is therefore ſuch, and carried rather this way than that way, becauſe there occurs to the Mind a *Species* inviting it, rather this way than that way; and the Mind, through the Dominion whereby it ruleth the Spirits contained in the Body, leads them this way and not that way; and together with them, the Members in which they are.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of Motion, which is the ſame with Action, or Effection; and of Fortune, Fate, End, and ſympathetical and antipathetical Cauſes.*

IN the mean time, I ſhall not need to make any Excuſe, for that I confound the Action or Effection of a Cauſe with Motion; ſince it is known, that both of theſe are one with Motion, and only add the Connotation, and for that it muſt be terminated to the thing done or effected.

I underſtand here no other *Motion*, than that which is *Migration* from place to place, which for the moſt part is called Lation, and tranſient *Motion*, and local *Motion*. For thus they name it in Diſtinction from that *Motion*, which ſome uſe to call *Mutation* and Alteration; that whereby a thing remaining unmoved, according to its internal Nature, is, as they conceive, changed or altered through Acquiſition, or loſs of ſome Quality, as Heat, or Cold.

This Mutation or Alteration is not a *Species* of Motion, distinct from that which is called local Motion or Transition. Local Motion or Transition is the *Genus*, this Mutation or Alteration is nothing but a *Species* thereof, to wit, that whereby moveables are carried through short and undiscernable intervals. *For whatsoever compound Body is changed according to Quality, is changed altogether by the local and transitive Motion of the Atoms and little Bodies, creating a Quality*; whether they be transposed in Place and Scituation in the Body itself, or come into it, or pass out of it.

*Sext. Emp. adv. Phy.* 2.

*Ibid.*

For Example: *That of sweet, somthing bitter be made; or of white, black; it is requisite, the little Bodies which constitute it be transposed, and one come into the rank of another. But this could not happen, unless those little Bodies themselves were moved by transient Motion. Again, that of hard, somthing soft be made; and of soft, hard; it is requisite, those Particles whereof it consists, be moved locally, forasmuch as by Extension of them it is softned, and by Condensation hardned; whence the Motion of Mutation is not generically different from the Motion of Transition.*

But to return to that Motion, which is proper to the Cause or Efficient, we may observe, that to some things the name of Cause is attributed, for that they excite Motion. For *Fortune*, which is a Cause of some things, can no other way be admitted, than as it is the same with the self-moving and Agent Cause, and only denotes Ignorance of the Effect connexed with it, and intended by it. Otherwise, so far is it from being fit to make it a Goddess, as the ordinary sort of Men do, (for by God nothing is done disorderly,) that it is not to be esteemed so much as an unstable Cause.

Even *Fate* also is no other than the self-moving Causes, that act by themselves, as they are connected among themselves, and the later depend of the former, albeit this Connexion and Dependance be not of that Dependance and Necessity, which some natural Philosophers would persuade; for there is no such Necessity in Nature, since the Motion of the Declination of Atoms, of which we already spoke, breaks it off, so as it intercurs neither in a certain Line, nor in a certain Region of Place.

Likewise an *End* is said to be a Cause, forasmuch as it produceth somthing, or not produceth it, no otherwise than because it moveth. It moveth, I say, by sending a *Species* into the Soul, which drawes and allures it by invisible, yet Physical little Hooks and Chains, as it were, by which, for the most part, together with the Soul, the Body also is attracted. Certainly, no such Attraction can be understood to be made, unless by some reboundings, and intanglings of Atoms.

Insomuch as even all those things, which are said to be done by Sympathy or Antipathy, are perform'd by Physical Causes, that is, by some (unseen indeed, but) very small Organs, which intervening, some things are as truly attracted to or repelled from one another, as those things which are wrought upon by sensible and grosser Organs are attracted and repelled.

*Lucret.*

For to explain this by an Example. How think we comes it to pass, that a Lyon is not able to endure the sight of a Cock, but, assoon as he sees him, runs away? unless there are some little bodies in the body of the Cock, which being, as in Looking glasses, immitted into the Eyes of the Lion, so pierce his Eye-balls, and cause so sharp pain, that he is not able to withstand or endure it, how fierce and furious soever he be. But in our Eyes, those Bodies produce nothing like this, they being of a different contexture, as shall be shewed when we come to discourse of the Senses. . . .

## CHAP. XII.

### *Of the Qualities of Compound things in general.*

AS concerning the Qualities belonging to Compound things, it is known, that under this term are comprehended all, as well Adjuncts as Accidents of things, but chiefly the Adjuncts, whether they be properly Adjuncts, that is, constantly abiding in a Compound Body, as long as it perseveres, and not separable from it without destroying; or more properly and largely taken, that is, as a mean between Adjuncts, properly so termed, and Accidents, forasmuch as, like these, they exist in them; but in those they come and go, may be with or from a Body, without the corruption thereof.

The most obvious Question concerning them, is, How it comes to pass, that they are in Compound things, when, as we said before, they are not in Atoms, of which Compound things consist? That they are not in Atoms, is already shewn; forasmuch as every Quality that exists in Atoms, as Magnitude, Figure, and Weight, is so natural to them, that it can no more be changed, than the very substance of the Atoms; and this, because in the dissolution of Compound things, there must needs remain somthing solid and undissolved; whence it comes, that all motions which are made are neither into nothing, nor out of nothing.

We answer, that Qualities arise in Compound things, as well from the transposition that is made of the Atoms, now fewer, now more; which in one position afford one quality; in another, another; as from the accession that is made of some Atoms wholly new, and the discession of some pre-existent. Whence these Qualities again are varied, or seem different from what they were at first.

For as Letters give a divers representation of themselves, not only those which are of different Figure and Form, as *A* and *N*, but even the same Letters, if their Position or Order be changed; Position, as in *N* and *Z*; Order, as in *A N*, and *N A*: So, not only Atoms, which are of divers Figures, (as also of different bulk and motion,) are naturally apt to affect divers Senses, and, in one, to exhibit Colour; in another Odor; in a third, Sapor; in a fourth, another: But also those which are of the same, if they change the Position or Order among them, affect the Senses in such manner, that those (for example,) which now exhibit one Colour, presently exhibit another, as we before instanc'd in the water of the Sea, which, being still, seemeth green; troubled, white; and, as is ordinarily instanc'd, the neck of a Pigeon, which, according

cording as it is variouſly placed towards the Light, receiveth a great variety of Colours.

And as there is made a diverſity, not only when the ſame Letters which compoſe one word are ſo tranſpoſed, as that they exhibit divers Forms, but much more, when ſome are added to them, and ſome taken away from them; in like manner it is neceſſary, that Colours, Odours, and other Qualities, be changed, not only when the ſame Atoms change their Poſition and Order, but likewiſe when ſome come to them, ſome depart from them, as is manifeſt from the ſoftning, hardning, crudefaction, ripening of things, and the like.

Briefly, as it is of great concernment amongſt Letters, with what other Letters they are joyned, and in what Poſition and Order they are among themſelves, ſince, by ſo ſmall a number of Letters, we ſignify the Heaven, the Earth, the Sun, the Sea, Rivers, Fruits, Shrubs, living Creatures, and innumerable ſuch like; ſo is it of great concernment amongſt Atoms, with what others they are joyned, and in what other Poſition, and in what Intervals and Connexions, what Motions amongſt one another they give or receive; foraſmuch as by this means they are able to exhibit the variety, as of all things, ſo of all Qualities in them.

To ſpeak more particularly, ſome Qualities firſt ſeem to ariſe out of Atoms, as conſider'd according to Subſtance; and being in ſuch Poſition amongſt themſelves, as that they have a greater or leſſer *Vacuum* intercepted or excluded. Other Qualities are made of them, as they are endued with their three Properties, ſome from a ſingle Property, others from a conjuncture of more.

## CHAP. XIII.

*Qualities from Atoms conſidered, according to their Subſtance, and interception of* Vacuum.

AND after the firſt manner ariſe *Rarity* and *Denſity*; for it is manifeſt, that no Denſe thing can be made Rare, unleſs the Atoms thereof, or the parts of which it is Compounded (they themſelves being compounded of Atoms,) be ſo put aſunder from one another, that, being diffuſed into a larger place, they intercept within it more and larger Vacuities. Neither can any thing Rare be made Denſe, unleſs its Atoms or Parts be ſo thruſt up together, as that, being reduced into a narrower place, they comprehend it in fewer, or more contracted Vacuities. Moreover, it is manifeſt, that, according to the more or leſſer Vacuity which is intercepted, the Air (for example,) or Light is ſaid to be Rare; but a Stone, Iron, and the like, ſaid to be Denſe.

Together with theſe ſeem to ariſe *Perſpicuity* and *Opacity*; for every thing is ſo much more Perſpicuous, (other reſpects being equal,) by how much more it is too Rare; ſo much more Opacous, by how much it is more Denſe: Becauſe the more Rare is the more patent to lucid and viſible beams; the more Denſe, the more obſtructive of them. But I ſay, (other reſpects being equal,) a more thick Body, as Glaſs, may have little vacuous paſſages placed in ſo ſtreight a line, that the beams may paſs more eaſily through it, than through a rarer Body; as a leaf of Colewort, whoſe ſmall Pores are peſter'd with little Bodies variouſly permixt; even the beams themſelves are cut off, unleſs they paſs through ſtrait holes, ſuch as are in Glaſs.

Again, there ariſeth alſo *Fluidity*, *Liquidity*, and *Firmneſs*; for a Body ſeemeth to be fluid for no other reaſon, than becauſe the Atoms, or Parts whereof it conſiſts, have little vacuities lodg'd within them, and are withal ſo diſſociated from one another, as that they are eaſily moveable, one in order to another, through the not-reſiſtence of the little Vacuities: Neither doth any thing ſeem to be firm from any other cauſe, than the contrary hereof; that is, the Atoms and Parts touch one another ſo cloſely, and are ſo coherent to one another, that for the ſame reaſon they cannot be moved out of their ſituation; for ſuch Atoms there may be, as, being more hooked, and as it were, more branching, may hold the Body more cloſely compacted. How Water, in particular, being liquid, becomes hardned into Ice, ſhall be ſaid hereafter.

Likewiſe, thoſe Qualities which depend of theſe, *Humidity* and *Siccity*. *Humidity* is a kind of fluidneſs, only it ſuperadds this, That the parts of a Humid thing, touching ſome Body, or penetrating into it, are apt to ſtick to it, thereby rendring it moiſt. *Siccity* is a kind of firmneſs, adding only this, that a dry Body is void of Humidity.

Moreover, *Softneſs* and *Hardneſs*, which cohere with theſe, and, upon another account, agree alſo with Rarity and Denſity, inaſmuch as (other reſpects being equal,) every Body is ſo much the more ſoft, by how much the more rare; and ſo much the more hard, by how much the more compact; I ſay, (other Reſpects being equal,) becauſe Dirt is ſoft, and a Pumice hard, by reaſon of the greater coheſion of the parts, which peſter the Cavities, and reſiſt the Touch, and cannot retire into the hindermoſt Cavities, as otherwiſe they would.

There are others which depend upon theſe; as *Flexility*, *Tactility*, *Ductility*, and others, from Softneſs; their oppoſites, from Hardneſs; but 'tis enough to have hinted them.

## CHAP. XIV.

*Qualities ſpringing from Atoms, conſidered according to the Properties peculiar to each.*

IN the ſecond manner, and as far as the properties of Atoms are conſidered particularly; In the firſt place, the Magnitude, Quantity, or bulke of every thing, ariſeth no other way than from the coacervate Magnitude of the Atoms, of which it is compounded. Whence it is manifeſt, that *Augmentation* and *Diminution* of Bodies is therefore made, becauſe Atoms, whereſoever they arrive, give to the things an increaſe; whereſoever they go away, they diminiſh them.

Not to mention, that, according as the Atoms are greater or leſſer, may be made that which we call *Bluntneſs* and *Acuteneſs*. And thence a reaſon may be given, Why the Fire of Light-

ning is more penetrative than that of a Taper: Or how it comes, that Light paſſeth through Horn, which reſiſts Rain, and the like.

Beſides, the very Figure of things, though it did not depend upon the Figure of Atoms, (whereas it ſeems to depend upon them, in all things which are conſtantly produced in the ſame Figure,) yet it is generally at leaſt true, that every Body is therefore figured, becauſe it conſiſts of Parts terminate and figurate; for Figure is a Term, or Bound.

Thus, though out of ſmoothneſs, and roughneſs (which, as I ſaid, are allied to the Figure of Atoms,) it doth not neceſſarily follow, that things ſmooth are made of ſmooth, rough things of rough: Yet in general nothing can be conceived to be ſmooth, but whoſe parts, to the leaſt of them, are ſmooth; nor rough, but whoſe parts are rough.

Here obſerve, That as well from the Figure, as from the Magnitude, the Reaſon may be given, Why Wine floweth eaſily through a Strainer, but Oil more ſlowly, which is, that the Oil may conſiſt not of greater Atoms only, but alſo of more hooked, and much intangled among themſelves.

Laſtly, *Weight*, or the Motive-Faculty, which is in every thing, can ariſe no other way, than from the weight or Mobility of Atoms. But that being declared formerly, we ſhall here only obſerve, that all Atoms are heavy, and none light; wherefore every compound Body is heavy, there is none that is light; or that is not of itſelf ready to tend downwards. Here preſently comes in Fire for an Objection; but although it foregoeth not its propenſion downwards, yet it therefore tendeth upwards; foraſmuch as it is driven that way by the ambient Air: After the ſame manner, as we ſee with great force the Water reſiſt Logs and Beams, things otherwiſe heavy; and the deeper we plunge them, the more eagerly it caſts them up, and ſends them back. Whence it comes, that thoſe things, which we call light, are not abſolutely light; as if, of their own accord, they did tend upwards, but only comparatively, that is, as they are leſs heavy, and extruded by the more heavy, which preſs themſelves down before them. So as Earth being the moſt heavy, Water leſs heavy, Air yet leſs heavy than that, and Fire leaſt of all; the Earth drives the Water upwards, and far from the middle; Water the Air; Air the Fire: But if we ſuppoſe the Earth to be taken away, the Water will come to the middle; if the Water, the Air; if the Air, the Fire.

## CHAP. XV.

*Qualities from Atoms, conſidered according to their Properties taken together.*

But Properties of Atoms, being taken together, and thoſe things, eſpecially of which we have hitherto ſpoken, Rarity, Denſity, and the reſt, being commixt and varied, there ariſe faculties of things, which, being active and motive, have it from the Weight and Mobility of the Atoms. And whereas ſome act one way, ſome another, they muſt of neceſſity have it, as well from the peculiar Magnitude, and Figure of the Atoms, as from their various Order and Poſition amongſt themſelves, as from their looſeneſs, compactedneſs, connexion, ſejunction, *&c.*

Of this kind, are not only, in Animals, the faculties of Senſe, Sight, Hearing, Smelling, Taſting, Touching, wherewith they can perceive ſenſible things; but alſo, in the things themſelves, thoſe very qualities which are called Senſible. Theſe are, in things, the faculties of ſtriking, and affecting the Senſes, after a certain manner, to the end they may be perceived by them; as colour and light, the Sight; ſound, the Hearing; odor, the Smell; ſapor, the Taſte; heat and cold (above the reſt,) the Touch. Whence it comes, that being to ſpeak of thoſe hereafter, we ought not here to omit theſe: To treat of which, will be worth our pains.

To begin from Heat: We cannot treat of it, without joyning Light to it, for without Light there are no Colours, the variety of Colours being taken away by night; whence in the Infernal Region, all things are ſaid to be black. But though in darkneſs, all things are alike diſcolour'd, nevertheleſs in themſelves, or in their Superficies, there are diſpoſitions of extreme Particles, by reaſon of which the affuſed Light is ſo variouſly modify'd, that, together with this Modification reflected on the Eye, it exhibits various Colours in the Eye, as White, for example, when the Ball receiveth into itſelf one kind of blow or ſtroke; Black, when another, *&c.*

For though Colours are not coherent to Bodies, but generated according to ſome reſpective Sites, Orders, and Poſitions, yet are they not generated, unleſs Light alſo be adjoyned to the diſpoſure of their Superficies, to compleat or make up the perfect nature of Colour. Neither, ſetting this aſide, do I ſee how it can be ſaid, that Bodies, which are in the dark inviſible, have Colour.

And indeed, ſince not only a Pigeon's Neck, a Peacock's Train, and the like, exhibit ſeveral Colours, according to their ſeveral Poſitions to the Light; but alſo even all other things appear ſomtimes in ſome Colours, ſomtimes in others, according as they are placed in ſeveral degrees of Light, what elſe ſhould we conceive, but that generally it is Light, by whoſe coming things put on Colours, and by its departure loſe them.

In the mean time, Light itſelf, being nothing elſe but a ſubſtantial effluxion from a lucid Body, is not viſible of itſelf, but only in Colour, as that is a part of it; for neither is it ſeen through a pure or liquid medium; neither when we imagine that we ſee it, either in a lucid or an illuminate Body, is it beheld as a thing diſtinct from the colour of the thing lucid or illuminate. In fine, neither is Shadow (the privation thereof,) in any other manner, than as becauſe it is withal the privation of Colour in a thing ſhadowed, which loſeth Colour always by the ſame proportion as it loſeth the Light. How it comes to paſs, that Shadow, though it be a meer privation, yet ſeems to be moved, was declared in the Canonick. *Chap. 2.*

*Sound* is nothing but an effluxion of tenuious little Bodies, ſent out from the thing ſpeaking, ſounding

ſounding, or what way ſoever making a noiſe, and apt, by entring into the Ear, to affect the Hearing.

That it is a corporeal effluxion, is proved, in that it moveth the Senſe, and that either by touching it ſmoothly and delightfully, or roughly and unpleaſantly, according to the ſmoothneſs or roughneſs of the little Bodies. Alſo in that it is moved through the Air, and being driven againſt ſolid Bodies, leaps back, whence Eccho is made; *viz.* by reaſon of the ſolidity of the little Bodies; alſo in that it is diminiſhed, and becomes confuſed, in regard of the long train of little Bodies, when it goes forward, or their ſwerving while they goe overthwart, through ſome thicker partition, and the like.

If you demand, why Sound can paſs, where Light and the ſpecies of Colour cannot, as when we ſpeak, the Doors being ſhut; the reaſon is, becauſe Light, or the Images of Colour, cannot paſs but in a direct line; but Sound can inſinuate itſelf through oblique Tracts. For being excited, it leaps forward in little Bodies, which turn upwards, downwards, forwards, backwards, on the right Side, on the left Side, and every way; in like manner as a ſpark of Fire, ſomtimes ſcatters itſelf into little ſparkles, which take a direct courſe towards all ſides.

The ſame may be ſaid of *Odor*. For this alſo is an effluxion, which going out of the odorous thing, is diffuſed every way, and, arriving at the Noſtrils, moveth the Senſe of Smelling, either by ſtroaking or pricking it. This is corporeal alſo, even more than Sound, in that it paſſeth more ſlowly through ſpace, and cometh not from ſo great a diſtance, and penetrates not through thoſe partitions, through which Sound doth penetrate.

As concerning *Sapor*, there is this difference, That, though it conſiſt in little Bodies, contained in the thing ſtyled Sapid; yet they iſſue not forth into the Tongue and Palate at a diſtance, but then only, when the thing Sapid is applied to the Tongue, they ſo inſinuate themſelves into it, that they affect the contexture of it, either mildly, and then make a ſweet Taſte; or roughly, and ſo they make a ſower Taſte.

As for *Heat* and *Cold*, that Senſation which they cauſe, is to be referred to the *Touch*. But though many of the foreſaid Qualities properly appertain to the Touch, as Hardneſs, Softneſs, Humidity, Siccity, and the reſt, which require application of the thing touched to the Hand, or to ſome other part of the Body; yet theſe two may be felt, not only when the Hot or Cold thing is applyed to the Hand, or ſome other part; but alſo when it is remote, and at ſuch a diſtance, as it can tranſmit ſome little Bodies out of itſelf into it.

*Heat* indeed is chiefly an effluxion of little Bodies or Atoms, in Bulk ſlender, in Figure round, in Motion ſwift. For as they are ſlender, there is no Body ſo compacted, that they find not little Pores, through which they inſinuate into it; as they are round, they are eaſily moved, and inſinuate themſelves every where; As they are ſwift, they rapidly are impelled, and enter into the Body, and more and more ſtill ſucceeding one another, they are ſo preſſed, as that they penetrate through the whole; and if they proceed in acting, they ſever and diſlocate the parts thereof, and at laſt diſſolve the whole. Such are the effects of Heat, and chiefly the fiery (for Fire is nothing but intenſe Heat,) towards all Bodies; and in a living Creature is only added the Senſe of the Heat, which is from the plucking aſunder, and looſening what before was continued.

*Cold* is an effluxion alſo, but of Atoms, whoſe Bulk is greater, their Figure more corner'd, their Motion ſlower; for, the Effects being contrary, the Principles muſt alſo be contrary. So that whereas Heat diſgregates and diſperſes, Cold compreſſeth and conſtipates: And in a ſenſitive Creature, it doth this with a particular kind of Senſation; for, entring into the Pores of the Skin, it keeps back, and drives in again the little bodies of Heat, by oppoſing the bodies of Cold, and with its little ſharp corners is tears and twingeth all things whereſoever it paſſes.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of thoſe Qualities which are eſteemed the Accidents of Things; and particularly, of Time.*

IT remains, that we a little touch thoſe Qualities which are not ſo much Adjuncts as Accidents, and therefore affect not the thing internally, but externally only, and qualifie them with a certain kind of reſpect to ſome extrinſecal thing. Not but that within the things themſelves alſo there are ſome Accidents, (ſuch are Poſition, Orders, Intervals of parts or particles, and the like,) but that being ſuch, they are Accidents of the parts themſelves, not of the whole, which conſiſts of them.

Accidents of this kind, are all thoſe generally out of which ariſeth ſome relation, for which every thing is ſaid to be ſuch or ſuch, in order to another; as like, unlike; greater, leſſer; many, few; ſuperior, inferior; right, left; cauſe, effect; giving, receiving; and innumerable of the ſame kind.

But it is known, that Relation is a work of the mind, referring and comparing one to another; ſo that, ſetting aſide the Mind, every thing is that only which it is in itſelf, but not that which it is in reſpect of another. Whence, to Accidents we formerly referred Liberty and Health, Riches and Poverty, *&c.* becauſe, ſetting the Mind aſide, a Man is nothing but a Man; not free, or ſubject; rich, or poor, *&c.*

Now of all Accidents, there is one which may be termed the *Accident of Accidents*, that is, *Time*, from which all things are denominated, either preſent, or paſt, or future; laſting, or little durable, or momentary; ſomtimes alſo ſwift or ſlow.

For firſt, That Time is an Accident, is manifeſt, in that it is not any thing by itſelf, but only attributed to things by Cogitation, or the Mind, as they are conceived to perſevere in the ſtate in which they are, or to ceaſe to be, and to have a longer or ſhorter exiſtence, and to have it, or to have had it, or be to have it. Whence it comes, that *Time is not to be enquired after the ſame manner as we enquire after other things, which are in ſome ſubject; ſetting aſide the mind; and* Lacrt.

*therefore*

*therefore neither to underſtand what it is, muſt it be referred to the prænotions of things which occur to our ſight; but we ought to diſcourſe of it according to evidence, uſing familiar ſpeech.* And not entangling ourſelves in Circumlocutions, we ſay, Time is long or ſhort.

Moreover, we call it the *Accident of Accidents*, becauſe, whereas ſome things cohere by themſelves as a Body, and as a *Vacuum* or Space; others happen, or are accident to the Coherent, as Days, Nights, Hours; as alſo paſſions and exemptions from them, as Motion, Reſt, *&c.* Time, by the aſſiſtence of the mind, preſuppoſeth all theſe Accidents, and ſupervenes to them.

For Day and Night are Accidents of the ambient Air; Day happens by the Sun's illumination; Night, by privation of the ſolar illumination. Hour being a part of Night or Day, is an Accident of the Air alſo, as likewiſe are Night and Day; but Time is coextended with every Day, and Night, and Hour; and for this reaſon a Day or Night is ſaid to be long or ſhort, whil'ſt we are carried by thought to time that ſupervenes to them, according to the former Notions.

In the ſame manner happen Paſſions, and Indolencies, and Griefs, and Pleaſures to us; and therefore they are not Subſtances, but Accidents of thoſe things which are affected by them; to wit, by ſenſe, of delectation, or of trouble. But theſe Accidents happen not without time.

Moreover, Motion and Reſt, as we have already declared, are Accidents of Bodies, neither are they without time; wherefore we meaſure the ſwiftneſs and ſlowneſs of motion by time, as alſo much or little reſt. And foraſmuch as none underſtand time by itſelf, or ſeparate from the motion and reſt of things; therefore by underſtanding things done, as the *Trojan* War, and the like, which are done with motion, and are Accidents partly of the men acting, partly of the places in which they are acted; together with them is underſtood their time, as they are compared to our affairs, and the exiſtence of the things intervening betwixt thoſe and us.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *Of the Generation and Corruption of Compounds.*

IT remains that we add, how things are *generated* and *corrupted*, either of which is ſome kind of mutation or alteration; but whereas by other mutations, a Body is not made and exiſts new, but only that which now is acquires a new quality, and a new denomination from it. *Generation* is a mutation, whereby every Body is firſt produced, and begins in nature to be, and to be denominated ſuch. *Corruption* is a mutation, whereby it is at laſt diſſolved, and ceaſes to be in nature, and to be denominated ſuch; for thus Fire, a Plant, an Animal, and whatſoever is in a determinate *Genus* of Bodies, when it firſt ariſeth into the light, and beginneth to be denominated ſuch, is ſaid to be *generated*; when it goeth out of the light, and can no longer be denominated ſuch, to be *corrupted*.

When I ſay, that a Body is firſt produced, or beginneth to be, I mean not, but that whatſoever is in it of Subſtance, Body, or Corporeal, was before; for all the Atoms, and little Bulks or Seeds, of which it is compounded, were before. As when a Houſe is ſaid to be made, the Stones, Wood, and the reſt, whereof it is ſaid to be built, are underſtood to be pre-exiſtent. But I only mean, that the Atoms and Seeds thereof are ſo commixt, and ſo united, as that they are in a new manner, or in a new form, wherein they were not before; and therefore a Body reſulting thence, then firſt begins to be, and be denominated ſuch.

Hence, becauſe there ariſeth not ſo much a new ſubſtance, as a new quality in compounds, it cometh to paſs, that Generation is a *Species* of Mutation or Alteration; and ſo is Corruption likewiſe, but in a contrary manner. Wherefore alſo it comes to paſs, that Generation and Corruption are performed only by conjoining and disjoining thoſe Principles, and not by changing them, becauſe the Atoms, as we ſaid, are incapable of change.

'And indeed, ſeeing all change, (as we have *Laert.*
'already ſaid, and ſhall ſhortly ſay again,) is
'perform'd either by Tranſpoſition, adding, or
'taking away of parts; it followeth, that Atoms,
'being ſo compact and ſolid, as that none of
'their Particles can be tranſpoſed, added, or
'taken away, are immutable and incorruptible,
'and ſuch alſo are their Properties, of which
'ſort are thoſe little Magnitudes, and little Fi-
'gures peculiar to them, for it is neceſſary that
'theſe alſo remain with the ſubſtance of the
'Atom, when the Compounds are diſſolved; and
'with good reaſon, ſeeing that alſo in things
'which we transform at our pleaſure, as when a
'Man, of ſtanding, or upright, becomes ſitting,
'or bowed, (or, if you will, is made black or
'hot,) it is ever underſtood, that the ſame Mag-
'nitude, Figure, and Order of parts are in them.
'But the qualities that are not in them, nor pro-
'per to them, as Standing, Straightneſs, White,
'Cold, *&c.* remain not in the Subject, after its
'Tranſmutation, as the others do, but periſh, or
'are loſt to the whole body, or to the part
'wherein they were.

Since therefore, Principles are intranſmutable, and, in Generation, are no other than mingled and put together, it follows that no ſuch mixture can be made, as is a perfect Confuſion by Coalition, but only that which is a compounding by Appoſition; and this, whether thoſe little Bulks made up of Atoms are only mingled, or whether alſo the Atoms themſelves be mingled with thoſe little Bulks reſolved into their Atoms, or firſt Principles; whence it follows, that the deſtruction of thoſe little Bulks, and of the Bodies conſiſting of them, as Wine, and Water, Honey, and the like, goeth accompanied with the generation of the mixt Body, and of the other little Bulks, which are proper to it; not as if Water and Wine, (for example,) but as if aquifying, and vinifying Atoms (as I may ſay,) were mingled together.

And to the Generation, which is made in an infinite *Vacuum*, we muſt conceive, that the Atoms ſevered from one another, and differing amongſt themſelves in Figure, Magnitude, Poſition,

sition, and Order, are carried through the *Vacuum*, and, where they concur, being mutually entangled, are condens'd; whence it happens, that a different temperature of the thing results, for they are conjoined according to proportion of Magnitude, Figures, Positions, Order, and by this means the generation of compound things comes to be perfected.

But where the Generation of one is made out of the Corruption of another, that usually happens after a threefold manner, which we touched, speaking of alteration; either only by *Transposition* of the Parts or Atoms, as when a Frog is generated of Dirt, a Mite of Cheese; or by *addition* of things accessory, as when, by accession of the Seed to a greater mass, (as of Rennet into Milk, or of Leaven into Dough,) there is begotten a Plant, or Animal; after which manner also Augmentation is made, by which the generated thing becomes bigger: Or lastly, by *taking away* somthing pre-existent, as when Fire is generated by the severing of watery, ashy, or other parts which were in Wood; Wax, by the severing of Honey which was in the Comb; and so of the rest.

Here the former comparison of Letters will serve to make us understand two things. One, that the particular manners of generation, and their opposite corruptions, which may be comprehended under any of these three manners, are (if not infinite, at least) innumerable, inexpressible, and incomprehensible, since of Four and twenty Letters only, which are in the Alphabet, there may be produced a multitude of words almost incomprehensible.

The other is, that as words, accommodated to Pronunciation and Reason, are not made of every combination of Letters; so in natural things, all things are not made of all things; nor are all Atoms fit, by being joined together, to constitute any *Species* of compound things. For every thing requires such a disposition, as that the Atoms constituting it match, and, as it were, associate themselves with those which are agreeable to them, but pass by, and, as it were, reject others. Whence again it comes to pass, that when a thing is dissolved, all the agreeing Atoms draw one another mutually, and disengage themselves from those which are disagreeing. This is manifestly seen in Nutrition, which is Aggeneration, and is evident even from this, that otherwise Monsters would be ordinarily generated, as Half-men, Half-beasts; Chimera's, and Zoophyts.

In a word, certainly he never had the least taste of Physiology, who conceiveth, that any thing which is generated can be eternal; for what Composition is there, which is not dissolveable? Or what is there, that hath a Beginning, and no End? Though there were no external Causes to destroy its Frame, yet wants there not an intestine motion, and, even within the most compact and durable Bodies, an unvanquishable inclination of Atoms downwards, whence their dissolution must necessarily follow.

Yet, this dissolution is not always immediately made into Atoms, but for the most part into little bulks, or parts compounded of them; which are certain kinds of compound bodies, as when there is a dissolution of Wood, partly into fire, partly into smoke, partly into some waterish moisture, partly into ashes. But what way soever it be done, we must always hold, that in Generation there is no new Substance made, but præexistent Substances are made up into one; so in Corruption, no Substance absolutely ceaseth to be, but is dissipated into more Substances, which remain after the destruction of the former.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*Whence it comes, that a generated Body is in a certain kind of things, and distinguished from other things.*

MOreover, seeing that every Body is generated only of the aggregation of Matter, or of material and substantial Principles, knitting together in a certain Order and Position; therefore, that which is concrete or generated is understood to be nothing else but the Principles themselves, as they are knit together in such an order or position, and thereupon are exhibited in such a form or quality.

This form or quality, whereby a thing generate, is established in such a certain kind of things, as of Metal, or of Stone, or of Plant, or of Animal, and is distinguished from all the *Species* and *Individuums* of the *Genus* wherein it is; this form, I say, is not one and simple, but rather, as it were, an aggregation and collection of many, which collection cannot be found in any thing, but in this.

'Wherefore we must here observe, that the *Lucr.* 'figures of things, their colours, magnitude, 'gravity, and (in a word,) all other qualities 'which are usually predicated of a compound 'body, as its Accidents, (whether perceived by 'sight, or by other senses,) are so to be under-'stood; not as if they were certain natures or 'substances, existent by themselves, (for our 'understanding cannot reach this;) nor, on the 'other side, as if truly they did not exist, or 'were absolutely nothing; neither again, as if 'they were such, as are those other incorporeal 'things, which are accident to it; nor, lastly, as 'if they were parts of the body. But they are 'thus to be esteemed, that whereas a Body may 'be disposed after several manners, the whole 'complex gains, by the aggregation of them, 'a certain nature proper and peculiar to its 'kind.

'Not that a Body comes to be such, as is a 'greater bulk made up out of a lesser, whether 'those be the first, least, greatest, or in general 'made up of others more minute; but only, as I 'said, that of all these joined together, and by 'this conjunction differencing it from others, it 'possesses a nature proper to itself, and distinct 'from any other.

'All these are comprehended by certain spe-'cial Notions and Conceptions, but so, that still 'the Body, which results out of them as a certain 'whole, and is not divided in itself, but conceived 'as one undivided thing, obtains the denomina-'tion of a Body, which is reckon'd up in such a 'certain kind of things.

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The ſame may, in a manner, be conceived to happen, by the concurrence of certain accidents, which are found the ſame in no other body; that is, the things indeed to which thoſe accidents agree, may be diſtinguiſhed and denominated from the notions of them, but yet only then, when each of thoſe accidents is conceived to be there. For theſe are not of that kind of accidents, which, exiſting in the thing, become therefore neceſſary and perpetually conjoin'd to it, and conſequently beſtow on it a perpetual denomination.

Here it may be demanded, Whether, if we were diſſolved by death, it might happen in proceſs of time, that the very ſame Principles, of which we conſiſt, might, by ſome odd chance, be ranged and ordered again in the ſame manner as they are now, and ſo we come to be denominated the ſame which we are at this preſent? To which we anſwer, That it is doubtleſly true; but ſtill ſo, that, to have been formerly would nothing appertain to us, becauſe, in our very diſſolution, every diſpoſition which we had, and all memory of thoſe things which compounded us, and which we were, would utterly be loſt; by which means, all our remembrance too would ſo have been totally decay'd, that it were impoſſible it ſhould come into our minds that we had ever had a Being. Thus much concerning the Univerſe.

## SECT. 2.

## *Of the World.*

IT followeth that we ſpeak of the World, which is a portion of the Univerſe, or Infinity of things, and may not unfitly be deſcribed, *The whole Circumferente of Heaven, containing the Stars, the Earth, and all things viſible.*

When I ſay, the *Circumference of Heaven*, I imply, That Heaven is the outmoſt part of the World, which may alſo be called *Æther*, and the Region of Fire, from the Stars which it containeth, and are, as it were, Fires lighted there.

When I ſay the *Earth*, I mean the loweſt, or, as it were, the middle part of the World, in which alſo there is the Water, and next over it the Air, immediate to the Region of Fire. And, becauſe the things which we ſee created of theſe, and in theſe, are various; therefore we comprehend them under the name of *things viſible.*

But ſeeing it may, and uſeth to be demanded concerning the World, what Form it hath within, what Figure without? Whether it be Eternal, or had a Beginning? Whether it require any other Author, than Nature or Fortune? In what manner was the production of the Whole, and of its Parts? Whether it require any Ruler, or perform its viciſſitudes by itſelf? Whether, How, and When it ſhall periſh? Whether it be One, or, beſides it, there be Innumerable? We muſt therefore ſpeak a little of each.

CHAP.

### CHAP. I.

*Of the Form and Figure of the World.*

AND as to the firſt Head, the World, by its internal form or conſtitution, is not animate, much leſs a God, as ſome think; but whereas what is conceived to be one in its form or conſtitution, is ſuch, either for that its parts are contained under one diſpoſition, as a Plant or Animal; or, that they are artificially joined one to another, without mingling their tempers, as a Houſe, or Ship; or, that they are diſcreetly diſtinguiſh'd from one another, yet have ſome mutual relation to each other, as an Army, and a Commonwealth; the World is only to be conceived One, partly the ſecond way, partly the third.

The ſecond way it may be eſteemed one, in regard between the Sun, the Moon, and the reſt of the more ſolid and compacted parts of the World, there is intercepted either Air or *Æther* diffuſive, whereby a kind of Coherence is made. It may alſo be eſteemed one the third way, in regard the Sun, Moon, Earth, and other compacted Bodies, are ſo ſeparated from one another, that, after a determinate order, they poſſeſs the Scituations or Seats of Superiors and Inferiors, Antecedents and Conſequents, things Illuſtrating, and things Illuſtrated.

But to ſay, that the World is one the firſt way alſo, How can it be made good? ſince that if it were ſo, that the World, as ſome will, were animate, nothing could be thought inanimate; not a Stone, not a Carkaſs, not any thing whatſoever, that ſame diſpoſition, called Soul, being diffuſed through all things.

Neither do they, who aſſert the World to be animate and wiſe, ſufficiently mind and underſtand, what kind of nature that muſt be to which ſuch expreſſions are proper, ſince as a Tree is not produced in the air, nor a Fiſh on dry ground, nor Blood in wood, nor Moiſture in a pumice; ſo neither can the Mind or the Soul be produced, or be, indifferently, in any kind of Body. But ſeeing it muſt be determinately ordered where every thing ſhall grow and inexiſt, the nature of the Soul muſt be looked for about the Nerves and Blood, not in putrid Globes of Earth, in Water, in the Sun, in the Sky, *&c.*

Now whereas ſome hold, That the World is not only endued with Mind and Senſes, but that alſo it is a round burning God, and ever-moving with reſtleſs Circumvolutions; theſe are Prodigies and Monſters, not of Philoſophers diſcourſing, but dreaming. For who can underſtand, what this ever-moving and round God is, and what Life is aſcribed to him, to be turned about with ſo great ſwiftneſs, as is unimaginable to be equall'd? With which I ſee not how a conſtant Mind and a happy Life can conſiſt.

But granting the World to be a God, not only the Sun, Moon, and the reſt, are parts of God, but even the Earth itſelf, as being a part of the World, muſt be alſo a part of God. Now we ſee, there are very great Regions of the Earth unhabitable, and uncultivated, part of them being burnt up by the approach of the Sun, part being

being oppreſſed with Snow and Ice through his diſtance from it. If then the World be God, theſe, being the Parts of the World, are to be termed, ſome, the Burning; ſome, the frozen Members of God.

As to its external Form or Figure, it ſeems, in the firſt place, certain, that there is ſome extremity of the World, becauſe the World is a kind of Segment of the infinite Univerſe; but what that is, who is able to tell, unleſs he came thence?

For whereas it ſeems to be Heaven, there is nothing in all apparent things hinders, but that it may be Rare, nor nothing hinders but that it may be Denſe; Rare, foraſmuch as the Stars which are in it, and appear to be moved, perform their Motions through it; Denſe, foraſmuch as itſelf is able to move the Stars fixed in it.

Again, nothing hinders, but that it may be either Quieſcent, if the Stars are moved through it; or Circularly moved, if the Stars are carried round about with it.

Beſides, nothing hinders, but that it may be round, oval, or lenticular, eſpecially if it be moved. Again, nothing hinders, but that it may be triangular, pyramidal, ſquare, hexaedrical, or of any other plain Figure, eſpecially if it be unmoved.

As for them, who, being perſuaded by ſome Arguments, aſſert the World ſo to have one determinate Figure, as that it can have no other, we cannot but wonder at their Stupidity. For moſt maintain the World to be, as Immortal and Bleſſed, ſo alſo Round, becauſe *Plato* denieth any Figure to be more beautiful than that. But, to me, that of the Cylinder, or the Square, or the Cone, or the Pyramid, ſeem, by reaſon of the Variety, more beautiful.

## CHAP. II.

### *Of the late Beginning of the World.*

AS for the ſecond Head. The World is not Eternal, but began to be at ſome time.

For firſt, Seeing that the Nature of the Whole and of the Parts is the ſame; And we obſerve, that the Parts of the World are obnoxious both to Generation and Corruption, it follows, That the whole World muſt be ſubject to Generation and Corruption. That the Parts of the World are generated and corrupted, is demonſtrated even by the Senſe, and ſhall be proved hereafter.

Neither let any ſay, That the Mutations which are made in the Parts of the World are not of the more Principal parts, as of the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, and the reſt; but of the leſſer only, which are but Particles, whereof the Principal conſiſt; for he ought to conceive, that if the Principal parts conſiſt of parts ſubject to Mutation, thoſe whole parts themſelves are ſubject to Mutation; and though ordinarily there occur not Cauſes ſo powerful as to change them, nevertheleſs nothing hinders, but that ſuch may ſomtimes occur, as even among the leſſer parts, ſome continue ſafe a great while, which, at laſt, in progreſs of time, find cauſes of Mutation.

Beſides, ſeeing that the moſt ancient Hiſtories of all things exceed not the *Theban* and *Trojan* Wars, what is the reaſon of this, but becauſe the World is not old, ſo far is it from being eternal? For if eternal, why did not other Poets celebrate other things? How came the memorable Acts of ſo many eminent Perſons to periſh? Why are the Records of Eternal Fame no where extant?

In like manner, ſeeing that we have all Arts newly invented, and their Inventors are not unknown, (for, that daily many Arts are advanced and receive increaſe, is very manifeſt,) how comes this to paſs, but becauſe the World had not its beginning long ago? for the World could not be ſo long without Arts, which are of ſo great importance to life.

If you believe, that in times paſt there were ſuch Records and Arts as now, which periſhed by ſome great Conflagrations, Deluges, Earthquakes, being ſubverted together with the Cities and Nations themſelves, do you not acknowledge it neceſſary, that there muſt be at ſome time to come a deſtruction of Earth and Heaven, as it had hapned, if in thoſe caſes ſome greater Cauſes had lighted? For we ourſelves think ourſelves mortal, for no other reaſon, but for that we perceive ourſelves to fall into the ſame diſeaſes, as they whom we ſee die.

The World therefore had a Beginning; nor was, as may appear by what we ſaid, of very great Antiquity. But whenſoever it begun, it is moſt probable it begun in the Spring, becauſe then all things ſprout, flouriſh, and bring forth; and the newneſs of the World required a temperate heat and cold for the cheriſhing of its young Brood, before it ſhould paſs to either of the Extreams.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of the Cauſe of the World.*

AS to the next Head: We muſt firſt acquit the Divine Power from the ſolicitude and labour of framing the World, for it could not be a Cauſe bleſſed and immortal that made it.

With what Eyes could *Plato* look upon the Fabrick of ſo great a Work, as to conceive the World made and built by God? What Deſigns, What Tools, What Beams, What Engines, What Miniſters, in ſo great a task? How could Air, Fire, Water, Earth, obey and ſerve the Will of the Architect? Whence ſprung thoſe five Forms, of which the reſt alſo are framed, ſighting aptly to make up Mind and Senſes? It were too long to repeat all, which are rather in our Wiſh, than in our Power to find out.

Again, this God, of whom he ſpeaks, either was not in the former age, wherein Bodies were either immoveable, or moved without any order; or he then ſlept or wak'd; or did neither. The firſt cannot be admitted, for God is Eternal; nor the ſecond, for if he ſlept from Eternity he was dead, Death being an Eternal Sleep. But neither is God capable of Sleep, for the Immortality of God, and a thing near Death, are far aſunder. Now if he were awake, either ſomthing was wanting to his Felicity, or he was

perfectly happy. But the first would not allow him to be Happy; for he is not Happy who wants any thing to make up his Felicity; the later is absurd, for 'twere a vain action for him who wants nothing, to trouble himself with making any thing.

To what end then, should God desire to adorn the World with fair Figures and Luminaries, as one that dresseth and sets out a Temple? If, to the end that he might better his Habitation, it seems then, that for an infinite time before, he lived in darkness as in a dungeon. Again, can we think, that afterwards he was delighted with the variety, wherewith we see the Heaven and the Earth adorned? What delight can that be to God, which, were it such, he could not so long have wanted it?

But some will say, That these were ordained by God for the sake of Men. Do they mean of the Wise? Then this great Fabrick of things was made for a very few persons. Or, of the Foolish? There was no reason, he should do such a Favour to the Wicked. Again, What hath he got by doing so, since all Fools are even in that regard most miserable; for what more miserable than Folly? Besides, there being many inconveniences in Life, which the Wise sweeten by compensation of the conveniences, Fools can neither prevent the future, nor sustain the present.

Or, Did he make the World, and, in the World, Men, that he might be worshipped by Men? But what doth the worship of Men advantage God, who is happy, and needeth nothing? Or, if he respect Man so much, as that he made the World for his sake, that he would instruct him in Wisdom, that he would make him Lord over all living Creatures, that he would love him as his Son; Why did he make him Mortal and Frail? Why did he subject him, whom He loveth, to all evils? Seeing rather a Man ought to be Happy, as conjoyned with, and next unto God, and Immortal, as he himself is, whom he is made to worship, and contemplate.

For these reasons ought we to say, that the World rather was made by Nature; or, as one of the Natural Philosophers said, by Chance.

By Nature, for such is the nature of the Atoms, running through the immensity of the Universe, that in great abundance running against one another, they can lay hold of, entangle, and engage one another, and variously commixing themselves, First roll up a great kind of Chaos, in manner of a great Vortex, (clue or bottom,) and then after many Convolutions, Evolutions, and making several Efforts, and as it were Attempts, trying all kinds of Motions and Conjunctions, they came at last into that Form, which this World bears.

By Chance, for the Atoms concur, cohere, and are co-apted, not by any design, but as Chance led them. Wherefore, as I said, Chance is not such a Cause, as directly, and of itself, tends to mingle the Atoms, and dispose them to such an Effect; but the very Atoms themselves are called Chance, inasmuch as meeting one another, without any premeditation, they fasten on one another, and make up such a Compound, as chanceth thence to result.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Of the Generation of the World.*

But to discuss this Matter more narrowly, and to come to another Head; the World seemeth to have been elaborated and molded into this round Figure, by a certain kind of Reason, without Billows, Anvile, or other Instruments.

First, whereas the Atoms, by an inconsiderate and casual Motion, were continually and swiftly carried on, when they began to run in multitudes into this immense place, in which the World now is; and to fasten upon one another, they presently became heaped into one rude and indigested Mass, in which great things were mingled with small, round with corner'd, smooth with hooked, others with others.

Then in this confused Croud, those, which were the greatest and most heavy, began by degrees to settle down; and such as were thin, round, small, slippery, these, in the concurrence of the others, began to be extruded, and carried upwards; as in troubled water, until it rests and groweth clear, the Earthy parts settle downwards, the Watry are as it were thrust upwards; but after the impulsive force, which drove them upward, grew languid; nor was there any other stroke, which might toss them that way, the Atoms themselves, endeavouring to go down again, met with obstacles from others; whereupon they flew about with greater activity to the utmost bounds; as also did others, which were reverberated by them, and repressed by others that closely followed them, whence was made a mutual Implication, which did generate Heaven.

But those Atoms, which were of the same nature, (there being, as we said, many kinds of them,) and carried round about in heaps, whil'st they were thrust upwards, made the Sun, and Moon, and other Stars. These were chiefly called Signifying Atoms; those which they left, as not able to rise so high, produced the Air.

At length, of those which setled down the Earth was generated; and seeing there yet remained much Matter in Earth, and that condensed by the beatings of the Winds and Gales from the Stars, that Figuration of it which consisted of least Particles, was squeezed forth and produced moisture. This being fluid, either run down into hollow places, fit to receive and contain it, or, standing still, made hollow Receptacles for itself. And after this manner, were the Principal parts of the World generated.

To say something of the less Principal, the Particles as it were of the former parts; there seems in that first Commistion, to have been made the divers Seeds of generable and corruptible things, of which, Compounds of divers Natures were first framed, and afterwards in a great degree propagated.

Stones, Metals, and all other Minerals were therefore generated within the body of the Earth, at the same time it was formed, because that Mass was heterogeneous, or consisting of Atoms and Seeds of different Natures; and in that the

Bulks

bulks of Stones did diverſly ſwell out to the very Superficies. Whereupon Mountains came to be made, and conſequently Vallies, and Plains muſt needs have been between them.

Soon after, about the Mountains and the Hills, and in the Vallies, and in the Fields grew up Herbs, Shrubs, Trees, almoſt in the ſame manner, as Feathers, Hair, Briſtles, about the Bodies and Members of Birds and Beaſts.

But as concerning Animals themſelves, it is likely that the Earth, retaining this new genital Seed, brought out of itſelf ſome little bubbles, in the likeneſs of little Wombs, and theſe when they grew mature (Nature ſo compelling,) broke, and put forth young little Creatures. Then the Earth itſelf did abound in a kind of Humor, like to Milk, with which Aliment living Creatures were nouriſhed.

Which Creatures were ſo framed, that they had all parts neceſſary for nutrition, and all other uſes. For as when *Nilus* forſakes the Fields, and the Earth beginneth to grow dry, through heat of the Sun, the Husbandman, turning up the Glebe, finds ſeveral living Creatures, part begun, part imperfect, and maimed; ſo that in the ſame Creature one part liveth, the other is mere Earth: In like manner, amongſt thoſe firſt efforts of the Earth, beſides the living Creatures perfectly formed, there were ſome produced, wanting Hands, Feet, Mouth, and other parts; without which, there is no way to take nouriſhment, or to live long, or to propagate their Kind.

What I ſay of other living Creatures, I hold alſo in Man, that ſome little Bubbles and Wombs, ſticking to the roots of the Earth, and warmed by the Sun, firſt grew bigger, and by the aſſiſtence of Nature afforded to Infants ſprung from it a connatural moiſture, called Milk; and that thoſe thus brought up, and ripened to perfection, propagated Mankind.

Two things I add; One, that it is by no means to be allowed, what ſome affirm, that at that time were produced *Centaures*, *Scyllaes*, *Chimaraes*, and other Monſters conſiſting of Parts, of different kinds. For how in a *Centaur* (for example,) could the Limbs of a Man, and of a Horſe be joyned together, when at the third year of his age, at what time a Child is hardly weaned, a Horſe is in full vigor? and at what time a Horſe languiſheth with Age, a Man flouriſheth in the prime of his Youth.

The Other, That in the Earth there were created new living Creatures, and more and greater than now, by more and more vigorous Seeds, and amongſt thoſe, Men too; ſo as that race of Men was more hardy, as conſiſting of greater and more ſolid Bones and Nerves: And ſo at laſt the Earth, her Seeds being exhauſted, like a Woman too old to bear Children, left off to produce voluntarily ſuch living Creatures. Whence it comes to paſs, that now Men are no where generated on this faſhion; but both they, and other more greater and perfect Animals, ſpring up only by way of Propagation.

## CHAP. V.

### *Of the Viciſſitudes in the World.*

THere followeth a Queſtion, Whether the World be Governed by itſelf, or by the Providence of any Deity?

Firſt therefore, we ought not to think, that the Motion of Heaven, or the Summer and Winter, Courſe of the Sun, or the Eclipſe of the Sun and Moon, or the Riſing and Setting of the Stars, or the like, happen, becauſe there is ſome Ruler over them, who diſpoſeth, and hath diſpoſed of them; and withal poſſeſſeth Beatitude and Immortality; for with Felicity agree not Buſineſs, Solicitude, Anger, and Favour; theſe happen through Imbecillity, Fear, and want of external Help.

Neither ought we (it being a troubleſom employment, and wholly averſe from a happy ſtate,) to think, that the Nature which poſſeſſeth Felicity is ſuch, as that (knowing and willing,) it undergoes theſe Commotions or Perturbations of Mind; but rather to obſerve, out of reſpect to it, all veneration, and to uſe ſome kind of addreſs to it, ſuggeſting ſuch Thoughts, as out of which ariſe no Opinions contrary to Veneration.

We ſhould rather think, that, when the World was produced, there were made thoſe Circumplexions of Atoms, involving themſelves about one another, that from thence the Celeſtial Bodies being framed, there was produced in them this neceſſity, whereby they are moved in ſuch a manner, and perform ſuch Periods; and after the ſame manner all the reſt perform their tasks, in order to the courſe of things once begun.

And why ſhould we not rather think thus? For Whether the World itſelf is a God, as ſome conceive, What can be leſs quiet, than unceſſantly to roll about the Axis, with admirable ſwiftneſs? But unleſs it be quiet, nothing is happy. Or whether there be ſome God in the World, who rules, governs, conſerves the courſes of the Stars, the mutations of Seaſons, the viciſſitude and order of things, who is preſent in all places, at all times; and, how great ſoever is the variety, or rather innumerability of all particular things, is diſtracted by ſo many cares, by taking order that they be done this way, and no other; indeed he is, as I before objected, involved in buſineſſes troubleſome and laborious.

Beſides, though it were but only ſuppoſed, that God doth not take care of things, Shall we not find, that all things happen no otherwiſe, than as if there we no Providence? For ſome fall out well, but the moſt ill, and otherwiſe, than they ought. To omit the reſt, if *Jupiter* himſelf did Thunder, or guide the Thunder, he ought at leaſt to ſpare Temples, though it were only not to give occaſion of doubting, Whether it proceed from Fortune, or Divine Counſel; that is, all things, in a manner, holding on their courſe, as it was at firſt begun.

This alſo is of no little weight, That they aſſert a ſpecial Providence in reſpect of Men. For, (not to repeat what I even now ſaid, That a happy and immortal Nature cannot be poſſeſs'd with any Anger or Favour,) put caſe, That God

takes no care of the Affairs of Men, How can they come to be otherwiſe than they are? In them there is an equal, or rather greater Imbecillity, than in other Creatures, equal inconveniences, equal ills: Some of them, making Vows, are preſerved from Shipwrack; How many have made Vows, and yet periſhed? Many pray for Children, and obtain them; How many pray for Children in vain?

But, to be brief, Why, if God takes care of the Affairs of Men, is it Ill with the Good, Well with the Bad? Truly it is an Argument with me, when I ſee Croſſes always happen to the Good, Poverty, Labours, Exile, loſs of Friends; on the other ſide, wicked Perſons to be Happy, to increaſe in Power, to be honoured with Titles; That Innocence is unſafe, wicked Actions goe unpuniſhed; That Death exerciſes his Cruelty without obſerving Manners, without order and diſtinction of Years; Some arrive at old Age, others are ſnatch'd away in their Infancy, others in their full ſtrength; others in the flower of their Youth are immaturely cut off. In War, rather the beſt are vanquiſhed and periſh. But that which prevails moſt with me, is, That the moſt Religious Perſons are afflicted with the greateſt Ills; but to them, who either wholly neglect the Gods, or worſhip them not Religiouſly, happen either the leaſt Misfortunes, or none at all.

Moreover, I think it may not be ill argued thus: Either God would take away Ills and cannot, or he can and will not, or he neither will nor can, or he both will and can. If he would and cannot, he is impotent, and conſequently not God; if he can and will not, envious, which is equally contrary to God's Nature; if he neither will nor can, he is both envious and impotent, and conſequently not God; if he both will and can, which only agrees with God, Whence then are the Ills? Or, why does he not take them away?

## CHAP. VI.

### *A Digreſſion, concerning* Genii *or* Dæmons.

IT is all one, whether God takes care of things by Himſelf, as ſome will have it, or (as others hold,) by Miniſters, whom they generally call *Genii* and *Dæmons*; for things happen no otherwiſe, than as if we ſhould ſuppoſe no ſuch Miniſters; and though it were granted, that there are ſome, yet can they not be ſuch as they feign them, that is, of a Human Form, and having a Voice that can reach to us, To omit, ſince for the moſt part they are ſaid to be ill and vicious, they cannot be happy and longliv'd, ſince both much Blindneſs and a proneneſs to Deſtruction perpetually attends Wickedneſs.

How much were it to be wiſhed, that there were ſome who might take care of us, and ſupply what is wanting to our Prudence, and to our Strength? eſpecially, how much were it to be wiſhed, by ſuch as are Leaders in War of moſt pious and honeſt Attempts, that they might confide not only in Arms, Horſes, Ships, but alſo in the aſſiſtence of the Gods themſelves?

And indeed, ſome are ſaid to appear ſomtimes to ſome Perſons; and why may it not be, that they who affirm *Dæmons* to have appeared to them, either lye and feign, or are melancholy, and ſuch, that their diſtemper'd Body either ſtrangely raiſeth, or diverts their Imagination to extraordinary conceits. It is well known, that nothing is more apt to be moved and tranſformed into any Species (although there be no real ground,) than Imagination. For the impreſſion made upon the Mind is like that in Wax, and the Mind of Man having within itſelf that which repreſents, and that which is repreſented, there is ſuch a power in it, that, taking even the very leaſt of things ſeen or heard upon ſome occaſion, it can of itſelf eaſily vary and transfigure the Species, as is manifeſted by the commutations of Dreams which are made in Sleep, from which we perceive, that the imaginative Faculty puts on all variety of Affections and Phantaſies; ſo that it is no wonder, if, where the Facûlty is unſound, they ſeem to ſee *Dæmons*, or other things, of which they have had any foretaken conceit.

Moreover, they uſe to alledge Divination as an argument to prove both Providence and the exiſtence of *Dæmons*; But I am aſhamed at Human Imbecillity, when it fetcheth Divinations even out of Dreams, as if God walking from Bed to Bed did admoniſh ſupine Perſons, by indirect Viſions, what ſhall come to paſs; and out of all kinds of Portents and Prodigies; as if Chance were not a ſufficient Agent for theſe Effects; but we muſt mix God, not only with the Sun, and with the Moon, and ſeveral other living Creatures, but alſo with all Braſs and Stone.

But to inſtance in Oracles only: Many ways may it be evinced, that they are meer Impoſtures of Prieſts, as may particularly be diſcover'd, for that the Verſes which proceed from them are bad, being, for the moſt part, maimed in the beginning, imperfect in the middle, lame in the cloſe; which could not be, if they came from Divine Inſpiration, ſince from God nothing can proceed, but what is well and decent.

And I remember, that, when in my younger days I lived at *Samus*, that Oracle was much cried up, by which (as they reported,) *Polycrates* King of that Iſland, celebrating the *Pythian* and *Delian* Games, ſent at the ſame time to *Delus*, demanding of *Apollo*, Whether he ſhould offer Sacrifice at the appointed time? *Pythius* anſwered, *Theſe to thee are the Pythian and the Delian*; whereby (ſaid they,) it was ſignify'd, that thoſe ſhould be his laſt, for ſoon after he happen'd to be ſlain. But how could it be ſignify'd by that Anſwer, that theſe Sacrifices ſhould be the laſt rather than the middle? But that the vulgar ſort of Men are moſt commonly led by Hear-ſay, and are greedy of ſtrange Stories.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of the End, or Corruption of the World.*

THat the World ſhall periſh and have an end, is conſequent, Foraſmuch as it was generated, and had beginning; for it is neceſſary, that all compounded things be alſo diſſipated, and reſolved into thoſe things of which they are compounded, ſome by ſome Cauſes, others by others; but ſtill all from ſome Cauſe, and at ſome time or other. Whence it is the more to be admired, that there ſhould be ſome, who, not only broaching the Opinion, that the World was generated, but even in a manner made by hands, thence define, that it ſhall be ever. For, as I argued before, What Coagmentation can there be indiſſoluble? or, What is there that hath a Beginning, but no End?

Certainly, the World ſeems like an Animal, or Plant, as generated ſo ſubject to corruption, as well becauſe, no otherwiſe than they, it conſiſts of Atoms, which by reaſon of the inteſtine Motion, wherewith they are inceſſantly moved, at length muſt cauſe a diſſolution; as alſo becauſe, there may happen both to them, and the World, ſome extrinſecal Cauſe, which may put them to deſtruction: Eſpecially it being known that every thing is produced but one way, but may be deſtroyed many; As alſo, becauſe, there are three Ages in them, Youth, Middle State, and Old Age; ſo the World firſt began to grow up; (as alſo after the time of its generation, there came extrinſecally from the Univerſe Atoms, which inſinuated into the Pores as it were of the World, and by which Heaven, the Stars, the Air, the Sea, the Earth,, and other things were augmented, the congruous Atoms accommodating themſelves to thoſe that were congruous to them) then, becauſe there ought to have been ſome end of growing, it reſted in a kind of perfect ſtate; and at laſt began ſo to decay, as plainly ſhews, that it declines towards its laſt Age.

This is firſt proved, becauſe, as we ſee, in progreſs of time, Towers fall, Stones moulder, Temples and Images decay, whereby at laſt they come to be diſſolved; So we may perceive the parts of the World ſenſibly to moulder, and wear away; a great part of the Earth goes away into Air, (not to ſay any thing of thoſe greater Concuſſions, which make us fear ſomtimes, leſt the whole ſhould fall, and ſinking from under our Feet ſink, as it were, into an Abyſſe,) the Wather alſo is partly exhaled into Air, partly ſo diſtributed through the Earth, that it will not all flow back again: The Air is continually changed, many things going forth into it, and many produced again out of it. Laſtly, the Fire (not only ours, but the Starry Fire alſo, as that which is in the Sun,) ſenſibly decays by the emanation, and caſting forth of Light. Wherefore, neither is there any reaſon to think, that that theſe Bodies of the World will continue ever.

Again, becauſe we ſee there is a continual Fight amongſt the Bodies of the World themſelves, through which ſomtimes happen Conflagrations, ſomtimes Deluges, as it were with equal ſtrength. But, as in wraſtling, ſo is it neceſſary, that in the World one of the Contraries prevail at laſt, and deſtroy all things. If any ſhall demand, which of the two is the more likely to prevail, it may be anſwer'd, The Fire, as being the more active, and receiving particular recruits from the Sun, and Heaven; ſo as, at laſt, it will come to get the upper hand, and the World thereupon periſh by Conflagration.

Laſtly, becauſe there is nothing indiſſolvable, but either as it is ſolid, as an Atom; or intactile, as Vacuum; or hath nothing beyond it, whence either a diſſolving cauſe may come, or whither itſelf may go forth, as the Univerſe. But the World neither is ſolid, by reaſon of the Vacuum intermix'd; nor intactile, by reaſon of corporeal Nature; nor hath nothing without it, by reaſon of its extremity: Whence it follows, that a deſtruction may happen extrinſecally, by Bodies incurring to it, and breaking it; but, both extrinſecally and intrinſecally, it is capable of being diſſolved.

This I add, becauſe the World may periſh, not only by Conflagration, or, if you will, by Inundation alſo, but by many other ways; amongſt which the chief is, that, as a living Creature, (to which I already compar'd it,) the frame of the Soul being unty'd, is diſſolved into ſeveral parts, and theſe at length are quite diſſolved alſo, either by being diſſipated, and turning into Air, and the moſt minute Duſt, or ſerving again for the production of ſome other living Creatures; So the Walls, as it were, of the World decaying, and falling, the ſeveral pieces of it are diſſolved, and go at length into Atoms, which, having gotten into the free ſpace of *Vacuum*, ruſh downwards in a Tumult, and recommence their firſt motions; or run forward, far and long; or ſoon fall upon other Worlds; or meeting with other Atoms, joyn with them to the production of new Worlds.

And though indeed, as a living Creature may be ſooner or later diſſolved by departure of the Soul, ſo may either of theſe happen to the World: Yet it is more probable, that it will ſo come to paſs, as that in a moment of time, nothing thereof ſhall remain except Atoms, and a deſolate ſpace; for which way ſoever the gate of death, as it were, ſhall be firſt opened, thither will all the crowd of Matter throng to get out.

That the World, as I ſaid, is declining towards its laſt age, is probable, for that the teeming Earth, as I lately touched, ſcarce bringeth forth even little Animals, when as formerly ſhe produced large; and that ſhe, not without extream labour, brings forth Corn and Fruits, whereas at firſt ſhe brought them forth of her own accord, in great plenty. Whence it comes, that there are frequent complaints, praiſing the former ages, and accuſing the preſent, for that they perceive not that it is the courſe of things, that all things ſhould decay by little and little, and, wearied with long ſpace of age, tend, as it were to deſtruction. I wiſh Reaſon, rather than the thing itſelf did perſuade, that within a ſhort time, we ſhall ſee all things ſhatter'd in pieces.

CHAP.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of Infinite Worlds.*

MOreover, as to demand, Whether there are, beſides this, not only other Worlds but many, even infinite: This ſeems to be the Anſwer, That there are infinite Worlds. For (a) *the Atoms being infinite, as we formerly ſhewed, are carried through infinite ſpaces; and that ſeveral ways in far diſtances from this World, and there meeting one another in Multitudes, may joyn to the production of infinite Worlds. Since the Atoms, being of this nature, that a World may be made up, and conſiſt of them, cannot, by reaſon of their Infinity, be conſumed, or exhauſted by one, nor any determinate number of Worlds; Whether theſe Worlds be ſuppoſed, framed after one faſhion, or after divers. It is not impoſſible therefore, but that there may be infinite Worlds.*

(a) Laert.

And indeed it is as abſurd for a ſingle World to be made in an infinite Univerſe, as for one Ear of Corn to ſprout up in a vaſt Field, ſowed with many Grains; For as in the Field there are many Cauſes, to wit, many Seeds apt to grow up, and places to produce them; So in the Univerſe, beſides Places, there are Cauſes, not many, but infinite, namely Atoms, as capable of joyning, as thoſe of which this World was made up.

Lucret. 2.

Beſides, we ſee not any generable thing, ſo one, as that it hath not many like itſelf, in the ſame kind, (for ſo Men, ſo Birds, ſo Beaſts, ſo Fiſhes, are multiplied each under their particular Species.) Wherefore, ſeeing that not only the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, the Sea, and the reſt of the parts of the World were generated; but even the whole World it ſelf, which conſiſts of them; we muſt acknowledge, that not only the Parts, but the World itſelf, are not ſingle, but many, as to number, and (for the Reaſons alledged) infinite.

Lucret. loc. cit.

Now there being nothing to hinder, but that ſome Worlds may be like this of ours, others unlike it; for there may be equal, there may be greater, there may be leſſer; there may be, that have the ſame Parts, diſpoſed in the ſame Order; there may be, that have different Parts, or diſpoſed in a different Order; there may be, that have the ſame Figure; there may be, that have a different, (for though Atoms cannot have an infinite variety of Figures, having a determinate ſpace in their Superficies, yet may they be of more Figures than we can number, as Round, Oval, Pyramidal, *&c.*) Although, I ſay, there be no repugnance in this, yet all theſe diverſities are only certain kinds of conditions, which vary the common Quality, and Nature of the World.

But it ſeems, that each of the other Worlds, as this of ours, and every compound which is made in that vaſt Vacuity, and hath any reſemblance with thoſe things which fall under our Obſervation, is generated apart, and after a faſhion peculiar to itſelf, *By certain Convolutions, and Intertextures of Atoms proper to it*; And this, whether it be generated in the *Intermundia*, (ſo we term the interval, included betwixt two or more Worlds, not far diſtant from one another,) or in a multivacuous place, (that is, in which, though there be great and little Bodies, yet vacuities take up the greater ſhare of it,) or Laſtly, in a great unmixt and pure *Vacuum*, though not as ſome (who aſſert ſuch a *Vacuum*,) deſcribe it.

Laert.

For we are to underſtand, contrary to them, that *there floweth together, if not from infinite, at leaſt from one, or more Worlds, or* intermundia, *ſome apt Seeds, that is, a congruous heap of Atoms, or little Bodies, which are by degrees mutually adjoyned here and there, and variouſly formed, and change place diverſly, according as it happens, and withal receive from without ſome Irriguous, as it were, Accretions; until a bulk, conſiſting of the whole Aſſembly of all theſe, be made up, and gain a conſiſtency, as much as the Principles, of which it was made, can well bear.*

Ibid.

*For it is not ſufficient, for the generation of a World, that a great heap of Atoms be thrown together in a* Vacuum, *and by the acceſſion of others, grow bigger, till it roll into another* Vacuum: *In the ſame manner, as a heap of Snow, being tumbled upon Snow, gathers ſtill more, and grows bigger, as was the Opinion of a certain Philoſopher, holding the neceſſity of ſuch a Method: Since this is repugnant to our daily Experience.* For a heap, whoſe immermoſt kernel, as it were, is ſolid, and its outermoſt ſhell ſolid alſo, can neither be rolled up and down, nor increaſed, if the part intercepted betwixt the kernel and the Shell be fluid, as in the World it is.

Finally, That the other Worlds alſo are, becauſe generated, ſubject to Corruption, is too manifeſt to be mentioned; that ſome may be diſſolved ſooner, others later; Some by ſome Cauſes, Others by others, is a thing neceſſarily conſequent to the peculiar diverſity of every one.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of inferior Terreſtrial things.*

BUt that (omitting the reſt,) we may ſpeak more particularly of this our World, ſince all things in it are either contained within the compaſs of the Earth, or exceed not the height of the ground, or are placed on high, that is, raiſed above the Earth's Superficies, and therefore may generically be divided into the low or Terreſtrial ſort of things, and thoſe which are Sublime, Celeſtial, or Aerial; Let us then ſo order our Diſcourſe, as to ſpeak firſt of the former, in regard, that as they are nearer, and more familiar to us; ſo we may thence aſcend by orderly degrees to diſcourſe, and define, what we ſhould moſt rationally conjecture of the later, which are more remote from us, and leſs viſible to us.

In the firſt place, we are to take a general view of the body of the Earth, next of the Water, a conſiderable part of this Maſſe, and mingled diverſly with the Earth, partly in its Superficies, partly in its very Bowels; Afterwards of theſe leſſer Bodies, with which we ſee that whole Maſſe repleniſhed, whether inanimate, as Minerals, Stones, and Plants; or animate, uſually called Animals.

CHAP.

## CHAP. I.

*Of the Earth ſituate in the middle of the World.*

FIrſt then, as to the Earth, we have already ſaid, how it was framed together with the other parts of the World; for it had been to no purpoſe to form it firſt, beyond the utmoſt Surface of the World, and then convey it into the World already framed, ſince it was ſufficient for that Effect, that there were ſuch Seeds found in the Univerſal Maſs, of which it, with the other parts of the World, might be generated; in the ſame manner as it would be unneceſſary, that living Creatures ſhould firſt be ſeparated from, and carried beyond, this Infinity of things, and be formed there, that, being now perfected, they might be brought thence into this our Region. Nor was it needful, that they ſhould firſt be exactly wrought in Heaven, and thence tranſmitted to our Earth; ſeeing no Man can ſhew, why there muſt needs be found ſuch Seeds there, of which Animals, Plants, and other viſible Compounds are made up, and could as well be found here; Or, whence Heaven hath this priviledge, of having ſufficient couveniences for their Generation and Nutrition, more than our Earth.

It is already ſaid, That the Earth, when the Heaven, and other higher Bodies, did fly, as it were, upwards, ſetled into the middle of the World, and there reſted as in the loweſt place. We add now, That as it is the middle part of the World, towards which all heavy things fall; it follows not, that there is alſo a middle part of it, called the Center, towards which, all things that ponderate are directed in a ſtreight line; for all heavy things fall in parallel Motions, without any endeavour to meet in any Angle, there being, as in the Univerſe, ſo alſo in our World, one Region above, from which all heavy things come, and only one below, towards which they tend.

Whence, as they are not to be approved of, who ſay, there are Antipodes, or Men ſo ſituated in a ſtrange region of the Earth, that they walk with their Feet Diametrically oppoſite to ours, in like manner as we ſee the Images of Men, or other things, either ſtand or go with their Heads downwards under the Water; for theſe Philoſophers endeavour to maintain, contrary to the Laws of Nature, and of heavy things, That Men, and other Terreſtrial Bodies placed there, tend upwards, or towards the Earth; and that it is equally impoſſible, they ſhould fall down from the Earth, to the inferior places of the Sky; as that Bodies amongſt us here ſhould unimpell'd mount up to Heaven. However, upon another account they ſpeak conſequently to their Hypotheſis, that 'tis day with the Antipodes when 'tis night with us, and night with them when 'tis our day.

The Earth then is framed indeed after a circular Figure, but yet as a Diſh or a Drum is, not like a Sphear or Bowl; for this Surface of it which we inhabit, and which indeed is only habitable, is flat or plain, and not globous, and ſuch as all heavy things are carried to it in a ſtreight line, or perpendicularly, as was formerly declared.

This being ſo, here ariſeth a great difficulty, How it can then be, that it ſhould ſtand ſteady, and not fall downwards into that Region, into which the Antipodes would ſlide? But, *the reaſon why the Earth falls not, is, becauſe it reſts upon the Air, as ally'd to it in Nature; Nor doth it any more burthen the Air than Animals, which are of like Nature with the Earth, burthen the Earth.*

Nor is it hard to conceive, that in the Air beneath there is a power to ſuſtain the Earth, becauſe the Air and the Earth, by the general contexture of the World, are things not of different extraction, but ally'd to one another by a certain affinity. Whence, as being Parts of the ſame Whole, one cannot be burthenſom to the other, but are held by a mutual embrace, as if they had no Gravity at all; eſpecially ſince this Earth, however in this upper part of it more compacted and heavy, may, deſcending lower, be, by degrees, leſs ſolid, and ſo leſs weighty; till at length, in its loweſt part of all, it approach very near the nature of the Air which ſupports it.

And for this reaſon I ſaid, that the Earth was not made in ſome place out of the World, and thence brought into it, becauſe then it would have preſſed the Air with its weight, as our Bodies are ſenſible of the leaſt weight, if impoſed from without; Whereas, neither the Head, nor other Parts are heavy to one another, by reaſon that they are agreeable to one another in Nature, and knit to one another by the Common Law of the ſame Whole.

And that it ſeem not incredible, a thing ſo tenuious as is Air ſhould be able to uphold ſo groſs a Bulk; do but conſider, how ſubtle a thing the Soul or Animal Spirit is, and yet how groſs and weighty a Bulk of the Body it upholds and governs, and that only by this means, becauſe it is a thing joyned to it, and aptly united to it, as the Air is to the Earth.

But we muſt not therefore conceive the Earth to be Animate, much leſs a Goddeſs, for we have formerly proved the contrary; The Earth indeed many times brings forth ſeveral living Creatures, yet not as being herſelf Animate, but becauſe, containing various Atoms and divers Seeds of things, ſhe produceth many things many ways; of which, Animate Beings are formed. Some there are, who call the Earth, The *Great Mother of the Gods*, and *Berecynthia*. That to the Earth theſe Names be attributed, if it be lawful to make uſe of Divine things, thereby to ſignify Natural things, may perhaps ſeem tolerable; But to believe, that there is a Divinity in the Earth, is no way allowable.

## CHAP. II.

*Of Earth-Quakes, and the Flames of Ætna.*

IT ſeems wonderful, how it comes to paſs, That the Earth is ſomtimes ſhaken, and trembles; but this is an Effect which may happen from divers Cauſes, ſuppoſing that the Earth, as I ſee no reaſon to doubt, is in all parts alike, and that below as well as above, it hath Caverns, Breaches,

Breaches, and Rivers, rolling great Billows, vaſt Stones, &c.

For the Water may move the Earth, if it hath waſh'd or worn away ſome parts, which being made hollow, it can no longer be held up, as it was whilſt they were entire; or, if ſome Wind drive upon Chanels, and Lakes, or ſtanding Waters within the Earth, and the [blow] impulſion either ſhake the Earth from thence, or the agitation of the Wind increaſing with its own motion, and ſtirring up it ſelf, be carried from the bottom to the top; as a Veſſel cannot ſtand ſtedfaſt, until the water which hath been troubled in it give over moving.

Likewiſe the Earth may receive a ſhock, by ſome part thereof ſuddainly falling down, and thereby be moved; ſeing that ſome of its parts are upheld, as it were, with Columns and Pillars, which decaying and ſinking, the weight that is laid on them quakes: For we ſee whole Houſes ſhake, by reaſon of the jumbling, and ſuccuſſion of Carts and Chariots.

Alſo the very Wind it ſelf may move the Earth, either if the Earth (its interior and lower parts being full of crannies and chinks,) be ſhaken by ſome Wind variouſly diſpers'd, and falling into thoſe hollow Caverns, and ſo tremble in ſuch manner, as our Limbs by inſinuation of Cold tremble, and are moved, whether we will or no; Or, if the Wind getting in at the top, and driving downwards, the Earth is driven upwards by the Air under it; which is ſomewhat groſs and watery, (for it ſuſtains the Earth,) and ſhaken as it were from beneath, leaps up, which happens to all things: Not only to thoſe which are forc'd againſt any thing, hard or firm; or ſo ſtretched or bent, that being preſt upon it recoils; but alſo againſt a fluid thing, if it be able to ſtrike it back, as when Wood is plung'd into Water.

The force of this Wind, if we conceive it turned into Fire, and reſembling Thunder, may be carried on with a great deſtruction of all things that oppoſe its paſſage. For as Lightning, engendr'd in a Cloud, breaks thorow it, and ſhakes the Air with wonderful violence; in like manner, may the Fire, generated within the Caverns of the Earth of a coacervate and exagitated Wind, break thorow it, and make it tremble.

Now as there appears not any Cauſe, more likely than that which is taken from the Wind; and chiefly in this laſt manner, either by diſtributing itſelf into many ſeveral Cavities of the Earth; it cauſeth a trembling only, and (as if there were a tranſpiration through the looſer Earth,) the Earth is not ſo broken thorow, as that there is a breach made, or ſomthing overthrown, or turn'd awry; or elſe by its being heaped up together in greater Caverns, there may follow ſuch a ſuccuſſion and impulſion, as may heave up, and cleave aſunder the Earth, and make Gaps big enough to entomb whole Cities, as in divers places it hath often hapned.

What I ſay concerning the force of the Wind, which being turned into Fire breaks thorow and ſhakes the Earth, may ſerve to make us underſtand, that the eruptions of Fire which often happen in the ſame places, as at *Ætna*, proceed from the ſame Cauſe.

For this Mountain is all hollow within, and ſo underpropped with Vaults of Flint, that the Wind ſhut up in them groweth hot, and being enkindled forceth its way thorough the breaches which it finds above, and eats into the ſides of thoſe Caverns; whence (together with Flame and Smoke,) it caſts up ſparkles and pumices.

And the better to bring this to paſs, the Sea lies at the foot of the Mountain, which rolling its Waves to and from the Shore, unto which the Caverns of the Hill extend, thruſts in, and drives forward the Air, whereby the Fire is augmented, and cheriſh'd, as with the blowing of Bellows.

## CHAP. III.

*Of the Sea, Rivers, Fountains, and the overflowing of* Nilus.

AS for thoſe Waters which are on the Earth, (for of thoſe which are generated on high, and thence fall down in Rain, we ſhall ſpeak more opportunely hereafter;) First, there is a vaſt body of them, which we call the Sea: For beſides thoſe in-land Seas which waſh our Shores, there is alſo an extern Sea, or Ocean, which flowing about all the habitable Earth, is believed by ſome to be ſo immediately placed under the Arch of Heaven, that the Sun and other Stars Riſe from it, and Sett in it, as we ſhall have occaſion to ſhew elſewhere.

And indeed, the Vaſtneſs of the Sea being ſuch, it may be eſteemed not the moſt inconſiderable Reaſon, Why the Sea ſeems not to be increaſed by the flowing of ſo many Rivers into it; for all the Rivers are hardly like a Drop, compared to ſo immenſe a Body. And withal the Sun, who with his beams ſo ſoon dries wet Garments; although he ſuck not up much moiſture from every place, yet from ſo large a compaſs cannot but take away a great deal. Not to mention, how much the Winds, which in one night many times dry up the Ways, and harden the Dirt, may in ſweeping along the Sea, conſume of it.

But, the chiefeſt reaſon ſeems to be this. The Earth being a rare Body, and eaſily penetrated, and withal, waſhed on all ſides by the Sea, the Waters, as well as they are poured from the Earth into the Sea, ſo muſt they alſo ſoak down from the Sea into the Earth, that they may riſe up in Springs and flow again.

Neither need it trouble us, that the water of the Sea is ſalt, and the waters of Springs and Rivers freſh; becauſe the water, paſſing out of the Sea into the Earth is ſtrained in ſuch manner, that it puts off the little bodies of Salt, and returns quite ſtripp'd of them. For, the body of the Sea being commixed of Salt, and of Water; foraſmuch, as the Seeds of Salt are more hooked, and thoſe of Water more ſmooth, therefore, theſe glide eaſily away, whilſt the others cannot but be entangled, and are all along left behind.

Hence appeareth the Cauſe (which ſeemeth the Principal,) of the perpetual flowing of Springs: Where they riſe up, there may indeed be ſome great quantity of water gather'd together, which may ſerve for ſupply: But upon another

other account, they may be ſupplied, foraſmuch as there is ſomthing continually flowing from beneath into them. And though theſe ſubterraneous Rivulets (as it were,) might be made up of the ſeveral Seeds, which are diſperſed through the Earth, yet muſt theſe Seeds be ſupplied by the Sea, which ſoaks into the Earth.

Whence it comes to paſs, as was ſaid, that thoſe Rivulets, diſperſing themſelves into leſſer ſtreams, and running down into lower hollow Receptacles, and meeting there, at laſt joyn together in great Channels, and make large Rivers, which continually renew and ſupply the immenſe Sea.

But ſince, there is not any River more wonderful than *Nilus*, for that every Summer it overfloweth and watereth *Ægypt*, we muſt not therefore omit to ſay, that this may happen by reaſon of the *Eteſian* Winds, which at that ſeaſon blowing towards *Ægypt* raiſe up the Sea to the mouths of *Nilus*, and drive up Sands thither, ſo as *Nilus* cannot but ſtop, and ſwell, and riſing above its Channel overflow the Plain which lies beneath.

Perhaps alſo it happens, for that the *Eteſian* Winds blowing from the North carry the Clouds into the South beyond *Ægypt*, which, meeting at ſome very high Mountains, are there crouded together, and ſqueeze forth Rain, by which *Nilus* is increaſed.

It may happen alſo, that the exceeding high Mountains of *Ethiopia*, may be cover'd with Snow, which being diſſolved by the Sun's exceſſive heat, fills the Channel of *Nilus*.

## CHAP. IV.

### *Of the Properties of ſome Waters, and of Ice.*

But that we may ſelect beſides ſome properties of Water, which ſeem wonderful to the Vulgar, I omit at preſent that Property, which is of kin to thoſe we laſt mentioned; That although the Water ſo eaſily diſſolves Salt, and admits to be imbued by it; yet there are ſome ſweet Fountains, which ſpring out of the midſt of the Sea. For this plainly happens hence, That the Water burſting forth from the bottom of the Sea, riſeth up with ſo great vehemency, that it drives away on all ſides the Sea-water, and neither ſuffers it, nor its Salt to be mingled with it.

Wonderful is that Fountain in *Epirus*, over which Flax or a Taper is no ſooner put, but it is preſently ſet on fire and flames. It ſeems, that from the Earth which is beneath it, ſo many Seeds of Heat are breathed forth, as that, though they are not able to heat the Water in their paſſage through it; yet as ſoon as ever they get out of it into the open Air, running into the Flax and Tapers, they aſſociate themſelves with the fiery Seeds, wherewith ſuch things abound, and break forth into flame; in the ſame manner, as when putting flame to a Candle newly extinguiſh'd, you may ſee it light before the flame touches it.

But what ſhall we ſay of that Fountain, which is reported to be at the Temple of *Jupiter Hammon*, cold in the day-time, and hot in the night? Certainly, the Earth about this Fountain, thō it be looſer than other Earth, yet being compreſs'd by the cold of night, it ſtrikes out, or ſqueezeth forth, and tranſmits into the Water, many Seeds of Fire which it contains, whereby the Water groweth hot; but being looſened by the Heat of Day, it ſucks back again, as it were, the ſame Seeds, whereby the Water becometh cold.

It may likewiſe come to paſs, that the Water which is made hot through the ſame Seeds, which are repreſſed in the night-time, by reaſon of the cold Air, may become cold in the day-time, the beams of the Sun paſſing ſo through the Water, that they afford to thoſe Seeds a free vent into the Air: Juſt as Ice is diſſolved by the ſame piercing and rarifying Beams; and though the Effects are contrary, yet may they proceed from the ſame Cauſe, as the melting of Wax, and hardning of Clay.

'Tis from the ſame Cauſe, that Water in Wells is Hot in the Winter, Cold in the Summer. For in Summer, the Earth is rarify'd by Heat, and exhaleth the Seeds of Heat which are in her; by which means the Water, which is kept cloſe within her, becomes colder. But in Winter the Earth is compreſs'd and condens'd with Cold; whence, if ſhe hath any Heat, ſhe ſqueezeth it forth into the Wells.

Theſe put me in mind to ſpeak of Ice, by which the Water, forgetting, as it were, its natural fluidity, grows ſolid and hard. Here we muſt conceive, that thoſe Bodies only are capable of being made ſolid, which are made up of Parts or little Bodies, that have plain Surfaces; becauſe, by excluſion of Vacuity, the Parts cohere beſt with one another; whereas if thoſe little Bodies be round, or joyned to round, or intermingled with plain, there is a *Vacuum* contained round about them, into which the round may roll, and the plain bend; whence followeth ſoftneſs, and (unleſs there be ſome hooks that ſtay it,) fluxibility.

Ice therefore is made, either when the round little Bodies, which cauſe Heat, are thruſt out of the Water, and the plain which are in the ſame Water (part whereof are acute-angled, part obtuſe-angled,) are thruſt up cloſe together; Or, when thoſe little Bodies are brought thither from without, (and that for the moſt part from the Air, when it is made cold by them,) which being cloſely preſſed, and thruſting out all the round that they meet, bring ſolidity into the Water.

## CHAP. V.

### *Of things Terreſtrial Inanimate.*

Our Method leading us to ſpeak of thoſe things which are generated of Earth and Water; it is in the firſt place manifeſt, that thoſe things are either Animate or Inanimate. Animate things are thoſe which have Senſe, and are vulgarly called Animals; Inanimate things are thoſe which want Senſe, whence, under this Name are comprehended all thoſe, to which the Name of Animal is not applyed.

Of this ſort are, Firſt, certain moiſt things which are grown conſiſtent, as we ſee Salt, Sulphur, and ill-ſcented Bitumen generated in the Earth. Now theſe are the chief cauſe, not only of ſubterraneous Heat, and ignivomous Eruptions, as that of *Ætna*, already ſpoken of; but alſo of peſtiferous Exhalations, which being carried on high cauſe Avernous Lakes and Diſeaſes. Wherefore we will ſpeak more amply of theſe, when we treat of Meteors. Concerning Amber, which attracteth Straws, we ſhall ſay ſomthing hereafter.

Of this ſort alſo are Metals, which were firſt found out upon occaſion of ſome Woods being burnt by Lightning, or ſome other Fire, which being quite burnt up, the Metals were melted and ſtuck to the roots, and thereupon dazled the Eye with their ſplendor, and were obſerv'd to retain the ſame Figure with the chinks in which they flowed. Whence Men conjectured, That the ſame Metals, being melted by the force of Fire, might be formed into any Figure, even, acute, or pointed; and by reaſon of the ſolidity they had acquired, might be made fit to malleate, or to ſtrike, or for other uſes.

Moreover, not only Lead, but alſo Gold and Silver lay neglected, as being found leſs commodious for thoſe uſes, and Braſs only was in eſteem, of which were made Darts, Swords, Axes, Ploughſhares, and the like; until Iron came to be found out; of which then, they choſe rather to make theſe things, by reaſon it was of greater hardneſs.

Of this ſort alſo are Stones, whereof many are daily generated, many broke off from Rocks, but the main bodies of Rocks and Stones were made from the beginning; for by this means, as we ſaid formerly, Mountains were firſt occaſion'd; and ſomtimes we find, that the Earth encloſeth in her Bowels, Caverns, Rocks, and broken Stones, as well as Rivers, Channels, and Winds.

Now as Stones are ordinarily diſcerned by their hardneſs and ſolidity, ſo in the firſt rank, as it were, may be reckoned Adamants, not damnify'd by blows, (for a tryal of them being made upon Anvils, they ſplit the Iron,) and huge Flints, out of which, by the ſtroke of Iron, Fire flyeth, for they contain Seeds of Fire cloſe hidden in their Veins; neither doth the cold force of the Iron hinder, but that being ſtirred up by its ſtroke, they meet together in one Body or Spark.

Laſtly, of the inanimate kind are Plants, that is, Herbs and Trees; for the Soul is not without Senſe. And we ſee, that of animate Beings, which from thence are called Animals and living Creatures, ſome have a moving and deſiderative Soul; others a diſcurſive; But Plants neither have Senſe, nor either of thoſe Souls, and therefore cannot be called Animate things.

Somthing indeed they have common with living Creatures, that is, Nutrition, Augmentation, Generation; but they perform theſe things by the impulſe of Nature, not by the direction of a Soul, and therefore are only Analogically, or for reſemblance-ſake, ſaid to live and die as Animals. Whence alſo whatſoever may be ſaid of them, may be underſtood by Parity, and in ſome proportion, by thoſe things which ſhall be ſaid of living Creatures.

I would add, that the original of Sowing and Graſting was, upon the obſervation Men took, that Berries and Acorns ſhedding, and falling to the ground, ſprung up again, and begot new Plants, like thoſe of which ſort they themſelves were. But it is enough to have hinted this.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of the Loadſtone in particular.*

BUt we muſt inſiſt a little longer upon a thing, inanimate indeed, yet very admirable; I mean, the *Herculean* Stone, which we call alſo *Magnet*, for that it was firſt found in *Magneſia*. It is much wondred at, by reaſon of its ſingular Power (or Virtue,) in attracting Iron.

To explicate this Power, we muſt ſuppoſe three or four Principles; One is, That there is a continual effluxion of little Bodies out of all things: As, out of coloured and lucid Bodies, flow ſuch as belong to Colour and Light; From hot and cold Bodies, ſuch as belong to heat and cold Bodies; From odorous Bodies, ſuch as belong to ſmell; and ſo of the reſt.

A Second is, That there is no Body ſo ſolid, but hath little vacuities contained within it, as is manifeſt by all Bodies, through which paſſeth Moiſture, (or Sweat,) Light, Sound, Heat, or Cold.

The Third, That theſe effluent little Bodies are not alike adaptable to all things. The Sun, by emiſſion of his Beams, hardens Clay, melts Snow; Fire reſolves Metal, contracts Leather; Water makes hot Iron harder, Leather ſofter; The Olive-tree is bitter to the Taſte of Man, pleaſing to Goats; Marjoram is ſweet to the ſmell of Man, hateful to Swine, *&c.*

The Fourth, That the little Vacuities are not of the ſame compaſs in all things, wherefore neither can the ſame be accommodated to all little Bodies. This is manifeſt from the contextures of the Senſes, for the little Bodies which affect theſe, move not thoſe; or thoſe which affect ſome one way, affect others another; as alſo from the contextures of all things elſe, for for what will penetrate one, will not penetrate another.

From theſe it is underſtood, that the Loadſtone may attract Iron (and Amber, Straw,) upon a double account. For Firſt, We may imagine the Atoms that flow out of the Stone, ſo to ſuit with thoſe which flow out of the Iron, that they eaſily knit together; wherefore being daſhed on both ſides on the Bodies of the Iron and the Stone, and bounding back into the middle, they entangle with one another, and draw the Iron along with them.

But foraſmuch as we ſee, that the Iron, which is attracted by the Stone, is itſelf able to attract other Iron; Whether ſhall we ſay, that ſome of the particles flowing out of the Stone, hitting againſt the Iron, bound back, and theſe are they which catch hold of the Iron. Others, inſinuating into it, paſs with all ſwiftneſs through the empty Pores, and being daſhed againſt the Iron that is next, into which they could not all enter, although they had penetrated it; from thence leaping back to the firſt Iron, they made other complications like the former; and if any happened

ned to penetrate farther, they likewiſe might attract another Iron, and that another, upon the ſame ground.

Moreover, it may be conceived in this manner, that there flow certain little Bodies, as well out of the Magnet, as out of the Iron, but more and ſtronger out of the Magnet; whereby it comes to paſs, that the Air is driven away much farther from about the Magnet, than from about the Iron; whereupon there are many more little vacuities made about it than about the Iron. And becauſe the Iron is placed within the compaſs of the diſpelled Air, there is much *Vacuum* taken up betwixt it and the Magnet. Whence it happens, that the little Bodies leap forward more freely, to be carried into that place, and thereupon run towards the Magnet; but they cannot go thither in a great and extraordinary company, without enticing along the things that cohere with them; and ſo the whole maſs, conſiſting of ſuch coherent things, goes along with them.

It may alſo be ſaid, that the motion of the Iron is aſſiſted by the Air, through its continual motion and agitation. And that firſt from the outward Air, which continually preſſing, and preſſing more vehemently where it moſt abounds, cannot but drive the Iron into that part where there is leſs, or which is more vacuous, as towards the Magnet. Next from the inward, which in the ſame manner continually agitating, moving, and driving, cannot but give it a motion into that part, where there is greateſt Vacuity.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of the Generation of Animals.*

WE come now to ſpeak of Animals, which are of ſo different Natures, ſome Walking, others Flying, others Swimming, others Creeping; ſome being Greater, ſome Leſſer; ſome more Perfect, ſome leſs Perfect, (even we Ourſelves alſo being Animals,) and yet withal ſtill of one Nature; that Nature diſcovers an admirable Power in the compoſure of them.

For ſince Nature is, as it were, inſtructed by the things themſelves, and from their orderly procedure, and compelled by a kind of neceſſity, or by the concatenation of Motions, to perform theſe ſo many and ſo different Effects, which we call the Works of Nature; this eſpecially appears in Animals, becauſe the concatenation of Motions ſhews itſelf to be Artificial, chiefly in them, although proceeding from a ſubſtance utterly void of Reaſon.

And although the Atoms themſelves be not endued with Reaſon, nor their motion govern'd by a rational Conduct; yet the nature of every living Creature in the beginning of the World grew to be ſuch, that, according to the temperature of thoſe Motions, which the Atoms then had, other Motions ſtill, and others followed, which being cauſed after the ſame manner ſtill produced their Like. By which means thoſe motions, which, in the beginning were merely caſual, in proceſs of time became artificial, and ſucceeded after a conſtant and determinate Order.

But to diſcourſe more fully hereupon, Divers kinds of Animals being produced in the beginning of the World, it came to paſs, firſt by their receiving congruous Aliment, that thoſe Atoms, which are adaptable to one another; were attracted and intangled by their fellow-Atoms, which were already in the Animal, (thoſe which were not adaptable being cut off,) ſo that a peculiar Nature to every one of them, *viz.* Such a compound of ſuch Atoms grows up firſt, and at length becomes confirmed.

Next, That by the perpetual motion of Atoms, and their intrinſecal Ebullition, ſome of them being ſtill thruſt out of their place, and running into the genital parts, meet there from all places; and, there being a diſtinction of Sexes, after mutual Appetition and Coition, are received in the Womb.

After this, that the Atoms, or ſeminal Bodies compounded of them, and flowing from all parts, (whence therefore, *the Seed may be conceived as ſomthing incorporeal*, not in rigour indeed, becauſe only *Vacuum* is truly ſuch, but *in the moſt familiar Senſe of the Word, by which we term any thing incorporeal, which eaſily penetrates through the moſt ſolid Bodies*,) that the Atoms, I ſay, are thoſe ſeminal little Bodies, which thus flowed from all parts, did therefore (this Motion continuing,) withdraw them from the tumult of others, and, like Atoms, drawing their Like; therefore thoſe that come from the Head would betake themſelves to one place; thoſe from the Breaſt into the next place; and thoſe which come from every other part, each rank themſelves in their diſtinct ſituations; and ſo at length, a little Animal is formed like that, whence the Seed was taken. *Laert.*

Moreover, that this little Animal is nouriſhed, and increaſeth by the attraction of like Atoms, or little Bodies meeting together in the Womb; until the Womb being wearied, and no longer fit to nouriſh them, ſlackens its motions, or rather opens the door, and gives them leave to go out.

Further, that this Animal being after the ſame manner fully grown up, and the continual agitation of the Atoms perſuing one another, not ceaſing, it begetteth another like thing, and that other conſequently another.

At length, that Nature, being by little and little accuſtomed hereunto, learneth, as it were, ſo to propagate Animals like in their kinds, as that from the motion, and perpetual Series of Atoms, it derives a neceſſity of operating continually in this manner.

Thus much for the generation of thoſe Animals, which are made by Propagation; As for thoſe which we ſomtimes ſee produced otherwiſe, they may be generated after the ſame manner, as all things at firſt were; whether ſome Seeds of them were remaining, formed from the very beginning; or whether daily formed, either within, or without, the Animals themſelves; and if within, then thruſt out, (as in the generation of Worms, and Flies, leaving behind them ſome remainders, either in the Earth, or elſewhere; of which, other Animals, of the ſame kinds, are begotten.)

What I ſaid of the defluxion of Seed, I mean not only, on the parts of the Male, but of the

Female alſo, ſeeing that ſhe likewiſe emitteth, having *Paraſtatæ* or Teſticles, though placed in a contrary way, and therefore is ſhe deſirous of Coition.

And this indeed ſeems neceſſary to be granted towards giving the Reaſon, why a Male or Female is formed; for nothing can be alledged more proper than this, that whereas the young One conſiſts of the Seeds, both of its Sire and Dam, if that of the Sire predominate, it proves Male, if that of the Dam, Female.

Hence alſo may be given a cauſe of the reſemblance which it hath to either, or both its Parents; for if the Female with a ſudden force attracts, and ſnatcheth away the Seed of the Male, then the young One becometh like the Dam, if both alike, it becometh like both, but mixtly.

If you demand, Why Children are ſomtimes like their Grandfathers, or Great Grandfathers? The Reaſon ſeems to be this; the Seed is made up of many little Bulks, which are not always all of them diſſolved into Atoms, or neareſt to Atoms, in the firſt or next Generations, but at length in ſome one of the following Generations, they unfold themſelves in ſuch manner, as that, what they might have done in the Immediate, they exhibit only in the Remote.

But whence comes Barrenneſs? From the Seed's being either thinner than it ought, ſo as it cannot faſten on the place; or thicker, ſo as it cannot eaſily be commixed: For there is requiſite a due proportion betwixt the Seeds of the Male, and of the Female; whence it happens, that many times the ſame Man or Woman who are incapable of having Children by one, may yet have them by another. I omit other Reaſons, as from the Aliment, ſince it is manifeſt, that Aliment, by which Seed is increaſed, differs from that whereby it is attenuated and waſted.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of the uſe of Parts in Animals.*

HEnce follows, That the parts of Animals were not from the very beginning of things framed, after the faſhion they have now, for thoſe ends and uſes whereto we ſee them now ſerve, (for there was no cauſe to foreſee this end, nor any thing precedent to which that cauſe attending, and thence taking a conjectural aim might deſign any ſuch faſhion,) but becauſe it hapned that the parts were made, and did exiſt as we now ſee them; therefore they came to be applied to theſe uſes rather than to others, and being firſt made, themſelves became afterwards the occaſion of their own uſefulneſs, and inſinuated the knowledge of it into the minds of the Uſers.

The Eyes therefore were not made to ſee, nor the Ears to hear, nor the Tongue to ſpeak, nor the Hands to work, nor the Feet to go, for all theſe Members were made before there was Seeing, Hearing, Speaking, Working, Going; but theſe became their Functions after they had been made.

For the Soul being formed together with and within the Body, and moreover being capable of Senſe, the Eye hapned to be made of ſuch a Contexture, that the Soul, being applied unto it, could not but produce the ſenſitive act of Seeing; and the Ear of ſuch, as that being joined to it, it could not but produce Hearing; and there being within the Body, made together with it, an Animal Spirit capable to impel and move, the Tongue hapned to be framed after ſuch a Contexture, as that this Spirit coming to it, could not but move it, and break the Air (which at the ſame time it breathed forth,) into words. In like manner, the Hands, the Feet, and the reſt of the Limbs were ſo faſhioned, as that this Spirit ruſhing into them could not but give this motion to one, and that to the other.

As for the Tendons, which are plainly the Organs, by which the Parts are ſtirred, it is evident that the Actions are not ſtrong, becauſe theſe are big; nor remiſs, becauſe they are ſmall; but the Actions are ſuch or ſuch, according to the occaſions of frequent or ſeldom uſing them: But the bigneſs of the Tendons follows the quantity of the Motion, ſo that thoſe which are exerciſed are in good plight, and grow conveniently bigger, thoſe which lie idle thrive not, but waſte away.

Wherefore the Tendons were not ſo formed by Nature, as if it were better, that they ſhould be ſtrong and big for the diſcharge of vehement Functions; weak and ſlender for the weaker, (for we ſee even Apes have Fingers faſhioned like ours,) but, as was ſaid before, thoſe which are exerciſed, muſt of neceſſity be big, becauſe they are well nouriſhed; and thoſe which are not exerciſed ſmall, becauſe they are leſs nouriſhed.

For Confirmation hereof may be alledged, that moſt Parts are ſomtimes directed to thoſe uſes for which no Man will ſay they were deſign'd; and this, when either Neceſſity or Occaſion, or ſome Conjecture taken elſewhere, lays them open to us, as Men would not ſo much as dream of fighting with Weapons, if they had not firſt fought with their Hands; nor of holding Shields before them, if they had not firſt felt Wounds that were to be avoided; nor of making ſoft Beds, if they had not firſt ſlept on the Ground; nor of making Cups, if they had not drunk Water firſt out of their Hands; nor of making Houſes, if they had not been acquainted with the uſe of Caves; And ſo of the reſt.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Of the Soul, the intrinſecal Form of Animals.*

LET us now come to the Soul, by which Animals are, and from it have their denomination. In the firſt place we muſt conceive it to be Corporeal, *ſome moſt tennious or ſubtle Body, made up of moſt ſubtle Particles.* Doubtleſs *they who affirm it is Incorporeal, beſides that they abuſe the Word, play the Fools exceedingly*; For, except it were ſuch, it could neither act nor ſuffer; it could not act, for it could not touch any thing; it could not ſuffer, for it could not be touch'd by any thing, but *would be as a meer Vacuity, which, as I ſaid before, is ſuch that it can neither act nor ſuffer any thing, but only affords a free motion to Bodies paſſing thorow it.* Laert.

Now

*Now that the Soul acts and ſuffers ſomthing, is manifeſtly declared by thoſe things which happen about its Senſes and Affections*; as alſo by the motions wherewith it impels the members, and, from within, governeth the whole Animal, turneth it about, tranſports it with Dreams; and, in general, by its union and conſent, to mix in one compound with this groſſer matter, which uſually, upon this occaſion, is more particularly termed the Body.

I ſay, it is a moſt tenuious and ſubtle Body, for that *it is made up of moſt tenuious or moſt ſubtle little Bodies; which, as they are, for the moſt part, exceeding ſmooth, ſo are they very round*; otherwiſe they could not permeate, and cohere intrinſecally with the whole Body, and with all its parts, as with Veins, Nerves, Entrals, and the reſt. Which is manifeſt even from hence, for that when the Soul goeth out of the Body, we find not that any thing is taken off from the Whole, neither as to its Figure nor Weight; but like Wine, when its flower or ſpirit is gone; or Unguent, that hath loſt its ſcent; for the Wine and Unguent retain the ſame quantity, as if nothing of them were periſhed. So that the Soul, if you ſhould imagine her to be rolled up together, might be contained almoſt in a point, or the very leaſt of places.

Nevertheleſs, though it be of ſuch a ſubtle Contexture, yet is it mixed and compounded of four ſeveral Natures: for we are to conceive it a thing made up and contemperated of ſomthing fiery, ſomthing aerial, ſomthing flatuous, and a fourth which hath no name; by means whereof, it is endued with a ſenſitive faculty.

The Reaſon is this, becauſe when a thin Breath departs out of the Body of a dying perſon, this Breath is mixed with Heat, and Heat attracts Air, there being no Heat without Air. Thus we have three of thoſe things which make up the Soul; and becauſe there is none of theſe three from which the ſenſitive motions can be derived, we muſt therefore admit a fourth, though without a name, whereunto the ſenſitive Faculty may be attributed.

This may be confirmed from hence, for that there is a certain Breath or Gale, as it were, and Wind, which is cauſe of the Body's motion; Air, of its Reſt; ſomthing Hot, cauſe of the Heat that is in it; there muſt likewiſe be ſome fourth thing, the cauſe of its Senſe.

Now the neceſſity of this fourth being manifeſt, upon another account, Anger, by which the Heart boils, and Fervor ſparkles in the Eyes, convinceth, that there is Heat in it; Fear, exciting Horror throughout the Limbs, argues a Cold, or copious Breath or Wind; and the calm ſtate of the Breaſt, and ſerenity of the Countenance, demonſtrates there is Air.

Whence it comes to paſs, that thoſe Animals in which Heat is predominant are angry, as Lions; thoſe in which a cold Breath, are timorous, as Harts; thoſe in which an aerial portion, are more quiet, and, as it were, of a middle condition between Lions and Harts, as Oxen. The ſame difference is alſo to be obſerv'd amongſt Men.

Laſtly, Although the Soul be a mixt and compounded thing, and this fourth nameleſs thing, or ſenſitive faculty, be the chief of its parts, (it being, in a manner, the Soul of the Soul, for from it the Soul hath; that it is a Soul, and it diſtinguiſhes Animals from other things, as their intrinſecal form and eſſential difference,) nevertheleſs theſe parts are ſo perfectly contemperated, as that of them is made one ſubſtance, and that moſt ſubtle and moſt coherent; neither, as long as the Soul is in the Body, can theſe four be ſeparated from one another, any more than Odor, Heat, or Sapor, which are natural to any inward part of the Body, can be ſeparated from it.

Now this ſubſtance being contained in the Body, and coherent, as it were, with it, is, in a manner, upheld by it, and is likewiſe the cauſe of all the Faculties, Paſſions, and Motions in the Body, and mutually containeth the Body, and governeth it, and is moreover the cauſe of its health and preſervation, and can no more be ſevered from the Body, without the diſſolution thereof, than Scent can be divided from Frankincenſe, without deſtruction of its nature.

I ſhall not need to take notice, that one of the Natural Philoſophers ſeems, without any reaſon, to conceive, that there are as many parts of the Soul, as of the Body, which are mutually applied to one another. For the ſubſtance of the Soul being ſo ſubtle, and the bulk of the Body ſo groſs, doubtleſs its Principles muſt be more ſubtle and fewer than thoſe of the Body; ſo that every one of theſe coheres not with another, but each of them to little bulks and heaps, as it were, that conſiſt of a greater number. Whence it comes to paſs, that ſomtimes we feel not when Duſt, or a Gnat lights upon the Body, nor a Miſt in the Night, nor the Spiders thread, nor Feathers, nor Thiſtle-down, or the like, when we meet with them; it being requiſite, that more of the little Bodies which are mingled with the parts of the Soul be ſtirred up, before they can feel any thing that toucheth or ſtriketh them.

We muſt further obſerve, that there is ſome internal part of the Body of ſuch a temperature, as that where the Soul adheres to it, it receives an extraordinary Perfection. This Perfection is the Mind, the Intellect, or that which we call the Rational part of the Soul; becauſe (the other part diffuſed through the whole Body being irrational,) this only diſcourſeth.

Now foraſmuch as the Irrational part is twofold, Senſe, and Affection or Appetite, and the Intellect is between both, for it hath the Senſe going before it to judge of things, and the Appetite coming after it, that by its own judgment it may direct it. We ſhall therefore, being to ſpeak of each, begin with the Senſe.

## CHAP. X.

### *Of Senſe in general, which is the Soul (as it were) of the Soul.*

TO ſpeak therefore firſt of Senſe in general: We muſt obſerve, that the Soul poſſeſſeth it after ſuch a manner, as that both to have it, and to uſe it, it requireth the Body, as being the thing wherein it is contained, and with which it operates. *Now the Body affording this to the Soul*, viz. *That it hath a Principle of Senſation, and is able to uſe it, becometh itſelf alſo par-*

*participant of this Effect, which dependeth upon that Principle,* (that is to say, it feeleth or perceiveth,) *but not of all things that belong thereto,* as of Tenuity, and the like.

*Ibid.* Wherefore it is not to be wondred at, that *the Body, when the Soul is departed, remaineth void of Sense; for it did not of itself possess this Faculty, but only made it ready for the Soul, which was congenious with it: Which Soul, by means of the Faculty coffected in the Body, exercising, by a peculiar motion of hers, the Act of Sensation, giveth Sense, not only to itself, but to the Body also, by reason of their Neighborhood, Cohæsion, or Union with one another.*

Thus it comes to pass, that not the Soul alone, nor the Body alone, perceive or feel, but rather both together; and though the Principle of Sensation be in the Soul, yet whoever holds, that the Body doth not perceive or feel together with the Soul, and believeth that the Soul, intermingled with the whole Body, is able of herself to perform this motion of Sensation, he oppugns a thing most manifest.

*Lucret.* And they who say, (as some do,) that the Eyes see not any thing, but it is the Soul only that seeth through them, as through open doors, observe not, that if the Eyes were like doors, we might see things much better if our Eyes were out, as if the doors were taken away.

Now that which here seems the greatest difficulty being this, How it comes to pass that a thing Sensitive, or capable of Sense, may be generated of Principles that are wholly Insensitive, or void of Sense; we are to take notice, that this is to be ascribed to some necessary and peculiar Magnitude, Figure, Motion, Position, and Order of those Principles, as was before declared when we treated of Qualities, for the Faculty of Sense is one of the Qualities, which, that it appear where it was not, requireth that there be some Addition, Detraction, Transposition, and, in a word, a new Contexture, able to do that which the former could not.

Yet we must not therefore believe, that Stones, Wood, Clods of Earth, and such like Compounds, perceive, or feel; for, as other Qualities, so this also is not begotten of every mixtion, or of the mixtion of any kind of things, but it is wholly requisite, that the Principles be endued with such a Bigness, such Figures, Motions, Orders, and the like Accidents; whence it comes to pass, that even Clods of Earth, Wood, and the like, when putrifi'd by Rain, and heated by the Sun, the Position and Order of their Parts being changed, turn into Worms, and other sensitive things. This may be understood from the several Aliments, which being applied to the Bodies of living Creatures, and variously altered, do, in like manner, of Insensitive become Sensitive; as Wood applied to Fire, of Not-burning becometh Burning.

And that it may appear, how much some are mistaken, who assert, that the Principles whereof Sense and Sensitive things consist must be sensitive; consider, that if they were such, they must be soft, forasmuch as no hard, or solid thing is capable of Sense, and consequently, as we argued before, they must be corruptible; because, unless they are solid, they may be diminished, and so lose their Nature, whereas the Principles of Things, as we have often heretofore alledged, must be incorruptible and permanent.

It may otherwise be proved thus, If we allow the Principles to be Incorruptible, we cannot conceive them to be Sensitive; neither as Parts, for Parts severed from the Whole feel not; neither as Wholes, for then they would be Animals, and consequently Mortal, or Corruptible, which is contrary to the *Hypothesis*. Moreover, if we should admit, that they are both Animals, and Immortal, it would follow, that no such Animals as we now behold, (that is, of a peculiar kind, and agreeing in one *species*,) could be generated, but only a heap of several little Animals.

Furthermore, If sensitive Things must be generated of sensitive, that is, like of like, it will be necessary, as we said before, that a Man (for Example,) consist of Principles that laugh, weep, ratiocinate, discourse of the mixture of Things, and of themselves, enquiring of what Things they consist, and these being like to corruptible Things must consist of others, and those likewise of others, into infinite.

Now it being well known, that in the Bodies of Animals there are five distinct Organs of Sense, by which the Soul (or the sensitive Faculty in Her,) apprehends, and perceives sensible Objects several ways, that is, by Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, Touching; nothing hinders, but that we allow Five Senses, the Sight, the Hearing, the Smell, the Taste, and the Touch.

All this diversity ariseth from hence, that on one side the *species* of Colours, and visible Things, as also Sounds, Odors, Sapors, and other Qualities, are made up of little Bodies, endued with particular Magnitudes, Figures, Positions, Orders, and Motions. On the other side, the Organs of Sight, Hearing, and the rest of the Senses, are of such Contextures as contain little Vacuities, or Pores, which have likewise peculiar Magnitudes, Figures, Positions, and Orders, and these Organs being various have several Aptnesses and Proportions, to which the several little Bodies of the Qualities are commensurated, so as some can receive into themselves these, others those, whence it happens, that only these little Bodies, of which the *species* of Colour consist, are capable of penetrating into the Organ of Sight, and to move and affect it after that manner: But so are not the little Bodies, which are only capable of piercing, moving, and affecting the Organ of Hearing, or those which can only affect that of the Touch, and so of the rest.

Hence also, when we observe, that not only Animals of different kinds, but even amongst Men themselves, some are not affected with the same sensible Objects, we may understand that there is not in them the same kind of Contexture. And since in all little Bodies blended and mingled together, some will naturally agree with others, some not, therefore neither can the impression and apprehensions, or sensation of the same quality be made in all Animals, neither can a sensible Object affect all Animals alike with all its parts, but each one with those qualities only which are suitable to their Senses, and convenient to affect them.

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I shall add nothing concerning the common Objects of Sense, as Magnitude, Figure, Motion, and the like, which are perceptible by more Senses than one; for what we said of them in the Canonick, is sufficient.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of Sight, and of the Images which glide into it.*

BEing to speak something of every Sense, we must begin with Sight, whose Organ manifestly is the Eye; nor is it less evident, that *the external Appearances, and Forms of Things, are therefore seen by us; because something glides from without, or from the Objects into us, that is, into our Eye.* But before we undertake to shew, that this is far more probable than what others assert, we must declare whether there be any thing which comes from the Things themselves into our Eye, and of what nature it is. Laert.

First then we affirm, that nothing hinders but that certain 'Effluxions of Atoms, perpetually 'flying in an uninterrupted course, are sent from 'the Surfaces of Bodies, in which also the same 'Position and same Order may be preserved, 'which was found in the Superficies and Solids of 'the very Bodies themselves, whence such Ef- 'fluxions are as it were Forms, Figures, or Ima- 'ges of these Bodies from which they are deri- 'ved, and resembling them in all their Linea- 'ments; and, moreover, are far more subtle than 'any of the things themselves, which by them 'are made visible to us. This then is the na- 'ture of those forms or figures, which we use to 'call Idola, or Images. Laert.

'Nor is it difficult, that such kind of contex- 'tures should be found in the middle Aire, or 'ambiently diffused space; nor, that there should 'be in the things themselves, and especially in the 'Atoms, certain dispositions rendring them apt 'to make representations, which are only meer 'empty cavities, and superficial tenuities of no 'determinable depth. * But in this place, we speak of those effluviums, which are as it were thin films, or skins stript from the remaining bodies. Ibid. *Lucret.

Nor yet is it difficult, that images of this nature should flow from the out-sides of bodies, as is hence proved, that there flowing ever something from the inner parts of bodies, as smell, heat, cold, (as we hinted formerly,) it is far more easie, that something should flow, or be carried away from their out-most parts; since the Atoms, as well in one as the other, are in a perpetual endeavour of disentangling themselves to get away, but in the former case, being covered with other Atoms, they find resistence, whereas in the later, being placed in the fore-front of the body, they find none. Add, that hence also they gain the advantage of flying out from the superficies in the same order and rank, which they held there; whereas those which come from within, cannot but change their postures, being often disturbed in the way, by their anfractuous passages. Lucret. loc. cit.

Now that there are indeed such effluviums, may hence be proved, that if the Sun-beams pass thorough Curtains, red (for example,) or of any other colour, drawn before the Theaters, such subtle emissions are sent from them, as make all things behind them appear so coloured. But the experiment from Looking-glasses is more than sufficient; for these clearly shew, that there are indeed such effluviums emitted from bodies, in regard, the bodies being present, they light upon the glass; if any thing intervene, they are hindred from coming thither; if the bodies be moved, they move also; if inverted, they also are inverted; if the bodies retire, they also goe back; if they are taken away, they wholly disappear. Ibid.

But 'forasmuch as there is no point of time, 'in which these Images flow not into the Medium, 'doubtless, their production must be made in a 'point of time, and be perpetually flowing out 'at the superficies, in a continued stream. For 'the reason, why they cannot be discerned apart, 'is, because, when one Image goes away, ano- 'ther coherently succeeds, and supplies its room; 'and instantly preserves the same order and po- 'sition of Atoms, which is ifi the superficies of 'the solid body, and that for a long time, and 'at a great distance, (although at last they are 'confounded.) Whence it comes to pass, that the body always appeareth with the same accidents, and in the same form. Laert.

I mean here, that form which is proper to the body, and is conceived to be a collection (as it were,) of parts, disposed in a certain order, or (as it were,) the superficies left behind by the Image, which flies away from it. Sext. Emp.

It may here seem strange, that the body seemeth no more to be diminish'd, than as if nothing at all were taken off from it; but this is by reason of their extraordinary tenuity, which cannot be understood, without first conceiving the tenuity of the Atoms. Concerning this, we instanc'd formerly, in an animal so small, as if we suppose it divided into three parts, each of them will be indiscernable; and yet for performance of those animal functions which it dischargeth, it must necessarily be made up of such parts and particles as can hardly be formed, without innumerable myriads of Atoms.

Not to mention, in confirmation of the probability hereof, that there are many odorous things, out of which, though something incessantly flow, yet for a long time nothing appeareth to be diminished, either as to their figure or weight, notwithstanding that the effluviums out of them are far grosser, and more numerous than these Images, which flow out along with them; yet are so inconsiderable a part of the things that flow out, as no man can express.

Wonderful also may seem their celerity in flying out; but this must be understood by the celerity of the Atoms, formerly declared; for these Images, by reason of the tenuity we spoke of, being nothing else but certain contextures of simple Atoms, 'have a celerity beyond all ima- 'gination, and their passage through the tran- 'sparent place which is round about them is 'like that which is through the infinite spaces, 'there being not much difference, because they 'meet few or no obstacles in the space which sur- 'rounds them. Certainly, if the light of the Sun and other Stars can come so swiftly (as we observe,) from Heaven, the celerity of these Images ought to be, if not greater yet not less, Laert.

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by reason of the Atoms which stand in the surface of the body, ready for motion, and have nothing to retard them.

## CHAP. XII.

*That Seeing is perform'd by means of those Images.*

Laert. THese things presupposed, some conceive, that 'external and distinct things are therefore seen by us, because they imprint in our eye 'the Image of their colour or figure, the Air intervening between them and us, performing the 'Office of a Seale, by means of which, this impression is made. Others thinke, that this 'is effected by the raies or effluviums sent from 'us of our eyes to the object; but it is far more 'probable, that it is performed by these Images 'we spoke of, which coming from the things, or 'their colour and figure, flow into us, and preserving a congruous magnitude, enter into our 'eyes, and strike our sight with a very swift motion.

This sigillation (or impression,) indeed is a thing extream hard, and perhaps impossible to be explicated; and as for the emission of raies out of our eyes, it is unimaginable what the Looking-glasses send out of them, that they also should have Images painted in them; or what that is, which in a moment is sent from the eye, into the whole vast circumference of the Heavens.

To omit, that since in hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, we send nothing out of ourselves, but receive something from without, which causeth a sensation of itself, (for of itself a voice comes into the Ears, odors into the nostrils, sapors into the palate, and things which may be touched are applied to the body,) it is obvious to be conceived, that neither is any thing sent out from our eyes, but that something (*viz.* those Images,) comes into our eyes from the things themselves.

But the soul, inasmuch as it is in the eyes, cannot but see, that is, apprehend the colour and outward form of that thing which is presented to it: For by reason of the polite and perspicuous contexture of the Organ, it receiveth the Image of the thing, and is struck by it according to all the presented parts.

Lucret. And forasmuch as those things are beautiful which delight the sight, those deformed which offend it, how should we imagine this to be, but that the Images which come from the one consist of bodies, which, by their smoothness, are gently accommodated to the contexture of the eye; but those which come from the other consist of such, as by their ugly figure rend the contexture?

Ibid. And when the eye is troubled with the Jaundice, how comes it, that all things seem yellow? but that the Images, in their application to the eye, receive a tincture; or they may be stain'd also without the eye, coming amongst the yellow little bodies or Images, which proceed in like manner from the eye.

Ibid. But how happens it, that we see not only the colour and form of a body, but we discern its distance also? This proceeds from the Air, which the Image drives on before it, For though it comes to the eye exceeding swiftly, and in imperceptible time; yet it comes thither, and touches upon it orderly, and by how much the longer it is in doing so, so much the more distant the thing appears to be; by how much the sooner, so much the nearer.

Hence also may be given a reason, why an Image seems to be beyond the Looking-glass; for as when a man, from any place within a house, looks upon a thing that is without doors, the Air cometh to him imprinted, as well that without to the door, as that within from the door: So to him who looketh in a glass, commeth successively as well that Air which is from the glass to the Eye, as that which is from the object to the glass. Ibid.

Hence also may be given a reason, why, being in the dark, we can see the things that are in the light; but being in the light, cannot see those that are in the dark. For the enlightned Air succeeding the dark, the Eye informed by it is enabled to see; but not when the dark succeedeth the enlightned. Ibid.

How comes it, that the Images in a glass seem to walk as we do? This happens, by reason of the varied parts of the glass, from which several parts there must necessarily be made a reflection upon the Eye, and thereupon the Images seem to walk as we. Ibid.

If you ask, Why the Image which goeth from us to the glass represents not the back-side, but the fore-side, and that so, as that the right part is on the left side, and the left on the right; take notice, that this happens on the very same fashion, as if the Image of a man made of chalk or clay, not quite dried, should be clapt to a ball or pillar. Ibid.

But if the Image be reflected from one glass to another, and thence to the Eye, the scituation of the parts is restored, so as the right parts appear on the right side, and the left on the left, (and by this means it may be brought to pass, especially if there be many glasses, that such things as are hidden behind something, and out of sight, may be brought to view,) which may also happen even in one glass, if it hath little sides, whereof one reflects the Image to the other. Ibid.

Thus much concerning the Sight; to which also some things, formerly hinted in our discourse of the Criteries and of Qualities, have reference.

## CHAP. XIII.

*Of Hearing.*

CConcerning Hearing, we must repeat what we have touched formerly, that, it being confess'd, the Ear is the Organ of the Hearing, As Seeing is perform'd by the coming of something into the Eye; so *Hearing* also 'is perform'd 'in the Ear by an emission of something, convey'd 'thither from the thing that speaks, sounds, 'makes a noise, or is some other way disposed 'to stir up the sense of hearing. This kind of effluvium, as it affects this sense, is called Sound. Laert.

More-

Laert. loc. cit. Moreover, this *effluvium*, either in the mouth of the Speaker, or generally in the thing ſtruck upon and making a noiſe, *is ſhatter'd there by motion into innumerable little pieces of the ſame figure*, (* round, if the whole effluvium were round; inequilateral and triangular, if the firſt effluvium were ſuch,) in like manner as we obſerve, that little drops are made when we pour any thing out of bottles, or when Cloath-workers ſpurt water upon their cloaths.

* Plut. plac. Phil.

Laert. ib. 'Theſe little pieces, or ſmall bulks, are thereupon diſperſed in ſuch manner, as that they preſerve a certain mutual conformity to one another, (and ſtrike the hearing of ſeveral perſons alike, ſo as they all ſeem to hear one and the ſame ſound, though it be not the ſame, but likely,) and keep faſt alſo within themſelves, each by a particular coherence, whereby it comes to paſs, that they are known to have reference to that thing, from which they were ſent forth, and for the moſt part make ſuch a ſenſation, as was firſt made by that which ſent forth the ſound, (as when the ſound comes not from far into the Ear, and paſſeth through a free ſpace.) But otherwiſe, (as by reaſon of a great diſtance, or ſome partition,) ſomthing from without bringeth in the ſound confuſedly onely. For without a kind of conformity and coherence, deduced and preſerv'd from the very thing ſounding, there could never be any diſtinct hearing.

Ibid. 'Yet muſt we not imagine, that when the voice (*for example*,) is once ſent forth into the Air, the Air is preſently imprinted or formed, either by that voice, or by ſome others made by it, into like voices, which (as * one expreſſeth it, flye away together, as one Jay with another, as ſaith the proverb,) 'It were too great a task, that the Air ſhould be deſigned for any ſuch employment; but as ſoon as ever the blow is made within us when we ſpeak, the voice being articulated out of certain little pieces, of a moſt ſpiritual and nimble effluxion, fit for this Office, and arriving at the Ear, cauſeth hearing in us.

* Democr.

Lucret. That theſe litle pieces which inſinuate into the Ear have a figure, may be argued, by reaſon that Sound could not affect the hearing pleaſantly and unpleaſantly, if it had not ſuch a ſmoothneſs as ſuits with the contexture of the Organ, not ſuch a roughneſs as rends the Organ. This may better be underſtood, by comparing the grating of a Saw with the ſweetneſs of a Lute, or the hoarſe cawing of a Crow with the ſweet melody of a dying Swan.

Plut. Symp. quæſt. 8. 37. Nor to repeat ſome things ſpoken heretofore, which ſeem to conduce hereunto, I ſhall onely touch this difficulty, How it comes to paſs, that ſounds in the night-time are both louder and clearer than in the day. To ſolve this, we muſt aſſume what is manifeſt from our diſcourſe formerly, That Motion is made through Vacuum, and that there is much of Vacuum ſcattered up and down through the little bodies, or bulks of Air, which are made up of Atoms; and that in the day-time it being hot, and theſe little bodies rarifyed, and the Atoms diffuſed, the little Vacuities contained in them muſt neceſſarily become narrower and ſtraiter; but in the night, it being cold, and theſe little bodies preſt up cloſe, and the Atoms crowded together, the Vacuities become larger. This is evident from all things, which in a Veſſel are boiled, ſoftned, and melted; but if they take up a larger place, they cool, return to their temper, and become contracted.

Ibid. Hence therefore it happens, that the Sound in the Day-time paſſing thorough the dilated Air, and lighting upon many Bodies in its way, is either quite ſtopp'd, or torn, and much knock'd and worn away. But when in the Night it paſſeth thorough a ſpace free from Bodies, it arrives at the hearing by a full, ready, and uninterrupted carriere, and with that ſwiftneſs preſerves its clearneſs and diſtinction.

Ibid. From the ſame ground it ſprings, that empty Veſſels being ſtruck, ſound; the full ſound not; and that the more ſmall Bodies, as Gold, make a low dull noiſe; the leſs compact, as Braſs, a greater and clearer.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *Of Smelling.*

AS concerning *Smelling*, we muſt underſtand, that *Odor (as was in proportion declared concerning ſound or voice, when we treated of Hearing) would not make any impreſſion or ſtamp of itſelf, unleſs from the odorous thing there were deduced ſome little Bodies or Bulks, ſo commenſurated to the organ of Smelling, (the Noſtrils,) as to be able to move and affect it.* Laert.

That Odors flow and come out of things, is manifeſt, foraſmuch as all things eſteemed odorous have a ſtronger Scent, being broken, pounded, or diſſolved by Fire, than whilſt they are whole. For the ſtock of theſe little Bodies, which are fit to move the Smell, is pent up, as it were, within the odorous Body, and bound; but, the Body being broken, pounded, or burnt, it leaps forth, and ſpreads itſelf like a Vapor or Cloud, and affects the Smelling, if it can light upon it. Lucret.

It uſeth to affect the Smell two ways, either *unquietly and unſuitably*, whence proceed unpleaſant Odors; or *ſmoothly and aptly*, whence pleaſant Odors. For ſome of the little Bodies of Odor having a ſmooth and even Surface; others, more or greater Angles than is fit; thence it happens, that ſome Odors affect the Organ with delight, as touching it ſmoothly; others, with a kind of Pain, as if they tore it. Laert.

There muſt needs be a difference betwixt the penetrations of theſe little Bodies into the Noſtrils, when Carkaſſes are burnt, and when the Theatre is newly ſtrew'd with Saffron. And it may be conceived after this manner. As the Hand, if we put Down to it, preſſeth upon it; but if a Nettle, ſnatcheth itſelf back, (for the ſmoothneſs of the One, and the roughneſs of the Other by its Prickles, affect two different ways,) in like manner the little Bodies which proceed out of the Saffron, are ſmooth; thoſe which out of the Carkaſs, prickly: ſo as the firſt gently ſtroke and delight the Noſtrils, the other prick them, and make them draw back. Lucret. lib. 2.

Moreover, there being ſo great variety of tempers amongſt Animals, (even amongſt Men one in reſpect of another) and the Contexture of the organ of Smelling being different in ſeve- Lucret. lib. 4.

ral Persons, it ought not to seem strange, that some Scents please Some; Others, Others; by reason of the dissimilitudes of the Figures of the little Bodies, of which they consist; nor that Bees delight in Flowers, Vultures in Carrion; or that Dogs find out by the Scent which way Beasts have gone, which we cannot perceive; as if in passing, they left a Steam which cannot strike our Smell.

## CHAP. XV.

### *Of Tasting.*

WE come next to speak of *Tasting:* Whereas it is manifest, that the Organ thereof is the Tongue and Palate; and that * we then taste and perceive the Sapor in our mouth, when chewing the Meat, we squeeze out the Juice. As when we press with the Hand a Sponge full of Water, and thereupon, the Juice which is squeezed forth, is distributed thorough the Pores, or complicated Holes of the Tongue and Palat, we may in general assert that Sapor to be sweet, the little Bodies whereof are accommodated to the Organ, gently and smoothly; on the contrary, that to be Bitter, Salt, Sharp, Acid, Sower, Hot, *&c.* which roughly and unsuitably. For neither could Hony or Milk affect the Tongue pleasantly, nor Wormwood or Centory unpleasantly, if it were not that those consist of smoother and rounder little Bodies, these of more harsh and hooked; so as those touch it gently, these prick and rend it.

* *Lucret.*

*Theophrast.* lib. 4. de sens. & sens.

He therefore not defines the thing amiss, who saith, That the Atoms, which make a sweet Sapor, are round, and of a convenient size; Those which a sower, large; Those which a harsh, mult-angular, and nothing round; Those which a sharp; acute, conical, crooked, not slender, nor round; Those which an acid; round, slender, corner'd, crooked; Those which a salt; corner'd, distorted, æquicrural; Those which a bitter; round, smooth, distorted, little; Those which a fat; slender, round, little.

*Lucret.*

But, more particularly, seeing that the tempers, not only of Animals, but even of Men among themselves, are so various, and that as they differ in the outward lineaments of their Bodies, so they cannot but differ also in their inward Contextures, hence we may say, that the Sapors, that are pleasing to some Animals or Men, are displeasing to others, by reason that the little Bodies, of which they consist, are suitable, and accommodated to the Contexture of the Organs of those, but unsuitable and unaccommodate to the Contexture of the Organs of these; since the round Pores, that are in the Organ, can receive the round Atoms smoothly, but the triangular difficultly; and the triangular Pores can receive the triangular smoothly, but the round difficultly.

*Ibid.*

Hereby also is understood, how it comes to pass, that the things which were formerly pleasant to us, are in a Fever distasteful, for the Contexture is so disorder'd, and the Figures of the Pores so alter'd, that the Figures of the little Bodies which insinuate into them, though formerly they were adaptable, now become unsuitable and incongruous.

*Ibid.*

From the same Reason it is, that the Meat which agreeth with one Animal, is Poison to another; as Hemlock, or Hellebore, is destructive to a Man, yet it fattens Goats, and Quails. This happens, by reason of the interior Contextures, which differing from one another, that which is accommodate, and adaptable to one, is inadaptable to another.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of Touching.*

LAstly, Concerning the *Touch*, I mean not that which is common to all Bodies, as they are said to touch one another by their *Superficies*, (contrary to the Nature of *Vacuum*, which can neither touch, nor be touched,) but that which is proper to Animals, not performed without perception of the Soul; and hath not one, but all parts of the Body for its Organ. Concerning this *Touch*, I shall only declare, that what is perceived by it, is perceived three ways.

*Lucret.*

*Ibid.*

For first, A thing is perceived by the *Touch*, when it is extrinsecally applied, or, from without insinuates itself; applied, as when the Hand feels a Stone clapp'd to it; insinuated, as when a hot thing emitting Heat, or a cold thing Cold, certain little Bodies get into the Pores, which, according to the state wherein the Body is, either refresh or disturb it.

*Ibid.*

Secondly, When a thing which is within, is driven out, which somtimes happens with Pleasure, especially when the thing itself was burthensom and incommodious, *ut dum semen excernitur*; somtimes with Pain, as when by reason of the angles of the little Bodies, it excoriates the Passage, as by the Strangury, or Difficulty of Urine.

*Ibid.*

Lastly, When some things within the Body take some of these motions, as by Impulsion, Diduction, Distraction, Convulsion, Compunction, Rasure, Excoriation, Inflation, Tension, Breaking, and innumerable other ways, it disturbs the Natural Constitution, and confounds and troubles the Sense. Thus all Aches and Pains of the Head, and other parts within, are caused; and the Animal doth in such manner affect itself, as if a Man should with his own hand strike a part of his Body.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *Of the Intellect, Mind, or Reason, and its Seat.*

HItherto of the *Sense*. We must now speak of the *Intellect*, which is also usually called, *Mind*, *Reason*. The Rational and Hegemonick part; somtimes Cogitation, Imagination, Opinion, Counsel: Its property is, when the Sense strikes it, to think, apprehend, understand, revolve, meditate, discourse, or deliberate somthing.

*Lucr.*

The Contexture of the *Intellect* consists of little Bodies, the most subtle, smooth and round of all, forasmuch as nothing can be more subtle, nor of quicker motion. Neither is there any thing that can stir up itself sooner, or perform any thing

thing quicker than the Intellect, which if it design or begin any thing, brings it to pass in a moment; whence all acknowledge, that nothing can be swifter than (her action) Thought.

And certainly, as Water is much apter to move, and more fluent than Honey, by reason that is made up of little Bodies, which are smoother, lesser, and rounder; nothing consequently can consist of rounder, lesser, and smoother, than the Mind, for nothing can be readier for motion, quicker, or more pliant.

And in whatsoever part of the Body the Intellect inheres, it so cohereth to the Soul, or to that portion of the Soul which coexists with it in that part, as that it is indivisibly conjoined to it, and constitutes one Nature with it, yet it always so preserves and retains its own Nature, as that it is the property of the Intellect, to think; of the Soul, to undergo affections; though, by reason of their Cohæsion, it be conceived, that the Soul thinks, and the Intellect is affected.

Indeed, the Intellect is void of Affection or Passion; but (because, as the Passions depending on Sense, are stirred up in the Soul about those parts wherein the Sense is seated; so those which depend on Cogitation, are stirred up in the Soul about that part where Cogitation is, and in which part the Soul is one thing with the Intellect thinking:) Hence it cometh to pass, that, as if the aggregate or compound of the Intellect and the Soul residing in that part, made up only Intellect, the Passions come to be attributed to the Intellect itself.

Thus, whether the Intellect be taken distinctly or jointly, it hath this property beyond the other part of the Soul, that, As when the Head or Eye aketh, we are not thereupon pained all over the Body; so sometimes the Intellect is affected with Grief or Joy, when the other part of the Soul, which is diffused through the Body, is free from this affection. I say, *sometimes*, because it may happen, that the Intellect be seiz'd with a Fear so vehement, as that the rest of the Soul may be struck together with it, and thereby may be caused Sweating, Paleness, stopping of the Speech, the Eyes grow dim, the Ears possessed with a humming, the Joints grow faint, and, in a word, the Man may fall into a Swoon.

Moreover, the Intellect may be conceived to partake of life more perfectly than the Soul, or the other part of the Soul, forasmuch as the Soul cannot subsist never so little in the limbs, without the Intellect; but the Intellect, though the limbs round about it were cut off, and thereby a great part of the Soul taken away, would nevertheless subsist and preserve life: Like the Ball, which conduceth more to Sight than all the rest of the Eye, because the Ball being hurt, though the rest of the parts be sound, the Sight is destroy'd; but as long as the Ball is sound, though the other parts be destroy'd, the Sight continueth.

*Lucr.* It seemeth not, that there can be any other seat assign'd for the Intellect, or rational part of the Soul, than the middle part of the Breast, and consequently the Entrails, or the Heart, which is in the midst of the Breast. This is manifest from the affections of Fear and Joy, proceeding from Cogitation, (or the Intellect thinking,) which we perceive to be in the Breast.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*That the Soul thinketh by Images, which glide into it.*

THere is only this difficulty, How the Intellect can be stirred up to think something? But it being manifest, that things are thought by the Intellect, in the same manner as they are seen by the Eye; it is also evident, that as Sight, so Thinking or Cogitation is made by Images which glide into it. *Lucr.*

For besides those Images which glide into the Eye, and being of something a grosser bulk, are accommodated to the contexture of the Eye, and produce in it the act of Seeing, there must necessarily wander through the Air an innumerable company of others, far more subtle, and those either peel'd off from Bodies, or form'd in the Air itself, as was formerly said; which penetrating through the Body, and being adaptable to the contexture of the Intellect, as soon as they arrive at it, move it to Think. *Ibid.*

Whence it comes to pass, that as we see (for example,) a Lion, because the image thereof glides into our Eyes; so we think a Lion, because the image of a Lion, glides into our Mind. That we think or imagine Centaurs, Sylla's, and the like, which neither are, nor ever were; this may happen, not so much by Images framed on purpose, as for that when the Images (for example) of a Man and of a Horse are presented to us, they, by reason of their Tenuity or Subtlety, like a Cobweb, or a Leaf of Gold, are joined together, and made one, such as is attributed to a Centaur. *Ibid.*

But take notice, that when sometimes we persevere in the same thought, whether waking or sleeping, this happens not, for that we use some one image of the same thing, but that we use many images succeeding in a continual fluxion, which if they come to us in the same posture, the thing thought or imagined seemeth unmoved; if in a varied, it seems moved. Which is the reason, why, in dreams especially, images seem to us to be moved, and to stir their arms and other limbs one after another. *Ibid.*

But how comes it to pass, that whatsoever any Man would, his Mind or Intellect thinks that very thing? Because, though there are every where Images of all sorts, yet the greatest part passeth by unthought of, and those only move the Mind which she herself takes notice of, or would observe, or frames herself to think of. And, observe we not, that the Eyes, when they begin to have a sight of something very little, bend and fix themselves upon it, and, till they see something plainly, all other things are as if they were not, although they receive their images also. *Ibid.*

Now as there is some Intentiveness requisite to the Mind, that it may apprehend things distinctly, so much more that it may simply think or give some judgment, by affirming or denying; but most of all, that it may discourse of them, as if its greatest care were not to be deceived.

But this we declared formerly, in treating of the Criteries. It will be sufficient, as to the speculation of natural things, here to observe, that

Lucr. *man Discourse first admireth the things that are produced by Nature, and next enquires into them, and finds out their Causes; but in some sooner, in others later; and sometimes evinceth this, or arrives at the full knowledge in a longer time, sometimes in a shorter.*

## CHAP. XIX.

### *Of the Affections or Passions of the Soul.*

THere is besides Sense another part of the Irrational Soul, which may be called Affectuous, or Passionate, from the Affections or Passions raised in it. It is also termed the Appetite or Desire, from the chief Affection which it hath, called Appetite or Desire; some distinguish it into Concupiscible and Irascible.

Now whereas it was already said, that the affections which follow Sense, are produced in the organs of Sense, those which follow opinion in the Breast; hereupon there being two principal affections, Pleasure, and Pain; the first, familiar, and suitable to the Soul; the other, incommodious, and unsuitable to Nature: It is manifest, that both these are excited, not in the Breast only, where Pleasure, for the most part, comes under the name of Joy, Gladness, Exultation, Mirth; and Pain, under that of Grief, Sorrow, Anguish, *&c.* but also in the other parts, in which, when they are removed from their natural state, there is raised Pain or Grief; when they are restored to that state, Pleasure.

If all the parts could continue in their natural state, either there would be no affection, or if there were any, it must be called Pleasure, from the quiet and calmness of that state. But because either by reason of the continual motion of principles in the Body of an Animal, some things depart from it, others come to it; some are taken asunder, others put together, *&c.* or by reason of the motion which is in the things round about, some things are brought which insinuate into them, change, invert, disjoin, *&c.* pain is caused, (from the first occasion, as by Hunger, Thirst, Sickness; from the second, as by burning, bruising, wresting, wounding,) therefore the affection of pain seems to be first produced: And withal, because it is of an opposite nature, that of aversation or avoidance of it, and of the thing that bringeth it, to which, for that reason, is attributed the name of Ill.

Hereupon followeth a desire of exemption from pain, or of that state which is void of pain, and consequently of the thing by which it may be expelled, and to which, for that reason, is given the name of Good; and then the pain being taken away, and the thing reduced into a better, that is, into its natural state, pleasure is excited, and goeth along with it; so as there would not be pleasure, if some kind of pain did not go before, as is easily observable even from hunger and thirst and the pleasure that is taken in eating and drinking.

For this pleasure is only made, because (most of the parts being dissipated by the action of the intrinsecal heat, by which means the body itself becomes rarify'd, all nature destroy'd, and the stomach especially grip'd, or otherwise some little Bodies of heat rolling about it, make it glow, whereby is caused pain) because, I say, meat cometh, and supplieth the defect, supports the limbs, stoppeth the desire of eating, which gapeth throughout the members and the veins; Drink comes and extinguishes the heat, moistneth the parts which before were dry, and reduceth them to their first state. And besides, both are made with a smooth and pleasing sense of Nature, which, it is manifest, is then absent, when a Man eats, not being hungry; or drinks, not being athirst.

Thus the general affections of the Soul seem to be these four, Pain and Pleasure, the Extreme; Aversion and Desire, the Intermediate. I say, General, because the rest are kinds of these, and made by opinion intervening, and may be reduced principally to Desire and Avoidance.

For Desire is particularly called Will, when the Mind wills that which it thinks, and conceiveth it to be good; and Avoidance is called Aversion, when it turneth away from that which it thinketh, or conceiveth to be ill. Hereupon, Love (for Example) is a Will, whereby we are carried to the enjoyment of something. Hate is an Aversion, whereby we withdraw ourselves from conversing with something. Again, Anger is nothing but Desire, whereby we are carried on to vengeance. Fear is an Avoidance, by which we shrink at some future Ill, and retire, as it were, within ourselves; and so of the rest.

But forasmuch as Desire (as also in proportion Avoidance too,) is partly excited by Nature, and by reason of some Indigence, which must necessarily be supplied, that Nature may be preserved; partly is begotten by Opinion, which is sometimes conformable to the design of Nature, and so tends to remove her Indigence, as that yet it is not necessary it should be quite taken away. Lastly, it sometimes conduces nothing either to Nature, or to the taking away of its Indigence. Hence it comes to pass, that of Desires, some are Natural and Necessary; others Natural, but not Necessary; others, neither Natural nor Necessary, but Vain.

Natural and Necessary are those, which take away both the Indigence, and the Pain proceeding from the Indigence; such is that of Meat, of Drink, of Cloathing, to expel the Cold. Natural, but not Necessary, are those which only vary the Pleasure, but are not absolutely Necessary to the taking away of the Pain, as those which are of delicate Meats, even that which is of Venereal Delights, to which Nature gives a Beginning, but from which a Man may abstain without Inconvenience. Lastly, neither Natural nor Necessary are those, which contribute nothing to the taking away of any Pain, caused by some indigence of Nature, but are begot only by Opinion; such are for Instance, those of Crowns, Statues, Ornaments, Rich Cloathing, Gold, Silver, Ivory, and the like.

Moreover, it is to be observed, That whereas Pleasure consists in the fruition of Good, Pain in suffering Ill; for this Reason, the first is produced with a kind of dilatation and exaltation of the Soul, the other with a contraction and depression thereof; and therefore it is not to be wondred at, if the Soul dilates herself as much

as

as ſhe can, to make way for the Good to come into her, and contracts herſelf to prevent the Ill.

There is a Diffuſion, or Dilatation; for as ſoon as ever the Form of a good and pleaſing thing ſtrikes the Senſe, or moveth the Mind, the little Bodies, of which it conſiſts, ſo inſinuate into the organs of Senſe, or into the Heart itſelf, as that being accommodated as well to the Soul, as to the Body, they, in a more particular manner, gently ſtroke and delight the Soul, and, like little Chains, allure and draw it towards that thing out of which they were ſent: Whereupon the Soul being turned towards, and intent upon that thing, gives a great leap, as it were, towards it, with all the ſtrength it hath, that it may enjoy it.

On the other ſide there is Contraction, becauſe as ſoon as ever the Form of a painful thing ſtrikes the Senſe, or the Mind, the little Bodies of which it conſiſts, as ſo many little Darts or Needles, prick the very Soul together with the Organ, in ſuch manner, that they looſen its Contexture, while ſhe, to prevent them as much as ſhe can, ſhuts herſelf up, and retires to her very Centre or Root, where the Heart or Intellect is placed.

It will not be neceſſary to repeat what we formerly ſaid, that it depends upon the contexture of the Soul, why one Animal is more inclined to Anger, another to Fear, a third to calm ſmooth Motions; nor to add, that this difference is found in Men alſo, according as their Souls participate more of a fiery, or of a flatuous, or of an aerial Principle. Or we may obſerve even in Men that are poliſhed by Learning, theſe Seeds cannot be ſo rooted out, but that one is more propenſe to Anger, another more ſubject to Fear, a third more prone to Clemency than he ought. Moreover, the difference of manners, which is obſerved to be ſo great, not amongſt Animals only, but in Men from one another, is plainly enough derived from the various commiſtion of theſe Seeds.

## CHAP. XX.

*Of Voluntary Motion, and particularly, of Speaking, and Impoſition of Names.*

NOW the Soul being naturally ſtirring, and ready for motion, and able to move the Body wherein it exiſts, and the Members thereof; it is well known, that whenſoever ſhe moveth the Body, or its Members with any motion whatſoever, ſhe therefore doth it, becauſe ſhe hath a Will to move them, and that this Will is ſtirred up by the Intellect, imagining; and that this Imagination is cauſed by the Image that ſtrikes it: for the Intellect, or Mind, never doth any thing, but firſt ſhe foreſeeth it, nor foreſeeth it, unleſs ſhe firſt have the Image of that thing.

Lucret. 4.879. Thus, when we move (for Example) the Thighs, and walk, this is therefore done, becauſe firſt the Images of walking coming to the Mind, ſtrike it, thence proceeds a Will to walk; then when the Mind hath ſo mov'd itſelf, as that it wills to walk, it inſtantly ſtrikes the Soul in that part whereto it is joined; that part ſtrikes the reſt of the Soul, which is diffuſed through the whole Body, and eſpecially through the Thighs and Feet. Thus the whole Frame is by degrees thruſt forward, and moved; Not to mention that the Air conduceth ſomthing thereto, by reaſon that as the whole Body becomes rarify'd, the Air inſinuates into its parts. The Body therefore is moved from two cauſes, like a Ship, which is driven on by Oars and Wind.

That the beginning of Motion proceeds from the Heart, where the Mind is ſeated, is manifeſt, for that we ſee ſomtimes Horſes (for Example) cannot, as ſoon as ever the Barrier is let down, break forth, nor ſtart away ſo ſuddenly, as their Will prompts them; becauſe the whole ſubſtance of the Soul diffuſed, thorough all the Limbs, muſt firſt be ſummoned, that, being ſtirred up, it may follow the deſign of the Mind. Thus it proceeds firſt from the will of the Mind, and then thorough the Body and Limbs. *Lucret.*

It may perhaps ſeem ſtrange, that ſo little Bodies as thoſe, whereof the Mind conſiſts, ſhould be able to move, wreſt, and turn about ſo great a weight, as is that of the Body. But what wonder, when the Wind, a thing ſo ſubtle, can with ſo great a force drive forward a vaſt Ship; and one Hand, one Rudder, turn it about and guide it, though under full Sail? And are there not Engines, which by Pullies and Screws, move and draw up huge Weights, and that with no great force? *Lucret.* 4.896.

But foraſmuch as of the motions, with which we move the parts of the Body, as we will ourſelves, that of the Tongue is moſt conſiderable, which is called Speaking, it ſeems requiſite to ſay ſomthing of this in particular.

The Tongue being framed in breathing Animals after ſuch a manner, as that it can break, and, as it were, mould the Air, which is vehemently breathed forth, and thereupon cauſeth a Sound; hence it hapneth, that, as becauſe every Animal perceiveth its own power, by which it can do ſomthing, and hereupon the Bull butts with his Horns, the Horſe ſtrikes with his Heels, the Lyon teareth with his Teeth and Claws, the Bird truſts to her Wings; hence it hapneth, I ſay, that Animals, and chiefly Men, perceiving the ability of their Tongue to expreſs the affections of the Mind, (even when they would ſignifie ſomthing, that is without them,) they ſend out a Sound which is called Voice, and by the interpoſition of the Tongue, and other parts ſerving for that variation, bend and mould it in ſeveral Faſhions. *Lucret.* 5.102.

I inſtance Animals alſo, becauſe we ſee that they likewiſe ſend forth ſeveral Voices, according as they are joy'd or griev'd, or fear, or perſue any thing; Dogs, for Example, make ſeveral Noiſes, when they aſſault furiouſly, when they bark, when they play with their Whelps, when they fawn, when they are hurt, and cry or howl; a Horſe neigheth after a different manner, when he rouzeth himſelf, when he followeth a Mare, and when he is ſpurr'd by his Rider. And Birds make different Cries, when they ſtrive about their Prey, and when they perceive Change of Weather, and when they ſit idly, ſtill. *Lucret. ibid.*

Now

Lucret. ib. Now Man, above the reſt, perceiving the great power of his Tongue, and how he can bend it various ways, ſo as to make divers articulate Sounds, which may be accommodated to ſignifie ſeveral things, hence proceeds Speech, by which Men ordinarily diſcourſe with one another, expreſſing the paſſions of the Mind, and other things, no otherwiſe than as by nodding the Head, or pointing with the Finger.

Here, becauſe it is uſually demanded, How Men came at firſt to impoſe Names on things?

Laert. We muſt know, that *Names were not impoſed merely by Invention of Man*, nor by ſome Law; *but the very Natures, or natural Diſpoſitions of Men, which were in ſeveral Nations, being, upon the preſentment of things to them, affected with particular motions of the mind, and compelled by images proper to the things, ſent forth the Air out of their mouths, after a peculiar faſhion, and broke and articulated it, according to the impulſion of the ſeveral affections or phantaſies, and ſomtimes according to the difference of places*, as the Heaven and the Earth is various in different Countries. The words which were thus pronounced, and particularly with a will of denoting things to others, became the names of things.

Laert. *Some alſo deſiring to mention ſome things to others, which were out of their ſight, pronounced certain ſounds or words, and then were conſtrained to repeat the ſame words; whereupon the hearers finding out the thing by ſome diſcourſe and conjecture, at laſt, with much uſe, underſtood what the others meant.*

And becauſe ſeveral Men uſed ſeveral Names, to ſignifie the ſame things to others, and thereupon there was a variety of Names; for this

Laert. Reaſon, *Names proper to ſignifie things were in every Nation by degrees, and, as it were, with common conſent choſen and appointed, ſo as their mutual ſignifications might be leſs ambiguous, and things might be explicated by a more compendious way of ſpeaking.*

Lucret. 1040. For this Reaſon I conclude, That the firſt Man impoſed Names on things, not out of certain Science, or by the Command or Dictate of any one Man; for how ſhould he come by that Science, or have power to compel many Men to uſe the words which he dictated? But rather, that they impoſed them, being moved by a certain natural Impulſion, like thoſe who cough, ſneeze, bellow, bark, ſigh. And therefore we may ſay, that Names are not by Inſtitution, but by Nature, ſeeing they are the Effects and Works, as it were, of Nature; for, to ſee and hear things (which are certain Effects and Works of Nature,) are of the ſame kind, as the giving of Names to Things.

## CHAP. XXI.

### *Of Sleep and Dreams.*

IT reſts, that we add ſomthing concerning *Sleep*, and the *Death of Animals*, two things near of Kin; for one is an Intermiſſion, the other he Extinction of Senſe; and Death is ordinarily termed an Everlaſting Sleep.

Laer. *Sleep is cauſed, when the parts of the Soul, which are diffuſed thorough the whole compoſition of the Body, are either repreſſed or ſegregated; or elſe ſome little Bodies, either from the Air or from Food, light upon the diſperſed parts, which partly drive them away from the Body, partly crowd them into the Body, and diſcompoſe them.* Lucret. 4. 948. For hereupon the Body, as deſtitute of its ordinary ſupport and government, becometh weak, and all the limbs grow feeble, the Arms and Eye-lids hang down, the Knees ſink, and, in a word, there is no more Senſe.

For it being certain, that Senſe proceeds from Lucret. 4. 918. the Soul, it is no leſs evident, that when Sleep hindereth the Senſe, the Soul is diſturbed, and thrown out of doors; not the whole Soul, for then it were not Sleep, but Death; but a part only, and yet ſo, as that which is left behind is oppreſſed within, and buried like Fire rak'd up in aſhes. And as, if we ſtir up the Fire, it wakes, as it were, and a flame riſes from it, in appearance extinguiſhed; ſo the Senſes are reſtored throughout the Members, and raiſed again out of a thing in appearance dead.

When I ſay, that little Bodies coming from Lucret. the Air cauſe this diſturbance, I mean, partly the exterior Air, which never ceaſeth to beat and drive againſt the Body, (whereby it comes to paſs, that the outward part of every Animal becomes ſolid and hard,) partly the interior, or that which is drawn in at the mouth, and blown out again. For the ſtroke of each of theſe paſſing through the little vacuities, to the principles and firſt elements of the Body, their Poſitions are ſo diſordered, that part are caſt out, part thruſt in, and the reſt, which is diffuſed through the limbs, are not able to diſcharge their office, by reaſon that they are intercepted, and not joined one to another.

I add, that this happens from the Food alſo, Lucret. becauſe the Food, being convey'd inwardly by the Veins, performs the ſame thing as the Air, and that with more abundant and greater force. Whence it comes to paſs, that the Sleep which is cauſed by Meat, by reaſon of the greater diſturbance of thoſe Particles, is more ſound than ordinary, as is that alſo which proceeds from exceſſive wearineſs, by reaſon of their greater diſſipation.

Now foraſmuch as it may ſeem ſtrange, that Lucret. Dreams ſhould come to us in Sleep, we muſt obſerve what was ſaid not long ſince, that every where there are Images of innumerable things, continually roving up and down, which, by reaſon of their ſubtlety, are able to penetrate into the Body, and able to ſtrike and affect the Mind, which is ſeated in the midſt of the Breaſt, ſo as it is ſtirred up to think of thoſe things whereof they are the Images. Hereupon, foraſmuch as theſe penetrate and ſtrike the Mind no leſs in ſleep, than in waking, it comes to paſs that we ſeem to behold things as well in ſleep as awake.

But it happens, that we receive the things Lucret. which appear to us in this manner as true, becauſe our Senſes being ſtupified, nothing can occur to us, that may give us notice of the Error, and convince the Falſity by true things; and beſides, our Memory being laid aſleep, we eſteem (for example,) thoſe Men to be alive who are dead, becauſe their Images are preſent to us, and we remember not their death.

If

If you demand, why we dream moſt of theſe things in which we chiefly delight, or to which we are moſt particularly addicted when awake, (for Orators plead, Soldiers fight, Mariners conteſt with the winds, Gameſters play, and ſo of others; Neither is it thus with men onely, but amongſt other Animals alſo; Horſes ſweat and blow, as if they were running a race; Hounds ſtretch their legs, cry, and ſnuff up the Air; and ſo of the reſt,) We muſt ſay, that this happens, foraſmuch as by reaſon of the impreſſion lately made in the mind, the paſſages are left open, into which the ſame Images inſinuate, and above the reſt, move the ſoul again.

From the ſame ground it ſeems to proceed, that he who is thirſty dreams of a fountain, and that he is drinking; he that hath need to Urine dreams of a chamber-pot, and that he is uſing it. For the intrinſecal motions open, as it were, the wayes, into which the Images of things of the ſame nature inſinuating, ſtrike the mind. Hence alſo it comes to paſs, that many Images of the ſame thing meeting together, there are produced certain great motions in the mind, and then he who dreameth, imagines that he poſſeſſeth great knowledge, performeth great actions, ſpeaketh excellent things; and ſomtimes cryeth out as if his throat were about to be cut, or himſelf to be devoured by a Lion or Panther, and is no leſs affrighted, than if he had caſt himſelf down from a high Mountain, ſo as when he awakes, he has ſcarce the uſe of his reaſon.

## CHAP. XXII.

### *Of Death.*

AS for Death, it is nothing but a privation of ſenſe, by reaſon of the departure of the ſoul. By ſenſe here, I underſtand not onely the action, of which ſleep alſo is the privation; but the faculty likewiſe of feeling or perceiving, which periſheth with the ſoul, and together with theſe, the mind alſo; ſo that the ſoul going forth, the mind which is joyned with it goeth forth alſo.

For, 'as long as the ſoul exiſts in the body, 'although ſome other part fail, yet there is not 'a privation of ſenſe: but ſenſe periſhes together 'with the ſoul, as ſoon as ever that wherein it is 'contained, whether it be the whole body, or 'ſome part in which it is ſeated, happens to be 'diſſolved. Neither can it be objected, that the 'body remaineth a while undiſſolved, either in 'whole or in part: For it is nevertheleſs void 'of ſenſe, as ſoon as ſuch a company of Atoms, 'as is neceſſary to conſtitute the nature of the 'ſoul, goeth out of it.

'Moreover, the body being diſſolved, the ſoul 'itſelf is diſſipated, and hath no longer the ſame 'faculties, nor any longer is moved, nor any long-'er hath ſenſe; for we cannot imagine, that the 'ſame thing doth any longer feel or perceive, 'when it no longer uſeth the ſame motions, when 'it no longer is in the ſame compound, when 'thoſe things no longer are by which it was che-'riſhed and preſerved, and in which exiſting it per-'formed ſuch kind of motions. It is the ſame 'with the ſoul as with the eye; which, being out, 'and divided from the body in which it was, 'cannot ſee any thing.

When I ſay, The ſoul is diſſipated, I imply the mind alſo; ſince the mind is indiviſibly joyned with it, neither can it ſubſiſt if the ſoul periſh. So that here it is all one to ſay, the mind and the ſoul, for the ſame diſſipation happens to both. Now this diſſolution is made, not into nothing, (as they muſt neceſſarily affirm, who hold the ſoul to be harmony, or ſuch a contemperation as health,) but into the Principles and little bodies, of which its contexture is made; and this not ſo much like water, which runneth about when the veſſel is broken, as like ſmoke, or a miſt, which goes away into Air, but much more eaſily; its contexture being more ſubtle, ſince it is capable of receiving impreſſions from the Images of ſmoke and miſt.

That the ſoul is diſſipated and periſheth, is manifeſt; for that it is compounded and hath a beginning. Some indeed there are, who conceive it to be eternal, denying it to have a beginning, to avoid its diſſolution; and aſſuming for granted, that it was before the body, and came from without into it, that they may maintain, that it ſurvives after the body, out of which it goes intire. I ſhall omit, that they ſeem not to obſerve, that nothing can be durable for ever, unleſs it be ſuch, either by reaſon of its ſolidity, as an Atom; or for that it is uncapable of being ſtruck, as Vacuum; or for that it wants place whereinto it might remove, as the Univerſe. Neither do they reflect how great a madneſs it is to conceive, that things ſo different as immortal and mortal, may be joyned together.

I omit this, I ſay, and demand onely, How it is poſſible the ſoul can, from without, be inſinuated into the body, and diffuſed through its parts, and yet not be divided and diſſolved, as meat diſtributed through the limbs? And muſt it not dwell in the Body, as a Bird in a Cage, rather than be thought to grow, and be coextended with the Body? And how then arrives it together with the Body, at the flower of age? And why it is, that in old age it fears, not rejoyceth, to go out of the Body as out of her priſon, and like the ſerpent to caſt her decay'd skin? And if forſaking the Body, it leaves ſome relicks of it ſelf behind, is it not diſſolvable? But if it leaves none, how comes it, that ſo many worms are generated in a carkaſs?

For to ſay, that ſo many ſouls flow thither from without, and fly up and down like ſhadowes, and chuſe their own matter, and frame their own Bodies, and the like, How abſurd is it? Neither is it leſs ridiculous, that there ſhould be a ſwarm, as it were, of Souls, hovering round about at the coition and birth of Animals, conteſting with one another, which ſhall enter into the Body.

And if Souls did ſo often ſhift Bodies, would not their natures, by degrees, become changed, and ſo the Lion in time not be fierce, the Hart not timorous, the Fox not crafty, the Dog afraid of the Hatt, the Hawke of the Dove? And if any ſhall ſay, that human ſouls only paſs into human Bodies, he cannot give a reaſon, Why the ſoul, of wiſe, becomes fooliſh? why no children are wiſe, why we, as the firſt Author of theſe Opinions feigned of themſelves, never remember

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ber our paſt life, and the actions performed in it.

The ſoul therefore hath a beginning, from which, as it groweth up, and flouriſheth with the Body, ſo muſt it neceſſarily tend to an end, growing old, and decaying by degrees, together with it.

This I ſay likewiſe of the Mind, which by degrees is perfected, and decayeth; ſeeing that it not onely bears a ſhare in the diſeaſes, and pains of the Body, but ſuffers diſeaſes, and pains of her own, and is cured by Medicine: which could not be, if ſomthing were not added to, or taken from, or tranſpoſed in her contexture. We need not inſtance, what happens to her by drunkenneſs, the falling ſickneſs, or dotage.

We muſt obſerve, that ſhe is affixed to ſome certain part of the Body, no otherwiſe than the ear to the eye, ſo that, accordingly ſhe begins and ends with the whole; and this is manifeſt, foraſmuch as every thing, (Trees, Fiſhes, &c) hath a certain determinate place in which it is produced, liveth, and at laſt ceaſeth to be, and cannot exiſt out of it.

And foraſmuch, as a man dieth limb by limb, and expireth by degrees, the ſoul being as it were diviſible; who can ſay, that the Mind (or Intellect) doth not evaporate out of the midſt of the breſt, but goeth entire out at the throat and mouth? For that the ſoul her ſelf goeth out, ſifted as it were, and ſever'd thorough the whole Body, is argued, even for that the ſtench which after her departure is in the dead carkaſs, proceedeth from no other cauſe, than that its ſeveral parts are got into that place, which was taken up by the ſeveral parts of the ſoul. Not to mention, that, otherwiſe, when the Body is ſuddenly cut aſunder, into two or more pieces, the ſoul could not be cut into two or more pieces as the Body.

As therefore, the ſoul was not before the generation, ſo neither will it be after the diſſolution, or death; and as, before that, we did not feel any pain; ſo neither ſhall we feel any, after this; as well, for that there will be no longer Touch, or any other Senſe, which cannot exiſt in a ſeparate ſoul; as for that, it is now without thoſe Organs, in which onely the ſenſes reſide, and with which onely, they can act and ſuffer.

Hence it is manifeſt, that all fears of the Inferi are vain; *Ixion* is not roll'd upon a wheel; *Siſiphus* does not thruſt a ſtone up hill continually; *Prometheus*'s liver cannot be devoured and renew'd every day. Theſe are but Fables, as are alſo thoſe which are reported of *Tantalus*, of *Cerberus*, of the *Danaides*, of the Furies, and the like; which if they are made good any whore, it is in this life, through the depraved manners of men.

## SECT. IV.

### *Of Superiour things, as well Celeſtial, as Aerial.*

HItherto, of *Inferiour* things; we come now to the *Superiour*, which appear in the Region above the Earth; ſuch are the Sun, the Moon, and other Stars, and all that belongs to them, as Riſings, Settings, Tropicks, Eclipſes, and the like. Moreover Clouds, Rain, Wind, Lightning, Thunder, Thunder-bolts, and the like. For thô ſome make a diſtinction, and call theſe later onely Μετέωρα, *Superiour things*, yet is it convenient, to call the former alſo Meteors, and to include both within Meteorology, that is, A Treatiſe of ſuperiour things.

Here we muſt repeat what was ſaid at firſt, that 'we muſt not propoſe any other end of 'the knowledge of Superiour things, whether 'they be treated of jointly with others, as here; 'or ſeparately, and by themſelves, as elſe where 'we do, than an undiſturbed ſtate of mind, and 'unwavering Judgement; as alſo in the reſt of 'the things, of which we uſe to diſcourſe. Laert.

'For Superiour things being ſuch, as that they 'either have, or may have a manifold cauſe of 'generation, and declaration of their being, 'conformable to that which we perceive by the 'ſenſe; we ought not to adhere to one particular 'way, as we do in Moral Maxims, or ſome in Phy'ſick, ſuch as are, The Univerſe is Body and Vacuum; the Principles of things are indiviſible, 'and the like, which agree onely one way 'with the Phænomena's: But firmly hold, that 'theſe things are indeed explicable, not one, but 'many ways, neither ought we to attempt any 'thing above the reach of human power, by de'fining one certain way, after which onely the 'thing may be performed. Ibid.

This, I ſay, we muſt repeat; foraſmuch as 'it is requiſite to conceive, that it is the Office of 'Phyſiology, accurately, to examine the cauſes 'of the chief things which are in nature, and 'that from hence proceedeth all the felicity 'which conſiſteth in knowledge of ſuperiour 'things, and in that eſpecially, that we examine, 'what kind of things thoſe are, which are diſ'covered in thoſe ſuperiour ones, and whatever 'has affinity with them. And withal, inviolably 'to obſerve this rule, that it is competent to 'thoſe things, to be done many ways, *and* not *neceſſarily* one way onely; *but*, that they may be brought about ſome other way alſo. Laert.

This, I ſo expreſly inculcate; leſt, if we adhere onely to one way, and that happen to diſpleaſe us, we preſently recur, not to ſome other natural cauſe, but to the divine; for this were to acknowledge a manifold manner, where there is but one. Thus, to the divine nature we ſhould attribute trouble and buſineſs, whereas 'it is ſimply and abſolutely neceſſary, that in 'an Immortal and Bleſſed Nature, there be none 'of thoſe things which cauſe diſſolution and trou'ble; for the mind immediately apprehends, and 'concludes from the conſideration of an immor'tal and bleſſed condition, that it is abſolutely 'impoſſible, any ſuch thing ſhould happen to it. Laert.

And doubtleſs, for want of this conſideration, it comes to paſs, that 'the contemplation and 'obſervation of riſing, ſetting, ſolſtices, eclipſes 'and the like, make our knowledge nothing the 'happier, but they who have conſidered theſe 'things (yet know not what are the nature of 'thoſe Bodies, and what are their chief Cauſes,) 'fear as much, and perhaps more, than as if they 'had not contemplated them at all; by reaſon, that

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'the admiration which ariſeth from their conſide-
'ration, cannot be ſatisfied, as to the diſpoſition
'and manner, whereby they performed. For
'this reaſon we endeavour to find out, and alledge
'many ſeveral cauſes of ſolſtices, ſettings, riſings,
'eclipſes and the like, conformable to things of the
'the like kind, which happen amongſt us on the
'earth.

'Beſides we muſt not think, that an accurate en-
'quiry after theſe things, conduceth to acquiſi-
'tion of tranquillity and felicity. In ſuperiour
'things, and others that are obſcure, we ought to
'ſeek out cauſes, according to the ſeveral ways
'by which the like things happen amongſt us,
'deſpiſing thoſe who neither know one certain
'way by which a thing is effected, nor a manifold
'way, but content themſelves onely with the ap-
'pearance of things as preſented at that diſtance,
'and yet are ignorant in what conſiſts or not con-
'ſiſts imperturbation. Truly, if we conceive it may
'fall out, that a thing may be done one certain
'way, and thereupon we are not troubled; truely
'I ſay, knowing on the other ſide, that the ſame
'thing may be effected many ſeveral waies, we
'ſhall be no leſs undiſturbed, than if we knew it
'could be done by a certain way.

'But whenſoever one has a mind to adhere to,
'or defend any thing that is likely in itſelf, that
'explication is ſufficient in this preſent ſubject
'which runs congruouſly, according to the mani-
'fold waies the Phænomena's afford us. Yet
'is it neceſſary to derive our conjectures concern-
'ing ſuperiour things, from thoſe which are done
'amongſt us; from thoſe, I ſay, which are ob-
'ſerv'd to reſemble thoſe in thoſe which are
'ſeen above: For thoſe things are effected ſeveral
'waies; wherefore alſo that which appeareth in
'every ſuperiour thing, is to conſidered by thoſe
'things which agree with it, and which may be
'effected ſeveral ways amongſt us, as ſeveral
'things may happen.

But I inſiſt too much hereupon. To come therefore to the buſineſs. Although the whole Region above Earth is ſomtimes called Heaven, for even the nearer part of it, the Air, is ſomtimes called ſo too; yet by the word Heaven and Æther we will underſtand the ſuperiour part of the Region, which containeth the Stars; and, by Air, the inferiour, in which Clouds, Lightning, and the like are generated. We ſhall begin with the celeſtial ſuperiour things, and ſpeak afterwards of the Aerial.

## CHAP. I.

### *Of the Subſtance and Variety of the Stars.*

WE muſt firſt lay down what was formerly touched, that *the Sun, Moon, and other Stars, were not made apart, and afterwards brought into the World, but received their figure, augmentation, and magnitude, immediately, and together with the World, (as the Earth, the Sea, and whatſoever is in the World,) by the coagmentations and convolutions made within it, of ſome more tenuious natures, and thoſe either derial, or fiery, or both; for this our ſenſe ſuggeſts to us.*

Hence ſome Stars ſeem to be of more fiery ſubſtance, eſpecially the Sun, whoſe heat is ſo manifeſt to ſenſe; but withal, they ſeem not ſo much to be pure fires, as ſome mixed concretions, to which fire is annext.

Or, it may be, they are, as it were, certain glaſſy ſmooth diſhes, capable to receive the bright, fiery little Bodies, which, coming from the ætherial Region thorough which they run, light upon them, and to reflect them, and to ſhew them to us in that form wherein they appear: For the like is done amongſt us. Or that they may be clouds, enlightned, and, as it were, enkindled; for thoſe Meteors, called the Parelii, are cauſed no other way.

Or, it may be, they are, as it were, deep veſſels, containing fire in their hollow part, like a Lanthorn, or a Chafing-diſh, which holdeth coles, or melting metals. Or, they may be, as it were, glowing plates, or, as it were, ſtones burning in a furnace; for there is nothing in all theſe that implies a contradiction.

In like manner, the Sun in particular may be nothing elſe, but a thick kind of clod, which being like a pumice, or a ſpunge full of pores, and little holes, may, containing fire, dart light out of them.

Onely the moſt impoſſible thing ſeems to be what ſome aſſert, that the Stars are animate, or ſo many Animals, and moreover, ſo many gods. For though we ſhould grant, that each of them is a kind of World, or rather, as it were, an Earth, which hath not onely an Air, but an æther peculiar to itſelf. Nevertheleſs, as this our Earth, though it produceth Animals, is not therefore itſelf an Animal; ſo neither would the Stars be, although we ſhould grant, that ſome Animals may be generated in them.

But if we ſhould admit this, yet what they further preſs, that there are ſuch a kind of round and rolling gods, needs to be repeated onely; for we formerly proved that theſe are prodigious fancies, not of diſcourſing, but dreaming Philoſophers, when expreſſing immortal beings by the language proper to mortals, they pronouuce things ſo contrary to the felicity of the gods, and which ſeem ſo far beneath their excellent nature.

The Stars have been already diſtinguiſhed into two kinds; ſome are fixed, which obſerve the ſame poſition from one another, and keep the ſame courſe from Eaſt to Weſt, never altering it. Others are wandring, whence called Planets or erratick Stars, becauſe they never obſerve the ſame poſition, neither towards one aonther, nor to the reſt; and ſomtimes perform their courſes nigher the North, ſomtimes nigher the South.

If you demand from whence this diverſity proceeds, I ſhall ſay, that *it may be the Stars were from the beginning moved round, with ſuch a neceſſity, that ſome took a circular motion uniform and even; others, an irregular and unequal one.* Laert.

*It may alſo be, that, in the places thorough which they move, there may be ſome even diffuſion of ſpaces, which may carry them on the ſame way one after another, whereby they may move evenly, but that elſewhere they may be uneven for the ſame reaſon; the varieties which we obſerve in their motions proceeding from thence.*

*To alledge one onely cauſe for theſe, ſeeing that the Phænomena's argue that the cauſes may be many, is madneſs, and not rightly conſidered by thoſe, who dote*

*on vain Aſtrology, and trivially explain the cauſes of ſome things, and in the mean time will not allow the divine nature* (to which they aſcribe moſt of theſe,) *to be free from the task of ſeveral troubleſome offices.*

## CHAP. II.

### *Of the Magnitude and Figure of the Stars.*

AS concerning the magnitude of the Sun, and of the reſt of the Stars, it may be conſidered, either as to us, or in itſelf. *As to us, it is ſo much as it appeareth to be,* for the ſenſe is not deceived; and whatſoever magnitude the eye ſeeth in them, is ſuch in them, for they have not any other thing immediately encompaſſing them without, which is viſible; nor any thing of their own, which falls not within view of the eye. Laert.

But this magnitude conſidered in itſelf, or *as to the thing itſelf, may be either ſomwhat greater, or ſomwhat leſſer, or exactly ſo much as it appears to be. For with ſuch variety are fires preſented to our ſenſes, ſeen at a diſtance, in the day-time, or by night.* For either they are juſt ſo big as they ſeem, as the light of a candle if we look near it; or leſſer, as when we ſee the ſame light in the day-time at diſtance; or greater than indeed they are, as when the ſame light is ſeen in the night-time afar off.

I ſay, ſomwhat greater or leſſer, in regard this diverſity betwixt the appearance and the true compaſs cannot be very great, as may be evinced from our ordinary fires; for, from what diſtance ſoever we perceive the heat of any fire, from the ſame its juſt form appeareth to us. In like manner, ſince we perceive the heat of the Sun here from the place where he ſeemeth to us to be, his juſt magnitude cannot be ſenſibly different.

That nothing perceivable is taken off from the Stars by this diſtance, is confirmed; becauſe thoſe things which we behold at a great diſtance, and much Air mediating between, are preſented to us with a confuſed circumference; but the Sun, to thoſe who can look upon him, appears to be of an exact compaſs; nor can any thing be ſeen more diſtinctly than the circumference of the Moon. There are indeed ſome Stars which twinkle, and ſeem to ſhoot forth trembling beams; but upon another account, this argues they are ſo near, as to be ſeen exactly. For fires amongſt us ſeem, in like manner, to wave and tremble, when we behold them at a diſtance, which, near at hand, ſeem fixed and conſtant.

Again, this is confirmed, becauſe, if the Stars did loſe their due magnitude by reaſon of diſtance, they would much more loſe their colour; for we know, that a thing at diſtance ceaſeth to be ſeen in its native colour, ſooner than by reaſon of its littleneſs it totally diſappears, or comes not to be ſeen at all. But though there be no diſtance more capable to effect this, (for there is not any length greater,) yet the Stars do not therefore loſe their true colour.

Laert. *Many things may be objected againſt this, but they are eaſily ſolv'd, if a man ſtick cloſe to thoſe things which are manifeſt to us, as we have ſhewed in our Books concerning Nature,* where we bring in this diſtinction of magnitude, conſidered in itſelf, and, according to us, we declared, that neither he did abſurdly, who ſaid, The Sun is a foot broad; nor he that ſaid, It was many times bigger than *Peloponneſus*; nor he who ſaid, It is of equal bigneſs with the Earth; foraſmuch as of things, which in themſelves are greater and leſſer, there may be as to us one magnitude, according as they are nearer or farther off.

As for the figure, I ſhall onely ſay, that ſince it appeareth round to us, it is globous and plain like a Plate, and therefore the Stars are either as diſhes, or as cylinders, or as cones and tops, or as certain nails fixed in the Sky. For none of theſe hath any thing that implyeth a contradiction, nor diſſonancy from the Phænomena.

## CHAP. III.

### *How the Stars move, out-run one another, and are turned round.*

HAving ſaid, not long ſince, that, of the Stars, ſome are fixed, others erratick, and that this difference proceeds from their having different motions; we muſt now ſay, in general, Laert. that the motions of both may be made *either by the turning about of the whole Heaven,* in which one or more of them are, ſuppoſing it to be ſolid, and carrying them about with it, like nails faſtned into it; or elſe, the Heaven ſtanding ſtill, as a fluid or pervious thing, by their being whirled about, and moved thorough it.

Now foraſmuch, as whether it be the motion of the Heaven, or of the Stars, it may have begun from a neceſſity made at the very time, that the World was generated, and impreſs'd eaſt-wardly; it might in the firſt caſe, (that is, if it be in the whole Heaven,) both have begun, and be continued by the hurry of ſome Air. For there may be a two-fold extrinſecal Air; one, preſſing from above, and driving the Heaven towards the Weſt; the other lifting it up as it were, and carrying it on, and that otherwiſe than the former, which on all ſides preſſes and fixes the Poles. In the ſecond caſe, (that is if the motion be in the Stars themſelves,) it may have been, either by hurry of Air, or by the courſe of the fire.

For it may have been from the very beginning, that a great company of little Bodies, evaporating, and diffuſing themſelves, might break the Air, and force their paſſage thorough it; and the Air, receiving this motion of the Wind, and hurrying the Stars along with it, might carry them about, and cauſe that continual circular Motion, which is ſtill ſeen above in them. It might alſo be, that the proper fire of every Star, either being ſhut up cloſe and ſeeking a vent, might begin to turn about, and continue ſtill as it began; or, being at greater liberty, might move in this faſhion that way, unto which the food or aliment of each invites them, and ſo go on, *thorough its heat and deſire of aliment to the next Bodies which were fuel* convenient to nouriſh it. Laert.

None of all theſe is repugnant to the Phænomena's; but otherwiſe, we cannot eaſily determine

mine from what cauſe the motion of the Stars ſhould proceed.

But, How comes it to paſs, that ſome Stars anticipate, or get before others, ſo as that we ſee the others left behind them? This may happen, either becauſe, the others performing the ſame diurnal revolution with them are moved more ſlowly, as the Moon, which moving more ſlowly than the reſt, towards the Weſt, is left as it were behind them Eaſt-ward. Or becauſe, being carried about by the diurnal motion towards the Weſt, they are in the mean time ſlowly carried on, by a contrary motion towards the Eaſt, whereby the Moon may not have been left by the reſt, Eaſt-ward, but rather have left them Weſt-ward. Or becauſe, all things being carried about only with a diurnal revolution, and equal motion, yet ſome perform a longer, others a ſhorter courſe; and ſo the Moon, if ſhe be above the fixed Stars, as ſome conceive, will perform its revolution more ſlowly, and be obſerved to be left behind.

Certainly, to aſſert any thing abſolutely in theſe matters, becomes thoſe, who affect to make oſtentation of ſomthing magnificent, and prodigious before the multitude.

Again, How comes it to paſs, that the Sun, Moon, and Planets, when they come to the Tropicks, or Solſtices, turn about and go back again? This may happen, either becauſe, ſuch a kind of circular motion was at the beginning impreſs'd upon theſe Stars, as that they ſhould be carried round about after a ſpiral manner, limited on each ſide at the Solſtices. Or that they go according to the obliquity of Heaven, which in proceſs of time acquired a neceſſity of that indirect poſition. *Or becauſe, they are repell'd by the Air, which driveth them back* on, now to this ſide, now to that, by reaſon of its coldneſs, denſity, or ſome other quality. *Or becauſe, their aliment is conveniently diſpoſed all along that way, kindling backward*, and failing forwards.

*And theſe, and thoſe which are like theſe, have in them nothing repugnant to the evidence of things; if a man adhering only to the poſſibility that is in theſe things, can reduce each of them to that, which agreeth with the Phænomena's, not fearing the groundleſs contrivements of Aſtrologers, who forbear not to build upon and in them a vaſt company of concentrick Orbs.*

## CHAP. IV.

### *Of the Riſing and Setting of the Stars, and of the alternate length of dayes and nights.*

THe Riſing and Setting of the Sun, Moon, and the reſt of the Stars may happen three waies.

Laert. First, *by appearance above, and occultation beneath*: For that the Stars being always bright and never extinguiſh'd, are ſo carried about, above, and below the Earth, that ſomtimes they riſe, ſomtimes they go down, or ſet; and the Sun, in particular, when he goeth down cauſeth darkneſs with us; but returning, he enkindleth as it were the Heaven with his morning-beams. There is not any thing amongſt the Phænomena's which contradicts this.

Again, *by being enkindled* in the Eaſt quarter, *and extinguiſhed* in the Weſt: For, *there may be ſuch a diſpoſition of the Medium in both theſe places, as that*, whilſt the Stars paſs through it, *what I affirm may be effected, there being nothing in the Phænomena's that contradicts it*; ſeeing, there are not onely fountains, that extinguiſh, but ſuch alſo, as enkindle Tapers, as that at *Epire*, formerly mentioned. So that the Ocean compaſſing the Earth, the Sun may be extinguiſhed by it in the Weſt quarter, and return all along it, paſſing along the North into the Eaſt quarter, and from thence ariſe re-enkindled. Laert.

Thirdly, by a new production every day; for nothing hindreth, but that there may every day ariſe new Suns; for example, there flowing together to the Eaſt, ſeveral fires, or ſeeds of fire, which joyn in one round Body, and ſhine, and are carried on impetuouſly towards the Weſt. For it is reported, that the like happens in the Mountains of *Ida*, and chiefly about the riſing of the Dog-ſtar; and that fires may meet in great Bodies together at certain ſeaſons, may be underſtood from what is obſerved to be done at ſome determinate time in all other Bodies. For, from the confluxion and defluxion of ſeed, Trees at a certain time bring forth leaves and fruits, at a certain time ſhed them; at a certain time Teeth are bred, at a certain time caſt; and ſo in other things, which it were too long to inſtance.

Now the Sun's continuance above the Earth making day, and his abſence night; How comes it to paſs, that all daies are not equal, and all nights equal, but that in Summer the daies are longer, the nights ſhorter; in Winter alternately, the nights longer and the daies ſhorter? This alſo may happen three waies.

Firſt, *For that the revolutions of the Sun above and beneath the Earth, are ſomtimes performed faſter, ſomtimes ſlower, according to the alternate lengths of the paces*, or waies in which the Sun paſſeth: † And this by reaſon of the poſition of the Orb called the *Zodiack*, through which the Sun paſſeth obliquely, and in two Signs of it makes the nights and the daies equal. But when from thence he declineth to the North or South, as much of his journey as he taketh off from one part, either above or below the Earth, ſo much he adds to the other. Laert. † Lucret. 5.

Secondly, *Becauſe there may be certain places in the Æther, which, by reaſon of their groſſneſs, and the reſiſtance which happens thereupon, cannot be paſſed thorough ſo ſwiftly as others.* Such are thoſe which make the Sun ſtay long beneath the Earth in the Winter, whereby they make the night longer and the day ſhorter than in Summer. *Some things of the ſame kind may be obſerved amongſt us, according to which it is convenient to explicate ſuperiour Bodies.*

Thirdly, that in the alternate parts of the year, the fires, or ſeeds of fire aforeſaid, flow together in ſuch manner, as that they make a Sun ſooner or later; and the Sun riſes out of that part from which he begins a longer or ſhorter courſe above the Earth.

They who inſiſt and fix upon but ſome one particular way, to explicate theſe effects, both contradict things apparent, and deviate from that which falls under human contemplation.

## CHAP. V.

*Of the light of the Stars, and of the changes and Spots in the Moon.*

LEt us now ſay ſomthing of the light, not onely of the Sun, but of the reſt of the Stars, and particularly of the Moon. Firſt, men admire, that the Sun, being ſo little, ſhould pour forth ſo much light out of himſelf, as ſufficeth to enlighten and warm the Heaven, the Earth, the Sea, and yet not be itſelf exhauſted. But the Sun is a kind of fountain, into which there flow together from beneath on every ſide perpetual rivulets; for the ſeeds of heat throughout the whole world flow ſo into the Sun, as that immediately from him, as from one fountain or head, both heat and light overfloweth every way.

Moreover, the ſubſtance of the Sun may be of ſuch thickneſs, and the light and heat which floweth from him of ſuch thinneſs, that as a little current or a rivulet, ſtreaming from a ſpring, watereth the meadows and fields round about it, without any loſs to itſelf; ſo that of the Sun may be ſufficient to irrigate, as it were, the whole world, without any ſenſible diminution of the Sun.

Moreover, the Air may be of ſuch a nature, as that it may be kindled, as it were, by a little light, diffuſed from the Sun; as a whole field of corn may be ſet on fire by one ſpark.

Likewiſe, the Sun may have his aliment round about him, which may ſupply what he loſeth, as the flame of a lamp is fed by the oyl which is put to it. It may happen alſo many other waies.

Laert. As to the reſt of the Stars, eſpecially the Moon, it may be, that they have their light from themſelves, *it may be they borrow it from the Sun; for amongſt us we ſee, that there are many things which ſhine of themſelves, many things which borrow light from others; and there is nothing appearing in the ſuperiour things themſelves, which hinders, but that either of thoſe opinions may be true.*

*If a man preſerve ſtedfaſt in his mind the manifold waies, and the ſuppoſitions conformable to it, and conſider the cauſes together with it, leſt minding things that are incoherent, he grow vainly proud, and ſomtimes fall into one particular way, ſomtimes into another.*

As for the Moon, it is in the firſt place wonderful, How ſhe comes to have ſo many changes, or increaſe or decreaſe of light. It may be, that being round, and receiving light from the Sun, ſhe is ſucceſſively ſo figured, (after the ſame manner as the Air, when the Sun riſeth, is enlightned, and when he ſetteth is darkened ſucceſſively,) as that going away from the Sun, ſhe ſemeth every day to encreaſe, becauſe ſhe ſheweth more and more of her enlightned face to us, until ſhe preſents it at full; and then going towards the Sun, decreaſeth every day, becauſe ſhe ſheweth leſs and leſs of it, until at laſt ſhe turneth no part of it towards us, but is quite unſeen.

Moreover, it may be, that the Moon being round, one part of her may be bright, another dark, and as ſhe turneth her Body about may diſcover to us, alternately, more or leſs of each part.

It may alſo be, that being bright of itſelf, ſhe may be obſcured by an interpoſition of ſome opacous Body coming under her, which is hemiſpherical and hollow, and, moved along with her, is continually rolled about her.

Neither doth any thing hinder, but that there may every day (according to what we formerly ſaid,) be made a new Moon of a ſeveral form and figure; as in like manner the ſeaſons of the Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter, and many things in them, come and go, are produced and periſh, at ſet times.

In fine, it may be any way, wherein thoſe things which appear to us may be applyed to explication of that manner, unleſs ſome man, being much in love with one ſingular way, ſhall vainly reject the reſt, not conſidering what things it is poſſible for a man to know, and thereupon aims at the knowledge of thoſe things which man cannot attain.

Moreover, they admire in the Moon, that there appear ſpots in her face; but *her face may appear ſo, either from the various and different nature of the parts of the Moon, or from the interpoſition of ſome body*, not ſo much opacous as dusky; not rolling about her, but perpetually adhering to her; and not ſolid all over, but full of holes like a Racket. Laert.

*Or, it may be any other way of all thoſe which are obſerved to be conformable to things apparent. This is the courſe to which we muſt adhere, concerning ſuperiour things; for no man, if he conteſt againſt apparent things, can ever partake of true tranquillity.* Laert.

## CHAP. VI.

*Of the Eclipſes of the Stars, and their ſet Periods.*

BUt there is nothing which uſeth to ſtrike a greater terrour into men, than that ſomtimes they obſerve Eclipſes, and defects of light in the Sun and Moon, to happen on a ſuddain. Yet why may not this alſo happen many ſeveral waies?

For firſt, the Sun may be Eclipſed, for that the Moon being interpoſed, puts her dark Orb or opacous Body before him, and keeping away his light from the Earth, cauſeth darkneſs in her, until by her removal the light is reſtored. The Moon may be Eclipſed, for that the Earth, being interpoſed betwixt her and the Sun, takes the Sun off from her, and darkens her, while ſhe comes within the cone of the ſhadow, until, paſſing from out of it, ſhe recovereth light.

Again, the Sun may be Eclipſed, for that ſome part of Heaven, or ſome other opacous Body, ſuch as is the Earth, may move along with the Sun, and at certain times come underneath him, and intercept his light. And the Moon in like manner, for that ſome other opacous Body paſſing betwixt her and the Sun, keeps off the beams of the Sun from her, or moving together with her, doth not onely perform its phaſes ſlowly, but ſomtimes overcaſts her with a ſuddain darkneſs. Not to mention, that if ſhe be dark on one ſide and bright on the other, it may happen, that ſhe may ſomtimes on a ſuddain turn her dark ſide towards us.

Moreover, both the Sun and Moon may ſuffer Eclipſe, for that they may paſs thorough places pernicious to fire, and thereby their light become exting-

extinguiſhed, until going beyond them they renew and recover it.

Thus ought the ſeveral ordinary waies to be heeded, and ſome of them alſo put together, it being poſſible, that many cauſes may concur.

*The periodical order*, by which Eclipſes happen at certain times, *is conceived to be kept in like manner as amongſt us in ſome things, as in the viciſſitude of ſeaſons. There is no need of recurring to the divine nature for the bringing of theſe to paſs; let us allow that to be free from all buſineſs, and exquiſitely happy. Unleſs this be done, all diſcourſe of Cauſes in ſuperiour things will be vain; as hath already happened to ſome, who taking an impoſſible courſe became frivolous for that they approved only one, and rejected all the reſt, though they were poſſible, and were tranſported to dream of that which exceeds the capacity of the Intellect, and were neither able to admit, as they ought, apparent ſignes, nor underſtand, as they ſay, how to rejoyce with God.*

Lucr.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of the Preſignifications of the Stars.*

IT remains, we ſpeak of the Preſignifications of the changes of the Air attributed to the Stars, as rain, wind, drought, heat, and the like, which happen according to the time of the riſing or ſetting of certain Stars, as of the Dog, Orion, the Pleiades.

*Theſe Preſignifications may be made either according to the condition of the Seaſons, as it happens in thoſe living creatures, which being ſeen at one time with us, at another with others, paſſing hither and thither, are ſigns not cauſes of the ſeaſons, for the riſing and ſetting-Stars may be not cauſes but ſigns of thoſe mutations; or as it happens not certainly, but caſually, at what time the Stars riſe or ſet, there are cauſes of ſome mutation in the Air.*

Lucr.

*For neither of thoſe is repugnant with things apparent; and what cauſe there may be, beſides theſe agreeable with things apparent, we cannot perceive.*

It is not without ſome reaſon what I hinted of Preſignifications; which are obſerved in ſome Animals, to be made according to the condition of the ſeaſon which at that time comes in, ſo as the motions obſerved in Animals only declare tempeſts, but make them not. As thoſe for example, which depart from us in Autumne induce not any neceſſity of the Winters being at that time: Neither is there any divine nature which ſits and marks the departure of living creatures, that it may make good what is foretold by them.

This is a kind of folly that cannot fall upon any Animal, in which there were the leaſt grain of wit; ſo far is it from being in that nature which poſſeſſeth all felicity.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of Comets, and thoſe which are called Falling Stars.*

WHat hath been hitherto ſpoken of the Stars, belongs to the Sun and Moon, and Stars, which having been made from the beginning of the World conſtantly inhere and appear in Heaven. But beſides theſe, there are other Stars, which ſomtimes are generated or newly appear, and after ſome few daies or Months either periſh or lye hid. They are called Comets, *quaſi Comatæ Stellæ* hairy-ſtarres, for that they have a long train, like hair.

Some alſo there are, that laſt but for a moment, vaniſhing almoſt aſſoon as they appear; and, ſeeming in ſome kind of excurſion to fall down, they are ordinarily termed falling-Stars.

As for the Comets, 'they may be generated; Lucret.
'Either for that ſome fire is ſomtimes kindled in 'ſome of thoſe ſuperiour places, and being kind-'led is for a time nouriſh'd and moved, accord-'ing to the abundance and diſpoſition of the mat-'ter. Or elſe they appear, for that Heaven, as 'to that part which is over our heads, hath ſome 'peculiar motion according to ſeveral viciſſitudes, 'ſo as theſe Stars are driven to be made manifeſt. 'Or elſe, they come forth by reaſon of a certain 'diſpoſition at ſome times; and, aſſoon as they 'come lower towards us, they become mani-'feſt.

'Comets diſappear to our ſight through the 'cauſes contrary to theſe: Either the matter con-'venient for them is not placed all along, as it is in 'that place where they are obſerved to inhere, 'ſo as by degrees through want of aliment, they 'conſume as it were and go out, or that ſome thing 'oppoſeth their motion. And that may happen, 'not only for that this part of the World, round 'about which the reſt is turned, remaineth un-'moved, as ſome affirm; but alſo, for that there 'may be in the Air ſome impetuous gyration, 'which may hinder their moving round, and drive 'it another way, as may alſo happen to the other 'Stars which are called Planets at the Tropicks.

'Moreover this may happen many other waies, 'if we diſcourſe upon that which is conformable 'to things apparent.

As for thoſe which are called falling-Stars, 'they may be made either by pieces broken off 'from the true Stars, or from the falling down 'of that matter whereof their is a kind of diſ-'flation, as may happen alſo in lightning; or 'from a company of ignifying Atoms, meeting 'and joyning together to effect it; the motion 'being made, according as the force of meet-'ing together was from the beginning. Or 'from the driving of wind up together within 'certain cloudy bottoms or windings, and ſet-'ting it a-fire whilſt it is rolled up and down, 'and breaking thorough the bottoms which 'reſtrain them, and moving to that part to-'wards which that impulſion carries them.

'There are other waies not fictitious, by 'which this may be done. But of celeſtial Mete-ors, enough.

CHAP.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Of Clouds.*

NExt these are the aerial Meteors, which are made neerer us in the Air. We shall begin with the Clouds; than which nothing is generated above in the Air or seen, more frequently.

Lucret. *A Cloud therefore may be generated and have its being, by some accumulation as it were of the Air, the Winds driving it, so as that a Cloud is nothing but a thickning of the Air. Again, by implication of som Atoms cohering mutually to one another, and fit to produce such a compound*; and this when they first come together into little Bodies of Clouds, and those are gathered together into greater bulks, so as at last they become greatest of all.

They most commonly seem to rise at the tops of Hills, for that the first little compounds are so subtle as that they escape the sight, and are carryed on by the wind, until being by little condensed, they appear on the tops of the Hills which by reason thereof seem to smoak.

If any shall doubt, From whence there can come so great a conflux of Atoms as is sufficient to make such great bulks of Clouds, let him consider, that if no other way, yet they may at least come from without, out of the immensity of the Universe where there is an infinite multitude of them. And this because there is allowed to the principles a free passage in and out, thorough the vents of the World, as was formerly declared.

Moreover, a Cloud may be generated *by the gathering together of effluxions and exhalations, out of the Earth and Water*, and carried upwards. For, that there are many little Bodies drawn out of the whole Sea, appeareth by Garments which being hung upon the shore grow moyst. Besides we see, that every where out of Rivers, arise mists and exhalations and vapours in such abundance, as that being carried upwards they darken the skye, and by little and little meeting togeher turn into Clouds.

*Neither doth any thing hinder, but that these coagmentations may be made many other waies.*

## CHAP. X.

### *Of the Winds, and of Prester.*

Laert. WInd may be generated, first, *when the Atoms or little Bodies leap out of some convenient places and fly thorough the Air, there being a more vehement effusion made from some heaps which are proper for such kind of emissions*; * When in a narrow Vacuum there are many little Bodies, there followeth Wind; and contrary, the Air is quiet and calm, when in a great Vacuum there are but a few little Bodies.

* Senec. nat. quæst. 55.

Senec. Ibid. For, as in a market place or street, as long as the people are but few they walk without any trouble; but when they run into some narrow place, they justle and quarrel with one another; so in this space which encompasseth us, when many Bodies crowd into one little place, they must necessarily justle one another, and be thrust forward, and driven back and entangled and squeezed; of which is made the wind, when they which contested yeeld and having been long tost'd up and down uncertainly shrink: But when a few Bodies stir up and down in a large space, they can neither drive nor be driven impetuously.

Again, Wind may be caused when the Air is driven on and agitated either by exhalations coming from the Earth and Water, or by the Sun's pressing upon it from above; for it is manifest, that where the Air is agitated and stirred, there is caused wind, so as wind seems to be nothing else, but the waves of the Air. Whence we may conceive, that the wind somwhat resembles water troubled, and that the more violent winds come from being stirred by some more vehement cause, after the same manner as torrents rage and make waste, when there happens a vast defluxion of Waters by great showers falling upon the Mountains. Plin. 2. 33.

*Presters* are windy whirlings (for the fiery, and those which burn, from which the name is taken, are a kind of Thunder.) They 'may be ge- Laert. 'nerated either from the depression of a Cloud after various fashions towards inferior places, 'whilst it is carried down and driven on by abun- 'dance of wind, which rouls itself about, and 'tears away the sides of the Clouds, the wind al- 'so driveth on the Cloud immediately from with- 'out, or from the wind standing round about, 'whenas the Air pressing upon it from above, 'and withal the Air which is driven on and dif- 'fused round about hindring by reason of its 'density, the great abundance of wind knoweth 'not which way it may spread itself, and being driven back, as well by the sides as from above, it necessarily thrusts the Cloud downwards.

*When this Prester is thrust down upon the land, it causeth whirl-winds; when upon the Sea, whirl-pools.* Whirle-winds are less frequently seen, because the mountains snatch them away before they come within our sight; whirl-pools more frequently, by reason of the wide smoothness of the Sea, into which we may behold a Cloud like a pillar descend from Heaven, and push it down, as it were with the force of an arm or fist, untill the violence of the wind breaking thorough it, the sea works and boils, and the ships incur a danger almost inevitable. Laert.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Of Thunder.*

IT was not without reason that I said, there are also fiery Presters, which are not different from Thunder. For, *Thunder seems to be caused by the manifold conglomeration* of blasts, swelling with fiery little Bodies, 'within the bulks of the Clouds; *and by the evolution and strong enkindling of them, and breaking of the Clouds by the fire, which is so forcibly darted to inferiour places, according as that breaking forth is somtimes directed towards a high mountain, (which kind of places are oftnest struck with Thunder,) somtimes towards other things.*

Laert. For that the nature of Thunder is fiery is manifest, even because it often burneth the houses upon which it is darted, and for that it leaveth behind it a stench like brimstone. That it is generated within the Clouds, is evident, for that it never Thunders when the sky is clear; but the Clouds first gather together all along the Air, and darken the sky, and there ariseth a foul night, as it were, of showers. Lastly, that many little Bodies or seeds, as it were, of fire, are contained within a Cloud may be argued, as well

well from the effect, as for that amongſt the little Bodies of a Cloud riſing up from beneath, are intermingled, not only watery, but fiery alſo, and of other ſorts. Withal, it cannot be, but that the Cloud muſt receive many things from the beams of the Sun.

When therefore the blaſt or wind, which drove the Clouds together, hath intermingled itſelf with the ſeeds of fire, that are in the boſom, as it were, and cavity of the Cloud, there is cauſed a whirling or vortex within it, which being carried about very rapidly, groweth hot by motion; and either by intenſion of this heat, or the contagion of ſome other fire, breaketh out into perfect Thunder, and tearing the Cloud is darted forth. Now the Cloud is cleft and broken, by reaſon that the places round about the whirling or vortex are taken up, and ſtuffed thicker with the part of the Cloud; neither, by reaſon of their being ſqueezed up ſo cloſe together, is there any chinck open, whereby whilſt it is ſpread with the wind may inſinuate itſelf, and retire, by penetrating into it by degrees. Whereupon it is neceſſary, that the fire lately made, being dilated by the wind, breaks thorough the Cloud with violence, which makes the noiſe of Thunder; and coming forth, ſhineth and filleth all parts with a glittering light.

It may alſo be, that the force of the wind may light from without upon the Cloud, at ſuch time as the Thunder is mature and perfect, and rending the Cloud, make way for the fiery vortex to break thorough.

It may alſo be, that the fiery vortex, though not ſet on fire when it breaks forth, may be kindled afterwards in its paſſage through the Air; after the ſame manner as a leaden ſlugg paſſing thorough the Air grows hot, and takes fire. It may alſo be, that the fire is made in the very daſhing againſt the thing which it hits, the ſeeds of fire being ſtruck out of both, in the ſame manner as they are ſtruck by a Flint out of Steel.

Lucr. ‘There are many other waies by which this ‘fire may be kindled, or thunder made, onely ‘let us caſt away all fiction; and caſt away it will ‘be, if we take our conjecture of things unſeen, ‘from that which is conformable to things ap‘parent.

Hence may be given the reaſon, Why it comes to paſs, that it Thunders oftner in the Spring and Autumn, than in other ſeaſons. In Winter, there wants the ſeeds of fire; in Summer, the blaſts and heaps of Clouds; in the Spring and in Autumn, all things convenient are ready.

But how comes it to paſs, that the motion of Thunder is ſo ſwift, and its ſtroke ſo violent? This proceeds from the great violence of the eruption, and the tenuity; by reaſon of which, nothing in the way reſiſts them, and force, which is, as it were, doubled by gravity, and encreaſeth by motion.

How comes it to penerate thorough the walls of Houſes, to melt metals in a moment, to draw out all the Wine out of full veſſels? This proceeds from the tenuity, and quick motion, and violent force of the little Bodies, whereby it can in a moment diſſipate and diſperſe thoſe things, which the ordinary fire of the Sun cannot under a long time.

## CHAP. XII.

### *Of Lightning and Thunder-claps.*

ALthough I hinted by the way, how Lightning and how Thunder are generated; yet nothing hinders, but that they may be generated many waies beſides.

For ‘Lightning may be made either by the rub- ‘bing or ſtriking of the Clouds againſt one an- ‘other, ſuch a kind of figure iſſuing from them; or by ſuch a diſpoſure and conformation of Atoms heaped up together, as cauſeth fire, and generates lightning; after the ſame manner as we obſerve it to be done, when iron and a ſtone are hit againſt one another. Laert.

*Or by the winds ſtirring up out of the Clouds thoſe Bodies*, or little Bodies, that is, Atoms, *which cauſe this glittering brightneſs*; for that the wind (and eſpecially if it grow hot like a leaden ſlugge,) ſtrikes off the ſame little Bodies, which are ſtruck by the mutual attrition of the Clouds.

‘Or by ſqueezing forth; there being made a ‘compreſſion either by the Clouds one with ano‘ther, or by the winds driving them, which is cauſed over and above the force of colliſion.

‘Or by interception of the light which is dif‘fuſed by the Stars, which thereupon is driven ‘by the motion of the Clouds and winds, and ‘falleth out of the Clouds.

‘Or by the falling down of ſome moſt tenuious ‘light out of the Clouds, whilſt the Clouds are ‘intrinſecally gather'd together by the fire; and ‘withal, Thunder is cauſed like a kind of bounce ‘by their motion.

‘Or by the enkindling of a wind, which is ‘cauſed, as well by a vehement intenſneſs, as con‘volution of motion.

‘Or by a breaking of the Clouds by the winds, ‘and falling down of fiery Atoms, which cauſe ‘lightning to ſhine.

That lightning may be generated many other waies, he will eaſily perceive, who adheres to things ‘apparent, and is able to underſtand what ‘ſuits with them.

Thunder-claps may be made thus, ‘Either by ‘the rolling of a wind within the cavities of the ‘Clouds, as in ordinary veſſels, when ſomthing ‘is rolled in them.

‘Or making a crack by the very diffiation and ‘ebullition, as it were, of the fire, within the ſame ‘Clouds.

‘Or by the breaking and tearing of the ſame Clouds, as when a ſwollen bladder cracks, paper is torn, or a ſhrowd rent.

‘Or by the ſame Clouds, rubbing and driving ‘againſt one another, having acquired an icy kind ‘of concretion, * and this by reaſon of the winds ‘driving them; as tall Woods crackle at the blowing of the Eaſt-wind, waves unbroken murmur, garments hung up, and papers carried away and beaten, as it were, by the winds, make a clattering noiſe. * Lucret.

Or by extinction of the fire of Thunder, breaking out of one Cloud, and lighting upon another which is wateriſh, whereupon it hiſſes like red-hot Iron, taken out of the fire, and caſt into the water.

Or

Or by the burning of ſome dry Cloud, which crackles like a branch in the fire.

'In a word, that this alſo may be explained 'ſeveral waies, the things which appear evince 'and teach us, that we think not, with ignorant and ſuperſtitious perſons, that the noiſe of Thunder denotes the appearance of ſome god, ſince other Bodies, being ſtruck againſt one another, make a ſound alſo, as Mill-ſtones in grinding, or the hands clapped together.

Leſt any wonder how it comes to paſs, that Lightning is ſeen before the Thunder is heard, this may happen, 'either for that in ſome certain 'diſpoſition of the Clouds, as ſoon as the wind 'lights upon them, there leaps forth ſuch a con-'figuration of little Bodies, as cauſeth lightning; and thereupon the wind, by rolling up and down, maketh this ſound.

'Or for that they being both generated toge-'ther, the lightning is brought to us with a quicker 'nimbleneſs; the Thunder cometh later, as hap-'peneth in ſome things which are ſeen at diſtance, 'and make a ſound by blowes; for it is manifeſt, that the ſtroak is ſeen before the ſound is heard.

## CHAP. XIII.

### *Of Rain and Dew.*

WE muſt now ſpeak of watery concretions, whereof ſome continue fluid, others acquire ſome ſolidity by the impreſſion of cold; thoſe which continue fluid are Rain and Dew, whereof one is made, the Heaven being cloudy; the other, when it is clear.

*Laert.* Rain may be made of the Clouds, either when being thinner than ordinary, the wind driving them, or they preſſing upon one another, are ſqueezed together, and knit into drops; or when being thicker than ordinary, they are rarifi'd and changed by heat or by the wind; or, like Wax, melt ſo, that they fall down in drops.

That there are ſeeds of Water contained in the Clouds, is ſo well known, that we need not ſpeak of it. They aſcend together with the Clouds, they encreaſe together with them, and are diſperſed thorough them, as blood through the parts of our Body. Neither doth there aſcend moiſture into the Clouds from all Rivers onely, but the Clouds alſo which hang over the Sea receive moiſture, like a fleece of wool.

*Lucret.* Wherefore Rain may flow from the Clouds, either when the force of the wind thruſteth the Clouds up together, and great ſtore of ſhowers being raiſed above them, preſſeth and thruſts them; or when the Clouds by the power of the winds are rarifi'd, and ſuffer their moiſture to flow abroad; or by the heat of the Sun are ſo diſſolved, that they fall down in drops, and, as I ſaid, like melting wax.

It may happen, that Rains ſomtimes laſt a long while, becauſe it then happeneth, that many ſeeds of waters, riſing up to ſeveral Clouds, and diſperſed every way, may ſupply the Rain. Somtimes alſo the Earth reeking, exhales back again all the moiſture which ſhe receiveth.

Dew is made, either by the meeting together of the little Bodies in the Air, , which are of ſuch a nature, as to be fit to generate this kind of moiſture; or by the bringing forth of little Bodies, which chiefly generate Dew above, when they ſo meet together as to make that moiſture, and flow down into the places beneath. Many things of this kind are done amongſt us, eſpecially in ſtoves.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *Of Hail, Snow, and Froſt.*

OF watery Concretions, which by impreſſion of cold are congealed into ſome ſolidity, there are two things which are made when the Heaven is Cloudy, Hail and Snow; one, when it is clear, Froſt.

Hail is generated, either when the congelation is ſtronger, by reaſon of the ſetling of a cold wind which is on every ſide, and preſſeth the drippings or drops of the Clouds, which otherwiſe would go away into Rain, or when the congealed bulk cleaveth aſunder in many places, and by a moderate liquefaction, watery drops inſinuating into the chincks by compreſſion of the parts, and breaking the whole frame into pieces, they cauſe that the parts exiſt compacted ſeverally by themſelves, and make a heap of fragments, which are thereupon diſperſed.

That theſe fragments be in a manner round, nothing hindreth, either, for that the outmoſt corners are cut off on every ſide, by reaſon of their long falling; or, for that in their very forming, ſomthing either watery or windy ſurrounds all the parts evenly, as we ſaid, ſo that their ſurface is round, and notun even.

Snow happeneth to be made either by thin water poured out of the Clouds, ſo that it froaths, (ſome Clouds fit for that purpoſe preſſing, and the winds blowing them abroad,) and is afterwards congealed in the very Motion, by reaſon of ſome more vehement cold in the lower places of the Clouds.

Or by ſome ſmooth congealing, cauſed in the Clouds; unto which, whilſt the little watery Bodies, compreſſed by, and neighbouring to, one another, arrive, there is cauſed an aggeneration of ſuch looſneſs, as the flocks of Snow have, whereas, the ſame driving one another cauſe Hail, with two things chiefly are made in the Air.

It may alſo be, that a kind of ejaculation of the Snow, which falleth down in heaps, may be made, the Clouds, which were firſt congealed, breaking in aſunder.

Laſtly, Froſt is made of the ſame little Bodies as Dew, whenas the little drops of Dew made either way, are by the cold temperament of the Air congealed, and, in congealing, receive a light compactedneſs.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XV.

### *Of the Rain-bow, and Halos.*

WE muſt not here paſs by two remarkable things, which appear in the Clouds or above; The Rain-bow, an Arch of various colours, over againſt the Sun; and Halos, which ſomtimes like a White Crown compaſſeth the Moon.

The Rain-bow is made either, for that the moiſt Air ſhineth by the oppoſite ſplendor of the Sun, or for that it is the particular nature of light, and of the Air, to preſent ſuch kind of colours either all of them, or one onely, from which (ſhining forward,) the neighbouring parts of the Air are ſo coloured; in like manner, as we obſerve to be done, when the parts of any thing, which is enlightned, make the parts of other things next to it ſhine alſo.

As to the roundneſs of its figure, this is cauſed by reaſon, that it is onely convey'd to the beholders eye, from a diſtance every way equal; or, for that the Atoms, which are carried out of the Air into the Cloud, are ſo compelled, that every concretion made of them is formed into this roundneſs.

A Halos is made about the Moon, either by the carrying up of a ſomewhat groſs or lightly-cloudy Air towards the Moon, whilſt in the mean time, ſome effluxions derived from her do as it were ſift it, (for they do not abſolutely diſperſe it,) in ſuch manner, that they are formed into a circle about her in this cloudy figure.

Or by the Air, compelled about the Moon, after ſuch a manner, as to make this round and groſſer figure about her; which ſome conceive to happen according to ſome of her parts, or by ſome effluxion driving together from without, or, by inſinuation of heat from beneath, fit to effect this.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of Avernal places.*

IT reſts, that we ſpeak ſome things of Avernal places, ſo termed, for that they are pernicious to Birds; for when Birds attempt to flye over them, they inſtantly fall down and dye: As alſo concerning the cauſes of Peſtilence, as far as they depend on the Air.

I muſt here only repeat, that the Earth containeth all kinds of little Bodies ſo diverſly figured that ſome are ſuitable to the natures of Animals, others hurtful; and by reaſon that the contextures of Animals are ſo unlike to one another, ſome of theſe are convenient and wholſome to ſome Animals, which to others are inconvenient and pernicious. And why not? when the contexture and temper of the ſame perſon being changed by a Feaver, the ſame wine, which before did him much good, is now as deadly to him as to be ſtabb'd to the heart.

It is manifeſt, that many things unpleaſant, troubleſome, and pernicious ordinarily come into the taſte, the ſmall, the touch, and all the ſenſes, not to mention ſome Trees which either cauſe a heavineſs to thoſe who ſleep in their ſhade; or by an ill ſcent kill them; nor ſtrong Wine, or the fume of coles and the like: How many places are there, which exhale ſtrong and hurtful ſcents of Brimſtone and ſulphur? They who dig in Mines, who look ſo whan, and dye ſo ſoon, how many noiſome vapours do they find to breath out of the inmoſt parts of the Earth?

Thus there are ſome places out of which theſe vapours breathe, which being carried up into the Air, diffuſed round over it, in ſome manner poyſon it, and infect it with a deadly quality; ſo as that, when Birds come to paſs over it, *Veluti ſi Mulier menſium tempore Caſtoreum olfaciat*, they become ſtupefy'd, and immediately fall down dead.

It may alſo be, that the Air which lies between the Birds and the Earth, being cleft aſunder by the force of a vapour breaking forth, and the place becoming almoſt Vacuous; the Birds may not have a ſupport, upon which to reſt their ſpreading wings, and continue their flight, ſo that they ſink and fall, over-burthen'd by the weight of their own Body. Thus much for Avernal places.

## CHAP. XVII.

### *Of Peſtilence.*

THough Peſtilence, or a mortal affection of the Air may come from above, like a Cloud or dew; yet is is moſt commonly cauſed, when the Earth is putrify'd by unſeaſonable rains and heats, and ſuch a vapour ariſeth out of it, as infects the Air, and killeth far and neer, not only men but other living Creatures.

That the Air eaſily entertains the affection (or quality,) of the vapour breathed immediately out of the Earth into it, is manifeſt, from the diſeaſes that are particular to Countries, as here with us, the gout is frequent; among the *Achæans*, ſoreneſs of eyes; among the *Ægyptians*, the Leproſie; As alſo for that Travellers find it by experience, acknowledging that the Air in ſeveral places is very different.

That this affection is ſomtimes propagated by the Air, the nature of the Peſtilence declareth; as That eſpecially, which, in the memory of our Anceſtors beginning in *Æthiopia*, ran on into *Lybia* and *Ægypt*, and almoſt over all the Dominions of the King of *Perſia*, ſo as it came into our City and Country alſo, and quite laid it waſte.

This propagation is made, when the poiſonous vapour intermingling its little Bodies with the Air, doth ſo diſorder, and pervert the ſcituation of the little Bodies thereof, that whatſoever of them are like its own, it formeth into the ſame contexture: As when fire inſinuating with its little Bodies into wood, ſo altereth its compoſition, that it ſtrikes forth all the fiery little Bodies that are in it; and, out of it, maketh a new fire like to itſelf. Moreover, as fire running along in its ſwift motion, is able to ſpread it ſelf thorough a whole Wood; ſo this Peſtilent affection, by reaſon of the little Bodies, of which it conſiſts, creepeth forward by Degrees, and changeth the Air a great way, until it be repreſs'd by an affection quite different, in like manner, as when

a Cloud or miſt creeps thorough the Air, and by little and little, changeth and diſturbeth it all along as it goeth.

Not to mention, that when men by breathing, draw the Air into their Bodies, they ſuck in at the ſame time, the little Bodies of this affection; wherewith, thoſe which are like them in the Body are tranſpoſed, and perverted in the ſame manner, as we ſaid of the Air; and by contagious afflation, they are tranſmitted on to others, which cauſe the ſame perverſion, whereby the diſeaſe ſpreds every where.

Thus much concerning not Meteorology onely, but all Phyſiology: Of which the few things that we have ſaid are ſuch, as that by contemplating them, we may throughly underſtand the things that are done, whereby the things that are of affinity with them, may be comprehended; and the cauſes of particular effects in Nature, known. For they, who perſue not theſe with all poſſible diligence, are far from underſtanding them, as they ought, and from obtaining the end, for which thoſe are to be underſtood.

And never muſt we caſt out of Mind the Criteries, (nor the evidence that belongs to every one of them,) becauſe, if we forſake not theſe, we ſhall with right reaſon find out from whence perturbation ariſeth, and what it is that cauſeth fear, and ſhall quit ourſelves from it, underſtanding the cauſe of ſuperiour things, and of all others which ordinarily happen, and ſtrike great fear into others.

But, preſuppoſing the Criteries, it avails moſt to apply ourſelves to ſpeculation of the Principles, of which all things conſiſt, and of the infinity of Nature, and other things coherent with theſe, and with conſtant remembrance to preſerve the chiefeſt and moſt general Maxims concerning them. For by this means, we ſhall be fartheſt off from Fables, and obtain that undiſturbed ſtate of mind, which is the true and onely mark, at which, in all this diſcourſe, we have aimed.

THE

# The Third Part OF PHILOSOPHY.

## *ETHICK*, or *MORALS*.

IT reſteth that we ſpeak of *Ethick*, or the Philoſophy of *Manners*; neither is it without cauſe that we ſaid at firſt, that this is to be eſteemed the principal Part of Philoſophy, becauſe that which is of Nature would be uſeleſs, unleſs it conferr'd to the End of Life with an Ethical Conſideration. Even Prudence itſelf, which belongs to this Part, therefore excels Natural Philoſophy, becauſe it rules it, and uſeth it as a means to Moral Philoſophy.

In ſaying this Part concerns the *End of Life*, I ſhew why it is commonly called the Philoſophy *concerning Life and Manners*, or concerning the inſtitution of the Actions of Life, (for Manners are no other than the cuſtomary Actions of Human Life;) likewiſe concerning the *End*, that is, the extream or greateſt of the Goods which we perſue; and concerning things eligible and avoidable, inaſmuch as it preſcribeth the election of ſuch things as conduce to that End, and the avoidance of ſuch as divert from it.

For the *End* of Life, by the tacit Conſent of all Men, is *Felicity*; and ſince almoſt all miſs of that End, muſt it not happen either, for that they propoſe not to themſelves that Felicity which they ought, or for that they uſe not the right means to attain it?

When we behold ſo many, who, abounding in all things neceſſary to the uſe of Life, (ſwimming in Wealth, adorn'd with Titles, flouriſhing in a hopeful Iſſue; in Fine, poſſeſs'd of all things commonly eſteemed deſirable,) are notwithſtanding anxious and querulous, full of cares and ſolicitudes, diſtracted with terrors, in a word, leading a miſerable life; thence we may infer, that they know not wherein true Felicity conſiſts, and by what means it may be attained: Their Hearts reſembling a Veſſel, which either being leaky and full of holes, can never be filled; or being tainted with ill liquor, corrupts and ſpoils whatſoever it receives.

It is therefore worth our pains, by the benefit of this Philoſophy, (which treats of the *End* and of *Felicity*,) to cleanſe and mend our heart, that it may be ſatisfi'd with a little, and be pleaſed in the enjoying of any thing, *we muſt Philoſophize not for ſhew, but ſeriouſly; for it is requiſite, not that we ſeem ſound, but that we be ſound*: We muſt Philoſophize forthwith, and not defer it to the morrow; for even to day it concerns us to live happily, and *it is a miſchief of Folly that it always begins to live*, or defers to begin, but in the mean time liveth never.

Stob.

Senec. Ep. 13.

A ſtrange thing it is! *We have been born once, we cannot be born twice, and Age muſt have an End; Yet thou, O Man, though the Morrow be not in thy power, in confidence of living to Morrow, put'ſt thyſelf off to the future, and loſeſt the preſent: So mens lives waſte with delay, and hence it is that ſome of us die in the midſt of buſineſs*: Every man leaves the World as if he had but newly entred it; and therefore old men are upbraided with Infancy, becauſe, as if employed in buſineſs that concerns them not, they do not take notice that they live, and ſo their whole life paſſeth away without the benefit of life. Plut. adv. Colot. Stob. ſerm. 16.

Let us therefore endeavor ſo to live, that we may not repent of the time paſt; and ſo enjoy the preſent, as if the morrow nothing concerned us. He moſt ſweetly attains the morrow, who leaſt needs or deſires the morrow; and that hour overtakes a man moſt welcom, whereof he had framed to himſelf the leaſt hope. And ſince *it is troubleſom always to begin life*, let life be always to us as it were perfect and abſolute, and as if there wanted nothing to its meaſure. *The life of a Fool is unpleaſant, it is timorous, it is wholly carried on to the future*; let us endeavor that ours be pleaſant, ſecure, not only preſent, but even now ſetled in ſafety. Senec. Ep. 23. Senec.

Doubtleſs the way to flie Folly, is to aſcend that Watch-tower (as it were) of wiſe men, from whence we may behold the reſt wandring, and, in life, vainly ſeeking life. If you think it pleaſant, from Land to behold Mariners ſtriving with Storms; or, without endangering yourſelf, ſee Armies joining Battel; certainly nothing can be more delightful, than from the calm Throne of Wiſdom, to view the Tumults and Contentions of Fools. Not that it is pleaſant that others be afflicted, but it pleaſeth that we are not involved in the ſame evils.

But that we may in ſome meaſure, to our ability, help thoſe who deſire to attain this height of Wiſdom, we will collect our meditations upon theſe things, treating firſt of *Felicity*, which is man's greateſt good, and then of thoſe things which conduce to the making and preſerving it, which are nothing elſe but the *Virtues* themſelves.

## CHAP. I.

*Of Felicity, or the End of Good, as far as Man is capable of it.*

OF *Felicity* we muſt firſt take notice, it is termed the *End*, that is, the laſt, the extreme and greateſt of Goods; becauſe ſince thoſe things are called Good which allure the Appetite to perſue them, and of theſe Goods ſome are deſired for themſelves, ſome for other things, Felicity is ſuch a Good as all Goods ought to be referred unto, itſelf to none.

And though *Felicity*, or *Beatitude*, and *Happy Life* be the ſame thing, yet that doth not hinder us, but that we ſomtimes mention the End of Happy Life, which we do, according to the Vulgar Phraſe, taking the End of Happy Life, and Happy Life, for the ſame thing; but not implying any further End, to which Happy Life may be thought to be referred.

This premiſed, we muſt firſt diſtinguiſh Felicity into two kinds; one Supreme, incapable of Intenſion and Remiſſion; the other Subalternate, in which there may be Addition and Detraction of Pleaſure.

The firſt is conceived to be a ſtate, than which none can be imagined, better, ſweeter, more deſirable, in which there is no Ill to be feared, no Good wanting: There is nothing that would and may not be done; and which is ſo ſure, that it can at no time be loſt.

By the other we underſtand a ſtate, in which it is as well as may be, or in which there are very many neceſſary Goods, very few Ills, and in which it is permitted to lead a Life ſo ſweetly, ſo quietly, and conſtantly, as the Company, Courſe of Life, Conſtitution of Body, Age, and other Circumſtances will allow.

Nor without Reaſon is it I make this Diſtinction and Definition. For, though it ſeem manifeſt, that the firſt kind is proper only to God; yet there are, who, having a high opinion of themſelves, and of their own Wiſdom, dare promiſe and arrogate it to themſelves, and therefore affirm, that they are equal to God; and modeſt amongſt them are they, who repute themſelves inferior to none but *Jupiter*.

But theſe truly ſeem forgetful of their own Mortality and Weakneſs, whenas all, who are conſcious thereof, cannot but acknowledge, that Men are capable only of the later, and that Wiſdom doth much, if, all Men being in ſome manner miſerable, it place thee in a ſtate, wherein thou ſhalt be the leaſt miſerable of all Men. Or, if among the ſeveral degrees of miſeries, to which thou art obnoxious by Birth, it place thee in that wherein thou ſhalt be leaſt miſerable. For that is to be happy, to be free from thoſe Ills wherewith thou mighteſt be afflicted; and in the mean time to enjoy ſuch Goods, than which, greater cannot be had in the condition wherein thou art.

This indeed is the Reaſon, why I conceive a Man, though deprived of Sight and Hearing, may nevertheleſs partake of Happy Life, becauſe he will yet perſevere in as many Goods as he can, and be free from thoſe Ills, if not of Body, at leaſt of Mind, which otherwiſe might have afflicted him.

I further declare, that a wiſe Man, though he ſhould be cruelly tormented, will yet be happy, by Felicity not Divine but Human; which in a wiſe Man is always as great as can be for the condition of the time.

For in Torments he feels the Pain indeed, ſomtimes groans and cries out; but, becauſe there is a neceſſity of ſuffering them, he exaſperates not or makes them greater, by Impatience or Deſpair, but rather, with as great conſtancy of Mind as is poſſible, mitigates and renders them ſomwhat more eaſie. Herein certainly he is more happy than if he ſunk under them, like thoſe, who, being under the ſame Torments, bear them not with equal Courage and Conſtancy, nor have the like aſſiſtence from Wiſdom (which confers at leaſt innocence of Life, and ſecurity of Conſcience,) to lighten them.

Therefore neither is there any Reaſon to cavil, that the Bull of *Phalaris*, and a Bed of Roſes, are all one to us; and the wiſe Man, burning in that Bull, muſt cry out, *How pleaſant is this! How unconcern'd am I! How little care I!* Since there are ſome things, which a wiſe Man had rather ſhould happen to him, as reſt of Body, free from all Diſturbance, and leiſure of Mind, rejoycing in contemplation of its own good. There are other things, which though he would not have them, yet when they do come, he bears them conſtantly, even commends and approves them, inaſmuch as they give him occaſion to pleaſe himſelf in his own conſtancy, and to ſay, I burn, but yield not. Why may it not be wiſhed, not indeed to be burnt, but to be vanquiſhed?

This I ſay, in regard a wiſe Man is obnoxious both to the Pains of Sickneſs, and the Tortures of Tyrants, although he neither invites thoſe, nor provokes theſe, ſo far as decently he may. Beſides, the times are not ſuch always to all Men, as that they may by Indolence live happy.

## CHAP. II.

*That Pleaſure, without which there is no Notion of Felicity, is in its own Nature Good.*

SEeing that to live without Pain is ſweet or pleaſant, and to enjoy good things, and be recreated by them, it follows that Felicity cannot conſiſt without both, or at leaſt one of theſe; (by Pleaſure, Suavity, Jucundity, and the like terms, I underſtand the ſame thing:) Yet ſome there are, who, with great flouriſhes, have ſo diſcourſed againſt Pleaſure itſelf, as if it were ſomthing ill in its own Nature, and conſequently not appertaining to Wiſdom and Felicity.

Therefore, before we enquire whether Felicity really conſiſts in Pleaſure, we muſt ſhew, that Pleaſure is in its own Nature good, as its contrary, Pain, is in its own Nature ill.

Certainly, ſince that is good which delighteth, pleaſeth, is amiable, and allures the Appetite; that, conſequently, ill which harmeth, is unpleaſant, and therefore excites Hate and Averſion; There is nothing pleaſeth more than Pleaſure, delighteth more, is lov'd more, is deſired more; as on the contrary, nothing incommodes more than Pain, diſpleaſeth, is abhorred, and ſhunned.

So

So as Pleaſure ſeems not only to be a good, but the very eſſence of good, it being that by which any thing is good or deſirable: Pain not only an ill, but the very eſſence of ill, as being that by which any thing is ill or hateful.

For though we ſomtimes ſhun Pleaſure, yet it is not the Pleaſure itſelf which we ſhun, but ſome Pain annexed accidentally to it; as, if at any time we perſue Pain, it is not the Pain itſelf that we perſue, but ſome Pleaſure accidentally joined to it.

For, (to expreſs this more plainly,) no man ſlights, hates, or ſhuns Pleaſure as Pleaſure, but becauſe great Pains overtake thoſe who know not how to follow Pleaſure with reaſon. Nor is there any who loves, perſues, would incur Pain ſimply as Pain, but becauſe ſomtimes it ſo happens, as that with Labour and Pain he muſt perſue ſome great Pleaſure.

For to inſtance in the leaſt things; Who amongſt us undertakes any laborious exerciſe of Body, unleſs that ſome Commodity ariſe by it? Who can juſtly blame him, who deſires to be in that Pleaſure which hath no Trouble? Or him, who ſhuns that Pain which procures no Pleaſure? But we accuſe and eſteem thoſe worthy of Contempt, who, blinded and corrupted with the blandiſhments of preſent Pleaſures, foreſee not the Troubles that muſt enſue. Alike faulty are they, who deſert their Duties out of ſoftneſs of Mind, that is, the avoidance of Labour and Pains.

Of theſe things, the Diſtinction is eaſie and ready. For at a free time, when our Election is at liberty, and nothing hinders, but that we may do what pleaſeth us moſt, all Pleaſure is to be embraced, all Pain to be expelled. But at ſome times it often falleth out, that Pleaſures are to be rejected, and Troubles not to be declined.

Thus, although we eſteem all Pleaſures a good, and all Pain an ill, yet we affirm not, that we ought at all times to perſue that, or to avoid this; but that we ought to have regard as to their quantity, ſo alſo to their quality; ſince it is better for us to undergo ſome Pains, that we may thereby enjoy the more abundant Pleaſures; and it is expedient to abſtain from ſome Pleaſures, leſt they prove the occaſion of our incurring more grievous Pains.

Hereupon this was, as it were, the Fountain, from which, in treating of Criteries, we deduced ſeveral Canons concerning Affection or Paſſion, eſteeming Pleaſure or Pain the Criterie of Election and Avoidance. And not without reaſon, foraſmuch as we ought to judge of all theſe things, by the commenſuration and choice of things profiting or hurting, ſince we ſomtimes uſe a good as an ill; and, on the contrary, ſomtimes an ill as a good.

Hence therefore, to preſs this further, I ſay, that no Pleaſure is ill in itſelf, but ſome things there are which procure ſome Pleaſures, but withal bring Pains far greater than the Pleaſures themſelves. Whereupon I add, that if every Pleaſure might be ſo reduced within itſelf, as that it neither ſhould compriſe within it, nor leave behind it any Pain; every Pleaſure, by this reduction, would be no leſs perfect and abſolute than the principal works of Nature, and conſequently there would be no difference amongſt Pleaſures, but all would be expetible alike.

Moreover, if thoſe very things which afford Pleaſure to luxurious Perſons, could free them from the fear of Meteors, and of Death, and Pain, and could inſtruct them what are the bounds of deſires, I could not find any fault, foraſmuch as they would be every way replete with Pleaſures, and have nothing grievous or painful that is ill.

## CHAP. III.

### *That Felicity conſiſts generally in Pleaſure.*

NOW to come to what was propoſed, Felicity ſeems plainly to conſiſt in Pleaſure. This is firſt to be proved in general, then we muſt ſhew, in what Pleaſure particularly it conſiſts.

In general, Pleaſure ſeems to be, as the Beginning, ſo the End alſo of Happy Life, ſince we find it to be the firſt good, and convenient to our, and to all animal, Nature; and is that from which we begin all election and avoidance, and in which at laſt we terminate them, uſing this affection as a Rule to judge every Good.

That Pleaſure is the firſt and connatural good, or (as they term it,) the firſt thing ſuitable and convenient to Nature, appeareth; for that *every Animal, as ſoon as born, deſireth pleaſure, and rejoiceth in it, as the chief good; ſhunneth pain as its greateſt ill, and, to its utmoſt ability, repels it.* We ſee that *even *Hercules* himſelf, tormented by a poiſonous Shirt, could not with-hold from tears; Cic. de fin.

Crying and howling whil'ſt the *Locrian* Stones,
And high *Enboean* Hills, retort his Groans.

* Laert.

*Thus doth every undepraved Animal, its own nature judging incorruptly and entirely.* Cic. ibid.

*There needs not therefore any reaſoning to prove, that Pleaſure is to be deſired, Pain to be ſhunned; for this is manifeſt to our Senſe, as that Fire is hot, Snow white, Honey ſweet. We need no Arguments to prove this, it is enough that we give Notice of it. For ſince that if we take away from Man all his Senſes, there is nothing remaining, it is neceſſary that what is convenient or contrary to Nature, be judged by Nature herſelf, and that Pleaſure be expetible in itſelf, and Pain in itſelf to be avoided: For what perceives, or what judgeth, either to perſue or avoid any thing, except Pleaſure and Pain?* Ibid.

That Pleaſure, as being the firſt thing convenient to Nature, is alſo the laſt of Expetibles, or the end of good things, may be underſtood even from this, Becauſe it is Pleaſure only for whoſe ſake we ſo deſire the reſt, that itſelf is not deſired for the ſake of any other, but only for itſelf; for we may deſire other things to delight or pleaſe ourſelves, but no man ever demanded a Reaſon, why we would be delighted and pleaſed? Certainly no more, than for what cauſe we deſire to be happy; ſince Pleaſure and Felicity ought to be reputed, not only in the ſame degree, but to be the very ſame thing, and, conſequently, the end, or ultimate and greateſt good, on which the reſt depend, but itſelf depends on none.

This

This is further proved, for that *Felicity* is, as we hinted formerly, no otherwiſe, than becauſe it is that ſtate, in which we may live moſt ſweetly and moſt pleaſantly, that is, with the greateſt pleaſure that may be. For, take from life this ſweetneſs, jucundity, pleaſure; and where, I pray, will be your Notion of *Felicity*, not of that *Felicity* only which I termed Divine, but even of the other, eſteemed Human? which is no otherwiſe capable to receive degrees of more and leſs, or intenſion and remiſſion, than becauſe addition or detraction of pleaſure may befal it.

*Cic. de fin.* To underſtand this better, by comparing Pleaſure with Pain, 'let us ſuppoſe a man enjoying 'many great inceſſant pleaſures, both in mind 'and body, no pain hindring them, nor likely 'to diſturb them; What ſtate, can we ſay, is 'more excellent, or more deſirable than this? 'For in him who is thus affected, there muſt ne'ceſſarily be a conſtancy of mind, fearing nei'ther death nor pain, becauſe death is void of 'ſenſe; pain, if long, uſeth to be light; if 'great, ſhort, ſo as the ſhortneſs makes amends 'for its greatneſs, the lightneſs for its length. 'When he arrives at ſuch a condition, as he 'trembles not with horror of the Deity, nor ſuf'fereth the preſent pleaſures to paſs away, whil'ſt 'his mind is buſied with the remembrance of paſt, 'or expectation of future, good things, but is 'daily joyed with the reflecting upon them; 'What can be added to better the condition of 'this perſon?

'Suppoſe, on the other ſide, a man afflicted 'with as great pains of body, and griefs of mind, 'as man's nature is capable of, no hope that they 'ſhall ever be eaſed, no pleaſure paſt, preſent, 'or expected; What can be ſaid or imagined 'more miſerable than he?

'If therefore a life full of pains be of all 'things moſt to be avoided, doubtleſs the greateſt 'ill is to live in pain; whence it followeth, that 'the greateſt good is to live in pleaſure. Nei'ther indeed hath our mind any thing elſe, 'wherein, as its Centre, it may reſt; all ſickneſſes 'and troubles are reduced to pain, nor is there 'any thing elſe which can remove Nature out of 'her place, or diſſolve her.

## CHAP. IV.

### *That the Pleaſure, wherein conſiſts Felicity, is Indolence of Body, and Tranquillity of Mind.*

THere being (as before is intimated,) two kinds of Pleaſures; one in ſtation or reſt, which is a placability, calmneſs, and vacuity, or immunity from trouble and grief; the other in motion, which conſiſts in a ſweet movement, as in gladneſs, mirth, and whatſoever moveth the Senſe delightfully, with a kind of ſweetneſs and titillation, as to eat and drink out of hunger and thirſt: It may be demanded, Whether in both, or in either, and in which, conſiſts Felicity?

We ſay, that Pleaſure, wherein Felicity conſiſts, is of the firſt kind, the ſtable, or that which is in ſtation; and ſo can be no other than Indolence of Body, and Tranquillity of Mind.

When therefore we ſay in general terms, Pleaſure is the end of happy Life, we are far from meaning the pleaſures of luxurious perſons, or of others, as conſidered in the motion or act of fruition, by which the Senſe is pleaſantly and ſweetly affected; as ſome, either through ignorance, diſſent, or ill will, interpret. We mean no more but this, (to repeat it once more,) *Not pained in Body, nor troubled in Mind.*

For it is not perpetual Feaſting, and Drinking; not the Converſation of beautiful Women; not Rarities of Fiſh, nor any other Dainties of a profuſe Table, that make a happy Life; but Reaſon, with Sobriety, and a ſerene Mind, ſearching the cauſes, why this Object is to be preferr'd, that to be rejected; and expelling Opinions, which occaſion much trouble to the mind.

The better to underſtand why this Pleaſure only is the End, we may obſerve, that Nature tends to no other Pleaſure primarily, as to her end, but to the ſtable, which followeth upon removal of pain and trouble. The Moveable ſhe propoſes not as the end, but provides only as a means conducing to the ſtable, to ſweeten (as it were) that operation of hers which is requiſite to the extirpation of pain and trouble. For Example, Hunger and Thirſt being things troubleſom and incommodious to an Animal, the primary end of Nature is to conſtitute the Animal in ſuch a ſtate, as that it may be free from that trouble and inconvenience; and becauſe this cannot be done but by eating and drinking, ſhe therefore ſeaſons with a ſweet reliſh the action of eating and drinking, that the Animal may apply himſelf more readily thereto.

Moſt Men, indeed, live prepoſterouſly; tranſported inconſiderately and intemperately, they propoſe for their end the pleaſure which conſiſts in motion: But Wiſdom ſummon'd to our relief reduceth all pleaſures into decent order, and teacheth that pleaſure is to be propoſed as the end; but that which is the end according to Nature, is no other than that which we have ſpoken of. For while Nature is our Guide, whatſoever we do tends to this, that we neither be pained in Body, nor troubled in Mind: And as ſoon as we have attained this, all diſturbances of the Mind are quieted, and there is nothing beyond it, that we can aim at to complete the good both of our Soul and Body. For we then want pleaſure when its abſence excites pain in us: But as long as we are not pained, we want not pleaſure.

Hence comes it, that amotion of pain, or the ſtate which follows upon that one word is the furtheſt bound or height of pleaſures; for, where ever pleaſure is, as long as it is there, there is nothing painful or grievous, or both together. Hence alſo it comes, that the higheſt pleaſure terminated in privation of pain may be varied and diſtinguiſhed, but not increaſed and amplified: For Nature, until ſhe hath quite taken away the pain, increaſeth the pleaſure; but when the pain is quite removed, ſhe permits not the pleaſure to increaſe in greatneſs, but only admits ſome Varieties which are not neceſſary, as not conducing to our not being pained.

Moreover, hence it appears, that they inſult without cauſe, who accuſe us, that we mean not by want of pain, ſome middle thing betwixt pain and

and pleaſure, but ſo confound it with the other part (in the diviſion,) as to make it not onely a pleaſure, but the very higheſt of pleaſures. For, becauſe when we are delivered out of Pain, we rejoyce at that very freedom and exemption from all trouble, but every thing whereat we rejoyce is pleaſure; as every thing whereat we are offended, pain; the privation of all pain is rightly named pleaſure. For, when hunger and thirſt are expelled by eating and drinking the very detraction of the trouble brings pleaſure; ſo in every thing elſe, the removal of pain cauſeth ſucceſſion of pleaſure.

Hence alſo may be ſhewn the difference, when they object, that there is no reaſon why this middle ſtate ſhould rather be eſteemed a pleaſure than a pain. For diſcontent enſues not immediately upon detraction of pleaſure, unleſs ſome pain chance to ſucceed in the room of the pleaſure: But on the contrary, we rejoyce at the loſs of pain, though none of thoſe pleaſures which move the ſenſe ſucceed. By this we may underſtand, how great a pleaſure it is, not to be pained; which if any doubt, let him aske thoſe who are oppreſſed with ſharp ſickneſſes.

Some laugh hereat; They object, that this pleaſure is like the condition of one that ſleeps, and accuſe us of ſloath, never conſidering that this conſtitution of ours is not mere ſtupidity, but rather a ſtate wherein all actions of life are performed pleaſantly and ſweetly. For, as we ſhould not have the life of a wiſe man to be like a torrent or rapid ſtream, ſo we would not it ſhould be like a ſtanding dead-pool: But rather like a river gliding on ſilently and quietly. We therefore hold his pleaſure is not unactive, but that which reaſon makes firm to him.

But to omit theſe, and return to our Subject, there are two good things of which our chiefeſt Felicity conſiſts; That the mind be free from trouble, the body from pain; and ſo as that theſe goods be ſo full, and all trouble taken away, that they admit not increaſe. For how can that increaſe, which is full? If the Body be free from all pain, what can be added to this indolence? If the mind from perturbation, what can be added to this tranquillity? As the ſerenity of Heaven being refin'd to the ſincereſt ſplendor, admits no greater ſplendor; ſo the ſtate of a man who takes care of his Body and Soul, and connects his good out of both, is perfect, and he hath attain ed the end of his deſires, if his Body be neither ſubject to pain, nor his mind to diſturbance. If any external blandiſhments happen, they increaſe not the chief good, but, as I may ſay, ſeaſon and ſweeten it; for that abſolute good of human nature is contained in the peace of the Soul and the Body.

## CHAP. V.

*Of the means to procure this Felicity; and of Virtues, the chiefe.*

NOw ſeeing this peace of Body and mind, tranquillity in one, indolency in the other, is the compleat felicity of man; nothing more concerns us, than to conſider what things will procure and preſerve it; for when we have it, we want nothing; while we want it, all we do is to obtain it, and yet (as we ſaid,) for the moſt part we fail of it.

Firſt, therefore, we muſt conſider of Felicity no otherwiſe than as of Health; it being manifeſt, that the ſtate in which the mind is free from perturbation, the Body from pain, is no other than the perfect health of the whole man. Whence it comes, that as in the Body, ſo in the mind alſo, thoſe things which produce and conſerve health are the ſame with thoſe which either preyent diſeaſes, or cure and expel them.

Now ſeeing that to provide againſt the diſeaſes of the Body belongs to the art of Medicine, as well for the prevention as cure of them, we ſhall not need to ſay much hereupon, but onely give two cautions which may be ſufficient.

One, that for the driving away all diſeaſes, or at leaſt making them lighter and eaſier to be cured, we uſe Temperance and a ſober continent life.

The other, that when there is a neceſſity of our ſuffering them, we betake ourſelves to fortitude and undergo them with a conſtant mind, not exaſperating them by impatience, but comforting ourſelves with conſidering, that, if great, they muſt be ſhort; if long, light.

Againſt the diſeaſes of the Mind, Philoſophy provides, when we juſtly eſteem it the medicine of the mind: But it is not with equal facility conſulted, nor applyed, by thoſe who are ſick in mind. For we judge of the diſeaſes of the Body by the mind; but the diſeaſes of the mind, we neither feel in the Body, nor know or judge as we ought by the mind, becauſe that whereby we ſhould judge is diſtempered. Whence we may underſtand, that the diſeaſes of the mind are more pernicious than thoſe of the Body; as amongſt thoſe of the Body, the worſt and moſt dangerous are ſuch as make the patient inſenſible of them; as the Apoplexy, or a violent feaver.

Moreover, that the diſeaſes of the Mind are worſe than thoſe of the Body, is evident from the ſame reaſon which demonſtrates that the pleaſures of the mind are better than thoſe of the Body; *viz.* becauſe in the Body we feel nothing but what is preſent, but in the mind we are ſenſible alſo of the paſt and future. For, as the anxiety of the mind which ariſeth from pain of the Body, may be highly aggravated, if we conceit, (for inſtance,) that ſome eternal and infinite Evil is ready to fall on us; ſo (to transfer the inſtance,) pleaſure is the greater, if we fear no ſuch thing; it being manifeſt, that the greateſt pleaſure or trouble of the mind doth more conduce to a miſerable or happy life, than either of the other two, though they ſhould be equally laſting in the Body.

Now forasmuch as there are two principal diſeaſes of the mind, *Deſire*, and *Fear*, with their ſeveral off-ſprings, and accompany'd with diſcontent and trouble, in the ſame manner as pain is joyned to the diſeaſes of the Body; it is therefore the office of Philoſophy to apply ſuch remedies as may prevent them from invading the mind, or, if they have invaded it, expel them. Such briefly, are the vain deſires of wealth, of honours, fear of the gods, of death, and the like, which having but once taken poſſeſſion of the mind they leave no part thereof ſound.

The

The remedies which Philoſophy applyeth, are the *Virtues*, which, being deriv'd from reaſon, or the more general prudence, eaſily drive away and expel the affections. I ſay, from Reaſon, or the more general prudence; becauſe, as there is a more particular prudence, ſerving for the directions of all the particular actions of our life; ſo is there a more general prudence, which is no other than reaſon itſelf, or the dictate of reaſon, and is by moſt eſteemed the ſame with wiſdome; whereas, Virtue is only a perfect diſpoſition of the mind, which reaſon or prudence doth create and oppoſe to the diſeaſes of the Mind, the *Vices*.

## CHAP. VI.

*Of Right-reaſon, and Free-will, from which the Virtues have all their praiſe.*

BEing therefore to proceed in our diſcourſe to Virtue and its ſeveral kinds, we muſt premiſe ſomthing concerning Reaſon itſelf, and likewiſe concerning the Free-will which is in it; for thence is derived all the praiſe belonging to Virtue; as alſo its oppoſite, the reproach due to Vice.

Foraſmuch as Reaſon generally is nothing but the faculty of ratiocinating, or judging and inferring one thing from another, we here take it particularly for that which judgeth, inferreth, and ratiocinates in things of action, ſubject to election or avoidance.

But whereas, judgement or reaſoning may be either right or wrong, that reaſon, whoſe judgement is falſe, is not properly reaſon, and therefore we terme it *opinion*; yet in reſpect it is the common phraſe, you may call it alſo reaſon if you pleaſe, meaning *wrong reaſon*; as right reaſon may be termed *Opinion*, meaning *ſound Opinion*.

Right reaſon ariſeth either from ingenuity, or experience, and ſedulous obſervation. Being grounded upon firm and correct principles, our ratiocination becomes ſolid; and juſtly do we appeal to the judgement of him, who is expert and knowing in things. But of this already in the Canonick part, concerning the Criteries, which need not repetition.

When I ſay, things ſubjects to election and avoidance; I take for granted that there is in us a free or arbitrary power or reaſon, that is, a faculty elective and proſecutive of that which reaſon hath judged good, and of avoiding and ſhunning what it hath judged ill.

That it really is in us, is proved even by experience, and by common ſenſe, which manifeſts, that nothing is worthy of praiſe or diſpraiſe, but what is done freely, voluntarily, deliberately, and by election; and therefore muſt depend on ſomthing within us, which is beyond compulſion, and in reſpect whereunto, all rewards and puniſhments are rightly ordained by the Laws: Than which nothing were more unjuſt, if the actions of men were to be imputed to that rigid Neceſſity, which ſome aſſert, derived from Fate, as the ſole commandreſs of all things, declaring, that whatſoever comes to paſs floweth from an eternal truth, and continuation of cauſes.

*Truly it is much better to be addicted to the fabulous (that is, the common,) opinion of the gods, than to be ſlaves to the belief of Fate, according as ſome Naturaliſts hold it, impoſing it upon our necks as an everlaſting Lord or Tyrant, whom we are to ſtand in awe of, night and day. For the other opinion hath ſome comfort in it, that the gods will be moved with our prayers; but this, imports an inexorable neceſſity.*

True indeed it is, that, in things void of reaſon, ſome effects are neceſſary, (yet not ſo neceſſary, but that they might have been prevented, as we declared in the Canonick; and where we treated of cauſes;) but, in Man, endu'd with reaſon, and as far as he makes uſe of that reaſon, there can be no Neceſſity. Hence it was, we endeavoured to aſſert the declination of motions in Atoms, that we might from thence deduce, how Fortune might ſomtimes intervene, and put in for a ſhare amongſt human affaires, yet, that which is in us, our Will not be deſtroy'd.

It behoves us to employ all our wit and endeavours to maintain our own free-will againſt that ſempiternal motion, and not to ſuffer wickedneſs to eſcape unculpable.

But what I ſay of fortune, implies not that we aſcribe any divinity to it, not only as the vulgar, but even as thoſe Philoſophers, who eſteeming her an unſtable Cauſe, though they conceive not, that ſhe beſtowes on men any thing of good or ill that may conduce to happy life, yet think that ſhe gives occaſion of very conſiderable goods and ills. We imply not this, I ſay; but onely mean, that, as many things are effected by neceſſity and counſel, ſo alſo by Fortune; and therefore, it is the duty of a wiſe man to arme himſelf againſt Fortune.

Now ſeeing, what ever good or ill there is in human actions, depends onely upon this, that a man doth it knowingly, and willingly, or freely; therefore the mind muſt be accuſtomed to know truly, that is, to uſe right reaſon; and to will truly, that is, to bend the free will to that which is truly good, from that which is truly ill. Foraſmuch, as this accuſtoming begets that diſpoſition in the mind, which we deſcribed to be Virtue; as the accuſtoming of it to the contrary, begets that diſpoſition which we may juſtly define Vice.

Not to mention, that what produceth pleaſure, ſincere without any pain, trouble, or repentance attending or enſuing thereupon, is truly good; that which produceth pain, ſincere without any pleaſure, or joy ſucceeding upon it, is truly ill; I onely give this hint of both to diſtinguiſh each of them from what is onely apparent and diſſembled: Such as that good which begets preſent pleaſure and afterwards introduceth pain and trouble; and that ill which procures pain or trouble, but afterwards pleaſure and cheerfulneſs.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of the Virtues in General.*

FOrasmuch as all *Virtue* is either *Prudence*, or the Dictate of *Right Reason*, as we accustom ourselves to it, or is directed by, and dependent on Prudence, and the Dictate of Right Reason; it is manifest, that to this later kind belongs, as well, that whereby a man is affected toward himself, as that, whereby he is affected towards another: For by Prudence, a Man is made capable to govern not only himself, but others.

The Virtue which relates to others, is generally called *Justice*; that which concerns ourself, is ordinarily distinguished into *Temperance*, and *Fortitude*. But we use to comprize both under the term *Honesty*, as when we say, to act Virtuously, is no other than to act Prudently, Honestly, Justly; they who live Soberly and Continently, are said to live Honestly or Decently; they who do Valiantly, are thought to behave themselves Honestly or Decently.

Hereupon we (as others,) distinguish Virtue into four kinds, *Prudence*, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, and *Justice*; but so, as that we oppose not *Prudence* to any affection so much as to *Incogitance*, *Ignorance*, *Folly*, (except by accident, inasmuch as Perturbation blinds Reason, and causeth a Man to act imprudently;) nor *Justice*, to any affection so much as to *Malice*, whereby a Man is prone to Deceits, (unless by accident, in as much as anger, hatred, covetousness, or some other passion may cause a Man to do unjustly;) *Temperance*, we oppose to *Desire*; *Fortitude*, to *Fear*.

Hence is manifest, when I formerly said, A sober or well-ordered Reason procures a pleasant or happy Life; we are to understand, that it procures it by means of the Virtues which it ingenerates and preserves. And whereas I added, that it searched out the Causes, why things are to be embraced or avoided, and chaseth away Opinions which occasion great trouble in the mind, we are to understand that is all one with general prudence, the principle of all things expetible and avoidable, and consequently the greatest, because the Virtues which arise from it appease Perturbations, teaching, that we cannot live pleasantly, unless prudently, honestly, and justly; not prudently, honestly, and justly, unless pleasantly.

By this you find why I conceive, that the Virtues are connatural to a happy life, and that it is impossible to separate happy life from them. All other things, as being frail and mortal, are transitory, separable from true and constant pleasure; only Virtue, as being a perpetual and immortal good, is inseparable from it.

By this also you may understand, that all the Virtues are connected within one another, and that by one; because to the principal, Prudence, all the rest are conjoined, as the Members to the Head, or as Rivers to the Spring from which they flow; the other, because as well Prudence, as all the rest cohere with happy life, there cannot be a happy life where the Virtues are not; neither can the Virtues be there, where the life is not happy.

Notwithstanding that the Virtues are all connected within one another, yet are they not therefore all equal, as some conceive, who hold that all Vices and Faults are also equal. For a man may be more inclin'd to Justice, than to Temperance; and Temperance may be more perfect in one, than in another. As for instance, (without Envy be it spoken,) myself, by length of time, have made so great a progress in Sobriety, as less than an *Obolus* serves me for a meal; *Metrodorus*, who hath not yet made so great progress, a whole *Obolus*. And it is evident, that, of men, one is wiser than another; and of them, who do rightly according to Virtue, equal Rewards are not allotted to all, as neither equal Punishments to all Offenders. Even Sense and Manners confute them, who make all equal, and hold that they offend alike, he who beats his Servant wrongfully, and he who his Parent; seeing, some there are who make no difference betwixt eating a Bean, and the head of our Father.

Others condemn, and exclaim on us, for affirming, that the Virtues are of such a nature, as that they conduce to Pleasure or Felicity, as if we meant that Pleasure which is obscene and infamous, but let them rail as they please. For as they make Virtue the chief good, so do we: If the discourse be of the means conducing to happy life, neither is there any of so great power as Virtue, therefore not more excellent, (not Wealth, not Honour, not Friends, not Children, *&c.*) But if the discourse be of living happily, or Felicity, why should not this be a Good superior to Virtue, to the attainment whereof Virtue itself is but subservient?

They exclaim again, that we enervate Virtue, in not allowing her so much power, as to render a wise man free from all passion or affection, but to permit him to be moved therewith, (as for instance) to grieve, weep, and sigh at the death of Friends: But as we set a high value upon Virtue, as being able to deliver us from vain terrors and superfluous desires, the chief heads of all grievous Perturbations; so likewise not a little esteem it, for that it reduceth the rest of the affections to such a mediocrity, in which there remains some sense as it were of humanity.

Certainly, that total exemption from Grief, which these men boast of, proceeds from some greater ill, cruelty, and immoderate ambition of vain-glory, and a kind of madness. So that it seems much better to feel some passion, to be affected with some grief, to shed some tears, such as proceed from persons touched with love and tenderness, than to be wise as these would have us, and grin like brute Beasts.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of* Prudence *in general.*

WE must now say something of every Virtue in particular, beginning with *Prudence*, whose office being to govern the life, and so to provide for every occurrent in life, as to direct it to happiness, it seems alone to comprize the offices of all Virtues.

That the propriety of Prudence, is to diſpoſe all accidents and actions of life to felicity, or pleaſure, is moſt manifeſt. As we value Medicine, not for the Science itſelf, but for Health; and the Art of ſteering, not for its Ingenuity, but uſe in Navigation; ſo Prudence, the Art of living, would never be deſired, if it were nothing efficacious in life; but being ſo, it is deſired, as the Art, by which Pleaſure is ſought and obtained.

For Prudence, or (if you like the word better) Wiſdom, alone it is, which not only provides that nothing happen which may afflict the Body, but likewiſe above all, expels ſadneſs from the mind, not permitting us to be daunted with fear; Under which Governeſs we may live in tranquillity, extinguiſhing the ardor of all deſires. For deſires are inſatiable, they ſubvert not only ſingle Perſons, but Families, many times a whole Commonwealth. From Deſires ariſe Hatreds, Diſſentions, Diſcords, Seditions, Wars; neither do theſe only revel abroad, or with blind fury aſſault others only, but likewiſe, ſhut up in the breaſt, they diſagree and quarrel with one another, which muſt neceſſarily make life exceeding bitter. Only the prudent and wiſe perſon, cutting off all vanity and error, content with the limits of nature, can live without diſcontent, and without fear.

Now ſeeing Life is diſturbed by error and ignorance, and that it is Prudence alone which reſcues us from the violence of Luſts and Fears, teacheth us temperately to ſuſtain the injuries of Fortune, and ſheweth us all the ways that lead to quiet and tranquillity, Why ſhould we ſtick to affirm, that Prudence is expetible in order to pleaſure, and Imprudence to be ſhunned for trouble's ſake?

That we ſay, a prudent Perſon temperately ſuſtains the injuries of Fortune, the reaſon is, that he foreſees them, if not in particular; at leaſt in the general; Neither, if any thing happen contrary to his expectation or deſigns is he troubled, for that he knoweth it not to be within the reach of human induſtry, ſagacity, or power, either to foreſee, or to prevent, that nothing adverſe or troubleſom happen. He judgeth it better to be, with well-ordered reaſon, (as far as human frailty will admit,) unfortunate, than with inconſideration fortunate; and thinks nothing more handſom, than if Fortune bring about a thing fairly and proſperouſly, that it was not undertaken without judgment and deliberation.

But indeed, a wiſe man orders ſo himſelf, that cutting off vain deſires, he contracts himſelf within neceſſaries, which are ſo few and ſmall, as hardly any Fortune can ſnatch them from him. Thus, ſince none, or very little fortune can intervene to a wiſe man, he may ſay to her, I have ſeized on thee, (Fortune,) and intercepted thee, ſo as thou canſt not come at me.

Concerning the cutting off all Deſires, we ſhall ſpeak hereafter. Now foraſmuch as Prudence may be conſidered, either as it governs ourſelves, or a Houſe, or a Family, or a City, or a Commonwealth, and ſo is diſtinguiſhed into Private, Domeſtick, Civil; let us ſay ſomthing upon each.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Private Prudence.*

PRivate Prudence conſiſteth almoſt wholly in this, that a man underſtand his own *Genius*, and undertake nothing whereto his nature is averſe, that he deliberately pre-examin the ſtate in which he is to ſpend his whole life, and to which he muſt ſo accommodate all the actions of life, as that, as much as poſſible, he may live in indolence and tranquillity.

For he ought to have the end or ſcope of life fixt, and conſtantly ſet before his eyes, and, conſult with right reaſon, according to all evidence, whereby we uſe to weigh whatſoever we think or determine. For unleſs this be done, all will be full of indiſcreet temerity and confuſion, and our deſigns and enterpriſes will be overtaken by too late repentance.

Beſides, if upon every emergent occaſion, you refer not each of your actions both to this kind of ſcope, and to that end of nature which you propoſed to yourſelf in deſigning it, but turn aſide to perſue or flie ſome other thing, the actions of your life will not correſpond to your own words. For example, you extol tranquillity in words, but in actions diſcover yourſelf buſie and obnoxious to trouble.

He underſtands the bounds preſcribed by Nature, to thoſe who enter the courſe of life, who diſcerns how eaſily procurable that is which is neceſſary to life, or what is ſufficient to remove any thing that afflicts the body with indigence. Thereby he knows ſo well to order the whole ſeries of life, as never to need ſuch things or buſineſs as are contentious, and conſequently full of hazard and danger.

Hence it is, that a wiſe man is not much afraid of poverty, it hapning ſeldom, that any man wants the things neceſſary to life. Yet if thoſe ſhould chance to be wanting, and he not have mony to procure them, he will not betake himſelf to beg, as the *Cynicks*, but rather apply himſelf to inſtruct ſome perſons in learning: thus taking an employment not misbecoming Wiſdom, and at the ſame time ſupplying himſelf with neceſſaries from thoſe who have full eſtates.

Whil'ſt we are obliged to this or the like employment, 'If neceſſaries fail us, and our buſineſs be, to entertain daily occurrences with a 'ſetled courage, we muſt have recourſe to Wiſdom or Philoſophy for relief. To an ill Counſellor we reſign the ordering of the things that 'concern us, if, what is neceſſary to nature, we 'meaſure and provide without Philoſophy. *Porp. de non eſu carn.*

'It therefore imports a Philoſopher to beſtow time in looking after theſe things, until 'by diligent care he hath furniſhed himſelf with 'them. But as long as he hath ſo much of theſe, 'as that he can ſpend of them, yet retain perfect confidence, he is not to apply himſelf to 'acquiſition of wealth and proviſions.

'Thus is Philoſophy to be our Guide in theſe 'things, by which we ſhall ſoon perceive, what 'a Virtue, and how great a Good it is, to require 'only what is ſimple, light, and very ſmall; becauſe what is moſt ſweet and free from trouble in all a man's life, depends upon our being 'con-

'contented with the leaſt. But, by thoſe impe-
'diments which a ſolicitous acquiſition of things
'draws upon us, being quickly diſcover'd, either
'by the pains and toil of the Body, or by the
'difficulty of their procurement, or by their
'drawing the mind away from the moſt advan-
'tageous ſpeculations, (which we ought ever-
'more highly to eſteem,) or by ſome other cauſe;
'we ſhall clearly find, that it is altogether fruit-
'leſs, and not of countervalue with the troubles
'which follow it.

I adviſed, that every man ſhould examine his own genius, and adviſe with himſelf, that he may apply himſelf to that which is proper for him; becauſe otherwiſe, nothing can be more miſerable, and more at a diſtance with tranquillity, than to be engaged in a courſe of life, for which nature hath rendred thee unfit.

For neither is an active life to be undertaken by an unactive perſon, nor an unactive life by an active perſon. To one, reſt is quiet, and action labour; to the other, reſt is labour, and action quiet. A timorous and ſoft perſon muſt avoid the military life; a bold and impatient, the eaſie; for one cannot brook War, nor the other Peace. The ſame it is in all the reſt. So that nothing can be more ſafe, than to undertake that courſe onely which thou canſt run through, without any reluctance or repugnance of nature.

I ſhall onely add this, That every man, as far as lies in his power, to the end the State of life which he chooſeth may be the more ſecure and quiet, ought to chooſe it mean, neither very eminent, nor very abject. For it behoves him to live in a civil ſociety, neither as a Lion, nor as a Gnat, leſt, reſembling the one, he be caſt out; the other, caught in a ſnare.

## CHAP. X.

### *Domeſtick Prudence.*

DOmeſtick Prudence being either conjugal and paternal, or dominative and poſſeſſory; we ſhall, in the firſt, onely conſider that which ariſeth from what hath been ſaid, concerning the Inſtitution of life.

If you find, that you cannot, without much trouble, live ſingle; that you can patiently bear with a croſs-wife, and diſobedient-children; that you will not ſo much as vex, to behold your children crying before you, that you ſhall not be perplexed and diſtracted with various ſolicitudes, how to provide all things requiſite to a married life, how to prevent all inconveniences, and the like: In this caſe, to marry a wife, and to beget children, for whom you may provide with a conjugal and fatherly prudence, is lawful. But unleſs you know yourſelf to be ſuch, you ſee, by Marriage and Iſſue, how much you hinder the happineſs of your life, True tranquillity.

Preſume you may, of having a loving wife, dutiful children, cares neither great nor many; but you can onely preſume it, there is not any God will warrant the ſucceſs of your preſumption. Since therefore the caſe is hazardous, it is no wiſdom voluntarily to undergo the venture, and throw yourſelf into a condition, out of which, ſhould you afterwards repent, you can never retire.

I ſay, voluntarily; for ſome circumſtance of life may exact, that, though unwilling, you marry and beget children; as if your condition be ſuch, as that it requires you to ſerve your Country herein. For whereas ſome pretend propagation of the ſpecies, to which we are in a manner oblig'd, certainly there is no danger, that there ſhould be wanting ſuch as will marry and procreate; ſo that ſome few wiſe men may be allowed to abſtain from this employment.

But if ſome caſe, or certain counſel, or neceſſity, enforce you to marry, you muſt ſo diſpoſe your wife, as that ſhe may be loving to you, and and a partner in your cares. You muſt take ſuch care for your children, as is partly preſcribed by Nature, which inſtigates us to love them as ſoon as born, (common alſo to ſheep, wolves, and other living creatures;) partly by prudence which adviſeth ſo to bring them up, as they may be obedient to the Laws of their Country, and deſirous themſelves may become wiſe.

Neither is this care to be taken for our own children onely, but likewiſe for the children of our friends, eſpecially if they are our Pupils; there being nothing more beſeeming friendſhip, than to be Guardian in the room of a parent to thoſe, whom our deceaſed friend entirely loved, and hath left Orphans needing protection.

For the other kind, as having ſlaves and ſervants under us, (a poſſeſſion, though neceſſary, yet for the moſt part not very pleaſant,) a wiſe man muſt take order, they grow not inſolent and froward, that he may behave himſelf mildly (as far as is fitting,) towards them, and chaſtiſe the diſobedient, remembring they are men, with a kind of unwillingneſs; being ever ready to forgive, eſpecially if they are diligent, not of an ill diſpoſition. And not onely this, but if he find any enclined to learning, (ſuch as we had, particularly *Mus*,) let him delight to further them, call them Friends, and ſtudy Philoſophy with them.

As to his Eſtate, he muſt take care of it, and provide for the future, but ſo, as without covetouſneſs, and the deſire of growing rich, of which hereafter. A wiſe man muſt not neglect his eſtate, becauſe it is his livelihood; leſt, if that be conſumed, and he want the neceſſaries of life, his ſtudy of Philoſophy be hindred, whilſt he either gains by labour what might with little or no pains have been preſerved; or begs, and by importunity extorts from another, what every one with little endeavour might provide for himſelf; or, growing old, fall ſick, and die in want, which not a little hinders the tranquillity of the mind.

Beſides the things neceſſary to the uſes of life, there may be others, which, according to the condition of the perſon, place, time, muſt be eſteemed neceſſary, and therefore not to be neglected. But our chiefeſt care muſt be for things requiſite, to the prevention of natural indigence, without which, nature herſelf would ſuffer; ſuch is the proviſion of corn. Thoſe who ſtore their houſes with corn, are to be commended above thoſe, who adorn them with rich furniture. I rejoyce exceedingly, that lately in a ſtrict Siege, when many periſhed in our City by Famine, we were able to ſuſtain ſo many good friends with

food (no delicacies, but a provident quantity of Beans,) which we diſtributed daily to every one by tale.

## CHAP. XI.

### *Civil Prudence.*

LAſtly, as to Civil prudence we muſt likewiſe repeat what we inſinuated concerning the choice of a courſe of life.

They who are naturally ambitious, deſirous of honour, active withal, and fit to manage publick affairs; as alſo they, whom the quality of their birth, or fortune, and opportunity invite by an eaſie acceſſion to publick government; thoſe men may decline quiet, and comply with their own nature, by addicting themſelves to publick government, and an active life. For their diſpoſition is ſuch, that a quiet live gives them trouble and moleſtation, whilſt they obtain not what they deſire.

But they, who either are naturally enclined to quiet, or have ſuppreſs'd ambition and vanity by the power of reaſon; or, having made trial hereof, have eſcaped, as out of a ſtorm, or took warning by many eminent precedents; theſe will juſtly conceive, that quiet is much the beſt for them, and that it is not convenient to exchange it for an active life, unleſs by chance ſome accident intervene in the Common-wealth, requiring their induſtry. Whence we conclude, that a wiſe man muſt not involve himſelf in publick affairs, unleſs upon ſome intervening neceſſity.

What elſe? Since he in perſuing quiet, may far more eaſily and ſafely attain to that end, which the ambitious aim at by dangers and labours.

For to ſpeak of their ſcope, there never wanted ſome, who, to procure ſecurity of men, (according to the condition of Sovereignty and rule, by which they commonly think it gained,) have affected to excel in honour, and to become illuſtrious, thinking by this means to attain a ſecure and quiet eſtate. But if their life be ſecure and quiet, they have acquired the chief good of nature; if not ſecure and quiet, (as indeed it can hardly be,) then have they loſt it, becauſe they ſought that which is convenient to nature in Dominion.

But the wiſe man's ſcope being the ſame, ſecurity and tranquillity of life, by how much nearer a way doth he arrive at that end, when flying the troubles of civil life, he directly and immediately ſettles himſelf in a moſt profound quiet, as in a ſtill calm Haven? Happy indeed, who knows, The chief good and a bleſſed life conſiſts not in Sovereignty or power, not in numerous wealth or plenty, but in indolence, compoſure of affections, and ſuch a diſpoſition of mind, as, circumſcribing all things by the boundaries of nature, makes him, in being content with little, obtain that which they, who rule over many, and poſſeſs great Treaſures, deſpair ever to arrive at.

Truly, if it be fit to ſpeak of myſelf, I eſteem it a great happineſs that I was never engaged in the factions of our City, and never ſtudied to flatter and pleaſe the people. To what end ſhould I? whenas, what I know, the people approve not; what the people approve, I know not. That *Metrodorus* and I lived private, How far was it from doing us harm, when among the large goods enjoyed in narrow gardens, and in obſcure *Melite*, *Greece* was ſo far from knowing us, that ſhe had ſcarce ever heard of us.

I ſaid, unleſs ſomthing intervene as to the Common-wealth: Becauſe, if the Common-wealth ſhould ſummon and really need our aſſiſtance, we ſhould be inhuman, where we might benefit many, not to do it: Injurious alſo to ourſelves; for unleſs the Common-wealth be ſafe, we cannot be what we moſt deſire, quiet.

A wiſe man therefore doth not like ſome, who, profeſſing wiſdome, have, through exceſſive pride, ſo great an opinion of their own judgement in civil government, that they think they could equalize *Lycurgus* and *Solon*.

But if he be deſired to make lawes, and to preſcribe a form of Government, and the offices of Magiſtrates, he will not refuſe it; knowing that they, who firſt made laws and ordinances, and conſtituted Government and Magiſtracy in Cities, ſetled life in a ſecure and quiet coudition: For if that be taken away, we ſhall live like Beaſts, and every man devour the next he meets with.

And if he be called to the ſupream power to govern the Common-wealth according to the laws and form of Government already eſtabliſhed, he ſhall not refuſe; knowing that though the thing itſelf is for the moſt part full of hazard, yet a wiſe man may have ſuch regard to all things, and ſuch a provident care of all, as that little of fortune, as I ſaid before, ſhall intervene to him; but the greateſt things, and ſuch as are of moſt concernment be managed by his advice and conduct. He will firſt take care, that the weaker ſort of men, diſcharging their duty towards the more powerful, be neither oppreſſed by them nor permitted to want thoſe neceſſaries of life wherewith the others abound; it being the end of every Society and Common-wealth, that by mutual aſſiſtance the lives of all be ſafe, and as happy as is poſſible.

Laſtly, if he be ſummoned by his Prince, and ſome occaſion requir, that he ſerve him either with his advice or help, neither ſhall he refuſe this, knowing that as it is, not onely more honourable, but more pleaſant to give than to receive a benefit: It is as the moſt honourable, ſo the moſt pleaſant, thing to oblige a Prince who confers ſo many obligations on others. Hitherto of Prudence.

## CHAP. XII.

### *Of Temperance in general.*

NExt follows Temperance, the firſt part, as we ſaid, of honeſty, and which ſeems to contain the greateſt ſhare of what is honeſt and decent. For it being the office of Temperance to

to ſuppreſs the mind when it deſires, as of Fortitude to exalt it when it fears; it is eſteemed leſs undecent to be dejected by puſillanimity, than exalted by deſire; and therefore to reſiſt deſire, is more decent than to oppoſe fear.

Concerning Temperance; we muſt firſt obſerve, that it is deſired not for its own ſake, but for that it procureth pleaſure, that is, brings peace to the minds of men, pleaſing and ſoothing them with a kind of concord. For it being employed in moderating deſires, and conſequently in adviſing that in things to be perſued or avoided we follow reaſon, it is not enough that we judge what is to be done or not to be done, but we muſt fix upon that which is judged.

But moſt men, not able to hold and keep to what they have reſolved on, being vanquiſh'd and debilitated by the appearance of a preſent pleaſure, reſign themſelves to the fetters of Luſt, not foreſeeing what will follow; and hereupon for a ſmall unneceſſary pleaſure, which might otherwiſe have been procured, or wholly wanted without incurring pain, they fall into great ſickneſſes, loſſes, and infamy, and many times into the penalties of Law.

But they who ſo enjoy pleaſures as that no pain ſhall enſue, and who preſerve their judgment conſtant, nor are overcome by pleaſure, to the doing of what they know ought not to be done; theſe men obtain the greateſt pleaſure, by pretermitting pleaſure: They alſo many times ſuffer ſome pain to prevent falling into greater.

Hence is it underſtood, that Temperance is to be deſired, not for that it avoids ſome pleaſures, but becauſe he who refrains from them declines troubles; which being avoided, he obtains greater pleaſures. Which it ſo doth, as that the action becomes honeſt and decent, and we may cleerly underſtand, that the ſame men may be Lovers both of pleaſure and of decency, and that ſuch as eſteem and practiſe all virtues perform for the moſt part thoſe actions and attain thoſe ends, as that by them it is manifeſt, how odious to all men cruelty is, and how amiable, goodneſs and clemency; and that thoſe very things which ill men moſt deſire and aim at, happen alſo to the good.

Now foraſmuch as of the deſires about which Temperance is employ'd, ſome are natural, others vain; and of the natural, ſome neceſſary, others not neceſſary, (to omit, that, of the neceſſary, ſome pertain ſimply to life, as that of meat and drink, and the pleaſure which conſiſts in motion; others to felicity itſelf, (as that of indolence and tranquillity or ſtable pleaſure:) It is manifeſt, that not without good cauſe we in our Phyſiology diſtinguiſhed deſires into three kinds, ſome both natural and neceſſary; others natural but not neceſſary; others neither natural nor neceſſary, but vain, or ariſing from vain opinion.

And foraſmuch as we ſaid, that thoſe are natural and neceſſary, which, unleſs they be ſatisfied, cauſe damage and pain in the Body; it is evident, that thoſe which infer no damage nor pain, though not ſatisfi'd yet are accompanied with earneſt and vehement inſtigations, are ſuch not by neceſſity, but vain opinions, and though they have ſome beginning from nature, yet there diffuſion and exceſs they have not from nature, but from the vanity of opinions; which render men worſe than beaſts, that are not obnoxious to ſuch diffuſion or exceſs. Likewiſe, that ſuch deſires are not only not neceſſary, but not natural, may be proved, for that they have a diffluent exceſſive appetition, very hardly or never to be ſatisfi'd; and are, for the moſt part, juſtly eſteemed cauſes of harm.

But to diſcourſe of ſome chief kinds of Temperance, according to ſome chief kinds of deſires, we may make choyce of Sobriety oppoſed to Gluttony, or the exceſſive deſire of meat and drink; Continence, to Luſt, or the unbridled deſire of coition; Mildneſs, to Anger or deſire of Revenge; Modeſty, to ambition or deſire of honour; Moderation, to Avarice or deſire of riches; and laſtly, in reſpect of the affinity betwixt deſire and hope, Mediocrity, which conſiſts betwixt hope and deſperation of the future.

## CHAP. XIII.

### *Of Sobriety oppoſite to Gluttony.*

IT can hardly be expreſſed, how great a good Sobriety is, which reduceth us to a thin ſimple and ſpare dyet, teaching us how little that is which Nature requires, and clearly ſhewing, that the neceſſities ſhe lies under may be abundantly ſatisfi'd with things light, and eaſily provided, as Barly-cakes, Fruits, Herbs, and water.

*For theſe things being every where to be had, and having the ſimple nature of moiſt and dry, moiſt aliments ſufficiently remove the trouble of the Body ariſing from want of ſuſtenance. Whatever is more than this amounts to Luxury, and concerns onely the ſatisfaction of a deſire, which neither is neceſſary, nor occaſion'd by any thing, the want whereof doth neceſſarily infer any offence to nature; but partly for that the want of ſomwhat is born with impatience; partly, for that there is preſumption of an abſolute delight without mixture of any trouble; partly, (to ſpeak in ſhort,) for that there are vain and falſe opinions inherent in the mind, which ſerve neither for the ſupplying of any natural defect, nor tend to the acquiſition of any thing by the want of which, the frame of the Body would be diſſolved.* Porph de non eſu carn.

*Thoſe very things which are ready at hand, abundantly ſuffice to ſupply all nature's wants; and they are ſuch as partly for their ſimplicity, partly for their ſlightneſs, are eaſily made ready. He, for example, who feeds on fleſh, needs other things inanimate to eat with it; whereas he, who is content with inanimate, needs but half ſo much as the other, and ſuſtains himſelf with what is eaſily got, and cheapely dreſs'd.*

There are four benefits ariſing from Sobriety; the firſt, that to accuſtome ourſelves to a ſimple diet *brings and preſerves health*: For it is ſumptuous feaſting and variety of meats, which begets, exaſperates, and continues crudities, head-aches, rheums, gouts, feavers, and other diſeaſes; not plain and ſimple food, which nature makes both neceſſary and wholſome, and not only to other Animals but even to man himſelf, who yet depraves Laert.

praves them by his exorbitancy, and corrupts them by such delicates, as which while he affects, he affects onely his own destruction.

Therefore if we are wise, *let us beware of that meat which we much desire and long for, but assoon as we have had it, find it was pleasant to us only to our harm. Such are all costly and luscious meats*; whence the eating flesh is less to be approved, as being rather prejudicial to health than wholsome, as may be argued because * *health is preserved by the same means whereby it is recovered*; but *it is manifest that it is recovered by a thin dyet and abstinence from flesh.*

*Porph. loc. cit.*

*Porph. loc. cit.

*Neither is it any wonder, that the ordinary sort of men conceive the eating of flesh to conduce much to health; for, they in like manner think, that the way to preserve health is to wallow in pleasures, even the Venereal; whereof nevertheless there is none benefits any man, and it is well if it hurt not.*

*Porph.*

The second is, that *it makes a man ready and quick in the offices necessary to life.* For if you look upon the functions of the mind, it preserves her serenity, acuteness, vigour; if upon the functions of the Body, it keeps it sound, active, and hardy. But repletion, over-satiety, surfeiting and drunkenness cloud the mind, make it blunt and languid; the Body diseased, unactive, and burdensome. What, I pray, can you expect extraordinary from that man, whose limbs are unweildy, his knees feeble, his tongue faltring, his head swimming, his eyes full of rheum, his mouth of the hick-up, brawling, and clamour; and all this, through excess of Wine.

*Laert.*

Certainly, a wise man, who ought to content himself with a *hemina* of small Wine, or to esteem the next water he comes at to be the most pleasant of all drinks, will be far from spending the night in drunkenness; and as far from stuffing himself with meats that are high, or burthening his stomack with such as are luscious and gross, who ought to be content with the most simple, even the very free, gifts of Nature.

'Indeed such simple and slender dyet will not 'make a man as strong as *Milo*, nor conduceth 'absolutely to an intense corroboration of the 'Body; but neither doth a wise man need such 'intense strength, seeing his employment con-'sists in contemplation, not in an active and 'petulant kind of life.

The third benefit is, that 'if somtimes the 'Table happen to be more plenteously furnish'd, 'we shall come much better prepar'd to tast 'what it yields. Not but that homely fare affords as much delight as sumptuous feasts; when hunger, which, in want of food, troubleth us, is satisfied, (for Barley-cakes and water are highly pleasant, if taken onely when we hunger and thirst;) but because they who are dayly accustomed to more costly viands are not so sensible of their sweetness by reason of their being almost continually cloyed with them; as a wise man is, who the better to relish them brings along with him a taste prepared by mean dyet: In like manner it comes to pass, that he, if at any time he chance to be present at publick spectacles, is taken with them more sensibly than are others.

What I affirm concerning the coursest meat and drink, that it affords no less pleasure than the greatest delicates, cannot be deny'd by any but by him who deceiveth himself with vain opinions; who observes not, that they only enjoy magnificence with greatest pleasure, who least need it; who never hath tasted course bread and water pressed with hunger and thirst. For my own part, when I eat course bread and drink water, or somtimes augment my Commons with a little *Cytheridian-Cheese*, (when I have a mind to feast extraordinarily,) I take great delight in it, and bid defiance to those pleasures which accompany the usual magnificence of feasts; so that if I have but bread, or barley-cakes and water, I am furnish'd to contend even with *Jove* himself in point of Felicity.

Shall I add, that 'magnificence of feasts, and 'variety of dishes not onely not free the mind 'from perturbation, but not so much as aug-'ment the pleasure of the Body, forasmuch as 'this also, when that trouble is removed, hath 'found its end? For example, the eating of 'flesh (which we lately instanc'd,) neither takes 'away any thing particularly that is a trouble 'to nature, nor performs any thing which would 'occasion trouble, if not fulfilled. But it hath 'a forc'd delight, and perhaps mingled with 'that which is contrary to these, for it condu-'ceth little to long life, and serveth only to 'variation of pleasures, like Venereal pleasures, 'and the drinking of foreign Wines, without 'which nature or life may well subsist: For 'those things, without which it cannot subsist, 'are most compendious, and may be obtained easily 'without breach of Justice, Liberality and Tran-'quillity.

'Neither is it any matter, whether the ordi-'nary sort of men be of this belief or not; since 'petulancy and intemperance abound in such 'persons, so that we need not fear, but there 'will be those who will feed on flesh. For though 'all men had the best and right judgement of 'things, yet would there be no need of Fowling 'or Fowlers, or Fishers, or Swine-herds; these 'Animals, living by themselves, free, and with-'out a keeper, would in a short time be de-'stroy'd by others preying upon them, and sup-'pressing the vastness of their increase, as hap-'pens to infinite others which men eat not. But 'since there reigneth always a multiplicious, or 'rather universal, folly amongst men, there will 'never be wanting an innumerable company of 'gluttons to feed on these.

Lastly, the fourth benefit is, that 'it renders 'us fearless of fortune. For they onely must stand in awe of Fortune, who, being accustom'd to live sumptuously, conceive their lives cannot be otherwise than most miserable, unless they are able to spend Pounds, and Talents every day. Whence it happens, that such men are for the most part subject to a troublesome life, and often commit Rapines, Murthers, and the like villainies. But he, who is content with course food, as fruits and sallads, who is satisfy'd with bread and water; who hath confin'd his desire within these, what can he fear from Fortune? For, who is there so poor as to want these? Who so distress'd, that he cannot easily meet with beans, pulse, hearbs, fruits? As for water, what need I mention it?

For

For my own part, truly (that I may with modesty instance myself) I am content, and highly pleas'd with the Plants and Fruits of my own little Gardens; and will, that this Inscription be set over the Gate, *Stranger, here you may stay; here the Supreme Good is Pleasure; the Master of this little house is hospitable, friendly, and will entertain you with* polenta, *and afford you water plentifully, and will ask you, How you like your entertainment? These little Gardens invite not hunger, but satisfie it; nor encrease thirst with drinks, but extinguish it with the natural and pleasant remedy.*

In this pleasure I have grown old, finding by account, that my diet amounts not fully to an *obolus* a day, and yet some days there are, in which I abate somwhat even of that, to make trial, whether I want any thing of full and perfect pleasure, or how much, and whether it be worth great labor.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *Of Continence, opposite to Lust.*

MOreover, Continence or Abstinence from Venereal Pleasures is a great Virtue; for the use of them, as I said formerly, doth never benefit, and it is well if it hurts not.

Certainly, to abuse them intemperately, is to make a man destitute of vigor, anxious with cares, painful with diseases, and of short continuance. Wherefore a wise man must stand upon his guard, and not suffer himself to be caught with love, far from conceiving love to be somthing sent from the Gods above, and therefore to be cherished.

And that a man may be least subject thereto, and want the chief excitements to venereal delights, nothing more avails than spare diet, of which we lately treated: for excess in eating, causeth abundance of that humor, which is the food and fuel of love's fire. The next antidotes are, an honest employment, (especially the study of wisdom,) and meditation upon the inconveniences to which they, who suffer themselves to be transported with love, are liable.

The general inconveniences which attend love of Women and Boys, are consumption of strength, decay of industry, ruin of estate, mortgages and forfeitures, loss of reputation. And while the feet wear *Sicyonian* buskins, the fingers Emeralds, the body other ornaments, the mind, in the mean time, conscious to itself, is full of remorse, for that she lives idly, and suffers good years to be lost, and the like, which it were easie to instance.

But as to Particulars, What ill doth it not draw upon a Man to desire the company of a Woman prohibited to him by the Laws? Doubtless, a wise Man will be very far from thinking of such a thing; it being enough to deter him from it, to reflect upon the vast solicitude, which is necessary to precaution, of those many and great dangers which intervene; it hapning, for the most part, that they who attempt such things are wounded, murthered, imprison'd, banish'd, or suffer some great punishments. Whence it comes, that (as we said before) for a pleasure, which is but short, little, and not necessary, and which might either have been obtained otherwise, or quite let alone, men expose themselves to great pain, and sad repentance.

Besides, to be incontinent, to resign up ourselves to this one kind of pleasure, were to defraud ourselves in the mean time of other pleasures, many and great; which he enjoys, who lives continently according to the Laws. He so applies himself to wisdom, as that he neither blunts his mind, nor excruciats it with cares, nor disturbs it with other affections; and for his body, he neither enervates it, nor vexeth it with diseases, nor torments it with pains. And thus he attains the chief good, which (as I said,) is not gotten by keeping company with Boys or Women, not having a Table plenteously furnished with choice of Fish or Fowl.

Yet there is no reason, any one, from this commendation of general abstinence from venereal delights, should infer, that therefore a man ought to abstain even from lawful marriage. What our judgment is of that Particular, we have formerly declared. I shall only add, that whereas I said, Love is not sent from the gods, it gives us to understand, that if a man hath no children by his wife, he must not attribute it to the anger of *Cupid* or *Venus*, or hope to become a Father by Vows, Prayers, and Sacrifices, rather than by natural Remedies.

I shall add, that a wise man ought not to live after the manner of the *Cynicks*, or to behave himself with such immodesty as they shew in publick. For whilst they plead they follow Nature, and reprehend and deride us, for esteeming it obscene and dishoneſt to call things which are not dishoneſt by their names, but things which are indeed dishoneſt we call by their proper names; as to rob, to cozen, to commit adultery, are dishoneſt indeed, but not obscene in name; whereas to perform the act of generation, is honeſt in deed, but obscene in name, and alledge divers others arguments against modesty: they seem not sufficiently to consider, that they live in a civil Society, not in the Fields, like wild Beasts, and therefore ought not to follow Nature exactly.

For, from the time that we enroll'd our names in a Society, Nature commands, that we observe the Laws and Customs of that Society; to the end, that participating of the common goods, we draw no evil upon ourselves: such as is (besides all other punishments,) the very infamy or ignominy which attends Impudence, or the want of such Modesty as is prescribed by the customs and manners of the Society wherein we live, and from which, in the Voice, the Countenance, and Behaviour, that modest Respect, which is deservedly commended by all, is denominated.

Lastly, I add, that it not a little conduceth as to Modesty in particular, so to all kinds of Continency, to abstain from Musick and Poetry, for that their pleasing Songs and Airs are not other than Incentives to Lust.

Hence is our Maxim, That a wise Man only can treat of Musick and Poetry aright, and according to virtue. For others, easily taken with the allurements of both, indulge to both; only the wise Man duely foreseeing the harm that would

would ensue, cast them away; declaring that Musick is, amongst other things, an allurement to drink, an exhauster of Money, a friend to idleness, conducing nothing to good, honest, and generous works; that Poetry hath alwaies made men prone to all sorts of vices, especially to lust, even by the examples of the gods themselves, whom it introduceth, inflamed with anger, and raging with lust, and represents not onely their Wars, conflicts, wounds, hatreds, discords, dissentions, births, deaths: But also their complaints, lamentations, imprisonments, coition with mortal children of immortal Parents, and the like; which certainly sober men would abhor.

## CHAP. XV.

### *Of Meekness opposite to Anger.*

MOreover Lenity or Meekness, whereunto are reduced Clemency and Pity, is so excellent an antidote against anger, or desire of revenge, that it is esteemed a most eminent virtue; in as much as anger, especially if excessive, causeth madness for the time. For by anger, the mind is heated and darkned, the eyes sparkling with fire, the breast ready to burst with rage, the teeth gnashing, the voice choaked, the hairs standing on end, the face glowing, and distorted with menacing looks, horrid, and ugly to behold, so that the mind seems to have lost the command of herself, and to have forgotten all decency. But, lenity cures the mind, or rather preserves it sound, so that it is neither moved in itself, nor is their any eruption of passion into the Body, that may cause the least undecency.

Now anger being commonly kindled, and set on fire, by opinion of some injury receiv'd; but men are injur'd through hatred, envy, or contempt; how can a wise man so bear an injury, as to behave himself with Lenity, and sweetness towards those who did it? By submitting himself to the government of right reason; whereby (as I formerly said,) he must fortifie himself against fortune. For, he accounts an injury among things of chance, and discreetly considers, is is not in his power to make other men just, and free from passion; and therefore, is as little moved at injuries done to him by men, as at the incommodities, or losses which happen by accidents of fortune, or by any other cause above, beyond his own power.

He is not, for example, troubled at the great heates or colds of the seasons of the year, because it is the nature of the seasons in their vicissitudes, which he cannot alter! In like manner, neither is he troubled at the injuries, which dishoneſt and malicious men do to him, because in doing so, they act according to their own natures, and to make them do otherwise, and to change their natures, is not in his power. Besides, he conceives it not agreeable to Reason, and Wisdom, to add ill to ill, (to add, unto the harm which happens to him from without, perturbation within by opinion,) or, because another man would afflict his mind with vexation, he should be so foolish as to admit that vexation, and further the ill designs of his enemy upon him.

Yet is it fit, that a wise man take such care of his reputation, as not to become contemptible, since there are some pleasures that arise from a good Name, some troubles from an ill, and the contempt that followes it; but he must take care of his reputation, not so much by revenging injuries, or being offended at those that do them, as by living well, and innocently, giving no man a just cause of contumely or malediction. To do thus, is in our power; not, to hinder another from exercising his own malice.

Whence, if one that bears you ill-will, and is your profess'd enemy, shall demand any thing of you, you must not deny him, provided what he demand be lawful, and you are nothing the less secure from him; he differs not from a Dog, and therefore must be appeased with a morsel. Nevertheless, nothing is better or safer, than to confront his malice with innocence of life, and the security of your own Conscience, and withal to shew that you are above injury.

Especially, seeing it may so happen, that a wise man (as I said before,) may be arraign'd and suffer not onely injury, but calumny, accusation, condemnation: Even then he considers, that to live well and virtuously, is in his power, but, not to fall into the hands of envious unjust persons; not to be unjustly accused by them; not to be sentenced by unrighteous Judges, is not in his power. He therefore is not angry, either with the accusers, witnesses, or judges but confiding in a good conscience, loseth nothing of his lenity and tranquillity, and esteeming himself to be above this chance, he looks upon it undaunted, and behaves himself in his tryal boldly, and with courage.

Let not any object, that what I here advise concerning lenity, is repugnant to what I formerly said of the chastising of servants; for I limited castigation, onely to the refractory and perverse. It is manifest, that punishment ought to be inflicted on offenders, as well in a private family, as in a Common-wealth; and that, as a Prince or Magistrate punisheth the offences of his subjects, without anger; so the Father of a family may without anger, punish the faults of his servants.

Moreover, a wise man must not onely bear injuries, nor onely pardon them mildly, but even kindly encourage, and congratulate him, who betakes himself to a better course. For since the beginning of reformation is to know our fault; therefore must this gratulation, and encouragement be given to the penitent offender, that, as he is affected with horrour at this knowledge of his crime, so the excellence, and beauty of that which he ought to have done, and thenceforward must do, may be fully represented to him, and the love of it increase daily in him.

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of Modeſty, oppoſite to Ambition.*

AS concerning *Modeſty*, there needs little more to be ſaid, than what we formerly declared, when we ſhew'd it was not the part of a wiſe man to affect high Offices, or Honours in a Common-wealth, but rather ſo to contain himſelf as to live in ſome private corner: Wherefore, here I ſhall once more give the ſame counſel, which I give to all my friends. Live cloſe, or private, (provided no neceſſities of the Common-wealth require otherwiſe,) for even experience teacheth, that he hath lived well, who hath well concealed himſelf.

It is but too frequently ſeen, that they who climb up to the top of Honour, are caſt down by envy, as with a Thunder-bolt, and then too late acknowledge that it is much better, quietly to obey, than by laborious climbing up the narrow path of ambition, to aime at command and ſoveraignty, and to arrive there, where nothing can be expected, but a great and dangerous precipitation. Beſides, are not they, whom the common people gaze upon with admiration, glittering with Titles and Honours, the moſt unhappy of all men, for that their breaſts are gnawn with weighty and troubleſome cares? You muſt not imagine that ſuch perſons live quiet and ſecure in mind; for it is impoſſible, but that they who are feared by many, ſhould themſelves fear many.

And though you ſee them ſend out great Navies, command Legions, compaſſed with Guards, yet you muſt not think they live all quiet, or indeed do at all partake of any true pleaſure, for all theſe things are ridiculous pageantry and dreams: Fears and cares are not afraid of the noiſe of Arms, nor ſtand in awe of the brightneſs of gold, or ſplendor of purple, but boldly intrude amongſt Princes and Potentates, and, like the Vulture, which the Poets talk of, gnaw and prey on their hearts.

Neither muſt you think, that the Body is any thing the better for this, ſince you ſee that Feavers go away nothing the ſooner, if you lye in a bed of Tyrian purple, in a chamber furniſhed with rich Tapiſtry, than under a plain homely coverlet; and that we take no harm by the want of purple robes, embroidered with Gold and Pearl, as long as we have a courſe plain Garment ſufficient to keep away the cold. And what, if, being cheerful and contented with rags and a bed of ſtraw, you ſhould inſtruct men how vain thoſe are, who with aſtoniſh'd and turbulent minds gape and thirſt after the trifles of magnificence, not underſtanding how few and ſmall thoſe things are which make a happy life? Beleive me, that which you ſhall ſay will appear far more magnificent and high, being delivered from a Mattreſs covered with courſe cloath; for it is not onely ſpoken but practiſed.

Though your houſe ſhine not with ſilver and Gold, reſound not with muſick, hath not any golden Images of Boyes holding tapers to light you at your nightly Revels and Banquets; truly, it is not a whit leſs pleaſant to repoſe yourſelf on the ſoft graſs by a purling ſtream, underneath a ſpreading tree and eſpecially in the ſpring, at what time the fields are beſprinkled with flowers, the birds entertain you with their muſick, the Weſt wind fans you, and Nature herſelf ſmiles on you.

Why therefore ſhould any man, that may live thus in his own fields and garden, perſue honour; and not rather modeſtly reſtrain his deſires within this compaſs? For to aim at glory by oſtentation of Virtue, Science, eloquence, nobility, wealth, attendants, attire, beauty, meen, and the like, is a ridiculous vanity: In all theſe, Modeſty requires no more than that we tranſgreſs not decency through ruſticity, ſtupidity, or negligence. It is (as I ſaid,) equally baſe and abject, to grow inſolent, upon poſſeſſion of theſe, as to be caſt down at their loſs.

Hereupon a wiſe man, if he happen to have the Images or ſtatues of his Anceſtors or other perſons, will be far from taking pride in them, or ſhewing them as badges of honour; yet on the other ſide, he will not neglect them, but place and keep them carefully in his gallery.

In like manner, neither will he be ſolicitous about his own funeral, or give order that it be performed magnificently. He will only conſider what may be beneficial and pleaſant to his ſucceſſours, knowing that as for himſelf or his dead Body, it is all one what becomes of it. For to propagate vanity even beyond death is madneſs, and ſuch alſo is the fancy of thoſe, who would not that their dead Bodies ſhould be devoured by wild beaſts. For, if that be an ill, muſt it not be very bad to have them burnt, embalmed, and immerſed in honey, to grow cold and ſtiff under a Marble-ſtone, to be preſſed and conſumed with Earth?

## CHAP. XVII.

### *Of Moderation, oppoſite to Avarice.*

THE next is Moderation, or that diſpoſition of mind by which a man is contented with little, and than which he cannot have a greater good. To be content with little is the greateſt wealth in the world, foraſmuch as a mean eſtate proportion'd to the Law of nature is great riches. To have wherewithal to prevent hunger, thirſt, and cold, is a felicity equal to that of the Divinity; and who poſſeſſes ſo much, and deſires no more, however the world may eſteem him poor, is the richeſt man.

How ſweet a thing is this poverty, cheerful and contented with what is enough, that is, with thoſe riches of nature which ſuffice to preſerve from hunger, thirſt, and cold? Truly, ſeeing the riches of nature are finite and eaſie to be had, but thoſe that are coveted out of vain opinions, are without meaſure and infinite, we ought to be thankful to kind Nature, for making thoſe things neceſſary, that are eaſie to be had, and thoſe that are hard to be got, unneceſſary.

'And ſince it behoves a wiſe man to hope he 'ſhall never, as long as he lives, want neceſſaries, 'doth not the eaſie acquiſition of theſe cheap 'and common things abundantly cheriſh that 'hope? Whereas, on the contrary, things of 'magnificence afford him not the like hope. And 'this is the reaſon, why ordinary men, though 'they have great poſſeſſions, yet as if they feared 'thoſe might faile them, labour ſtill to heap up 'more, never thinking their ſtore compleat.

'This may teach us to content ourſelves with 'the moſt ſimple things, and ſuch as are eaſily 'gotten, remembring that not all the wealth in 'the World put together is able in the leaſt mea'ſure to allay the perturbation of the mind, where'as things that are mean, ordinary, and eaſie to 'be had, remove that indigence which is incom'modious to the Body, and beſides are ſuch that 'the thought of parting with them is nothing 'grievous to him who reflects upon death.

Miſerable indeed are the minds of men and their hearts blind, in as much as they will not ſee that Nature dictates nothing more to them than this, that they ſupply the wants of the Body, and withal enjoy a well pleaſed mind, without fear or trouble; not that they ſhould employ their whole life in ſcraping together that which is neceſſary to life, and that with ſuch greedineſs as if they were to out-live death, never thinking how deadly a cup, from our very birth, we are deſign'd to pledge.

What though thoſe things which are purely neceſſary, and in reſpect whereunto no man is poore, yield not the delights which vulgar minds dote on? Nature wants them not, and yet ſhe ceaſeth not to afford real and ſincere pleaſures, in the fruition of thoſe mean and ſimple things, as we already have declared. Whence a wiſe man is ſo indifferently affected towards thoſe things, for whoſe ſake mony is coveted, (to ſupply the dayly expences of love, and ambition,) as that being at a great diſtance from them all, he hath no reaſon either to deſire or care for mony.

Whereas I ſaid, that the riches which are coveted through opinions, have not any meaſure or bound, the reaſon is, that though Nature is ſatisfied with little, yet vain opinion, uſhering in deſire, always thinks of ſomthing which we we have not, and, as if it were really needful, directs the deſire to that thing. Whence it happens, that he who is not ſatisfied with a little, can never have enough; but the more wealth he hath, the more he conceives himſelf to be in want.

Wherefore ſeeing there can never be want of a little, a wiſe man, poſſeſſing that little, ought to eſteem it great riches, becauſe therein is no want; whereas other riches, how great ſoever in eſteem, are indeed ſmall, becauſe they want multiplication to infinity. Whence it follows, that he who thinks not what he poſſeſſeth is ſufficient and plenteous, though he were maſter of the whole World, would yet be miſerable. For miſery is the companion of want, and the ſame vain opinion which firſt perſuaded him, that his own eſtate was not ſufficient, will continue to perſuade him, that one World is not ſufficient, but that he wants more and more to infinity.

Would you then make a man rich? Know, that it muſt be done, not by adding to his riches, but by detracting from his deſires. For when, having cut off all vain and ſuperfluous deſires, he ſhall compoſe himſelf to the rules of Nature, and covet no more than ſhe requires, then ſhall he find himſelf to be rich indeed, becauſe he ſhall then find that he wants nothing. Whence this alſo ſhould be inculcated to him, if you live according to Nature, you ſhall never be poor; but if according to Opinion, never rich. Nature deſires little, Opinion infinite.

Certainly this diſpoſition or faculty of the mind, whereby a man, moderating himſelf, cuts off from his deſires whatſoever is not neceſſary to nature, and contents himſelf with ſuch things as are moſt ſimple and eaſie to be got; this diſpoſition, I ſay, begets that ſecurity which is found in a quiet retirement, and avoidance of the multitude; moreover, by it, even he who lives with much company wants no more, than he who lives alone.

Hence alſo it proceeds, that whoſoever endeavours to beget a confidence and ſecurity to himſelf out of external things, the beſt way that may be, ſeeks after things poſſible to be got, as being not unſuitable to him: But the impoſſible he eſteems unſuitable. Beſides, even of the poſſible, there are many which he attains not; and all thoſe which it is not neceſſary for him to attain, he renounceth.

Now for want of this renouncing or detraction, how great miſery is it for a man, to be continually pouring into a bored Veſſel, never able to fill his mind? For not to mention, that many, who have heaped up wealth, have therein found onely a change, not an end, of their miſery; either becauſe they run themſelves into new cares, to which they were not ſubject before, or becauſe they made way for ſnares, in which they were entangled and taken. Not to mention this, I ſay, the greateſt miſery is, that the more thou feedeſt, the more thou art tormented with hunger.

## CHAP. XVIII.

*Of Mediocrity, betwixt Hope and Deſpair of the Future.*

LAſtly, ſeeing that all deſire whatſoever is carried to that which is not poſſeſſed, but propoſed as poſſible to be attained, and accompany'd with ſome hope of obtaining it; which hope, cheriſhing the deſire, is accompany'd with a certain pleaſure; as its contrary Deſpair, fomenting a fear that what is deſired cannot be obtained, is not without trouble. Somthing therefore muſt be added concerning *Mediocrity*, which is of great uſe, as well in the general, concerning things hoped or deſpaired, as in the particular, concerning the duration, or rather perpetuity of life, whereof, as there is a deſire kindled in the breaſts of men, ſo the deſpair of it torments them.

*In*

Laert. *In the first place therefore we must look upon this as a general Rule; In contingent things, that which is to come is neither absolutely ours, nor absolutely not ours; so that we are neither to hope for it, as if it must certainly come to pass,* because it may be diverted by some accident intervening; *nor to despair of it, as if it must certainly not come to pass,* because it may fall out, that no accident may intervene to divert it. Thus, not being destitute of all hope, we shall not be without some pleasure; nor being quite frustrated of our hope, we shall not receive any trouble.

This difference there is betwixt a wise Man and a Fool; the wise Man expects future things, but depends not on them, and in the mean time enjoys the present, (by considering how great and pleasant they are,) and remembers the past with delight. But the life of a Fool (as I said before,) is unpleasant and timorous, for that it is wholly carried on to the future.

How many may we see, who neither remember the past good, nor enjoy the present? they are wholly taken up with expectation of future things, and, those being uncertain, they are perpetually afflicted with anguish and fear, and are exceedingly grieved when they too late perceive, that they have in vain addicted themselves to the getting of Riches, or Honours, or Power, or Glory; for they fail of obtaining those Pleasures, with the hopes whereof being enflamed, they had undergone many and great labours. Not to say any thing of those others, who being abject and narrow-hearted despair of all things, and are, for the most part, malevolent, envious, morose, shunners of the light, evil speakers, monstrous.

I say, a wise Man remembers the past goods with delight and gratitude; but indeed it cannot sufficiently be lamented, that we are too ungrateful towards the past, in not calling to mind, nor accounting amongst pleasures all the good things we have received; forasmuch as no pleasure is more certain, than that which cannot now be taken from us. The present goods are not yet consummate and wholly solid, some chance or other may intervene, and cut them off in half; the future are dependent and uncertain, what is already past is only safe, and out of all danger to be lost.

Among the past goods I reckon, not only such as we have enjoyed, but even the avoidance of the Ills that might have befall'n us; as also, our deliverance out of such Ills as did fall on us, and might have lasted longer, likewise the remembrance and delight that we sustained them constantly and bravely.

As to the desire of prolonging Life to a vast extent, I already hinted, that a wise Man must cut off that desire, because there would immediately upon it follow Desperation, which is never without trouble and anguish. Hither it conduceth to consider, that no greater pleasure can be received from an age of infinite duration, than may be received from this which we know to be finite, provided a Man measure the bounds of it by right reason.

For seeing that to measure the bounds of Nature by right reason, is nothing else but to consider, (as I said before,) that the supreme pleasure is no other, than an exemption from pain and trouble, it is manifest, that it can neither be made greater by length; nor lesser, or more remiss, by shortness of time.

And though the hopes of a more prolonged pleasure, or of a longer age, seem to render the present pleasure more intense; yet it is only so with those, who measure the bound of pleasure, not by right reason, but by vain desire; and who look upon themselves so, as if, when they die and cease to be, they should yet be troubled at the privation of pleasure, as if they had been alive. Whence it happens, that, as I hinted formerly, to understand fully, that Death nothing concerns us, much conduceth to our enjoyment of this mortal life, not by adding any thing of uncertain time, but by casting away the desire of Immortality.

Wherefore seeing that since Nature hath prescribed bounds to corporeal pleasure, and the desire of eternal duration takes them away, it is necessary that the mind or reason interpose, that, by discoursing upon those bounds, and extirpating the desire of Sempiternity, it may make life every way perfect, so that we being content therewith, shall not want a longer duration.

Moreover, neither shall we be deprived of pleasure, even then when Death shall summon us, forasmuch as we have attained the perfect and delightful end of the best life, departing like Guests full and well satisfied with life, and having duly discharged that office, to acquit ourselves of which we received life.

## CHAP. XIX.

### *Of Fortitude in general.*

WE come next to *Fortitude*, which I affirmed to be the other part of *Honesty*, because it withstands Fear, and all things that use to cause Fear; whereby, they who behave themselves not timorous and cowardly, but valiantly and stoutly, are said to behave themselves honestly and beseemingly. This may be manifested many ways, especially from War, wherein they who behave themselves with courage and honesty, get honour above the rest. Whence Honest is almost the very same with that, which in the common esteem is Honourable.

That this virtue conduceth also to pleasure, may be inferred from hence, for that neither the undergoing of Labors, nor the suffering of Pains, are things in themselves allective, nor patience, nor assiduity, nor watchings, nor industry, though so highly commended, nor Fortitude itself; but we persue these, to the end we may live without care and fear, and so (as much as possible) free both the body and mind from molestation.

For as by the fear of death (for example,) all the quiet of life is disturbed; and as to sink under pains, and to bear them with a dejected and weak mind, is a great misery, and by such lowness of spirit, many have quite undone their Parents, Friends, Country, and even themselves: so on the other side, a strong and gallant mind is free from all care and anguish, for it contemns

death, because they who suffer it, are in the same case, as before they were born; and is so fortify'd against all pains, as to remember, That the greatest are determined by death, the least have many intervals of ease, the middle sort we ourselves can master; if they are tolerable we can endure them, we can contentedly quit this life, when it no longer pleaseth us, as if we went off from a stage.

Hence is it manifest, that timidity and cowardliness are not dispraised, nor fortitude and patience praised, for their own sakes; but, those are rejected, for that they cause pain; and these desired, for that they produce pleasure.

Whereas I said, that Fortitude withstands Fear, and all things that use to cause Fear, it tends to let us understand, that they are the very same ills, which torment when they are present, and are feared, when expected as future; and therefore, we must learn not to fear those ills, which we either fancy to ourselves, or any ways apprehend as future, but to bear those which are present with constancy and patience.

Of the Ills, which we fancy to ourselves, but are not really future, the chiefest are those, which we fear either from the Gods, as if they were ill themselves, or could be the Authors of any ill to us; or from death, as if that brought along with it, or after it, some sempiternal ill. Of the Ills which we fear, for that they may happen, and yet in the mean time are so present, that they afflict and trouble us, are, those which either cause pain in the body, or discontent in the mind.

Those which cause pain are, Sicknesses, Stripes, Fire, Sword, and the like: Those which cause discontent, are such as are termed external Ills; and of these some are publick, as Tyranny, War, destruction of our Country, Pestilence, Famine, &c. Others private, of which sort are Servitude, Banishment, Imprisonment, Infamy, Loss of Friends, and the like.

The difference betwixt all these things on one part, and pain and discontent on the other, is this, that pain and discontent are absolute Ills in themselves, the others are not so, but only inasmuch as they relate to pain and discontent, as causes; for if they did not cause pain and discontent, there were no reason why we should shun them.

We shall say somthing, in order, upon these: but first take notice, that Fortitude is not to be looked upon as if ingenerate in us by nature, but acquired by reason. Fortitude is different from Audacity, Ferocity, inconsiderate Temerity, for those are found even in brute Animals also, but this is proper to Man, and to such Men only as act advisedly and prudently; and therefore it is to be measured not by the strength and violent carriage of the Body, but by the firmness of the Mind, constantly adhering to an honest intention or purpose.

## CHAP. XX.

*Of Fortitude, as to Fear of the Gods.*

WE must first treat of a twofold fear, far transcending the rest: For if any thing ever produced the ultimate good, and chief pleasure, proper to the mind; it was the expunction of those opinions, (and all allied to them,) which have impress'd the greatest fear upon the mind. Such is the condition of miserable Mortals, that they are not led by sound opinions, but by some affection void of reason; so that not discerning what is ill indeed, by reason they suffer an equal and no less intense perturbation, than as if these things, for which they are troubled, were indeed such.

That, which in the first place, useth to possess men with greatest fear, and, consequently, causes in them the greatest perturbation, is this, that, conceiving there are certain blessed and immortal Natures, they do yet think them to have wills, passions, and operations, plainly repugnant to those attributes, (of beatitude and immortality,) as perpetual solicitude, business, anger, favour; whereby it comes to pass, that ill men receive great harms by way of punishment; the good protection and benefits, from these Natures, that is, from the Gods. Thus men being nursed up in their own, that is, in human affections, fancy and admit Gods like to themselves; and whatsoever suits not with their own dispositions, that they conceive incompetent to them.

Hereupon, it cannot be express'd, how great unhappiness mankind hath drawn upon itself, by attributing such things to the Gods, especially anger, and severity; by reason whereof, Mens minds being dejected, every one trembles with fear, when the Heaven Thunders, or the Earth quakes, or the Sea is Tempestuous, or any other thing happens, whereby he is persuaded, that the Gods intend to punish him, miserable man.

But it is not so with those, who, instructed by reason, have learnt, that the Gods live in perpetual security and tranquillity, and that their nature is too far remov'd from us, and our affairs, for them to be either pleased, or displeased with us. Truly if they were, and did hear the prayers of men, how soon would all men be destroy'd, who continually imprecate mischief on one another?

Therefore, when you conceive God to be an immortal and blessed Animal, (as the common notion concerning God suggests,) take heed of attributing any thing to him, which is either incompetent with immortality, or repugnant to beatitude; but let all your conceptions be such, as may consist with immortality and beatitude.

Gods indeed there are, for the knowledge of them is evident, as we formerly proved; but such as men commonly conceive them, they are not. For first, they describe them by some adjuncts or properties, as when they say, they are immortal and blessed, and then overthrow what they asserted, by applying other attributes to them, repugnant to the former; as when they say, that they have business, or create business for others; that

that they are affected with anger or favour, which, as I hinted formerly, imply imbecillity, fear and want of external assistance.

Neither need you fear, that this will make you esteemed impious; for he is impious indeed, not, who denies the vulgar Gods of the multitude, but he who ascribes to the Gods the opinions of the multitude. For those things which are commonly delivered concerning the Gods, are not genuine prænotions, but false opinions.

By the same reason likewise, he is not pious, who out of fear to the Gods addresseth himself to every stone, to every Altar, besprinkles every Temple with the blood of Victims: But he, who, contemplating all things with a serene and quiet soul, conceiveth aright of the Gods, and worshipping them in his mind, not induced thereto by hope or reward, but for their excellent Majesty and supreme nature, observes all kind of veneration towards them, and useth expressions suggesting such thoughts, as out of them arise no opinions repugnant to veneration, and consequently, suffereth not that which others suffer, in whose minds, this contrariety causeth an extraordinary perturbation.

## CHAP. XXI.

### *Of Fortitude, as to fear of Death.*

THat which next striketh greatest terrour into the minds of men is *Death*, for that they expect, and fear, I know not what everlasting ill, as Fables tell them, (and which is strange, in the very privation of sense which then happens, as if they should still have being,) not knowing that all stories concerning the infernal places, (which we spoke of formerly,) are mere fictions of Poets; or if they contain any thing of truth, it is made good in this life, by vain fears, superfluous cares, insatiable desires, and other violent passions, which torture unhappy men in such manner, that their life is worse than hellish.

That you may exempt yourself, therefore, from these terrours, accustome *your self to this thought, That death nothing concerns us*; and to this argument, That *all good or ill that happens to us is with sense; but death is a privation of sense*, for death is a dissolution, and what is dissolved remains without sense. So that death seems easie to be contemn'd, because it is an ineffectual Agent, and in vain threatens pain, when the patient is not. Laert.

*Indeed the ordinary sort of men abhor death, because they look upon it somtimes as the greatest of pains, somtimes because they apprehend it as the cessation of all things that we enjoy in life; but without cause is it, that not to live, or not to be, is fear'd; for when it comes to that, we shall not have any faculty left whereby to know, that, not to live, is ill.* Laert.

Hence we may conclude, that they are very fooliſh who abhor, amongst other things, to think, that after death their Bodies should be torn by wild Beasts, burnt by fire, devoured by worms; for, they do not consider, that then they shall not be, and so not feel nor complain, that they are torn, burnt, devoured, turned into corruption. As also, those who are troubled to think, that they shall no longer enjoy the conversation of their Wives, Children, Friends; no longer do them good offices nor assist them; for these consider not, that then they shall have no desire of such things.

*Death therefore, which is esteemed the most horrid of all Ills, doth (as I said,) nothing concern us, because while we are, Death is not; and when Death is, we are not: So that it concerns neither the living nor the dead; the living it toucheth not, the dead are not.* Laert.

*Now the assured knowledge that Death nothing concerns us, makes us enjoy this mortal life, not adding uncertain time to it, but casting away the desire of immortality. For, in life, there can be nothing of ill to him, who perfectly understands, that there can be nothing of ill in the privation of life. Whence, as we make choice not of the most meat, but of the best, so should we covet, not the longest, but most pleasant life.*

*Neither can he be acquitted of folly, who says, he fears death, for that, when it comes, it brings not any trouble, but because it afflicts the mind with grief before it comes: For, that which brings no trouble with it, when it comes, ought not to make us sad with expectation.* Certainly, if there be any thing of inconvenience or fear in this business, it is the fault of him that is dying, not of Death: Nor, is there any trouble in death, more than there is after it, and it is no less folly to fear death, than to fear old age, since as old age follows youth, so death follows old age.

Moreover, we are to hope at least, that either we shall feel no pain at the point of death; or if any, so short, as the very consideration of that may comfort us; for no great pain lasts long, and every man ought to believe, that, though the dissolution of his Soul and body be accompanied with some torment, yet that being past he shall feel no more pain.

*He also who advised young men to live well, and old to dye well, was very ridiculous, for these are not be be parted; the meditation of living well and of dying well is one and the same*, seeing that a young man may dye suddenly, and an old man hath something more of life behind: Besides, the last act is a part, even the crown, of life. Laert.

Both young and old ought to consider, that though men may provide for their security in other things; yet as to death itself, all men live as it were in a City without walls or bulwarks.

Besides, a young man may dye happy, if he consider, that he should find nothing more in a longer life, than what he hath already seen and experienc'd; and an old man may live unhappy, if, like a vessel full of holes, he suffer the goods of life only to run thorough him, and so is never full of them, nor, as a sober guest of Nature, after a plentiful feast of life, is willing to go away, and take his repose.

Think not any old man happy for dying old, but for dying full and well satisfi'd with goods.

*Lastly, far more fooliſh and ridiculous is he, who saith, It is good either not to be born at all; or as soon as born to pass the gates of death. For, if he speak this in earnest, why does he not presently rid himself of life, it being very easie for him so to do, if he hath well deliberated upon it? If in jest, he is perfectly mad, because these are things that admit not of jesting. Again, in life there is somthing amiable in itself*; and therefore they are no less to be reproved who desire death, than they who are afraid Laert.

of

of it. What can be ſo ridiculous as to deſire death, having made your own life unquiet by fear of death? Or, out of a wearineſs of life, to run to death, when your own imprudent and conſtant courſe of life is the cauſe of that wearineſs.

You muſt rather take care to make life not tedious to you, that you be not willing to part with it, unleſs either nature, or ſome intolerable chance ſummon you to ſurrender it. And in that reſpect we ought ſeriouſly to conſider, whether it be more commodious, that death come to us, or that we go to death. For though it be an evil indeed to live in neceſſity, yet is there no neceſſity we ſhould live in neceſſity; ſince Nature though ſhe hath given us but one way into life, yet hath furniſh'd us with many to get out of it.

But though it may ſomtimes ſo fall out, that it behoves us to haſten and flye to death, before ſome greater power intercept and rob us of the liberty to quit life; yet ought we not to attempt any thing, but when it may be attempted conveniently and opportunely, and when that long waited for time comes, then to leap out of life reſolutely. For neither is it fit for him, who thinks of flight, to ſleep; nor ought we to deſpair of a happy exit even out of the greateſt difficulties, if we neither haſten it before the time; nor, when the time is come, delay it.

## CHAP. XXII.

### *Of Fortitude againſt Corporeal pain.*

CORporeal pain is that, which alone would deſerve the name of ill, even of the greateſt ill, did we not of ourſelves add to it the pain of the mind, which is worſe than that of the Body. For diſcontent of mind, taken at the loſs of riches, honours, children, and the like, many times becomes more intolerable than the greateſt corporeal pains; but this is by reaſon of our own opinion, which if it were right and ſound, we ſhould not be moved by any ſuch loſs, in regard that all ſuch things are without or beyond us, and touch us not indeed, but onely by mediation of that opinion which we frame to ourſelves. And thereupon we may infer, that there is no real ill, but the pain of the Body, and that the mind ought not to complain of any thing, which is not joyned to ſome pain of the Body, either preſent or to come.

He therefore who is wiſe, will be very cautious that he draw not any corporeal pain upon himſelf, or do any thing upon which corporeal pain may enſue; unleſs it be done either for avoidance of ſome greater pain or accquiſition of ſome greater pleaſure, as we formerly declared. Hence we may well wonder at thoſe Philoſophers, who, accounting health, which is the ſtate of indolence, a very great good, as to all other reſpects, do yet, as to this, hold it to be a thing indifferent? as if it were not a trivial playing with words, or rather a high folly, to affirm, that to be in pain, and to be free from pain, is all one thing.

But if any neceſſity either of the natural conſtitution, whereby the Body is obnoxious to diſeaſes, or of any external violence done to him, which, as human affairs ſtand, cannot ſomtimes be avoided, (for that a wiſe and innocent perſon may ſomtimes be arraigned, condemned, beaten and tortur'd, is manifeſt,) if either of theſe ſhall bring pain upon him, then is it his part to endure that pain, with a conſtant and valiant mind, and patiently to expect, either the ſolution or relaxation of it.

Certainly, Pain never continues long in the Body, but that which is great, or highly intenſe ſoon ceaſeth, for either it is determined of itſelf, and ſucceeded, if not by abſolute indolence, yet by very great mitigation, or is taken away by death, in which there is no Pain. And as for that Pain which is laſting, it is not only gentle, but hath many lucid intervals; ſo that it will not be many days, nay, not hours, ere the Body hath not only eaſe, but pleaſure.

And may we not obſerve, that long or Chronical Diſeaſes have more hours of eaſe, and quiet intervals, than of pain and trouble? For (not to mention that the thirſt, which they raiſe, increaſeth the pleaſure of drinking,) they allow us time for repaſt, ſtrength to talk, ſome recreation and ſports, and for the moſt part have many long intermiſſions, in which we may apply ourſelves to ſtudies and buſineſs. Whence it is evident, that as great pain uſually is ſhort, ſo long pain is light; thus the ſhortneſs makes amends for the greatneſs, the remiſsneſs for its length.

Let us therefore often reflect, that Pain either is not intolerable, or not perpetual; for if it be long, it is light; if great, ſhort. Provided, that you remember the bounds preſcribed to the things themſelves by nature, and add nothing through your own opinion, whereby you may think, and make it greater than it is; and oppreſſing yourſelf with complaints, and impatient exaſperations, help only to render it more inſupportable: Whereas, on the other ſide, nothing doth aſſwage Pain more than conſtancy, and inurance to ſuffering. Whence it comes that a wiſe man, accuſtom'd to Pain, can many times rejoice and ſmile, even in the height of his ſickneſs.

Thus much we can teſtifie of our friend *Metrodorus*, who hath at all times behaved himſelf undauntedly, as well againſt death, as pain. For concerning myſelf, I need not ſay any thing, who frequently ſuffer ſuch pain in the bladder and bowels, as none can be greater: And yet full amends, for all theſe, is made by the alacrity of mind which redounds to us, from the remembrance of our diſſertations and inventions, and by our conſtant patience; whereby we forbear not to eſteem thoſe very daies, in which we are tormented with thoſe diſeaſes and pains, happy.

And this indeed is the reaſon, why we formerly ſaid, that a wiſe man, though in torments, may yet be happy; becauſe he both ſoftens, by his patience, the neceſſity which he cannot break; and, as much as poſſible, withdraws his mind from his ſuffering Body, converſing no otherwiſe with it, than as with a weak and querulous part. He bethinks himſelf, what he hath at any time done honeſtly and generouſly; and fixing his memory upon thoſe things, which he hath moſt admired, and have moſt delighted him, cheers himſelf with the paſt goods, for which he is far from ſhewing himſelf, as fools uſually do, unthankful.

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He also considers, that he can do nothing more worthy that virtue and wisdom which he professeth, than not to yield the victory to pain, though the most hard to be sustained of all things, to bear up couragiously, to repulse by patience so dangerous an enemy; and at length to make so perfect a conquest, as that the very remembrance of it will be most delightful, and especially through absolute indolency, which will be so much the more pleasing, as a quiet Haven is most welcom after a Tempest.

Now if a wise man is not without his alleviations and comforts in the greatest pain, what shall we say of him in remiss and gentle pains, or at the loss of some limb or sense? Truly, it was not without reason, that I said formerly, a wise man, though depriv'd of the best of Senses, Sight, would yet be happy: For if the Night doth not diminish the happiness of life, why should blindness, that so nearly resembles Night? However he may want some pleasures that depend upon the light, yet are there several others left him, and what is much above all the rest, he may delight his mind with many things, and many ways without Seeing.

For since to a wise man, to live is to think, certainly his thoughts are not oblig'd to his eyes in the business of searching into truth. And that man, to whose doctrine I gave up my name, could live long and happy, without being able to distinguish colours: But without the knowledge of things, he could not have lived happy. Moreover, he was of opinion, that the perspicacity of the mind was very much dimm'd by the sight of the eyes; and while others could scarcely be said to see things that were before them, he travelled abroad into all infinity, not stopping at any bounds.

## CHAP. XXIII.

### *Of Fortitude, against Discontent of Mind.*

I Said, that Discontent of Mind is commonly taken at such things as are conceived to be external Ills, and the Contraries to those Goods which we most love and desire. For men call some things adverse, others prosperous: And we may generally observe, that the Mind, which is elevated, and insolent with prosperity, and cast down with adversity, is abject and base. Hence is it, that all we should here say, concerning the Ills which cause Discontent, and against which we have need of Fortitude, may be sufficiently inferred from what we formerly said, touching those Goods which are the general objects of our desires or inclinations, and in respect whereof we have need of Temperance.

Let it suffice in general to repeat what we formerly said, That Discontent of Mind is not grounded upon Nature, but merely upon opinion of Ill. Wherefore, who ever conceives himself to lie under some Ill, whether only foreseen and expected, or already come upon him, must of necessity be discontented. For how comes it, that a Father whose Son is kill'd, and he knows it not, is not a whit less chearful or merry, than if he were alive? Or that he, who hath lost much of his good Fame abroad, or all his Goods and Cattel, by Robbery at home, is not at all sensible of either loss till he hear of it? Is it not Opinion only which discontents him? For, if Nature did it at the same minute wherein the Son was slain, the Father's mind would be struck with a sense of his death; the like would be perceived in the loss of Honours or Goods.

Therefore, to raise Discontent in the Mind, it is necessary that Opinion, not Nature, intervene. And that you may doubt the less of this, observe, that a Man who thinks a supposititious Child his own, and his own supposititious; if News be brought him of the death of his own Son, he will not be moved, but if of his supposititious, he will be exceedingly afflicted; and this comes not from Nature, but Opinion.

But that those things which afflict us are not indeed Ills to us, appears even from this, that they are without or beyond us, and cannot reach us of themselves, but only by our own opinion are made Ills to us. And hence it was that I said, it is reason which makes Life happy or pleasant, by expelling opinions, for which the mind is possess'd with trouble. For it is discontent alone which disturbs the mind, and its quiet and content.

But how can reason expel these opinions? By teaching a wise Man to arm his mind against Fortune. For the external things which we think Goods, and the loss of which causeth discontent in our minds, are termed the Goods of Fortune, because indeed they are not ours, but come and go, as Fortune pleaseth.

For this reason, a wise Man esteems them no more belonging to him, than to others; nor possesseth them so, as not to be ready to part with them. He hath cast off that opinion which tells us, Such Goods are our own, and can never be lost; and hath put on the right opinion, which assures him they are uncertain and transitory, as indeed they are. And hereupon he considers with himself before-hand, what he shall do if he chance to lose them; he considers, I say, before-hand, that when it happens, he may not be afflicted with vain grief, but take it quietly, that Fortune redemands what she gave not, but only lent.

Certainly to those who think, that to be deprived of these Goods is an Ill, the most unhappy thing of all is, that Premeditation encreaseth the Ills which it might have much diminished, if not wholly prevented; and thus becomes only a foolish consideration of Ill to come, and which perhaps will never come. Every Ill is of itself troublesom enough when it comes; and if it chance never to come, we draw a voluntary misery upon ourselves to no purpose, and by that means shall never be free from trouble, either by receiving or apprehending some Ill; for he who always thinks that some Ill or adversity will befall him, to him that very thought is a continual Ill.

Now if it shall happen also to a wise man, that, by being long accustomed to the possession and use of the goods of Fortune, he hath not quite blotted that opinion out of his mind, and so some little of Fortune intervene, and give him a blow, by reason whereof, he falls into some

ſome diſcontent, and perhaps grieves: In this caſe, the aſſwagement of his diſcontent conſiſts in two things, formerly preſcribed as remedies againſt corporeal pain; *viz.* Diverſion of his thoughts from his loſs, or the cauſe of it; and an application of them to thoſe things, which he knows to be grateful and pleaſant to his mind.

For the mind of a wiſe man is conformed to reaſon, and follows the conduct thereof; but reaſon forbids to look on thoſe things, which create and nouriſh diſcontent; and thus he abſtracts the mind from bitter thoughts, to convert it to think upon goods, either future or paſt, eſpecially thoſe which he knows pleaſe him moſt.

Thoſe ſad and importune thoughts indeed are very apt to return, but he muſt inſiſt upon that diverſion and application of the mind whereby it is brought by little and little to wear out, and deface its ſorrow. Neither doth time diminiſh diſcontent any other way, than by exhibiting various occaſions of divertiſement, which, by degrees, take the mind off, and make her forget, as it were, the things that cauſed her diſcontent.

## CHAP. XXIV.

### *Of Juſtice in general.*

IT reſts, we ſpeake of Juſtice, which, as I ſaid before, wholly relates to others, and therefore belongs to a man, as living in a civil ſociety. And certainly it is a common tye, without which, no Society can ſubſiſt, it being a virtue which gives to every one that which is his, and takes care that none receive injury.

And to begin with that, with which I uſed to begin, in treating of the other virtues, truely not unlike are the things that may be ſaid of this. For, as I ſhewed, that Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, are inſeparably joyned to pleaſure, the ſame may be ſaid of Juſtice, which not onely never hurts any one, but, on the contrary, alwaies preſerves and nouriſheth ſomthing, that calms and quiets the mind; and this as well by its own power and nature, as by hope, that none ſhall ever want any of thoſe things, which pure undepraved Nature deſires.

Now foraſmuch as temerity, luſt, and cowardiſe, alwaies excruciate the mind, always perplex and trouble it; it is impoſſible, that a mind in which Injuſtice dwells, ſhould, for that very reaſon, becauſe Injuſtice dwells in it, be otherwiſe than unquiet: Becauſe though ſuch a mind ſhould attempt any unjuſt action with the greateſt ſecrecy imaginable, yet can it not perſuade itſelf, but that it will at laſt come to light. And though ſome men may think their conſciences ſufficiently barricado'd and fortifi'd by their wealth, yet they dread the diuine powers, and imagine, that thoſe very ſolicitudes and troubles, which torture their ſouls day and night, are ſent by the immortal Gods for their puniſhment.

But, how can we expect, that unjuſt actions ſhould diminiſh the troubles of life, ſo much as remorſe of conſcience, penalties of the Law, and the being hated by our country-men encreaſe them? And yet in ſome men, there is not any bound or moderation of wealth, of honour, of power, of luſt, of gluttony, and other deſires, which nothing that is unjuſtly gotten diminiſheth, but rather encreaſeth and enflameth, ſo that they are fitter for reſtraint than inſtruction.

All ſound and judicious perſons therefore, are, by right reaſon, induced to juſtice, equity, honeſty; but neither can unjuſt actions benefit a child or impotent perſon, for ſuch can neither eaſily effect what they endeavour, nor obtain their ends when they have effected it. Beſides, riches are more ſuitable to fortune, or a noble genius, which they who enjoy, procure to themſelves a general reſpect and good-will, and (what moſt conduceth to quiet living,) an endearment from others, eſpecially there being no cauſe of offending.

For the deſires which proceed from Nature are eaſily ſatisfied, without injuring any man; thoſe which come from vain opinions are not to be followed, for they aim at nothing which is deſirable; and there is more detriment in the injury itſelf, than advantage or benefit in the things that are gained by the injury.

Nevertheleſs, no man can ſay rightly, that Juſtice is a virtue, expetible onely for itſelf, but becauſe it brings great pleaſure along with it. For to be belov'd, and to be dear to others, is pleaſant, becauſe it renders life more ſafe, and pleaſure more full. We therefore conceive, that Injuſtice ought to be avoided, not onely for the inconveniences which happen to the unjuſt; but much more, for that as long as it is in the mind, it never ſuffers it to take breath, never to be at reſt.

Theſe conſiderations might perhaps be ſufficient, yet I ſhall add ſomthing, partly concerning *Right* or *Juſt*, from which *Juſtice* is denominated, that we may come the better to underſtand what is its original, among whom it is practiſed, what are its benefits; and partly concerning ſome other virtues nearly allied to Juſtice, as, *Beneficence*, *Gratitude*, *Piety*, *Obſervance*, and *Friendſhip*.

## CHAP. XXV.

### *Of Jus (Right,) or Juſt, whence Juſtice is denominated.*

FIrſt therefore, foraſmuch as *Juſtice* is ſo named, for that it preſerves the *Jus* or Right, due to one another, or performs that which is *juſt*; it is worth our knowing, what that is, which ought to be eſteemed *Right* or *Juſt*.

Now in regard Juſtice was inſtituted in order to the common good, neceſſary it is, that Right or Juſt, to which Juſtice hath reſpect, ſhould be ſuch a good, as is common to all and every member of the Society. And becauſe every one, by the direction of nature, deſires what is good for himſelf; it is alſo neceſſary, that what is right or juſt be conformable to Nature, and therefore tearmed Natural.

It is not without cauſe that I hint this; for ſomtimes it happens, that in a Society, ſomthing is preſcribed as Right and Juſt, which is not good for the Society, and ſo being not Natural, or contrary to Nature, it cannot, but by abuſe, and onely in name, be reputed Right or Juſt, ſince that

that which hath the true reaſon of Natural right or juſt, is ſuch, as that it is not onely preſcribed as profitable and good, but is really ſuch.

Wherefore to ſpeak properly, Natural right or juſt is no other, than a ſymbol of utility, or ſuch an utility agreed upon by concurrence of votes, as may keep men from hurting, or being hurt by one another, ſo that they may live ſecurely; A good, which every man is taught by Nature to deſire.

I here take Profitable and Good for the ſame thing; and I conceive, that, to a thing's being juſt or rightly kept, two things are requiſite; One, That it be profitable, or reſpect the common utility, that is, ſecurity: The other, That it be preſcribed by the common conſent of the Society; For nothing is compleatly juſt, but what the Society, by common conſent or agreement, hath decreed to be obſerved.

Hence it is, that the name of Right or Juſt is uſually given to both theſe, ſince not onely what is profitable is ſaid to be juſt, but alſo the very common covenant or preſcription of the Society, which is tearmed Law, as being that which preſcribes to very one what is profitable or juſt.

Some there are, who conceive all things that are juſt, to be juſt of their own proper and unalterable Nature, and that Laws do not make them to be juſt, but only declare and preſcribe, according to the Nature which thoſe things have. But it is not ſo, but rather after the ſame manner as is obſerved in other things, which are profitable, as in thoſe which concern health, and many others of the like Nature, which are beneficial to ſome men, hurtful to others; by which means they often fail of their mark, as well in common as in private.

And ſeeing that every thing is apprehended every where, alwaies, and by all men, to be really ſuch as it is in its own Nature, becauſe its Nature is unalterable, whether are thoſe things, which theſe men call juſt, juſt in all places and alwaies, and amongſt all men? Ought they not to have obſerved, that many of thoſe things that are conſtituted by Laws, and conſequently accounted lawful and juſt, are not conſtituted and received amongſt all Nations alike, but are neglected by many as things indifferent, rejected by others as hurtful, and condemned as unjuſt? And are there not ſome, who account things not generally profitable, to be nevertheleſs ſuch; and accordingly embrace thoſe things which are not generally approv'd, if they find them advantageous in reſpect of their own Society, and ſeem but to promiſe ſome general benefit?

In fine, that is univerſally juſt, or hath the Nature of juſt, which is profitable or conformable to the prenotion of right or juſt even now deſcribed: For particularly, according as utility is various amongſt ſeveral Nations, ſo alſo is right or juſt, various; inſomuch as what is eſteemed juſt in one, is unjuſt in another. Whence, if it be demanded, whether juſt or right be the ſame among all men? I anſwer, that, as to the general, it is the ſame, for it is ſomthing that is profitable in mutual ſociety: But the differences of ſeveral Countries, and various cauſes amongſt them being conſidered in particular, it comes to paſs that it is not the ſame amongſt all.

And, (to deduce ſome few particulars hence,) whatſoever is by experience found profitable to a mutual Society, or the common participation of ſuch things as are eſteemed juſt, that thing hath the nature of juſt or right, if it be ſuch as its utility extends unto all. But if any man ſhall eſtabliſh ſuch a thing for juſt, and yet it ſhall happen not to be profitable to mutual Society, it hath not the true nature of juſt or right.

Again, though ſomtimes the utility of that which was eſteemed juſt may faile, nevertheleſs, if there be ſomtimes ſome utility in it, ſo that it correſponds to the prenotion of juſt or right, it is truly juſt for that time: They certainly will eſteem it ſo, who confound not themſelves with vain loquacity, but look more generally into human affaires.

Laſtly, where, no new circumſtance of things intervening, thoſe very things, which were eſteemed juſt in the actions of men, are found not to correſpond with the notion of juſt, they are not juſt at all: But where, upon innovation or change of affairs, thoſe things, which we formerly decreed to be juſt, ceaſe to be profitable, they were juſt, as long as they continued profitable to mutual Society, but as ſoon as ever they ceaſed to be profitable they ceaſed to be juſt.

## CHAP. XXVI.

### *Of the Original of Right and Juſt.*

BUt that we may go higher and deduce the thing from its original, it appears that Right and Juſt are as ancient, and Juſtice hath been kept amongſt men, as long as they have had ſocieties amongſt themſelves.

For, in the beginning, Men wandring up and down like wild beaſts and ſuffering many inconveniences, as well from beaſts as from the injuries of weather, a certain natural agreement amongſt them (by reaſon of their likeneſs in form and ſoul or manners,) perſuaded them to joyn together in ſeveral companies, and to make ſome proviſion againſt thoſe inconveniences, by building huts or cottages, and furniſhing themſelves with other ſhelters, as well againſt wild beaſts as the weather. But in regard every one was deſirous to be in a better condition than another, hereupon there aroſe frequent conteſtations about food, women, and other conveniences, which they took away from one another; until at length they perceived, that they could not live ſecure and commodiouſly, unleſs they made a covenant not to injure one another, and that in caſe any one did harm and injure another, the reſt ſhould puniſh him.

This was the firſt band of Society; which, ſuppoſing that every one might have ſomthing proper to himſelf, or which he might call his own, as being his, either by firſt poſſeſſion, or by purchaſe, or by acquiſition through his own induſtry, or otherwiſe, decreed, that it ſhould remain in the poſſeſſion and diſpoſal of that perſon. Now this band or covenant was no other than a common law, which all were equally bound to obſerve, and which did confirm to every one a certain right or faculty of uſing whatſoever was his own. Whereupon that very law

also came to be (as I formerly intimated,) the common right as it were of the Society.

I need not mention, how the whole Society transferr'd their power of restraining or punishing, upon some few wise and good persons, or else on one, who was reputed the wisest and best amongst them. I shall only observe, that in the Society those were accounted just or favourers of justice, who being content with their own rights invaded not those of other men, but did injury to none; those unjust, or doers of injustices, who being not content with their own rights, did assault the rights of other men; and, harming them by rapine, personal violence, or some other way, became injurious to them.

Thus men lived a while peaceably and happily, especially being under one or more Kings or Princes, the wisest and best, who being wholly intent upon the conservation and utility of the publick, made, and, with consent of the people, established divers Laws, to prevent dissentions from rising, or, if any did arise, to compose them. But, such is the corruption of mens manners, in process of time the government fell into the hands of Princes or Kings that were not good; and those being either deposed or slain, it reverted to the people, whereupon tumults were raised by the factions of such as aspired to the supream power, until at length, the people languishing under emnities and dissentions, and weary of living by force and hostility, became willing to submit again to the government of Magistrates or Princes. But because the Wills of Princes had formerly pass'd for absolute laws, they made a covenant with their governours, about those Laws, according to which they desired to be governed; and thus brought themselves again under Laws, that is, under strict Rights.

But not to descend to later times, but to touch only upon that chief head, which concerns the preservation of life, for whose security (as being the most precious of all things,) care was taken from the beginning, that it might be established by common Covenants or Laws; * *It appears, that those most wise and good founders of Laws, having regard to the Society of life, and to those things, which men usually do each to other, declared it a wicked act to kill a man, and decreed, that the Murtherer should be punish'd with more than common ignominy*, and loss of life. And to this they seem to have been induced, partly by considering the conciliation of men among themselves, (of which I treated even now,) in respect whereof men ought not to be as forward to destroy an animal of their own kind, as one of different kind, which it is lawful to kill; partly, indeed chiefly, by considering, that *men ought to abhor, what is no way advantageous to life, but tends only to evil.*

* *Porph. de non esu carnium.*

*Indeed from the beginning, to those who had regard to the utility of that constitution, there needed not any other cause to make them contain themselves from doing any such act: But they, who could not sufficiently comprehend of what great concernment it was, abstained from murthering one another, onely out of a fear of those great punishments; both which we may observe to have happened even in our own daies. They, who consider the great advantages of such a constitution, are sufficiently disposed for a constant observance thereof; but they, who are not capable of understanding it, conform themselves to it out of fear of the punishments threatned by the Laws, and ordained by the more prudent, against such as had no regard to this utility, the greater part of the multitude admitting them as legal.*

*For none of the Laws written or not written that have been derived to us, and shall be transmitted to our posterity, did at first subsist by any force or violence, but (as I said,) merely by the consent of those who used it. For it was prudence, not strength of Body or imperious sway, wherein they, who setled these Laws upon the people, transcended the vulgar; and this, by inducing some men to consider, what would be profitable, (especially when they did not before so well understand it as they ought,) and by terrifying others with the greatness of the punishments. Nor could they indeed make use of any other remedy for cure of the peoples ignorance of this utility, than fear of the punishment prescribed by the Law. For even now also, it is fear alone, that keeps the ordinary sort of men within the bounds of their duty, and hinders them from committing any thing against either the publick or private good.*

*Now if all men could alike understand, and bear in mind what is truly profitable, they should need no Laws at all, but would of their own accord beware of doing such things as the Laws forbid, and do what they enjoyn: Since onely to know what is profitable and what hurtful, is more than sufficient, to induce them to avoid this, and persue that. But as for those, who discern not what is beneficial, what hurtful, doubtless the commination of punishment against such is highly necessary; insomuch, as the fear of the punishment impendent causeth them to suppress and bridle those heats of their passions, which instigate them to unjust actions, and in a manner compel them, though against their wills, to do what is right.*

*Hereupon was it, the Law-makers ordained, that even involuntary killing of a man should not be free from all mulct and punishment. Not that they might not, to such as were apt to commit wilful murder, give any occasion of pretext or excuse, to imitate that on set purpose, which the others did unwittingly; but lest they might seem not to have used sufficient caution, and diligence as to this particular, whereupon many things would fall out, which indeed were not involuntary. Nor could this course but prove beneficial for the same causes, for which men were expressely prohibited to kill each other. So that considering, that, of these actions, of this kind, that are done involuntarily, some happen from a cause, that could not be fore-seen, not prevented by human nature, others merely through our negligence, and heedlesness of the imminent danger; therefore to prevent negligence, which might tend to the destruction of others, they provided, that even the involuntary action should not pass altogether unchastised, but took away the frequency of this sin, by the fear of Law.*

*Moreover I conceive, that even those slaughters of men, which were permitted by the Law, were made liable to those accustomed expiations, by publick Lustrations, (and that by order of the same persons, who first ordained them,) for no other cause but this, that they had a mind to deter men from involuntary slaughter, which was too too frequent.*

*For the vulgar sort of men stood in need of somthing, to restrain them from doing any thing rashly, which might not conduce to the publick utility; which these first Law-makers understanding, not onely decreed severe punishments, but withal struck another*

*fear*

*fear into their minds, the reaſon of which was not ſo manifeſt as the other, declaring that ſuch as had killed a man, by what means or accident ſoever, ſhould be impure until they had uſed luſtrations.*

*Thus the brutiſh part of the Soul, in which the affections and paſſions reſide, being inſtructed and reform'd, came at length to that gentleneſs which now flouriſheth amongſt us, by applying the arts of taming and civilizing our ſavage affections, which were invented, and practiſed at firſt, by thoſe who ruled the multitude; of which, this is one chief act among the reſt, that men ſhould not deſtroy one another without any diſtinction.*

## CHAP. XXVII.

*Between whom, Right and Juſtice is to be exerciſed.*

NOw ſince, it may be demanded, Betwixt what Perſons, as well Right, and the violation of it, which is Injury, as Juſtice, and what is oppoſite to it, Injuſtice, properly conſiſt? We ſhall therefore explicate this, by comparing men with other living Creatures.

As therefore, there is no reaſon of Right or injury, or juſt and unjuſt betwixt Animals, that could not make a common agreement, not to hurt, nor be hurt by mutual invaſion: So neither, is there between thoſe nations which neither would not, or could not, enter into a mutual engagement, not to hurt, nor be hurt by one another.

For juſt, or right, the conſervation whereof is Juſtice, hath no being at all, but in mutual Society, whence Juſtice is the good of a Society, inſomuch as by it, every one of the ſaid aſſociated Perſons live ſecurely, free from that anxiety, which is cauſed by the continual fear of harm. Whence it follows, that whatever Animals, or what Men ſoever, either cannot, or will not make an aſſociation, nor enter into covenant among themſelves, muſt want this good, not being reciprocally oblig'd by any bond of right or Juſtice, whereby they might live ſecurely. And ſo to them, there can remain no other reaſon of ſecurity, than onely this, to do harm to others, that they be not harmed themſelves.

As therefore, when one of thoſe brute Animals, amongſt which there hath paſt no ſuch agreement or pact, doth hurt another, though it may be ſaid that one hurts the other, yet it cannot be ſaid that one doth an injury to the other, becauſe one was not bound by any right, compact, or Law, not to hurt the other: In like manner, if one man of that nation, among whom there is no covenant, or aſſociation, hurts another, it may be ſaid that he hurts him, but not that he wrongs or doth him an injury; becauſe he was not obliged by any compact or Law, not to hurt him.

I ſpeak of brute Animals, not as if there were any even of thoſe who live in heards or flocks, that are capable of entring into covenants, not to harm or be hurt by each other, and ſo might be conceived to be juſt, if they do not hurt each other, and unjuſt if they do; but onely to the end, that from thence it may be the better underſtood, that, even among men, juſtice in itſelf is nothing, for that it is found onely in mutual Societies, according to the amplitude of every Country, in which the inhabitants may conveniently enter into agreements, and covenants of not doing, or receiving any hurt; ſince otherwiſe, and in a man ſingly conſidered, there is no juſtice at all; and what is Juſtice in one Society of men, many times is in reſpect of contrary covenants, Injuſtice in another.

But can there be juſtice betwixt Men and other Animals? Certainly not. For if men could make a covenant with brute Animals, as they can with other men, that they ſhould not kill, nor be killed by them, without any diſtinction: then indeed, might the reaſon of Juſt or right be founded betwixt them and us, ſince the end of that covenant would be the ſecurity of both parties: But, becauſe it is impoſſible, that Animals void of reaſon ſhould be obliged by one Law with us, it muſt alſo be impoſſible, for us to obrain more aſſurance of ſecurity from Animals, than even from inanimate things. So that, there is no other way for us to ſecure ourſelves from brute beaſts, but onely to execute that power of deſtroying them, which Nature hath given us.

Perhaps you will, by the way, demand, why we kill even ſuch Animals, as can give us no occaſion of fear? This we may do either through intemperance, and a certain natural ſavageneſs or cruelty, as we exerciſe cruelty even upon men, who live out of our Society, and cannot give us any fear. But it is one thing, to break the rules of Temperance, or any of its kinds, as Sobriety, Lenity, or Manſuetude, or, (if you pleaſe,) mere humanity or goodneſs of nature; another, to violate Juſtice, which preſuppoſeth Laws and Covenants eſtabliſhed by mutual conſent.

* *Nor can it be alledg'd, that we have a power granted us by Law, to deſtroy any ſuch Animals, as are not offenſive or deſtructive to mankind. I confeſs, there is not any kind of living Creatures, among all thoſe we are allowed to deſtroy, which being permitted to increaſe to vaſt multitudes, would not prove pernicious to mankind, but being preſerved in ſuch number as ordinarily they are, are not ſome waies uſeful to life.* * Porphyr.

*For ſheep, kine, and all ſuch like, as long as they are preſerv'd to a moderate number, afford us many neceſſaries for life: But if they were ſuffered to multiply in a far greater manner; certainly, they could not but prove very hurtful to us, as well in regard of their ſtrength, as for that they would devour the fruits of the earth, that ſhould ſerve for our ſubſiſtence. And for this very cauſe is it, that we are not prohibited to deſtroy ſuch Animals, yet preſerve ſo many of them as may be uſeful to us, and eaſily ruled by us.*

*For, of Lyons, Wolves, and all ſuch as are called wild beaſts, (whether little or great,) we cannot take a certain number, which being preſerved, may afford us any relief neceſſary to life, as we may of kine, horſes, and the reſt, that are called tame Creatures. Whence it comes to paſs, that we endeavour wholly to extirminate thoſe, and of theſe cut off onely ſo many as are over and above a competent ſtock.*

Hereupon, (to touch briefly on this alſo,) we may conceive, that even among thoſe Nations who make their choice of certain ſorts of Animals for food, *the matter was determined and preſcribed by certain Laws, grounded upon reaſons correſpondent to thoſe we have now given. And as for thoſe Animals that were not to be eaten, there was reſpect had to their utility and inutility*, and for ſome

reaſon peculiar to each Country; to the conſtitutions whereof there is no neceſſity for us to adhere, who live not in thoſe places.

Hence we come to underſtand, that from the very beginning a difference was put betwixt the killing of Men, and the killing of all other Animals*; *For as to other Animals it is manifeſt, that thoſe primitive wiſe perſons who preſcribed what we ſhould do, and what not, did not forbid to kill any of them, becauſe the profit that ariſeth from them is perfected by the contrary action, that is, by killing them. For it could not be, that men living promiſcuouſly amongſt beaſts, could preſerve themſelves in ſafety otherwiſe, than by expelling or deſtroying them.*

* Porph.

* Porph. But as concerning Mankind, * *Some, who at that time were more gracious than the reſt, (theſe perhaps were they that perſuaded men firſt to enter into the Covenant we ſpoke of) remembred, that in thoſe places where men lived promiſcuouſly, they had ſomtimes abſtained from ſlaughter, out of a reſpect to that utility which conduced to their ſafety; as alſo repreſented to others in their meetings what had hapned, that refraining from ſlaughter of an Animal of the ſame kind, they might defend the ſociety of life, which is generally the cauſe of every man's particular ſafety. And it was profitable at firſt to quit the ſociety of either other Animals, or Men meeting together, at leaſt not to hurt any, to avoid the incenſing of, not only other Animals of ſeveral kinds, but alſo Men, who are all of the ſame, and apt enough of themſelves to do harm. Whence, upon this account, Men refrained laying hands upon an Animal of their own ſpecies, that offer'd itſelf to the communication of things neceſſary, and contributed ſome benefit to ſociety.*

*But in proceſs of time, there being a great encreaſe on both ſides, and Animals of different ſpecies being forc'd away, Men began to make uſe of their reaſon, (whereas before that time they had truſted altogether to memory,) and to enter into conſultation what was to be done in order to their ſafety, when they ſhould come together, and conjoin their habitations. For they endeavor'd ſtrongly to reſtrain thoſe who raſhly and imprudently would murder one another, and thereby made the mutual aſſiſtence, that Men were able to afford each other, daily the weaker; and this chiefly, becauſe thoſe great inconveniences which had frequently fallen out in former times upon the like caſes, were utterly forgotten. Now whilſt they endeavoured to bring this to paſs, they at length introduced the Laws and Conſtitutions which continue in all Cities and Nations even to this day, the Common people of their own accord conſenting to them, as I ſaid; being ſenſible how much greater utility would from thence accrue to them, living in mutual ſociety. In like manner, it conduceth alſo to ſecurity, both to deſtroy without any pity what is pernicious, and to preſerve whatever is uſeful to exterminate it.*

*Thus it is probable, that upon theſe Conſiderations, the ſlaughter of all other Animals came to be permitted, and that of Men prohibited.* But I inſiſt too long hereupon.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

### *With what Right Juſtice is to be exerciſed.*

JUſtice being eſtabliſhed by a mutual agreement, it remains, that every Man, whether a Native or Alien, ought, from the time he hath given up his Name to a Society, to account himſelf a Member of that Society, upon this condition, either expreſly or tacitly, that he hurt none of his Fellow-members, nor be hurt by any other. Wherefore he muſt either ſtand to the Covenant, or depart out of the Society; for he is not to be ſuffer'd to live in the Society upon any other terms. Whence it follows, ſince by nature no Man is willing to receive harm from another, that he do not that to another which he would not ſhould be done to himſelf.

Hereupon it may be imagined, that the Laws in all Societies were made in favor of the wiſe, not to prevent wiſe Men from doing unjuſtly, but that others ſhould not injure them: For as for them, they are ſo well diſpoſed, as that, if there were no Laws, yet would they not do harm to any. They have preſcribed bounds to their deſires, and accommodate them to Nature, which requires nothing that muſt be obtained by ways of Injuſtice; nor indeed is there any of Nature's pleaſures which induceth a Man to do injury to another, but ſome exorbitant deſire ariſing from vain opinion.

For Nature having (for Example,) provided Herbs, Corn, Fruits, for Food, competent and uſeful, and Water for Drink, things eaſie to be had, it cannot be the pleaſure of ſatisfying Hunger and Thirſt, that ſhould cauſe a Man to rob his Neighbor, or commit any of thoſe Injuries which they uſually do: But the vain deſire of living at a higher rate, more ſplendidly and wantonly, that ſo he may acquire wealth enough to diſcharge the expences of his Luxury. The ſame may be ſaid alſo of thoſe, who not content with plain Apparel, a plain Houſe, a plain Match, and the like, through Ambition, Pride, Luſt, and other Paſſions, deſire more than Nature needs.

Moreover, ſeeing that a wiſe Man, as I hinted formerly, doth all things for his own ſake, nothing certainly can more conduce to his advantage, than to obſerve Juſtice exactly. For in giving to every one his due, and harming no Man, he, to his utmoſt, preſerves and keeps ſafe that Society, which, unleſs it be ſafe, he cannot be ſafe himſelf; nor doth he provoke any Man to revenge an injury ſuffered at his hands, or fear any mulct or puniſhment to be inflicted upon him by publick Decree. Thus being conſcious to himſelf of no ill done, he remains free from all perturbation, which is the greateſt benefit and fruit of Juſtice; and while he reaps that, what can be more to his own advantage?

Neither ought you to think, that he, who, though ſecretly, and without the knowledge of any Man, violates Right, or the Covenants ratifi'd by general conſent, to prevent the commit-

mitting and ſuffering of wrong, can live in the ſame ſecurity and indiſturbance as the juſt Man doth, becauſe (as I ſaid,) he cannot aſſure himſelf that his Injuſtice ſhall never be brought to light: For Crimes, though they may be ſecret, can never be ſecure; nor doth it avail an Offender to be concealed from others, while he can never be concealed from himſelf.

Truly, though his Offence were never ſo well concealed for a time, yet it is very uncertain, whether it will continue ſo concealed till his death. For firſt, there is a jealouſie and ſuſpicion, that follows upon ill actions; and again, there have been many who have detected themſelves, ſome in Dreams, others in raving Fits, others in Drink, others through Incogitancy. So that a wicked Man, though he may for a time lie hid both from gods and men, (as they ſay,) yet he hath reaſon to miſtruſt that he will not be concealed for ever.

Hence is it, that notwithſtanding Injuſtice is not an Ill in itſelf, becauſe what is reputed unjuſt in one place, may be juſt in another; yet it is an Ill in reſpect of that fear, which, ſtinging the Conſcience, creates in it a continual ſuſpition, that at ſome time or other his unjuſt deeds will come to the ears of the avengers of Unjuſtice, and ſo he be called to a ſevere account for them. Thus there is nothing that more conduceth as to ſecurity, ſo likewiſe to a quiet and pleaſant life, than to live innocently, and upon no occaſion to violate the common Covenants of Peace.

Wherefore ſince the juſt and unjuſt are in this oppoſition, that the juſt, of all men, are the moſt free from Perturbations, What can be more profitable to thoſe, than Juſtice? What more hurtful to theſe, than Injuſtice? For how can any anguiſh of mind, ſolicitudes, daily and nightly fears, be profitable to any man?

Juſtice therefore being ſo great a good, and Injuſtice ſo great an ill, let us embrace one, and abhor the other. And if at any time our mind ſeem to ſtagger, and we are in ſuſpence what to do, let us fix on ſome grave good Man, and ſuppoſe him to be always preſent with us, that we may live and do all things as if he looked upon us.

By this means we ſhall not only avoid the doing of any thing openly againſt Juſtice, but alſo of offending in ſecret againſt the Rules of Honeſty. This good man will be to us inſtead of a Guardian or Tutor, whom, becauſe we reverence, we fear to offend. Following this counſel therefore, thus argue; If he were preſent, I would not do it; Why do I do it in his abſence? He would find fault with it, becauſe it is ill; Why do not I ſhun ill, of my ſelf? Thus, do all things, as if ſome ſuch perſon looked on; for if you in this manner reverence another, you will ſoon come to be reverenced yourſelf.

## CHAP. XXIX.

### *Of Beneficence, Gratitude, Piety, Obſervance.*

WE come next to the Virtues which we ſaid were allied to Juſtice, for that they have regard to other perſons; and though they are not (as Juſtice is,) preſcribed by Laws and Covenants, yet they import, out of decency, a certain obligation like that of Juſtice.

The firſt is *Beneficence*, or the doing good to others, whereunto thoſe are obliged, who are able to aſſiſt or relieve others, either with their hand or purſe. If they deny the aſſiſtence of their hands, they are cenſured as barbarous, cruel, inhuman; if that of their purſe, they are thought the ſame, as alſo ſordid, tenacious, covetous, and the like. But if they aſſiſt others, they are accounted courteous, civil, kind; as alſo liberal, munificent, magnificent, *&c.* So that they are obliged for their own ſakes to do good to others, ſo far as may be without prodigality.

For thoſe who practiſe this Virtue, procure to themſelves good will, and (what moſt of all conduces to quiet living) dearneſs or tender eſtimation from others: They who uſe it not, ill-will, and (what moſt occaſions troubleſom life) contempt and hatred. Take heed therefore you omit not to be beneficent, at leaſt in ſmall matters, that ſo you loſe not the advantage of being accounted ready to gratifie others, even in great.

Not without reaſon did I ſay formerly, It is not only more honourable, but alſo more delightful to give than to receive a benefit; becauſe, the giver thereby makes himſelf ſuperior to the receiver, and reaps moreover the intereſt of Thanks; and there is not any thing that joys a man more than Thanks. A beneficent perſon is like a Fountain, which if you ſhould ſuppoſe it to have a reaſonable Soul, what joy would it not have at the ſight of ſo many Corn-fields, and Paſtures, which flouriſh and ſmile as it were with plenty and verdure, and all by the diffuſion of its ſtreams upon them?

The ſecond is *gratitude*, to which every man that receives a benefit is reciprocally obliged, unleſs he would incur the greateſt hatred and ignominy. For Ingratitude is worthily hateful to all men; becauſe ſeeing nothing is more ſuitable to nature, than to be propenſe to receive a good, it is highly contrary to nature, not to be readily grateful towards the Author of that good.

Now ſince no man is more gratefully affected towards his Benefactors than the wiſe man, we may juſtly affirm, that only the wiſe man knows how to fulfil the duty of gratitude, becauſe he alone is ready upon all occaſions to expreſs his thankfulneſs to his Friends, both preſent and abſent, even to thoſe that are dead.

Others pay thanks only to preſent Friends, when preſent, and this perhaps for their own farther ends, to encourage them to ſome new favour; but how few are there, who gratefully commemorate their abſent Benefactors? Who requite the good they did them upon their Children, or other Relations? How few who honour their memory after death; who rejoice not rather, as if their obligations were cancelled? Who love thoſe that were dear to them, reſpect them, and as far as in them lies, do good to them?

The third is *Piety*, the moſt ſacred ſpecies of gratitude. It looks upon our parents in the firſt place, to whom every man is more obliged than to all the World beſides: For to others he may owe

owe other things; but to his parents he owes himself. Therefore if ingratitude to others be hateful, that which is shewn to parents must certainly be the most horrid and detestable.

We say, in the first place; because piety in the second place extends to kindred, and chiefly to our Brothers and Sisters, to whom we are obliged by the interest of our parents; in such manner as that we cannot shew ourselves disrespectful and unkind to them, but we must be at the same time highly ungrateful to our parents, and all our progenitors, who in the circle of their love and benevolence comprehended all that were, and should afterwards be derived from them.

Not is this piety distinct from that dearness we are to bear towards our native Country, which comprehends our Parents and all our kindred, and receives us at our birth, brings us up and protects us. And as by the interest of our parents we are obliged to our kindred, so by the interest of our Country we are obliged to respect all our Countrymen; but more especially the Magistrates and Princes, who defend the Country itself, and the laws of it, and give us this benefit in particular, that under their protection we may live securely and peacebly.

The fourth is *observance*, or that reverence which we owe to all persons of eminency in any kind. This is accompany'd partly wirh gratitude and piety, (for we cannot any way better express the gratefulness of our minds, than by giving due veneration and worship to our Benefactors, Parents, Governours, Princes, and all men of dignity and power,) and partly with honour and respect, as it is the best testimony we can give of our internal sentiments of their deservings, who excel in Age, Wisdom, Learning, and Virtue, the most honourable of all things.

To this observance belongs that which men call *Religion* and *Sanctity* toward the Gods, whom we are bound to reverence and honour no otherwise than our parents, nor through hope of any reward, but (as I said before,) for their transcendent majesty and the supremacy of their nature. Because, whatever is excellent deserves a just veneration, and no excellency is greater than that of the divine Nature, for it is immortal and most blessed.

Thus understanding, that the Gods neither create troubles to themselves nor give to others, we piously and holily reverence their most excellent nature.

## CHAP. XXX.

### *Of Friendship.*

THE last is *Friendship*, to which all are mutually obliged, who love and are reciprocally belov'd. And well may it be the close and crown of this Discourse; for amongst all the means procured by wisdome, to make life happy, there is not any thing more full and pleasant than Friendship; and the same reason that confirms the mind not to fear any lasting or eternal ill, doth also assure, that, in life, there is no Sanctuary so safe, no protection so secure as that of Friendship, which together with that security, conferreth also very great pleasures.

For as hatreds, envies, despites are enemies to pleasure; so are friendships, not onely most faithful conservers, but effectual causers of pleasures, aswell to our friend as to ourselves: By which, men not only enjoy present things more fully, but are cheer'd with hopes of those to come. And a solitary life destitute of friends being full of fears, and subject to treacheries, reason itself adviseth us to procure friendships, by which the mind is confirmed, and possessed with hopes of enjoying future pleasures.

Now though friendship is contracted in respect of use and utility, in like manner as we sow the earth in hope of a crop hereafter; and the first meetings and conversations of friendship are made in respect of the utility and pleasures which are hoped from thence; Yet when this custom hath gone on to intimacy, then love so flourisheth, that though there were not any benefit of friendship, yet friends would be loved for their own sakes. If we love Places, Temples, Cities, Academies, Plains, Horses, Dogs, Sports, out of an habitual custome of exercising or hunting, how much easier and more justly may we do this in conversation with men?

But in the choice of our friends, we must be exceeding cautious and prudent; for it concerns us to be more circumspect with whom we eat, than what we eat. And though to eat alone without a friend, be to lead the life of a Lion or Wolfe, yet we must be careful to choose such a friend, whose conversation may be the best sauce to our meat. We must seek one to whom nothing is more in esteem, than candor, simplicity, and sincerity; one that is not morose, querulous, and murmuring at all things, but who by his complacency, alacrity, and pleasantness may render our life sweet to us.

Friendship, I grant, consists in, and is kept alive by, the mutual participation of pleasures or goods which we may enjoy whilst we live; yet is it not necessary that the goods of friends should be put into one common stock, as he conceived, who said, *Amongst Friends all things are common.* This implies a diffidence, (that all their wills may not continue constant,) and they who are diffident are not friends; such only are friends, who can with full confidence and freedom take and use so much of their friends goods or estate as they need, although kept in several not in one joynt-stock, no otherwise than as if it were their own, esteeming them to be no less their own, than if they had them in their own possession and keeping.

This sounds strange in the ears of the vulgar: But what are they to us? There is no faith or constancy in their kindness and friendship, they being uncapable of these things and of the least part of commendable Wisdom.

Moreover, he that is one of the vulgar understands not, what is profitable in private or publick, nor can distinguish betwixt good manners and bad.

I speak therefore of the wise onely, amongst whom there is a kind of league, and covenant not to love their friends less than themselves, which we

we know may be done and ſee it often comes to paſs; whence is is manifeſt, that there can be nothing more conducing to pleaſant living than ſuch a conjunction.

Whence alſo we underſtand, that the placing of the chief good in pleaſure is ſo far from being obſtructive hereunto, that without it there can be no inſtitution of friendſhip.

For it being impoſſible for us to conſerve the ſweetneſs and ſecurity of our lives firm and laſting without friendſhip, and to preſerve friendſhip, unleſs we love our friends as much as ourſelves, this therefore and pleaſure are the inſeparable adjuncts of friendſhip; for, we rejoyce in our friends joy as much as if it were our own, and are concern'd equally in his grief.

A wiſe man therefore will be alike towards his friend as towards himſelf; what labour and pains he undergoes for his own pleaſure, the ſame will he undergo for the pleaſure of his friend. And as he would rejoyce to think, that he hath one that will ſit by him, if he ſhould be ſick, and relieve him if he were caſt into priſon, or fallen into want; ſo will he rejoyce, as having one, by whom, if he ſhould fall ſick, he may ſit, and whom if impriſoned, or fallen into want, relieve. And not onely this, but his love will be ſo great, as to undergo the greateſt torments, even death itſelf, for his friend's ſake.

We have known it certainly happen, (and that within the memory of our parents,) that many, who had the happineſs of procuring to themſelves full confidence and ſecurity in the Society of men living in the ſame opinion and the ſame affections with them, have, in the aſſurance of this comfortable league, lived moſt ſweetly together and been conjoyned with ſo abſolute a nearneſs, as that one could, without the leaſt reluctancy, wiſh to ſuffer for the other, condemned to dye.

This is all I had to ſay concerning ETHICK, which in the beginning I aſſerted to be the chiefeſt part of Philoſophy. You, who ever you are, that aſpire to true wiſdome, practiſe and meditate upon theſe rules, conſidering them as the grounds of honeſt, well, and happy living.

Meditate, I ſay, upon them day and night, as well when you are alone, as when in company of ſome faithful companion who is like yourſelf, and to whom you may ſay, We are indeed alone, but by this means we have the greater opportunity of making inquiſition into truth without prejudice. I ſpeak not to many, but to you; and you ſpeak not to many, but to me, and that's enough, ſince each to other is a theatre large enough.

Do you not now grant, that no man can be compared to him, whoſe mind is rightly informed as concerning the Gods, and is fearleſs of death, and who hath ſo reaſoned concerning the end of nature, and the ultimate good, as to underſtand, that it may be compleated and attain'd with the greateſt facility imaginable, and that whatever ill he muſt endure, either is ſhort, if vehement; if long, gentle; and telleth himſelf, that there is no ſuch thing as an inevitable neceſſity of fates concerning him, but that he hath an abſolute freedome of will, and that nothing at all or very little of fortune can at any time intervene to croſs him; and the reſt which we have laid down?

Certainly when you ſhall come to be ſuch a man as this, you will never be troubled waking nor ſleeping (for even in ſleep you will be juſt as you are when awake by reaſon of the well-compoſedneſs of your mind,) but ſhall live like ſome Deity among men. For that man who ſpends his life in the enjoyment of immortal goods, is far different from a mortal creature. Hitherto *Gaſſendus*. *Laert.*

## CHAP. XXXI.

*Wherein* Epicurus, *aſſerting Pleaſure to be the ultimate good, differs from the* Cyrenaicks.

Though *Epicurus* agrees with the *Cyrenaicks* in aſſerting Pleaſure to be the ultimate good, yet * *concerning this Pleaſure, they diſagree. The* Cyrenaicks *admit not pleaſure to conſiſt in reſt, but in motion onely*; Epicurus *allowed both, as well that of the Soul as of the Body, as he aſſerts in his Book* Of Election and Avoidance, *and in his Treatiſe of the* End, *and in his firſt book of* Lives, *and in his Epiſtle* To the Philoſophers at Mitylene. *Likewiſe* Diogenes *in the eleventh of his Select Rules, and* Democritus *in his* Timocrates, *ſay thus; Whereas pleaſure is twofold, one conſiſting in motion, the other in reſt*, &c. *And* Epicurus, *in his Treatiſe* Of Elections, *expreſly thus; Of pleaſures, indolence and imperturbation conſiſt in reſt; joy and delight, in motion.* * *Laert.*

*Moreover, he differs from the* Cyrenaicks, *for that they conceived the pains of the Body to be worſe than thoſe of the mind; whence it comes to paſs, that, upon Malefactors, corporal puniſhment is inflicted as being the moſt grievous. But* Epicurus *held, that the pains of the mind are the greateſt, for that no ill can afflict the Body longer than whilſt it is preſent; but beſides the preſent, the paſt and future alſo torment the mind; and by the ſame reaſon, the pleaſures of the Soul are the greateſt. Thus much of the* Epicurean, *the laſt of all the* Italick *Sects.*

FINIS.

# A CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

| *Olymp.* | *Archons.* | *Oympick Victors.* |
|---|---|---|
| XXX | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XXXI | | |
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| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XXXII | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XXXIII | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XXXIV | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XXXV | | |
| 2 | *Damasias.* See Life of *Thales*, | *Sphærus.* Dion. |
| 3 | Chap. 2. | |
| 4 | | |
| XXXVI | *Epænetus.* Antig. Cariſt. Hiſt. | |
| 2 | Mir. 133. | *Phryno.* Euſeb. probably the ſame with whom *Pittacus* fought. Pitt. c. 1. but *Antigonus Cariſtius* calls the Victor this year, *Arytamas.* |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XXXVII | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XXXVIII | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XXXIX | *Draco.* Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. | |
| 2 | Tatian. Suid. | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XL | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
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| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | 1. *Thales* born. See *Thales*, *chap.* 2.<br>2. *Solon* born about this time. | 2. *Ancus Martius* King of *Rome*. *Dion. Halic. lib.* 3. |
| | | |
| | | |
| | 4. *Periander* begun to Reign at *Corinth*. *Periand. chap.* 2. | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| | *Arion*. See *Periand. chap.* 4. | |

| *Olymp.* | *Archons.* | *Olympick Victors.* |
|---|---|---|
| XLI | *Heniochides.* Halic. lib. 3. | *Cleonidas.* Dion. |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XLII | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XLIII | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | *Ariſtocles*, (perhaps.) Marm. Arund. | |
| XLIV | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XLV | *Megacles*, (perhaps.) Plut. in Solon. | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XLVI | | |
| 2 | *Philombrotus.* Plut. in Solone. | |
| 3 | *Solon.* Laert. in Solone. | |
| 4 | *Dropides.* Philoſtr. in Critia. | |
| XLVII | *Eucrates.* Laert. in Anachars. | |
| 2 | *Simon.* Marm. | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XLVIII | *Philippus.* Clem. Strom. 1. Euſeb. | *Glaucias.* Pauſan. *Glycon.* Eu- |
| 2 | Chron. 1. | ſeb. |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| XLIX | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | *Damaſias* the Second. *Marm.* See | |
| 4 | *Thales Life*, Chap. 2. | |
| L | | *Epitclides.* |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | *Archeſtratides.* Dionyſ. Halic. lib. 4. | |

*Anaximander*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | |
| | | 2. *Tarquinius Priſcus*, King of *Rome*. *Dionyſ. Halic. lib.* 3.<br>3. *Allyatttes*, King of *Lydia*, begun to Reign. |
| | *Anaximander* born. *Laert.* | |
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| | | |
| | | |
| ÆRA PHILOSOPHICA. | 1. *Epimenides* luſtrates the City of *Athens*. *Laert.*<br>3. *Solon* made *Archon*. *Laert.* | |
| | 1. *Anacharſis* came to *Athens* to viſit *Solon*, *Laert.* | |
| | 4. *Periander* died. *Laert.* | |
| 1<br>2 | In the third year, *Damaſias* being Archon, the Attribute of *Wiſe* was conferred on *Thales* and the reſt, from which the Philoſophical *Æra* begins. *Thal. chap.* 5. | |
| 3<br>4<br>5<br>6 | *Theſpis* preſents Tragedies; reproved by *Solon*, *Sol. cap.* 10. *Anaximander* found out the obliquity of the Zodiack, *Plin.* | 4. *Servius Tullus*, King of *Rome*. |

| *Olymp.* | *Archons.* | *Olympick Victors.* |
|---|---|---|
| LI | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | *Ariſtomenes.* Laert. | |
| 4 | | |
| LII | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LIII | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | *Hippoclides.* Marcellin. in vita Thucyd. | |
| 4 | | |
| LIV | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | *Comias.* Plut. in Solone. Marm. | |
| LV | *Hegeſtratus.* Plut. in Solone. | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LVI | *Euthydemus.* Marm. Laert. See Life of *Chilon.* | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LVII | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LVIII | *Erixiclides.* Pauſ. in Phoc. See Thal. | *Diognetus.* |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LIX | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LX | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |

| Æra Philoſ. | | |
|---|---|---|
| 7 | | |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | *Pittachus* dies. | |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | | |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | *Pythagoras* born. | |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | | |
| 21 | | |
| 22 | | |
| 23 | | 1. *Cyrus* began his Reign over *Perſia.* |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | | |
| 26 | | 4. *Cræſus* King of *Lydia.* |
| 27 | Chilon Ephorus, *Laert.* | |
| 28 | | |
| 29 | | |
| 30 | | |
| 31 | | |
| 32 | | |
| 33 | | |
| 34 | | |
| 35 | | |
| 36 | | |
| 37 | *Pythagoras* went into *Ægypt.* | |
| 38 | | |
| 39 | | 1. *Cyrus* vanquiſheth *Cræſus.* |
| 40 | | |
| 41 | | |
| 42 | | |
| 43 | | |
| 44 | | |
| 45 | | |
| 46 | | |

| Olymp. | Archons. | Olympick Victors. |
|---|---|---|
| LXI | —*næus* 1. Marm. | *Agatharcus.* |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | *Theribles,* Diod. excerpt. p. 241. | |
| 4 | *Heraclides,* Dionyſ. Halic. 4. rather | |
| LXII | | *Eryxidas.* |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LXIII | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LXIV | *Miltiades,* Halic. 7. | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LXV | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LXVI | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LXVII | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LXVIII | *Iſagoras,* Halic. 1. & 5. | *Iſchomachus.* |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LXIX | *Aceſtorides,* Hal. 5. | *Iſchomachus.* |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LXX | *Myrus,* Hal. 5. | *Nicæas.* |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |

| Æra Philoſ. | | |
|---|---|---|
| 47 | | |
| 48 | | |
| 49 | | 4. *Tarquinius Superbus*, King of *Rome*. *Halic.* 4. |
| 50 | | |
| 51 | | |
| 52 | | |
| 53 | (years. *Ariſt. Pol.* 5. | |
| 54 | *Piſiſtratus* died, having Reigned 17 | |
| 55 | | |
| 56 | | |
| 57 | *Cambyſes* conquers *Ægypt*, and ſends | 3. *Amaſis* King of *Ægypt* dies, |
| 58 | *Pythagoras* priſoner to *Babylon*. | *Pſammeticus* his Son ſucceeds him. |
| 59 | | |
| 60 | | |
| 61 | | 4. *Darius Hyſtaſpis*, King of |
| 62 | | *Perſia*. |
| 63 | | |
| 64 | | |
| 65 | | |
| 66 | | |
| 67 | | |
| 68 | | |
| 69 | | |
| 70 | *Pythagoras* went into *Italy*. | |
| 71 | | |
| 72 | | |
| 73 | | |
| 74 | | |
| 75 | | |
| 76 | | |
| 77 | | |
| 78 | | |
| 79 | | |
| 80 | | |
| 81 | | |
| 82 | | |
| 83 | *Anaxagoras* born. | |
| 84 | | |
| 85 | | |
| 86 | *Pythagoras* dieth. *Euſeb.* | |

| Olymp. | Archons. | Olympick Victors. |
|---|---|---|
| LXXI | *Hipparchus*, Halic. 6. | *Tiſicrates.* |
| 2 | *Pythocritus*, Marm. | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| LXXII | *Diognetus*, Hal. 6. | *Tiſicrates.* |
| 2 | *Phanippus* 2. Plut. in Ariſtide. *Hybrilides*, Hal. 7. Pauſ. El. 2. | |
| 3 | *Ariſtides*, Plut. ibid. Marm. | |
| 4 | *Themiſtocles*, Thuc. 1. Pauſ. lib. 17. | |
| LXXIII | *Anchiſes*, Hal. 8. *Lacratides*, Schol. Ariſt. Suid. *Phædon*, Plut. | *Aſtylus.* |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | *Philocrates*, Marm. | |
| 4 | | |
| LXXIV | *Leoſtratus*, Hal. 8. | *Aſtylus.* |
| 2 | *Nicodemus*, Hal. 8. | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | *Calliades*, Marm. | |
| LXXV | *Xantippus*, Marm. *Cal.* Hal. 9. Diod. | |
| 2 | *Timoſthenes*, Marm. *Xantippus*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Idimantus*, Marm. *Timoſthenes*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Adimantus*, Diod. | |
| LXXVI | *Phædon*, Hal. Diod. | *Scamandrus.* |
| 2 | *Dromoclides*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Aceſtorides*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Menon*, Diod. | |
| LXXVII | *Chares*, Marm. Halic. Diod. | *Dates.* |
| 2 | *Praxiergus*, Diod. (*Socr.* chap. 1. | |
| 3 | *Apſephion*, Mar. *Demotion*, Diod. ſee | |
| 4 | *Theagenides*, Marm. | |
| LXXVIII | *Theagenides*, Hal. Diod. | *Parmenides.* |
| 2 | *Lyſiſtratus*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Lyſanias*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Lyſitheus*, Diod. | |
| LXXIX | *Archedemides*, Diod. *Archim.* Pauſ. | *Xenophon.* |
| 2 | *Euthippus*, Marm. *Tlepolemus*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Conon*, Dion. | |
| 4 | *Euippus*, Diod. | |
| LXXX | *Phaſiclides*, Diod. *Phraſides*, Hal. | *Torymbas.* |
| 2 | *Philocles*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Bion*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Callias* 1. Marm. *Mneſithides*, Diod. | |

| Æra Philoſ. | | |
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| 87 | | |
| 88 | | |
| 89 | | |
| 90 | | |
| 91 | | |
| 92 | | 2. The Fight at *Marathon.* |
| 93 | | |
| 94 | | |
| 95 | | |
| 96 | | |
| 97 | | 3. *Darius* dies, *Xerxes* ſucceeds. |
| 98 | | |
| 99 | | |
| 100 | | |
| 101 | | |
| 102 | | |
| 103 | *Anaxagoras* went to *Athens. Laert.* | 1. *Xerxes* croſt the *Helleſpont.* |
| 104 | | The Fight at *Salamis.* |
| 105 | | |
| 106 | | |
| 107 | | |
| 108 | | |
| 109 | | |
| 110 | | |
| 111 | | |
| 112 | | |
| 113 | *Socrates* born. A Stone fell from Heaven, foretold by *Anaxagoras.* | |
| 114 | | |
| 115 | | |
| 116 | | |
| 117 | | |
| 118 | | |
| 119 | | 1. *Artaxerxes Longimanus* |
| 120 | | King of *Perſia.* |
| 121 | | |
| 122 | | |
| 123 | *Democritus* born, *Anaxagoras* being | |
| 124 | 40 years old. *Laert.* | |
| 125 | | |
| 126 | | |

| Olymp. | Archons. | Olympick Victors. |
|---|---|---|
| LXXXI | *Callias*, Diod. Hal. | *Polymneſtus.* |
| 2 | *Soſiſtratus*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Ariſton*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Lyſicrates*, Diod. | |
| LXXXII | *Chærophanes*, Halic. | *Lycus.* |
| 2 | *Antidotus*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Enthydemus*, Diod. lib. 12. | |
| 4 | *Pedieus*, Diod. | |
| LXXXIII | *Philiſcus*, Diod. Halic. | *Criſon.* |
| 2 | *Timarchides*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Callimachus*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Lyſimachides*, Diod. | |
| LXXXIV | *Diphilus*, Marm. *Praxiteles*, Diod. | *Criſon.* |
| 2 | *Lyſanias*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Diphilus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Timocles*, Diod. | |
| LXXXV | *Munichides*, Diod. | *Criſon.* |
| 2 | *Glaucides*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Theodorus*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Euthemenes*, Diod. | |
| LXXXVI | *Nauſimachus*, Diod. | *Theopompus*, or, as *Plato*, *Diopompus.* |
| 2 | *Antilochides*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Chares*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Apſeudes*, Diod. | |
| LXXXVII | *Pythodorus*, Diod. | *Sophon.* |
| 2 | *Euthydemus*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Apollodorus*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Epaminondas*, Diod. | |
| LXXXVIII | *Diotimus*, Diod. Life of *Eucl. c.* 3. | *Symmachus.* |
| 2 | *Euclides*, Diod. *Euclees*, Ariſt. See | |
| 3 | *Euthydemus*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Stratocles*, Diod. | |
| LXXXIX | *Iſarchus*, Diod. | *Symmachus* 2. |
| 2 | *Amintas*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Alcæus*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Aſtyphilus*, Marm. *Ariſton*, Diod. | |
| XC | *Ariſtophilus*, Diod. | *Hyperbius.* |
| 2 | *Archias*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Antiphon*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Euphormus*, Diod. | |

| Æra Philoſ. | | |
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| 127 | | |
| 128 | | |
| 129 | | |
| 130 | | |
| 131 | *Xenophon* born about this time. | 1. From the building of *Rome* 300. *Halic.* |
| 132 | | |
| 133 | *Anaxagoras* condemned, and baniſhed *Athens.* | |
| 134 | | |
| 135 | | |
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| 148 | | |
| 149 | | |
| 150 | | |
| 151 | | 1. *Archelaus* King of *Macedon.* |
| 152 | | 2. The Peloponneſian War; year 1 |
| 153 | | 2 |
| 154 | | 3 |
| 155 | *Anaxagoras* died. | 4 |
| 156 | | 5 |
| 157 | | 6 |
| 158 | | 7 |
| 159 | The Fight at *Delium*, in which were *Socrates* and *Xenophon.* The *Clowds* of *Ariſtophanes* acted. | 8 |
| 160 | | 9 |
| 161 | The *Clowds* of *Ariſtophanes* acted the ſecond time. | 10 |
| 162 | The time of *Xenophon's* Sympoſium. | 11 |
| 163 | | 12 |
| 164 | | 13 |
| 165 | | 14 |
| 166 | | 15 |

| *Olymp.* | *Archons.* | |
|---|---|---|
| XCI | *Ariſtomneſtus*, Diod. | |
| 2 | *Chabrias*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Piſander*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Cleocritus*, Diod. | |
| XCII | *Callias*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 2 | *Theopompus*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Glaucippus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Diocles*, Diod. | |
| XCIII | *Euctemon*, Diod. | |
| 2 | *Antigenes*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Callias*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Alexias*, Diod. | |
| XCIV | *Pythodorus*. | |
| 2 | *Euclides*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Micion*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Exenætus*, Diod. | |
| XCV | *Laches*, Diod. | |
| 2 | *Ariſtocrates*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Pithycles*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Lyſiades*, Diod. | |
| XCVI | *Phormio*, Diod. | |
| 2 | *Diophantus*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Eubulides*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Demoſtratus*, Diod. | |
| XCVII | *Philocles*, Diod. | *Terires.* |
| 2 | *Nicoteles*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Demoſtratus*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Antipater*, Diod. | |
| XCVIII | *Pyrrhion*, Diod. *Pyrgion*, Halic. | *Soſippus.* |
| 2 | *Theodotus*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Myſtichides*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Dexitheus*, Diod. | |
| XCIX | *Diotrephes*, Diod. | *Dicon.* |
| 2 | *Phanoſtratus*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Menander*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Demophilus*, Diod. | |
| C | *Pytheus*, Marm. Diod. | *Dionyſiodorus.* |
| 2 | *Nicon*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Nauſinicus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Callias*, Marm. Diod. | |

| Æra Philoſ. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 167 | | | 16 |
| 168 | | | 17 |
| 169 | | | 18 |
| 170 | | | 19 |
| 171 | | *Thucydides* ends: *Xenophon* begins. | 20 |
| 172 | | | 21 |
| 173 | | | 22 |
| 174 | | | 23 |
| 175 | | | 24 |
| 176 | | 2 The firſt aſcent of *Cyrus* into *Aſia*. | 25 |
| 177 | | 3 *Dionyſius* made King of *Syracuſe*. | 26 |
| 178 | | | 27 |
| 179 | The 30 Tyrants at *Athens*. See *Socr. chap.* 9. | | |
| 180 | | | |
| 181 | | (put down. | |
| 182 | *Xenophon*'s retreat. The 30 Tyrants | 4 The aſcent of *Cyrus* into *Aſia*. | |
| 183 | *Socrates* put to death. End of *Xenophon*'s retreat. | | |
| 184 | | | |
| 185 | | | |
| 186 | | | |
| 187 | | 1 *Ageſilaus* goes into *Aſia* againſt the Perſian. | |
| 188 | | | |
| 189 | | 2 *Ageſilaus* call'd him, fights with the Bœotians at *Coronea*. | |
| 190 | | 3 *Conon* re-edifies the Walls of *Athens*. | |
| 191 | | | |
| 192 | | | |
| 193 | | | |
| 194 | | | |
| 195 | | | |
| 196 | | | |
| 197 | | | |
| 198 | | | |
| 199 | *Ariſtotle* born. *Laert.* | | |
| 200 | | | |
| 201 | | | |
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| 203 | | | |
| 204 | | | |
| 205 | | | |
| 206 | | | |

| *Olymp.* | *Archons.* | *Olympick Victors.* |
|---|---|---|
| CI | *Chariander*, Diod. | *Damon.* |
| 2 | *Hipppodamus*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Socratides*, Diod. | |
| 4 | *Aſteius*, Marm. Diod. | |
| CII | *Alciſthenes*, Diod. Demoſth. Halic. | *Damon.* |
| 2 | *Phraſiclides*, Mar. Diod. Dem. Pauſ. | |
| 3 | *Dyſnicetus*, Diod. *Dyſcinetus*, Pauſ. | |
| 4 | *Lyſiſtratus*, Diod. | |
| CIII | *Nauſigenes*, Marm. Diod. | *Pithoſtratus.* |
| 2 | *Polycelus*, Diod. *Polyzelus*, Halic. | |
| 3 | *Cephiſodorus*, Marm. Diod. | |
| 4 | *Chion*, Diod. | |
| CIV | *Timocrates*, Diod. Halic. | *Phocides.* |
| 2 | *Chariclides*, Diod. | |
| 3 | *Molon*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Nicophemus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| CV | *Callimedes*, Diod. Halic. | *Porus.* |
| 2 | *Euchariſtus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Cephiſodorus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Agathocles*, Mar. Diod. Halic. Pauſ. | |
| CVI | *Elpinus*, Diod. Halic. | *Porus.* |
| 2 | *Calliſtratus*, Marm. Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Diotymus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Eudemus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| CVII | *Ariſtodemus*, Diod. Halic. | *Suierinas.* |
| 2 | *Theſſalus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Apollodorus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Callimachus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| CVIII | *Theophilus*, Diod. *Theomneſtus*, Hal. | *Polycles.* |
| 2 | *Themiſtocles*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Archias*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Eubulus*, Diod. *Eudorus*, Halic. | |
| CIX | *Lyciſcus*, Diod. Halic. | *Ariſtolochus.* |
| 2 | *Pythodorus*, Diod. *Pythodotus*, Halic. | |
| 3 | *Soſigenes*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Nicomachus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| CX | *Theophraſtus*, Diod. Halic. | *Anticles.* |
| 2 | *Lyſimachides*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Charondas*, Diod. *Charonidas*, Halic. | |
| 4 | *Phrynichus*, Diod. Halic. | |

| Æra Philos. | Archons. | | Olymp. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 207 | | | CXI |
| 208 | | | 2 |
| 209 | | | 3 |
| 210 | | | 4 |
| 211 | | | CXII |
| 212 | | | 2 |
| 213 | | | 3 |
| 214 | | | 4 |
| 215 | *Eudoxus* flouriſhed. *Laert.* | 1. *Dionyſius* the Elder dieth, | CXIII |
| 216 | | ſucceeded by his Son. | 2 |
| 217 | | | 3 |
| 218 | | | 4 |
| 219 | | | CXIV |
| 220 | | | 2 |
| 221 | | | 3 |
| 222 | | | 4 |
| 223 | | | CXV |
| 224 | | | 2 |
| 225 | | | 3 |
| 226 | | | 4 |
| 227 | | | CXVI |
| 228 | | | 2 |
| 229 | | 3. *Dion* murdered. | 3 |
| 230 | | | 4 |
| 231 | | | CXVII |
| 232 | | | 2 |
| 233 | | | 3 |
| 234 | | | 4 |
| 235 | *Plato* died 82 years old, *Athen.* | | CXVIII |
| 236 | *Ariſtotle* went to *Hermias* at *Atarne.* | | 2 |
| 237 | | | 3 |
| 238 | *Ariſtotle* went to *Mytilene. Laert.* | | 4 |
| 239 | | | CXIX |
| 240 | *Ariſtotle* went to King *Philip*, *Alexander* being 15 years old. *Laert.* | | 2 |
| 241 | | | 3 |
| 242 | | | 4 |
| 243 | | | CXX |
| 244 | | | 2 |
| 245 | | | 3 |
| 246 | | | 4 |

| Olymp. | Archons. | Olympick Victors. |
|---|---|---|
| CXI | *Pythodorus*, Diod. *Pythodemus*, Halic. | *Cleomantis.* |
| 2 | *Euænetus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Cteſicles*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Nicocrates*, Diod. Halic. | |
| CXII | *Niceratus*, Diod. *Nicetes*, Halic. | *Gryllus.* |
| 2 | *Ariſtophanes*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Ariſtophon*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Cephiſophon*, Diod. | |
| CXIII | *Euthycritus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 2 | *Chremes*, Diod. *Hegemon*, Halic. | |
| 3 | *Anticles*, Diod. *Chremes*, Halic. | |
| 4 | *Soſicles*, Diod. *Anticles*, Halic. | |
| CXIV | *Agaſias*, Diod. | *Micinas.* |
| 2 | *Cephiſodorus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Philocles*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Archippus*, Halic. | |
| CXV | *Neæchmus*, Halic. | *Dinomenes.* |
| 2 | *Apollodorus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Archippus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Demogenes*, Diod. Halic. | |
| CXVI | *Democlides*, Diod. Halic. | *Parmenio.* |
| 2 | *Praxibulus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Nicodorus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Theophraſtus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| CXVII | *Polemon*, Diod. Halic. | *Apollonides.* |
| 2 | *Simonides*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Hieromnemon*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Demetrius Phalereus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| CXVIII | *Charinus*, Diod. *Carinus*, Halic. | *Andromenes.* |
| 2 | *Anaxicrates*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Corybus*, Diod. *Coræbus*, Halic. | |
| 4 | *Xenippus*, Diod. *Euxenippus*, Halic. | |
| CXIX | *Pherecles*, Diod. *Phericles*, Halic. | |
| 2 | *Leoſtratus*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 3 | *Nicocles*, Diod. Halic. | |
| 4 | *Calliarchus*, Halic. | |
| CXX | *Hegemachus*, Halic. | |
| 2 | *Euclemon*, Halic. | |
| 3 | *Mneſidemus*, Halic. | |
| 4 | *Antiphanes*, Halic. | |

| Æra Philoſ. | | |
|---|---|---|
| 247 | | 1. *Alexander* begun to Reign. |
| 248 | *Ariſtotle* teacheth in the *Lycæum* 13 years. | |
| 249 | | 3. *Alexander*'s Expedition into *Aſia* againſt *Darius*. |
| 250 | | |
| 251 | | |
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| 258 | | |
| 259 | | |
| 260 | | |
| 261 | *Ariſtotle* went to *Chalcis*, and died | |
| 262 | there, 63 years old. *Laert.* | |
| 263 | | |
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| *Olymp.* | *Archons.* | *Olympick Victors.* |
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| CXXI | *Nicias*, Halic. | |
| 2 | *Nicoſtratus*, Halic. | |
| 3 | *Olympiodorus*, Halic. | |
| 4 | *Philippus*, Halic. | |
| CXXII | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| CXXIII | | *Idæus*, Pauſan. Eliac. 2. |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
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| CXXIV | | |
| 2 | | |
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| CXXV | | |
| 2 | | |
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| CXXVI | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| CXXVII | *Pytharatus.* Cic. | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| CXXVIII | | |
| 2 | | |
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| 4 | | |
| CXXIX | *Diognetus.* | |
| 2 | | |
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| CXXX | | |
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| Æra Philos. | | |
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| *Olymp.* | *Æra Philos.* | | |
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| CXXXI | 327 | | |
| 2 | 328 | | |
| 3 | 329 | | |
| 4 | 330 | | |
| CXXXII | 331 | | |
| 2 | 332 | | |
| 3 | 333 | | |
| 4 | 334 | | |
| CXXXIII | 335 | | |
| 2 | 336 | | |
| 3 | 337 | | |
| 4 | 338 | | |
| CXXXIV | 339 | | |
| 2 | 340 | | |
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| 4 | 342 | | |
| CXXXV | 343 | | |
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| 3 | 345 | | |
| 4 | 346 | | |
| CXXXVI | 347 | | |
| 2 | 348 | | |
| 3 | 349 | | |
| 4 | 350 | | |
| CXXXVII | 351 | | |
| 2 | 352 | | |
| 3 | 353 | | |
| 4 | 354 | | |
| CXXXVIII | 355 | | |
| 2 | 356 | | |
| 3 | 357 | | |
| 4 | 358 | | |
| CXXXIX | 359 | | |
| 2 | 360 | | |
| 3 | 361 | | |
| 4 | 362 | | |
| CXL | 363 | | |
| 2 | 364 | | |
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| Olymp. | Æra Philos. |
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| CXLI | 367 |
| 2 | 368 |
| 3 | 369 |
| 4 | 370 |
| CXLII | 371 |
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| CXLIII | 375 |
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| 4 | 378 |
| CXLIV | 379 |
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| CXLV | 383 |
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| 3 | 385 |
| 4 | 386 |
| CXLVI | 387 |
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| CXLVII | 391 |
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| CXLVIII | 395 |
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| *Olymp.* | *Æra Philos.* | |
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| CLII | 411 | |
| 2 | 412 | |
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| CLIII | 415 | |
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| CLIV | 419 | |
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| CLV | 423 | |
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| CLVI | 427 | |
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| 4 | 430 | |
| CLVII | 431 | |
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| 4 | 434 | |
| CLVIII | 435 | |
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| 3 | 437 | |
| 4 | 438 | |
| CLIX | 439 | |
| 2 | 440 | |
| 3 | 441 | |
| 4 | 442 | |
| CLX | 443 | |
| 2 | 444 | |
| 3 | 445 | |
| 4 | 446 | |
| CLXI | 447 | |
| 2 | 448 | |
| 3 | 449 | |
| 4 | 450 | |
| CLXII | 451 | *Clitomachus* flourished. |
| 2 | 452 | |
| 3 | 453 | |
| 4 | 454 | *Carneades* died. |

# A TOPOGRAPHICAL TABLE.

## A.

*Abdera*, a City of *Thrace*, ſituate next beyond the River *Neſtus*, toward the Eaſt; Founded and Named by *Abdera*, Siſter to *Diomedes*, in the 104th year after the taking of *Troy*: And afterwards, (*Olymp.* 31.) re-edifi'd by a Colony of Clazomenians.

*Ægina*, an Iſland over againſt *Epidaurus*, in the Saronian Bay.

*Ægos potamos*, a River in the Thracian *Cherſoneſus*, diſtant from *Seſtos* 15 Furlongs.

*Ægypt*, a Kingdom of *Africa*, moſt Eminent; divided into the Upper and Lower. It had Twenty Thouſand Cities, the Principal were *Memphis*, *Dioſpolis*, and *Heliopolis*; Its River, *Nilus*.

*Agrianes*, a People of *Thrace*, dwelling upon the River *Agrianes*, betwixt the Mountains *Rhodope* and *Hæmus*. Of this Country perhaps was *Hippomedon* the Pythagorean, mentioned by *Jamblichus*. [*Doctr. Pyth. p.* 1. *chap.* 8.]

*Agrigentum*. See *Pythag.* Chap. 10.

*Ambracia*, an Eminent City of *Epirus*, in the bottom of the Ambracian Bay, upon the River *Aracthus*, not far from the Sea. The Ambracian Bay parts *Epirus* from *Acarnania*.

*Atarna*, a City of *Myſia*.

*Athens*, the chief City of *Greece*, ſeated in *Attica*; founded by *Cecrops*.

*Attica*, an Eminent Region of *Greece*, bounding on the Territory of *Megara*, on the Shore over againſt *Salamis*; and on the Territory of the Bœotians, by Sea, at *Orpus*; by Land, at *Panactum*, at *Oenæ*, at *Hyſiæ*.

## B.

*Bœotia*, a Region of *Greece*, between *Attica* and *Phocis*; reaching from the Ægean Sea to the Corinthian Iſthmus.

*Brachmanes*. See *Pythag. ch.* 5.

*Branchidæ*, a Town where there was a Temple to *Apollo*, on the Mileſian Shore, between the Promontory of *Poſideum*, and the City *Miletus*.

*Byzantium*, a City of *Thrace*, ſituate at the entrance of the *Boſphorus*, over againſt *Chalcedon*; *Conſtantine* afterwards enlarg'd it, from whom it is now called *Conſtantinople*.

## C.

*Caria*, a Region of *Aſia*, bounded on the North by *Ionia*, on the Eaſt by *Lycia*, on the Weſt by the Carpathian Sea, on the South by the Rhodian: Its principal Cities were *Miletus*, *Mindus*, *Halycarnaſſus*, and *Gnidus*.

*Catana*. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

*Chalcedon*, a City of *Bythinia*, over againſt *Byzantium*, in the Mouth of *Pontus Euxinus*. From its nearneſs to *Byzantium*, which is leſs than a Mile, it was termed (*Pliny* ſaith,) *The City of the Blind*.

*Chene*, an obſcure Village, either belonging to *Oetæa*, or *Lacedæmonia*; not mentioned (that I know of,) by any Geographer.

*Chios*, an Iſland and City of the Ionians, diſtant from *Lesbos* about 400 Furlongs, and 900 Furlongs in Circuit.

*Cilicia*, an Eminent Kingdom of *Aſia*, denominated from *Cilix*, Son of *Rhea*; lying betwixt *Pamphylia* to the Weſt, and *Syria* to the Eaſt, and Mount *Taurus* to the North, and the Cilician Sea to the South.

*Cirrha*, a Maritime City of *Phocis*, ſeated in the Corinthian Bay, at the Foot of the Mountain *Parnaſſus*, over againſt *Sicyon*, diſtant from *Delphi* 60 Furlongs. From *Delphi* to *Cirrha* runs the River *Puſtus*; It is the Haven or Town of Shipping for *Delphi*. It bordereth on *Locris*.

*Clazomene*, an Ionick City in *Lydia*, ſituate in the Cherſoneſus of *Erythræ*, confining on the Erythræans, theſe being within the Cherſoneſus, the Clazomenians without it: In the narroweſt part of the Iſthmus.

*Cnidus*, a City of the Dorians in *Aſia*, by the Sea, called *Tropium*; on the North is the Ceraunian Bay; on the South, the Rhodian Sea.

*Cnoſſus*, a City of *Creet*.

*Corcyra*, an Iſland in the Ionian Sea, over againſt *Epirus*, from which it is but 12 Miles diſtant.

*Corinth*, an Eminent City near the Iſthmus of *Peloponneſus*, governed Democratically.

*Cos*, an Iſland of the *Carpathian* Sea, with a City in it of the ſame Name, oppoſite to *Tarmerium*, a Promontory of the *Myndians*. It belonged to the Dorians of *Aſia*, called *Cos Meropidis*, becauſe inhabited of old by the Meropians. It was moſt eminent, for being the Country of *Hippocrates* the Phyſitian. [*Heraclit. chap.* 3.]

*Cranon*, a City of *Theſſaly*, bordering upon *Macedonia*, diſtant from *Crato* an 100 Furlongs.

*Creet*, an Iſland in the Mouth of the Ægean Sea, between *Rhodes* and *Peloponneſus*; famous for the Birth and Prieſts of *Jupiter*, and Laws of *Minos*; for both which viſited by many Philoſophers.

*Crotona*. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

*Cyclades*, Iſlands in the Ægean Sea; ſo called, for that they lye round about the Iſland *Delos*; their Number and Order, according to *Strabo*, is this, *Helena*, *Ceos*, *Cythaos*, *Seriphus*, *Melos*, *Siphaus*, *Cimolis*, *Prepeſinthus*, *Olearus*, *Naxus*, *Parus*, *Syrus*, *Myconus*, *Tenus*, *Andrus*, *Gyarus*.

*Cyprus*, an Iſland in the Carpathian Sea, ſituate betwixt *Syria* and *Cilicia*.

*Cyrene*, a City of *Affriek*, the Metropolis of the Cyrenaick Province, which contained beſides, *Apollonia*, *Barce*, *Teuchira*, and *Berenice*.

*Cythera*, an Iſland in the Ægean Sea, oppoſite to *Malea*, a Promontory of *Laconia*, and diſtant from it 40 Furlongs, oppoſite directly to the City *Boa*.

*Cyzicus*, an Iſland and City of *Myſia* in *Aſia*, ſeated on the *Propontis*, at the Mouth of the River *Æſopus*; built after *Rome* 70 years, at the ſame time as *Miletus*.

D.

*Delium*, a little Town in *Bœotia*, by the Sea-ſide, in the Territory of *Tanagra*, oppoſite to *Chalcis* of *Eubœa*. Here there was a Temple of *Apollo*.

*Delos*, an Iſland in the Ægean Sea, the chiefeſt of thoſe that were called *Cyclades*, and in it a City, with a Temple of *Apollo*. It is diſtant from *Andros* 15 Miles, and as many from *Mycomus*; from *Eubœa* 30 Miles to the Weſt.

*Delphia*, a City of *Phocis* in *Achaia*, at the Foot of the Mountain *Parnaſſus*, on the South part of the Hill; Famous for the Temple and Oracle of *Apollo*; Threeſcore Furlongs from the Sea.

E.

*Elia*, a City of *Magna Græcia*. See *Xenophanes*, *chap.* 1.

*Elis*, a Region on the Weſt part of *Peloponneſus*, bounded on the North by the Promontory *Araxus*, and divided from *Meſſenia* in the parts towards the Sea, by the River *Neda*; the principal City thereof bore the ſame Name, diſtant from the Sea 120 Furlongs, from *Olympia* almoſt 300.

*Epheſus*, a Maritime City of *Ionia*, built by the Amazons, 40 years after the taking of *Troy*. It was famous for the Temple of *Diana*, burnt by *Heroſtratus*, after it had ſtood 385 years.

*Epidaurus*, a City of *Argia* in *Peloponneſus*, ſeated by the Sea, in the inmoſt part of the Saronian Bay.

*Ereſſus*, a City of *Lesbos*, between *Pyrrha* and the Promontory *Sigrium*.

*Eretria*, a Maritime City of *Eubœa*, between *Chalcis* and *Gereſtus*, oppoſite to *Oropus* in *Attica*; diſtant from *Chalcis* 20 Miles to the Eaſt.

*Eubœa*, a great Grecian Iſland, oppoſite to the Continent of *Attica*, and *Bœotia*, and *Locris*, extending from *Sunium* as far as *Theſſaly*; the length of it is reckoned to be 150 Miles: Its principal Cities, *Chalcis*, *Caryſtus*, and *Eretria*.

G.

*Galatæ*, Galli.

H.

*Hellas*, firſt ſignified only a City of *Theſſaly*, betwixt *Pharſalus* and *Melitæa*, named from *Hellen* Son of *Deucalion*, *Thucydides lib.* 1. *Stephanus*: Whence *Euſtathius*, throughout *Homer*, interprets Ἕλλας and Ἕλληνες, only that City of *Theſſaly* and *Theſſalians*. Afterwards the word extended to all that Tract of Land, which is from the *Sunian* Promontory to *Acarnania* and *Athamenæ* on the Eaſt, and to *Theſſaly* on the North, unto the *Melian* Bay. This is the *Hellas* of *Ptolomy*, who excludes *Theſſaly*, which firſt gave that Name to *Greece*, out of the Name *Hellas*. Thirdly, in a larger acception, beſides that Tract, it includes alſo *Theſſaly* and *Peloponneſus*, and moſt of the Iſlands in the *Ægean* Sea; and this is the *Greece* of *Strabo*. Laſtly, beſides thoſe Countrys, it implies *Aſia* the Leſſer, and ſome parts of the African Shore; and, in a Word, all Places inhabited by the *Grecians*: In which ſenſe, it is moſt commonly uſed by the later Authors.

*Heraclea* of *Pontus*, a City of *Bithynia*, the Metropolis of the *Mariandyni*, ſeated upon the Euxine Sea. See *Xenoph.*

*Himera*. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

*Hyperboreani*, a People of *Scythia*, ſo named from the *Hyperborean*-Mountains.

I.

*Imbros*, an Iſland in the Ægean Sea, not far from the Thracian Cherſoneſus, diſtant from *Lemnos* 22 Miles.

*Ionia*, a Region of *Aſia*, lying upon the Ægean Sea, inhabited by the Grecians, reaching from *Poſideum*, a Promontory of *Miletus*, on the South, to *Phocea*, and the Mouth of the River *Hermus* on the North; its chief Cities, *Miletus* and *Epheſus*.

L.

*Lacedæmon*, the chief City of *Laconia*, on the Weſt ſide of the River *Eurotas*, remote from the Sea, lying beneath the Mountain *Taygetus*; to which was aſcribed its unhealthfulneſs. *Pyth.*

*Lampſacum*, a City of *Myſia*, ſeated on the *Helleſpont*, at the Mouth of the River *Granicus*; having *Parius* on the North, and *Abydus* on the South.

*Lariſſa*; there were two Citys in *Theſſaly* of this Name.

*Lebedus*, a Maritime City of *Ionia*, between *Colophon* to the South, and *Teos* to the North; diſtant from each, 120 Furlongs.

*Lesbos*, an Iſland in the Ægean Sea, over againſt *Æolis* in *Aſia*, diſtant from *Lemnos*, *Tenedos*, and *Chios*, almoſt equally; leſs than 500 Furlongs from the

the fartheſt of them. Cities, *Mitylene* and *Methymne*. Promontories; to the North, *Sigrium*; to the Eaſt, *Malea*.

*Lindus*, one of the three chief Cities of the Iſland *Rhodes*, ſituate on the right hand to them that ſail from the City of *Rhodes* Southward.

*Locri* in *Italy*: See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

*Lydia*, a Kingdom of *Aſia*, lying betwixt *Ionia* to the Weſt, and *Phrygia magna* to the Eaſt.

M.

*Magna Græcia*. Ovid. *Faſt.* 4.

*For the* Italian *Land was* Greater Greece.
*Hither* Evander *did his Navy Steer*,
*Hither* Alcides *Sail'd*; *both* Grecians *were*
*The Club-Arm'd Traveller, whoſe Herd did ſtray*
*On* Aventine, *here drunk of* Albula.
*That here* Ulyſſes *was*, Leſtrigons *beſt*,
*And the Shore nam'd from* Circe, *can atteſt*.
*Not long ago, of* Telegone *appear'd*
*The Walls, and* Tiber, *both by Grecians rear'd*.
*Hither* Haleſus *forc'd* Atrides *Death*,
*Who to* Faliſca *did his Name bequeath*.
Antenor *add, who for* Troy's *peace did plead*,
*And (Sou t' Apulian* Daunus,) Diomed.
*Hither* Æneas, *ſince* Antenor, *came*,
*And brought his Gods, reſcu'd from* Ilion's *Flame*:
*Him* Solimus *from* Ida *did attend*,
*From whom to* Sulmo *did that Name deſcend*.

But though *Ovid* takes it for *Italy* in general, yet *Pliny* more cautiouſly ſaith, it comprehended *a great part thereof*, *(quotam partem.) Athenæus*, *almoſt all* Italy. And perhaps no otherwiſe is *Feſtus* to be underſtood, than as of a great part, when he ſaith, Italy *was called* Major Græcia, *becauſe the Sicilians poſſeſſed it*, *or becauſe many great Cities thereof were derived from the Greeks*. And *Servius*, Italy *is called* Μεγάλη Ἑλλας, *becauſe from* Tarentum *to* Cumæ, *all the Cities were built by the Greeks*. More expreſly *Seneca*, *all that ſide of* Italy, *which lies upon the low Sea, was called* Major Græcia. And ſo indeed is it ſet out by Geographers, but including alſo *Sicily*.

*Mantinea*, a City of *Arcadia* in *Peloponneſus*, confining on *Argia*, *Tegea*, *Methydrium*, and *Orchomenes*, near to *Megalopolis*.

*Marathon*, a Town of *Attica*, over againſt *Eretria* of *Eubœa*, between *Rhamnus* and *Brauron*; diſtant from *Athens* Ten Miles, and as much from *Caryſtus* in *Eubœa*.

*Media*, the greateſt Kingdom in *Aſia*, lying betwixt *Armenia* the Greater, to the Weſt, and *Parthia* and *Hyrcania* to the Eaſt; extending Northward to the *Caſpian* Sea, and Southward to *Aſſyria* and *Suſiana*.

*Megara*, a City confining with *Attica* at *Eleuſis*, diſtant from the Sea 18 Furlongs.

*Memphis*, a City of *Egypt*, built by *Oſiris* at the point of *Delta*, over againſt *Babylon*.

*Metapontum*. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

*Miletus*, an Ionick City of *Caria*, the furthermoſt towards the South, next to *Poſideum*, ſituate 12 Furlongs from the Mouth of the River *Mæander*; built by *Miletus*, Son of *Apollo*.

*Mitylene*, the chief City of *Lesbos*, ſituate between *Methymna* and *Malea*, diſtant from *Malea* 70 Furlongs, from *Canæ* 120 Furlongs. *Cicero* much commends it for ſituation, beauty of the Buildings, and fruitfulneſs of the Soil; *Cic. de leg. agr.* 2.

*Munychia*, a Promontory of *Attica*, which, with *Piræus*, made the Harbour of the Athenian Shipping, with three fair Havens within it. At the Mouth of the River *Iliſſus*, on the Weſt is *Piræus*; on the Eaſt, the Promontory *Sunium*.

O.

*Oetæa*, a City of *Theſſaly*, named from the Mountain *Oeta*.

*Olympia*, a place in *Elis*, with a Temple dedicated to *Jupiter*, upon the ſide of the River *Alpheus*, diſtant from the Sea 80 Furlongs. Here were celebrated the Games called *Olympick*.

P.

*Parnes*, a Mountain of *Attica*.

*Paros*, an Iſland in the Ægean Sea; one of the *Cyclades*.

*Peloponneſus*, a Grecian Peninſula, within the Iſthmus of *Corinth*, containing many Regions, whereof the principal, *Achaia*, *Elis*, *Meſſenia*, *Laconica*, and *Argia*; the moſt Eminent Cities, *Meſſena*, *Corinth*, *Tegea*, *Lacedæmon*, *Argos*.

*Phœnicia*, a Region of *Syria*, lying next the Sea; it contained four Eminent Cities, *Tripolis*, *Byblus*, *Tyre*, and *Sidon*. The Phœnicians were Inventors of Navigation and Arithmetick; great Merchants, but Subtle, Deceitful, and Thieviſh to a Proverb, *Phœnicum more*. Whence *Polemo* ſaid of *Zeno*, *He came to ſteal Learning* (φοινικικῶς,) *like a Phœnician*, (not *Phœniceo amictu*, as rendred,) *Zen. chap.* 2.

*Phologondros*, an Iſland to the Weſt of the Iſland *Ios*, of very mean account, as appears by *Solon*'s expreſſion, *chap.* 2.

*Piræus*, a Town and Haven of *Attica*, ſerving for the Shipping of *Athens*, in the midſt betwixt *Pegæ* and *Sunium*, diſtant from *Athens* 40 Furlongs.

*Piſa*, a City of the *Peloponneſus*, ſituate at the River *Alpheus*, and the *Piſæan* Mountain.

*Poſidonia*, Pæſtum, a Maritime City of *Lucania* in *Italy*, betwixt *Salernus* to the Weſt, and *Velia* to the Eaſt; built by the *Dorians* and *Sybarites*.

*Priene*, a Maritime City of *Caria* in *Ionia*, between the Mouth of *Mæander*, and the Mountain *Mycale*.

*Pylus*, a City of *Meſſenia*, in the Promontory *Coryphaſium*, diſtant from *Methone* 100 Furlongs.

R.

*Rhegium*. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

S.

*Salamis*, an Iſland in the Saronick-Bay, betwixt *Peloponneſus* and *Attica*; adjacent to *Eleuſis* of *Attica*, and to *Ægina*.

*Same*, a City in the Iſland *Cephalonia*, at the paſſage between it and *Ithaca*. From hence went *Ancæus*, who firſt planted a Colony in the Iſland *Samus*, which he ſo named from *Same*. See *Pythag. chap.* 1.

*Samus*, an Ionian Iſland, and a City of the ſame Name; the Iſland is 600 Furlongs about, and *Poſideum*, a Promontory thereof, not above Seven Furlongs from the Continent. The City ſtandeth on the South part of it, at the Sea-ſide. It was firſt

called *Melamphylos*, as *Strabo*; or *Melamphyllos*, as *Iamblichus*. See *Pythag. chap.* 1.

*Sardes*, the Metropolis of *Lydia*, ſituate under the Hill *Tmolus*, upon the River *Pactolus*.

*Scepſis*, a City of *Troas* in *Aſia*, ſeated on *Cotylus*, the higheſt part of Mount *Ida*, whence floweth the River *Scamander*.

*Sicinus*, an Iſland not far from *Melos*, on the Weſt of the Iſland *Ios*; obſcure, and of no eſteem, as appears by *Solon*'s expreſſion, *chap.* 2. and *Ariſtophanes* in his *Clouds*, *Act.* 1. *Scen.* 2.

*Sicyon*, a City of *Peloponneſus*, Metropolis of the Kingdom of *Sicyonia*, between *Corinth* and *Achaia*, diſtant 100 Furlongs from *Phlius*.

*Sinope*, a Maritime City of *Paphlagonia*.

*Sparta*, all one with *Lacedæmon*.

*Stagyra*, a City of *Thrace*, ſeated in the Bay of *Strymon*, between *Argilus* and *Acanthus*. See *Ariſt. chap.* 1.

*Sunium*, a Promontory in *Attica*, together with a Town of the ſame Name, between the Saronean Bay, and the Sea towards *Eubœa*.

*Sybaris*. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

*Syrus*, an Iſland in the Ægean Sea, one of the *Cyclades*, 20 Miles diſtant from *Delus*, to the North. The Adjective is *Syrius*; as on the contrary, the Adjective of *Syria* in *Syrus*: Which the Interpreters of *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Euſebius*, *Theodoret*, *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, not obſerved, who, render Φερεκύδην τὸν Σύριον, *Pherecidem Syrum*; much leſs they, who, as an argument to prove, that Learning was brought out of *Syria* into *Greece*, inſtance *Pherecydes*, Maſter to *Pythagoras*, the firſt Philoſopher.

T.

*Tænarus*, a Promontory of *Laconia* in *Peloponneſus*, parting the Laconian and Meſſenian Bays.

*Tarentum*. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

*Tauromenium*. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

*Taygetus*, a Mountain of *Laconia*, at the River *Eurotas*, and the City *Sparta*; which City was ſubject to Diſeaſes, by reaſon of that Mountain's hanging over it.

*Thebes*, a City of *Bœotia*, ſeated at the Rivers *Aſopus* and *Iſmenus*; built by *Cadmus*.

*Thyatira*, a City of *Lydia*, ſeated upon the River *Lycus*, betwixt *Sardes* and *Pergamum*.

*Troas*, a Territory of *Aſia* the Leſs, upon the ſide of the Ægean Sea, between *Æolis* and *Helleſpont*; having a City of the ſame Name.

# A TABLE

## *Of ſome Memorable Paſſages in the Lives of the Philoſophers.*


A.

*Baris* the Hyperborean, *Pyth. chap.* 23.
*Academy*. *Plat. cap.* 5.
*Achillean Field* conteſted for by the Mytelenæans and Athenians. *Pit. cap.* 1.
*Achilleum* founded. *Pit. cap.* 1.
*Acroatick* Doctrine of the Peripateticks. *Ariſt. cap.* 6.
Ægyptian Prieſts. *Sol. cap.* 8. *Pyth. cap.* 2, 3.
Ægyptian Prieſts. *Thal. cap.* 3.
Ægyptian kind of Writing. *Pyth. cap.* 4.
Ægyptian year introduced into *Greece*. *Thal. cap.* 8. §. 4.
*Æthiops* of *Ptolemais*, a Cyrenaick Philoſopher. *Ariſtip. cap.* 9.
*Ageſilaus* warreth againſt the Perſian, returns to *Greece*, overcomes the Thebans at *Coronea*. *Xen. cap.* 5.
*Adomena*, what. *Thal. cap.* 11.
*Alcibiades*. *Socr.* 1. 17.
*Alexander* taught by *Ariſtotle*, *Ariſt. cap.* 5. began to Reign, *Ibid.* ſends all Rarities to *Ariſtotle*, *Ariſt. cap.* 8. viſits *Diogenes*, *Diog. cap.* 3. dies, *Ariſt. cap.* 8.
Altars erected to *Anaxagoras*. *Anaxag. cap.* 5.
*Amaſis* King of *Ægypt*. *Thal. cap.* 3.
*Amaſis* his conteſt with the King of *Æthiopia*. *Thal. cap.* 9.
*Amaſis* his Correſpondence with *Bias*. *Bias, cap.* 1.
*Amphibolis* taken by *Braſidos*. *Socr. cap.* 8.
Analyſis, what. *Plat. cap.* 7.
Annicerians. *Anniſ. cap.* 2.
Anniverſary of *Anaxagoras*. *Anaxag. cap.* 5.
*Antigonus*. *Arceſ. cap.* 3.
*Antigonus Gonatas* invites *Zeno*. *Zen. cap.* 4.
*Antipater* receives *Xenocrates* Ambaſſador from *Athens*. *Xenocr. chap.* 3.
Antipodes, the word by whom firſt uſed. *Plat. cap.* 7.
*Anytus* accuſeth *Socrates*. *Socr. cap.* 10.
*Appelles* the Painter, relieved by *Arceſilaus*. *Arceſ. cap.* 3.
*Apocarteron*, a Book of *Hegeſias* againſt Life. *Hegeſ. cap.* 1.
*Archelaus* King of *Macedonia*. *Socr. cap.* 15.
*Areopagus*, when inſtituted, and when reformed. *Sol. cap.* 5.
*Arete*, Daughter to *Ariſtippus*, educated in Philoſophy, *Ariſtip. cap.* 8.
*Arginuſæ*, a Sea-fight there, *Socr. cap.* 9.
*Arymneſtus*, Son of *Pythagoras*, *Pyth. cap.* 21.


*Arion*:

*Arion. Per. cap.* 4.
*Ariſtophanes* his *Clowds* acted. *Socr. cap.* 10.
*Ariſtotle*, drowned not himſelf. *Ariſt. cap.* 11.
Arithmetick, *Pyth. doctr. p.* 2. *Sect.* 1.
*Artaxerxes Mnemon. Xen. cap.* 2.
*Aſpaſia*, Miſtreſs to *Pericles. Socr. cap.* 3.
Aſtrological Predictions of *Thales. Thal. cap.* 8. *ſect.* 5.
Aſtronomy. *Thal. c.* 8. *Doct. Pyth. part.* 2. *ſect.* 2.
*Aſtu* of *Athens. Per. cap.* 2.
*Athens* Iluſtrated. *Sol. cap.* 3.
Atlantick Language or Story. *Sol. cap.* 8. 13. *Plat. cap.* 15.
*Attalus*, *Lacydes.*
*Axes* and *Cyrbes. Sol. cap.* 7.

C.

*Cleobulæ*, a Comedy of *Cratinus. Cleob. cap.* 1.
*Calliſthenes* put to Death by *Alexander. Ariſt. cap* 5.
*Carneades* ſent on Embaſſy to *Rome. Carn. cap.* 3.
*Cato* moves the Senate againſt the Philoſophers. *Carn. cap.* 3.
*Charicles*, one of the 30 Tyrants. *Socr. cap.* 9.
*Cherſoneſus* Thracian, reduc'd by the Athenians. *Sol. cap.* 2.
*Chio* beſtows a Talent upon *Speuſippus. Speuſ. cap.* 1.
*Chiriſophus. Xen. cap.* 4.
*Chreocopidæ*, Who? *Sol. cap.* 4.
*Cirrha* reduc'd by the Athenians by a Stratagem. *Sol. cap.* 2.
*Cleander* Governor of *Byzantium. Xen. cap.* 4.
*Cleobis* and *Bito. Sol. cap.* 11.
*Cleobulina. Cleob. cap.* 1.
*Cleombrotus* kills himſelf, upon reading of *Plato*'s *Phædo. Plat. cap.* 15.
Commentaries upon *Ariſtotle. Ar. cap.* 17.
*Connus* a Lutiniſt. *Socr. cap.* 3.
*Corinth*, the Wiſe Men meet there. *Sol. cap.* 8.
*Creet*, *Sol. cap.* 8. *Pyth. cap.* 6. famous for Religious Myſteries. *Thal. cap.* 3.
*Critias*, one of the 30 Tyrants. *Socr. cap.* 9.
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*Dionyſius*, the Elder, entertains *Plato. Plat. cap.* 9.
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*Heraclides*, Friend to *Plato. Plat. cap.* 9.

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*Xeniades* buys *Diogenes*, *Diog. ch.* 2.
*Xenophon*'s Armour. *Xen. ch.* 3.
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*Zamolxis*, *Pyth. ch.* 21.
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*Authors*

*Damaſtes* (of *Sigeum*, a Promontory of *Troas*,) Son of *Dioxippus*, Diſciple of *Hellanicus*, wrote, *Of Sophiſts*, (*Suid.*) He lived before the Peloponneſian War. (*Dionyſ. Halicar. de Thucyd. Charact.*)

*Xenophon*, the Philoſopher, wrote firſt, *Of the Lives of Philoſophers*; (*Suid.*) perhaps meaning his Socratical Apology and Commentaries.

*Anaximander* the Younger, of *Miletus*, Contemporary with *Xenophon*, for he lived in the time of *Artaxerxes Mnemon*, wrote, *An Explication of the Pythagorick Symbols.*

*Theopompus*, of *Chios*, the moſt Eminent of all *Iſocrates* his Diſciples, (*Dionyſ. Halic. Epiſt. ad Pomp.*) in the time of *Artaxerxes Ochus*, King of *Perſia*, and of *Philip* King of *Macedon*, wrote, *Concerning the Exercitations of Plato. Athen. Deip.* 11.

*Timæus* the Locrian, a Pythagorean Philoſopher, wrote *the Life of Pythagoras*, (*Suid.*)

*Speuſippus* wrote, *Of Philoſophers*, one Book. (*Laert.*)

*Xenocrates*, the Philoſopher, wrote Books, *Of Lives.* (*Laert.*)

*Theophraſtus* wrote of the *Wiſe Men.* (*Laert.*)

*Ariſtoxenus* of *Tarentum*, Diſciple of *Ariſtotle*, wrote, *Of the Lives of Eminent Perſons*; amongſt whom were *Pythagoras*, *Archytas*, *Socrates*, *Plato.*

*Heraclides*, of *Pontus*, heard *Speuſippus* and *Ariſtotle*; wrote, *Of the Pythagoreans*, and, *Of Lives*: Which laſt, though reckoned by *Laertius* amongſt Phyſical Writings, yet, as *Voſſius* (*de Hiſtor. Græc.* 1. 9.) conceives, they ſeem to have been rather Hiſtorical, becauſe *Eutocius* cites his *Life of Archimedes*, (*in Archim.*)

*Dicearchus* of *Meſſene*, Diſciple alſo to *Ariſtotle*, (*Athen. Deipn.* 11.) wrote, *Of Lives. Laert. in Plat.*

*Clearchus* of *Soli*, Diſciple alſo to *Ariſtotle*, wrote, *Of Lives*, (*Athen. Deipn.* 6.) Of this Work, *Athenæus* cites the Firſt, Fourth, and Fifth Books; and out of it, *Agellius* takes what he writes of *Pythagoras.* 4. 11.

*Phanias* of *Ereſſus*, Diſciple alſo to *Ariſtotle*, wrote, *Of the Socraticks.* (*Laert. in Antiſth.*)

*Epicurus* wrote, *Of Lives*, Four Books: (*Laert.*) But *Gaſſendus* conceives, they contained not the Stories of any Eminent Perſons but Moral Rules, whereby to lead a quiet Life. (*Laert.*)

*Apollodorus*, Sirnamed *Cepotyrannus*, Diſciple of *Epicurus*, wrote, *His Life*, (*Laert.*)

*Bardeſanes*, a Babylonian, living in the time of *Alexander Severus*, wrote, *Of the Brachmanes* and *Samanæans*, Indian Philoſophers, whom the Grecians tearm Gymnoſophiſts.

*Idomenæus* of *Lampſacum*, Diſciple to *Epicurus*, wrote Books, *Of the Socraticks.* (*Laert. in Socrates.*)

*Antigonus* of *Caryſtus*, Lived in the time of *Ptolemæus Lagis*, and *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; wrote, *Of Lives*, (*Laert.*) of which are particularly mentioned thoſe of *Polemo*, *Menedemus*, *Dionyſius*, *Metathemenus*, *Lyco*, *Zeno*, *Pyrrho*, *Timon*, by *Athenæus* and others.

*Callimachus* of *Cyrene*, a Poet, Lived in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; wrote a *Table or Deſcription of thoſe, who were eminent in any kind of Learning, and of their Writings.* (*Athen. Deipn.* 6. & 14.)

*Neanthes*, of *Cyzicus*, an Orator, (Diſciple of *Philiſcus* the Mileſian, the Orator,) who Learnt of *Iſocrates*, wrote, *Of Eminent Perſons*, cited by *Stephanus*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Laertius*, *Porphyrius*, and *Heſychius Mileſius.*

*Hermippus* of *Smyrna*, about the time of *Ptolemæus Euergetes*, wrote Books, *Of Lives*; of which are particularly cited the Lives of *Plato*, *Arceſilaus*, *Ariſtotle*, *Theophraſtus*, *Lyco*, and others; by *Laertius.*

*Sphærus*, in the time of *Ptolemæus Euergetes*, Diſciple to *Zeno* the Cittiean, and to *Cleanthes*, wrote, *Of the Eretriack Philoſophers*, and *of Lycurgus and Socrates*, Three Books. (*Laert.*)

*Chryſippus*, the Philoſopher, wrote, *Of Lives*; to which, perhaps, appertained that which he wrote, *Of antient Phyſiologiſts.*

*Sotion* wrote a *Succeſſion of Philoſophers*, wherein, as *Eunapius* declares, he gave an account of the Lives of the Philoſophers, as they ſucceeded one another. *Laertius* cites the third Book.

*Heraclides*, Son of *Serapion*, lived under *Ptolemy Philometor*, wrote a *Succeſſion* in Six Books, doubtleſs *of Philoſophers*; perhaps the ſame with his Epitome of *Sotion*: *Laertius* cites both Titles.

*Apollodorus* an Athenian, Son of *Aſclepiades*; he was a Grammarian, flouriſhed under *Ptolemæus Euergetes*, heard *Ariſtarchus* the Grammarian, and *Panætius* the Stoick, (*Suid.*) He wrote, *Of the Sects of Philoſophers*; and (if it were not the ſame work,) a *Collection of Doctrines*, both cited by *Laertius in Solone*, & *in Chryſippo.*

*Clitomachus*, Diſciple to *Carneades*, flouriſhed about the 162 Olympiad; wrote, *Of Sects.* (*Laertius in his Life.*

*Alexander Cornelius*, Sirnamed *Polyhiſtor*, flouriſhed in the 173d Olympiad; wrote *Succeſſions.* (*Laert.*)

*Damis* the Aſſyrian, wrote the Life of *Apollonius Tyanæus.* (*Hierocles*, cited by *Euſeb.*)

*Maximus* the Ægiean, Contemporary with *Damis*, wrote the Life of the ſame *Apollonius* (*Hierocl. Ibidem.*)

*Mocragenes* wrote Four Books of the Life of the ſame *Apollonius*; diſcredited by *Philoſtratus*, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 4.

*Plutarch* (who flouriſhed under *Trajan* and *Hadrian*,) wrote of the *Opinions of Philoſophers*, Five Books extant.

*Diogenes Laertius*, or, as *Tzetzes* terms him, *Diogenianus*, whoſe Ten Books, *Of the Lives of Philoſophers*, are extant; out of which *Photius* affirms, that *Sopater* borrow'd much, (*Timem.* 161.) *Diogenes* therefore lived before *Conſtantine* the Great, who put *Sopater* to Death, (*Suid. in* Ἀλεξανδρός,) but later than *Trajan*; for he mentions *Plutarch*, and *Sextus Empiricus*, and *Saturninus* Diſciple of *Sextus.* Whence *Voſſius* collects, he lived under *Antoninus Pius*, or ſomwhat later, *De Natura & conſtit. Rhetor. cap.* 9.

*Lucian* of *Samoſata*, under *Aurelius* and *Commodus*, wrote the Life of *Demonax*, a Philoſopher of that time.

*Philoſtratus*, flouriſhing from *Severus* to *Philippus*, (*Suid.*) wrote the Life of *Apollonius Tyanæus*, compriſing

priſing all that *Maximus* and *Damis* had written before; it conſiſts of Eight Books extant.

*Philoſtratus*, Uncle and Father-in-Law to the other, living under *Macrinus* and *Heliogabalus*; wrote the *Lives of the Sophiſts*.

*Porphyrius*, living from *Galienus* to *Probus*, wrote, φιλοσόφου ἱστορίαν, *Hiſtoriam Philoſophicam*, concluding about the time of *Plato*, (*Eunap. Proem.*) It is mentioned by *Theodoret* and *Tzetzes* under the Title of, *The Lives of Philoſophers*. The third Book of it is cited by *Suidas*; part of the Life of *Pythagoras* belonging to it is extant, firſt ſet forth by *Ritterhuſius*, afterwards by *Lucas Holſtenius*.

*Soterichus* lived under *Dioclesian*, wrote the *Life of Apollonius Tyanæus*. (*Suid.*)

*Jamblichus*, Maſter to *Julian* the Emperor, wrote the *Life of Pythagoras*, put forth by *Joannes Arcerius*.

*Eunapius*, living under *Valentinian*, *Valens*, and *Gratian*, an Eminent Sophiſt, Phyſician, and Hiſtorian, wrote, at the requeſt of *Chryſantius*, *The Lives of the Philoſophers and Sophiſts*, extant.

*Marinus*, a Neapolitan, a Philoſopher and Orator, Diſciple to *Proclus*, lived about the times of *Zeno* and *Anaſtaſius*; wrote, *the Life of Proclus*, his Maſter and Predeceſſor in the School, in Proſe and Verſe. That in Proſe only is extant.

*Heſychius illuſtris*, a Mileſian, wrote a *Nomenclator*, or *Index of ſuch as were Eminent for Learning*, extant.

*Damaſcius*, of *Damaſcus* in *Syria*, lived under *Juſtinian*, was a Stoick, Diſciple of *Simplicius* and *Elamita Phrygians*; wrote a *Philoſophical Hiſtory*. (*Suid.* in Δωεὺς.)

*Of more uncertain time are theſe following.*

*Amphicrates*, who writ a Book of Eminent Perſons, cited by *Laertius* and *Athenæus*.

*Andron* of *Epheſus*, who wrote a Treatiſe *of the Seven Wiſe Men*; perhaps the ſame with his *Tripod*, the ſubject of which was the Story of the Golden Tripod. *Laert. in the Life of Thal.*

*Antiſthenes*, a Peripatetical Philoſopher, writ the *Succeſſions of Philoſophers*. (*Laert.*)

*Apollodorus*, who wrote a *Collection of Doctrines*. (*Laert.*)

*Ariſtocles* of *Meſſena*, a Peripatetical Philoſopher, wrote Ten Books, *Of Philoſophy*, in which he gave account of all the Philoſophers and their Opinions. (*Suid.*)

*Damas* wrote, *The Life of Eudemus*; *Eudemus* was a Rhodian, Diſciple to *Ariſtotle*.

*Damon*, a Cyrenæan, wrote a Book of *Philoſophers*. (*Laert.*)

*Didymus* lived in the time of *Julius* the Dictator; wrote, *Of the Pythagorick Philoſophy*. (*Suid.*)

*Diocles* wrote the *Lives of Philoſophers*. (*Laert.*)

*Eubulides* wrote a Book of *Diogenes*; and perhaps of *Socrates*. (See *Laert. Socr.*)

*Herodotus* wrote, *Of the Youth of Epicurus*; (*Laert. Dionyſ. Halic.*)

*Heron*, Son of *Cotys*, an Athenian Orator, wrote an *Epitome of the Hiſtories of* Heraclides. (*Suid.*)

*Hippobotus* wrote, *Of Sects*, (*Laert.*) not only of the Doctrines, but Lives, of Philoſophers; for there is cited alſo his Book, *Of Philoſophers*, perhaps the ſame. (*Laert.*)

*Jaſon* wrote, *Succeſſions of Philoſophers*. (*Suid.*)

*Lycon* of *Jaſia* wrote, *The Life of* Pythagoras. (*Athen.* 14.)

*Meleager* wrote, *Of Opinions*. (*Laert. in Ariſtip.*)

*Nicander* of *Alexandria* wrote, *Of the Diſciples of* Ariſtotle. (*Suid.* in αἰχεῶν.)

*Nicias* of *Nice*, wrote the *Hiſtory*, or *Succeſſion of Philoſophers*. (*Athen.*)

*Panætius* wrote, *Of Sects*. (*Laert. in Ariſtippo.*)

*Satyrus*, a Peripatetick, wrote, *The Lives of Eminent Perſons*; Epitomiz'd by *Heraclides*.

*Socrates* wrote, *Succeſſions*, cited by *Laertius*, *in Diogene*; but perhaps it ſhould be,

*Soſicrates*, a Rhodian, who wrote the *Succeſſions of Philoſophers*.

*Theodorus* wrote, *Of Sects*. (*Laert. in Ariſtip.*)

*Timotheus* an Athenian, wrote, *Of Lives*, (*Laert.*)

Conjectures

# CONJECTURES

## UPON

## Some Paſſages of the ſaid AUTHORS.

*Ariſtotle.*

*De anima, lib.* 1. *cap.* 2. ἀπείρων γὰρ ὄντων σχημάτων καὶ ἀτόμων (Pacius, *cum enim infinitæ ſint figuræ & atomi*;) perhaps, σχημάτων γὰρ ἀτόμων. (*Democr. chap.* 9. *Sect.* 8.

*De generatione animalium*, lib. 4. cap. 9. ἐν μὲν τῇ μήτρᾳ (perhaps μήτρᾳ,) γίνεσθαί φησι τὸν διαφορὰν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ τοῦ ἄρρενος. (*Democr. chap.* 9. *Sect.* 7.)

*Baſil.*

*Homil.* 24. *de legend. lib. Gentil.* ὅπως ἔχῃ· ὁ πάντοτε χαλεπώτερον σαυτῷ κατασκεύαζων τὸ δεσμωτήριον; perhaps, ἔστω, ἔχῃ, ὁ πάσῃ χαλεπώτερον ἑαυτῷ, &c. (*Pythag. doctr. part.* 3. *Sect.* 1. *chap.* 3.)

*Ibid.* δὸς δὴ καὶ Πλάτωνα φασὶ τὸν ἐν σώματι βλάβην πεφευγόμενον, &c. perhaps πεφευδόμενον. (*Plat. chap.* 5.)

*Clemens Alexandrinus.*

*Stromat.* lib. 1. ἤδει γάρ, οἶμαι, ὡς ἄρα ἦν πολυμαθὴς νόον ἔχει· ὁ διδάσκει καθ' Ἡράκλειτον (rendred, *ſciebat enim, ut exiſtimo, eum multarum rerum ſcientem jam habere mentem, quod docet, ut eſt, Heraclitι ſententia,*) perhaps, πολυμαθίη νόον ἔχειν διδάσκει. (*Heracl. chap.* 1.)

*Lib.* 5. for Ευρύσε πυθαγορείη, perhaps read Ευρύτε. (*Pyth. chap.* 24.)

*Lib.* 6. καὶ γὰρ ἄρα θέρος, ἐν ταῖς ἄλωσιν ἔπῆς, the ſenſe ſeems to require, ἐκὶ πῆς. (*Democr. chap.* 4.)

*Diodorus Siculus.*

*Hiſt. lib.* 6. ἐπ' ἄρχοντος δ' Αθλώνη * φαινος, ſupply, ἀλφείωνος. (*Socrat. chap.* 1.)

*Excerpt. Valeſ.* pag. 245. ſupply the Text (out of *Iambl. de vit. Pyth.* cap. 29.) thus, ὑδὲν γὰρ μεῖζον πρὸς ὁπισήμω καὶ φρόνησιν, ἔπι δὲ ἧσι πάντων ἐμπειρίαν, τῷ διμάδαι πολλὰ μνημονεύειν, (*Pyth. doctr. part.* 1. *chap.* 10.)

*Diogenes Laertius,*

More frequently.

*Etymologicum Magnum.*

Σολοικοὶ οἱ βάρβαροι· ἀπὸ Σόλωνος κίλικος, perhaps ἀπὸ σόλων χιλικίων. (*Solon. chap.* 11.)

*Gregory Nazianzen.*

*Adverſ. Julian. Orat.* 3. Ἐστὶ καὶ ἕτερα μυρία λέγειν ἅπερ ἀνθρωπίνων πάθεσμάτων, καὶ ἀκοτέχνως πεπλεγμένων· τούτοις μὲν τοι καὶ ἀλίσκεσθαι μὴ δυναμένης ἐξίκεσθαι τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφῆς ἢ μιμήσεως, perhaps tranſpoſe; πλεγμάτων μὲν τοι καὶ ἀκοτέχνως πεπλεγμένων τούτοις καὶ ἀλίσκεσθαι. (*Pyth. chap.* 22.)

*Herodotus.*

Lib. 4. ἴσχω γὰρ τῆς ἀδελφειῆς ὑποδεκάς· (*Valla & Stephen. a patruele,*) perhaps ἀδελφεῆς. (*Anacharſ. chap.* 1.)

*Iamblichus*, his *Life of Pythagoras*,

Set forth corruptly by *Arcerius*; and corrupted yet more by his Tranſlation and Caſtigations, reſtored a little by the *Anonymus* Writer at the end of his Edition, and by *Deſiderius Heraldus* at the end of his *Animadverſions*; and by *Ritterhuſius* upon *Porphyrius*: But generally requires much more; as,

Cap. 2. for τὸν Σάμον τὸν ἐν τῇ Κεφαληνίᾳ, read Σάμην, and afterwards, pag. 27. ἀντὶ τῆ Σαμίης read Σάμης. For ſo the Oracle immediately following.

Αγχοῦ, (not Αγχοῦε,) εἰναλίαν νῆσον Σάμον ἀντὶ Σάμης σέ

Οἰκίζειν κέλομαι· φυλλὰς (Heſych. φυλλὶς,) δ' ὀνομάζεται αὐτη. (*Pyth. c.* 1.)

Pag. 29. καὶ κύσης αὐτὴν, εἰ μὴ ὕστως ἐχούσης κατασῶσαι, read, καὶ κυήσιν αὐτὸν ὂν (for ſo the MS.) μὴ ὕστως ἐχούσης. (*Pyth. chap.* 2.)

Pag. 32. πρὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἐφοδιάζεσθαι ταῦτα· διὸ σοφὸς ἔφη τοῖς πολλοῖς νομίζεσθαι. read, ἔφη γὰρ ἐκείνων καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἐφοδιάσασθαι ταῦτα, διὰ (for the MS. had διὰ,) σοφὸς, &c. and immediately, for ὅσον τὸ Πυθαγόρειον καθορᾶν, read, ὅσων and καθορᾶ. (*Pyth. Ibid.*)

Chap. 3. κἂν τόπον ὀλιγουτνίαν, read, κἂν τύτε. (*Pyth. chap.* 3.)

Pag. 33. καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ φοινικοῖς ἱερογράφαντας, καὶ πάσας τελεσθεὶς τελετὰς ἐν τε Βύβλῳ καὶ τύρῳ, καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ τῆ Συρίας μέρη ἐξ ἀρρήτως ἱερουργύμενα, read and diſtinguiſh, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ φοινίκης (or φοινικικοῖς,) ἱερογράφαντας, καὶ πάσας τελεσθεὶς τελετὰς ἔνθε Βύβλῳ καὶ τύρῳ, καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ τῆ Συρίας μέρη, ἐξαιρέτως ἱερουργύμενα. (*Pyth. Ibid.*)

Pag. 34. μόνον τε ὑπερθεγξάμενος, εἰς Αἴγυπτον ὁ ἀπόπλους, perhaps, ὑπερθεγξάμενός τε, μὴ εἰς Αἴγυπτον ὁ ἀπόπλους, (*Pyth. chap.* 4.)

Cap. 5.

Cap. 5. for κατ' ἐπιδιδόν, read κρδῶς. (*Pyth. chap.* 6.)

Pag. 38. ἐνδιαδέξατο αὐτόν, read ἢν διαδέξατο αὐτὸς. (*Pyth. Ibid.*)

Pag. 39. διὸ νοῶν χαλάζειν, read κωῦ. (*Pyth. Ibid.*)

Cap. 8. pag. 50. ἓν οἷς (read θεοῖς,) ἀρετὰς ἔλαττον, &c. (*Pyth. chap.* 12.

Pag. 51. for ἐυδυμίας read δαιδυμίας. (*Pyth. Ibid.*)

Cap. 9. ὁδὲ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοῖς συμφιλόλαον ἱδρύσασθαι μυσῶν, (read μυσσῶον,) ἵνα πρῶσιν τὸν ὑπάρχω (read ὑπάρχωσ,) ὁμόνοιαν. (*Pyth. chap.* 13.)

Cap. 10. μήτε ἀρχὴν λοιδορίαν, read λοιδορίας, and afterwards, ἢ μίνοις δὲ τίλως ἀγνόμενον ἐξοίκις, &c. (*Ibid.*)

Pag. 60. for ἰλλυδίσιν, read, φυλιλυθόων. (*Ibid.*)

Cap. 11. ὅπως αὐτὰς πρὲ πλείστε ποιῆσθαι ὁμοιείαν, perhaps ἐπιμέλειαν. (*Pyth. chap.* 14.)

Chap. 15. for ἀφορῶσι, read καὶ ἰφορῶσι. (*Pyth. doctr. part.* 1. *Sect.* 2. *chap.* 7.)

Cap. 18. pag. 89. ἱππομέδων ἄχι Ἀινδὸς, perhaps Ἀχιανδὸς, (*Pyth. doct. part.* 1. *chap.* 8.)

Cap. 19. ἀκεράσαι φῆς τὸν ἀκρίαιν, perhaps ἀπερράσατο. (*Pyth. chap.* 23.)

Pag. 93. for χῖ τὰ δίκαια διακαίνειν, read χῆ, and afterwards, for ἄλλα τοιοῦτα τύχη, perhaps ἴχνη: (*Ibid.*)

Chap. 21. pag. 99. θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ χρὴ ζώων θυσιῶν ἱερέων, expunge ἱερέων, which ſeems a gloſs. (*Pyth. doct. part.* 1. *chap.* 9.)

Cap. 23. καὶ δεῖ (read ἀεὶ,) τὸν ἴρρην. (*Pythag. doctr. part.* 1. *Sect.* 2. *chap.* 8.)

Cap. 26. δεῖ μὲν τὰ ἴσως ἀκίνων) perhaps ἀκίνη,) Ελπίδα χὴ πάντ' ἐπεὶ ὐκ ἐς' ὑδὲν ἄελπτον. (*Pyth. doctr. part.* 4. *chap.* 4. *Symb.* 4.)

Pag. 135. δίαν * οἱ τῇ μητεῖ, read διανοεῖ. (*Pyth. chap.* 21.

Ibid. ὀργιδεὶς ἐν Λιβήθροις, read ὀργιαδεὶς. (*Pyth. doctr. part.* 2. *Sect.* 1. *chap.* 15.)

*Marmora Arundeliana.*

Pag. 10. line 28. ἄρχον]ος Αθλύμπα τὸ ἄμυ, (Mr. *Selden, archonte Athenis populo,*) read Ευδυδήμυ: (*Chilon. chap.* 1.)

*Nicomachus*, his *Introduction to Arithmetick.*

(So ſupply the Title, ἀριθμητικῆς εἰσαγωγῆς; ſee pag. 30, 35, 44, 62, 76.)

Pag. 7. ἀλλὰ χὴ ὅπ φύσει πρεσβύτερος ὑπάρχων ὅσῳ σωσαιρεῖ μᾶλ' ἑαυτῇ τὰ λοιπὰ, read, πρεσβυτέρα ὑπάρχουσ' σωσαιρεῖ μᾶλ', &c. (*Pythag. doct. part.* 2. *Sect.* 1.

His *Enchiridion of Muſick*, ſet forth by *Meibomius.*

Pag. 10. continue the *fifth* Section, and diſtinguiſh thus, ὁ ἄρχ. τόν. ἀπόγδοον. τὼ δὲ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ποσότητα ταύτην, ἥτις διὰ πέντε, χὴ ἢ κατ' ἀμφοτέρων σωφόνων, διὰ πασῶν λεγομένη, χὴ μεσοκείμων. μεταξὺ ἥν δυὸ τετραχόρδων τόν. τρόπῳ τινὶ τοιούτῳ ὑπὸ τῶ Πυθαγόρα καταληφθέντα ἔχειν ἐρεῖ αὐδῆ. (Sect. 6.) Ἐν φρονεῖν ποτὲ χὴ διαλογισμῷ, &c. (*Pyth. part.* 2. *Sect.* 2. *chap.* 3.

Pag. 11. ἰσοτρόφους, not ἰσορρόπους as *Meibomius*: (*Pyth. part.* 2. *Sect.* 2. *chap.* 4.)

*Porphyrius*, his *Life of Pythagoras*,

Set forth by *Lucas Holſtenius*: p. 2. and p. 10. Ερμοδάμαντι τῷ Κρεοφυλίῳ, perhaps τῷ Κρεοφύλῳ: or τῶ Κρεοφύλυ. (*Pyth. chap.* 2.)

Pag. 11. ἐν τῷ χαλκείῳ τετάσθαι, perhaps, τείνειν. (*Pyth. chap.* 7.)

Pag 27. τὸν θάλατταν μὲν ὀκάλει ἴδ (read Κρόνυ,) δὲ χρύσεον. (*Pyth. doctr. part.* 4. *chap.* 1.)

Ibid. φανῆναι ἔδ τινὸς ἅδ δαιμόνιον ἐναπεκλημβόλιον τῷ χαλκῷ, perhaps ἐναπειλημβόλιον. (*Pyth. doctr.* 3. *Sect.* 3. *chap.* 4.)

*Proclus*, upon *Euclid.*

Lib. 1. chap. 12. ἔστι δ' ὠφελήσας (read ὠφελήσας,) ἅδ ἀπείρων τὰς ἐπιστήμας καταυοεῖν, ὡς ὁ κανὼν τῶν καθ' ἑκάστεον ἀπειρίαν γνώσει λαζεῖν, transpoſe, ὡς ὁ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστεον ἀπειρίαν γνώσει λαζεῖν κανὼν. (*Pyth. doctr. part.* 2. *chap.* 2.)

Ibid. χὴ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ· χῖ δὲ τῶν ἕνωσιν τῶ πλήθυς, χὴ ἡ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ κοινωνίαν, χὴ ἡ νοήσασα ἑαυτὸν ἓν χὴ πολλὰ ὄν· τὰς τε ἀριθμὸς προβάλλει, χὴ ἡ τούτων γνῶσιν, χὴ συμφώνιαμον * ἡ μουσική, transpoſe the lines, χὴ νοήσασα ἑαυτὸν ἓν χὴ πολλὰ ὄν· τὰς τε ἀριθμὸς προβάλλει, χὴ ἡ τούτων, γνῶσιν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ. χῖ δὲ ἡ ἕνωσιν τῶ πλήθυς, χὴ ἡ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ κοινωνίαν χὴ συμφώνιαμον, ἡ μουσική. (*Pythag. Ibid.*)

Ibid. for κατηγῶ read χῖ γὰρ. (*Pyth. Ibid.*)

Lib. 2. chap. 4. ἀπὸ αἰδήσιος ἕως εἰς λογισμὸν, χὴ ἀπὸ τῆ * ἡ μετάβασις γίνοιτ' ἂν εἰκότως, ſupply χὴ ἀπὸ τῆ λογισμῶ εἰς τὴ νοῶ ἡ μετάβασις, &c. and preſently after, for ὃς ἐφαρμόσῃ, read ὡς ἐφαρμόσῃ. (*Thal. chap.* 7.)

Ibid. χὴ μᾶλ' τοι χὴ φασὶν ὅτι Πτολεμαῖος ἤρετο ποτὲ αὐτὸν εἴ τις ὁδὸς περὶ γεωμετρίαν, εὐκτὸς μὲν ἦν, &c. ſupply, εἴ τις ὁδὸς περὶ γεωμετρίαν τὰ στοιχειώσεως βεβαίαν μέθοδον, ὁλμίας (φησὶν,) ὦ βασιλεῦ, πρὸς γεωμετρίαν βασιλικὴ ὁδὸς παίτερον, &c.

Pag. 31. Τρεῖς γεωμέτρας δεῖ πάντα σοφὸς εὑρεῖν τὰς * σπειρικὰς, read, τὰς σπειρικὰς ἐυρών. (*Thal. chap.* 7. *Sect.* 1.)

Lib. 4. pag. 109. ὅτ' ἂν χὸ εὐθείας ὁπτεμένης τὸ δοθὲν χρεῖον πάσῃ τῇ εὐθείᾳ συμφωνεῖν ὁπάτον τὸ χρεῖον φασὶν, ὅτ' ἂν μεῖζον δὲ πάσης, &c. ſupply, πάσῃ τῇ εὐθείᾳ συμπεπτώκυῖα, τοτὲ θεωρεῖν ὁπάτον τὸ χρεῖον φασὶ· ὅταν δὲ μεῖζον, &c. (*Pythag. doctr. part.* 2. *Sect.* 3. *chap.* 2.)

*Sextus Empiricus*, his *Pyrrhoniam Hypotupoſes.*

Lib. 1. c. 4. χὴ τὸ, ἀντιθετικῇ φαινομένων τε χὴ νουμένων. MS. χὴ τ. perhaps τῇ. (*Sext. Ibid.*)

Cap. 14. ὡς χὴ λόγως χὴ τύπως σωωνύμως καλεῖσι. perhaps τόπως, (*chap.* 11.)

Ibid. p. 10. πολὺ δίπτε ἀλογώτερόν ὄτι. MS. ὐλογώτερον. better. (*chap.* 12.)

Chap. 33. pag. 46. in the Verſes of *Xenophanes*, for ἀμφότερα βλεπτὰ MS. ἀμφοτερόβλεπ]ον. for ὅπη read ὅπαν. for ἴσασι MS. ἴσασ'. for Εα τ'. MS. Εκτον· perhaps ξίσον. (*chap.* 31.)

Lib. 2. cap. 5. pag. 61. ἀνόλυθον μᾶλ' ἦν ἴσως perhaps μὴ ἦν. (*Ibid.*)

Cap. 6. p. 64. τῇ διανοΐᾳ χὴ ταῖς αἰδήσεσι κενεῶμῳ, ποὶ δὲ μή, in the MS. of Sir *Henry Savile* and Mr. *Caſaubone* there is a breach, to ſhew the defect, thus, ταῖς αἰδήσεσι κενεῶμῳ * ποὶ δὲ μὴ. preſently after for διὰ τῶτο κείνειν, read τὸ τῶν. (*Ibid.*)

Ibid. lin. 36. ἥτοι ἀγαθός ἔστιν ὁ πλ]ῶς, ἢ κακὸς, ſupply, ἢ ἀδιάφορ]ος. otherwiſe it is not a defective reaſon. (*Ibid.*)

Cap. 13. pag. 82. lin. 4. εἰ ἡμέρα ὄτι, ὐχὶ δὲ φῶς ὄτιν, ὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ὄστιν. ſupply, εἰ φῶς ὐκ ὄστιν ὐχὶ ἡμέρα ὄτι. ὐχὶ δὲ φῶς ὄστιν· ὐκ ἄρα, &c. (*Ibid.*)

Cap. 22. pag. 101. lin. 18. ἐρώτηκα δὲ τί σε φεῦτον, εἰ ἄρα αἰτέρες ἄρτιόν εἰσιν. read ὐκ ἄρα.

Cap. 23.

Cap. 23. pag. 102. perhaps τὸ ὑποφαινὸν τ' συμπλοκῆς should be expunged; and is but a repetition of the next line. *(Ibid.)*

Lib. 3. cap. 8. line 30. for. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ὑφ' ἡτέρου τ perhaps read, ἀλλ' ὧδε ὑφ' αὑτῶ ὧδε ὑφ' ὑτέρου. *(Ibid.)*

Cap. 16. pag. 136. lin. 40. εἰ δὲ ὑστεροῖεν, κινούμενον μεταξαπικῶς. perhaps κινέμενον. *(Ibid.)*

Cap. 18. * ἀεὶ τ Θ δύας· read δόσεις Θ. *(Ibid.)*

Pag. 141. lin. 3. ὑκ ἄρα τὸ ζῶον ἐν βίῳ, add, ἀλλ' τ ἑαυτῦ λόγον. *(Ibid.)*

Lin. 20. ὃς μεμνήσομαι, read ὑπομνήσομαι. *(Ibid.)*

*Socrates* and the *Socraticks*, their Epistles. Set forth by *Leo Allatius*.

Epist. 1. pag. 2. ὄντως ὁμοίως ἀμέλειν τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι τε, καὶ μὴ. perhaps τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι τε, καὶ μὴ, *(Socrat. Epist. 1.)*

Pag. 3. ὡς ὑμῖν ἐψεύδω. perhaps ὡς ὑμεῖς ἡμῖν ἐψεύδου. *(Ibid.)*

Pag. 5. ἀλλὰ τ μὲν ἑτέρων ἔχειν πῶ αἰτίαν, τῦ δὲ καθάπαξ αὐτός. M. S. τῦ μὲν ἑτέρω. perhaps ἀλλὰ τῦ μὲν ἑτέρ' ἂν ἔχοι πῶ αἰτίαν, τῦ δὲ, καθάπαξ αὐτός. *(Ibid.)*

Pag. 9. ἀπ ὑκ ἀλλάττημαι τ ἀκεῖ πάνδαδε, ἀμείνω δοκῶν, perhaps, ἀμείνον εἶ δοκῶν, or, ἐμμένειν δοκῶν. *(Ibid.)*

Epist. 5. Πρόξενον δὲ καταλαβεῖν εἰς πῶ Ασίαν. perhaps, καταλαβεῖν τὴν Ασίαν, or διαβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Ασίαν. *(Socr. Epist. 3.)*

Pag. 15. ἡ μακαριωτάτῳ ὑπάρχειν. read μακαριώτατον. *(Ibid.)*

Pag. 16. θεὸς οἷς ἐπύχει ἤδη ἢ τ ὄντως ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν περσαπισέρηται, τὴν ὑπερ τ μελλόντων χρησὴν ἐλπίδα. perhaps, θεὸς οἷς ἐπύχιαν ἤδη γε τ ὄντως ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν, περσαπισέρηται, &c. or, θεὸς οἷς ἐπύχει, ἤδη ἢ τ ὄντως ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν περσαπισέρηται τ ὄπι τ μελλόντων, &c. *(Ibid.)*

Ibid. ἡ ὑ λόγοις μόνον, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἔργοις δηλώσαντες. MS. ἐαν ὑ λόγοις, which I choose, reading afterwards δηλώσω τις. *(Ibid.)*

Pag. 18. ὃν ὧν μὲν ὄφλω τιμῆς τυγχάνει. read, φεύγει.

Epist. 7. pag. 22. τῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι ἔφη εἰ ἢ κεφαλὴ πεποιηκέναι ἐβούλοντο τ συμμάχων, &c. perhaps, τῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι σφίσι γε κεφαλὴν πεποιηκέναι εἰ ἐβούλοντο. *(Ibid.)*

Epist. 8. Ὀυκ ἔστι τῦτο φιλοσόφου, τὸ ὧδε τυφλοῖς ἀνδράσι. perhaps add, ζῆν. *(Antisth. chap. 4.)*

Epist. 9. ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ ἀκαίνω τὸ χεώμα Θ εἶ. perhaps χεώμα Θ. Doricè, for χρῆμα Θ. *(Aristip. cap. 7.)*

Pag. 26. ἡδέιν ὅτι κακοδαιμονήσω ταῦτα πάσχω, καθάπερ σὺ μοι γράφεις τυῶ. ἐλεουμένῦς μὴ ἀπειγλέπονται Συρρακόσιοι, &c. read and distinguish, καθάπερ σύ μοι γράφεις. τυῶ δὲ ἐλεουμένῦς μὴ ἀπειγλέπονται, &c. Doricè. *(Ibid.)*

Ibid. πὰς δὲ μανίας ἀς ἐμάγλω read, πὰς δὲ μανίας ἀεὶ ἀς ἐμάνλω. *(Ibid.)*

Ibid. ὅπ δὲ ἐγὼ γιγνῶς, &c. read, ὅτι δή, &c. *(Ibid.)*

Epist. 12. Ακέω σι θαυμάζειν ἡμᾶς· perhaps, τυθάζειν. *(Simon.)*

Ibid. μέμνησο μὴ τοι ἀεὶ μὰ χ' ἥλῖος. Ταῦτα γὰρ δύναται μέγα τοῖς σωφρόσιν διώκειν. read, μέμνησο μὴ τοι λαμῶ χ' ἥλῖος· ταῦτα γὰρ δύναται μεγάλα τοῖς σωφρόσιν διώκειν. for so *Stobæus* Serm. 17. citing this fragment, *ex Simonis Epistola ad Aristippum*: whence supply the Inscription also. *(Ibid.)*

*Stobæus.*

*Serm.* 82. citing *Hierocles*, πολὺ δὲ διαφερόντως ἐφ' ἀλλῆ, τὸ τῆ Σωκράτυς, perhaps τῆ Σωκρατικῆ. *(Euclid. chap. 31.)*

*Themistius.*

*Orat.* 4. ἐν Κρότων Θ δὲ εἰς Λόκρυς, διὰ γλῶσσα read (as also in *Laertius, vit. Pyth.* for Κύδωνα,) Κύλωνα· and in *Plutarch. de Gen. Socr.* for Κυλλόνιοι, Κυλώνιοι, twice. *(Pyth. chap. 19.)*

*Synes: Hymn. 4.*

Πάτερ ἄγνωστε,
Πάτερ ἄῤῥητε,
Ἄγνωστε νόῳ,
Ἄῤῥητε λόγῳ,
ΝόΘ ἐστὶ νόυ,
Ψυχᾶν ψυχά,
φύσις εἶ φυσίων.

FINIS.

THE

# HISTORY

OF THE

# CHALDAICK Philoſophy.

BY

THOMAS STANLEY.

*LONDON*,

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# HISTORY

OF THE

# CLADDAICK

Philosophy.

# TO
## Sir *JOHN MARSHAM*, Kt.

*SIR*,

I Send this Book to you, becauſe you firſt directed me to this Deſign. The Learned *Gaſſendus* was my Precedent; whom nevertheleſs I have not followed in his Partiality: For he, though limited to a Single Perſon, yet giveth himſelf Liberty of Enlargement, and taketh occaſion from his Subject to make the World acquainted with many excellent Diſquiſitions of his own. Our Scope being of a greater Latitude, affords leſs Opportunity to favour any Particular; whilſt there is due to every one the Commendation of their own Deſerts. This Benefit I hope to have received from the Variety of the Subject; but far more are thoſe I owe to your Encouragement, which if I could wiſh leſs, I ſhould upon this Occaſion, that there might ſeem to have been expreſſed ſomething of Choice and Inclination in this Action, which is now but an inconſiderable Effect of the Gratitude of,

*Dear Uncle,*

*Your moſt affectionate Nephew,*

*and humble Servant,*

THOMAS STANLEY.

# PREFACE.

WE are entring upon a Subject which I confess, is in it self harsh, and exotick, very unproper for our Tongue; yet I doubt not but they will pardon this, who shall consider, that other Philosophies and Sciences have been lately well received by several Nations translated into their own Languages, and that this, as being the first, contributes not a little to the understanding of the rest.

Another disadvantage this Subject incurs far more considerable: There is not any thing more difficult to be retrieved out of the Ruins of Antiquity than the Learning of the Eastern Nations, and particularly that of the Chaldæans. What remains of it is chiefly transmitted to us by the Greeks, of whom, some converted it to their own use, intermixing it with their Philosophy, as Pythagoras and Plato; others treated expresly of it, but their Writings are lost. Of its first Authors nothing remains; what others took from it, is not distinguishable from their proper Philosophy. The Greeks were first made acquainted with it by Osthanes, and, long after, by Berosus; the former living in the time of Xerxes, the other, under Ptolomæus Philadelphus. Whence it may be inferred, that the Discourse, which Democritus writ of Chaldæa, and his Commentary of the Sacred Letters at Babylon, either came short of these Sciences, or were so obscure, that they conduced little to their discovery. Neither seems the Treatise, entituled Magicum, ascribed, by some, to Aristotle, by others, to Rhodon, but indeed written by Antisthenes, to have considered the Learning and Sciences, so much as the History of the Professors. Of which kind were also the Writers concerning the Magi, cited, under that general Title, by Diogenes Laertius.

But there wanted not those, who further explained to the Greeks what Osthanes and Berosus had first communicated. Hermippus (to use Pliny's Words) wrote most diligently of Magick, and Commented upon the Verses of Zoroaster. About the time of Antonius Pius flourished the two Julians, Father and Son, Chaldaick Philosophers: the first wrote concerning the Chaldaick Rites, the latter, Theurgick Oracles in Verse, and other Secrets of that Science. Afterwards wrote Symbulus and Pallas, concerning the Magi; and the later Platonick Philosophers more frequently: Amelius, 40 Books of Confutation; Porphyrius, 4. on the History of Julian the Chaldæan; Jamblichus, 28. intituled, Of the most perfect Chaldaick Theology; and Syrianus, 10. upon the Oracles.

Of all these, there is nothing extant, unless (which we shall have occasion hereafter to prove) the few Oracles, dispersed among the Platonick Writers, be part of those, which were, by the Greeks, (Hermippus, Julian the Son, and others) translated out of the Chaldaick. Some of these Pletho and Psellus have explained with a Comment, adding two brief obscure Summaries of the Chaldaick Doctrine, which we have endeavoured to supply and clear, by adding and digesting the few Remains of those Sciences which lie dispersed amongst other Authors; taking care to reject such as are suppositious, or of no credit, as in the Historical Part, Annius Viterbiensis, Clemens Romanus, and the like: in the Philosophical, the Rabbinical Inventions, which (though incuriously admitted by Kircher, Gaulmin, and others) manifestly appear to have been of later Invention.

THE

# THE HISTORY OF THE CHALDAICK PHILOSOPHY.

## THE FIRST BOOK.

### *Of the Chaldæans.*

PHiloſophy is generally acknowledged even by the moſt Learned of the *Grecians* themſelves, to have had its Original in the Eaſt. None of the Eaſtern Nations, for Antiquity of Learning, ſtood in competition with the *Chaldæans* and *Ægyptians*. The *Ægyptians* pretended that the *Chaldæans* were a Colony of them, and had all their Learning and Inſtitutions from them, but they who are leſs intereſſed, and unprejudiced Judges of this Controverſie, aſſert that (*a*) *The Magi* (who derived their knowledge from the *Chaldæans*) *were more ancient than the Ægyptians*, that (*b*) *Aſtrological Learning paſſed from the* Chaldæans *to the* Ægyptians, *and from them to the* Grecians; and, in a word, that the *Chaldæans* were (*c*) *antiquiſſimum Doctorum genus*, the moſt ancient of Teachers.

(a) The Author of the Treatiſe Magus, cited by Lamius in Præm.
(b) Joſeph. l. 8.
(c) Cic.

*Chaldæa* is a part of *Babylonia* in *Aſia*, the Inhabitants termed *Chaſdim*, (as if *Chuſdim*) from *Chus* the Son of *Cham*. But the Philoſophy of the *Chaldæans* exceeded the Bounds of their Country, and diffuſed it ſelf into *Perſia* and *Arabia*, that border upon it; for which reaſon the Learning of the *Chaldæans*, *Perſians* and *Arabians* is comprehended under the general Title of CHALDAICK.

Of theſe therefore we ſhall begin with That, from which the other two were derived, and is more properly termed CHALDÆAN, in reſpect of the Country. In treating of which (as likewiſe of the other two) the firſt part of our Diſcourſe ſhall conſider the Authors or Profeſſors, and their Sects; the Second, their Doctrine.

## THE FOURTEENTH PART.

### *The Chaldæan Philoſophers, Inſtitution, and Sects.*

### SECT. I.

### *Of the Chaldæan Philoſophers.*

### CHAP. I.

### *The Antiquity of the Chaldaick Learning.*

THE Antiquity of the *Chaldaick* Learning, though ſuch as other Nations cannot equal, comes far ſhort of that to which they did pretend. When *Alexander*, by his Victories againſt *Darius*, was poſſeſſed of *Babylon*, (in the 4383d. year of the *Julian* Period) *Ariſtotle*, a curious promoter of Arts, requeſted his Nephew *Caliſthenes*, who accompanied *Alexander* in the Expedition, to inform him of what Antiquity the Learning of the *Chaldæans* might with reaſon be eſteemed. The *Chaldæans* themſelves pretended, that, from the time they had firſt begun to obſerve the Stars until this Expedition of *Alexander* into *Aſia*, were 470000 years. But far beneath this number were the Obſervations, which (as *Porphyrius* cited by (*a*) *Simplicius* relates) *Caliſthenes* ſent to *Ariſtotle*, being out of 1903 years, preſerved to that time, which from the 4383d. year of the *Julian* Period upward, falls upon the 2480th. And e-

(a) In lib. 2. de cœlo, p. 123. lin. 18.

ven this may with good reaſon be queſtioned, for there is not any thing extant in the Chaldaick Aſtrology more ancient than the Æra of *Nabonaſſar*, which began but on the 3967th of the *Julian* Period. By this Æra they compute their Aſtronomical Obſervations, of which if there had been any more ancient, *Ptolemy* would not have omitted them. (b) The firſt of theſe is in the firſt year of *Merodach*, (c) (that King of *Babylon* who ſent the Meſſage to *Ahaz* concerning the Miracle of the Dial) which was about the 27th. of *Nabonaſſar*. The next was in the 28th. of *Nabonaſſar*. (d) the third Obſervation is in the 127th. of *Nabonaſſar*, which is the 5th. year of *Nabopolaſſar*. This indeed is beyond all exception; for we have them confirmed by the Authority of *Ptolemy*, who ſhews the Reaſons and Rules for the Obſervations. What is more than this, ſeems to have been only hypothetical. And if we ſhall imagine a canicular Cycle, which conſiſts of 1461 years (and are 1460 natural years) to have been ſuppoſed by *Porphyrius* to make up his Hypotheſis, then there will want but 18 years of this number.

(b) *Ptol. lib. 4. cap. 6, 7.*
(c) *Ezek.*
(d) *Lib. 5. p. 325.*

## CHAP. II.

### *That there were ſeveral* Zoroaſters.

THe invention of Arts among the *Chaldæans* is generally aſcribed to *Zoroaſter*. The name *Zoroaſter* (to omit thoſe who give it a Greek Etymology from ζῶον and ἀςρονόμος) *Dinon* cited by (a) *Laertius* interprets ἀςρονόμον, rendred by his Tranſlators, a Worſhipper of the Stars. (b) *Kircher* finds fault with this Etymology, as being compounded out of two ſeveral Languages from the Greek ἄςρον, and the Chaldee *Zor*, and therefore endeavours to deduce it from (c) *tſura*, a figure, or (d) *tſajar*, to faſhion, and (e) *as* and (f) *ſtar*, hidden fire, as if it were (g) *Zairaſter*, faſhioning Images of hidden fire, or (h) *Tſuraſter*, *the Image of ſecret things*, with which the *Perſian Zaraſt* agreeth. But it hath been obſerved, that *Eſter* in the Perſian Language ſignifieth a *Star*. The former Particle *Zor* (i) *Bochartus* derives from the Hebrew *Schur*, to contemplate, and thereupon, for ἀςρονόμος, (in *Laertius*) reads ἀςροθεάτης, *a contemplator of the Stars*. But we find *Zor* uſed among other words (by compoſition) in the name *Zorobabel*, which we interpret, *born at Babylon*: *Zoroaſter* therefore properly ſignifies *the Son of the Stars*.

(a) *In Proœm.*
(b) *Obeliſc. Pamphil. l. 1. c. 2. §. 1.*
(c) צירא
(d) צויר
(e) עש
(f) סטר
(g) עיראסתר
(h) צור אסתר
(i) *Geogr. Sacr. l. 1. c. 1.*

The ſame name it is which ſome call *Zabratas*, others *Nazaratas*, others *Zares*, others *Zaran*, others *Zaratus*, others *Zaradas*; all which are but ſeveral corruptions from the Chaldee or Perſian word, which the Greeks moſt generally render *Zoroaſter*.

That there were ſeveral *Zoroaſters* (except *Goropius*, who paradoxically maintains there was not any one) none deny; but in reckoning them up, there is no ſmall diſagreement amongſt Writers, grounded chiefly upon (k) *Arnobius*, whom they differently interpret; his words are theſe, *Age nunc veniat quis ſuper igneam zonam Magus interiore ab orbe Zoroaſtres, Hermippo ut aſſentiamur Auctori: Bactrianus & ille conveniat, cujus Cteſias res geſtas hiſtoriarum exponit in primo; Armenius, Hoſtanis nepos, & familiaris Pamphilius Cyri.* (l) *Patricius*, (m) *Naudæus*, (n) *Kircher*, and others, conceive that *Arnobius* here mentions four *Zoroaſters*; the firſt a *Chaldæan*, the ſecond a *Bactrian*, the third a *Pamphilian* (named alſo *Erus*,) the fourth an *Armenian*, Son (as *Kircher* would have it) of *Hoſtanes*. (o) *Salmaſius* alters the Text thus, *Age nunc veniat quæſo per igneam Zonam Magus interiore ab orbe Zoroaſtres, Hermippo ut aſſentiamur Auctori, Bactrianus. Et ille conveniat, cujus Cteſias res geſtas hiſtoriarum exponit in primo, Armenius, Hoſtanis nepos, & familiaris Pamphilus Cyri.* Which words thus altered by himſelf, imply, as he pretends, but three *Zoroaſters*, *the firſt according to ſome, an Æthiopian (a Country near the torrid Zone) but, according to* Hermippus, *a Bactrian; the ſecond*, Armenius, *Nephew of* Hoſtanes, *of whoſe actions* Cteſias *gives account in the firſt Book of his Hiſtories; the third named* Pamphilus, *friend to* Cyrus. (p) *Urſinus*, from the ſame reading of the words, infers that *Arnobius* mentions *only two*, that *he manifeſtly explodes the Bactrian* Zoroaſter *of* Hermippus, *and that* Cteſias *confuting the fabulous Relation of* Eudoxus, *proved* Zoroaſter *to have lived in the time of* Cyrus. But the words of *Arnobius* ſeem not to require ſuch alteration; which will appear more, if we mention particularly all thoſe on whom the name of *Zoroaſter* was conferred.

(k) *Cont. gent.*
(l) *Mag. Phil.*
(m) *Apol. Mag. 8.*
(n) *Obeliſc. Pamphil.*
(o) *Plin. exercit.*
(p) *In Zor.*

The firſt a *Chaldæan*, the ſame whom (q) *Suidas* calls the *Aſſyrian*, adding that he died by fire from Heaven; to which Story perhaps *Arnobius* alludes, or to that other Relation mentioned by (r) *Dion Chryſoſtom*, that *Zoroaſter* the Perſian (for their Stories are confounded) *came to the People out of a fiery Mountain*; or elſe, by *fiery Zone*, he means the Seat of the *zoned Deities* juſt above the Empyreal or Corporeal Heaven, according to the Doctrine of the *Chaldæans*; for I find not any where that *Zoroaſter* was eſteemed an Æthiopian, or of interiour *Lybia*, as *Salmaſius* expounds. Concerning this *Zoroaſter*, *Arnobius* cites *Hermippus*: who, as (ſ) *Pliny* ſaith, *wrote in explication of his Verſes, and added Tables to his Volumes.*

(q) *In Zor.*
(r) *Orat. Boriſth.*
(ſ) *Lib. 36. c. 1.*

The ſecond a *Bactrian*; (t) *Juſtin* mentions *Zoroaſtres*, King of *Bactria* contemporary with *Ninus* the *Aſſyrian*, by whom he was ſubdued and ſlain; adding, *He was ſaid to be the firſt that invented Magical Arts, and obſerved the beginnings of the World, and the Motions of the Stars.* *Arnobius* ſaith, (u) *he conteſted with* Ninus, *not only by ſteel and ſtrength, but likewiſe by the Magical and abſtruſe Diſciplines of the Chaldæans.* The Actions of this *Zoroaſter*, *Cteſias* recorded in the firſt Book of his *Perſica*; for ſo *Arnobius*, (x) *Bactrianus & ille conveniat, cujus* Cteſias *res geſtas hiſtoriam exponit in primo.* The firſt ſix Books of that Work, treated (as (y) *Photius* ſhews) only of the *Aſſyrian* Hiſtory, and Paſſages that preceded the *Perſian* Affairs. Whereupon, I cannot aſſent to the conjecture of *Salmaſius*, who applies the citation of *Cteſias* to the Nephew of *Hoſtanes*, ſince *Hoſtanes* (as (z) *Pliny* affirms) lived under *Darius*. But (a) *Diodorus* names the King of *Bactria*, whom *Ninus* conquered, *Oxyartes*; and ſome old Mſs. of *Juſtin* (atteſted by *Ligerius*) *Oxyatres*, others *Zoroaſtes*: perhaps

(t) *Lib. 1.*
(u) *Cont. gent.*
(x) *Loc. cit.*
(y) *Biblioth.*
(z) *Lib. 36. c. 1.*
(a) *Lib.*

perhaps the nearneſs of the Names and Times (the *Chaldæan* living alſo under *Ninus*, as (*b*) *Suidas* relates) gave occaſion to ſome to confound them, and to aſcribe to the *Bactrian* what was proper to the *Chaldæan*; ſince it cannot be imagined, that the *Bactrian* was Inventer of thoſe Arts, in which the *Chaldæan*, who lived contemporary with him, was ſo well skilled. *Elichmannus*, a Perſian Writer, affirms the Arabians and Perſians to hold, that *Zoroaſter was not King of the Bactrians, but a Magus or Prophet; who by perſwaſions having wrought upon their King, firſt introduced a new Form of Superſtition amongſt them, whereof there are ſome remainders at this day.*

(b) *In Zor.*

The third a *Perſian*, ſo termed by (*c*) *Laertius* and others; the ſame whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſtyles a *Mede*; *Suidas*, a *Perſo-Mede*; Inſtitutor of the *Magi*, and Introductor of the *Chaldaick* Sciences amongſt the *Perſians*. Some conſound this *Zoroaſter* with the *Chaldæan*, and both of them (as (*d*) *Kircher* doth) with *Cham* the Son of *Noah*, not without a very great Anachroniſm: for we find the Word *Perſian* no where mentioned before the Prophet *Ezekiel*, neither did it come to be of note till the time of *Cyrus*. The occaſion of which miſtake ſeems to have been, for that *Zoroaſter* the *Perſian*, is by *Pliny*, *Laertius*, and others, ſtyled Inſtitutor of Magick, and of the *Magi*, which is to be underſtood no otherwiſe than that he firſt introduced them into *Perſia*. For (*e*) *Plutarch* acknowledgeth, *Zoroaſter inſtituted Magi amongſt the Chaldæans, in imitation of whom the Perſians had theirs alſo*: And the (*f*) *Arabick* Hiſtory, that *Zaraduſſit not firſt inſtituted, but reformed, the Religion of the Perſians and Magi, being divided into many Sects.*

(c) *In Proœm.*

(d) *Obſ. Pamphil. lib. 1. cap. 2. ſect. 1.*

(e) *De Iſid. & Oſirid.*

(f) Set forth by *Erpinius.*

The fourth a *Pamphylian*, commonly called *Er*, or *Erus Armenius*. That he alſo had the Name of *Zoroaſter*, (*g*) *Clement* witneſſeth: *The ſame Author*, (ſaith he, meaning *Plato*) *in the* 10th. *of his Politicks, mentioneth* Erus Armenius, *by deſcent a Pamphylian, who is* Zoroaſter; *now this* Zoroaſter *writes thus* (*h*) "*This wrote I*, Zoroaſter "Armenius, *by deſcent a Pamphylian, dying in War*, "*and being in Hades, I learned of the Gods.* This *Zoroaſter*, (*i*) *Plato* affirmeth to have been raiſed again to Life, after he had been Dead ten days, and laid on the Funeral Pyle, repeated by (*k*) *Valerius Maximus*, and (*l*) *Macrobius*. To this *Zoroaſter*, doubtleſs the latter part of *Arnobius*'s Words, with which Interpreters are ſo much preplexed, out to be referred, *Armenius Hoſtanis nepos, & familiaris Pamphylius Cyri.* Some conjecture he mentions two *Zoroaſters*; I rather conceive, the Words relate only to this one, and perhaps are corrupt, thus to be reſtored and diſtinguiſhed, *Armenius Hoſtanis nepos & familiaris, Pamphylius Erus: Armenius*, Nephew and Diſciple (in which ſenſe γνώριμος is uſually taken) of *Hoſtanes, Erus Pamphylius.*

(g) *Strom. lib.*

(h) Reading τάδε συνέγραψα Ζωροάστρης ὁ Ἀρμένιος.

(i) *Loc. cit.*

(k) *Lib. 1. c. 8.*

(l) *In ſomn. Scip.*

The fifth a *Proconneſian*, mentioned by (*m*) *Pliny*; *Such as are more diligent* (ſaith he) *place another* Zoroaſter, *a Proconneſian, a little before* Hoſtanes. This *Zoroaſter* might probably be *Ariſteas* the *Proconneſian*, who, according to (*n*) *Suidas*, lived in the time of *Cyrus* and *Cræſus*. He adds, that *his Soul could go out of his Body, and return as often as he pleaſed.* (*o*) *Herodotus* relates an inſtance hereof, not unlike that of *Erus Armenius*, that *he died ſuddenly in a Fuller's ſhop at* Proconneſus, *and was ſeen at the ſame time at* Cyzicus: *his Friends coming to fetch away his Body, could not find it. Seven years after he returned home, and publiſhed the Verſes which were afterwards called* Arimaſpian, a Poem deſcribing a Happy Life, or rather an Imaginary Civil Government after ſuch a manner as he conceived moſt perfect. This we may gather from (*p*) *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who ſaith, that *the Hyperborean and Arimaſpian Cities, and the Elizian Fields are Forms of Civil Governments of juſt Perſons; of which kind is* Plato's *Commonwealth.*

(m) *Lib. 36. c. 1.*

(n) *In Ariſteas.*

(o) *Lib.*

(p) *Strom. lib.*

To theſe may be added a *ſixth Zoroaſter*, (for ſo (*q*) *Apuleius* calls him) who lived at *Babylon*, at what time *Pythagoras* was carried Priſoner thither by *Cambyſes*. The ſame Author terms him, *omnis divini arcanum Antiſtitem*, adding, that *he was the chief Perſon whom* Pythagoras *had for Maſter*; probably, therefore, the ſame with *Zabratus*, by whom (*r*) *Diogenes* affirms, *he was cleanſed from the pollutions of his life paſt, and inſtructed from what things vertuous Perſons ought to be free; and learn the Diſcourſe concerning Nature* (Phyſick,) *and what are the Principles of the Univerſe*; The ſame with *Nazaratas* the *Aſſyrian*, whom *Alexander* in his Book of Pythagorick Symbols, affirms to have been Maſter to *Pathagoras*; the ſame whom *Suidas* calls *Zares*; *Cyril*, *Zaran*; *Plutarch*, *Zaratas.*

(q) *Flor.*

(r) *Porphyr. vit. Pythag.*

That there ſhould be ſo many *Zoroaſters*, and ſo much confuſion amongſt Authors that write of them, by miſtaking one for another, is nothing ſtrange; for, from extraordinary Perſons, Authors of ſome Publick Benefit, they who afterwards were Eminent in the ſame Kind, were uſually called by the ſame Name. Hence it is, that there were ſo many *Belus's*, *Saturns*, *Jupiters*; and, conſequently, ſo much confuſion in their Stories. The like may be ſaid of *Zoroaſter* the *Chaldæan*, who being the Inventer of Magical and Aſtronomical Sciences, they who introduced the ſame into other Countries, as *Zoroaſter* the *Perſian* did, in imitation (as *Plutarch* ſaith) of the *Chaldæans*, and ſuch likewiſe as were eminently skilful in thoſe Sciences, as the *Bactrian*, the *Pamphylian*, and the *Proconneſian*, are deſcribed to have been, were called by the ſame Name.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of the Chaldæan* Zoroaſter, *Inſtitutor of the Chaldaick Philoſophy.*

THE firſt of theſe *Zoroaſters* termed the *Chaldæan* or *Aſſyrian*, is generally acknowledged the Inventer of Arts and Sciences amongſt the *Chaldæans*, but concerning the time in which he lived, there is a vaſt diſagreement amongſt Authors.

Some of theſe err ſo largely, as not to need any Confutation; ſuch are (*a*) *Eudoxus*, and the Author of the Treatiſe entituled Μαγικὸν, commonly aſcribed to *Ariſtotle*, (and ſo (*b*) *Pliny* cites it,) who aſſerts he lived 5000 years before *Plato*. Such likewiſe are *Hermippus*, *Hemodorus* the Platonick, *Plutarch*, and *Gemiſtus Pletho* (following *Plutarch*,) who place him 5000 years before the Deſtruction of *Troy*.

(a) *Laert. in Proœm.*

(b) *Lib. 36. c. 1.*

Others conceive *Zoroaster* to be the same with *Cham*, the Son of *Noah*; of which Opinion (not to mention the *Pseudo-Berosus* of *Annius Viterbiensis*) were *Didymus* of *Alexandria*, *Agathias*, *Scholasticus*, and *Abenephi*: *Cham* (saith the last) *was the Son of* Noah; *he first taught the worshipping of Idols, and first introduced Magical Arts unto the World, his Name is* Zuraster, *he the second Adris, a perpetual fire.* Hither also some refer the Rabbinical stories concerning *Cham*, that (*c*) *by Magick he emasculated his Father*, &c. (*d*) That Noah *being by this means disabled from getting a fourth Son, cursed the fourth Son of* Cham; That (*e*) *this curse* (which was that he should be a Servant of Servants) *implied strange service*, viz. *Idolatry*; That (*f*) *hereupon the Posterity of* Chus *became Idolaters*, Cham *himself being the first that made Idols, and introduced strange service into the World, and taught his Family the worshipping of Fire.*

(*c*) *R. Levi in Gen. R. Samuel. in fortalitio fidei.*
(*d*) *Rassi.*
(*e*) *Aben Esra in Gen.*
(*f*) *R. Hanasse in Scuto fortium.*

The greater part of Writers place him later. *Epiphanius* in the time of *Nimrod*, with whom agree the Observations (*g*) said to be sent by *Callisthenes* to *Aristotle* of 1903 years before *Alexander*'s taking *Babylon*, for from the year of the *Julian* Period, in which *Babylon* was taken, the 1903. upward falls on the 2480. of the same *Æra*; about which time *Nimrod* laid the Foundations of that City, and there setled his Empire.

(*g*) *Simplic.*

*Suidas* relates him contemporary with *Ninus* King of *Assyria*; *Eusebius*, with *Semiramis* Wife of *Ninus*; *Ninus* is placed by Chronologers above the 3447. of the *Julian* Period.

*Suidas* (elsewhere) reckons him to have lived 500 years before the taking of *Troy*; *Xanthus*, 600 years before *Xerxes*'s Expedition into *Greece*. *Troy*, according to the *Marmor Arundelianum* was taken 434 years before the first Olympiad. *Xerxes*'s Expedition was on the first of the 75. Olympiad, *viz.* the of the *Julian* Period. The accompt of *Suidas* therefore falls on the 3030. that of *Xanthus* on the 3634. of the *Julian* Period. The latest of these seemeth to me most Historical, and agreeable to Truth.

Of his Birth, Life, and Death, there is little to be found; and even that, uncertain, whether appliable to him, or to the *Persian*. *Plato* styles *Zoroaster the Son of Oromases*; but *Oromases* (as *Plutarch* and others shew) was a Name given to God by *Zoroaster* the *Persian*, and his Followers: whence I conceive that *Plato* is to be understood of the Persian *Zoroaster*, who perhaps in regard of his extraordinary knowledge, was either Allegorically styled, or fabulously reported to be the Son of God, or of some good Genius, as *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, and many other Excellent Persons were.

(*h*) *Lib.* 36. *c.* 1. (*h*) *Pliny* reports, that *Zoroaster* (not particularizing, which of them) *laughed the same day he was Born*; and that *his brain did beat so hard that it heaved up the hand laid upon it, a presage of his future Science*; and that *he lived in the Desarts twenty years upon Cheese so tempered, as that it became not old. The Assyrian* Zoroaster, (saith *Suidas*) *prayed he might dye by fire from Heaven, and advised the Assyrians to preserve his Ashes, assuring that as long as they kept them, their Kingdom should never fail*; but *Cedrenus* attributes the same to the *Persian*.

Of Writings attributed to him, are mentioned,

(*i*) *Verses, two millions*, upon which *Hermippus* wrote a Comment, and added Tables to them. (*i*) *Plin. lib.* 36. *c.* 1.

*Oracles*, perhaps part of the foresaid Verses; upon these *Syrianus* wrote a Comment in twelve Books.

*Of Agriculture, or Mechanicks*; *Pliny* alledgeth a rule for sowing; and the Author of the *Geoponicks*, many Experiments under his Name: but this was either spurious, or written by some other *Zoroaster*.

*Revelations*; suppositious also, forged (as *Porphyrius* professeth) by some *Gnosticks*.

To these add, cited by the *Arabians*, *a Treatise of Magick*; and another *of Dreams, and their Interpretations*, cited by *Gelaldin* frequently; Inventions doubtless of latter times.

Some ascribe the Treatises of the Persian *Zoroaster* to the *Chaldean*; but of those hereafter.

## CHAP. IV.

*Of* Belus, *another reputed Inventer of Sciences amongst the* Chaldæans.

SOme there are who ascribe the Invention of Astronomy to *Belus*, of which Name there were two Persons, one a *Tyrian*, the other an *Assyrian*, who reigned in *Babylonia* next after the *Arabians*, about the 2682 year of the World, according to the accompt of *Africanus*; for whose Inventions the *Babylonians* honoured him as a God. *There is yet standing*, (saith (*a*) *Pliny*) *the Temple of* Jupiter Belus; *he was the Inventer of the Science of the Stars*, and (*b*) *Diodorus*, speaking of the *Ægyptians*, *They affirm that afterwards many Colonies went out of* Ægypt, *and were dispersed over the Earth, and that* Belus *reputed to be Son of* Neptune *and* Lybia, *carried one to* Babylon; *and, making choice of the River* Euphrates, *to settle it instituted Priests after the manner of those in* Ægypt, *exempt from all publick Charges and Duties, which the Babylonians call Chaldæans; these observed the Stars, imitating the Ægyptian Priests, Naturalists and Astrologers.* Thus *Diodorus*. But that *Belus* was Son of *Neptune* and *Lybia*, is nothing but Greek Mythology; that he brought a Colony out of *Ægypt* into *Babylon*, is fabulous. For the *Ægyptians* had not any Correspondence with Foreigners for a long time after. But to confirm that he was skilful in those Sciences, (*c*) *Ælian* gives this Relation. (*a*) *Lib.* (*b*) *Lib.* 1. (*c*) *Var. Hist.*

Xerxes *Son of* Darius, *breaking up the Monument of ancient* Belus, *found an Urn of Glass, in which his dead Body lay in Oyl; but the Urn was not full, it wanted a hand-breadth of the Top: next the Urn there was a little Pillar, on which it was written, That whosoever should open the Sepulcher, and did not fill up the Urn, should have ill fortune, which* Xerxes *reading grew afraid, and commanded that they should pour Oyl into it with all speed; notwithstanding, it was not filled: Then he commanded to pour into it the second time; but neither did it increase at all thereby: So that at last failing of success, he gave over; and shutting up the Monument, departed very sad. Nor did the*

*the Event foretold by the Pillar deceive him: for he led an Army of* 50 *Myriads against* Greece, *where he received a great Defeat, and returning home, died miserably, being murthered by his own Son, in the Night-time, a-bed.*

(d) Diod. l. 2. To this *Belus*, *Semiramis* his Daughter (*d*) *erected a Temple in the middle of* Babylon, *which was exceeding high, and by the help thereof the* Chaldæans *who addicted themselves there to Contemplation of the Stars, did exactly observe their risings and settings.*

## CHAP. V.

### *Other Chaldæan Philosophers.*

FRom *Zoroaster* were derived the Chaldæan Magi and Philosophers his Disciples; amongst whom, (*a*) *Pliny* mentions one *Azonaces* Master of *Zoroaster*, which doubtless must have been meant of some later *Zoroaster*, there being many of that name, as we shewed formerly.

(a) Lib. 36.

(b) Loc. cit. By the same (*b*) Author are mentioned of the ancient Magi, Marmaridius *a Babylonian, and* Zarmocenidas *an Assyrian; of whom nothing is left but their Names, no Monuments extant of them.*

(c) Suid. To these add (*c*) Zoromasdres *a Chaldæan Philosopher, who wrote Mathematicks and Physicks*; and *Teucer* a Babylonian, an ancient Author, who wrote concerning the *Decanates*.

(d) Lib. *The Mathematicians also*, saith (*d*) Strabo, *mention some of these, as* Cidenas, *and* Naburianus, *and* Sudinus, *and* Seleucus *of* Seleucia *a Chaldæan, and many other Eminent Persons.*

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of* Berosus, *who first introduced the Chaldaick Learning into* Greece.

AFter these flourished *Berosus*, or, as the *Greeks* call him Βηρώσσος, which name (*a*) some interpret *the Son of* Oseas: for, as is manifest from *Elias*, בר with the *Chaldees* is the same with כר in *Syraick*; whence *Bar-Ptolemeus*, as if the Son of *Ptolemy*, *Bar Timæus*, and the like: *Gorionides* and other Rabbins call him (*b*) *Bar-Hosea*, The *Arabians Barasa*; so *Abenephi*, and others.

(a) Jos. Scal. in Eusib.

(b) בר הושיע

(c) Voss. de hist. Græc. lib. 1. c. 21. (*c*) *Barthius* saith, that there are some who assert him contemporary with *Moses*, which Opinion justly he condemns as ridiculous; (*d*) *Clandius Verderius* in his Censure upon the *Annian Berosus* affirms, he lived a little before the Reign of *Alexander* the Great; upon what Authority, I know not. That he lived in the time of *Alexander*, we find in the Oration of *Tatian* against the Gentiles; but the same *Tatian* adds, he dedicated his History to that *Antiochus*, who was the third from *Alexander*. But neither is this reading unquestionable; for (*e*) *Eusebius* cites the same place of *Tatian* thus, Berosus *the* Babylonian, *Priest of* Belus *at* Babylon, *who lived in the time of* Alexander, *and dedicated to* Antiochus, *the third after* Seleucus, *a History of the* Chaldæans *in three Books, and relates the Actions of their Kings, mentions one of them named* Nabuchodonosor, &c. Here we find μετὰ Σέλευκον, but in the Text of *Tatian*, μετ' αὐτὸν *after Alexander*. And indeed this Reading seems most consonant to the Story. The next to *Alexander* was *Seleucus Nicator*: the next to him, *Antiochus* Σωτὴρ; The third, *Antiochus* Θεὸς, who began his Reign sixty one years after the death of *Alexander*: Now, it is possible that *Berosus* at the time of *Alexander*'s taking *Babylon* might be thirty years old or less; and at his 90th. year, or somewhat younger, might dedicate his History to *Antiochus* Θεὸς. Or we may say, that by *Antiochus* the third from *Alexander* is meant *Antiochus* Σωτὴρ; reckoning *Alexander* himself inclusively for one, *Seleucus* the second, *Antiochus* Σωτὴρ the third; to whom from the death of *Alexander* are but 44 years: And in approving this Accompt we may retain the Reading of *Eusebius*, supposing the first to be *Seleucus*, the second *Antiochus* Σωτὴρ, the third *Antiochus* Θεὸς: neither is this inconsistent with *Gesner*'s Translation of the Words of *Tatian*, κατ' Ἀλέξανδρον γενόμενος, as in *Stephens* Edition of *Eusebius*; or κατ' Ἀλέξανδρον γεγονὼς, as in *Tatian* himself, *qui Alexandri ætate vixit*: which Interpretation (*f*) *Onuphrius Panvinus* also follows. But considering these Words more intently, it came into my mind (saith *Vossius*) that it might better be rendred, *qui Alexandri ætate natus est*, whereby all scruple may be taken away, supposing *Berosus* to have been born but two years before *Alexander*'s death; by which accompt he must have been but 64 years old when *Antiochus* Θεὸς, to whom he dedicated his Book, began to Reign: which way soever it is, *Berosus* published his History in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; for he reigned 38 years, and in the sixth year of his Reign *Antiochus Soter* began to reign in *Syria* in the 22d of *Antiochus* Θεὸς, to one of whom *Berosus* dedicated his Book. But by no means can we assent to the Learned (*g*) *Conradus Gesnerus*, who by *Alexander* conceives to be meant not he who was sirnamed the Great, Son of *Philip*, but that *Alexander* who succeeded *Demetrius Soter*, in the Kingdom of *Syria*, and was succeeded by *Demetrius Nicanor*; by *Antiochus* understanding *Antiochus Sedetes*, who reigned next after *Demetrius Nicanor*: for if it were so, *Berosus* must have been a whole Age later than *Manetho*; but *Manetho* flourished under *Philadelphus* (as *Vossius* elsewhere proves.) *Philadelphus* died in the third year of the 133d Olympiad; but *Antiochus Sedetes* invaded *Syria* in the first of the 160th. Olympiad. How then could *Berosus* live so late, who was a little precedent to *Manetho*, as *Syncellus* expressly affirms? Again, we may assert the time of *Berosus* another way. (*h*) *Pliny* saith, he gave accompt of 480 years, which doubtless were years of *Nabonassar*: now the Æra of *Nabonassar* begun in the second year of the 8th Olympiad; from which if we reckon 480, it will fall upon the latter end of *Antiochus Soter*'s Reign; wherefore *Berosus* dedicated his Book either to him or to *Antiochus* Θεὸς his Son. These Arguments will not suffer us to doubt of the time of *Berosus*.

(d) Adversar. 51. 7.

(e) Præpar. Evang. l. 10.

(f) Lib. de Sibyl.

(g) In Tatian.

(h) Lib. 6. c. 55.

This *Berosus* is mentioned by many of the Ancients. (*i*) *Vitruvius* saith, he *first settled in the Island* Coos, *and there opened Learning*. (*k*) *Josephus*

(i) Lib. 9. c. 7.

(k) Contra Apion. lib. 1.

ſephus that *he introduced the Writings of the* Chaldæans *concerning Aſtronomy and Philoſophy among the* Grecians. (*l*) *Pliny* that *the* Athenians, *for his divine Predictions, dedicated to him publickly in their* Gymnaſium *a Statue with a golden Tongue.* He is mentioned likewiſe by (*m*) *Tertullian*, and the Author of the (*n*) *Chronicon Alexandrinum.*

(*l*) *Lib. 7. c. 37.*
(*m*) *In Apologet. c. 19.*
(*n*) P. 48.

He wrote *Babylonicks* or *Chaldaicks*, in three Books: for they are cited promiſcuouſly under both theſe Titles: *The Babylonicks of* Beroſus (*o*) *Athenæus* cites; but *Tatian* ſaith, *he wrote the Chaldaick Hiſtory in three Books.* And (*p*) *Clemens Alexandrinus* cites *Beroſus, his third of Chaldaicks*; and elſewhere, ſimply *his Chaldaick Hiſtories.* And *Agathias* affirms, *he wrote the Antiquities of the* Aſſyrians *and* Medes; for thoſe Books contained not only the *Aſſyrian* or *Chaldæan* affairs, but alſo the *Median*; (*q*) *Agathias, as ſomewhere* Beroſus *the Babylonian*, and *Athenocles*, and *Sinacus*, relate, who have *Recorded the Antiquities of* Aſſyrians *and* Medes. Out of this Work (*r*) *Joſephus* hath preſerved ſome Excellent Fragments; But the ſuppoſititious *Beroſus* of *Annius* is moſt trivial and fooliſh, of the ſame kind as his *Megaſthenes* and *Archilochus*; many Kings are there reckoned which are no where to be found; and ſcarce is there any of thoſe Fragments which *Joſephus* cites out of the true *Beroſus*. on the contrary, ſome things are plainly repugnant, as when he ſaith, *Semiramis* built *Babylon*, whereas *Joſephus* ſaith *Beroſus* wrote, that it was not built by *Semiramis.*

(*o*) *Deipn. l. 14.*
(*p*) *Strom. 1.*
(*q*) *Lib. 2.*
(*r*) *Antiquit. Jud. 1. 5. contra Apion. Lib. 1.*

A Daughter of this *Beroſus* is mentioned by (*ſ*) *Juſtin Martyr* a Babylonian *Sibyl*, who propheſied at *Cumæ*; This cannot be underſtood of that *Cumæan Sibyl*, who lived in the time of *Tarquinius Priſcus*; for betwixt *Tarquinius Priſcus*, and the firſt Pontick War (in which time *Beroſus* lived) are 245 years; but of ſome other *Cumæan Sibyl* of much later time. That there were ſeveral *Sibyls*, who propheſied at *Cumæ*, (*t*) *Onuphrius* hath already proved out of the *Treatiſe of wonderful things* aſcribed to *Ariſtotle*; and out of *Martianus Capella*, and other Writers.

(*ſ*) *Paræn.*
(*t*) *Lib. de Sibyl.*

*Beroſus* being the Perſon who introduced the *Chaldaick* Learning into *Greece*, we ſhall with him cloſe the Hiſtory of the Learned Perſons or Philoſophers amongſt the *Chaldæans.*

## SECT. II.

## *The Chaldaick Inſtitution, and Sects.*

### CHAP. I.

### *That all Profeſſors of Learning were more peculiarly termed* Chaldæans.

PHiloſophy or Learning was not taught and propogated by the *Chaldæans* after the Grecian manner, communicated by publick Profeſſors indifferently to all ſorts of Auditors; but reſtrained to certain Families. Theſe were by a more peculiar compellation termed *Chaldæans*; addicted themſelves wholly to ſtudy; had a proper habitation allotted for them; and lived exempt from all publick Charges and Duties.

Of theſe is (*a*) *Diodorus* to be underſtood; who relates, that Belus *inſtituted Prieſts exempt from all publick Charges and Duties*, *whom the* Babylonians *call* Chaldæans. *Strabo* adds, that *there was a peculiar Habitation in* Babylonia *allotted for the Philoſophers of that Country, who were termed* Chaldæans, and that *they inhabited a certain Tribe of the* Chaldæans, *and a portion of* Babylonia, *adjoyning to the* Arabians *and the* Perſian-*Gulf.*

(*a*) *Lib. 1.*

There were thoſe *Chaldæans* who, as (*b*) *Cicero* ſaith, *were named not from the Art, but Nation.* And of whom he is elſewhere to be underſtood, when he affirms that (*c*) *in* Syria *the* Chaldæans *excel for knowledge of the Stars, and acuteneſs of Wit*; and (*d*) *Q. Curtius*, who deſcribing the Solemnity of thoſe who went out of *Babylon* to meet *Alexander*, ſaith, *Then went the Magi after their manner*; *next whom, the* Chaldæans, *Non vates modo ſed artifices Babyloniorum*: Where though ſome interpret *Artifices*, thoſe *Aſtrologers who made Inſtruments for the practice of their Art*; yet *Curtius* ſeems to intend no more than the *Chaldæans* of both ſorts, the Plebeian Tradeſmen, and the Learned.

(*b*)
(*c*)
(*d*) *Lib.*

Of theſe *Chaldæans* peculiarly ſo termed, is (*e*) *Laertius* likewiſe to be underſtood, when he cites as Authors of Philoſophy *amongſt the* Perſians *the Magi*, *amongſt the* Babylonians *or* Aſſyrians *the* Chaldæans. And *Heſychius*, who interprets the word *Chaldæans*, *a kind of Magi that know all things.*

(*e*) *In prooem.*

### CHAP. II.

### *Their Inſtitution.*

THeſe *Chaldæans* preſerved their Learning within themſelves, by a continued Tradition from Father to Son. *They learn not*, (ſaith (*a*) *Diodorus*) *after the ſame faſhion as the* Greeks: *For amongſt the* Chaldæans, *Philoſophy is delivered by Tradition in the Family, the Son receiving it from the Father, being exempted from all other Employment*; *and thus having their Parents for their Teachers, they learn all things fully and abundantly, believing more firmly what is communicated to them: and being brought up in theſe Diſciplines from Children, they acquire a great habit in Aſtrology, as well becauſe that Age is apt to Learn, as for that they imploy ſo much time in Study. But among the* Greeks, *for the moſt part they come unprepared, and attain Philoſophy very late*; *and having beſtowed ſome time therein, quit it to ſeek out means for their Lively-hood: and though ſome few give themſelves up wholly to Philoſophy, yet they perſiſt in Learning only for gain, continually innovating ſome things in the moſt conſiderable Doctrines, and never follow thoſe that went before them*; *whereas the* Barbarians *perſevering always in the ſame, receive each of them firmly: But the* Greeks *aiming at gain, by this Profeſſion erect new Sects, and contradicting one another in the moſt conſiderable Theorems, make their Diſciples dubious*; *and their minds, as long as they live,*

(*a*) *Lib. 1.*

*live, are in ſuſpenſe and doubt, neither can they firmly believe any thing: for if a man examine the chiefeſt Sects of the Philoſophers, he will find them moſt different from one another, and directly oppoſite in the principal aſſertions.*

## CHAP. III.

*Sects of the* Chaldæans *diſtinguiſhed according to their ſeveral Habitations.*

AS all Profeſſors of Learning amongſt the *Chaldæans*, were diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of the People by the common Denomination of the Country, *Chaldæans*; ſo were they diſtinguiſhed amongſt themſelves into Sects, denominated from the ſeveral Parts of the Country, wherein they were ſeated: whereof (*a*) *Pliny* and (*b*) *Strabo* mention *Hipparenes* from *Hipparenum*, a City in *Meſopotamia*; *Babylonians*, from *Babylon*; *Orchenes*, (*c*) (*a third Chaldaick Doctrine*) from *Orchoë* a City of *Chaldæa*; and *Borſippenes*, from *Borſippe*, another City of *Babylonia* dedicated to *Apollo* and *Diana*. And though (*d*) *Diodorus* prefer the *Chaldæans* before the *Grecians*, for their perſeverance in the ſame Doctrines without Innovations; yet we muſt not infer thence, that there was an univerſal conſent of Doctrine amongſt them; but only, that each of them was conſtant in belief, and maintenance of his own Sect, without introducing any new Opinion. For, that amongſt theſe Sects there was no abſolute agreement, is manifeſt from *Strabo*, who adds that (*e*) *they did* (*as indifferent Sects*) *aſſert contrary Doctrines*; (*f*) *ſome of them calculated Nativities*, others diſapproved it; Whence (*g*) *Lucretius*,

(*a*) *Lib.* 6. *c.* 26.
(*b*) *Lib.* 16. *p.* 739.
(*c*) *Lib.*
(*d*) *Supra citat.*
(*e*) *Loc. citat.*
(*f*) *Loc. citat.*
(*g*) *Lib.*

*The Babylonick Doctrine doth oppoſe*
*The Chaldee, and Aſtrology o'rthrows.*

## CHAP. IV.

*Sects of the* Chaldæans *diſtinguiſhed according to their ſeveral Sciences.*

ANother (more proper) diſtinction of Sects amongſt the Learned *Chaldæans*, there was, according to the ſeveral Sciences which they profeſt. The Prophet (*a*) *Daniel* relating how *Nebuchadonoſar* ſent for all the Learned Men, to tell him his Dream, takes occaſion to name the principal of them, which were four; *Hhartumim*, *Aſhaphim*, *Mecaſhphim*, *Chaſdim*.

(*a*) *Chap.* 2. *v.* 2.

*Hhartumim*, are by *Abrahaniel*, expounded *Magi, skilful in Natural Things*; and by *Jachiades*, *thoſe Magi who addicted themſelves to contemplative Science*, which interpretation ſuits well with the Derivation of the Word; not as ſome would have from *Charmini*, *Burnt bones*, (for that the *Magi* performed their Rites with Dead mens bones) nor from *Charat*, a *Pen* or *Scribe*, (in regard the Ægyptians uſed to call their wiſe Perſons, Scribes:) for the Word in *Chaldee* is not taken in that ſenſe; but from *Charad* a Perſian Word, (by Tranſmutation of ד into ת) ſignifying *to know*, whence *Elnacinus* inſtead of this *Perſe-Chaldee*, uſeth two Arabick Words, *Alhochamaon*, *Walarraphaon*; *Wiſe and Knowing Perſons*. The *Hhartumim*, therefore, were not (as commonly rendered) *Magicians*, but rather ſuch as ſtudied the Nature of all things, under which Contemplation is comprehended Theology, and Phyſick, the Knowledge of Beings, Divine and Natural.

*Aſhaphim* (*b*) *Jachiades* expounds thoſe *Magi qui ſcientiam activam excolebant*: ſo *Conſtantinus* renders him, but adds, *that* Jachiades *is miſtaken, and that the* Aſhaphim *were rather the ſame as* Souphoun *in Arabick*, *Wiſe*, *Religious Perſons*. This indeed, is the more probable; *Souphoun* is an Attribute, proper to thoſe who delivered all Theology, Myſtically, and Allegorically, derived from *Souph*, *Wooll*; either for that the Garments of theſe Profeſſors of Theology, were made only of *Wooll*, never of Silk; or, from *attyring* and *vailing* the things which concern the Love of God, under the Figures of viſible things: whence is derived, the Word *Hatſeviph*, *Myſtick Theology*; and perhaps, from the Hebrew Root, *Aſhaph*, comes the Greek σοφὸς, the firſt Attribute given by the Greeks to Learned Perſons, afterwards changed into φιλόσοφος. Theſe *Aſhaphim*, the ordinary Interpretation of the Text in *Daniel* ſtyles *Aſtrologers*: and *Aben Ezra* derives the Word from אשף *my-light*, *becauſe they obſerve the Heavens, at that time*; But the Aſtrologers are meant afterwards by the Word *Chaſdim*, (laſt of the four.) The *Aſhaphim* of the *Chaldæans*, ſeem rather to be the ſame with the *Magi* of the *Perſians*, Prieſts, the Profeſſors of Religious Worſhip, which they termed *Magick*.

(*b*) *In Dan. p.* 34.

*Mecaſhphim* properly ſignifieth *Revealers*, (that is,) of abſtruſe things: the Word is derived from *Chaſhaph*, which the *Arabians* ſtill uſe in the ſame ſenſe of *Revealing*: *Mecaſhphim* are generally taken, (as by *R. Moſes*, *Nachmarides*, *Abrabaniel*, and others) for ſuch as practiſed Diabolical Arts: not improperly rendered, *Sorcerers*.

*Chaſdim*, (or *Chaldæans*) was an Attribute (as we ſhewed formerly) conferred in a particular ſenſe upon the Learned Perſons of the *Chaldæans*: Amongſt whom, by a reſtriction yet more particular, it ſignified the Profeſſors of Aſtrology, this being a Study to which they were more eſpecially addicted, and for which moſt eminent; theſe are thoſe *Chaſdim*, whom (*c*) *Strabo* ſtyles χαλδαϊκὸς ἀστρονομικὸς, *Aſtronomical Chaldæans*.

(*c*) *Lib* 16. *p.* 739.

Beſides theſe four kinds (which ſeem to have been the Principal,) there are ſeveral others mentioned, and prohibited by the Levitical Law, *Deut.* 18. 10. *Choſer*, *Caſmim*, *Megnonenim*, *Menacheſhim*, *Hhober*, *Hhaber*, *Shel*, *Ob*, *Jideoni*, *Doreſh el Hammetim*, *R. Maimonides* reciting them all, adds, that, *they were ſeveral ſorts of Diviners ſprung up of old amongſt the* Chaldæans. *Jachiades* mentions them, as particular kinds of the *Mecaſhphim*.

THE

# THE FIFTEENTH PART.

## *The Chaldaick Doctrine.*

FRom the four general kinds of the Professors of Learning amongst the *Chaldæans*, mentioned by the Prophet *Daniel*, (of which we (a) last treated) may be inferred, of what Parts or Sciences the *Chaldaick* Doctrine did consist. The *Hhartumim* were employed in *Divine* and *Natural Speculation*; The *Ashaphim*, in *Religious Worship, and Rites*; The *Mecashphim*, and *Chasdim* in *Divination*; these by *Astrology*, those by *other Arts*: which two last, *Diodorus*, speaking of the Learned *Chaldæans*, comprehends under the common name of *Astrologers*; the other two, under that of *Natural Philosophers*, and *Priests*: for he saith, *they imitated the* Ægyptian *Priests, Naturalists, and Astrologers.*

(a) Part. 1. Sect. 2. cap 4.

In treating therefore of the *Chaldaick* Doctrine, we shall first lay down their *Theology*, and *Physick*, the proper Study of the *Hhartumim*; Next, their *Astrology*, and other Arts of *Divination*, practised by the *Chasdim*, and *Mecashphim*: Thirdly, their *Theurgy*, and Lastly, their *Gods*. Which Contemplation and Rites were peculiar to the *Ashaphim*.

## SECT. I.

### *Theology, and Physick.*

THe *Chaldaick* Doctrine, in the first place considers all Beings, as well Divine, as Natural: the Contemplation of the first, is Theology; of the latter, Physick.

(a) Zoroaster *divided all things into three Kinds; the first Eternal; the second had a beginning in time, but shall have no end; the third Mortal*: the two first belong to Theology. *The Subject of Theology*, (saith (b) *Eusebius*, speaking doubtless of the Followers of *Zoroaster*) *they divided into four Kinds; the first is God, the Father and King: next him, there followeth a multitude of other Gods*; in the third place they rank *Dæmons*; in the fourth *Heroes*, or, according to others, Angels, Dæmons, and Souls.

(a) Psell. in Oracc. p. 51.

(b) Præp. Evang. lib. 4. cap. 3.

The third, or mortal kind is the Subject of *Physick*: It comprehends all things material; which they divide into seven Worlds, one *Empyreal*, three *Ætherial*, three *Corporeal*.

### CHAP. I.

#### *Of the Eternal Being, God.*

THe first kind of things (according to *Zoroaster*) is Eternal, the Supream God. *In the first place* (saith *Eusebius*) *they conceive that God the Father and King ought to be ranked.*; This the *Delphian* Oracle (cited by *Porphyrius*) confirms.

> *Chaldees and Jews wise only, worshipping*
> *Purely a self-begotten God and King.*

This is that Principle of which the Author of the Chaldaick Summary saith, *They conceive there is one Principle of all things, and declare that it is one and good.*

(a) *God* (*as* Pythagoras *learnt of the Magi, who term him* Oromasdes) *in his Body resembles Light, in his Soul Truth*; That God (according to the Chaldaick Opinion) is Light, besides the Testimony of *Eusebius*, may be inferred from the Oracles of *Zoroaster*, wherein are frequently mentioned *the* (b) *Light, Beams*, and *Splendour of the Father.*

(a) Porph. vit. Pythag.

(b) Φάος. διὸ γνῶ, ἐξ φέγγος φατέος.

In the same sense they likewise termed God *a Fire*; for *Ur* in Chaldee signifying both *Light* and *Fire*, they took Light and Fire promiscuously (as amongst many others *Plato* doth when he saith that *God began to compound the whole Body of the World out of Fire and Earth*: by which Fire he afterwards professeth to mean *the Sun*, whom he styles *the brightest and whitest of things*, as if Light and Fire, Brightness and Whiteness were all one;) this is manifest from the *Zoroastrean* Oracles also; wherin he is sometimes called simply *Fire*, sometimes the *Paternal Fire, the one Fire, the first Fire above.*

(a) Euseb.

(b) Plut.

(c) Plut.

Upon this Ground (doubtless) was the Worship of Fire instituted by the Ancient *Chaldæans*, and (c) from them derived to the *Persians*; of which hereafter, when we shall come to speak of their Gods and Religious Rites.

(c) Agath.

### CHAP. II.

#### *The Emanation of Light or Fire from God.*

GOd being (as we have shewn) an Intellectual Light or Fire *did not* (as the Oracle saith) *shut up his own Fire within his Intellectual Power*, but communicated it to all Creatures; first and immediately to the first Mind (as the same Oracles assert) and to all other æviternal and incorporeal Beings, (under which notion are comprehended a multitude of God's Angels, good Dæmons, and the Souls of Men:) The next Emanation is the Supramundane Light, an Incorporeal Infinite luminous Space, in which the Intellectual Beings reside; The Supramundane Light kindles the first Corporeal World, the Empyreum or fiery Heaven, which being immediately beneath the Incorporeal Light, is the highest, brightest and rarest of Bodies. The Empyreum diffuseth it self through the Æther, which is the next Body below it, a Fire less refined than the Empyreum: But that it is Fire, the more condensed parts thereof, the Sun and Stars, sufficiently evince; from the Æther this Fire is transmitted to the Material and Sublunary World; for though the Matter whereof it consists be not Light but Darkness, (as are also the material or bad Dæmons) yet this (a) *vivificative Fire* actuates and gives Life to all it's Parts,

(a) Ζωογόνον πῦρ, Orac.

Parts, insinuating, diffusing it self, and penetrating even to the very Center: *passing from above* (saith the Oracle) *to the opposite Part, through the Center of the Earth.* We shall describe this more fully, when we treat of the Particulars.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of things æviternal and incorporeal.*

THe Second or middle kind of Things (according to *Zoroaster* is that which) is begun in time, but is without end (commonly termed æviternal.) To this belong that *multitude of Gods*, which *Eusebius* saith, they *asserted next after God the Father and King*; and the Souls of Men: *Psellus* and the other Summarist of the Chaldaick Doctrine, name them in this order; *Intelligibles*; *Intelligibles and Intellectuals*; *Intellectuals*; *Fountains*; *Hyperarchii or Principles*; *Unzoned Gods*; *Zoned Gods*; *Angels*; *Dæmons*; *Souls*. (a) All these they conceive to be light, (except the ill Dæmons which are dark.)

(a) Euseb.

(b) Plut.

(c) Plut.

(b) Over this middle kind *Zoroaster* held *Mithra* to preside, whom the Oracles (saith *Psellus*) call the Mind. (c) This is employed about secondary things.

## CHAP. IV.

### *The First Order.*

IN the first place are three Orders, one *Intelligible*, another *Intelligible and Intellectual*, the third *Intellectual*. The first Order which is of Intelligibles, seems to be (as the Learned *Patricius* conjectures; for *Psellus* gives only a bare accompt, not an Exposition of these things) that which is only understood: This is the highest Order: The *second* or middle Order is of Intelligibles and Intellectuals, that is, those which are understood, and understand also; as *Zoroaster*,

*There are Intelligibles and Intellectuals, which understanding are understood.*

The *third* is of Intellectuals; which only understand: as being Intellect, either essentially or by participation. By which distinction, we may conceive that the highest Order is above Intellect, being understood by the middle sort of Minds. The middle Order participates of the Superiour, but consists of Minds which understand both the Superiour and themselves also. The last Order seems to be of Minds, whose Office is to understand not only themselves but Superiours and Inferiours also.

Of the first of which Orders, the *Anonymus* Author of the Summary of the Chaldaick Doctrine, thus: *Then* (*viz.* next the one and good) *they worship a certain paternal Depth consisting of three Triads; each Triad hath a Father, a Power, and a Mind*: *Psellus* somewhat more fully; *Next the One they assert the paternal depth compleated by three Triads: each of the Triads having a Father first, then a Power middle, and a Mind the third amongst them: which* (Mind) *shutteth up the Triad within it self, these they call also Intelligibles.*

This Triple Triad seems to be the same with the Triad mentioned in the Oracles of *Zoroaster*. What *Psellus* terms *Father*, he calls *Father* also.

*The Father perfected all things*, and *Paternal Monad*
*Where the Paternal Monad is.*———

The second which *Psellus* calls *Power*, he terms also *the Power of the Father*.

*Neither did he shut up his own Fire in his Intellectual Power.*

And———*The strength of the Father.*

And the *Duad* generated by the Monad, and resident with him:

*The Monad is enlarged which generates two.*

And again,

*The Duad resides with him.*

This is also *the first paternal Mind*; for the third of this Triad, which *Psellus* terms the Mind, he saith is the second Mind.

*The Father perfected all things, and delivered them over*
*To the second Mind, which all Man-kind calls the first.*

And as *Psellus* saith, that this Mind shuts up the Triad and paternal Depth within it self; so *Zoroaster*;

*It is the Bound of the paternal Depth and Fountain of Intellectuals.*

And again,

*It proceeded not further, but remained in the paternal Depth.*

## CHAP. V.

### *The Second Order.*

NExt these (saith *Psellus*) *there is another Order, of Intelligibles and Intellectuals; This also is divided three-fold, into Jynges, Synoches, and Teletarchs.* With him agrees the Anonymous Summarist, *Then is the Intelligible Jynx; next which are the Synoches, the Empyreal, the Æthereal and the Material; after the Synoches, are the Teletarchs.*

The first are Jynges, of which the Oracle;

*Intelligent Jynges do themselves also understand from the Father*
*By unspeakable Counsels being moved so as to understand;*

*Psellus* saith, *they are certain Powers next to the paternal Depth consisting of three Triads* (I would rather read, *the paternal Depth which consists of three Triads*, for so it is described in the foregoing Chapter by the same Author) *which, according to the Oracle, understand by the paternal Mind, which contains the cause of them singly within it self*: Pletho, *They are Intellectual Species conceived by the Father, they themselves being conceptive also and exciting Conceptions or Notions by unspeakable Counsels*; These seem to be the Ideas described by the Zoroastræan Oracle;

*The Mind of the Father made a jarring noise, understanding by vigorous Counsels*
*Omni-form Idea's, and flying out of one Fountain,*

*They ſprung forth, for from the Father was the Counſel and End;*
*But they were divided, being by Intellectual Fire diſtributed*
*Into other Intellectuals, for the King did ſet before the multi-form World*
*An Intellectual incorruptible Pattern, the Print of whoſe Form*
*He promoted through the World, and accordingly the World was framed,*
*Beautified with all kind of Idea's, of which there is one Fountain,*
*Out of which came ruſhing forth others undiſtributed,*
*Being broken about the Bodies of the World which through the vaſt Receſſes,*
*Like Swarms, are carried round about every Way,*
*Intellectual Notions from the paternal Fountain croping the Flower of Fire,*
*In the point of ſleepleſs Time, of this*
*Primigenious Idea, the firſt ſelf-budding Fountain of the Father budded.*

Upon which Words *Proclus*, having cited them as an Oracle of the Gods, adds, *Hereby the Gods declared as well where the ſubſiſtance of Idea's is, as who that God is who contains the one Fountain of them, as alſo, after what manner the multitude of them proceeded out of this Fountain, and how the World was made according to them. And that they are movers of all the Syſtems of the World, and that they are all Intellectual eſſentially: Others may find out many other profound things, by ſearching into theſe Divine Notions; but for the preſent let it ſuffice us, to know, that the Gods themſelves ratifie the Contemplations of* Plato, *for as much as they term thoſe Intellectual Cauſes Idea's; and affirm that they gave pattern to the World, and that they are Conceptions of the Father: for they remain in the Intellections of the Father: and that they go forth to the making of the World, for* ἐποιζήσας *implies their going forth: and that they are of all forms, as containing the Cauſes of all things diviſible: and that from the Fountaneous Idea's there proceeded others, which by ſeveral Parts framed the World, and are ſaid to be like Swarms* (of Bees) *becauſe they beget the ſecondary Idea's:* thus *Proclus.*

The ſecond are *the Synoches*, which *are three, the Empyreal, the Æthereal, the Material:* anſwerable to the ſeveral Worlds, which they govern: for they ſeem to be Minds, which receiving from *Hecate* the Influence of that Fire which diſpenſeth Life, infuſe it into the Empyreal, Æthereal, and Material Worlds, and ſupport and govern thoſe Worlds, and give them vital Motion. The Oracle termeth them *Anoches.*

*Each World hath Intellectual Anoches inflexible,* where *Pſellus* interprets them *the moſt Excellent of Intelligible Species, and of thoſe that are brought down by the Immortals in this Heaven, in the head of whom is conceived to be a God, the ſecond from the Father.*

The laſt of this Order are the *Teletarchs*, joyned with the *Synoches* by the Oracle.

*The Teletarchs are comprehended with the Synoches.*

This ſecond Order or Triad, *Proclus* and *Damaſcius* often mention, ſtyling it by the double name of *Intelligent and Intellectual.*

## CHAP. VI.

### *The third Order.*

THe laſt Order is of *Intellectuals*; (a) Pſellus, *After the middle Order is the Intellectual, having one paternal Triad, which conſiſts of the once above, and of* Hecate *and of the twice above; And another* (Triad) *which conſiſts of the Amilicti, which are three; And one, the Hypezocos. Theſe are ſeven Fountains.* Anonymus Summariſt, *After theſe are the fountainous Fathers called alſo Coſmagogues; the firſt of whom is called the once above, next whom is Hecate; then the twice above, next whom three Amilicti; and laſt, the Hypezocos.* (a) Epiſt.

Of the *Coſmagogues Pſellus* interprets the *Zoroaſtrean* Oracle.

*Oh how the World hath intellectual Guides, inflexible!*

*The Chaldæans*, ſaith he, *aſſert Powers in the World, which they term Coſmagogi, (guides of the World) for that they guide the World by provident Motions. Theſe Powers the Oracle calls* ὑποστάτας *Suſtainers; as ſuſtaining the whole World. The Oracle ſaith, they are immoveable, implying their ſetled Power; ſuſtentive, denoting their Guardianſhip. Theſe Powers they deſign only by the Cauſes and immobility of the Worlds. Pletho* interprets them *the moſt excellent of Intelligible Species, and of thoſe that are brought down by Immortals in this Heaven. The* Coryphæus *of whom, he conceives to be a God, the ſecond from the Father.*

The *Amilicti* alſo, and the *Hypezocos* are mentioned by the Oracle.

——— ——— *for from him*
*Spring forth all the implacable* (Amilicti) *Thunders.*
*And the Receſſes* (*ſuſcipient of Preſters*) *of the omni-lucent Strength.*
*Of Father-begotten Hecate, and Hypezocos the Flower of Fire.*

The Amilicti [implacable] are Powers ſo termed, for that they are firm, and not to be converted towards theſe inferiour things; and alſo cauſe that Souls be not allured by affections. *Pſell. in Orac.*

## CHAP. VII.

### *Fountains, and Principles.*

BEſides this laſt Order of Intellectuals, which *Pſellus* ſtyles *ſeven Fountains*, and the Anonymous Summariſt *fountainous Fathers*, the latter gives Account of many other Fountains, *They reverence alſo* (ſaith he) *a fountainous Triad of Faith, Truth, and Love; they likewiſe aſſert a Principiative Son from the Solar Fountain, and Archangelical, and the Fountain of Senſe, and fountainous Judgment, and the Fountain of Perſpectives, and the Fountain of Characters which walketh on unknown Marks, and the fountainous Tops of* Apollo, Oſyris, Hermes, *they aſſert material Fountains of Centers and Elements, and a Zone of Dreams, and a fountainous Soul.* Ἀρχικ. Συνθήματα.

*Next the Fountains*, ſaith *Pſellus*, *are the Hyperarchii*; The Anonymous more fully, *Next the Fountains* Ἀρχικ.

*Fountains, they ſay, are the Principalities, for the Fountains are more principle than the Principles*; Both theſe names of *Fountains* and *Principles* are uſed by *Dionyſius Areopagita*, frequently; even in the third Triad, he puts the name of *Principles*, ἀρχῶν (or Principalities) after whom the Arch-Angels.

*Of the Animal-productive Principles*, (continues the Anonymus) *the top is called Hecate, the middle principiative Soul, the bottom principiative Vertue.* This ſeems to be that *Hecate*, whom *Pſellus* ſaith, *they held to be the Fountain of Angels, and of Dæmons, and of Souls, and of Natures*; The ſame which the Oracle means, ſaying,

On the left ſide of *Hecate*, is the Fountain of Vertue: for *the Chaldæans*, (as *Pſellus* ſaith) *eſteem Hecate a Goddeſs, ſeated in the middle rank, and poſſeſſing as it were the Center of all the Powers; in her right parts they place the Fountain of Souls, in her left the Fountain of Goods, or of Vertues; Moreover they ſay, the Fountain of Souls is prompt to propagations, but the Fountain of Vertues continueth within the bounds of its own Eſſence, and is as a Virgin incorrupted; which ſetledneſs and immobility, it receives from the power of the Amilicti, and is girt with a Virgin Zone. What* Pſellus *here calls the Fountain of Souls, and the Fountain of Vertues, is the ſame which the Anonymus ſtyles, principiative Soul, and Principiative Vertue.*

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Unzoned Gods, and Zoned Gods.*

NExt (the Hyperarchii, according to *Pſellus*) *are the Azoni*, (Unzoned Gods) *there are amongſt them*, (ſaith the Anonymus Summariſt) (*a*) *unzoned Hecates, as the Chaldaick, the Triecdotis, Comas, and Eccluſtick: The unzoned Gods are* Sarapis *and* Bacchus, *and the* (*b*) *Chain of* Oſyris, *and of* Apollo, (continued Series of Geniuſſes, connected in the manner of a Chain) *they are called unzoned, for that they uſe their power freely* (without reſtriction) *in the Zones, and are enthroned above the conſpicuous Deities*: Theſe conſpicuous Deities are the Heavens and the Planets, (perhaps of the ſame kind as the Intelligences, which the Peripateticks aſſerted Movers of the Spheres) and whereas he ſaith, they live *in Power*, ἐν ἕξσοΐα, it is the ſame Attribute which *Dionyſius* gives the third of the ſecond Hierarchy, τὴν ἀγλὼν ἕξσοΐαν.

(*c*) *The Zoned Gods are next*: (*d*) *Theſe are they which have* (confinement to) *particular Zones, and are rouled freely about the Zones of Heaven, and have the Office of governing the World; for they hold, there is a Zoned kind of Deity, which inhabits the Parts of the ſenſible World, and girdeth* (or circleth) *the Regions about the material Place, according to ſeveral diſtributions.* The ſame Office *Dionyſius* ſeems to aſſign to the ſecond and third Hierarchies.

Theſe *Azoni*, and *Zonæi*, are mentioned alſo by *Damaſcius*; *This* (ſaith he) *ſendeth out of her ſelf the Fountain of all things, and the fountainous* (*e*) *Chain; but That* (ſendeth out of her ſelf the fountainous Chain) *of Particulars; and paſſeth on to Principles and Arch-Angels, and* Azoni, *and* Zonæi, *as the Law is of the Proceſſion of the renowned particular Fountains.* And by *Proclus*, *The ſacred names of the Gods delivered according to their myſtical Interpretation, as thoſe which are celebrated by the Aſſyrians,* * *Zonæi, and Azoni, and Fountains, and Amilicti, and Synoches, by which they interpret the Orders of the Gods.*

## CHAP. IX.

### *Angels and Immaterial Dæmons.*

NExt (the Zonæi) *are the Angels.* *Arnobius* ſaith of *Hoſthanes*, (one of the Perſian Magi, who received their Learning from the Chaldæans) that *he knew the Angels, Miniſters, and Meſſengers of God (the true God) did wait on his Majeſty, and tremble as afraid, at the Beck and Countenance of the Lord*; the Zoroaſtrian Oracles mention *reductive Angels*, which *reduce Souls to them, drawing them from ſeveral things.*

The *next are Dæmons*; Of theſe the (*a*) Chaldæans hold ſome to be good, others bad. (*b*) The good, they conceive to be Light; the bad Darkneſs. That there are good Dæmons, natural Reaſon tells us; Oracle:

*Nature perſwades that there are pure Dæmons.*
*The bourgeons even of ill matter are beneficial and good.*

*Nature, or natural Reaſon*, ſaith *Pletho*, *perſwades, that the Dæmons are holy, and that all things proceeding from God, who is good in himſelf, are beneficial: if the bloomings of ill matter* (viz. of laſt Subſtances) *are good, much more are the Dæmons ſuch, who are in a more excellent rank, as partaking of Rational nature, and being mixed with Mortal nature.*

## CHAP. X.

### *Souls.*

NExt to *Dæmons*, *Pſellus* (in his Epitome of the Chaldaick Doctrine) placeth *Souls*, the laſt of æviternal Beings.

(*a*) Of Forms, the *Magi*, (and from them the Pythagoreans and Platoniſts) aſſert three Kinds; One wholly ſeparate from matter, the ſuperceleſtial Intelligences; Another inſeparable from matter, having a Subſtance not ſubſiſting by it ſelf, but dependent on matter, together with which matter, which is ſometimes diſſolved by reaſon of its nature, ſubject to mutation, this kind of Soul is diſſolved alſo, and periſheth. This they hold to be wholly Irrational.

(*b*) Betwixt theſe, they place a middle kind, a Rational Soul, differing from the Superceleſtial Intelligences, for that it always coexiſts with matter; and from the Irrational kind, for that it is not dependent on matter, but on the contrary matter is dependent on it; and it hath a proper ſubſtance potentially ſubſiſtent by it ſelf. It is alſo indiviſible, as well as the Superceleſtial Intelligences, and performing ſome Works in ſome manner allyed to theirs, being it ſelf alſo buſied in the knowledge and contemplation of Beings, even unto the Supreme God, and for this



In Orac.

(a) Reading ἄζωνα.

(b) Σάειρ.

(c) Pſell.
(d) Anon.

(b) Σάειρ.

In Proœm. Parmenid.

* Read, ζωναῖοι.

Pſell.

In Orac.

(a) Pſell. in Orac.
(b) Euſeb.

(a) Pletho in Orac.

(b) Ibid.

reaſon is Incorruptible.

(c) *Pſel. in Orac.* (c) This Soul is an Immaterial and Incorporeal Fire, exempt from all Compounds, and from the material Body; it is conſequently Immortal: for nothing material or dark is commixed with her, neither is ſhe compounded ſo as that ſhe may be reſolved into thoſe things of which ſhe conſiſts.

(d) *In Orac.* (d) This Soul hath a ſelf-generate and ſelf-animate Eſſence; for it is not moved by another: for if according to the Oracle, it is a portion of the Divine Fire, and a Lucid Fire, and Paternal Notion, it is an immaterial and ſelf-ſubſiſtent Form, for ſuch is every Divine Nature, and the Soul is part thereof.

(e) *Epit.* (e) Of humane Souls they alledge two fountainous Cauſes, the Paternal Mind, and the Fountainous Soul: the particular Soul, according to them, proceeds from the Fountainous, by the Will of the Father.

(f) *Pſel. in Orac.* (f) Now whereas there are ſeveral Manſions, one wholly bright, another wholly dark, others betwixt both, partly bright, partly dark, the place beneath the Moon is circumnebulous, dark on every ſide; the Lunary, partly lucid, and partly dark, one half bright, the other dark; the place above the Moon circumlucid, or bright throughout; the Soul is ſeated in the circumlucid Region.

(g) *Pſel. epit.* (g) From thence this kind of Soul is often ſent down to Earth, upon ſeveral occaſions, either by reaſon of the flagging of its Wings (*ſo they term the diviation from its Original Perfection*) or in Obedience to the Will of the Father.

(h) *Pletho in Orac.* (h) This Soul is always coexiſtent with an Æthereal Body as its *Vehiculum*, which ſhe by continual approximation maketh alſo immortal. Neither is this her *Vehiculum* inanimate in it ſelf, but is it ſelf animated with the other Species of the Soul, the Irrational (which the Wiſe call (εἴδωλον) *the Image* of the Rational Soul) adorned with Phantaſie and Senſe, which ſeeth and heareth it ſelf whole through whole, and is furniſhed with all the Senſes, and with all the reſt of the Irrational Faculties of the Soul.

(i) *Loc. cit.* (i) Thus by the principal faculty of this Body Phantaſie, the Rational Soul is continually joyned to ſuch a Body, and by ſuch a Body ſometimes the Humane Soul is joyned with a Mortal Body, by a certain affinity of Nature, the whole being infolded in the whole enlivening Spirit of the Embryon, this *Vehiculum* it ſelf being of the nature of a Spirit.

(k) *In Orac.* (k) The Image of the Soul, *viz.* that part which being it ſelf void of Irrational, is joyned to the Rational Part, and depends upon the Vehicle thereof, hath a part in the circumlucid Region; for the Soul never layeth down the Vehicle adherent to her.

(l) *Pletho in Orac.* (l) The Soul being ſent down from the Manſion wholly bright, to ſerve the Mortal Body, that is, to operate therein for a certain time, and to animate and adorn it to her power, and being enabled according to her ſeveral Vertues, do dwell in ſeveral Zones of the World, if ſhe perform her Office well, goes back to the ſame place, but if not well, ſhe retires to the worſt Manſions, according to the things ſhe hath done in this Life.

(m) *Pſel. in Epit.* (m) Thus (the Chaldæans) reſtore Souls to their firſt condition, according to the meaſure of their ſeveral purifications, in all the Regions of the World; ſome alſo they conceive to be carried beyond the World.

## CHAP. XI.

### *The Supramundane Light.*

ALL theſe æviternal and incorporeal Beings are ſeated in the Supramundane Light, which it ſelf alſo is incorporeal, placed immediately above the higheſt Corporeal World, and from thence extending upwards to infinite.

*Proclus* (cited by *Symplicius* on this Oracle of *Zoroaſter*

*Abundantly animating Light, Fire, Æther, Worlds*)

ſaith, *This Light is above all the ſeven Worlds, as a Monad before or above the Triad of the Empyreal, Æthereal, and Material Worlds*: adding, that *this primary Light is the Image of the Paternal Depth, and is therefore ſupramundane, becauſe the Paternal Depth is ſupramundane.* And again, *this Light*, ſaith he, *being the ſupramundane Sun, ſends forth Fountains of Light; and the Myſtick Diſcourſes tell us, that its generallity is among ſupramundane Things, for there is the Solar World, and the Univerſal Light, as the Chaldaick Oracles aſſert:*

And again, *the Centers of the whole World, as one, ſeem to be fixed in this: for, if the Oracles fixed the Centers of the Material World above it ſelf, in the Æther, proportionably aſcending, We ſhall affirm that the Centers of the higheſt of the Worlds are ſeated in this Light. Is not this firſt Light the Image of the Paternal Depth, and for that reaſon ſupramundane alſo, becauſe that is ſo?*

## CHAP. XII.

### *Of Things Temporal (or Corruptible) and Corporeal.*

THE third and laſt kind of things, according to *Zoroaſter*, is Corruptible or Temporal; which as it began in time, ſo ſhall it likewiſe in time be diſſolved: The Preſident over theſe is *Arimanes.*

Under this third kind are comprehended the Corporeal Worlds, the Empyreal immediately below the Supramundane Light, the Æthereal next the Empyreal, and the Material the loweſt of all, as the Oracle ranks them.

*Abundantly animating, Light, Fire, Æther, Worlds.*

Theſe Corporeal Worlds are ſeven; *Orac.*

*For the Father formed ſeven Firmaments of Worlds,*

*Including Heaven in a round Figure,*

*He fixed a great company of inerratick Stars,*

*He conſtituted a Heptad of Erratick Animals,*

*Placing the Earth in the middle, but the Water in the boſom of the Earth;*

*The Air above theſe.*

*Pſellus* explaining how they are ſeven, ſaith, *They*

*They affirm that there are ſeven Corporeal Worlds; one Empyreal and firſt; then three Æthereal; and laſtly three Material, the fixed Circle, the Erratick, and the Sublunary Region*: But this enumeration ſeems to fall ſhort; for he mentions but two Æthereal Worlds (the Orb of fixed Stars, and the Planetary Orb) and one Material, (the Sublunary Region;) as the Learned *Patricius* obſerves, who therefore reckons the ſeven thus; One Empyreal, three Æthereal, (the Fixed Orb, the Planetary Orb, the Orb of the Moon) and three Elementary, (the Aereal, the Watry, and the Terreſtrial;) But perhaps it will better ſuit with the Oracle (which includes the Moon within the Planetary Orb, and placeth the Water under the Earth,) as alſo with *Pſellus* (who calls the laſt three Worlds, Material,) to diſpoſe them thus,

*Corporeal Worlds ſeven,*
- *One Empyreal World.*
- *Three Æthereal Worlds;*
  - *The Supreme Æther next the Empyreum,*
  - *The Sphere of fixed Stars,*
  - *The Planetary Orb.*
- *Three Material ſublunary worlds;*
  - *The Air,*
  - *The Earth,*
  - *The Water.*

Neither can it ſeem ſtrange that the three laſt only ſhould be called Material: for the Chaldæans conceiving matter to be a dark ſubſtance or rather Darkneſs it ſelf, the Empyreal and Æthereal Worlds, which (as we ſhall ſhew) conſiſt of Light or Fire, cannot in their ſenſe be ſaid to be Material, though Corporeal.

Epitom. 1. *The* Empyreal or *Firſt* of theſe, ſaith *Pſellus*, *they attributed to the Mind, the Æthereal to the Soul, the Material to Nature.*

## CHAP. XIII.

### *The Empyreal World.*

* Pſel. THE * *Firſt* of the Corporeal Worlds, is the Empyreal; (by *Empyræum* the Chaldæans underſtand not, as the Chriſtian Theologiſts, the Seat of God, and the Bleſſed Spirits, which is rather analogous to the Supreme Light of the Chaldæans, but the outmoſt Sphere of the Corporeal World.) It is round in Figure, according to the Oracle,

*Incloſing Heaven in a round Figure.*

It is alſo a *ſolid Orb, or Firmament*: for the ſame Oracles call it στερέωμα. It conſiſts of Fire, whence named the Empyreal, or, as the Oracles, *the fiery World*; which Fire being immediately next the Incorporeal ſupramundane Light is the rareſt and ſubtileſt of Bodies, and by reaſon of this Subtilty penetrates into the Æther, which is the next World below it, and, by Mediation of the Æther, through all the Material World: *This may be evinced more particularly*, ſaith *Proclus*, *from the Divine Tradition* (meaning the Zoroaſtrian Oracles:) *for the Empyræum penetrates through the Æther, and the Æther through the Material World; and though all the Intellectual Tetrads and Hebdomads have a Fountainous Order, and conſequently an Empyreal Preſident, nevertheleſs they are contained in the Worlds, ſince the Empyreal paſſeth through all the Worlds.*

Nevertheleſs, the Empyræum it ſelf is fixed and immoveable; as *Simplicius*, further explicating the Chaldaick Doctrine, acknowledgeth, by this Similitude; *Let us imagine to our ſelves* (ſaith he) *two Spheres, one conſiſting of many Bodies, theſe two to be of equal bigneſs, but place one together with the Center, and put the other into it; you will ſee the whole World exiſting in place, moved in immoveable Light, which World according to its whole ſelf is immoveable, that it may imitate place, but is moved as to its Parts, that herein it may have leſs than Place.*

## CHAP. XIV.

### *The Æthereal Worlds.*

AFter the Empyræum, the Oracle names the Æther, *Fire*, *Æther*, *Worlds*; confirmed by *Pſellus* and the Anonymous Summariſt, who aſſert, that next the Empyræum are the three Æthereal Worlds; but of theſe three they mention only two, (and thoſe miſapplied to the Material Worlds) *The Sphere of fixed Stars, and the Planetary Sphere*: The third (perhaps implied though not expreſt) might be the Æther which is betwixt the Empyræum and the Sphere of fixed Stars.

The Æther is a Fire (as its name implies) leſs ſubtile than the Empyræum, for *the Empyræum penetrates through the Æther*: yet is the Æther it ſelf ſo ſubtile, that *it penetrates through the Material World.*

The ſecond Æthereal World is the Sphere of fixed Stars, which are the more compacted or condenſed Parts of the Æthereal Fire, as *Patricius* ingeniouſly interprets this Oracle,

*He compacted a great number of inerratick Stars,*
*Forcing* (or preſſing) *Fire to Fire.*

The third Æthereal World is that of the Planetary Orb, which contains the Sun, Moon, and five Planets; ſtyled by the Oracles, Erratick Animals and Fire.

*He conſtituted a Heptad of Erratick Animals.*
And again, *He conſtituted them ſix; the ſeventh was that of the Sun,*
*Mingling Fire in them.*

## CHAP. XV.

### *The Material Worlds.*

THE laſt and loweſt are the Material Worlds, which *Pſellus* and the other Summariſt aſſert to be *three*, meaning doubtleſs the Air, Earth and Water; for ſo the Oracle ranks them,

—

*Placing*

*Placing the Earth in the middle, but the Water in the bosom of the Earth,*
*The Air above them.*

This is that *last* Order of Worlds, of which the Chaldaick Summary saith, *It is called terrestrial, and the hater of Light: it is the Region beneath the Moon, and comprehends within it self matter, which they call the bottom.* By which Words it appears upon what ground the Chaldæans asserted only these Sublunary Worlds to consist of Matter, but the Empyreal and Æthereal to be Immaterial though Corporeal: for Matter they understand to be the hater of Light, Darkness, and the Bottom of a Nature quite different from the Empyræum and Æther, whose very substance is Light it self, yet it is actuated by their vivificative Fire which penetrates quite through it even to the Center, as we shewed formerly.

*Lib.* 1. Concerning the Earth, *Diodorus Siculus* saith, they held Opinions peculiar to themselves, asserting that *it is in Figure like a Boat, and hollow*, for which, as likewise for other things concerning the World, they abound with probable Arguments.

*Psellus* adds, that *they sometimes call this Sublunary Region Hades.*

## CHAP. XVI.

### *Of Material Damons.*

OF Dæmons, as we said, they asserted two kinds, some good, others ill; the good, light, the ill, dark. The former are those whom **Hostanes* calls the *Ministers and Messengers of God, dwelling in his presence*; But these, he describes as *Terrestrial, wandring up and down, and Enemies of Mankind.* Of the First we have treated already; of the Latter *Psellus*, in his Discourse upon this Subject, gives a large account from one *Marcus* of *Mesopotamia*, who having been of this Religion, and well acquainted with their Institutions, was afterwards converted to Christianity: what he relates, as well from the Doctrine it self, as from the place, sufficiently appears to be of the *Chaldaick* Tradition. It is to this effect.

** Arnob.*

These Dæmons are of many kinds, and various sorts, both as to their Figures and Bodies, insomuch that the Air is full of them, as well that which is above us, as that which is round about us. The Earth likewise is full, and the Sea, and the most retired Cavities and Depths.

There are six general kinds of these Dæmons. The first named *Leliurius*, which signifies Fiery. This kind dwelleth in the Air that is above us: for from the places next about the Moon, as being Sacred, all kinds of Dæmons, as being prophane, are expelled. The second kind is that which wandereth in the Air contiguous to us, and is by many peculiarly called Aerial. The third, Terrestrial. The fourth, Watery and Marine. The fifth, Subterraneous. The sixth, Lucifugous, and hardly sensible.

All these kind of Dæmons are haters of God, and Enemies of Man. Moreover, of these ill Dæmons, some are worse than others. Aquatile, and Subterraneous, and Lucifugous, are extreamly malicious and pernicious: for these do not hurt Souls by Phantasms and Delusions, but by Assault, like the most Savage Beasts, accelerate the destruction of men. The Watery drown those who are sailing upon the Water. The Subterraneous and Lucifugous, insinuating into the Entrails cause Epilepsies and Frenzy. The Aerial and Terrestrial circumvent Men by Art and Subtilty, and deceive the Minds of Men, and draw them to absurd and illegal Passions.

They effect these things not as having Dominion over us, and carrying us as their Slaves whithersoever they please, but by suggestion; for applying themselves to the Fantastick Spirit, which is within us, they themselves being Spirits also, they instil Discourses of Affections and Pleasures, not by Voyce verberating the Air, but by whisper insinuating their Discourse.

Nor is it impossible that they should speak without voyce, if we consider that he who speaks, being a far off, is forced to use a greater sound; being near, he speaks softly into the ear of the Hearer, and if he could get into the Spirit of the Soul, he would not need any sound, but what discourse soever he pleaseth, would, by a way without sound, arrive there where it is to be received, which they say is likewise in Souls, when they are out of the Body, for they discourse with one another without noise. After this manner the Dæmons converse with us, privately, so as we are not sensible which way the War comes upon us.

Neither can this be doubted, if we observe what happens to the Air. For, when the Sun shineth it assumeth several colours and forms, transmitting them to other things, as we may see in Looking-glasses. In like manner the Dæmons, assuming Figures and Colours, and whatsoever Forms they please, transmit them into our animal Spirit, and by that means afford us much business, suggesting Counsels, representing Figures, resuscitating the remembrance of pleasures, exciting the images of passions, as well when we sleep, as when we wake, and sometimes, titillating the genital parts, inflame us with frantick and unlawful desires, especially if they take, co-operating with them the hot humidities which are in us.

The rest of the Dæmons know nothing that is subtile, nor how to breed disturbance, yet are they hurtful and abominable, hurting in the same manner as the spirit or vapour in *Charon*'s Cave: For as that is reported to kill whatsoever approacheth it, whether Beast, Man, or Bird; in like manner these Dæmons destroy those upon whom they chance to fall, overthrowing their Souls and Bodies, and their natural Habits, and sometimes by Fire, or Water, or Precipice, they destroy not Men only, but some irrational Creatures.

The Dæmons assault Irrational Creatures, not out of hate, or as wishing them ill, but out of the love they have of their Animal Heat: For dwelling in the most remote Cavities, which are extreamly cold and dry, they contract much coldness, wherewith being afflicted, they affect the humid and animal heat, and, to enjoy it, they insinuate themselves into Irrational Creatures, and

and go into Baths and Pits; for they hate the heat of Fire and of the Sun, because it burns and drieth up.

But they most delight in the heat of Animals, as being temperate, and mixt with moisture, especially that of men, being best tempered, into which insinuating themselves, they cause infinite disturbance, stopping up the pores in which the Animal Spirit is inherent, and streightning and compressing the Spirit, by reason of the grosness of the Bodies with which they are indued. Whence it happeneth, that the Bodies are disordered, and their principal Faculties distempered, and their Motions become dull and heavy.

Now if the insinuating Dæmon be one of the Subterraneous kind, he distorteth the possessed Person, and speaketh by him, making use of the Spirit of the patient, as if it were his own Organ. But if any of those who are called Lucifugous, get privately into a Man, he causeth relaxation of the Limbs, and stoppeth the Voice, and maketh the Possessed Person in all respects like one that is dead. For this being the last of Dæmons is more Earthly and extreamly cold and dry, and into whomsoever it insinuates, it hebetates and makes dull all the Faculties of his Soul.

And because it is Irrational, void of all Intellectual Contemplation, and is guided by irrational Phantasie, like the more savage kind of Beasts, hence it comes to pass, that it stands not in awe of Menaces, and for that reason most Persons aptly call it Dumb and Deaf, nor can they who are possessed with it by any other means be freed from it, but by the Divine Favour obtained by Fasting and Prayer.

That Physicians endeavour to perswade us, that these Passions proceed not from Dæmons, but from Humours, and Spirits ill affected, and therefore go about to cure them, not by Incantations and Expiations, but by Medicines and Diet, is nothing strange, since they know nothing beyond Sense, and are wholly addicted to study the Body. And perhaps not without reason are some things ascribed to ill-affected Humours, as Lethargies, Melancholies, Frenzies, which they take away and cure, either by evacuating the Humours, or by replenishing the Body if it be Empty, or by outward applications. But as for Enthusiasms, ragings, and unclean Spirits, with which whosoever is possessed is not able to act any thing, neither by Intellect, Speech, Phantasie nor Sense; or else there is some other thing that moves them unknown to the Person possessed, which sometimes foretelleth Future Events; How can we call these the Motions of depraved Matter?

No kind of Dæmon is in its own Nature Male or Female, for such Affections are only proper to Compounds: but the Bodies of Dæmons are simple, and being very ductile and flexible, are ready to take any Figure. As we see the Clouds represent sometimes Men, sometimes Bears, sometimes Dragons, or any other Figures: so is it with the Dæmoniack Bodies. Now the Clouds appear in various Figures according as they are driven by exteriour Blasts or Winds: but in Dæmons, who can pass as they please into any Bodies, and sometimes contract, sometimes extend themselves like Worms on the Earth, being of a soft and tractable Nature, not only the Bulk is changed, but the Figure and Colour, and that several ways; for the Dæmoniack Body being by Nature capable of all those, as it is apt to recede, it is changed into several Forms; as it is Aereal, it is susceptible of all sorts of Colours, like Air, but the Air is coloured by some thing extrinsecal.

The Dæmoniack Body, from its intrinsecal Phantastick Power and Energy, produceth the Forms of Colours in it self, as we sometimes look Pale, sometimes Red, according as the Soul is affected either with Feat or Anger. The like we must imagine of Dæmons: for from within they send forth several kinds of Colours into their Bodies. Thus their Bodies being changed into what Figure, and assuming what Colour they please, they sometimes appear in the shape of a Man, sometimes of a Woman, of a Lion, of a Leopard, of a wild Boar, sometimes in the figure of a Bottle, and sometimes like a little Dog fawning upon us.

Into all these Forms they change themselves, but keep none of them constantly: for the Figure is not solid, but immediately is dissipated; as when we pour something coloured into Water, or draw a Figure in the Air. In like manner is it with Dæmons, their Colour, Figure, and Form presently vanish.

But all Dæmons have not the same Power and Will, there is much inequality amongst them as to these. Some there are Irrational, as amongst Compound Animals; for as, of them, Man participating of Intellect and Reason, hath also a larger Phantasie, extending also to all Sensibles, as well in the Heavens, as on Earth and under the Earth; but Horses, Oxen, and the like, have a narrower and more particular Phantasie, yet such as extends to the knowledge of the Creatures that feed with them, their Mangers and their Masters; Lastly, Flies, Gnats, and Worms have it extreamly contracted, and incoherent; for they know neither the hole out of which they came, nor whether they go, nor whither they ought to go, they have only one Phantasie, which is that of Aliment. In like manner there are different kinds of Dæmons. Of these some are Fiery, others Aereal; these have a various Phantasie, which is capable of extending to any thing imaginable: the Subterraneous and Lucifugous are not of this Nature; whence it comes to pass, that they make not use of many Figures, as neither having variety of Phantasms, nor a Body apt for Action or Transformtion. But the Watery and Terrestial, being of middle kind between these, are capable of taking many Forms, but keep themselves constantly to that in which they delight. They which live in humid places, transform themselves into the shapes of Birds and Women, whence termed by the Greeks *Naiades* and *Nereides* and *Dryades* in the Feminine Gender. But such as are conversant in dry places, have also dry Bodies, such as the *Onosceles* are said to be. These transform themselves into Men, sometimes into Dogs, Lions, and the like Animals, which are of a Masculine Disposition.

The Bodies of Dæmons are capable of being struck, and are pained thereby, though they are not Compounds, for Sense is not only proper to Compounds. That thing in Man which feeleth,

eth, is neither the Bone nor the Nerve, but the Spirit which is in them. Whence if the Nerve be pressed, or seized with cold, or the like, there ariseth pain from the Emission of one Spirit into another Spirit: for it is impossible that a Compound Body should in it self be sensible of pain, but in as much as it partaketh of Spirit, and therefore being broken into pieces, or dead, it is absolutely insensible, because it hath no Spirit. In like manner a Dæmon being all Spirit, is of his own nature sensible in every part; he immediately seeth, and heareth, he is obnoxious to suffering by touch; being cut asunder, he is pained like Solid Bodies, only herein differing from them, that other things being cut assunder can by no means or very hardly be made whole again, whereas the Dæmon immediately cometh together again, as Air or Water parted by some more Solid Body. But though this Spirit joyns again in a moment, nevertheless, at the very time in which the dissection is made, it is pained.

*Hitherto the Theology and Physick of the* Chaldæans.

# THE SECOND SECTION.

## *Astrology, and other Arts of Divination.*

THE Second Part of the *Chaldaick* Learning consists in Arts of Divination; the chief whereof was Astrology. This, as it is generally acknowledged to have been their proper Invention, so were they most particularly addicted to it, for which *Ptolemy* gives a Reason, out of the Art it self; *because they are under Virgo and Mercury*; But *Cicero* one much better; that *the plainness and evenness of the Country* did invite them to Contemplation of the Stars.

It consists of two Parts; one *Meteorologick*, which considers the Motions of the Stars; the other *Apotelesmatick*, which regards Divination: The first was known to the Ancient *Græcians* by the common names of *Astronomy* and *Astrology*; until the other being brought into *Greece* also, they for distinction called the former more particularly *Astronomy*, the latter *Astrology*. The excellent (a) *Joseph Scaliger* to advance the Credit of the *Greek* Learning, *constantly avers that the* Chaldæans *had only a gross and general, not exact Knowledge of Astronomy*; (ὁλοχερὴ tantum, non etiam ἀκριβῆ,) and that the *Greeks learned nothing therein of the Chaldæans*: whenas *Aristotle* ingenuously acknowledgeth the contrary, *the Ægyptians and Babylonians*, saith he, *from whom we have many Informations concerning each of the Stars.* Though doubtless they were far short of that height in this Art, to which the *Greeks*, who brought it out of the East, improved it: for *Diodorus Siculus* affirms that (b) *they alledged very weak Reasons for the Eclipses of the Sun, which Eclipses they neither durst foretel, nor reduce to certain Periods.*

(a) *Proleg. in Manil.*

(b) *Lib. 1.*

But of the *Apotelesmatick* part they boasted themselves not only the Inventors, but Masters; insomuch that all the Professors of it, of what Country soever, were (as we formerly shewed) called after them, *Chaldæans.*

## CHAP. I.

### *Of the Stars Fixed and Erratick, and of their Præsignification.*

*THey First lay down for a Ground, That Terrestrials Sympathize with the Celestials, and that every one of those is renewed by the Influence of these.* *Sext. Emp.*

*For every Man's endued with such a Mind,*
*As by the Sire of God's and Men's assigned.*

Above all things they hold that our Act and Life is subjected to the Stars, as well to the Erratick as the Fixed, and that Mankind is governed by their various and multiplicious course; * *That the Planets are of the kind of efficient Causes in every thing that happens in life, and that the Signs of the Zodiack co-operate with them*: * That they confer all good and ill to the Nativities of Men, and that by Contemplation of their Natures may be known the chief things that happen to Men. *Censor.* * *Sext. Emp. loco cit.* * *Diod. lib. 1.*

*They held the principal Gods to be twelve, to each of which they attributed a Month, and one of the Signs of the Zodiack.* *Diod. lib. 1.*

*Next the Zodiack they assert twenty four Stars, whereof half they say are ranked in the Northern Parts, the other half in the Southern: Of these they which are apparent they conceive to be deputed to the Living, the inapparent congregated to the Dead: These they call Judges of all things.* *Diod. loc. cit.*

*But the greatest Observation and Theory they hold to be that concerning the five Stars termed Planets, which they call the Interpreters, * because the rest of the Stars being Fixed, and having a setled Course, these only having a peculiar course, foretel things that shall come to pass, interpreting and declaring to Men the Benevolence of the Gods: for some things (say they) they presignify by their rising, some things by their setting, some things by their colour if observed; sometimes they foretel great Winds, sometimes extraordinary Rains or Droughts Likewise the rising of Comets, and Eclipses of the Sun, and of the Mind, and Earthquakes, and in a word all Alterations in the Air signify things advantageous or hurtful, not only to Nations or Countries, but even to Kings and private Persons.* *Diod. loc. cit.* * *Ibid.*

*Beneath the Course of these, they hold that there are placed thirty Stars, which they call Consiliary Gods; that half of these oversee the Places under the Earth, the other half oversee the Earth and the Business of Men, and what is done in the Heavens, and that every ten days one of these is sent to those below as a Messenger, and in like manner one of the Stars under the Earth is sent to those above, and that they have this certain Motion settled in an Æternal Revolution.* *Diod. lot. cit.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. II.

### *Of Planets*

Diod. lib. 1. *THE greateſt Theory they hold* (as we ſaid) *to be that which concerns the Planets: Theſe they call the Interpreters, becauſe whereas the reſt of the Stars are Fixed, and have one ſetled courſe, theſe having their proper courſes foretel what things ſhall come to paſs, interpreting and declaring to Men the Benevolence of the Gods.*

Sext. Emp. *Of the Seven, they hold the Sun and Moon to be the chief, and that the other five have leſs Power than they, as to the cauſing Events.*

Sext. Emp. loc. cit. Of the five *they affirm that there are three which agree with and are aſſiſtant to the Sun, viz.* Saturn, Jupiter, *and* Mercury; *theſe they call Diurnal, becauſe the Sun to whom they are aſſiſtant predominates over the things that are done in the day.*

Sext. Emp. loc. cit. As concerning the Powers *of the five, ſome they ſay are Benevolent, others Malevolent, others Common; the Benevolent are* Jupiter *and* Venus; *the Malevolent* Mars *and* Saturn; *the Common,* Mercury, *who is Benevolent with the Benevolent, and Malevolent with the Malevolent.*

## CHAP. III.

### *The Diviſions of the Zodiack.*

Sext. Emp. *THE* Chaldæans *having at firſt no certain Rule of Obſervation of the other Stars, in as much as they contemplated not the Signs as within their proper circumſcriptions, but only together with their obſervation of the ſeven Planets, it came at length into their minds to divide the whole Circle into twelve Parts: The manner they relate thus; they ſay that the Ancients having obſerved ſome one bright Star of thoſe in the Zodiack, filled a Veſſel (in which they bored a hole) with water, and let the water run into another Veſſel placed underneath, ſo long until the ſame Star roſe again; collecting that from the ſame Sign to the ſame, was the whole revolution of the Circle; Then they took the twelfth part of the water which had run out, and conſidered how long it was in running; affirming that the twelfth part of the Circle paſt over in the ſame ſpace of time; and that it had that proportion to the whole Circle which the part of water had to the whole water: By this Analogy (I mean of the Dodecatemorion or twelfth part) they marked out the extream term from ſome Signal Star which then appeared, or from ſome that aroſe within that time, Northern or Southern; the ſame courſe they took in the reſt of the Dodecatemoria.*

That to each of theſe Dodecatemoria, the Ancient Chaldæans applied a particular Figure and a Character, (as for inſtance to the firſt the Figure of a Ram, and this Character ♈.) though denied by the Learned * *John Picus Mirandula*, ſeems manifeſt enough from what we find aſcribed peculiarly to them, by *Ptolemy*, *Sextus Empyricus* and others, which we ſhall cite in their due places.

* Contra Aſtrol. lib.

Diod. lib. 1. *To each of theſe Signs they appropriated One of the principal Gods which they held to be twelve, and One of the Months*; the Zodiack it ſelf they termed the Circle Mazaloth, which the Septuagint render μαζϑωθ, interpreted by *Suidas*, *the Conſtellations which are commonly termed* ζωδια, *Signs*, for *Mazal* ſignifieth a Star. That they aſcribed ſeveral Gods to them agreeth with what is ſaid of the followers of *Baal* (whom Rabbi *Maimonides* conceives the ſame with theſe Chaldæans) *they burnt Incenſe unto Baal, to the Sun,* 2 Kings 23. 5. *and to the Moon, and to the Mazaloth, and to all the Hoſt of Heaven.* Hence ſome are of Opinion that *Homer* received this Doctrine from the Ægyptians, as the Ægyptians from the Chaldæans, alluding to it in the firſt of his Iliads, where he mentions the Entertainment of *Jupiter* and the reſt of the Gods in *Æthiopia* twelve days, with the ſeveral Houſes built for them by *Vulcan*; and much better deſerve they to be credited than thoſe *Ancients*, who (according to *Euſtathius*) *write that* Homer *firſt gave the Hint of* In Iliad. 1. *this Opinion to the Mathematicians.* Neither is what he adds in Explication of this Mythology diſſonant from the Chaldaick Doctrine, that *the making thoſe Manſions for the Gods or Stars, is* In Iliad. 1. *aſcribed to* Vulcan *in reſpect of the Æthereal Heat of the Celeſtial Orb.*

*Of the Signs ſome they call Maſculine, others Feminine, ſome Double, others Single, ſome Tropical, others Solid.* Sext. Emp.

*The Maſculine or Feminine are thoſe which have a Nature that co-operates towards the Generation of Males or Females,* Aries *is a Maſculine Sign,* Taurus *a Feminine,* Gemini *a Maſculine, in like manner the reſt alternately are Maſculine and Feminine; In Imitation of whom as I conceive the Pythagoreans call the Monad Maſculine, the Duad Feminine, the Triad Maſculine, and ſoon through all Numbers Odd and Even. Some there are who divide every Sign into twelve Parts, obſerving almoſt the ſame order; As in* Aries *they call the firſt twelfth part* Aries *and Maſculine, the ſecond* Taurus *and Feminine, the third* Gemini *and Maſculine, and ſo of the reſt.*

*Double Signs are* Gemini, *and its diametrically oppoſite* Sagittarius; Virgo *and* Piſces: *The reſt are ſingle.*

*Tropical are thoſe to which when the Sun cometh he turneth back, and maketh a Converſion: Such is the Sign* Aries, *and its oppoſite* Libra, Capricorn *and* Cancer; *In* Aries *is the Spring Tropick, in* Capricorn *the Winter, in* Cancer *the Summer, in* Libra *the Autumnal. The Solid are* Taurus *and its oppoſite* Scorpio, Leo *and* Aquarius.

*Some Chaldæans there are who attribute the ſeveral parts of Man's Body to particular Signs, as ſympathizing with them; To* Aries *the Head, to* Taurus *the Neck, to* Gemini *the Shoulders,* Cancer *the Breaſt,* Leo *the Sides,* Virgo *the Bowels and Belly,* Libra *the Reins and Loyns,* Scorpio *the Secret Parts and Womb,* Sagittarius *the Thighs,* Capricorn *the Knees,* Aquarius *the Legs,* Piſces *the Feet. This did they not without conſideration, for if any Star ſhall be in any Aſcenſion of theſe Malignant Signs, it will cauſe a Maim in that Part which bears the ſame Name with it. Thus much in brief of the Nature of the Signs in the Zodiack.* Sext. loc. cit.

Beſides this Diviſion of the Zodiack into Signs * they *Subdivided every Sign into* 30 *Degrees, every Degree into* 60 *Minutes, ſo they call the leaſt indiviſible Parts,* (as *Empyrius* affirms; whence it may be argued, that the Chaldæans made not any lower Diviſions into Seconds, or the like.) *The Degrees being in every Sign* 30, *are* * Sext. Emp. Cenſorin. de die natali.

*are in the whole Zodiack* 360. *in some one of these the Sun must necessarily be at the time of the Nativity; which Degree the Chaldæans properly call the place of the Birth. Hence the Greeks call these Degrees* μοῖραι, *in Allusion to the* μοῖραι *Goddesses of Destiny, these being our Fates; for it is of greatest Importance which of these Degrees is Ascendant at the time of Birth.*

Three other Ways there are of dividing of the Zodiack ascribed to the Chaldæans, which are *Triplicities, Terms, Decanates.*

Ptol. The Trigons or Triplicities are these four. *The first is* Aries, Leo, Sagittarius, *the second* Taurus, Virgo, Capricorn, *the third* Gemini, Libra, Aquarius, *the last* Cancer, Scorpio, Pisces;) That the Chaldæans divided the Zodiack according to these Triplicities is manifest from their Way of collecting the Terms of the Planets described by *Ptolemy.*

* Ptol. Every Sign hath five *Terms.* * *The Chaldaick way of finding out the Quantity of the Terms in every Sign is one, and that very plain, for their Quantities differ by an equal Diminution, every Term is less than the precedent by one Degree, for they made the first Term of every Sign to be eight Degrees, the second seven, the third six, the fourth five, the fifth four, which make up* 30 *Degrees.*

Lastly, the Signs are divided into *Faces*, for so the Ancients called them, in Hebrew *Phanim*, in Arabick *Mageah*, in Greek πρόσωπα; but the latter Astrologers *Decanates* δεκάνας. *Decanos* a
In Manil. word (as *Scaliger* observes) derived from the Roman Militia, of these in every Sign there are three, each of which comprehends ten Degrees. That the *Chaldæans* were not ignorant of these is manifest, in as much as Temer *the Babylonian, an Author of great Antiquity, wrote concerning them.*

## CHAP. IV.

*Of the Planets considered in respect to the Zodiack.*

Sext. Emp. THe *Chaldæans* held *that the Planets have not always* Power alike, as to the procuring of Good and Ill; but that in some Places [or Signs of the Zodiack] they are more efficacious,
Sext. Emp. loc. cit. in others less; and that *the same Stars have greater Power being in their proper Houses, or in their Exaltations* [or Triplicities,] *or Terms*, or Decanates. All which the later Astrologers call their Essential Dignities.

Sext. Emp. ibid. The most Efficacious is that of Houses. *They hold the Sun's House to be* Leo, *the Moon's* Cancer, Saturn's Capricorn *and* Aquarius, Jupiter's Sagittarius *and* Pisces, *that of* Mars Aries *and* Scorpio, *that of* Venus Taurus *and* Libra, *that of* Mercury Gemini *and* Virgo.

Sext. loc. cit. *They call the Exaltations and Depressions of the Planets, when they are in Signs wherewith they are delighted, or when they are in those in which they have little* (or no) *Power: for they are delighted in their Exaltations; but have little* (or no) *Power in their Depressions. As the Sun's Exaltation is in* Aries, *when he is exactly in the* 19th *Degree thereof, his Depression in the Sign and Degree diametrically opposite to it. The Moon's Exaltation is in* Taurus, *her Depression* (or Detriment) *in the Sign diametrically opposite. That of* Saturn *is in* Libra, *of* Jupiter *in* Cancer, *of* Mars *in* Capricorn, *of* Venus *in* Pisces, *and their Depressions are in the Signs diametrically opposite to their Exaltations.*

The Trigones or Triplicities of Planets are ordered by the *Chaldæans* after this manner. * *The* * Ptol. *Lord of the first Triplicity* (of the Zodiack) *is* Jupiter, *of the second* Venus; *the same Order they observe in the other two Triplicities, except that the third is said to have two Lords*, Saturn *and* Mercury: *the first part of the Day is assigned to* Saturn, *the Night to* Mercury. *The Lord of the last Triplicity is* Mars. How much this differs from the Vulgar Way (which takes in the Sun and Moon) will easily appear to those who will take the pains to compare them. The latter way see in *Firmicus.*

Sext. Emp. *They call the Terms of the Planets in every Sign, those in which any Planet from such a Degree to such a Degree is most powerful or prevalent.* * *The* * Ptol. Chaldaick *way of Terms is gathered from the Lords of the Triplicities, (which is plainer and more effectual than that of the* Ægyptians from the Lords of the Houses) *yet neither in their Orders or Quantities do they always follow those Planets which govern the Triplicities. In the first Triplicity, their Division of Terms in every Sign thereof is one and the same. The first Term they give to the Lord of the Triplicity* Jupiter, *the second, to the Lord of the following Triplicity* Venus, *the third and fourth, to the two Lords of the Triplicity of the* Gemini, *which are* Saturn *and* Mercury; *the fifth, to the Lord of the last Triplicity* Mars. *In the second Triplicity they divide every Sign alike, and alot the first Term to* Venus, *by reason of her Dominion in that Triplicity, the second and third to the two Lords of the Triplicity of the* Gemini, *which are* Saturn *and* Mercury; *the fourth to* Mars; *the last to* Jupiter. *To* Saturn *are attributed in the Day* 66 *Degrees, in the Night* 78, *to* Jupiter 72, *to* Mars 60, *to* Venus 75, *to* Mercury *in the Day* 66, *in the Night* 78.

## *The Terms of the* Chaldæans *or* Babylonians.

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aries | Jupiter | 8 | Venus | 7 | Saturn | 6 | Mercury | 5 | Mars | 4 |
| Taurus | Venus | 8 | Saturn | 7 | Mercury | 6 | Mars | 5 | Jupiter | 4 |
| Gemini | Saturn | 8 | Mercury | 7 | Mars | 6 | Jupiter | 5 | Venus | 4 |
| Cancer | Mars | 8 | Jupiter | 7 | Venus | 6 | Saturn | 5 | Mercury | 4 |
| Leo | Jupiter | 8 | Venus | 7 | Saturn | 6 | Mercury | 5 | Mars | 4 |
| Virgo | Venus | 8 | Saturn | 7 | Mercury | 6 | Mars | 5 | Jupiter | 4 |
| Libra | Saturn | 8 | Mercury | 7 | Mars | 6 | Jupiter | 5 | Venus | 4 |
| Scorpio | Mars | 8 | Jupiter | 7 | Venus | 6 | Saturn | 5 | Mercury | 4 |
| Sagittarius | Jupiter | 8 | Venus | 7 | Saturn | 6 | Mercury | 5 | Mars | 4 |
| Capricorn. | Venus | 8 | Saturn | 7 | Mercury | 6 | Mars | 5 | Jupiter | 4 |
| Aquarius | Saturn | 8 | Mercury | 7 | Mars | 6 | Jupiter | 5 | Venus | 4 |
| Piſces | Mars | 8 | Jupiter | 7 | Venus | 6 | Saturn | 5 | Mercury | 4 |

The *Decanates* or *Faces* of the Planets, have reference to thoſe of the Zodiack; the firſt Face is that Planet whoſe Sign it is: the ſecond, the next Planet; and ſo on. That theſe were of Ancient *Chaldaick* Invention is manifeſt, not only in regard that *Teucer* the *Babylonian* wrote concerning them, but likewiſe they were obſerved by the *Ægyptians*, who (as *Joſephus* ſaith) derived this Learning from the *Chaldeans*. Nicipſo *King of* Ægypt, *a moſt juſt Governour, and Excellent Aſtrologer, did* (if we credit *Julius Firmicus*) *collect all Sickneſſes from the* Decanates; *ſhewing what Diſeaſes every Decanate cauſed; becauſe one Nature was overcome by another, and one God by another.* The ſame Author adds, that Petoſiris *touched this part of Aſtrology but lightly; not as being ignorant of it, but not willing to communicate his Immortal Learning to Poſterity.*

### CHAP. V.

*Aſpects of the Signs and Planets.*

Cæſar. *EVery Sign of the Zodiack hath a mutual Aſpect to the reſt*; In like manner the Planets have ſeveral Aſpects; * *They are ſaid to be in mutual Aſpect or Configuration, when they appear either in Trine or Square. They are ſaid to behold one another in Trine, when there is an Interpoſition of three Signs between them: in Square or Quartile, when of two.*

*Sext. Emp.

Cæſar. *The Sun paſſing into the Sign next to that, wherein he was at the time of Birth, regards the place of Conception either with a very weak Aſpect, or not at all; for moſt of the* Chaldæans *have abſolutely denied, that the Signs which are next to one another behold one another; But when he is in the third Sign, that is, when there is a Sign betwixt them, then he is ſaid to behold the firſt place whence he came, but with a very oblique and weak light, which Aſpect is termed Sextile; for it ſubtends the ſixth part of a Circle: for if we draw Lines from the firſt Sign to the third, from the third to the fifth, and from thence to the ſeventh, and ſo on, we ſhall deſcribe an equilateral Hexagone. This Aſpect they did not wholly of, for that it ſeemed to conduce the leaſt to the Nativity of the Child, but when he comes to the fourth Sign, ſo that there are two betwixt, he looks on it with a Quarterly Aſpect: for that Line which his Aſpect makes, cuts off a fourth part of the Circle. When he is in the fifth, there being three betwixt, it is a Trine Aſpect, for it ſubtends a third part of the Zodiack: which two Aſpects the Quartile and Trine, being very efficacious, afford much increaſe to the Birth. But the Aſpect from the ſixth place is wholly inefficatious, for the Line there makes not a Side of any Polygone, but from the 7th. Sign which is the oppoſite the Aſpect is moſt full and powerful, and bringeth forth ſome Infants already mature, termed Septimeſtres, from being born in the 7th. Month: But if within that ſpace it be not mature, in the 8th. Month it is not born, for from the 8th. Sign as from the 6th. the Aſpect is inefficacious, but either in the 9th. Month, or in the 10th. for the Sun from the 9th. Sign beholds again the Particle of the Conception in a Trine Aſpect, and from the 10th. in a Quartile; which Aſpects, as we ſaid, are very efficacious: But in the 11th. Month they hold it cannot be born, becauſe then, the Light being weak, ſends firſt his languiſhing Ray in a Sextile Aſpect, much leſs in the 12th. which Aſpect is not all valid.*

### CHAP. VI.

*Schemes.*

Sext. Emp. *THe way by which the* Chaldæans *from the very beginning obſerved the Horoſcope of any Nativity, correſponds with that of their Diviſion of the Zodiack* (mentioned formerly;) *For a* Chaldæan *ſate in the Night-time on ſome high Promontory contemplating the Stars; another ſate by the Woman in Travail until ſuch time as ſhe were delivered. As ſoon as ſhe was delivered, he ſignified it to him on the Promontory, which as ſoon as he had heard, he obſerved the Sign then riſing for the Horoſcope, but in the Day he attended the Aſcendants and Sun's Motion.*

Sext. Emp. loc. cit. Of the twelve Parts or Houſes into which the Zodiack is divided, *thoſe which are predominant in every Nativity, and chiefly to be conſidered in Prognoſticks, are four, which by one common Name*

*they term Centers* (or Angles) *but more particularly, they call one the Horoſcope*, or Aſcendant, *another the* Medium Cœli, (the tenth Houſe,) *another the Deſcendant*, (the ſeventh Houſe,) *another the Subterreſtrial and oppoſite to the* Medium Cœli, (the fourth Houſe.) *The Horoſcope is that which happens to be Aſcendant at the time of the Birth, the* Medium Cœli *is the fourth Sign incluſively from it. The Deſcendant is that which is oppoſite to the Horoſcope. The Subterreſtrial and* Imum Cœli, *that which is oppoſite to the* Medium Cœli: *as* (*to explain it by an Example*) *if* Cancer *be the Horoſcope*, Aries *is the* Medium Cœli, Capricorn *Deſcendant, and* Libra *Subterreſtrial. That Houſe which goes before either of theſe Houſes they call cadent, that which followeth, ſuccedent; now that which goeth before the Horoſcope being apparent to us, they affirm to be of the ill* Genius, *that next which followeth the* Medium Cœli *of the good* Genius, *that which is before the* Medium Cœli, *the inferiour Portion and ſingle Lot, and God. That which is before the Deſcendant, a ſlothful Sign, and the beginning of Death; that which is after the Aſcendant, and is not apparent to us, the Fury and ill Fortune; that which cometh under the Earth good Fortune, oppoſite to the good* Genius: *that which is beyond the* Imum Cœli *towards the Eaſt, Goddeſs; that which followeth the Horoſcope ſlothful, which alſo is oppoſite to the ſlothful.*

*Sext. loc. cit.* Or more briefly thus: *The Cadent of the Horoſcope is called the ill* Genius, *the Succedent ſlothful, the Cadent of the* Medium Cœli, *God, the Succedent good* Genius, *the Cadent of the* Imum Cœli, *Goddeſs, the Succedent good Fortune, the Cadent of the Deſcendant ill Fortune, the Succedent ſlothful. Theſe, as they conceive, ought to be examined not ſuperficially.*

*Sext. loc. cit.* *Upon theſe Grounds the* Chaldæans *made their* Apoteleſmatick *Predictions, of which there is a difference; for ſome of them are more ſimple, others more accurate: the more ſimple, thoſe which are made from any one Sign, or the ſimple force of a ſingle Star, as that a Star being in ſuch a Sign ſhall cauſe ſuch kind of Men: the more accurate, thoſe which are made by the Concourſe, and as they ſay, the Contemporation of many. As if one Star be in the Horoſcope, another in the Mid-Heaven, another in the oppoſite Point to the Mid-Heaven, others thus or thus poſited, then theſe or theſe things will come to paſs.* Theſe are all the Remains of this Art, which can be attributed to the Ancient *Chaldæans*.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Other Arts of Divination.*

(a) *Lib.* 1. THe *Chaldæans*, beſides Aſtrology, invented and uſed many other ways of Divination, of which (a) *Diodorus Siculus* inſtanceth, *Divination by Birds, Interpretation of Dreams, Explication of Prodigies, and Hieroſcopy.* (b) *R. Maimonides* likewiſe affirms, that *amongſt the* Chaldæans *anciently there aroſe ſeveral ſorts of Diviners*, in particular theſe, *Megnonemin, Menacheſhim, Mecaſhephim, Chober chaber, Shel ob, Fideyoni, Doreſh el hammetim*; all which are mentioned, *Deut.* 18. 10, 11.

(b) *Mor. Nev.*

The firſt aſcribed by *Diodorus* to the *Chaldæans*, is *Divination of Birds*, ὀρνέων μαντικὴν, or Augury: neither is it probable, that they who were ſo great Inquiſitors into the ſeveral kinds of Divination, ſhould be ignorant of this, which after-Ages eſteemed one of the moſt conſiderable. But they who underſtand the Word (c) *Menacheſhim* in this Senſe, ſeem to have been drawn to it by a miſtake of the Latine Word *augurari*, by which it is rendred. (c) מנחשם

The next, *Interpretation of Dreams*, ἐξήγησις ἐνυπνίων, (d) *Philo Judæus* affirms to have been invented by *Abraham*. Indeed that it was profeſt by the Ancient *Chaldæans* appears from their Anſwer to *Nebuchadnezzar*, (e) *Tell thy Servants the Dream, and we will ſhew the Interpretation.* There are extant many onirocritical Verſes, under the name of *Aſtrampſychus*, collected out of *Suidas*, and digeſted by *Joſeph Scaliger*: *Aſtrampſychus* is mentioned amongſt the Magi by *Laertius*: and (f) there are who conceive the name to be only an Interpretation of the *Chaldæan* or *Perſian Zoroaſter*, which ſome render, *a living Star*. (d) *Suid.* (e) *Dan.* 2. (f) *Vrſin. Zor.*

The third, *Explication of Prodigies*, ἐξήγησις τεράτων, this kind the *Greek* Interpreters conceive included in the Word *Fideyoni*, for they render it ἐγγαστρίμυθοι ἢ τερατοσκόποι.

The laſt that *Diodorus* mentions, is *Hieroſcopie*, by which I conceive to be meant *extiſpicium*, Divination by Inſpection into the Entrails (ἱερείων) of ſacrificed Beaſts. That the *Chaldæans* uſed this kind, may be argued from the Prophet *Ezekiel*, who ſaith of the King of *Babylon* (uſing Divination) (g) *he looked into the Liver.* Theſe ſeem to be the *gazrim*, reckoned by (h) *Daniel* amongſt the *Chaldæan* Diviners; from *gazar*, *to cut*; for they cut open the Beaſt and divined by his Entrails. (g) *Chap.* 21. *v.* 21. (h) *Chap.* 2.

*Ob*, is rendred *Pytho*, or (rather) *Pythonicus ſpiritus*; the Word originally ſignifieth *a Bottle*; and thereupon is taken for that Spirit which ſpeaketh *ex utero Pythoniſſa*: The Sacred Text calls the Woman *Eſheth Baalath Ob*, which the Septuagint render, γυναῖκα ἐγγαστρίμυθον, and where *Saul* ſaith, (i) *I pray thee divine unto me in Ob*, they tranſlate, μάντευσαί μοι ἐν τῷ ἐγγαστριμύθῳ. *R. Maimonides* ſaith, ſhe that was *initiated held in her hand a Myrtle Wand, and received Suffumigations*: *R. Abraham ben David*, that *theſe Rites were uſually performed at ſome dead man's Tomb.* (i) 1 *Sam.* 28. *v.* 8.

*Doreſh el hammetim*, is properly (as rendred) a *Necromancer*; (k) ſome affirm this kind of Divination had its Original in *Chaldæa*. (k) *Fran. Mirand. de rer. prænot. lib.* 4. *p.* 328.

Theſe and the reſt of this kind are all comprehended under the general name *Mecaſhphim*, of which formerly.

# THE THIRD SECTION.

## *Magick, Natural and Theurgick.*

THe third Part of the *Chaldaick* Doctrin was *Magick*: for though the Name is conceived to be *Perſian* (by ſome derived

ved from *Mog*,(a) a Sirname of the *Perſian Zoroaſter*, (b) by others from the *Magusſeans*) yet this Science it ſelf was originally *Chaldæan*, and properly the Study of the *Aſhaphim*; of whom *Laertius* is to be underſtood, when he ſaith that *the* Chaldæans *were the ſame with the* Babylonians, *as the* Magi *with the* Perſians: Hence it is alſo that the Term *Magi* is ſometimes extended to the *Chaldæan* Philoſophers.

(a) Salmaſ. (b) Suid.

*Pliny* indeed ſaith, that (c) Magick *had its beginning in* Perſia *from* Zoroaſter, but adds, that *whether this* Zoroaſter *was one, or afterwards a ſecond alſo, is not certain*: and that he rather meant the *Chaldæan*, than the *Perſian*, may be inferred from his citing thoſe Authors who placed this *Zoroaſter* 6000 years before *Plato*, or 5000 years before the *Trojan* War; which Accounts (though extravagant) were doubtleſs intended of the moſt Ancient *Zoroaſter*, the *Chaldæan*. He likewiſe inſtanceth (d) as skilful in this Art *Marmaridius a Babylonian*, and *Zormoecnidas an Aſſyrian*, both ſo ancient as that *there are not any Monuments of them extant*.

(c) Lib. 30. cap. 1.

(d) Loc. cit.

The few Remains we find of the *Chaldæan Magick* may be reduced to two Kinds, *Natural* and *Theurgick*.

## CHAP. I.

### *Natural Magick.*

THe Firſt Part of the *Chaldaick* Magick is that which we commonly term *Natural*, becauſe it contemplates the Virtues of all Natural Beings, Cœleſtial and Sublunary, (a) makes Scrutiny into their Sympathy, and by a mutual Application of them, produceth extraordinary Effects.

(a) Pſal.]

By this kind of Magick the *Chaldæans* profeſſed (b) *to perform many admirable things, not only upon particular Perſons, but upon whole Countries.* R. Maimonides inſtanceth *the* (c) *expelling of Noxious Animals, as Lions, Serpents, and the like, out of Cities; the driving away all kind of harms from Plants, prevention of Hail, the deſtroying of Worms that they hurt not the Vines; concerning theſe* (ſaith he) *they have written much in their Books; and ſome there are who boaſt they can cauſe that no Leaves or Fruit ſhall fall from the Trees.*

(b) Maimon. Mor. Ne. (c) Mor. Ne.

## CHAP. II.

### *Magical Operations, their Kinds.*

THeir Operations (a) R. *Maimonides* reduceth to three Kinds. *The Firſt of thoſe which deal in Plants, Animals, and Metals. The Second conſiſts in Circumſcription and Determination of ſome time, in which the Operations are to be performed. The Third conſiſts in Humane Geſtures and Actions; as in clapping the Hands, Leaping, Crying aloud, Laughing, Lying Proſtrate on the Earth, Burning of any Thing, Kindling of Smoak, and Laſtly in Pronouncing certain Words Intelligible or Unintelligible; theſe are the Kinds of their Magical Operations.*

(a) Mor. Ne.

(b) *Some there are which are not performed but by all theſe Kinds: As when they ſay, take ſuch a Leaf of ſuch an Herb, when the Moon is in ſuch a Degree and Place: Or, take of the Horn of ſuch a Beaſt, or of his Hair, Sweat or Blood, ſuch a quantity, when the Sun is in the middle of Heaven, or in ſome other certain Place. Or, take of ſuch a Metal, or of many Metals, melt them under ſuch a Conſtellation, and in ſuch a Poſition of the Moon; then pronounce ſuch and ſuch Words; make a ſuffumigation of ſuch and ſuch Leaves, in ſuch and ſuch a Figure, and this or that thing ſhall come to paſs.*

(b) Loc. cit.

(c) *Other Magical Operations there are which they conceive may be performed by one of the forementioned Kinds, only theſe (ſay they) are performed for the moſt part by Women, as we find amongſt them: for the bringing forth of Waters, if ten Virgins ſhall adorn themſelves, and put on red Garments, and leap in ſuch manner that one ſhall thruſt on the other, and this to be done going backwards and forwards, and afterwards ſhall ſtretch out their fingers towards the Sun, making certain Signs, this Action being finiſhed, they ſay that Waters will iſſue forth. In like manner they write, that if four Women, &c. uſing certain Words and certain Geſtures, by this Action they ſhall divert Hail from falling down. Many other ſuch like Vanities they mention all along their Writings, which are to be performed by Women.*

(c) Loc. cit.

(d) *But none of theſe (as they imagine) can be performed without having reſpect and conſideration of the Stars; for they conceive that every Plant hath its proper Star: they aſcribe alſo certain Stars to all living Creatures and Metals; Moreover theſe Operations are peculiar Worſhips of the Stars, and that they are delighted with ſuch an Action, or Speech, or Suffumigation, and for its ſake afford them what they wiſh.* Hitherto *R. Maimonides*, who only hath preſerved theſe Remains of the Ancient *Chaldaick* Superſtition.

(d) Maim. Mor. Ne.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of the Tſilmenaia (or Teleſmes) uſed for Averruncation.*

MOreover the *Chaldæans* are by the Rabbies reported to have been the firſt that found out the ſecret Power of Figures; neither was there any thing more celebrious than the Images of this kind made by them.

They are called in *Chaldee* and *Perſian Tſilmenaia*, from the Hebrew *Tſelem*, *an Image*: in Arabick, *Talitſmam* or *Tſalimam*, perhaps from the ſame Root; rather than as ſome conjecture from the Greek Word τελέζμα τετελέζμενόν τι.

Theſe Images were prepared under certain Conſtellations, for ſeveral Purpoſes; ſome for Averruncation, others for Prædiction.

Thoſe that ſerve for *Averruncation*, ſome conceive to have been of later Invention, and aſcribe them to *Apollonius Tyanæus*; he indeed was the firſt amongſt the *Græcians* that was Famous for them: but it is moſt probable that he brought this Art out of the Eaſt, there being yet to be ſeen many of theſe Figures or Teleſmes throughout the whole Eaſtern Part of the World; and ſome of them very Ancient, which (a) *Gaffarel* alledgeth to confirm, that *the* Perſians, *or if you will, the* Babylonians *or* Chaldæans, *were the firſt that found them out.*

(a) Curioſ. inouyes.

Theſe

These the *Greeks* term also στιχεῖα, and στιχάζεις; and the makers of them *Stoicheiomaticks*.

(b) *Centiloq.* (b) Ptolemy, *The generable and corruptible Forms are affected by the Celestial Forms: for which reason the* Stoicheiomaticks *make use of them, considering the Entrance of the Stars into them*: On which Words *Hali Aben Rodoan* (or as the Hebrew Translation *Aben Giafar*) writes thus. *In this Chapter* Ptolemy *means to discover many secrets of Images, and that the Figures which are here below are correspondent to the like Figurations above, which predominate over them: as for instance, the Celestial* Scorpion *predominates over the Terrestrial* Scorpions, *and the Celestial* Serpent *over the Terrestrial* Serpents; *and the skilful in Images* (Stoicheiomaticks) *observed, when a Planet was out of his Combustion, and entred into any of these Figures, then placing the Planet in the Horoscope, they engraved the Figure upon a Stone, and having added what else was necessary, they fitted it for preservation, or destruction, as they pleased; and this Power continued in the Stone a long time after.*

## CHAP. IV.

### *Of the Tsilmenaia, used for Prediction.*

ANother kind there was of Tsilmenaia or Telesmes, used for Prediction: *These Images* (according to the Description of (*a*) *R. Maimonides*) *they did erect to the Stars: of Gold to the Sun, of Silver to the Moon, and so distributed the Metals and Climates of the Earth among the Stars, for they said, that such a Star is the God of such a Climate. There they built Temples, and placed the Images in them, conceiving that the Power of the Stars did flow into those Images, and that those Images had the faculty of understanding, and did give to Men the Gift of Prophecy, and in a word did declare to them what things were good for them. So also they say of Trees which belong to those Stars, every Tree being dedicated to some Star, and planted to its Name, and worshipped, for this or that reason, because the Spiritual Virtues of the Stars, are infused into that Tree, so that after the manner of Prophecy they discourse to Men, and speak to them also in Dreams.*

(a) *Mor. Ne.*

The Word *Teraphim* in the Sacred Scripture, amongst other significations, is sometimes taken for these Images, whence (*b*) *Onkelos* the *Chaldee* Paraphrast renders it *Tsilmenaia*, with which the *Syriack* Version agrees; The Septuagint δῆλας, and ἀποφθεγγομένας, and φωτίζοντας, implying by all these Interpretations, that they were indued with the Gift of Prediction: which is no more than the Text it self confirms; for (*c*) *Ezekiel* saith of the King of *Babylon* using Divination, that *he consulted the Teraphim*.

(b) *Gen.* 3.

(c) *Ch.* 21. 21.

Of this kind are those *Teraphim* conceived to be, which *Rachel* stole from her Father *Laban*; for he calls them his (*d*) *Gods*; the Coptick Version renders it, *the greatest of his Gods*: *R. D. Kimchi* conceives they were made by Astrologers to foretel things to come, and that they were Images whose Figures we know not, by which the Ancients were informed of future Events, they being in some manner like the Oracles which often spake by the mouth of the Devil. *R. Eliezer*, that they were Statues made in the Figure of Men under certain Constellations, whose Influences (which they were capable of receiving) caused them to speak at some set hours, and give an answer to whatsoever was demanded of them. *Aben Ezra*, that they were made after the shapes of Men, to the end they might be capable of Celestial Influence (and in the same manner interprets he the *Teraphim* placed by *Michol* in *David*'s Bed.) Adding, that *the reason why* Rachel *took them away, was not to take her Father off from Idolatry; for if it were so, why then did she take them along with her, and not rather hide them in the way near his House: But by reason that her Father was skilful in Astrology, she feared lest by consulting those Images and the Stars, he should know which way* Jacob *was gone.* And St. *Austin*, that Laban *saith, why hast thou stoln my Gods? It is perhaps in as much as he had said he divined,* * *I divined the Lord blessed me because of thee,* for so the more Ancient Expositors interpret the Word *nicashti*, and the Jews understand that place, of Prescience, Divination, or Conjecture, as Mr. *Selden* observes.

(d) *Gen.* 31.

*In Gen. quæst.* 94.

* *Gen.* 30.

נחשתי *De Deis Syriis.*

*Philo Judæus* speaking of the * *Teraphim* of *Micah*, fancies *that* Micah *made of fine Gold and Silver three Images of young Lads, and three Calves, and one Lion, one Dragon, and one Dove; so that if any had a Mind to know any Secret concerning his Wife, he was to have recourse to the Image of the Dove, which answered his Demands; if concerning his Children, he went to the Boy; if concerning Riches, to the Eagle; if concerning Power and Strength, to the Lion; if it any thing concerned Sons and Daughters, he went then to the Calves; and if about the length of Tears and Days, he was to consult the Image of the Dragon.* This, how light soever, shews that he also understood the *Teraphim* to be Prophetical.

* *Judg.* 17.

## CHAP. V.

### *Theurgick Magick.*

THE other Part of the *Chaldaick* Magick is *Theurgick*: to which perhaps *Plato* more particularly alluded, when he defined (*a*) *the Magick of* Zoroaster, *the Service of the Gods.* This they called also (*b*) *the Method of Rites*; *the Works of Piety*, and (as rendered by the Greeks) τελέσμων ἐπιστήμην, *the Telestick Science and Telesiurgick.* In what it did consist may be gathered from what *Suidas* saith of the two *Julians*; *Julian* (saith he) *the* Chaldæan, *a Philosopher, Father of* Julian *Sirnamed the* Theurgick; *He wrote of Damons four Books; they treat of Preservatives of every part of Man's Body, of which kind are the* Chaldaick *Telesiurgicks.* And again, Julian *Son of the afore-mentioned, lived under* Marcus Antonius *the Emperor; he also wrote Theurgick Initiatory Oracles in Verse; and all other Secrets of the Science.*

(a) *Alcibiad.* 1.

(b) *Psell. in Orac.*

Thus the Telestick Science was conceived to procure a Conversation with Dæmons by certain Rites and Ceremonies, and (*c*) *to initiate or perfect the Soul by the power of materials here on Earth; for the supream faculty of the Soul cannot by its own guidance aspire to the sublimest Institution, and to the comprehension of Divinity, but the Work of Piety leads it by the hand to God*

(c) *Psell. in Orac.*

by

*by illumination from thence; Plato* indeed holds, *that we may comprehend the ungenerate Essence by Reason and Intellect; but the* Chaldæan *asserts, that there is no other means for us to arrive at God, but by strengthening the Vehicle of the Soul by material Rites: for he supposeth that the Soul is purified by Stones, and Herbs, and Charms, and is rendred expedite for Ascent.*

It is likewise beneficial to the Body, as well as to the Soul, for * *if a man shall give his mind to these, he shall not only render his Soul unvanquishable by Passions, but shall also preserve his Body the better in health: for the usual effect of Divine Illuminations is to consume the matter of the Body, and to establish Nature by Health, that we be not seized either by Passions or Diseases.*

* Psell. in Orac.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Theurgick Rites.*

BY *Theurgick* or *Telestick* Rites they conceived that they could procure a Communication with the good Dæmons, and Expulsion or Averruncation of the bad.

The chief of these Rites was Sacrifice; concerning which there is a remarkable Passage in (*a*) *Jamblichus*, who delivers the *Chaldaick* Opinion thus: *The Gods give those things that are truly good, to such as are purified by Sacrifices; with whom also they converse, and by their Communication drive away Wickedness and Passion far from them; and by their brightness chase from thence the dark Spirit; for the evil Spirits, when the light of the Gods cometh in, fly away as Shadows at the light of the Sun: neither are they able any longer to disturb the pious Sacrificer, who is free from all Wickedness, Perverseness, and Passion: but such as are pernicious, and behave themselves insolently in opposition to Sacred Rites and Orders, these by reason of the imbecillity of their Action, and want of Power, are not able to attain to the Gods, but because of certain Pollutions are driven away from the Gods, and associated with ill Dæmons, by whose bad breath they are inspired, and depart thence most wicked, profane and dissolute; unlike the Gods in desire, but in all things resembling the bad Dæmons with whom they converse daily. There Men therefore being full of Passion and Wickedness, by the Affinity that is betwixt them, draw the evil Spirits to them, by whom being quickly possest, they are again excited to all Iniquity, one assisting and strengthning the other, like a Circle whose beginning and end meet.*

(*a*) *De Myster. Ægypt.*

Several other Rites they used also, which they conceived to be prevalent in evocation of these Dæmons. *They are allured* (saith (*b*) *Gregorius Nicephoras*) *out of the Air and Earth by certain Stones or Pulse, or certain Voices or Figures, which they call Characters, invented by the* Chaldæans *and* Egyptians *who first found out the proper dignoscitive sign of every Dæmon.*

(*b*) *In Synes.*

Some few of these are mentioned in the *Chaldaick* Oracles; as.

*When thou seest the Terrestrial Dæmon approach, Sacrifice the Stone Mnizuris, using invocation.*

*The Dæmons* (saith *Psellus*) *that are near the Earth are by Nature lying, as being far off from the Divine Knowledge, and filled with dark matter. Now if you would have any true Discourse from these prepare an Altar and Sacrifice the Stone Mnizuris. This Stone hath the power of Evocations, the other greater Dæmon who invisibly approacheth to the material Dæmon will pronounce the true Relation of Demands, which transmits to the Demandant the Oracle the vocative name with the Sacrificing of the Stone.*

Another of these Rites mentioned by the same Oracles, is that of the *Hecatine Strophalus.*

### *Labour about the* Hecatine Strophalus.

*The* Hecatine Strophalus (saith *Psellus*) *is a Golden Ball, in the midst whereof is a Sapphire, they fold about it a Leather thong, it is beset all over with Characters; Thus whipping it about they made their Invocations. These they use to call Fynges whether it be round or triangle, or any other Figure, and whilst they are doing thus they make insignificant or brutish cries, and lash the Air with their whips. The Oracle adviseth to the performance of these Rites, or such a Motion of the* Strophalus, *as having an expressible Power. It is called* Hecatine *as being dedicated to* Hecate. Hecate *is a Goddess amongst the* Chaldæans, *having at her right side the Fountain of Vertues.*

No little Efficacy was attributed to certain Words used in these Rites, which the *Chaldaick* Oracles expresly forbid to be changed.

### *Never change Barbarous Names.*

*There are certain Names* (saith *Psellus*) *among all Nations delivered to them by God, which have an unspeakable Power in Divine Rites, change not these into the Greek Dialect; As* Seraphim *and* Cherubin, *and* Michael *and* Gabriel: *These in the Hebrew Dialect have an unspeakable Efficacy in Divine Rites; but changed into Greek Names are ineffectual.*

## CHAP. VII.

### *Apparitions.*

THE Apparitions procured by these Rites are of two Kinds.

(*a*) The First is called ἐποπτεία *Super-inspection* (in respect to the initiated Person.) When he who orders the Divine Rites seeth a meer Apparition, (as for instance) of Light in some Figure or Form, concerning which the *Chaldaick* (*b*) Oracle *adviseth, that if any one sees such a Light, he apply not his Mind to it, nor esteem the voice proceeding from thence to be true.* (*c*) *Sometimes likewise too many initiated Persons there appears whilst they are sacrificing some Apparitions in the shape of Dogs, and several other Figures. These are Apparitions of the Passions of the* Soul *in performing Divine Rites, meer Appearances, having no Substance, and therefore not signifying any thing true.*

(*a*) *Psel. in Orac.* 15.

(*b*) *Psel. in Orac.* 14.

(*c*) *Psel. in Orac.* 19.

The Second is called (*d*) αὐτοπτία, *self inspection*, this is *when the initiated Person seeth the Divine Light it self without any Figure or Form: This the* Oracle calls ἐυειδὲς, (*e*) *Sacro-sanct, for that*

(*d*) *Psel. in Orac.* 15.

(*e*) *Loc. cit.*

*thou it is seen with a Beauty by Sacred Persons, and glides up and down pleasantly and graciously through the Depths of the World.* (f) *This will not deceive the initiated Person, but whatsoever question you shall propose, the answer will be most true.*

(f) Loc. cit.

*When thou seest* (saith the Oracle) *a Sacred Fire, without*
*Form, shining flashingly through the Depths of the whole World,*
*Hear the voice of Fire.*

(g) *When thou beholdest the Divine Fire void of Figure brightly gliding up and down the World, and graciously smiling, listen to this Voice, as bringing a most perfect Prescience.*

(g) Psel. in Orac. 21.

But (b) *these things which appear to initiated Persons, as Thunder, Lightning, and all else whatsoever, are only Symbols or Signs, not the Nature of God.*

(b) Psel. in Orac. 25.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Material Dæmons how to be repulsed.*

AS it is one property of *Theurgy* to evocate and procure a Conversation with good Dæmons, so is it another, to repulse and chase away the Material Dæmons, which as they conceive may be effected several ways; either by Words or Actions.

By *Words*: For (as (a) *Marcus* delivers the *Chaldaick* Opinion) *these Material Dæmons fearing to be sent to Abysses and Subterraneal Places, and standing in awe of the Angels who send them thither, if a Man threaten to send them thither, and pronounce the Names of those Angels whose Office that is, it is hardly to be expressed how much they will be affrighted and troubled; so great will their astonishment be, as that they are not able to discern the Person that menaces them, and though it be some old Woman, or a little old Man that threatens them, yet so great is their fear, that commonly they depart as if he that menaces were able to kill them.*

(a) Psel. de Dæmon.

By *Actions*: For *the Bodies of Dæmons* (saith the same (b) Author) *are capable of being struck, and are pained thereby; Sense is not the Property of Compounds, but of Spirits; That thing in a Man which feeleth, is neither the Bone, nor the Nerve, but the Spirit which is in them: whence if the Nerve be pressed or seized with cold, or the like, there ariseth pain from the Emission of one Spirit into another Spirit; for it is impossible that a compound Body should in it self be sensible of pain, but in as much as it partaketh of Spirit, and therefore being cut into pieces, or dead, it is absolutely insensible; because it hath no Spirit. In like manner a Dæmon being all Spirit is of his own Nature sensible in every part; he immediately seeth and he heareth; he is obnoxious to suffering by touch; being cut asunder he is pained like Solid Bodies; only herein differing from them, that other things being cut asunder can by no means or very hardly be made whole again, whereas the Dæmon immediately cometh together again, as Air or Water parted by some more Solid Body. But though this Spirit joyns again in a moment, nevertheless at the very time in which the dissection is made it is pained; for this reason they are much afraid of Swords; which they who chase them away knowing, stick up pointed Irons or Swords in those places where they would not have them come, chasing them away by things Antipathetical to them, as they allure them by things Sympathetical.*

(b) De Dæmon.

*From these Material Dæmons,* * *upon those that worship them, descend certain Fiery Irradiations, like those we call falling Stars, gliding up and down, which those mad Persons term Apparitions of God; but there is nothing true, firm or certain in them, but cheats, like those of Juglers, which the common People term Wonders, because they deceive the eye,* * *for being removed far from the Beatitude of Divine Life, and destitute of Intellectual Contemplation, they cannot presignifie futures, but all that they say or shew is false and not solid, for they know Beings μορφωτικῶς by their outsides, but that which knoweth Futures particularly, useth Notions indivisible and not figured.*

* Psel. de Dæmon.

* Psel. in Orac. 23.

# THE FOURTH SECTION.

## *Of the Gods, and Religious Worship of the* Chaldæans.

IN the last place, (as to the Explication of the *Chaldaick* Doctrine, especially of that Part which concerned their *Assaphim*) it is necessary we give account of the Gods of the *Chaldæans*, and of their Religious Worship.

And though Mr. *Selden* hath reduced all the *Asiatick* Gods under the common name of *Syrian*, in his Excellent Treatise upon that Subject; yet we shall take notice of such only as were proper to *Assyria*, (whether as being worshiped no where else, or from thence brought into *Syria* and other Countries) conceiving the rest nothing pertinent to the *Chaldæans* or *Babylonians*.

The Religious Worship of the *Chaldæans* may be reduced to three Kinds; The first, a Worship of the true God, but after an Idolatrous manner: The second, of Dæmons, or Spirits: The third, of the Celestial Bodies, and Elements.

## CHAP. I.

*Of their Idolatrous Worship of the True God.*

THE first kind of the *Chaldaick* Worship, was of the True God, though after an Idolatrous manner: The Author of the *Chaldaick* Summary affirms, that *they held one Principle of all things, and declare that it is one and good.* That by this *one* and *good* they meant the True God, (to whom alone those Attributes belong) may be gathered from (a) *Eusebius*, who saith, (speaking doubtless of the Followers of *Zoroaster*) that *in the first place they conceive God the Father and King ought to be ranked*; for this reason the *Delphian* Oracle attested by *Porphyrius*, joyns them with the Hebrews;

(a) Præpar. Evang.

*Chaldees and Jews wise only, worshipping*
*Purely a self-begotten God and King.*

But

But (notwithstanding the Oracle) that this Worship, though of the True God, was Idolatrous, is beyond doubt: so as to them might be applied what St. *Paul* saith of the *Romans*, (*a*) *when they knew God they glorified him not as God*, but (*b*) *changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an Image made like to corruptible man.*

(*a*) Rom. 1. 20.

(*b*) Ver. 23.

The Name and Image whereby they represented the Supream God was that of *Bell*, as appears by the prohibition given by God himself, not to call him so any more: (*c*) *Thou shalt call me no longer Baali; Bell* with the *Chaldæans* is the same as *Baal* with the *Phœnicians*, both derived from the Hebrew *Baal*, *Lord*; this *Bell* of the *Babylonians* is mentioned by the Prophets *Esay* and *Jeremy*: They who first translated the Eastern Learning into Greek, for the most part interpret this *Bell* by the Word Ζεὺς, *Jupiter*. So *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Hesychius*, and others: *Berosus* (saith *Eusebius*) *was Priest of* Belus, *whom they interpret* (Δία) *Jupiter*; the reason of which seems to be, for that *Bell* was the Chief God with the *Chaldæans*, as *Jupiter* with the *Græcians*, who by that name meant the True God, as the *Chaldæans* by the other; for to him St. *Paul* applies that Hemistick of *Aratus*, τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν, (*for we are also his off-spring*,) which hath reference to the first Verse, ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεθα. And upon these Words of St. *Peter*, *worship ye God, but not as the Græcians. Clemens Alexandrinus* observes, that *he saith not, worship not the God whom the Græcians, but as the Græcians: he changed the manner of the Worship, but preached not another God.*

(*c*) Hos. 2. 16.

Acts 17. 28.

Strom. 6.

The Temple of this *Jupiter Belus* at *Babylon*, is exactly described by *Herodotus* an eye-witness, in whose time it was yet extant, thus: *the Gates were of Brass; the Temple it self square; every side two furlongs broad. In the midst of the Temple there was a solid Tower* (not hollow) *of thickness and height of a* Stadium; *upon which there was set another, and another upon that, and so on to eight: on the outside of these were stairs, by which to go up to every one of them; in the midst of the stairs were seats for such as went up, to rest themselves: in the highest Tower there was another Temple (or Chapel,) and in it a Bed sumptuously furnisht, and a Table of Gold; but neither in this was there any Statue, nor doth any Person lie here a-nights except one Woman, a Foreigner, of whom the God makes choice above all other, as the* Chaldæans *who are Priests of this God aver: for they say* (though I hardly credit it) *that the God himself comes into this Temple, and rests in this Bed: There is moreover in this Temple another lower Chapel, in which there is a great Statue of* Jupiter *all of Gold, sitting; and beside it a Table and Bench all of Gold also: in so much that the* Chaldæans *value it at* 800 *Talents: Likewise without the Chapel there is an Altar of Gold, and another Altar very great, upon which are sacrificed Sheep of full growth, for upon that of Gold, it is not lawful to sacrifice any but Sucklings; On this greater Altar the* Chaldæans *burn yearly Frankinsence to the value of a hundred thousand Talents, in sacrifice to their Gods. There was also at the same time in this Temple a Statue* 12 *Cubits high, of massy Gold*, which I saw not, but take upon the report of the *Chaldæans: this Statue* Darius *Son of* Hystaspes *had a great mind to take, but durst not; but his Son* Xerxes *afterwards took it, and slew the Priest who forbad him to stir it: Thus was this Temple built and beautified, besides infinite gifts and presents.* Hitherto *Herodotus*: he terms the Priests of *Belus Chaldæans*; and *R. Maimonides* asserts the *Chaldæan* Idolaters to be the same with the Prophets of *Baal*.

Lib. 1.

The Festival of *Bell* is mentioned, 2 *Kings* 10. 20. his Oracle by *Arrian*; the same which *Stephanus* means, saying, *The* Chaldæans *had an Oracle which was no less in esteem with them, than that at* Delphi *was with the* Græcians.

## CHAP. II.

### *Worship of other Gods, Angels and Dæmons.*

THe second kind of their Religious Worship, was that of other Gods, Angels and Dæmons; *Next* the Supream God (saith *Eusebius*, delivering their Opinion) *there followeth a multitude of other Gods*; Angels and Dæmons. These Gods they distinguished into several Orders, *Intelligibles*; *Intelligibles and Intellectuals*; *Intellectuals*; *Fountains*; *Principles*; *Unzoned Gods*; *Zoned Gods*; *Angels and Dæmons*. To the Worship of these belongs what we have already delivered concerning their Theurgy.

## CHAP. III.

### *The* Chaldæan *Worship of the Celestial Bodies.*

THe third kind of Idolatrous Worship used by the *Chaldæans* and *Babylonians* was of the Celestial Bodies; into which, *Maimonides* saith, *they fell soon after the Flood*: perhaps occasioned by their continual addiction to Contemplation of them; and grounded upon Observation of the great Benefits communicated to Mankind by their Influence.

Mor. Nt.

The Levitical Law, in prohibiting this Idolatry, sets down the Particulars of it, *Lest thou lift up thine eyes unto Heaven, and when thou seest the Sun, and the Moon, and Stars, even all the Host of Heaven, should be driven to worship them and serve them.* And of the Jewish Idolaters put down by *Josiah* (besides *those that burn Incense to* Baal, of whom already) are reckoned those that burnt Incense *to the Sun and to the Moon, and to the Planets* (or Signs, *Mazaloth*) *and to all the Host of Heaven.* This doubtless they learned of *their Neighbours the* Assyrians, of whom the Prophet *Ezekiel* complains that they doted.

Deut. 4. 19.

2 Kings 23. 5.

## CHAP. XIV.

### *Of the Sun.*

THe Sun and Moon are first named and distinguished from the rest; with them perhaps this kind of Idolatry began, before it came to be applied to any of the other Stars; for in the most ancient mention of it, (which is by *Job* a Neighbour to the *Chaldæans*) we find these two only named: That the *Chaldæans* esteemed these the Principal is confirmed by *R. Maimonides*, who saith, *They held the rest of the seven Planets*

Cap. 31. v. 26.

Mor. Nt.

*to be Gods, but the two Luminaries the greateſt.*

*Mor. Nt.* *But of theſe* (adds *Maimonides*) *they held the Sun to be the greateſt God.* What he further relates in confirmation hereof, out of the Books of the *Sabeans* concerning *Abraham*, and the like, was delivered formerly. Of the *Aſſyrian* Idols dedicated to the Sun, *Macrobius* mentions three, *Adad*, *Adonis* and *Jupiter Heliopolites*.

*Saturn. 1. Cap.* *Adad* (ſaith he) *ſignifieth one; this God they adore as the moſt powerful, but they joyn with him a Goddeſs named* Atargates, *aſcribing to theſe two an abſolute power over all things; by theſe they mean the Sun and the Earth; that hereby they underſtand the Sun, is manifeſt, for the Image of* Adad *is very fair, and hath beams bending downwards, to ſhew that the power of Heaven conſiſts in the beams of the Sun, ſent down upon the Earth. The Image of* Atargates *hath beams erected; to ſhew that the Earth produceth all things by the power of the beams ſent from above*: Thus *Macrobius*; but whereas he ſaith that *Adad* ſignifieth one, either he himſelf is miſtaken, or his Text depraved, for (as Mr. *Selden* obſerves) with the *Syrians*, and *Chaldeans* or *Aſſyrians*, *Chad*, from the Hebrew *Achad*, ſignifieth one; but *Adad* or *Adod* which in the Scripture is *Hhadad*, is of a different ſpelling; *Druſius* reads (in *Macrobius*) *Hhada*, which ſignifieth *One* in Syriack. Of this Idol perhaps is the Prophet *Iſaiah* to be underſtood, *They that ſanctifie and puriſie themſelves after One in the midſt of the Gardens*, dedicated to that Idol behind the Temple; *Subintelligendum enim Templum, pone Templum*, ſaith *Joſeph Scaliger*.

חד אחד

*Cap. 66. v. 17.*

*Saturn. 1. 21.* *Adonis* is derived from *Adon, Lord. That* Adonis *is the Sun* (ſaith *Macrobius*) *is not doubted, upon view of the Religion of the* Aſſyrians, *with whom* Venus Architis (*now worſhipped by the* Phœnicians) *and* Adonis *were held in great veneration: For the Naturaliſts worſhipped the Superiour Hemiſphear of the Earth, in part whereof we dwell, by the name of* Venus; *the inferiour they called* Proſerpina. *Hereupon amongſt the* Aſſyrians *or* Phœnicians *the Goddeſs is introduced mourning, becauſe the Sun in performing his Annual Courſe paſſeth through the twelve Signs of the Inferiour Hemiſphear; for of the Signs of the Zodiack, ſix are eſteemed ſuperiour ſix inferiour; and when he is in the inferiour, and conſequently makes the days ſhorter, the Goddeſs is believed to mourn, as if the Sun were ſnatched away by Death for a time, and detained by* Proſerpina *the Goddeſs of the inferiour part, and of the* Antipodes: *Again they conceive that* Adonis *is reſtored to* Venus *when the Sun ſurmounting the ſix Stars of the inferiour Order begins to illuminate our Hemiſphear, and lengthen the light and days.*

*Saturn. 1. 17.* The laſt is *Jupiter Heliopolites*; *The* Aſſyrians (ſaith the ſame Author) *under the name of* Jupiter *worſhip the Sun (whom they ſtyle* Διὰ ἡλιοπολίτην*) with extraordinary Ceremonies: The Image of this God was taken from a Town in* Ægypt, *named* Heliopolis *alſo, at what time* Senemus, *perhaps the ſame as* Senepos, *reigned over the* Ægyptians; *it was brought thither by* Oppias *Ambaſſador of* Delebois *King of the* Aſſyrians, *and by the* Ægyptian *Prieſts, the chief of whom was* Parmetis; *and having been a long time kept by the* Aſſyrians, *was afterwards removed to* Heliopolis (in Ægypt) *the reaſon of which, and why being carried out of* Ægypt *it was brought back into the place where now it is, and where it is worſhipped with Rites that are more* Aſſyrian *than* Ægyptian, I forbear to relate, as being nothing pertinent to our purpoſe. *That this* Jupiter *is the ſame with the Sun, appears as well by their Religious Rites, as by the faſhion of the Image, for its being of Gold* (of which Metal *Maimonides* deſcribes thoſe Teleſmes to have been which the *Chaldeans* made to the Sun) *and without a Beard, is ſufficient Argument hereof. The right hand is lifted up, holding a Whip like a Charioteer, the left holds a Thunderbolt and ſome ears of Corn, all which denote the conſociate powers of* Jupiter *and the Sun. Moreover the Religion of this Temple is excellent for Divination, which is aſcribed to the power of* Apollo, *who is the ſame with the Sun: Likewiſe the Image of the* Heliopolitane *God is carried on a Bier, as the Image of the Gods are carried at the Solemnity of the Games of the* Circenſian *Gods; Many Nobles of that Country follow, their heads ſhaved, they themſelves pure by a long Chaſtity; they are driven by Divine Inſpiration, not as they will themſelves, but whither the God carries them. This God they conſult even abſent, by ſending Table books ſealed up, and he writes back in Order to the Queſtions inſerted in them: Thus the Emperour* Trajan *being to go out of that Country into* Parthia *with his Army, at the requeſt of his Friends zealous in this Religion, and who having had great experiments in this kind, perſwaded him to inquire concerning the ſucceſs of his Expedition, proceeded with Roman prudence, leſt there might be ſome deceit of man in it, and firſt ſent the Table-books ſealed up, requiring an anſwer in writing: The God commanded paper to be brought, and ordered that it ſhould be ſent to him, blank: to the aſtoniſhment of the Prieſts.* Trajan *received it with admiration, for that he alſo had ſent a blank Table-book to the God. Then he took another Table-book, and wrote in it this Queſtion, whether having finiſhed this War, he ſhould return to* Rome; *This he ſealed up: The God commanded a Centurial Vine, one of thoſe Gifts that were in the Temple, to be brought, and to be cut into two pieces, and wrapt up in a Napkin and ſent. The Event appeared manifeſt in the death of* Trajan, *his bones being brought back to* Rome: *for by the Fragments, the kind of Reliques* (his bones) *by the token of the Vine, the future chance was declared.* Hitherto *Macrobius*.

To theſe add *Bell* or *Belus* a name though more peculiar to the Supreme Deity, yet common to many of the *Chaldaan* Gods, and amongſt others to the Sun, as *Servius* witneſſeth. *In Punick Language* (ſaith he) *God is named* Bal; *but amongſt the* Aſſyrians *he is called* Bell, *and by a certain myſtical reaſon,* Saturn *and the Sun.* *In Æneid. 1.*

## CHAP. V.

### *The* Chaldæan *Worſhip of the Moon.*

THE Moon was worſhipped by the *Chaldæans* under many Names, all which are Feminine; and the greater part anſwerable to thoſe of the Sun (laſt mentioned) which ſeems to confirm what *R. Maimonides* delivers of them, that *they held the ſeven Planets to be Gods and Goddeſſes, Male and Female, married to one another.* *Page 18.*

Now the *Chaldeans* (or rather they who firſt tranſlated the *Chaldaick* Learning into *Greek*) amongſt other names applied to the *Sun* thoſe of *Jupiter*

*Jupiter* and *Adonis*, in like manner did they give to the *Moon* the correſpondent Attributes of *Juno* and *Venus*.

To *Juno* belong *Ada* and *Belta*, for ſo interpreted by *Heſychius*; (a) *Ada*, *Juno*, with the *Babylonians*; (b) *Belthes*, *Juno* or *Venus*. Both which are doubtleſs no other than the Feminine names anſwerable to *Adad* and *Bell*, two names of the Sun. That by *Juno* Mythologiſts ſometimes underſtand the Moon, the Learned (c) Mr. *Selden* confirms by the old form of incalation which the *Roman* Prieſts uſed at the Nones of every Month, *dies te quinque calo Juno novella* (or *covella*, *Cœleſtis*) to this *Juno* perhaps may more properly be referred what *Julius Firmicus* applies to the Air; *The Aſſyrians* (ſaith he) *aſcribed the Principality of the Elements, to the Air, the Image whereof they worſhipped, ſtyling it by the name of* Juno *or* Venus *the Virgin*; *Whom the Quires of their Prieſts worſhipped with effeminate Voices and Geſtures, their skin ſmoothed, and their habit after the faſhion of Women*; thus he; But that the *Aſſyrians* worſhipped the Element of Air is not elſewhere eaſily found; what he adds concerning their immodeſt Rites, ſeems rather of Affinity with thoſe of *Venus*, as deſcribed by other Authors.

(a) *In Ada.*
(b) *In Belthes.*
(c) *De diis Syr.*

To *Venus* (taken for the Moon) belong the names *Mylitta* and *Alilat*. *They learnt* (ſaith *Herodotus* ſpeaking of the *Perſians*) of the *Aſſyrians* and *Arabians* to Sacrifice to *Urania*: the *Aſſyrians* call *Venus Mylitta*, the *Arabians* (our *Sabæans*) *Alilat*. Thus *Herodotus*; who indeed ſeems to make this *Mylitta* diſtinct from the Moon, (of whom he had ſpoken a little before) but that by *Alilat* was meant no other, is evident from its Etymology from *Lail Night*. *The Ancients*, (ſaith *Sihal Aſſemon*) *amongſt many other falſe Gods, ſerved one whom they called* Alilath, *and affirmed that ſhe is the Moon, as being the Miſtriſs and Queen of the Night*.

Lib. 1.

## CHAP. VI.

### The Chaldæan *Worſhip of the Planets*.

(a) *Mor. Nv.*

THe reſt of the Seven Planets (as (a) *Maimonides* ſaith) *they held to be Gods alſo*. To *Saturn*, whom *Diodorus* (if the Text be not depraved, which I ſuſpect) affirms they held to be the chiefeſt of the five, they gave the common name of *Bell*. *Euſebius*, in the 28th year of *Thara*; Belus *the firſt King of the* Aſſyrians *died*; *whom the* Aſſyrians *ſtyled a God*; *others call him* Saturn; and *Servius*, cited elſewhere, (b) *In the* Punick *Language God is named* Ball; *but amongſt the* Aſſyrians *he is called* Bell, *and by a certain Myſtical reaſon*, Saturn *and the Sun*. (c) Whence *Theophilus* Patriarch of *Antioch*, *Some worſhip* Saturn *as a God*; *and call him* Bell, *and* Ball; *this is done chiefly by thoſe who dwell in the Eaſtern Climates, not knowing who* Saturn *is, and who* Belus.

(b) *In Æneid. lib.*
(c) *Ad Antolic. lib. 3.*

*Chap. 5.*

Some conceive that the more particular name of this Planet was *Chiun* or *Remphan*: of which the Prophet *Amos*, *But ye have born the Tabernacle of your* Moloch *and* Chiun *your Images, the Stars of your God which ye made to your ſelves*: Which Text St. *Stephen* renders thus, (d) *Yea, ye took up the Tabernacle of your God* Remphan, *Figures which ye made, to worſhip them*; What is in the Hebrew *Chiun*, the Greek renders *Remphan*. By *Chiun Aben Ezra* underſtands the Planet *Saturn*, whom *Plautus* alſo, as *Petitus* obſerves, calls *Chiun*: *Rephan* (as *Kircher* atteſts) is uſed in the *Coptick* Language for the ſame Planet.

(d) *Acts 6. 43.*

Of *Jupiter* (having ſpoken already in treating of *Bell* and the Sun, to both which this name was applied,) there is little more to be ſaid.

*Mars* (as the Author of *Chronicon Alexandrinum* relates) was firſt owned as a Deity by the *Aſſyrians*: *the* Aſſyrians, ſaith he, *were the firſt who did erect a Column to* Mars, *and adored him as a God*; They gave him the common name of *Belus*, whence the *Babylonian Belus* is by *Heſtiæus* interpreted Ζεῦς ἐνυάλιος *Jupiter Martius*.

But a more particular name of *Mars* was that of *Azizus*, under which he was worſhipped together with *Mercury* in the Temple of the Sun at *Edeſſa* a City of *Meſopotamia*. *They who inhabit* Edeſſa (ſaith *Julian*) *a Region of a long time Sacred to the Sun, place together with him in the Temple* Monimus *and* Azizus. That by *Monimus* they underſtood *Mercury*, by *Azizus Mars*, and that both theſe were Aſſeſſours to the Sun, *Julian* acknowledgeth to have learned of his Maſter *Jamblicus*.

Some there are who refer the Idol *Negal* (brought by the *Samaritans* out of *Aſſyria*) to this Planet, for the *Rabbies* fancy this Idol to have been in the form of a Cock: Now the Cock being * Sacred to *Mars*, and *ſtyled his Bird, in regard of his Courage*, hence † they infer that *Mars* was repreſented under that form, as *Venus* under that of the Hen by the Idol *Succoth Benoth*.

2 *Kings* 17. 30.
* *Ariſtoph. Scol. Ariſtoph.*
† *Kirch. Lit.*

*Venus* was worſhipped by the *Aſſyrians* and *Chaldæans* under many names; Three of which we find in *Heſychius*: The firſt *Belthis* (or rather *Belta*) which he interprets *Juno* and *Venus*. This was a name common to the Moon alſo, and ſpoken of formerly.

The next, *Delephat*, a name more appropriate to *Venus* than the former, as appears by its Etymology, from the Syriack word *Delpha* coition.

The laſt *Myleta*, as *Heſychius* reads, who adds, *the Aſſyrians* (ſo called) *Urania*. *Herodotus* writes it *Mylitta*: *They Learned* (ſaith he, ſpeaking of the *Perſians*) *from the* Aſſyrians *and* Arabians, *to ſacrifice to* Urania: *The* Aſſyrians *call* Venus Mylitta, *the* Arabians Alilat. Of which two names, though *Alilat* (as was obſerved heretofore) was given to the Moon alſo; yet that of *Mylitta* ſeems peculiar to *Venus*, it being no other (as *Scaliger* obſerves) than the plain Syriack Word *Mylidtha*, generative or prolifick: *Venus* genetrix. With this Etymology well ſuit the Rites belonging to the Idol; of which thus *Herodotus*: *The Babylonians have one abominable Law*; *every Woman of that Country, muſt once in her life ſit in the Temple of* Venus, *and there accompany with a ſtranger. Some of the Richer ſort not deigning to aſſociate themſelves with the reſt of ordinary quality, are carried thither in covered Chariots, and ſtand before the Temple, a long train of Attendants coming after them; the greater part do in this manner; there are many Women ſitting in the Temple of* Venus *Crowned with Garlands of Flowers, ſome coming, others going: There are alſo ſeveral Paſſages diſtinguiſhed by Cords, which guide the ſtran-*

Lib. 1.

*gers to the Women; of whom they make choice as they best like; No Woman being once set there, returns home, until some stranger hath cast money in her lap, and taking her aside, lain with her. The stranger who offers this money must say, I invoke the Goddess* Mylitta *for thee; the* Assyrians *call* Venus Mylitta; *the money she must not refuse whatever it be; for it is Sacred: Neither may the Woman deny any man, but must follow him that first offers her money, without any choice on her part. As soon as she hath lain with him, and performed the Rites of the Goddess, she returns home, nor from thence forward can be allured by any price whatsoever. Such as are handsom are the sooneſt dismist; but the deformed are forced to stay longer before they can satisfie the Law; sometimes it happens that they attend a whole year, or two, or three in expectation.* Hitherto *Herodotus*, of which Custom some interpret the Words of the Prophet *Baruch* concerning the *Chaldæan* Women, *The Women sit in the ways girded* (or rather surrounded περιεζωσμέναι ὁδοὺς) *with rushes, and burn straw; and if one of them be drawn away and lie with such as come by, she casteth her Neighbour in the teeth, because she was not so worthily reputed, nor her Cord broken.*

2 *Kings* 17. 30. To these add *Succoth benoth*, an Idol made by the Men of *Babylon*: the signification of the Word being *the Tents of the Daughters*. Some conceive that hereby were meant those Tents or Partitions by Cords described by *Herodotus*, in which the Women sate to perform the Rites of *Venus Mylitta*; *Venus* being, as Mr. *Selden* is of Opinion, derived from *Benoth*: but from the Words of the Sacred Text, it is manifest, that by *Succoth Benoth* was meant rather an Idol, than Temple or Tents. The Rabbies fancy it to have been in form of a Hen and Chicken; *For as they called a Hen* Succus, *that is covering, so they called Hens* Succoth, *as brooding and covering, and* Benoth *they interpreted her Chickens, which she useth to cover with her wings.* Whence *Kircher* expounds it of *Venus Mylitta*.

*Radak.*

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of the other Stars.*

NOr were the Planets only but the Signs, and all the rest of the Stars esteemed Gods by the *Chaldæans*: for they burnt Incense *to the Mazaloth, and to all the rest of the Host of Heaven. Mazal* is a Star: they called the Signs the twelve *Mazaloth*; the Zodiack the Circle *Mazaloth*; and sometimes changing ז into ר *Mazaroth*; the Septuagint renders it μαζεροθ, which *Suidas* interprets, *the Constellations called* ζῶδια, *Signs.* This agrees with what *Diodorus* reports of the *Chaldæans*, that *they held the principal Gods to be twelve, to each of which they attributed a Month, and one of the Signs of the Zodiack.*

2 *Kings.*

*Lib.* 1.

That they worshipped the rest of the fixed Stars as Gods also, is implied by the Sacred Text last cited, which adds, *and to all the Host of Heaven*; and is more expressly asserted (amongst others) by *Diodorus*, who in his account of their Doctrine affirms, that as they called the Planets *Interpreters*, so of the other Stars, they called *some the Judges of all things*, others *consiliary Gods*; as we shall shew more particularly, when we come to speak of their Astrology: Neither is it to be doubted, but that as they owned some of the fixed Stars by these common Titles of Dignity *Judges* and *Counsellors*, so to the principal of them they attributed particular names and Idols, as well as to the Planets. And since the Chaldaick Polytheism was not (like that of the *Greeks*) founded upon an Imaginary Mythology, (though later Writers treat of it after the same manner) but had reference to the Celestial Bodies, which they Worshipped under several Names and Idols; It is no less probable than Consonant to the Chaldaick Doctrine, that those other Assyrian Idols, (*Ashim, Nibhaz, Tartak, Adrammelek, Anammelek, Nisroch,*) mentioned in the Scripture, were of the same kind with the rest, and belonged to several others of the Stars; but this conjecture is not easily evinced, in regard that there is little extant of those Idols more than the bare mention of their Names.

## CHAP. VIII.

### *Of Fire.*

THere are who reckon the Elements amongst the Gods which the *Chaldæans* Worshiped: That they had a particular Devotion to the Fire, is certain; by it as some conceive they represented the Supream God; as others, the Sun; the ground of which Analogy we delivered formerly.

Concerning this Pyrolatry of the *Chaldæans* there is a memorable Passage related by (*a*) *Rufinus*; *The* Chaldæans *in the time of* Constantine *the Great travelled all over the Earth to shew all men that their God excelled all other Gods, for they destroyed all the Statues of other Gods by their Fire; At length coming into* Ægypt, *and making this Challenge, the Ægyptian Priests brought forth a large Statue of* Nilus, *filling it (for it was hollow) with store of water, and stopping up the holes it had (which were many) with wax so artificially, that is kept in the water, but could not hold out against the fire.* [(*b*) *Suidas* relates this something differently, as performed by a Priest of *Canopus*, who taking off the Head of an old Statue, put it upon a water-pot, which (stopping the holes with wax) he painted over, and set up in the room of *Canopus*.] *The Chaldæan began the Contest with much rejoycing, and put fire round about the Statue; the wax melted, the holes opened, the water gushing forth, put out the fire, and the Chaldæans were laughed at for their God.*

(*a*) *Hist. Eccles. lib.* 2.

(*b*) *In voce* Καινόπολις.

## CHAP. IX.

### *Of the Air and Earth.*

OF the Air thus (*a*) *Julius Firmicus*, *The Assyrians ascribed the Principality of the Elements to the Air, the Image whereof they worshipped, stiling it by the name* Venus *the Virgin; whom the Quires of their Priests worshipped with effeminate Voices and Gestures; their Skin smoothed, and their Habit after the fashion of Women.*

(*a*) *De error. profan. Relig.*

As for the Earth, (*b*) *Macrobius* saith, *They worshipped the Superiour Hemisphere of it, in part whereof*

(*b*) *Saturn. lib.* 1. *c.* 21.

*whereof we dwell, by the name of* Venus; *the inferiour Hemisphere of the Earth they called* Proserpina; More of this Mythology, rather *Phœnician* than *Assyrian*, and perhaps more *Græcian* than either, see in *Macrobius*. Thus much concerning the Doctrine of the *Chaldæans*.

# THE SECOND BOOK.

## *Of the Persians.*

BEyond *Chaldæa*, to the South, on one hand lies *Persia*, on the other, *Arabia*. Philosophy (or Learning) was communicated to both these Countries by their Neighbours, the *Chaldæans*. *Zoroaster*, saith (a) *Plutarch*, *instituted Magi amongst the Chaldæans, in imitation of whom, the Persians had theirs also. Persia* is the most considerable Kingdom of *Asia*; bounded, on the North, by *Media*, on the East, by *Cilicia*, on the West, by *Susiana*; on the South, by part of the *Persian* Gulf.

(a) De Isid.

# THE SIXTEENTH PART.

## *The* Persian *Philosophers, their Sects and Institutions.*

## SECT. I.

### *Of the* Persian *Philosophers.*

### CHAP. I.

*Of the* Persian Zoroaster, *Institutor of Philosophy amongst the* Persians.

THE *Persian* Learning is generally acknowledged to have been instituted by *Zarades*, *Zaradusit*, or *Zoroaster*: but this name, (as we observed formerly,) seems to have been commonly attributed to such Persons as were eminently Learned. Who therefore this *Zoroaster* was, or (a) about what time he lived, is uncertain. (b) *Laertius* stiles him a *Persian*; (c) *Clemens Alexandrinus*, a *Mede*; (d) *Suidas*, a *Perso-Mede*: whence it may be argued, that he was not of so great Antiquity, as most Authors conceive. For we find the Word *Persian* no where used before the Prophet *Ezekiel*; neither did it come to be of any note, until the time of *Cyrus*. *The later Persians*, saith (e) *Agathias*, affirm, *he lived under* Hystaspes, *but simply, without any addition, so as it is much to be doubted, nor can it be certainly known, whether this* Hystaspes *were the Father of* Darius, *or some other. Hystaspes* the Father of *Darius* was contemporary with *Cyrus*, neither doth it appear, that the Persian *Zoroaster* lived much earlier.

(a) Agath.
(b) In Proœm.
(c) Strom. lib.
(d) Zor.
(e) Lib. 2.

*But at what time soever he lived*, saith (f) *Agathias, he was the Author, and Introducer, of Magical Religion, amongst the Persians, and changing their old form of Sacred Rites, he introduced several Opinions.* So likewise (g) the Arabick Historiographer, Zaradusit *not first instituted, but reformed the Religion of the Persians and Magi, it being divided into many Sects.*

(f) Loc. citat.
(g) Elm.

A Fabulous Tradition of the occasion and manner thereof related by the *Persians* themselves, receive from (h) *Dion Chrysostom. They say, that through love of Wisdom, and Justice, he withdrew him from men, and lived alone in a certain Mountain; That afterwards leaving the Mountain, a great fire coming from above, did continually burn about him; That hereupon the King, together with the Noblest of the Persians, came nigh him intending to pray to God; that he came out of the fire unharmed, appeared propitiously, bidding them to be of good cheer, and offered certain Sacrifices, as if God had come along with him into that place; That from thenceforward he conversed not with all men, but with such only as were naturally most addicted to truth, and capable of the knowledge of the Gods, whom the Persians called Magi.*

(h) Biriſthin.

To this Persian *Zoroaster* (i) *Suidas* ascribes, *Of Nature, four Books; Of precious Stones, one; Astroscopick Apotelesmes, five*; (k) *Eusebius*, a *Sacred Collection of Persicks*, which, by the Fragments he cites, seems to have treated of the *Persian* Religion. These some attribute to the *Chaldæan Zoroaster*; others, to some other, nor any with greater certainty than the rest.

(i) In Zor.
(k) Præpar. Evang. l. 1. c. 7.

### CHAP. II.

*Of* Hystaspes, *a great Improver of the* Persian *Learning.*

THE Doctrine of the *Persian* Magi was much augmented by *Hystaspes*. He was (according to (a) *Herodotus*) of *Achamenia*, a Region of *Persia*, Son of *Arsames*, or, (as other Editions) *Arsaces*; he lived in the time of *Cyrus*, whose Dream concerning *Darius*, the eldest Son of *Hystaspes*, prognosticating his being King of *Persia*, together with the Discourse betwixt *Cyrus* and *Hystaspes* concerning it, is related by (b) *Herodotus*. *Darius* the Son of this *Hystaspes* was born in the 4165. year of the *Julian* period, and was almost 20 years old a little before *Cyrus* died. About the same time also, (c) *Hystaspes* and *Adusius* joyning together conquered all *Phrygia* bordering upon the *Hellespont*, and taking the King thereof, brought him Prisoner to *Cyrus*.

(a) Lib. 1.
(b) Loc. cit.
(c) Xenoph. Instit. Cyr. lib. 7.

*Hystaspes* was, (as (d) *Ammianus Marcellinus* affirms) *a most wise Person*, who adds, *that boldly penetrating into the inner parts of upper* India, *he came to a woody Desert, whose calm silence was possessed by those high Wits the* Brachmanes. *Of these he learn the discordant Concord of the motions of the Stars, and of Heaven, and of pure Rites of Sacrifice, which, returning into* Persia, *he contributed as an addition and complement to Magick.*

(d) Lib. 23.

CHAP.

## CHAP. III.

### *Of* Oſthanes, *who firſt introduced the* Perſian *Learning into* Greece.

(a) *Lib.* 30. 1. THE *Perſian* Learning, (as (a) *Pliny* affirms,) was firſt communicated to the *Gracians* by *Oſthanes*. *The firſt*, ſaith he, *that I find to have commented upon this Art* (Magick) *is* Oſthanes, *who accompanied* Xerxes *King of the* Perſians *in the War which he made upon* Greece. *Xerxes* ſet out from *Suſa* upon this Expedition in the beginning of the fourth year of the 74 Olympiad, though *Diodorus Siculus*, confounding the Tranſactions of two years in one, relates this done in the firſt year of the Olympiad following. (b) *Herodotus* affirms, that this proviſion was in making the three whole years before this year; but with a note premiſed in the precedent Chapter, which cannot conſiſt with the exact courſe of the times. For, ſaith he; From the ſubduing of *Ægypt*, he was full four years, in gathering an Army, and in making his preparations, and in the beginning of the fifth year, he began to march with a huge Army; for indeed he ſet out from *Suſa*, in the beginning of the fifth year, not from his ſubduing of *Ægypt*, but from his coming to the Crown. So that both (c) *Juſtin* out of *Trogus*, and *Oroſius* following him do unadviſedly attribute five years: but moſt abſurdly, doth *Julianus*, in his firſt Oration of the praiſes of *Conſtantine*, ſay, that he was ten years in making this preparation. But more Ingenuous than all thoſe, (yet not over exquiſite in his account) is (d) *Libanius*, where he ſaith, that, between *Darius* and *Xerxes* there was ten years time ſpent in making this preparation againſt *Greece*, ſince we have formerly ſhewed out of *Plato*, that from the fight at *Marathon*, to the fight of *Salamis*, which was fought in the firſt year of the 75 Olympiad (almoſt a full year after *Xerxes* his ſetting out from *Suſa*) there were only ten years run out.

(b) *Lib.* 7. *c.* 21.

(c) *Lib.* 2. *c.* 20.

(d) *In* Βασιλικῷ.

Hence it appears that *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, who where precedent in time to *Oſthanes*, and in their Travels converſed with the *Perſian* Magi, were not fully acquainted with the depth of their Sciences, or elſe being more reſerved, forbore to communicate them, otherwiſe than as intermingled with thoſe which they appropriated to themſelves.

(e) *Loc. cit.* (e) *Pliny* adds, that *Oſthanes*, *whilſt he accompanied* Xerxes *into* Greece, *ſcattered the ſeeds as it were of this portentuous Art* (Magick) *wherewith he infected the World*, *all the World wither ſoever he went*; *and it is certain*, *that this* Oſthanes *chiefly made the Gracians not deſirous*, *but mad after his Art*. Thus *Pliny*, alluding to *Goetick Magick*, of which the Author of the (f) Treatiſe μαγικὸν, aſſerts the *Magi* to have been *wholly ignorant*. And (g) *Arnobius* affords him a better Character, that *he was chief of the Magi*, *both for Eloquence and Action*; that *he made addreſs to the true God with due Veneration*; that *he knew the Angels did wait upon the true God*, and the like.

(f) *Laertius proœm.*

(g) *Cont. gent.*

By *Oſthanes* (as we ſaid) the *Perſian* Learning was brought into *Greece*, and therefore we ſhall not proceed further in our inquiry after the Profeſſors of it amongſt the *Perſians*.

## SECT. II.

### *The Inſtitution, and Sects of the* Perſians.

## CHAP. I.

### *The* Perſian *Magi their Inſtitution.*

ALL Profeſſors of Learning amongſt the *Perſians* were termed Magi. (a) *Laertius. It is ſaid, that Philoſophy had its Original from the Barbarians, ſince among the Perſians were Magi; amongſt the Babylonians, or Aſſyrians, the Chaldæans; and Gymnoſophiſts amongſt the Indians; amongſt the Celtæ and Gallatæ, where thoſe who were called the Druides, or Seninothei, as* Ariſtotle, *in his Treatiſe* Magicum, *and* Sotion, *in the* 23 *Chap. of his Succeſſion, affirms.* Hence, (b) *Suidas, Magi amongſt the Perſians were Philoſophi and Philothei.* But their principal Study and Employment conſiſting in Theology and Religious Rite, *Magus* is more frequently interpreted a *Prieſt*. *Amongſt the Perſians*, ſaith (c) Porphyrius, *thoſe wiſe Perſons who were employed about the Divinity, and ſerved him, were called Magi; this is the ſignification of* Magus *in their Dialect.* And (d) Apuleius, Magus *in the Perſian Language, ſignifieth the ſame as Prieſt in ours.* Heſychius, *A Worſhipper of God, and a Theologiſt, and a Prieſt, is by the Perſians ſtyled* Magus.

(a) *Proœm.*

(b) *In voce Magus.*

(c)

(d) *Apolog.* 1.

Some conceive they were ſo termed by *Zoroaſter*, at their firſt inſtitution. (e) Suidas, Zoroaſter *the* Perſo-Mede, *who firſt began the name of Magi celebrious amongſt them.* (f) Others derive the Word from *Mog* a Sirname of *Zoroaſter*, or from (g) *Mije Guſh*, one that hath *ſhort ears*, affirming that *Zoroaſter* was ſuch.

(e) *In Zor.*

(f) *Salmas.*

(g)

The Author of the Arabick Hiſtory relates, that the (h) *Religion of the Perſians being before* Zoroaſter's *time divided into many Sects, he reformed it*; (i) *Agathias*, that *he changed their old form of Sacred Rites, and introduced many new Opinions, and was the Author and Introducer of Magical Religion among the Perſians.*

(h)

(i)

(k) The *Magi delivered their Learning ſucceſſively in their Families from one Age to another, whence after the Succeſſion of many Ages, at this preſent*, ſaith *Ammianus Marcellinus*, *a multitude ſprung from one and the ſame Race, is dedicated to the Rites and Worſhip of the Gods. For, increaſing by degrees, they grew at laſt to the largeneſs and name of a compleat Nation dwelling in Towns not fortified with any Walls, and, being permitted to uſe their own Laws, they were honoured in reſpect of their Religion.*

(k) *Ammian. Marcellin.*

The Country of the Magi in *Perſia*, is mentioned by (l) *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who takes notice of three wonderful Mountains in it. And (m) *Solinus* mentions, as belonging to them, the City *Paſagarda*. (n) *Suidas* and (o) *Cedrenus* call them *Maguſſæans*, and affirm, that they were called *Magog* by thoſe of their own Country.

(l) *Strom.* 6.

(m)

(n)

(o)

So great was the Eſteem which the Magi had among the *Perſians*, that (p) *Cicero* ſaith, the Kings of *Perſia*, before they undertook the Government, were always *initiated in the Sacred Myſteries*

(p)

(q) Alcib. *Mysteries of the Magi*, which (q) *Plato* describes thus: *At fourteen years old they whom they call the Royal Pædagogues take charge of the Youth. These are four men chosen out of the most excellent of the Persians, in the prime of their age. The most wise, the most just, the most temperate, and the most valiant. The first of these teacheth him the Magick of* Zoroaster *the Son of* Horomases *(this is the Service of the Gods) and teacheth him also the Royal Institutions. Dion Chrysostom* saith, that *the Magi were admitted to the King's Counsels, and were Assessors with him in Judicature, as being well acquainted with the natures of things, and knowing after what manner the Gods are to be served. All Publick Affairs* (saith (r) *Agathias*) *were managed by their direction and advice. They adjudged rewards or punishments. Dion* elsewhere relates, that *Cambyses*, upon his Expedition into *Ægypt*, *resigned the Government of the Persians into the hands of the Magi.* (f) *Constantius Manasses* styles them *the Guardians of the Royal Palaces*, and (t) *Pliny*, speaking of Magick, saith, *it grew up at last to so great height, that even at this day it is exceeding prevalent with many Nations, and in the East it beareth sway over the King of Kings:* King of Kings was the proper title of the *Persian* Monarch.

(f)

(f) 30. 1.

(t)

## CHAP. II.

### *The Sects, Discipline and Manners of the Magi.*

(a) D. Hieron. adver. Jovin. lib. 2.

Eubulus, (a) *who wrote the History of* Mythra *in many Volumes, affirms, that amongst the Persians there were three kinds of Magi: the first, who were the most Learned and Eloquent of them, did eat no other food but Meal and Oyl.* Thus *Eubulus* cited by St. *Hierom.* More of the distinction of the Magi into three Sects we meet not elsewhere; but, probably, it had reference (as amongst the *Chaldæans*) to their several Studies, of which hereafter.

(b) Laert. in proem.

(b) *Dinon* and *Aristotle*, or rather the Author of the Treatise of Magick cited by *Laertius*, relate of the Magi, that *they renounce rich attire, and to wear Gold. Their Rayment is white upon occasion, their beds, the ground, their food, nothing but Herbs, Cheese, and Bread; instead of a Staff they carry a Cane, in the top whereof they put their Cheese, which as occasion served they did eat.*

(c)

They had one in their Society chief amongst them, called by (c) *Sozomene*, *the Prince of the Magi.*

(d) Laert.

(d) *Their chief employment was Religious Worship, they being conceived to be the only Persons whose prayers the Gods would hear.*

(e) Laert. proem.

(e) They *made discourses concerning Justice, and esteemed it impious to burn the Bodies of the dead, and lawful to lie with a Mother or a Daughter*, as *Solion* in his 23. Book.

(f) Lib.

(f) *Herodotus* saith, *they differ, as from others, so from the Ægyptian Priests, in this, that these pollute themselves with the death of nothing but their Sacrifices, whereas the Magi, with their own hands, kill any thing, except a man and a dog; yea they esteem it a great Exploit, if they have killed very many Ants, or Serpents, or other creeping or flying things.*

# THE SEVENTEENTH PART.

## *The Doctrine of the* Persians.

THat which is delivered to us of the *Persian* Doctrine and Opinions, is so little and so imperfect, as it will not easily admit of being knit together by any Method; yet, in regard of the near affinity their Learning is conceived to have had with the *Chaldæans*, we shall observe the same course in collecting and digesting the few remains of it: First to alledge what concerns their Theology and Physick; Next, Their Arts of Divination; Thirdly, Their Religious Worship and Rites, particularly termed Magick; And lastly, to give a Catalogue of all their Gods.

## CHAP. I.

### *Theology and Physick.*

THat the *Persian* Magi were not unacquainted with Theology and Physick, is confirmed by (a) *Suidas*. *Magi*, saith he, *among the Persians are Philosophers and lovers of God.* (b) *Laertius* affirms, *they discoursed concerning the substance and generation of the Gods*; and (c) *Dion Chrysostom*, that *they were skilful in Natures.*

(a) Voc. Mag. (b) In Proem. (c)

(d) Zoroaster *the Magus in his Sacred Collection of Physicks, saith expresly thus.* "*God hath the* "*Head of a Hawk: he is the first incorruptible, e-*"*ternal, unbegotten, indivisible, most like himself,* "*the Charioteer of every good, one that cannot be* "*bribed: the best of things good; the wisest of* "*things wise: Moreover he is the Father of Equi-*"*ty and Justice: self-taught, natural and perfect,* "*and wise, and the sole Inventor of Sacred Na-*"*ture.*

(d) Euseb. Præp. Evang.

(e) Plutarch *relates of* Zoroaster, *that he divided all things into three kinds. Over the first kind he conceived* Horomazes *to be President*, the same *whom the Oracles call* the Father. *Over the last*, Arimanes; *Over the middle kind*, Mythra, *whom the Oracles call* the second Mind. *And that* Horomazes *made himself three times as big as the Sun (who in the Persian Language is called* Cyrus.) Mythra *made himself twice as big (as the Sun) who was next to* Horomazes. *To which these Platonick assertions are correspondent, That all things are about the King of all, and that all things are for him, That he is the cause of all good things, The second is employed about the secondary things, The third is employed about the third kind of things. The three parts into which* Zoroaster *and* Plato *divided all things, are these; The first is eternal; The second had a beginning in time, but is eternal; The third is corruptible.* Thus *Plitho* citing *Plutarch*, whose own Words are these.

(e) Plith. in Orac. ad. fin.

(f) *Some are of Opinion that there are two Gods, one opposite in operation to the other; one, working good, the other, ill. Others call him who is the good, God, the bad, Damon: of this Opinion was* Zoroaster *the Magus, whom they report to have preceded the*

(f) Isid. & Orid.

*the Trojan War* 5000 *years. This* Zoroaſter *declared the names of the good, to be* Oromazes, *of the bad,* Arimanius, *adding, that, of ſenſible things, the one did moſt reſemble Light, and Knowledge, the other darkneſs, and ignorance. Wherefore the Perſians call* Mythra *the Mediator. He further taught, that, to one, we ought to offer votives and gratulatory Sacrifices, to the other, averruncative and diſmal Oblations. For, pounding a certain Herb called* Omoni, *in a morter, they envoke Hades and darkneſs, then, mixing it with the blood of a ſlain Wolf, they carry it forth and throw it into a place, where the beams of the Sun come not: for, of plants, they hold, that ſome belong to the good God, others, to the ill Damon, and that of Animals, ſome, as Dogs, Birds, and Porcupines belong to the good, the aquatile, to the bad; for which reaſon they eſteem him bleſſed who hath killed moſt of that kind.*

(g) *Loc. cit.* (g) *They likewiſe, relate many fabulous things concerning the Gods, of which kind is this I will alledge, That* Oromazes *was produced of pureſt light,* Arimanes *of darkneſs, and that theſe two war againſt one another; That* Oromazes *made ſix Gods, The firſt, of Benevolence; the ſecond, of Truth; The third, of Equity; the reſt of Wiſdom, Riches, and Pleaſure, which good things are attendant upon the Maker; That then* Oromazes *tripled himſelf, and removed himſelf ſo far from the Sun, as the Sun is diſtant from the Earth, and that they adorned the Heaven with Stars, appointed one the Dog-ſtar as Guardian and watch for the reſt; That he made 24 other Gods, and put them in an Egg, and that* Arimanius *having made as many more, they broke the Egg. Whence it comes, that good is intermingled with ill. That the fatal time approacheth, in which theſe ſhall be deſtroyed by Famine and Peſtilence, and* Arimanius *utterly deſtroyed, and the Earth made even and ſmooth; There ſhall be one Life and one City (or common Society) of all men living, and one Language.*

## CHAP. II.

### *Arts of Divination.*

AMongſt the other Parts of the *Perſian* Learning, are to be reckoned their Arts of *Divination* and *Prædiction*, which (a) *Laertius* affirms were *practiſed by the Magi.* (b) *Cicero* adds, that *they aſſembled (in fana) in Temples or conſecrated places, to conſult about Divination.*

(a) *In Proœm.* (b) *De Divinat.*

(c) *Lib.* Hence (c) *Strabo* ſaith, that, *by the Ancients, Diviners were much eſteemed, ſuch as amongſt the Perſians, were the Magi, and Necromancers, and Lecanomancers, and Hydromancers:* (d) *Ælian,* that *the Wiſdom of the Perſian Magi, beſides all other things which it was lawful for them to know, did conſiſt alſo in Divination;* And (e) *Lucian* ſtyles the Magi *a kind of Perſons ſkilful in Divination, and dedicated to the Gods.* Of their Divination (f) *Cicero* giveth an inſtance concerning *Cyrus*; (g) *Ælian,* another concerning *Ochus.*

(d) *Var. Hiſt.* (e) *Macrob.* (f) *De Divinat. lib. 1.* (g) *Var. Hiſt. 2. 17.*

Amongſt other kinds of Divination, (h) *Velleius Paterculus* affirms, that they foretold by the marks of the Body. They ſeem to have been skilful likewiſe in Aſtrology, for (i) *Suidas* aſcribeth to the Perſian *Zoroaſter five Books of Aſtroſcopick Apoteleſmes.* That they were alſo conſulted concerning the preſignification of Prodigies, is manifeſt from the Relation of (k) *Valerius Maximus,* concerning that which happened to *Xerxes.*

(h) *Lib. 2.* (i) *In Zor.* (k) *Lib. 1. c. 6.*

## CHAP. III.

### *Of the Religious Rites, or Magick of the* Perſians.

THE chief Science and Employment of the *Perſian* Magi, was termed *Magick*, from the Profeſſors, *Magi*, and is defined by *Plato,* (a) *the ſervice of the Gods,* called alſo Μαγεία. *The Magi,* ſaith (b) *Laertius, are employed in the ſervice of the Gods, and about ſacrificing and praying, as being the only Perſons, whom the Gods will hear.* So (c) *Dion Chryſoſtom, The Perſians call them Magi, who are ſkilful in the Worſhip of the Gods, not like the Greeks, who, ignorant of the meaning of the Word, called them ſo who were ſkilful in Goetick Magick*; of which that the *Perſian Magi were ignorant*; (d) *Laertius* alledgeth the Teſtimonies of *Ariſtotle, in his Treatiſe entituled Magick,* and *Dinon* in the firſt Book of his Hiſtories.

(a) *Alcibiad.* (b) *Proœm.* (c) *Boryſthen.* (d) *Proœm.*

As concerning their Religious Rites, (e) *Herodotus* and (f) *Strabo* affirm, that *they had no Temples, Altars, or Images, but did impute it to madneſs in ſuch as had*; the reaſon whereof (g) *Herodotus* conceives to have been, *for that they did not believe as the Græcians, that the Gods were* (h) *of human form*; or as (i) *Cicero, for that they conceived the Gods, to whom the whole World was but a Temple or Houſe, could not be ſhut up within Walls; upon which ground the Magi perſwaded* Xerxes *to burn the Grecian Temples.*

(e) *Lib.* (f) *Lib.* (g) *Loc. cit.* (h) *De leg. 2.* (i) Ἀνθρωπομόρφους, *i. e.* ἀνθρωπομόρφους.

But (k) *Strabo* frequently elſewhere mentions their Temples, Altars, and Images; whence it may be argued, either that in the time of *Herodotus* they had not any, and that *Strabo,* in affirming the ſame, with *Herodotus,* is to be underſtood only of their Primitive Inſtitution, which when the *Macedonians* afterwards conquered them, became corrupted with *Græcian* Rites; Or that there were different Sects among them from the beginning: whereof ſome allowed Altars, Images, and Temples, others diſallowed them. (k)

(l) *Herodotus* and *Strabo* further add, that *they ſacrificed in High Places*; their Rites and Sacrifices *Herodotus* deſcribes thus. *When they go about to ſacrifice, they neither erect an Altar, nor kindle Fire, nor uſe Libation, nor Flutes, nor Garlands, nor Cakes, but when any man intends ſacrifice to ſome one of theſe Gods, he drives the victim to a clean place, and invocates that God; his Tyara being crowned with Myrtle; It is not lawful for him who ſacrificeth to pray for good things for himſelf alone, but he muſt pray for all the Perſians in general, and in particular for the King: for in praying for all the Perſians he includes himſelf. Having cut the victim into little pieces, he boils the fleſh, and ſtrewing ſoft Herbs, eſpecially Trifoly, he laies the fleſh upon them; The Magus ſtanding by ſings a Theogonial Hymn; for this they conceive to be a powerful incantation. Without a Magus it is not lawful for them to ſacrifice. Soon after, he who ſacrificeth takes away the fleſh and diſpoſeth of it as he pleaſeth.* (l)

(m) *Strabo* adds, that *when the Magus who declares the ſacrificed, hath diſtributed the pieces of the fleſh, every one taking his piece they all depart home; leaving no part for the Gods; for they ſay the Gods* (m) *Lib. 15.*

*require*

*require nothing but the Soul of the victim: Yet ſome (it is ſaid) lay part of the fat upon the fire.*

## CHAP. IV.

### *The Gods of the* Perſians.

(a) *Lib.* 1. (b) *Lib.* 15. HErodotus (*a*) and (*b*) *Strabo* reckon the Gods of the *Perſians* thus, *Jupiter*; *the Sun*; *the Moon*; *Venus*; *the Fire*; *the Earth*; *the Winds*; *the Water*. (*c*) *Laertius* not ſo fully, *the Fire, the Earth, and the Water,*

(c) *Proœm.*

(d) *Loc. cit.* By *Jupiter*, as (*d*) *Herodotus* and *Strabo* affirm, *they underſtood the whole Circuit of Heaven*: *Agathias* adds, that *they worſhipped* Jupiter *under the name of* Bell, which ſufficiently argues they derived this God from the *Chaldæans*.

(e) *Loc. cit.* *To the Sun* (as both (*e*) *Herodotus* and *Strabo* witneſs) *they ſacrificed*: *Strabo* adds, that *they called him* Mithra. This was the greateſt of their Gods, as *Cyrus* (introduced by (*f*) *Xenophon*) acknowledgeth; ſwearing by him: *Heſychius* likewiſe affirms it was the greateſt of their Gods, and that the greateſt Oath which the King himſelf took was by *Mithra*.

(f) *Oeconom.*

They repreſented him with the face of a Lion, in a *Perſian* Habit, with a Tiara, holding with both hands a Bull by the horns, which ſeemed to ſtrive to get from him; ſignifying, that the Moon begins to receive her light from him when ſhe leaves him.

(g) *Porphyr. in antr. Nymph.* (*g*) Zoroaſter *firſt amongſt the Perſians* (*as* Eubulus *affirms*, *who wrote many Volumes of the Hiſtory of* Mithra) *did conſecrate a natural Cave in the Mountains next* Perſia, *in honour of* Mithra, *the King and Father of all*: *ſignifying by this Cave the World framed by* Mithra; *by the other things diſpoſed within it, in fit diſtances, the Elements and Quarters of the World.* The Cave of *Mithra* is mentioned by many others.

(h) *Lib.* 6. *contra Celſ.* In *the Mithræan Rites* (for ſo *Lampridius* terms them) *Celſus* (cited by (*h*) *Origen*) ſaith, *the twofold motion of the Stars, fixed and erratick, was repreſented*; *and the paſſage of the Soul through them*: *in ſign whereof there was ſet up a high pair of ſtairs, having ſeven Gates, the firſt of Lead, the ſecond of Tin, the third of Braſs, the fourth of Iron, the fifth of Leather, the ſixth of Silver, the ſeventh of Gold*: *the firſt belongs to* Saturn, *the Lead ſignifying the ſlowneſs of that Planet*; *the ſecond to* Venus, *to whom they compare Tin, for its brightneſs and ſoftneſs*; *the third to* Jupiter, *as being moſt ſolid with brazen ſteps*; *the fourth to* Mercury, *for they hold him to be the ſtouteſt undertaker of all buſineſſes, cunning and eloquent*. *The fifth to* Mars, *in regard of its unequal and various commixture*; *the ſixth to the* Moon, *of Silver*; *the ſeventh to the Sun, whoſe colour, as alſo that of the Stars reſembles Gold.*

He who was *initiated into theſe Rites proceeded*, as *Suidas* relates, *through ſeveral degrees of contumely.* (*i*) *Nonnus* upon *Gregory Nazianzen* ſaith *twelve* (*k*) *and of pain, as burning, blows, and the like, by which trial he was to give teſtimony of his ſanctity, and of his being void of Paſſion.*

(i) *In Stelicut.* (k) *Gregor. Naz.*

Of the Rites of the Moon there is nothing ſaid in particular.

(l) *Lib.* 1. Concerning thoſe of *Venus*, (*l*) *Herodotus* ſaith, *They ſacrifice alſo to* Urania *which they learnt of the Aſſyrians and Arabians*; *the Aſſyrians call* Venus, Militta, *the Arabians* Alilat; *the Perſians* Metra. And as *Milidtha* in Syriack ſignifieth *generative, proliſick, Venus genetrix*, ſo *mader*, or *mater*, with the *Perſians* ſignifies (as *Raphelengius* obſerves) *a Mother*. This perhaps was that *Mother of the Gods*, which (*m*) *Cicero* affirms to have been *worſhipped by the Perſians, Syrians, and all the Kings of* Europe *and* Aſia, *with great devotion.*

(m)

The Fire, (*n*) *Julius Firmicus* ſaith, *they preferred before all the other Elements*; (*o*) *Agathias* affirms, they learnt to worſhip it of the *Chaldæans*: (*p*) *Strabo* relates, that *in* Cappadocia *there was a great number of Magi, called* Pyrethi, *and many Temples of the Perſian Gods*; *they kill not the victim with a knife, but ſtrike it down with a club*: *Here alſo there are Pyrethia Chappels, in the midſt of which is an Altar, covered with great ſtore of aſhes*; *where the Magi preſerve a fire that never goes out*; *and coming in every day ſing almoſt the ſpace of an hour, holding a bundle of rods before the fire*, [with which, as (*q*) Mr. *Selden* obſerves, they ſtirred it up whilſt they ſung,] *Their heads are covered with woollen Tiaras, which being tied on both ſides hide their lips and cheeks*: Thus *Strabo*, an eye-witneſs. Theſe *Pyratheia* (or as *Suidas* terms them *Pyreia*,) where thoſe *ſempiternal fires of the Magi* mentioned by (*r*) *Ammianus Marcellinus*: Neither in Temples only did they uſe theſe Rites, but in private Caves, where (*ſ*) *Julius Firmicus* reports they worſhipped the Fire with many extraordinary Ceremonies, as amongſt other things uſing to pronounce theſe Words, Μιτραθῶ μυσταγωγῶ ὁ κλοπίης σύνδιτε πατρὸς ἀγόντος. Nor did this Worſhip extend to Fire only, but (*t*) *to all things that reſembled it*, as *Dionyſius* reports, whereof (*u*) *Strabo* inſtanceth *the Pyropus*. (*w*) *Julius Firmicus* adds, that *they called the Fire Mithra*, by which, as alſo by their worſhipping it in Caves, it is manifeſt that (ſometimes at leaſt) they took it for the Sun, their greateſt Deity.

(n) *De errar. prof. Relig.* (o) (p) *Lib.* 15. (q) *De Diis Syr. Syntag.* 2. *c.* 7. (r) *Lib.* (ſ) *Lib.* (t) *Perieg.* (u) *Lib.* (w)

Concerning the Worſhip of the *Earth* and *Winds* nothing particular is delivered; That of the *Water* was performed in this manner, (*x*) *They go to a Lake, River, or Spring, where they make a trench, and kill a victim*; *taking care that none of the blood come at the water*; *then laying Mirtle and Laurel upon it they burn it with rods*; *and making ſome prayers, ſprinkle oyl mixed with milk and honey, not in the fire or water*; *but on the Earth.*

(x) *Strab. lib.* 15.

Other Gods the *Perſians* had, though not reckoned amongſt theſe, whether as leſs principal, or of later date; of theſe are mentioned by the ſame Author (*Strabo*,) and by others, *Anaitis* (Venus) *Amandatus, Sacæa, Sandes* and *Nannæa* (Diana.)

*Hitherto of the Doctrine of the* Perſians.

# THE THIRD BOOK.

## *Of the* Sabæans.

*Arabia* the noblest Peninsula (if we may so term it) of *Asia*, is terminated by the Persian, the Indian, and the Red Sea, except that on one side it is conterminous to *Syria*, by which vicinity was occasioned so near a correspondence betwixt those Nations, that as the Chaldæan Learning overspreading all *Mesopotamia*, *Syria*, and *Assyria*, did on one side extend to their Neighbours the *Persians*, so on the other it reached to the *Arabians*, From which nearness perhaps it was (not only of Situation, but Religion and Opinions,) that *Pliny* useth their names promiscuously, calling a great part of *Mesopotamia*, *Arabia*; and the *Arabians* themselves *Syrians*. And the later Eastern Writers (especially the *Arabians*) under the appellation of *Chasdim* or *Chaldanin* (*Chaldæans*,) comprehended not only the *Babylonians* but the *Nabathæans*, *Charaneans*, and *Sabæans*, as (amongst others) *Muhamed Isacides* takes *Chasdanin* and *Nabathea* to be synonimous, and *Ahmedus*, to his Book concerning the Religion of the *Sabæans*, gives this Title, *Of the Rites of the Charanean Chaldæans commonly known by the name of Sabæans*, he adds, *commonly known by the name of Sabæans*; because the *Sabæans* being the most considerable of these, they likewise under the appellation of *Sabæans* included all the rest; even the *Chaldæans* of *Mesopotamia*: using the terms of *Chaldæa* and *Sabæa* no less promiscuously than *Pliny* those of *Arabia*, *Mesopotamia*, and *Syria*: for which *R. Maimonides* (who doth so throughout all his Writings) gives this reason, because the Doctrine of the *Chaldæans* extended thither, and that the Religion of all these Nations was the same.

Now whereas *Arabia* is commonly distinguished into the *Stony*, the *Desert*, and the *Happy*, we here mean not that part which is stiled the *Desert*, lying on the North of *Sabæa*, and first planted by *Ismael*, whose Posterity afterwards, having learned the Language of the *Sabæans* (Arabick) were called *Arabians* also, or more properly, *Hagarens*, as descended from *Hagar*, and *Aarab Mastiaarabah*, *the made Arabians*, (that is, made such by cohabitation and conversation with the true *Arabs*,) but those other true *Arabs* the Inhabitants of the *Desert* and the *Happy*, whereof the former came from *Nebaiothus*, Son of *Ismael*, and are by *Pliny*, *Strabo*, and *Ptolemy* called *Nabatæans*, as the Country it self *Nabatæa*, the later from *Saba*, Son of *Chus*, the Son of *Cham*, after whom stiled *Sabæans* (as the Country *Sabæa*) and (in distinction from *the made Arabians* of *Arabia*, the *Desert*) *the native Arabians*. The *Charanæans* mentioned together with these, were the Inhabitants of *Cara*, a City of *Arabia*, mentioned by *Pomponius Mela*, whose Inhabitants the *Carræans*, *Pliny* placeth next the *Sabæans*, distinct from *Hara* or *Caran* in *Mesopotamia*.

# THE EIGHTEENTH PART.

## *The* Sabæan *Philosophers.*

### CHAP. I.

### *Of the Institutors of the* Sabæan *Sect.*

CONcerning the first Institutor of Learning and Religion amongst the *Sabæans*, there is not any certain Agreement of Authors. *Patricides*, an *Arabian* Writer, attributes this Invention to *a certain Persian*, *named* Zerodast, *contemporary with* Terah *Father to* Abraham; *Zerodast* and *Zoroaster* are the same; whereby it appears, that *Patricides* means one of those two *Zoroasters*, whereof one was the first Author of Sciences amongst the *Chaldæans*, the other introduced the same Sciences amongst the *Persians*; and though he calls this *Zerodast* a *Persian*, yet by the Antiquity of the Time in which he conceives him to have lived, it is probable he rather intended the *Chaldæan*.

*Others* (adds *Patricides*) *are of Opinion that* Tachmurat *King of* Persia *gave beginning to this Religion*. The same perhaps whom *Elmacinus* (another *Arabian* Historian,) calls *Tachurith*: *Others* (saith he) *conceive that the Religion of the* Sabæans *was manifested by a certain King of the* Persians, *whose name was* Tachurith.

*Elmacinus* mentions another *Persian*, to whom the same Invention was attributed, *In those days*, saith he, *came forth* Nazarib *a* Persian, *who, as is reported, was Author of the Religion of the* Sabæans.

*Others* (continues *Patricides*) *derive the Infancy of the* Sabæans *from a certain* Græcian *named* Juvan *or* Javan, *Son of* Berkley, *and him they will have to be of the City* Zaituna, *which was built in* Attica. Thus he; where *Hottinger* for *Berkley* reads *Mercolim*, *Mercury*, confirmed by *Elmacinus* upon the same Subject. *Others*, saith he, *affirm, that the Religion of the* Sabæans *was brought forth by a Man whose name was* Juvan, *Son of* Markoli, *a* Græcian, *who first found out the Science of the Stars*.

To these *Patricides* adds the Opinions of some *others*, who *held that the Authors of this Sect were some of those who were at the building of the Tower of* Babel. Thus the *Arabians*.

Some attribute the Institution of the *Sabæans* to *Cham*, Son of *Noah*, who *being banished from his Father's sight, fled thither, and* (to use the Words of *Lactantius*) *setled in that part of the Earth, which is now called* Arabia. *This was the first Nation that knew not God, because the principal Founder thereof had not received the Worship of God by Tradition from his Father*: Thus *Lactantius*, with whom many agree in attributing the Original of Idolatry to *Cham*, and to his Son *Chus* the first Planter of *Chaldæa*, from whose Son *Saba* the *Sabæans* were so named, and, upon this ground, some have laboured to prove *Cham* and

and *Chus*, to be the same with the first and second *Zoroasters*, of which formerly.

Others (as *Damascen*) ascribe the Original of Idolatry to *Serug*. *Epiphanius*, and the Author of the *Chronicon Alexandrinum*, affirm that *Hellenism began in the time of* Serug. This *Hellenism* some conceive the same with the *Sabæan* Superstition; what the *Greek* Fathers call *Hellenism*, the Rabbins term *Goth*, the *Arabians*, *Algiaheleiton*, *the time of Ignorance* and *Paganism*. And though to determine any thing of those early and obscure Times be very difficult, yet we cannot doubt, but that the Idolatrous Worship of Fire and of the Sun (ascribed to the *Sabæans*) was of great Antiquity among them, since mentioned by the most Ancient of Authors, *Job*, who lived near them, as appears by the inroad which the (*a*) *Sabæans* made upon him. * (*b*) *If I beheld* (saith he) *the* (*c*) *Sun when it shined, and the Moon walking in brightness, and my heart hath been secretly enticed, or my mouth hath kissed my hand, this also were an Iniquity to be punished by the Judge, for I should have denied the God that is above*; where by kissing of the hand is implied the ancient manner of Veneration.

(*a*) *Chap.* 1. *v.* 15.
(*b*) *Chap.*
(*c*) The word is אש, which signifieth as well *Fire.*

## CHAP. II.

### *Others of the* Sabæan *Sect.*

THat *Terah* Father of *Abraham* was bred up in this Doctrine might be conjectured from *Josuah* 24. 2. where he is reckoned among those *that served strange Gods*. (*a*) *Philo* terms him an Astronomer, one of those that are versed in Mathematicks.

(*a*) *De Nobilit.*

(*b*) *Mor. Nev.*

Of *Abraham* Son of *Terah*, (*b*) *R. Maimonides* expresly saith, *It is well known that our Father* Abraham *was educated in the Faith of the* Zabians, *who held, there is no God but the Stars*; indeed (*c*) *Berosus* acknowledgeth *he was skilful in the Celestials*, and *Eupolemus*, cited by *Eusebius*, ascribes to him the Invention of *Astrology and Chaldaick*. The *Zabians* themselves in their Annals give this accompt of his departure out of *Chaldæa*. (*d*) *Abraham*, say they, *being educated in* Ur, *but dissenting from the Vulgar, and asserting that there was another Creator besides the Sun, they began thus and objected against him, and amongst other Objections, they alledged the evident and manifest operations of the Sun in the World*; *but* Abraham *answered them, You are right, which Sun is like the Ax which is in the hand of him that striketh therewith: then they recite some of the Objections which he brought against them, and at last they say, that the King cast him in prison, but nevertheless he persisted in prison to oppugn them*; *whereupon the King fearing lest he might do some hurt to his Kingdom, and seduce men from their Religion, confiscated all his Estate, and banished him to the utmost Borders of the East.* Thus the *Zabians*: from which Relation *Josephus* differs not much, who saith, that (*e*) Abraham *first undertook to convince the received Errontous Opinion of men, concerning the Deity, and that he first taught and proved that there is but one God, but seeing the* Chaldæans *and* Mesopotamians *began to mutiny against him for it, he thought it Expedient to forsake the Country.*

(*c*) *Joseph. Antiquit.* 1. 8.

(*d*) *Mor. Nev.*

(*e*) *Lib.* 1. *c.* 7.

The Rabbinical Traditions, are more particular herein: *R. Solomon Hiarki* reports from an Ancient Commentary, that *Terah* fell out with his Son *Abraham*, in the Presence of *Nimrod*, for breaking his Idols, and that *Abraham* was thereupon cast into a fiery Furnace. *Moses Gerundensis* confirms the same Story, but *R. Chain* relates it otherwise: *Abraham*, saith he, *met with a Woman holding a Dish in her hand, and the Woman asking him whether he would offer any thing to the Gods, he took a staff, and broke the Images which the Woman had, and threw away the staff*; *his Father coming thither at the same time, demanded what was the matter?* Abraham *answered, that she had asked him, whether he would make an offering, and that upon his answering that he would first eat something, there arose a dispute betwixt them*: *but his Father urged that the business was otherwise, and that he was heard to say many reproachful things of* Nimrod. *The Controversie was brought before* Nimrod *the King of* Babel: *he commanded* Abraham *to worship the Fire that was set before him*; Abraham *answered, If so, then adore you the Water, Water which quencheth Fire.* Nimrod *said to him, Worship the Water*; Abraham *answered, If so, worship the Clouds which distil the Water.* Nimrod *said, Then worship the Clouds*; *whereupon* Abraham, *If it be so, then the Wind is to be worshipped which agitates and scatters the Clouds. Again* Nimrod, *Worship the Wind*; *but* Abraham, *If so, then is Man much more to be worshipped who understands the Wind. At length* Nimrod *growing angry, You talk, saith he, idlely, I worship none but the Fire, into the midst of which I will cast thee. Let the God whom thou worshippest come and free thee by his right hand.* Aran *stood by and talked*; *they asked of which Opinion he was*; *he answered, If* Abraham *get the better, I will be for him, if* Nimrod, *for* Nimrod. *After* Abraham *had gone into the fiery Furnace and was freed, they said to* Aran, *of which side art thou? he said of* Abraham's; *then they took him, and cast him into the fire, and all his Bowels were burned, and he was taken out dead in the presence of his Father.* Thus *R. Chain*; but *Cedrenus* affirms, that *Abraham* throwing his Father's Idols into the fire, his Brother *Aran* endeavouring to rescue them, was burned.

The *Arabians* who imitate the Jews in Relations of this kind, and fancy Superstructures of their own upon Fables of the Rabbies, give a further accompt of what happened unto *Abraham* after his departure from *Nimrod*, as appears by a fragment of a Mahometan Writer, of which I shall cite only so much as most particularly concerns the *Sabæans*. Edris, *on whom be peace, was the first who after* Enoch, *the Son of* Seth, *the Son of* Adam, *on whom peace, wrote with a pen*; *This thing afterwards* Edris *taught his Sons, and said to them, O Sons, know that you are* Sabæans, *learn therefore to read Books in your Youth. Now* Sabæans *are Writers, of whom the High* (he means *Mahomet*) *said* (Alk. Sur. 2) *The* Sabæans *and the* Nazarenes. The Author adds, that *they ceased not to possess the Books of* Seth *and* Edris *by Hereditary Right among themselves, until the times of* Noah, *and of* Abraham, *after that the High God aided him against* Nimrod, *on whom be malediction. But in that day wherein* Abraham *went out of the Land of* Irack, *and would go into* Syria, *into the Land of his Fore Fathers, he went to the Land of* Charan *and* Ghesira, *and there he found a Peo-*

*ple of the* Zabians, *who read old Books, and believed such things as were contained in them. But* Abraham *said,* "*O my God, I did not think that* "*besides my self, and those that are with me, there* "*had been any of the Faithful who believed thee to be* "*One; and God breathed to* Abraham *this Answer.* "*O* Abraham, *the Earth is never destitute, but that* "*there are some in it that dispute for God: But God commanded him to call them to his Religion, and he called them, but they would not, saying, How shall we believe thee, when thou readest not a Book? and God sent among them a forgetfulness of those things which they knew of Sciences and Books, for they conceived the Books which they used to be from God, and some of them believed, others not. Afterwards the* Zabians *were divided, and some of them believed,* viz. *the* Barhameans, *who did not separate themselves from* Abraham *of Blessed Memory, but the rest followed their own Religion very eagerly,* viz. *those who are in the Land of* Charan, *who went not with* Abraham *into* Syria, *and said, we follow the Religion of* Seth, Edris, *and* Noah; Thus according to *Kissaus*, the Religion of the *Sabæans* was the same with that of the *Haranæans*, or *Mesopotamians*. What he relates of *Abraham*'s being sent to the *Sabæans*, is all borrowed from the Rabbinical Traditions.

But that there were anciently Learned Persons in *Arabia*, skilful in Natural Philosophy, Astronomy, and other Sciences, is manifest from Testimonies far more authentick; as (particularly) from the Discourses betwixt *Job* and his Friends: of the *Arabian* Philosophers is it understood, that *Salomon's Wisdom* is said to have *excelled the Wisdom of all the Sons of the East*. *Tacitus*, describing *Judæa*, *the Land and Bounds to the East are terminated by* Arabia. And that the Jews called *Arabia* the East Country is evident from several places in Scripture, as *Gen.* 10. 30. and 25. 6. 18. *Job* 1. 3. *Judg.* 6. 3. 1. &c. *Pliny* also mentions the Magi of *Arabia*, (of whom he instanceth *Hippocus.*) Ptolomy, *the Gulf of the Magi*, in *Arabia*; and *Porphyrius* (citing *Diogenes*) relates, that *Pythagoras* (amongst other Countries to which he travelled for Learning) *went also to* Arabia, *and lived with the King there.*

30. 1.

## CHAP. III.

### *Their Writings.*

THe *Sabæans* pretended (as was lately shewed out of *Kissaus*,) to have had the Books of *Seth*, and *Edris*, and not only those, but some also written by *Adam*; for the same Author continuing the Story of *Abraham*'s coming amongst the *Sabæans*, adds, that *afterwards* Abraham *opened the Chest of* Adam, *and behold, in it were the Books of* Adam; *likewise the Books of* Seth, *and of* Edris; *as also the names of all the Prophets that were to be sent after* Abraham; *But* Abraham *said, Happy indeed are the Loins out of which all these Prophets shall come: And God breathed to him* (this Answer) *Thou, O* Abraham, *art the Father of them all, and they thy Children; and for this reason* Abraham *deserved to be called* the Father of the Prophets, *upon whom be peace.*

(a) *Mor. Nev. lib.* Of the same allay (*a*) *Maimonides* conceives the Book of Healings to have been, which was hid by *Ezekiel*.

The same (*b*) *Maimonides* cites many other Books of the *Sabæans*, translated into *Arabick*, of which the chiefest is entituled, *of the Agriculture of the* (*c*) Nabateans, *translated by* Aben Vachaschijah: *full of Idololatrical extravagancies; it treats of the making of* Tsilmenaias, *of the descent of Familiar Spirits, of Conjurations of Demons, of Devils, of such as dwell in Deserts* (as Satyrs were thought to do) *many other things it contained very ridiculous, by which nevertheless they conceived that they could confute the manifest Miracles* (of *Moses*, and the Prophets.)

(b) *Mor. Nev. lib.*

(c)

Another entituled, *the Worship, or of the worship of the* Nabateans, out of which (*d*) *Maimonides* cites a Story concerning *Abraham* related formerly.

(d) *Lib.*

(*e*) *The Book* Haistanchus, *ascribed to* Aristotle, *but falsly.*

(e) *Maim. Mor. Nev. lib.*

(*f*) *The Book* Hatteleſmaoth, of *Tsilmenaias*; *Buxtorfius* renders it, of speaking Images; the reason we have given formerly.

(f) *Ibid.*

*The Book* Tamtam.

*The Book of* Hassearab.

*The Book of the Degrees of the Celestial Orbs and the Figures that are ascendent in every Degree.*

*Another Book concerning* Tsilmenaias, *which also is attributed to* Aristotle.

*Another Book ascribed to* Hermes.

*The Book of* Isaak *the* Zabian, *wherein he argues in defence of the Law of the* Zabians.

*A great Book of the Customs and Particularities of the Law of the* Zabians, *as of their Feasts, Sacrifices, Prayers, and other things concerning their Belief: All these* (saith *Maimonides*) *are Books which treat of Idololatrical things, and are translated into the Arabick Tongue.*

Besides these, (as *Maimonides* acknowledgeth,) there are many others, (*g*) *Hottinger* cites (in his own Possession) *A Treatise of* Mahomet *the Elder, Son of* Isaak, who is otherwise called *Abulfark*, the Son of *Abi Jakub.*

(g) *Histor. Orientat. lib. 1. cap. 8.*

# THE NINETEENTH PART.

## *The Doctrine of the* Sabæans.

WHat is left to us of the Doctrine of the *Sabæans* is delivered upon later Authorities, than those from which we have the *Chaldaick*: and therefore perhaps is but an account of what it was in later times, degenerated from their Primitive Doctrine, which was immediately derived from the *Chaldaick*. Nor is it improbable, but that this corruption might be somewhat aggravated by the eager opposition of the *Talmudists*, and some Arabick Writers that follow them, from whose hands only we receive it. However, we conceive it necessary to be annexed to the former, of which, though depraved, it pretends at least to be the continued Succession.

CHAP.

## CHAP. I.

### *Of the Gods and Rites of the* Sabæans.

(a) *Maimon.* THE (a) Sabæans *held* (as the *Chaldæans*) *that the Stars are Gods, but the Sun the greatest God; for they plainly assert, that the Sun governs the superiour and inferiour Worlds;* (b) and *call him the great Lord, the Lord of good.* What they relate concerning *Abraham*, refusing to worship the Sun, is delivered elsewhere; what they further fable of the Patriarchs, That *Adam*, (not being the first Man, but begotten by a Man and Woman) was a Prophet of the Moon, and, by preaching, perswaded men to worship the Moon, and composed Books of Husbandry; That *Noah* was a Husbandman likewise, but believed not in Idols, for which they discommended him in all their Writings; That *Seth* also dissented from *Adam*, as to worshipping the Moon; See delivered more fully by (c) *Maimonides.*

(b) *Idem.*

(c) *Mor. Nev.*

Their Forms of worshipping these Gods was twofold, daily, and monthly; the daily, is by *Said Vahed* described thus: *They make the first day sacred, to the Sun; the second, to the Moon; the third, to* Mars; *the fourth, to* Mercury; *the fifth, to* Jupiter; *the sixth, to* Beltha Venus; *the seventh, to* Saturn.

The description of their monthly Worship receive from a Ms. of *Mahumed ben Isaac*, cited by *Hottinger*; They begin the year from the Month *Nisan*, of which they keep holy the first, second, and third days; adoring and praying to their Goddess *Beltha*: they go to her Temples, sacrificing Sacrifices, and burning living Creatures: On the sixth day of the same month they kill a Bull to their Goddess the Moon; and towards the Evening of the same day eat it, On the eighth day they keep a Fast, and likewise celebrate (at Night) a Feast in honour of the seven Gods, and of the Dæmons; offering a Lamb to the God of the Blind (*Mars*:) On the fifteenth day is the Festival of *Sammael*, (by this name the *Talmudists* understand the Devil) celebrated with many Sacrifices, Holocausts, and Offerings: On the twentieth they visit a *Cœnobium* of the *Haranæans*, called *Cadi*, where they kill three Oxen, one to *Saturn*; another to *Mars*, the blind God; the third to the Moon: they kill likewise nine Lambs, seven to their seven Gods (the Planets) one to the God of the Geniusses, and one to the God of the Hours. They likewise burn many Lambs and Cocks. On the 28. day they go into the Temple which they have in the City *Saba*, at a certain gate of *Charran*, called the gate *Assarah*; and kill to *Hermes* their God a great Bull; as also seven Lambs to their seven Gods; one to the God of the Dæmons, and to the God of the Hours, eating and drinking; but they burnt nothing of any Beast that day.

The second Month which is *Jiar*, they begin also with Sacrifices, celebrating the Consecration of *Sammael*, and Feasting; The second day they keep in honour of *Caben Salem*; drinking, and filling their hands with Tamarisk and other Fruits.

The 23. day of the third Month they keep in honour of *Sammael*, whom they affirm to be *the God that maketh the Arrows fly*; the *Cumar*, or Priest, makes an Arrow take fire twelve times, by rubbing another stick against it: the last time he creeps upon the ground, and puts flax to it; if their flax kindle, they conceive their Rites well accepted of the Gods, otherwise not.

The fourth Month *Thammuz*, had a peculiar Solemnity about the middle of it, called the Festival *Albukal*, *of the weeping Women*: The Original of which is thus related by *R. Maimonides*: In the same Book, saith he, they tell a Story of a certain Idolatrous Pseudo-Prophet, named *Thammuz*: who calling upon the King to worship the seven Planets, and the twelve Signs of the Zodiack, and being by the King put to an ignominious death, the same night in which he was slain, all the Images from all Parts of the Earth met in the Palace which was erected at *Babylon* to the great Golden Image of the Sun, suspended betwixt Heaven and Earth: There this Image of the Sun fell down prostrate in the midst, and (all the rest of the Images standing round about it) bewailed *Thammuz*, and began to relate what had happened to him; whereupon the rest of the Images fell a-weeping, and lamented all that night: But assoon as the morning appeared they all flew away and returned home to their several Temples. Hence came the Custom, that on the first day of the Month *Thammuz* (*June*) they weep, lament, and bewail *Thammuz*. This Custom of *Women weeping for* Thammuz, is mentioned also by the Prophet (d) *Ezekiel*, as imitated by the Jews. The 27. day of this Month they consecrate to *Sammael*, and to other Gods and Dæmons; sacrificing nine Lambs to *Hanan*.

(d) *Chap.* 8. *v.* 14.

In the fifth Month, which, as the *Syrians*, they call *Ab*, they press new Wine to their Gods, and give it several names; this they do the eight first days. They likewise kill a new born Infant to their Gods, which they beat all to pieces; then they take the flesh and mix it with Rye-meal, Saffron, Ears of Corn, Mace, and little Cakes like Figs; they bake this in a new Oven, and give it to the People of the Congregation of *Sammael* all the year long; no Woman eats of this, nor Servant, nor Son of a Bond-woman, nor Man that is possessed, or mad.

The Rites of the sixth Month, named *Eiloul*, are thus described by the same Author; Three days they boil water to wash themselves, that they may perform the Rites of *Sammael*, who is the Prince of the Dæmons, and the greatest God; into this Water they cast some Tamarisk, Wax, Olives, Spice, *&c.* and when it is hot, take it before Sun-rise, and pour it upon their Bodies, as an Amulet: The same day also they kill eight Lambs, seven to their Gods, and one to the God *Sammael*; they eat also in their Congregations, and drink every Man seven Cups of Wine; The Prince exacts of every one of them two Drachms to be paid into his Exchequer. On the 26. day of the same Month, they go forth to a Mountain, celebrating the Rites of the Sun, *Saturn* and *Venus*; burning eight Hen-Chickens, eight Cocks, and as many Hens; He who made a Prayer and Request to Fortune takes an old Cock, or a Cock-chicken, to the wings of which he ties two strings; and sets their ends on fire, and

and gives up the Chickens to the Goddess Fortune; If the Chickens are quite consumed by the fire, his prayer is heard; but if the fire of those strings goes out before the Chickens be quite burnt, the Lord of Fortune accepts not his Prayer, nor Offerings, nor Sacrifices. On the 27. and 28. they have their Mysteries, Sacrifices, Offerings, and Holocausts to *Sammael*, (who is the greatest Lord:) to the Dæmons and Geniusses, which compass them about, defend them, and bestow good Fortune on them.

The seventh Month, which the *Syrians* and *Sabæans* call *the first Tischri*, hath peculiar Rites, thus described by the same Author: About the middle of this Month, they burn Meat to the dead, in this manner: Every one buys of every sort of meat that is in the Market; of all kind of Flesh, Fruits, green and dry; they likewise dress it several ways; all which they burn in the night-time to the dead, and wish it the thigh-bone of a Camel; they also pour mixed Wine upon the fire, for the dead to drink.

In the eighth Month, which is called the *later Tischri*, they fast on the 21. day, and so on, for nine days, the last of which is the 29. this day they do in honour of the Lord of Fortunes; *&c.*

The ninth Month, called *the first Canun*, is chiefly Sacred to *Venus*; on the fourth day they set up a Tabernacle, which they call the Bed of *Beltha*; adorning it with several Leaves, Fruits, Roses, *&c.* Before they offer their Sacrifices of Beasts and Birds, they say, Let these Sacrifices be destined to our Goddess *Beltha*; this they do for seven days: all which time they burn many Beasts to their Gods and Goddesses. On the 30. day of the same Month, the Priest sits in an High Chair, to which he gets up by nine steps; and, taking in his hand a stick of Tamarisk, stretcheth it out to them all, and striketh every one of them with it three, or five, or seven times. Afterwards he makes a Discourse to them, wherein he declareth to the Congregation their continuance, multitude, places, and excellency above all other Nations; he likewise tells them the largeness of their Empire, and the days of their Reign: After which he comes down from the Chair, and they eat of the things offered to the Idols, and drink: and the Prince exacts of every one of them this Day two Drachms to the Exchequer.

The tenth Month, called *the other Canun*, seems particularly devoted to the Moon; for on the 24. day thereof is the Nativity of the Lord, that is, the Moon, at what time they celebrate the Rites of *Sammael*, sacrificing, and burning fourscore living Creatures four-footed Beasts and Fowl; They also eat and drink and burn *Badi*, sticks or canes of Palm, slender at the bottom, to their Gods and Goddesses.

In the eleventh Month, *Sijubat*, they fast seven days together, beginning from the ninth day, upon which they proclaim a Fast to the Sun, who is the great Lord, the Lord of good: They eat not in all this time any thing of Milk; nor drink Wine; nor pray during this Month to any but *Sammael*, the Genii, and Dæmons.

In the Month *Adar*, which is the twelfth and last, they fast also to the Moon, especially on the 28. day; The President distributes a Barley Loaf to the Congregation, in honour of *Mars*; the Prince exacts of every one of them towards his Exchequer two Drachms.

## CHAP. II.

*Other Rites of the* Sabæans *contrary to the Levitical Law.*

(a) R. *Maimonides* mentions several other Rites of the *Sabæans*, which were expressly repugnant to the Levitical Law, adding, that *he was acquainted with the Reasons and Causes of many of the Laws of* Moses, *by means of knowing the Faith, Rites and Worship of the* Sabæans. The Examples alledged by him and others are these. (a) *Mor. Nev.*

*They offered leavened Bread only, and, for their Offerings, made choice of sweet things only, and anointed their Sacrifices with Honey*; prohibited, *Levit.* 2. 11.

*They used on a certain day to feed on Swines flesh*; prohibited, *Levit.* 11. 7.

They held it unlawful to kill and feed on some Beasts permitted to the Jews; as the Ox, which *Maimonides* saith, *they much honoured for the great profit he brings by Agriculture, and therefore held it unlawful to kill him, as also the Sheep; neither of which they killed.*

*Some of the* Sabæans *worshipped Devils, believing they had the shapes of Goats, and therefore called them* Seirim; On the contrary, the Levitical Law prohibits *to offer Sacrifices* le Seirim, *unto Goats*, that is to say, Devils, appearing in the forms of Goats, *Levit.* 17. 7.

*Though they did abominate Blood, as a thing exceeding detestable, yet they did eat it, believing it to be the Food of the Dæmons, and that he that did eat of it should become a Brother or intimate Acquaintance of the Dæmons, insomuch that they would come to him and tell him future Events*; prohibited, *Levit.* 17. 10. 23.

*They worshipped the Sun at his rising, for which reason, as our Rabbins expresly teach in* Gemara, saith *Maimonides*, Abraham *our Father designed the West for the place of the* Sanctum Sanctorum, *when he worshipped in the Mountain* Moria. Of this Idolatry they interpret what the Prophet (b) *Ezekiel* saith, of the *men with their backs towards the Temple of the Lord, and their faces towards the East, worshipping the Sun towards the East.* (b) *Chap.* 8. 16.

*Mahummed Ben-Isaac* relates, that *they shaved themselves with Razors, and branded themselves with fire; there were also married Women amongst them who shaved themselves in the same manner*; forbidden, *Levit.* 21. 5.

(c) They had a Custom of *passing their Children, as soon as they were born, through the fire, which they worshipped, affirming that such Children as were not so passed would die.* This was also expresly forbidden by the Levitical Law. (c) *Maimon. Mor. Nev.* 3.

Another most obscene Custom they had of Engrafting, described by (d) *Maimonides*, to which he conceives the Levitical Prohibition to allude. (d) *Mor. Nev.* 3. 37.

Others there are of the same kind cited by the same (e) Author, who concludes, that *as concerning those particular Laws, the reasons whereof are* (e) *Mor. Nev.* 3. 44.

*concealed*

*concealed, and the benefit unknown to me, it proceeds from hence, that the things which we hear are not such as those which we see and perceive with our eyes. For this cause, those things concerning the Rites of the* Sabæans, *which I have learnt by hearing, and from their Writings, are not so solid and certain, as with those who have seen them practised, especially seeing that their Opinions and Sects perished* 1000 *years since, and their names were abolished.*

With the *Sabæans*, we conclude the Chaldaick Philosophy.

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# THE CHALDAICK ORACLES OF *ZOROASTER* and his Followers.

THE most considerable Remains of the Chaldaick Philosophy are those Oracles which go under the name of *Zoroaster*; Some indeed condemn them as suppositious, (*a*) *forged by some Pseudo-Christian Greek*; (perhaps the rather, because (*b*) *The followers of* Prodicus *the Heretick, boasted that they had the secret Books of* Zoroaster.) But this seems less probable, in regard they lie dispersed amongst several Authors; nor are they to be neglected, in that they have been held in great veneration by the Platonick Philosophers. Which sufficiently also argues that they are none of the Writings charged by (*c*) *Porphyrius* upon the *Gnosticks*, as *forged by them under the name of* Zoroaster, since those (as he acknowledgeth) were by the Platonick Philosophers, (of whom he instanceth *Plotinus* and *Amelius*) rejected and *demonstrated to be spurious and suppositious.*

(*a*) Biza.
(*b*) Clem. Strom.
(*c*) Vit. Plotin.

Some argue that they are not Chaldaick, because many times accommodated to the Greek Style; But there are in them many so Harsh and Exotick Expressions, as discover them to be Originally foreign; and where they agree in Terms with that which is proper to the Greek Philosophy, we may say of them as (*d*) *Jamblichus* upon another Occasion, (on the Writings that go under the Name of *Hermes Trismegistus*) as they are published under the Name of *Zoroaster*, so also they contain the Doctrine of *Zoroaster*, though they frequently speak in the Style of the Greeks; for they were Translated out of Chaldee into Greek by Persons skilful in the Greek Philosophy.

(*d*) De Myst. Ægypt.

To perswade us that they are genuine, and not of Greekish Invention, (*e*) *Mirandula* professeth to *Ficinus*, that he had the Chaldee Original in his possession, *I was* (saith he) *forcibly taken off from other things, and instigated to the Arabick and Chaldaick Learning by certain Books in both those Languages, which came to my Hands, not accidentally, but doubtless by the Disposal of God in favour of my Studies. Hear the Inscriptions, and you will believe it. The Chaldaick Books,* (*if they are Books and not rather Treasures*) *are, the Oracles of* Aben Esra, Zoroaster *and* Melchior, Magi: *in which those things which are faulty and defective in the Greek, are Read perfect and entire. There is also,* (adds he) *an Exposition by the Chaldæan Wise-men upon these Oracles, short and knotty, but full of Mysteries; There is also a Book of the Doctrines of the Chaldaick Theology, and upon it a Divine and copious Discourse of the* Persians, Græcians, *and* Chaldæans; Thus *Mirandula*, after whose death these Books were found by *Ficinus*, but so worn and illegible that nothing could be made out of them.

(*e*) Epist.

Further, to confirm that these Oracles were (as we said) Translated into Greek by Persons skilful in the Greek Philosophy, let us call to mind that *Berosus* (*f*) *introduced the Writings of the Chaldæans concerning Astronomy and Philosophy amongst the Græcians*; and that *Julian* the Son, a Chaldæan Philosopher, (*g*) *Wrote Theurgick Oracles in Verse, and other Secrets of that Science*: and probably, if these were no part of that Chaldaick Learning which *Berosus* first rendered in Greek, they yet might be some of the *Theurgick Oracles* (for such the Title speaks them) of *Julian*; for some of them are cited by *Proclus* as such. From the account which *Mirandula* gives of those in his possession, to which were added a Comment, and a Discourse of the Doctrines of the Chaldaick Theology, it might be conjectured, that what is delivered to us by *Pletho* and *Psellus*, who besides the Oracles, give us a Comment on them, together with a Chaldaick Summary, was extracted out of that Author which *Mirandula* describes to have been of the same Kind and Method, but much more Perfect and Copious.

(*f*) Joseph contra Apian. 1.
(*g*) Suid. in voce Julianus.

This Title of *Oracles* was perhaps not given to them only Metaphorically to express the Divine Excellence of their Doctrine, but as conceived indeed to have been delivered by the Oracle it self; for (*h*) *Stephanus* testifies that *the Chaldæans had an Oracle which they held in no less Veneration than the Greeks did theirs at* Delphi: This Opinion may be confirmed by the high Testimonies which the Platonick Philosophers give of them, calling them (*i*) *the Assyrian Theology revealed by God, and the Theology delivered by God.* And *Proclus* elsewhere having cited as from the Gods, one of these Oracles which speaks of the Ideas, (a *Platonick* Doctrine) adds, that *hereby the Gods declared the Subsistance of Ideas*, and acquiesceth as *satisfied in that the Gods themselves ratifie the Contemplations of* Plato.

(*h*) De urb.
(*i*) Procl. in Tim.

Some of these Oracles which escaped the Injuries of time, were first published by *Ludovicus Tiletanus*, *Anno* 1563. at *Paris*; together with the Commentaries of *Gemistus Pletho*, under the Title of *the Magical Oracles of the Magi descended from* Zoroaster, the same were afterwards Translated and put forth by *Jacobus Marthamus*, and lastly together with the Comment of *Psellus* also, by *Johannes Opsopæus* at *Paris*, 1607.

These by *Franciscus Patricius* were enlarged with

with a plentiful Addition out of *Proclus*, *Hermias*, *Simplicius*, *Damascius*, *Synesius*, *Olympiodorus*, *Nicephorus*, and *Arnobius*: encreasing them (*k*) by his own account, to 324. and reducing them for the better perspicuity to certain general Heads, put them forth and Translated them into Latin, *Anno* 1593.

(*k*) *Zor. pag. 4. b.*

They were afterwards put forth in Latin by (*l*) *Ottho Heurnius*, *Anno* 1619. under the Title of *The sincere Magical Oracles of* Zoroaster *King of* Bactria, *and Prince of the Magi*; but *Heurnius* under the pretence of (*m*) *putting them into good Latine*, (as he calls it) *and polishing them with a rougher File*, hath patched up and corrupted what *Patricius* delivered faithfully and sincerely, endeavouring to put these Fragments into a continued Discourse, which in themselves are nothing coherent, but dispersed amongst several Authors.

(*l*) *Philos. barbar.*

(*m*) *Pag.*

*Patricius* indeed hath taken much Learned pains in the Collection of them; but with less Regard to their Measures and Numbers, and (as from thence may be shown) sometimes of the Words themselves: nor is there any certain means to redress this Omission, by conparing them with the Authors, out of which he took them, since few of those are extant, neither doth he, (as he professeth to have done) affix the Names of the Authors to the several Fragments, except to some few at the beginning; However, we shall give them here according to his Edition, that being the most perfect; together with such Additions as we meet withal elsewhere, and some Conjectures to supply the Defect we mentioned.

* And whereas many of these Oracles are so broken and Obscure, that they may at first sight seem rather Ridiculous than Weighty, yet he who shall consider, that as many of them as are explained by *Pletho*, *Psellus*, and others, would without those Explications seem no less absurd than the rest, but being explained disclose the Learning of the *Chaldæans* in a profound and extraordinary manner, will easily believe all the rest (even those which appear least intelligible) to be of the same kind, and consequently ought no more to have been omitted than any of the rest.

## Φ P.

# Φ Ρ. ΠΑΤΡΙΚΙΟΥ ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΖΩΡΟΑΣΤΡΟΥ ΛΟΓΙΑ.

## ΜΟΝΑΣ, ΔΥΑΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΡΙΑΣ,

Ψελ. Ὅπου πατρικὴ μονάς ἐστι.
Δαμ. Ταναὴ ἔστι μονὰς, ἣ δύο γεννᾷ.
Πρακ. Δαμ. Δυὰς γὰρ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ἑνὸς καθῆται, καὶ νοεραῖς ἀκριβέσι τομαῖς.
Καὶ τὸ κυβερνᾶν τὰ πάντα, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἔμακρον ἐς τάχος ἄγειν.
Δαμ. Πάντι γὰρ ἐν κόσμῳ λάμπει τριὰς, ἧς μονὰς ἄρχει.
Ἀρχὴ πάσης τμήσεως ἡ ἓν ἡ τάξις.
Πρακ. Εἰς τρία γὰρ νοῦς εἶπε πατρὸς τέμνεσθαι ἅπαντα,
Οὗ τὸ θέλημ κατένευσε, καὶ ἤδη πάντα ἐτέτμητο.
Εἰς τρία γὰρ εἶπε νοῦς πατρὸς αἰδίου,
Νῷ πάντα κυβερνῶν.
Δαμ. Καὶ ἐφάνησαν ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ τ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ σοφία,
Καὶ ἡ πολύφρων ἀτρεκία.
Τῇ τῶνδε ἕνεκα τομὰς δίμας πρὸ τ' ὄσης,
Οὐ πρώτης, ἀλλ' ἣ τὰ μετρεῖται.
Ἀρχαῖς γὰρ τρισὶ ταῖς δὲ λάβοις δουλεύειν ἅπαντα.
Ἱερὸς πρῶτος δ' ἕρμος, ἐν δ' ἄρα μέσῳ
Ἥριος, τρίτος ἄλλος, ὃς ἐν πυρὶ τῷ χθόνα θάλπει.
Καὶ πηγὴ πηγῶν, καὶ πηγῶν ἁπασῶν.
Μήτρα συνέχουσα τὰ πάντα.
Πρακ. Ἐνθεν ἀφθόνως θρώσκει χθονὸς πολυποικίλης ὕλης.
Ἐνθεν συρίγμου πρηστὴρ ἀμιθρήτοιο πυρὸς ἄνθος,
Κόσμων ἐν θρώσκων κοιλώμασι. Πάντα γὰρ ἔνθεν.
Ἀρχεῖαι εἰς τὸ κάτω τείνειν ἀκτῖνας ἀγήτους.

## ΠΑΤΗΡ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΥΣ.

Ψελ. Ἑαυτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ἥρπασεν οὐδ' ἐν ἑῇ
Δυνάμει νοερᾷ κλείσας ἴδιον πῦρ.
Ψελ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ πατρικῆς ἀρχῆς ἀτελές τι τροχάζει.
Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσε πατὴρ,
Καὶ νῷ παρέδωκε δευτέρῳ,
Ὃν πρῶτον κλῄζεται πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπων.
Πρακ. Πατρογενὴς φάος, πολὺ γὰρ μόνος
Ἐκ πατρὸς ἀλκῆς ἄρνυται μένος νόος ἄνθος.
Ἔργα νοήσας, γὰρ πατρικὸς νοῦς αὐτογένεθλος,
Πᾶσιν ἐνέσπειρε δεσμὸν πυρὸς ἐρωτος.
Ὄφρα τὰ πάντα μένῃ, χρόνου εἰς ἀπερείσιον ἐρῶντα.
Μήτι πᾶσι τὰ πατρὸς νοερῶς ὑφασμένα φέγγει.

Ὡς ἐν ἔρωτι μένῃ κόσμου στοιχεῖα μενοινᾷ.
Ἔχει γὰρ νοῆσαι πατρικὸν νοῦν ἐνδιδύναι
Πάσαις πηγαῖς τε καὶ ἀρχαῖς.
Ἔστι γὰρ πέρας τοῦ πατρικοῦ βάθους, καὶ πηγὴ τῶν νοερῶν.
Μὴ ἦ προῆλθεν, ἀλλ' ἔμεινεν ἐν τῷ πατρικῷ βάθει,

Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ, καὶ τῷ θεοθρέμμονι σιγῇ.
Οὐ γὰρ εἰς ὕλαν, πῦρ ἐπέκυρσε τὸ πρῶτον
Εἰῶ δύναμιν κατακλείσει ἔργοις, ἀλλὰ νόῳ.

# FRANCISCI PATRICII ZOROASTRI ORACULA.

## MONAS, DYAS, ET TRIAS.

UBi paterna monas est. *Psel.*
Ampliata est Monas, quæ duo generat. *Dam.*
Duitas enim apud hunc sedet, & intellectualibus fulget sectionibus. *Proc. Dam.*
Et gubernare cuncta, & ordinare quodcumque non ordinatum.
Toto enim in mundo lucet Trias, cujus monas est princeps. *Dam.*
Principium omnis sectionis hic est ordo,
In tria namque Mens dixit Patris secari omnia, *Proc.*
Cujus voluntas annuit, & jam omnia secta fuere.
In tria namque dixit Mens patris æterni,
Mentə omnia gubernans.
Et apparuerunt in ipsâ Virtus & Sapientia, *Dam.*
Et multiscia Veritas.
Hinc fluit Triadis vultus ante essentiam,
Non primam, sed eam quæ mensuratur.
Principiis tribus hisce capias servire cuncta.

* * * * *

Et fons fontium, & fontium cunctorum.
Matrix continens cuncta.
Indè affatim exilit generatio multivariæ materiæ. *Proc.*
Indè tractus præster exilis ignis flos,
Mundorum indens cavitatibus. Omnia namque indè.
Incipit deorsum tendere radios admirandos.

## PATER ET MENS,

Seipsum rapuit pater neque suæ *Psel.*
Potentiæ mentali claudens proprium ignem.
Non enim à paterno Principio imperfectum quid rotatur. *Psel.*
Cuncta namque perfecit pater,
Et menti tradidit secundæ,
Quam primam vocat omne genus hominum.
Patrogenia lux, multum namque sola *Proc.*
E patris robore decerpens mentis florem.
Opera enim intelligens paterna mens è se genita,
Cunctis inseminavit vinculum igni gravis amoris.
Quo omnia maneant, tempus in interminatum amantia.
Neque omnibus quæ patri mentaliter contexta monstret.
Ut in amore maneant mundi elementa manentia.
Habet ipsa intelligentia paternam mentem indere
Omnibus fontibus & principatibus.
Est enim finis paterni profundi, & fons mentalium.
Neque progressus est, sed mansit in paterno profundo,
Et in adyto, per deo-nutriens silentium.
Non enim in materiam, ignis trans primus
Suam potentiam claudit operibus, sed mente.

Σύμβολα γὰρ πατρικὸς νόος ἔσπειρε κατὰ κόσμον.

Ὅς τὰ νοητὰ νοεῖ καὶ ἄφραστα καλλύνεται.

Δαμ. Ὁλοφυὴς μεριστὸς καὶ ἀμέριστος.
Νῷ μὲν κατέχει τὰ νοητὰ, ψυχῇ δ' ἐπάγει κόσμοις.
Νῷ μὲν κατέχει τὰ νοητὰ, ψυχὴν δ' ἐπάγει κόσμοις.

## ΝΟΥΣ, ΝΟΗΤΑ, καὶ νοερά.

Δαμ. Καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς νοὸς τοῦ νοητοῦ.
Πρ. Οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ νοὸς ἔστι νοητὸν· ὁ χωρὶς ὑπάρχει.

Τὰ μὲν ἔστι νοερὰ καὶ νοητὰ, ὅσα νοοῦντα νοεῖται.

Τρεφὴ ὁ τοῦ νοοῦντι τὸ νοητόν.
Μάνθανε τὸ νοητὸν, ἐπεὶ νόος ἔξω ὑπάρχει.

Καὶ τοῦ νὸς, ὃς τὸ ἐμπύριον κόσμον ἄγει.
Νοῦς γὰρ νὸς ἔστιν ὁ κόσμου τεχνίτης πυρός.
Οἳ τὸ ὑπέρκοσμον πατρικὸν βυθὸν ἴσε νοοῦντες.

Ἡ νοητὴ πάσης τμήσεως ἄρχει.
Ἔστι γάρ τι νοητὸν, ὃ χρή σε νοεῖν νόος ἄνθει.

Δαμ. Ἡ γὰρ ἐπιγνλίνῃς, ὡς ἂν νοῦν, κἀκεῖνο νοήσῃς,
Ὡς τὴ νοῶν, ὁ κεῖνον νοήσεις.
Ἔστι γὰρ ἀλκὴς ἀμφιφαὲς δύναμις,
Νοεραῖς τρεφόμενα τομαῖσι, τὸ δὴ χρὴ
Σφοδρότητι νοεῖν τὸ νοητὸν ἐκεῖνο,
Ἀλλὰ νόος πανσθὲ πανσθῇ φλογὶ
Πάντα μετρούσῃ, πλὴν τὸ νοητὸν ἐκεῖνο.
Χρεὼν δὴ τοῦτο νοῆσαι· ἢ γὰρ ἐπιγνλίνῃς

Σὸν νοῦν, κἀκεῖνο νοήσεις οὐκ ἀκτενῶς.
Ἀλλ' ἁγνὸν ὕπτιον ὄμμα,
Φερομένα σῆς ψυχῆς τείνει κενεὸν νόον
Εἰς τὸ νοητὸν, ὄφρα μάθῃς τὸ νοητὸν·
Ἐπεὶ ἔξω νόος ὑπάρχει.
Τὸν ὃ νοεῖ πᾶς νοῦς θεὸν, ὁ γὰρ ἄνευ
Νοός ἔστι νοητοῦ, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν ὁ νοῦ χωρὶς ὑπάρχει.

Τοῖς δὲ πυρὸς νοεροῖς νοεροῖς πρεσβύεσιν ἅπαντα
Εἴκαθε δουλεύοντα, πατρὸς πειθανδρὸς βουλῇ.
Καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, ἀεί τε μενόντων ἀόκνῳ σφαδάζῃ.

Πηγάς τε καὶ ἀρχὰς, δινεῖν, ἀεί τε μενόντων ἀόκνῳ σφαδάζῃ.
Ἀλλὰ δ' ὄνομα σεμνὸν ἀκοιμήτῳ σφαδάζῃ
Κόσμοις εὐθρόοις, πρεπνὸν διὰ πατρὸς ἐπιπλοκάς.
Ὑπὸ δύο νόων ἡ ζωογόνος πηγὴ περιέχεται ψυχῶν.

Καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς, ὃς αὐτοργῶν τεύξατο τὸ κόσμον.
Ὃς ἐκ νόος ἔκθορε πρῶτος.
Ἐσταμένως πυρὶ πῦρ, συνδέσμων ὄφρα κεράσῃ
Πηγαίας κρατῆρας, ἐὸς πυρὸς ἄνθος ὑπέχων.
Νοεροῖς ἀσφαδάστοις τομαῖς, ἐρώτως δ' ἐπλησε τὰ πάντα.
Τὰ ἀτύπωτα τυποῦσθαι.
Σμίνεσιν ἐοικυῖαι φέρονται, ἐρηγνύμεναι
Κόσμου σωμάτων.
Ἃ νοῦς λέγει, τῇ νοεῖν δὴ πάντ' λέγει.
Ἡ μὲν γὰρ δύναμις σὺν ἐκείνοις, νοῦς δ' ἀπ' ἐκείνου.

Symbola enim paterna mens ſeminavit per mundum.
Quæ intelligibilia intelligit, & ineffabilia exornat.
Tota partitio, & impartibilis.
Mente quidem continet intelligibilia, ſenſum verò inducit mundis. *Dam.*
Mente quidem continet intelligibilia, animam verò inducit mundis.

## MENS, INTELLIGIBILIA, & Mentalia.

Et unius mentis intelligibilis. *Dam.*
Non enim ſine intelligibili mens eſt: non ſeorſum exiſtit. *Proc.*
Quædam ſanè ſunt mentalia & intelligibilia, quæcunque dum intelligunt intelliguntur.
Cibus verò intelligenti eſt intelligibile.
Diſce intelligibile, quandoquidem extra mentem exiſtit.
Et Mentis, quæ empyreum mundum ducit.
Mentis enim mens eſt quæ mundi eſt artifex ignei.
Qui ſupermundanum paternum profundum eſtis intelligentes.
Intelligibilis omnis ſectionis princeps eſt.
Eſt enim quoddam intelligibile, quod oportet te intelligere mentis flore.
Vel enim inclines, ut mentem, & illud intellexeris. *Dam.*
Ut aliquid intelligens, non illud intelliges.
Eſt enim roboris circumquaque lucidi potentia,
Mentalibus fulgens ſectionibus, non ſanè oportet
Vehementiâ intelligere intelligibile illud,
Sed mentis amplæ amplâ flammâ
Omnia metiente, præterquam intelligibile illud.
Opus ergò eſt hoc intelligere; nam ſi inclinaveris
Mentem tuam, etiam illud intelliges non parùm.
Sed purum converte oculum,
Ferentem tuæ animæ tendere vacuam mentem
In intelligibile; ut diſcas intelligibile,
Quandoquidem extra mentem exiſtit.
Deum hunc intelligit omnis mens, non enim ſine
Mente eſt intelligibili, & intelligibile non ſine mente exiſtit.
Ignis mentalis mentalibus præſteribus cuncta
Cedunt ſervientia, Patris perſuaſorio conſilio.
Et intelligere, ſempérque manere impigrâ vertigine.
Fonte & principii, vertere, ſempérque manere impigrâ vertigine.
Sed nomen venerandum inſomni vertigini
Mundis indens, terribiles ob patris minas.
Sub duabus mentibus vitigenius fons continetur animarum.
Et facta, qui per ſe operans fabrefecit mundum.
Qui ex mente exiliit primus.
Indutus igne ignem, Vinculorum ut temperet
Fontanos crateras, ſui ignis florem ſuſtinens.
Mentalibus fulget ſectionibus, amoréque implevit omnia.
Infigurata figurans.
Examinibus ſimiles feruntur, perrumpentes
Per mundi corpora.
Quæ mens dicit, intelligendo ſanè dicit.
Potentia quidem cum illis, Mens verò ab illâ.

ΙΥΓΓΕΣ, ΙΔΕΑΙ, ΑΡΧΑΙ.

Πολλχὶ μὲν αἵδε ἐπεμβαίνουσι φαεινοῖς κόσμοις.
Ἐκθρώσκουσαι, καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀκρότητες ἔασι τρεῖς,
Ὑποκέιται αὐτοῖς ἔρχος αὐλῶν.
Ἀρχὰς, αἱ πατρὸς ἔργα νοήσασαι νοητὰ

Αἰσθητοῖς ἔργοις, καὶ σώμασιν ἀφεκάλυψεν.
Διὰ παρόδοι ἑστῶτες φάναι τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ.
Καὶ τὰ ἐμφανῆ μιμήματα τῶν ἀφανῶν ἐργαζόμενοι.
Καὶ τ' ἀφανῆ εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὴ κοσμοποιΐαν ἐγγεγραφότες.
Νοῦς πατρὸς ἐρέθιζεν, νοήσας ἀκμαίῳ βουλῇ
Παμμόρφους ἰδέας. πηγῆς δ' ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀπορρῶσαι
Ἐξέθορον. πατρόθεν γὰρ ἦν βουλή τε τέλος τε.
Διὸ ζῶν συνάπτεται τῷ πατρὶ, ἄλλῳ κατ' ἄλλο

Ζωὴ, ἀπὸ μεριζομένων ὀχετῶν.
Ἀλλ' ἐμερίσθησαν, νοερῷ πυρὶ μοιρηθεῖσαι,
Εἰς ἄλλας νοερὰς· κόσμῳ γὰρ ἄναξ πολυμόρφῳ

Προύθηκεν νοερὸν τύπον ἄφθιτον, ἐς κατὰ κόσμον

Ἴυγγος ἐπιγόμενος μορφῆς καθ' ἃ κόσμος ἐφάνθη.
Παντοίαις ἰδέαις κεχαρισμένος, ὧν μία πηγή.
Ἐξ ἧς ῥοιζοῦνται μεμερισμέναι ἄλλαι,
Ἁπλατοι, ἐριγνώμονα κόσμου σῴζουσαι σήματα.
Αἱ σφὶ κόλπους σμερδαλέους, σμίνεσιν ἐοικυίας,
Φορέονται τρηχύνουσαι· σφὶ δ' ἀμφὶ ἄλλυδις ἄλλη.
Ἔννοιαι νοεραὶ πηγῆς πατρικῆς ἀπὸ
Πολὺ δ' ἐρεπτόμεναι πυρὸς ἄνθος
Ἀκοιμήτου χρόνου. ἀκμὴ ἀρχεγόνοι ἰδέαι
Πρώτη πατρὸς ἔβλυσε· τὰς δ' αὐτοθαλὴς πηγή.

Νοήμονες ἴυγγες πατρόθεν νοέουσι καὶ αὐταί.
Βουλαῖς ἀφθέγκτοισι κινούμεναι ὥστε νοῆσαι.

ΗΚΑΤΗ, ΣΥΝΟΧΕΙΣ, ΚΑΙ Τελεταρχαι.

Ἐξ αὐτοῦ γὰρ πάντες ἐκθρώσκουσι
Ἀμείλικτοί τε κεραυνοὶ, καὶ περισσοβόχοι κόλποι
Παμφεγγέος ἀλκῆς πατρογλῶσσ' Ἑκάτης.
Καὶ ὑπεζωκὸς πυρὸς ἄνθος, ἢ ἦ κρατίστου
Πνεῦμα πόλων, πυρὸς ἔκπυνα.
Φορυφεῖν αὖ περισσοῖσιν οἷς ἀκροτῆτας ἔδωκεν.
Ἐγκερόσας ἀλκῆς ἴδιον μένος· ὦν συνοχεῦσιν.
Ὧ πῶς ἔχει κόσμος νοεροὺς ἀνοχῆας ἀκαμπεῖς.

Ὅτι ἐργάτις, ὅτι σκεδάστις ὀξὺ πυρὸς ζωηφόρου.
Ὅτι καὶ τὸ ζωογόνον πληροῖ τ' Ἑκάτης κόλπον.
Καὶ ὑπερρεῖ τοῖς Συνοχεῦσιν ἀλκὴν ζήδωρον πυρὸς
Μέγα δυναμένοιο.
Ἀλλὰ καὶ φερεσπόνοι τῷ ἔργων εἰσὶ τοῦ πατρός.
Ἀφομοιοῖ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν, σκεῦος ἐπιγόμενος
Τὸν τύπον ἁρμόζεσθαι τῷ εἰδώλων.
Οἱ τελεταρχαι συνέλκηται τοῖς συνοχεῦσι.
Τοῖς δὲ πυρὸς νοεροῖς νοεροῖς περισσοῖσιν
Ἅπαντα ἔκαθεν δουλεύοντα.
Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑλαίοις ὅσα δουλεύει συνοχεῦσι.

Ἐναμένου πολυβρόμου ἀλκὴν φωτὸς κελαδοῦντος.
Ἀλκῇ τριγλίχῳ, νοῦν ψυχὴν θ' ὁπλίσαντα.
Παντοίαν σύνθημα βάλλειν φρενί.
Μηδ' ὑπερπολᾶν ἐμπυρίοις σποργάσιν ὀχετοῖς,
Ἀλλὰ συναθρόον.
Οἱ δὲ τὰ ἄτομα, καὶ αἰσθητὰ δημιουργοῦσι,
Καὶ σωματοειδῆ, καὶ καταπεπαυμένα εἰς ὕλην.

IYNGES, IDEÆ, PRINCIPIA.

Multæ quidem hæ ſcandunt lucidos mundos.
Inſilientes, & in quibus ſummitates ſunt tres.
Subjectum ipſis eſt principale pratum.
Principia; quæ patris opera intelligentes intelligibilia
Senſibilibus operibus, & corporibus revelârunt.
Tranſvectrices ſtantes dicere patri & materiæ.
Et manifeſta imitamina latentium operantes.
Et latentia in manifeſtam Coſmopœiam inſcribentes.
Mens patris ſtriduit, intelligens vigente conſilio
Omniformes Ideas. Fonte verò ab uno evolantes
Exilierunt. A patre enim erat conſilium & finis.
Per quæ conjunguntur patri, per aliam atque aliam
Vitam, à compartitis canalibus.
Sed partitæ ſunt, mentali igne diſpoſitæ,
In alias mentales: mundo namque rex multiformi
Propoſuit mentalem typum incorruptibilem, non per mundum
Veſtigium promovens formæ per quæ mundus apparuit.
Omnifariam ideis gratioſus, quarum unus fons.
Ex quo ſtrident diſpertitæ aliæ,
Immenſæ, perrumpentes mundi circa corpora:
Quæ per ſinus immenſos, examinibus ſimiles,
Feruntur converſæ: circúmque alibi alia.
Conceptiones mentales fonte à paterno
Multum decerpentes ignis floreum
Inſomnis temporis. Vigor principigeniæ ideæ
Prima, è patris miſſa eſt; cujus per ſe florens fons.
Intellectæ Iynges à patre intelligunt & ipſæ.
Conſiliis ineffabilibus moventur ut intelligant.

HECATE, SYNOCHES, ET Teletarchæ.

Ex ipſo enim omnes exiliunt
Amilictíque fulmines, & preſterocapaces ſinus
Omnilucidæ vigoris patrogenii Hecates.
Et Hypezocus ignis flos, & fortis
Spiritus polorum, igneos trans.
Cuſtodire preſteribus ſuis ſummitates dedit.
Immiſcens vigoris proprium robor in Synochis.
Quo mundus habeat mentales ſuſtentatores inflexiles.
Quia operatrix, quia largitrix eſt ignis vitiferi.
Quia & vitigenium implet Hecates ſinum.
Et influit Synochis vigorem vitidonum ignis
Magni potentis.
Sed & Cuſtodes operum ſunt patris.
Aſſimilat enim ſe ipſum; ille urgens
Typum induere idolorum.
Teletarchæ comprehenſi ſunt cum Synochis.
His verò ignis mentalis mentalibus preſteribus
Omnia parent ſervientia.
Sed & quæcunque materialibus ſerviunt Synochis.
Induti armorum vigorem luminis reſonantis.
Vigore Triglicho, mentem animámque armantem.
Pervarium Synthema jacere ratiocinio.
Neque ſuper incedere empyreis ſparſim canalibus,
Sed collectim.
Hi verò individua, & ſenſibilia efficiunt,
Et corporiformia, & deſtinata in materiam.

## ΨΥΧΗ, ΦΥΣΙΣ.

Οτι ψυχὴ πῦρ δυνάμει παλεγς ἔστι φαινόν,

Ἀθάνατός τε μένει, καὶ ζωῆς ἔξ πύπις ἔχει.
Καὶ ἴχνια κόσμε πολλὰ πληρώματα κόλπων.
Νοῦ γὰρ μίμημα πέλει, τὸ δ' ἔνδεν ἔχει τι σώματος.
Μιγνυμένων δ' ἀγγείοις, πυρὸς ἀφθίτε ἔργα τελοῦσα.
Μετὰ δ' πατρικὰς διανοίας ψυχή, ἐγώ, ναίω.
Θερμὴ, ψυχοῦσα τὰ πάντα, κατέθετο γὰρ
Νοῦν μὲν εἰς ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δ' εἰς σώματι ἀφθίτῳ.
Ἡμέων ἑκατέρῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.
Ἄρθλιον ἐμψυχῶσα φάος, πῦρ, αἰθέρα, κόσμους.
Συνυφίσταται γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ ἔργα τοῦ νοεροῦ φέγγους
Τοῦ πατρός. Ψυχὴ γὰρ ἡ κόσμησα τὸ μέγα
Θέραπνον, καὶ κόσμησα μετὰ τοῦ πατρός.
Κέρατα δ' αὐτῆς ἐστήριται ἄνω,
Πάντοις δ' ἀμφὶ θεᾶς φύσις ἄπλετος ὠάρισται.

Ἄρχει δ' αὖ φύσις ἀκαμάτη κόσμων τε καὶ ἔργων.
Οὐρανὸς ὄφρα θέῃ δ' ἑλικοειδὲς ἄϋδιον καταδύων.
Καὶ ταχὺς ἀίδιος περὶ κέντρον, ὅπως ἐθέλῃ
Μὴ φύσεως ἐμελέψεις ἐμαιμάξιον ὄνομα τήνδε.

## ΚΟΣΜΟΣ.

Ὁ ποιητὴς ὃς αὐτεργῶν τεκτήνατο τὸν κόσμον.
Καὶ τις πυρὸς ὄγκος ἦν ἕτερος· τὰ δὲ πάντα
Αὐτεργὸν, ἵνα πῶμα τὸ κόσμιον ἐκτελέσῃ πανόν.
Κόσμος ἦν ἐνδελὴς, καὶ μὴ φαίνοιτο ὑλικὰ δῆς.
Τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ὦρα πυρὸς, καὶ ὕδατος, καὶ γῆς,
Καὶ παντοτρόφε αἰθέρος.
Τ' ἀρρήτα, καὶ τὰ ῥητὰ σπερμάτα τῆς κόσμε,
Ἄλλο κατ' ἄλλο ζώνει, ἀπὸ μεριζομένων ὀχετῶν.
Ἀνάδεν διήκοντος ἔστι τὸ κατ' ἀντικρυ
Διὰ τῆς κέντρου γῆς, καὶ πέμπτον μέσον, ἄλλον
Πυρείοχον, ἐν δὲ κάτοπτα μίγει πλαίων ἀχετῶν.
Ζωηφόρε πυρὸς
Κέντρον, ὅπερ ἔχων ἑαυτὸν φαεσιμελάδεν
Πηγαῖον ἄλλον, ὃς τ' ἐμπύριον κόσμον ἄγει
Κέντρον ἀφ' ἧς πᾶσαι μανεῖς ἂν τυγχάνωσι ἔασι.
Σύμβολα γὰρ πατρικὸς νόος ἔσπαρε κατὰ κόσμου.

Μέσον τῶν πατέρων ἑκάστης κέντρον φορεῖται,
Νοῦ γὰρ μίμημα πέλει· τὸ δ' ἔνδεν ἔχει τι σώματος.

## ΟΥΡΑΝΟΣ.

Ἑπτὰ γὰρ ἔδωκεν πατὴρ σφαιρώματα κόσμων·

Τὸν ἀρανὸν κυρτῷ σχήματι περικλείσας.
Πῆξε δ' πολὺν ὅμιλον ἀστέρων ἀπλανῶν,
Ζώων δ' πλανωμένων ὑφέστακεν ἑπτάδα.
Γῇ δ' ἐν μέσῳ θεὶς, ὕδωρ δ' ἐν γαίας κόλπους,
Ἠέρα δ' ἄνωθεν τότων.
Πῆξε δ' καὶ πολὺν ὅμιλον ἀστέρων ἀπλανῶν.
Μὴ τάσει ὀπτπόνῳ πονηρᾷ.

## ANIMA, NATURA.

Quoniam anima ignis potentiâ patris exiſtens lucidus,
Immortaliſque manet, & vitæ domina eſt:
Et tenet mundi multas plenitudines ſinuum.
Mentis enim imitamen eſt, partum verò habet quid corporis
Miſtis verò canalibus, ignis incorruptibilis opera efficiens.
Poſt verò Paternas conceptiones anima, ego, habito:
Calida, animans omnia, repoſuit enim
Mentem ſanè in animâ, animam verò in corpore inerti.
Noſtri impoſuit pater hominúmque Deúmque.
Affatim animans lucem, ignem, æthera, mundos.
Coexiſtunt namque naturalia opera mentali ſplendori
Patris. Anima enim eſt quæ ornavit magnum
Cœlum, & quæ ornat ſimul cum patre.
Cornua & ipſius firmata ſunt ſurſum.
Humeros verò circa Deæ natura immenſa attollitur.
Imperat rurſus natura infatigabilis mundíſque operibuſque:
Cœlum ut currat ſurſum æternum trahens.
Et celer ſol circa centrum, ut ameno vehat.
Non naturæ inſpicias fatale nomen ejus.

## MUNDUS.

Factor qui per ſe operans fabrefacit mundum.
Etenim quædam ignis moles erat altera: hæc omnia
Per ſe efficiens, ut corpus mundanum
Mundus ſit manifeſtus, & non videatur membraneus.
Totum mundum ex igne, & aquâ, & terrâ,
Et omni-alente aere.
Ineffabilia, & fabilia ſynthemata mundi.
Aliam per aliam vitam, à partitis canalibus.
Deſuper permeantis in oppoſitum
Per centrum terræ, & quintum medium, ætherem
Igneum, ubi deſcendit uſque ad materiales canales.
Vitifer ignis.
Centro incitans Serpens lumine reſonante.
Fontanum alium, qui Empyreum mundum ducit.
Centrum à quo omnes uſque quo fortè æquales fuerint.
Symbola enim paterna mens ſeminavit per mundum.
Medium inter patres ſingulæ centrum fertur.
Mentis enim imitamen eſt: quod verò partum eſt habet quid corporis.

## CŒLUM.

Septem enim in moles formavit Pater firmamenta mundorum:
Cœlum rotundâ figurâ circumcludens.
Fixítque multum cœtum aſtrorum inerrantium.
Animalíumque errantium conſtituit ſeptenarium.
Terram in medio poſuit, aquámque in terræ ſinibus,
Aerémque ſupra hæc.
Fixítque multum cœtum aſtrorum inerrantium.
Tenſione, non laboriosâ malâ.

Sed

Πήξεν ἡ πλάνιν ὂν ἐχέσην φέρεσθαι.
Ἔπηξε ἡ κ̓ πολὺν ὅμιλον ἀστέρων ἀπλανῶν.
Τὸ πῦρ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ ἀναλύσας.
Πήξεν πλάνιν ὂν ἐχέσην φέρεσθαι.
Ἓξ αὐτὸς ὑπέστησεν, ἕβδομον ἠέλιον,
Μεσεμβολήσας πῦρ.
Τὸ ἅπαντον αὖτε διακοσμήσας ἀναπρεπέσας ζώναις.
Τίκτει γὰρ ἡ θεὰ, ἠέλιόν τε μέγαν, κ̓ λαμπρὴν σελήνην.
Αἰθὴρ, ἄνεμε, πνεῦμα σελήνης, ἀέρος ἄγωγοι,
Ἡνιοχῆες τε κύκλων, κ̓ κυρτῶν κανονισμῶν,
Κόλπων τε πλατέων.
Αἰθὴρ μέλος, ἠέλιός τε, κ̓ μήνης ὀχετὸς, ἠ τε πλάτος.

Καὶ πλάτος αἰθέρος, μήνειός τε δρόμος, κ̓ πόλος ἠελίοιο.
Συλλέγει αὐτὸ, λαμβάνουσα ἁρμονίης μέλος,
Ἠελίου τε, σελήνης τε, κ̓ ὅσα πέρι συνέχονται.
Πῦρ πυρὸς ἔσχατον, κ̓ πυρὸς ταμίας.
Χαίτας γὰρ ἐς ὀξὺ πεφυκότι φωτὶ βλέπονται,
Ἔνθα Κρόνος.
Ἥλιος πάρεδρος ὑπερσκοπέων πόλον ἀγνόν.
Αἰθέριός τε δρόμος, κ̓ μήνης ἄπλετος ὁρμή,
Ἠέριοί τε ῥοαί.
Ἠελίου τε πάρεδρον, κ̓ λαμπρὸν σελήνην.

Θεὸν ἐκδρομον, αἰώνιον, ἀπέραντον.
Νέον, κ̓ πρεσβύτην, Ἑλικοβλῆ.
Καὶ πηγαῖον ἄνοιν, ὃς ὑπερτέρου κόσμου ἄγει.

ΨΥΧΗ, ΣΩΜΑ, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ.

Χρὴ σπεύδειν πρὸς τὸ φέγγος κ̓ πατρὸς αὐγάς,
Ἔνθεν ἐπέμφθη σοι ψυχὴ, πολὺν ἑσαμένην νόον.
Τοῦτο γὰρ πατὴρ σπείρας ἐνέθηκε ψυχαῖς.
Ἔρωτι βαθεῖ ἀναπλήσας τὴν ψυχήν.
Ὑμῖν ἐγκατέθηκε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.
Σώματα δὲ ἀπὸ πατρὸς ἔπλασεν ἁρμονίας.
Ἀδύνατοι γὰρ ἔσαν ἀθάνατοι ἐόντες σώμασιν,
Διὰ τὸ πολὺ ἄστατον, καὶ μὴ ἐνέχειν ἀκρήτου φύσιν.

Ἐν ἅρμασι πέμπει πυρὸς ἀδάμαντος ἀκόντια.
Ἐκ πατρὸς ἔβλαστε κακότητας, ἀφρίων ὑλικὴ κακότητων.
Ἁρμονίαν ἐμοὶ δίπλαξ ἔκρανεν ἀθάνατον.

Διὸ κ̓ νοήσατε τὰ λεγόμενα παῖδες
Μοίρας ἐρευνήσαντες πατρὸς ἐπὶ ψυχὴν ἀνιδρεῖς.
Κἂν γὰρ τῶνδε ψυχῶν ἴδῃς ἀποκατασχόμενον,
Ἀλλ' ἄλλην εἶδον πατὴρ, ἐπὶ ἀθανάτοισιν.
Κεῖναι ὄλβιαί τε, κ̓ ὑπὲρ μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν.
Ὅσαι πατρὸς ἰαχὴν ἔκλυον, καὶ ἀπὸ κεφαλῆς ὑπ' ἀνάγκης
Ἐκ πατρὸς ἐξεφάνησαν ἐπὶ ἀθανάτοισιν.
Κεῖναι ὄλβιαί τε, κ̓ ὑπὲρ μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν.
Πάσαι ἐκπέτασαν ἄνω.
Μήτε κάτω νεύσῃς εἰς ὑπὲρ μελανωχὲς κεῦμα.

Sed fixione errorem non habente in motu.
Fixítque multum cœtum aſtrorum inerrantium.
Ignem ad ignem cogens.
Fixione errorem non habente in motu.
Sex eos conſtituit, ſeptimum Solis,
In medium jaciens ignem.
Inordinationem eorum bene-ordinatis ſuſpendens zonis.
Parturit enim Dea Solemque magnum, & ſplendidam Lunam.
Æther, Sol, ſpiritus Lunæ, aeris ductores,
Solariúmque circulorum, & lunarium eſt repituum,
Sinuúmque aereorum.
Ætheris cantus, Soliſque, & Lunæ canalium, & aeris.
Et latus aer, lunariſque curſus, & polus Solis.

Colligit ipſum, accipiens ætheris harmoniam,
Soliſq; Lunæque, & quæcunque aere continentur.
Ignis ignis derivatio, & ignis penu.
Crines enim in acutum nato lumini conſpiciuntur,
Ubi Saturnus.
Sol aſſeſſor intuens polum purum.
Ætheriúſque curſus, & Lunæ ingens impetus,
Aeriique fluxus.
Solémque magnum, & ſplendidam Lunam.

TEMPUS.

Deum mundanum, æternum, infinitum.
Juvenem, & ſenem———
Et fontanum aliud, quod empyreum mundum ducit.

ANIMA, CORPUS, HOMO.

Oportet te feſtinare ad lucem & patris lumina,
Unde miſſa eſt tibi anima, multam induta mentem.
Hæc pater mente concepit, mortaliſque ei eſt animatus.
Symbola enim paterna mens ſeminavit in animis.
Amore profundo replens animam.
Repoſuit enim mentem in anima, in corpore verò
Vos repoſuit pater hominúmque deúmque.
Incorporea quidem ſunt divina omnia.
Corpora verò in ipſis veſtri causa ſunt alligata.
Non potentes continere incorporeos corpora,
Ob corpoream, in quam concentrati eſtis, naturam.
Inque deo jacent faces trabeatæ validas.
A patre deſcendentes, à quibus anima deſcendentibus
Empyreos carpit fructus, animam alentem florem.
Ideóque mente concipientes opera patris
Parcæ fatalis alam fugiunt inverecundam.
Et ſi hanc animam videris redeuntem,
At aliam immittit pater, ut in numero ſit.
Certè valde illæ ſunt beatiſſimæ ſupra omnes
Animas, ad terram à cœlo profuſæ.
Illæque divites, & ineffabilia ſtamina habentes.
Quæcunque à lucente, ô rex, à te, vel ipſo Jove ſunt progenitæ. Mirè validæ à neceſſitate
Ductæ, animæ profunditas immortalis oculóſque affatim
Omnes ſurſum extende.
Nec deorſum pronus ſis in nigricantem mundum.

Cui

Ὦ βαθὺς ἀιὲν ἄπυς ὑπερῳαί τε, καὶ Ἄδης

Ἀμφικνεφὴς, ἐρεβώδη, εἰδωλοχαρὴς, ἀνόητος,

Κρημνώδης, σκολιὸς, πωρὸν βάθος ἀιὲν ἑλίσσων,

Ἀενυμφεύων ἀφανὲς δέμας, ἀργὸν, ἄπνουμον.

Καὶ ὁ μισοφαὴς κόσμος, καὶ τὰ σκολιὰ ῥεῖθρα
Ὑφ' ὧν πολλοὶ καταιθερόωνται.
Ζήτησον παράδεισον.
Αἶζεο σὺ ψυχῆς ὀχετὸν, ὅθεν, ἢ τίνι τάξει
Σώματι πνεύσας, ὅπῃ τάξιν ἀφ' ἧς ἐρρύης
Αὖθις ἀναστρόφας, ἱερῷ λόγῳ ἔργον ἐνώσας.
Μήτε κατὰ νοῦσιν, κρημνὸς κάτω γῆς ὑπόκειται,

Ἑπταπόρου σύριγγι βαθμίδος ὑπὸ ἣν ὕπο
Δεινῆς ἀνάγκης θρόνος ἕδρη.
Μὴ σὺ αὔξανε τλῆναι εἱμαρμένον.
Ψυχὴ ἢ μερόπων θεὸν ἄγει πῶς εἰς ἑαυτήν·

Οὐδὲν θνητὸν ἔχουσα, ὅλη θεόθεν μεμέθυσται.
Ἁρμονίαν αὐχεῖ γάρ, ὑφ' ἣ πέλε σῶμα βροτήσιον.

Ἐκτείνας πύρινον νοῦν ἔργον ἐπ' εὐσεβίης,
Ῥεῖον καὶ σῶμα σαώσεις.
Ἔστι καὶ εἰδώλῳ μέρος εἰς τόπον ἀμφιφάοντα.
Παντόθεν ἀπλάστῳ ψυχῇ πυρὸς ἴνια τέτανον.
Ἡ πυριθαλπὴς ἔννοια πρωτίστην ἔχει τάξιν.

Τῷ πυρὶ γὰρ βροτὸς ἐμπελάσας θεόθεν φάος ἕξει.

Δηθύνονται γὰρ βροτοὶ κρείττονοι μάκαρες τελέθοντι.
Αἱ ποιναὶ μερόπων ἄγκυρόμαι.
Καὶ τὰ κακῆς ὕλης βλαστήματα χρηστὰ, καὶ ἐσθλά.
Ἐλπὶς τρεφέτω σε πυρὶ οχῳ ἀγγελικῷ οἰκὶ χώρῳ.
Ἀλλ' ὃν εἰς Ἅιδεω κείνης τὸ σκότον παιδὸς νόος,
Μέχρις ἂν ἐξέλθῃ λήθης, καὶ ῥῆμα λάλησῃ.

Μνήμων ὁ θεμοῦς παΐριος συνθήμασιν ἁγνοῖς.
Τοῖς γὰ διδακτὸν φάος ἔδωκε γνώρισμα λαβέσθαι.

Τοὺς δ' ὑπνώοντας ἐῆς ἐκάρπισεν ἀλκῆς.

Μὴ πνεῦμα μολύνῃς, μήτε βαθύνῃς τὸ ὑπὸ πόδιον.

Μήτε τὸ τ' ὕλης σκύβαλον κρημνῷ καταλείψῃς.
Μὴ ἐξάξῃς, ἵνα μὴ ἐξιοῦσα ἔχῃσι.
Βίᾳ ὅτι σῶμα λιπόντων ψυχαὶ καθαρώταται.
Ψυχῆς ἐξωστῆρες ἀάπνοοι, εὐλυτοί εἰσι.

Λαιὸς ἐν λαγόσιν Ἑκάτης ἀρετῆς πέλε πηγὴ
Ἔνδον ὅλη μίμνουσα, τὸ παρθένιον ἑ περοῖσα.
Ὦ τολμηροτάτης φύσεως, ἄνθρωπε, τέχνασμα!
Μὴ τὰ πελώρια μέτρα γαίης ὑπὸ σῷ φρένα βάλλε,

Οὐ γὰρ ἀληθείης φυτὸν ἐν χθονί.
Μήτε μέτρει μέτρα ἠελίου κανόνας συναθροίσας,

Ἀϊδίῳ βουλῇ φέρεται, οὐχ ἕνεκα σεῖο.
Μισσαῖον μὲν δρόμημα, καὶ ἀστέριον προπόδισμα
Μοίρης ῥοίζον ἔασον, ἀεὶ τρέχει ἔργῳ ἀνάγκης
Ἀστέριον προπόδισμα, σθένει χάριν οὐκ ἐλοχεύθη.
Αἰθέριος ὀρνίθων πλατὺς ἔστ' ἀληθὴς,
Οὐ θυσιῶν σπλάγχνων τ' ἔτημος· ταῦτ' ἀθέμιτα πάντα,
Ἐμπορικῆς ἀπάτης σημήϊα· φεῦγε σὺ ταῦτα
Μέλλων εὐσεβίης ἱερὸν παράδεισον ἀνοίγειν.

Cui profunditas ſemper infida ſubſtrata eſt, & Ades
Circumquaque caligans, ſqualidus, idolis gaudens, Amens,
Præcipitoſus, tortuoſus, cœcum profundum ſemper involvens,
Semper deſponſus obſcuram faciem, inertem, ſpiritu-carentem.
Et Oſor luminis mundus, & tortuoſi fluxus
A quibus vulgus attrahitur.
Quære paradiſum.
Quære tu animæ canalem, unde, aut quo ordine
Corpori inſervieris, in ordinem à quo effluxiſti
Rurſus reſtituas, ſacro ſermoni operam uniens.
Neque deorſum ſis pronus, præcipitium in terrâ ſubeſt,
Septemvios trahens per gradus: quo ſub
Horribile neceſſitatis Thronus eſt.
Nè tu augeas fatum.
Anima hominum Deum coget quodammodo in ſeipſam:
Nihil mortale habens, tota à Deo eſt ebria facta:
Harmoniam reſonat namque, ſub quâ eſt corpus mortale.
Extendens igneam mentem ad opus pietatis,
Et fluxile corpus ſervabis.
Eſt & idolo portio in loco circumlucente.
Undique infictâ animâ ignis habenas tende.
Igne calens cogitatio primiſſimum habet ordinem.
Igni namque mortalis propinquans à Deo lumen habebit.
Immoranti enim mortali præſtò Dii adſunt.
Pœnæ hominum ſunt angores.
Et malæ materiæ germina utilia ſunt, & bona.
Spes nutriat te ignea Angelicâ in regione.
Sed non recipit illius velle Paterna mens,
Donec non exeat ex oblivione, & verbum loquatur
Memoriam indens Paterni Sythematis puri.
His quidem diſcibile lucis dedit notitiam ſuſcipere.
Hos verò & ſomnolentos ſui fructum dedit roboris.
Nè ſpiritum macules, neque profundum fac ſuperficiem.
Neque materiæ quiſquilias præcipitio relinquas.
Nè educas, nè exiens habeat quidpiam.
Vi corpus relinquentium animæ ſunt puriſſimæ.
Animæ expulſores, reſpiratores & faciles ſolutu ſunt.
Siniſtris in lumbis Hecates virtutis eſt fons,
Intùs tota manens, virgineum non abjiciens.
O audaciſſimæ naturæ, homo, artificium!
Neque ingentes menſuras terræ in tuam mentem pone,
Non enim veritatis planta eſt in terrâ.
Neque in menſuris menſuras Solis regulas congregans,
Æterno conſilio fertur, non gratiâ tui.
Lunarem quidem curſum, & aſtreum progreſſum
Lunæ ſtrepitum dimitte, ſemper currit operâ neceſſitatis
Aſtreus progreſſus, tui gratiâ non eſt partus.
Ætheréus avium pes latus nunquam verus eſt.
Non ſacrificia viſceráque cupio: hæc ſunt omnia ludi,
Mercatoriæ deceptionis firmamenta; fuge tu hæc
Si vis pietatis ſacrum paradiſum aperire.

Ubi

Ἐνθ' ἀρετὴ, σοφία τε, καὶ εὔνομα συνάγονται.

Σὸν γὰρ ἀγγεῖον θῆρες χθονὸς οἰκήσουσι.
Αὐτὰς ὁ χθὼν κατόπιν καλύψει ἐς τέκνα μέχρις.

ΔΑΙΜΟΝΕΣ, ΤΕΛΕΤΑΙ.

Ἡ φύσις πείθει εἶναι τοὺς δαίμονας ἀγνοὺς.
Καὶ τὰ κακῆς ὕλης βλαστήματα χρηστὰ, καὶ ἐσθλά.
Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἐν ἀδύτοις σηκοῖς διανοίας ἀνελίσσω.
Πῦρ ἴκελον σκιρτηδὸν ἐπ' ἠέρος οἶδμα πταλίνων,

Ἢ καὶ πῦρ ἀτύπωτον, ὅθεν φωνὴ προσθέσαν,

Ἢ φῶς πλόσιον ἀμφιγυῆν, ῥοιζαλέον, ἐλιχθὲν·

Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἵππον ἰδεῖν φωτὸς πλέον ἀστράπτοντα,
Ἢ καὶ παῖδα θεοῖς νώτοις ἐποχούμενον ἵππου,

Ἐμπυρσον, ἢ χρυσῷ πεπυκασμένον, ἢ παλίγυμνον,
Ἢ καὶ τοξεύοντα, καὶ ἑστῶτα ὅπλοις νώτοις.
Πολλάκις σοὶ λέξης μοι, ἀθρήσεις πάντα λέοντα,
Οὔτε γὰρ ἀρθμιον κυρτὸς τότε φαίνεται ὄγκος.
Ἀστέρες ἀ λάμπουσι, τὸ μὴν φῶς κεκάλυπται,
Χθὼν ἀχ ἕστηκε, βλέπεταί τε πάντα κεραυνοῖς.
Μὴ φύσεως καλέσῃς αὐτόπτρεον ἄγαλμα,
Οὐ γὰρ χρὴ κείνας σε βλέπειν πρὶν σῶμα τελεσθῇ.

Ὅτε τὰς ψυχὰς θέλγοντες ἀεὶ τῆς τελετῆς ἀπάγουσι.
Ἐκ δ' ἄρα κόλπων γαίης θρώσκουσι χθόνιοι κύνες,
Οὐ ποτ' ἀληθὲς σῶμα βροτῷ ἀνδρὶ φανύντες,

Ἐνέργει περὶ τὸν Ἑκατικὸν στρόφαλον.
Ὀνόματα βάρβαρα μήποτ' ἀλλάξῃς,
Εἰσὶ γὰρ ὀνόματα παρ' ἑκάστοις θεόθεν δοθέντα
Δύναμιν ἐν τελεταῖς ἄρρητον ἔχοντα.
Ἡνίκα βλέψῃς μορφῆς ἄτερ αὐτέρα πῦρ,
Λαμπόμενον σκιρτηδὸν ὅλα κατὰ βένθεα κόσμου,

Κλῦθι πυρὸς φωνῆς.

Ubi virtus, ſapientiáque, & bona lex congregantur.
Tuum enim vas beſtiæ terræ habitabunt:
Ipſas autem terra ſepeliit ad filios uſque.

DÆMONES, SACRIFICIA.

Natura ſuadet eſſe Dæmonas puros.
Et mala materiæ germina, utilia, & bona.
Sed hæc in abditis ſeptis mentis evolvo.
Ignis Simulacrum ſaltatim in aere in tumorem extendens,
Vel etiam ignem infiguratum, unde vocem currentem,
Vel lumen abundans radians, ſtreperum, convolutum:
Sed & equum videre, luce magis fulgurantem,
Vel etiam puerum ſuis humeris inequitantem equo,
Ignitum, vel auro diſtinctum, vel ſpoliatum,
Vel etiam ſagittantem, & ſtantem ſuper humeris.
Multoties ſi dixeris mihi, cernes omnia leonem,
Neque enim cœleſtis curvitas tunc apparet moles.
Aſtra non lucent, Lunæ lux opertum eſt,
Terra non ſtat, cernuntur verò cuncta fulminibus.
Neque naturæ voces per ſe viſibile ſimulacrum,
Non enim oportet illos te ſpectare antequam corpus ſacris purgetur.
Quando animas mulcentes ſemper a ſacris abducunt:
Ergo ex ſinibus terræ exiliunt terreſtres canes,
Nunquam verum corpus mortali homini monſtrantes.
Operare circa Hecaticum turbinem.
Nomina barbara nunquam mutaveris,
Sunt enim nomina apud ſingulos à Deo data
Potentiam in Sacris ineffabilem habentia.
Quando videris formâ ſine ſacrum ignem,
Collucentem ſaltatim totius per profundum mundi,
Audi ignis vocem.

# THE ORACLES OF ZOROASTER;

Collected by

FRANCISCUS PATRICIUS.

## MONAD. DUAD. TRIAD.

*WHere the Paternal* Monad *is.*
*The* Monad *is enlarged, which generates two.*
*For the* Duad *sits by him, and glitters with intellectual Sections.*
*And to govern all Things, and to Order every thing not Ordered.*
*For in the whole World shineth the* Triad, *over which the* Monad *Rules.*
*This Order is the beginning of all Section.*
*For the Mind of the Father said, that All things be cut into three.*
*Whose Will assented, and then All things were divided.*
*For the Mind of the Eternal Father said into three, Governing all things by Mind.*
*And there appeared in it* [the Triad] *Virtue and Wisdom,*
*And Multiscient Verity.*
*This Way floweth the shape of the* Triad, *being pre-existent.*
*Not the first* [*Essence*] *but where they are measured.*
*For thou must conceive that all things serve these three Principles.*
*The first course is sacred, but in the middle.*
*Another the third, aerial; which cherisheth the Earth in fire.*
*And fountain of fountains, and of all fountains.*
*The Matrix containing all things.*
*Thence abundantly springs forth the Generation of multivarious Matter.*
*Thence extracted a prester the flower of glowing fire,*
*Flashing into the Cavities of the World: for all things from thence*
*Begin to extend downwards their admirable Beams.*

## FATHER. MIND.

*THe Father hath snatched away himself; neither Hath he shut up his own fire in his Intellectual Power.*
*For the Father perfected All things, and deliver'd them over to the second Mind,*
*Which the whole Race of Men calls the First.*
*Light begotten of the Father; for he alone*
*Having cropt the flower of the Mind from the Fathers Vigour.*
*For the Paternal self-begotten Mind understanding* [*his*] *Work,*
*Sowed in all the fiery bond of Love,*
*That all things might continue loving for ever.*
*Neither those things which are intellectually context in the light of the Father in All things.*
*That being the Elements of the World they might persist in Love.*
*For it is the Bound of the paternal Depth, and the Fountain of the Intellectuals.*
*Neither went he forth, but abided in the paternal Depth,*
*And in the Adytum according to Divinely-nourished site*
*For the fire once above, shutteth not his Power*
*Into Matter by Actions, but by the Mind.*
*For the paternal Mind hath sowed Symbols through the World,*
*Which understandeth intelligibles, and beautifieth ineffables.*
*Wholly Division and Indivisible.*
*By Mind he contains the Intelligibles, but introduceth Sense into the Worlds.*
*By Mind he contains the Intelligibles, but introduceth Soul into the Worlds.*

## MIND. INTELLIGIBLES. INTELLECTUALS.

*AND of the one Mind, the Intelligible* [Mind.] *For the Mind is not without the Intelligible; it exists not without it.*
*These are Intellectuals, and Intelligibles, which being understood, understand.*
*For the intelligible is the Aliment of the Intelligent.*
*Learn the Intelligible, since it exists beyond the Mind.*
*And of the Mind which moves the Empyreal Heaven.*
*For the Framer of the fiery World is the Mind of the Mind.*
*You who know certainly the supermundane paternal Depth.*
*The Intelligible is predominant over all Section.*
*There is something Intelligible, which it behooves thee to understand with the flower of the Mind.*
*For if thou enclinest thy Mind, thou shalt understand this also;*
*Yet understanding something* [*of it*] *thou shalt not understand this wholly; for it is a Power*
*Of Circumlucid Strength, glittering with Intellectual Sections* [*Rays.*]
*But it behooves not to consider this Intelligible with Vehemence of Intellection,*
*But with the ample flame of the ample Mind, which measureth all things,*
*Except this Intelligible: but it behooves to understand this.*
*For if thou enclinest thy Mind, thou shalt understand this also,*
*Not fixedly, but having a pure turning Eye* [thou must]
*Extend the empty mind of thy Soul towards the Intelligible,*
*That thou mayst learn the Intelligible, for it exists beyond the Mind.*
*But every mind understands this God; for the Mind is not*
*Without the Intelligible, neither is the Intelligible without the Mind.*
*To the Intellectual Presters of the Intellectual fire, all things*

By

*By yielding are ſubſervient to the perſwaſive Counſel of the Father.*
*And to underſtand, and always to remain in a reſtleſs Whirling*
*Fountains and Principles; to turn and always to remain in a reſtleſs Whirling.*
*But inſinuating into Worlds the Venerable Name in a ſleepleſs Whirling,*
*By reaſon of the terrible menace of the Father.*
*Under two Minds the Life-generating fountain of Souls is contained;*
*And the Maker, who ſelf-operating framed the World.*
*Who ſprung firſt out of the Mind.*
*Cloathing fire with fire, binding them together, to mingle*
*The fountainous Craters, preſerves the flower of his own fire.*
*He glittereth with Intellectual Sections, and filled all things with Love.*
*Like ſwarms they are carried, being broken,*
*About the Bodies of the World.*
*That things unfaſhioned may be faſhioned.*
*What the Mind ſpeaks, it ſpeaks by underſtanding.*
*Power is with them, Mind is from Her.*

## JYNGES. IDÆA'S. PRINCIPLES.

*THeſe being many aſcend into the lucid Worlds.*
*Springing into them, and in which there are three Tops.*
*Beneath them lies the chief of Immaterials,*
*Principles which have underſtood the intelligible Works of the Father.*
*Diſcloſed them in ſenſible Works as in Bodies;*
*Being (as it were) the Ferry-men betwixt the Father and Matter.*
*And producing manifeſt Images of unmanifeſt things,*
*And inſcribing unmanifeſt things in the manifeſt frame of the World.*
*The Mind of the Father made a jarring Noiſe, underſtanding by Vigorous Counſel,*
*Omniform Idea's; and flying out of one fountain*
*They ſprung forth; for from the Fathers was the Counſel and End,*
*By which they are connected to the Father, by alternate*
*Life from ſeveral Vehicles.*
*But they were divided, being by intellectual fire diſtributed*
*Into other Intellectuals: for the King did ſet before the multiform World*
*An Intellectual incorruptible Pattern; this Print through the World he promoting, of whoſe form*
*According to which the World appeared*
*Beautified with all kind of Idea's, of which there is one fountain,*
*Out of which come ruſhing forth others undiſtributed,*
*Being broken about the Bodies of the World, which through the vaſt Receſſes,*
*Like ſwarms, are carried round about every Way.*
*Intellectual Notions from the paternal fountain cropping the flower of fire.*
*In the Point of ſleepleſs time, of this Primigenious Idea,*
*The firſt ſelf budding fountain of the Father budded.*
*Intelligent* Jynges *do (themſelves) alſo underſtand from the father:*
*By unſpeakable Councils, being moved ſo as to underſtand.*

## HECATE. SYNOCHES. TELETARCHS.

*FOr out of him ſpring all*
*Implacable Thunders, and the Preſter-receiving cavities*
*Of the Intirely-lucid ſtrength of Father-begotten* Hecate.
*And He who begirds (viz.) the flower of fire; and the ſtrong*
*Spirit of the Poles fiery above.*
*He gave to his Preſters that they ſhould guard the Tops.*
*Mingling the power of his own ſtrength in the* Synoches.
*Oh how the World hath Intellectual guides inflexible!*
*Becauſe ſhe is the Operatrix, becauſe ſhe is the Diſpenſatrix of Life-giving fire.*
*Becauſe alſo it fills the Life-producing boſom of* Hecate.
*And inſtills in the* Synoches *the enlivning ſtrength*
*Of potent fire.*
*But they are Guardians of the Works of the Father.*
*For he diſguiſes himſelf, profeſſing*
*To be cloathed with the Print of the Images.*
*The* Teletarchs *are comprehended with the* Synoches.
*To theſe Intellectual Preſters of Intellectual fire,*
*All things are ſubſervient.*
*But as many as ſerve the Material* Synoches,
*Having put on the compleatly-armed Vigour of reſounding Light.*
*With triple ſtrength fortifying the Soul and the Mind.*
*To put into the Mind the Symbol of Variety.*
*And not to walk diſperſedly on the Empyreal Channels;*
*But ſtiffly*
*Theſe frame indiviſibles, and ſenſibles,*
*And Corporiformes, and things deſtin'd to matter.*

## SOUL. NATURE.

*FOr the Soul being a bright fire, by the power of the Father*
*Remains Immortal, and is Miſtreſs of Life;*
*And poſſeſſeth many Complections of the Cavities of the World:*
*For it is in imitation of the Mind; but that which is born hath ſomething of the Body.*
*The Channels being intermix'd, ſhe performs the Works of incorruptible Fire.*
*Next the paternal Conceptions I (the Soul) dwell;*
*Warm, heating, all things; for he did put*
*The Mind in the Soul, the Soul in the dull Body.*
*Of us the Father of Gods and Men impoſed,*
*Abundantly animating Light, Fire, Æther, Worlds.*
*For natural Works co-exiſt with the Intellectual Light of the Father, for the Soul which adorn'd the great*
*Heaven, and adorning with the Father.*
*But her Horns are fixed above,*
*But about the ſhoulders of the Goddeſs, immenſe Nature is exalted.*
*Again indefatigable Nature commands the Worlds and Works.*
*That Heaven drawing an Eternal Courſe may run.*
*And the ſwift Sun might come about the Center as he uſeth.*
*Look not into the fatal Name of this Nature.*

## THE WORLD.

*THe Maker who Operating by himself framed the the World.*
*And there was another Bulk of fire,*
*By it self operating all things that the Body of the World might be perfected,*
*That the World might be manifest and not seem Membranous.*
*The whole World of Fire, and Water, and Earth,*
*And all-nourishing Æther,*
*The unexpressible and expressible Watch-words of the World.*
*One Life by another from the distributed Channels,*
*Passing from above to the opposite Part,*
*Through the Center of the Earth; and another fifth Middle:*
*Fiery Channel, where it descends to the material Channels.*
*Life-bringing fire.*
*Stirring himself up with the goad of resounding Light.*
*Another fountainous, which guides the Empyreal World.*
*The Center from which all (Lines) which way soever are equal.*
*For the paternal Mind sowed Symbols through the World.*
*For the Center of every one is carried betwixt the Fathers.*
*For it is in Imitation of the Mind, but that which is born hath something of the Body.*

## HEAVEN.

*FOr the Father congregated seven Firmaments of the World;*
*Circumscribing Heaven in a round figure.*
*He fixed a great Company of inerratick Stars.*
*And he constituted a Septenary of erratick Animals.*
*Placing Earth in the middle, and the Water in the middle of the Earth,*
*The Air above these.*
*He fixed a great Company of inerratick Stars,*
*To be carried not by laborious and troublesome Tension,*
*But by a settlement which hath no Error.*
*He fixed a great Company of inerratick Stars,*
*Forcing fire to fire,*
*To be carried by a Settlement which hath not Error.*
*He constituted them fix; casting into the midst*
*The fire of the Sun,*
*Suspending their Disorder in well-ordered Lones.*
*For the Goddess brings forth the great Sun, and the bright Moon.*
*O Æther, Son, Spirit, Guides of the Moon and of the Air;*
*And of the solar Circles, and of the Monthly clashings,*
*And of the Aerial Recesses!*
*The Melody of the Æther, and of the Passages of the Sun, and Moon, and of the Air,*
*And the wide Air, and the Lunar Course, and the Pole of the Sun.*
*Collecting it, and receiving the Melody of the Æther,*
*And of the Sun, and of the Moon, and of all that are contained in the Air.*
*Fire, the Derivation of fire, and the Dispenser of fire;*
*His Hair pointed is seen by his native Light;*
*Hence comes Saturn.*
*The Sun Assessor beholding the pure Pole;*
*And the Ætherial Course, and the vast Motion of the Moon,*
*And the Aerial fluxions,*
*And the great Sun, and the bright Moon.*

## TIME.

*THe Mundane God, Æternal, Infinite.*
*Young, and Old, of a Spiral form.*
*And another fountainous, who guides the Empyreal Heaven.*

## SOUL. BODY. MAN.

*IT behooves thee to hasten to the light, and to the beams of the Father;*
*From whence was sent to thee a Soul cloathed with much Mind.*
*These things the Father conceived, and so the mortal was animated.*
*For the paternal mind sowed Symbols in souls;*
*Replenishing the Soul with profound Love.*
*For the Father of Gods and Men placed the Mind in the Soul;*
*And in the Body he established You.*
*For all Divine things are incorporeal.*
*But bodies are bound in them for your sakes:*
*Incorporeals not being able to contain the bodies.*
*By reason of the Corporeal Nature in which you are concentrated.*
*And they are in God, attracting strong flames.*
*Descending from the Father, from which descending the Soul*
*Crops of Empyreal fruits the soul-nourishing flower.*
*And therefore conceiving the Words of the Father*
*They avoid the audacious wing of fatal Destiny;*
*And though you see this Soul manumitted,*
*Yet the Father sends another to make up the Number.*
*Certainly, these are superlatively blessed above all Souls; they are sent forth from Heaven to Earth,*
*And those rich Souls which have unexpressible fates;*
*As many of them (O King) as proceed from shining Thee, or from*
Jove *Himself, under the strong power of (his) thread.*
*Let the Immortal Depth of thy Soul be predominant; but all thy eyes*
*Extend upward.*
*Stoop not down to the dark World,*
*Beneath which continually lies a faithless Depth, and* Hades
*Dark all over, squallid, delighting in Images, unintelligible,*
*Precipitious, Craggy, a Depth; always Rolling,*
*Always espousing an Opacous, idle, breathless Body,*
*And the Light-hating World, and the winding currents,*
*By which many things are swallowed up.*
*Seek Paradise;*
*Seek thou the way of the Soul, whence or by what Order*
*Having served the Body, to the same place from which thou didst flow.*
*Thou maist rise up again, joyning Action to sacred speech,*
*Stoop not down, for a Precipice lies below on the Earth;*

*Dra win*

*Drawing through the Ladder which hath ſeven ſteps, beneath which*
*Is the Throne of Neceſſity.*
*Enlarge not thou thy Deſtiny.*
*The ſoul of Men will in a manner claſp God to her ſelf;*
*Having nothing mortal, ſhe is wholly inebriated from God:*
*For ſhe boaſts Harmony, in which the mortal Body exiſts.*
*If thou extend the fiery Mind*
*To the work of piety, thou ſhalt preſerve the fluxible body.*
*There is a room for the Image alſo in the Circumlucid place.*
*Every way to the unfaſhioned Soul ſtretch the reins of fire.*
*The fire-glowing cogitation hath the firſt rank,*
*For the Mortal approaching to the fire, ſhall have Light from God.*
*For to the ſlow Mortal the Gods are ſwift.*
*The Furies are ſtranglers of Men.*
*The bourgeons, even of ill matter, are profitable and good.*
*Let hope nouriſh thee in the fiery Angelical Region.*
*But the paternal Mind accepts not her will,*
*Until ſhe go out of Oblivion, and pronounce a Word,*
*Inſerting the remembrance of the pure paternal Symbol.*
*To theſe he gave the double Character of Life to be comprehended.*
*Thoſe that were aſleep he made fruitful by his own ſtrength.*
*Defile not the Spirit, nor deepen a ſuperficies.*
*Leave not the Droſs of matter on a Precipice.*
*Bring her not forth, leſt going forth ſhe have ſomething.*
*The ſouls of thoſe who quit the Body violently, are moſt pure.*
*The ungirders of the Soul, which give her breathing, are eaſie to be looſed.*
*In the ſide of ſiniſter* Hecate, *there is a fountain of Vertue;*
*Which remains entire within, not omitting her Virginity.*
*O Man the machine of boldeſt Nature!*
*Subject not to thy Mind the vaſt meaſures of the Earth;*
*For the plant of Truth is not upon Earth.*
*Nor meaſure the Meaſures of the Sun gathering together Canons;*
*He is moved by the Eternal Will of the Father, not for thy ſake.*
*Let alone the ſwift courſe of the Moon: ſhe runs ever by the impulſe of Neceſſity.*
*The Progreſſion of the Stars was not brought forth for thy ſake.*
*The etherial wide flight of Birds is not veracious,*
*And the Diſſections of Entrails and Victims, all theſe are toys,*
*The ſupports of gainful cheats; fly thou theſe*
*If thou intend to open the ſacred Paradiſe of Piety*
*Where Vertue, Wiſdom, and Æquity are aſſembled.*
*For thy Veſſel the Beaſts of the Earth ſhall inhabit.*
*Theſe the Earth bewails, even to their Children.*

## DÆMONS. RITES.

*NAture perſwades that there are pure Dæmons;*
*The bourgeons, even of ill matter, are profitable and good.*
*But theſe things I revolve in the recluſe Temples of my mind,*
*Extending the like fire ſparklingly into the ſpacious Air*
*Or fire unfigured, a voice iſſuing forth.*
*Or fire abundant whizzing and winding about the Earth,*
*But alſo to ſee a Horſe more glittering than Light.*
*Or a Boy on* [thy] *ſhoulders riding on a Horſe,*
*Fiery or adorned with Gold, or diveſted,*
*Or ſhooting and ſtanding on* [thy] *ſhoulders.*
*If thou ſpeak often to me, thou ſhalt ſee abſolutely that which is ſpoken:*
*For then neither appears the Celeſtial concave Bulk,*
*Nor do the Stars ſhine: The Light of the Moon is cover'd,*
*The Earth ſtands not ſtill, but all things appear Thunder.*
*Invoke not the ſelf-conſpicuous Image of Nature;*
*For thou muſt not behold theſe before thy Body be initiated.*
*When ſoothing ſouls they always ſeduce them from theſe Myſteries.*
*Certainly out of the cavities of the Earth ſpring Terreſtrial Dogs,*
*Which ſhow no true ſign to mortal Man.*
*Labour about the* Hecatick Strophalus.
*Never change barbarous Names;*
*For there are Names in every Nation given from God,*
*Which have an unſpeakable power in Rites.*
*When thou ſeeſt a ſacred fire without form,*
*Shining flaſhingly through the Depths of the World,*
*Hear the Voice of Fire.*

# PLETHO
## HIS
# EXPOSITION
## Of the more obſcure Paſſages in theſe ORACLES.

*Seek thou the way of the Soul, whence or by what Order.*
*Having ſerved the body, to the ſame order from which thou didſt flow.*
*Thou maiſt riſe up again; joyning Action to ſacred ſpeech.*]

THE *Magi* that are followers of *Zoroaſter*, as alſo many others, hold, that the Humane Soul is immortal; and deſcended from above to ſerve the Mortal Body, that is, to operate therein for a certain time; and to animate, and adorn it to her power; and then returns to the place from which ſhe came. And whereas there are many Manſions there for the Soul, one *wholly bright*, another *wholly dark*; others betwixt both *partly bright*, *partly dark*: The Soul, being deſcended from that which is wholly bright, into the Body, if ſhe perform her Office well, runs back into the ſame place; but if not well, ſhe retires into worſe Manſions, according to the things which ſhe hath done in Life. The Oracle therefore ſaith, *Seek thou the Souls path*, or the way by which the Soul floweth into thee; or by what courſe (*viz.* of Life) having performed thy charge toward the Body, thou maiſt mount up to the ſame place from which thou didſt flow down, *viz.* the ſame Track of the Soul, *joyning action to ſacred ſpeech*. By *ſacred ſpeech*, he underſtands that which concerns Divine Worſhip; by *action*, Divine Rites. The Oracle therefore ſaith, that to this Exaltation of the Soul, both ſpeech concerning Divine Worſhip (Prayers,) and Religious Rites (Sacrifices) are requiſite.

*Stoop not down, for a Precipice lies below on the Earth,*
*Drawing through the Ladder which hath ſeven ſteps; beneath which*
*Is the Throne of Neceſſity.*]

He calls the Deſcenſion into wickedneſs, and miſery, a Precipice; the Terreſtrial and Mortal Body, the Earth: for by the Earth he underſtands mortal Nature, as by the Fire frequently the Divine; by the Place with ſeven Ways, he means Fate dependant on the Planets, beneath which there is ſeated a certain dire and unalterable Neceſſity: The Oracle therefore adviſeth, that thou ſtoop not down towards the mortal Body, which being Subject only to the Fate, which proceeds from the Planets, may be reckoned amongſt thoſe things which are at our Arbitrement: for thou wilt be unhappy if thou ſtoop down wholly to the Body, and unfortunate and continually failing of thy Deſires, in regard of the Neceſſity which is annexed to the Body.

*For thy Veſſel the Beaſts of the Earth ſhall inhabit.*]

The *Veſſel* of thy Soul, that is this mortal Body, ſhall be *inhabited* by Worms and other vile Creatures.

*Enlarge not Thou thy Deſtiny.*]

Endeavour not to encreaſe thy Fate, or to do more than is given thee in charge, for thou wilt not be able.

*For nothing proceeds from the Paternal Principality imperfect.*]

For from the Paternal Power, which is that of the Supream God, nothing proceedeth imperfect, ſo as thou thy ſelf mighteſt compleat it for all things proceeding from thence are perfect; as appears, in that they tend to the Perfection of the Univerſe.

*But the Paternal Mind accepts not her Will,*
*Until ſhe go out of Oblivion, and pronounce a Word,*
*Inſerting the remembrance of the pure Paternal Symbol.*]

The Paternal Mind, (*viz.* the Second God and ready Maker of the Soul) admits not her Will or Deſire until ſhe come out of the Oblivion, which ſhe contracted by Connexion with the Body; and until ſhe ſpeak a certain Word, or conceive in her thoughts a certain Speech, calling to remembrance the Paternal Divine Symbol or Watch-word; this is the purſuit of the good which the Soul calling to remembrance hereby becomes moſt acceptable to Her Maker.

*It behooves thee to haſten to the Light, and to the beams of the Father:*
*From whence there was ſent to thee a Soul endued with much Mind.*]

The Light and Splendor of the Father is that Manſion of the Soul which is circumlucid, from whence the Soul arrayed with much of Mind was ſent hither, wherefore We muſt haſten to return to the ſame Light.

*Theſe the Earth bewails, even to their Children.*]

Thoſe who haſten not to the Light, from which their Soul was ſent to them, the Earth or mortal Nature bewails, for that they being ſent hither to adorn her, not only not adorn her, but alſo blemiſh themſelves by living wickedly; moreover the Wickedneſs of the Parents is tranſmitted to the Children, corrupted by them through ill Education.

*The ungirders of the Soul, which give her breathing, are eaſie to be looſed.*]

The Reaſons which expel the Soul from Wickedneſs, and give her breathing, are eaſie

to

to be untied; and the Oblivion which keeps them in, is eaſily put off.

*In the ſide of the ſiniſter Bed there is a Fountain of Vertue:*
*Which remains entire within; not emitting her Virginity*]

In the left ſide of thy Bed, there is the Power or Fountain of Vertue, reſiding wholly within, and never caſting off her Virginity, or nature void of Paſſion: for there is always in us the power of Vertue without paſſion which cannot be put off; although her Energy or Activity may be interrupted: he ſaith the power of Vertue is placed on the left ſide, becauſe her Activity is ſeated on the right: by the Bed is meant the Seat of the Soul, ſubject to her ſeveral Habits.

*The Soul of Man will, in a manner, claſp God to her ſelf.*
*Having nothing mortal, ſhe is wholly inebriated from God;*
*For ſhe boaſts Harmony, in which the mortal Body conſiſts.*]

*The humane Soul will in a manner claſp God*, and joyn him ſtrictly *to her ſelf*, (who is her continual Defence) by reſembling him as much as ſhe can poſſibly; *having nothing mortal* within her, *ſhe is wholly drenched in Divinity*, or repleniſhed with Divine Goods; for though ſhe is fetter'd to this mortal Body, yet ſhe *glories in the Harmony* or Union *in which the mortal Body exiſts*; that is, ſhe is not aſhamed of it, but thinks well of her ſelf for it; as being a Cauſe, and affording to the Univerſe, that, as Mortals are united with Immortals in Man, ſo the Univerſe is adorned with one Harmony.

*Becauſe the Soul being a bright fire by the power of the Father,*
*Remains Immortal, and is Miſtreſs of Life,*
*And poſſeſſeth many Completions of the cavities of the World.*]

The ſecond God, who firſt before all other things proceeded from the Father and ſupreme God, theſe Oracles call all along, *The power of the Father*, and his *intellectual Power*, and the *paternal Mind*. He ſaith therefore, that *the Soul procreated by this power of the Father, is a bright fire*; that is, a Divine and Intellectual Eſſence, and *perſiſteth immortal* through the Divinity of its Eſſence, *and is Miſtreſs of Life*, viz. of her ſelf, poſſeſſing Life which cannot be taken away from her; for, how can we be ſaid to be Maſters of ſuch things, as may be taken from us, ſeeing the uſe of them is only allowed us? but of thoſe things which cannot be taken from us, we are abſolute Maſters: The Soul according to her own Eternity, *poſſeſſeth many Rooms in the* Receptacles of the *World*, or divers places in the World, which according as ſhe hath led her Life paſt is allotted to every One.

*Seek Paradiſe.*]

The circumlucid Manſion of the Soul.

*Defile not the Spirit, nor deepen a Superficies*]

The Followers of *Pythagoras* and *Plato* conceive the Soul to be a Subſtance not wholly ſeparate from all Body, nor wholly inſeparate; but partly ſeparate, partly inſeparate; ſeparable potentially, but ever inſeparate actually. For they aſſert three kinds of Forms, One wholly ſeparate from matter, the Superceleſtial Intelligences; another wholly inſeparable from matter, having a Subſtance not ſubſiſtent by it ſelf but dependent on matter; together with which Matter, which is ſometime diſſolved by reaſon of its nature ſubject to Mutation, this kind of Soul is diſſolved alſo and periſheth: this kind they hold to be wholly irrational. Betwixt theſe they place a middle kind, the rational Soul, differing from the Superceleſtial Intelligences, for that it always co-exiſts with Matter; and from the irrational kind, for that it is not dependant on matter; but, on the contrary, matter it is dependant on it, and it hath a proper ſubſtance potentially ſubſiſtent by it ſelf; it is alſo indiviſible, as well as the ſuperceleſtial Intelligences, and performing ſome works in ſome manner allyed to theirs, being it ſelf alſo buſied in the knowledge and contemplation of beings even unto the ſupreme God; and for this reaſon is incorruptible. This kind of Soul is always co-exiſtent with an Æthereal Body as it's *Vehiculum*, which ſhe by continual approximation maketh alſo Immortal: neither is this her *Vehiculum* inaminate in it ſelf, but is it ſelf animated with the other ſpecies of the Soul, the irrational, (which the Wiſe call the Image of the rational Soul) adorned with Fantaſie and Senſe, which ſeeth and hears it ſelf whole through whole, and is furniſhed with all the Senſes and with all the reſt of the irrational faculties of the Soul. Thus by the principal faculty of this Body, Phantaſie, the rational Soul is continually joyned to ſuch a Body, and by ſuch a Body ſometimes the humane Soul is joyned with a Mortal Body by a certain affinity of Nature, the whole being infolded in the whole enlivening Spirit of the Embryon. This *Vehiculum* it ſelf being of the nature of a Spirit. The Dæmons Souls differ not much from the humane, only they are more noble and uſe more noble Vehicles. Moreover, they cannot be mingled with corruptible Nature: Likewiſe the Souls of the Stars are much better than the Dæmons, and uſe better Vehicles; are Bodies ſplendid by reaſon of the greatneſs of the operative faculty: Theſe Doctrines concerning the Soul the *Magi*, followers of *Zoroaſtres*, ſeem to have uſed long before. Defile not this kind of Spirit of the Soul, ſaith the Oracle, nor deepen it being a ſuperficies; He calls it Superficies, not as if it had not a triple Dimenſion, for it is a Body; but to ſignifie its extraordinary rarity: nor make it become groſs by acceſſion of more matter to its Bulk: for this Spirit of the Soul becomes groſs, if it declines too much towards the mortal Body.

*There is a room for the Image alſo in the circumlucid place.*]

He calls the *Image* of the Soul that part which being it ſelf void of irrational, is joyned to the rational

rational part, and depends upon the Vehicle thereof: now he ſaith that this kind of *Image hath a part in the circumlucid Region*; for the Soul never layeth down the Vehicle adherent to her.

*Leave not the droſs of matter on a Precipice.*]

He calls the mortal Body *the droſs of matter*, and exhorteth that we neglect it not being ill affected, but take care of it whilſt it is in this life, to preſerve it in Health as much as poſſible, and that it may be pure, and in all things elſe correſpond with the Soul.

*Carry not forth, leſt going forth ſhe have ſomething.*]

*Carry not forth*, meaning the Soul, out of the mortal Body *leſt by going forth* thou incurr ſome danger, implying as much as to carry her forth beyond the laws of Nature.

*If thou extend the fiery mind to the work of Piety, thou ſhalt preſerve the fluxible Body.*]

*Extending up thy divine Mind to the Exerciſe of Piety* or to religious Rites, and thou *ſhalt preſerve the mortal Body* more ſound by performing theſe.

*Certainly out of the cavities of the Earth ſpring terreſtrial Dogs,*
*Which ſhow no true ſign to mortal Man.*]

Sometimes to many initiated Perſons there appear, whilſt they are ſacrificing, ſome Apparitions in the ſhape of *Dogs* and ſeveral other figures. Now the Oracle ſaith, that *theſe iſſue out of the Receptacles of the Earth*; that is, out of the terreſtrial and mortal Body, and the irrational Paſſions planted in it, which are not yet ſufficiently adorned with Reaſon; theſe are Apparitions of the paſſions of the Soul in performing divine Rites: meer appearances having no ſubſtance, and therefore *not ſignifying any thing true.*

*Nature perſwadeth that Dæmons are pure;*
*The bourgeons, even of ill matter, are profitable and good.*]

*Nature* or naturalReaſon *perſwadeth that Dæmons are Sacred*, and that all things proceeding from God, who is in himſelf good, *are beneficial*; and the *very bloomings of ill Matter*, or the forms dependant upon Matter are ſuch: alſo he calls Matter *ill*, not as to it's ſubſtance, for how can the ſubſtance be bad the bloomings whereof are beneficial and good? but for that it is ranked laſt among the ſubſtances, and is the leaſt participant of good, which littleneſs of good is here expreſt by the Word ill: now the Oracle means, that if the bloomings of ill matter, *viz.* of the laſt of ſubſtances are good, much more are the Dæmons ſuch, who are in an excellent Rank as pertaking of rational Nature and being not mixed with mortal Nature.

*The furies are Stranglers of Men.*]

*The furies* or the Vindictive Dæmons claſp Men cloſe, or reſtrain and drive them from Vice and excite them to Vertue.

*Let the immortal depth of the Soul be predominant; but all thy Eyes*
*Extend quite upward.*]

Let the *divine depth of thy Soul* govern, and lift thou all thy Eyes or all thy knowing faculties *Upward.*

*O Man, the machine of boldeſt Nature!*

He calls Man the *Machine of boldeſt Nature*, becauſe he attempts great things.

*If thou ſpeak often to me, thou ſhalt ſee abſolutely that which is ſpoken:*
*For there neither appears the celeſtial concave bulk;*
*Nor do the Stars ſhine: the light of the Moon is covered,*
*The Earth ſtands not ſtill, but all things appear Thunder.*]

The Oracle ſpeaks as from God to an initiated Perſon, *If thou often ſpeak to me* or call me, *thou ſhalt ſee that which thou ſpeakeſt*, viz. Me whom thou calleſt every where: for then thou ſhalt perceive nothing but *Thunder* all about, fire gliding up and down all over the World.

*Call not on the ſelf conſpicuous image of Nature.*]

Seek not to behold the ſelf-ſeeing *Image of Nature*, viz. of the Nature of God, which is not viſible to our Eyes: but thoſe things which appear to initiated Perſons, as Thunder, Lightning, and all elſe whatſoever, are only Symbols or Signs, not the Nature of God.

*Every way to the unfaſhioned Soul ſtretch out the reins of fire.*]

Draw unto thy ſelf every way *the reins of fire* which appear to thee when thou art ſacrificing with a ſincere Soul; *viz.* a ſimple and not of various habits.

*When thou ſeeſt a ſacred fire, without form,*
*Shining flaſhingly through the depth of the World,*
*Hear the voice of Fire.*]

*When thou beholdeſt the divine fire* void of figure *brightly gliding up and down the World* and graciouſly ſmiling, liſten to this Voice as bringing a moſt perfect Præſcience.

*The Paternal mind hath implanted Symbols in Souls.*]

*The Paternal Mind*, viz. the ſedulous Maker of the Subſtance of the Soul, *hath ingrafted Symbols* or the Images of Intelligibles *in Souls*, by which every Soul poſſeſſeth in her ſelf the reaſons of beings.

*Learn the Intelligible, for as much as it exiſts beyond thy Mind.*]

*Learn the Intelligible, becauſe it exiſts beyond thy Mind, viz.* actually; for, though the Images of intellectual

intellectual things are planted in thee by the Maker of All, yet they are but potentially in thy Soul; but it behooves thee to have actually the knowledge of the Intelligible.

*There is a certain Intelligible which it behooves thee to comprehend with the Flower of thy Mind.*]

The Supream God, who is perfectly One, is not conceived after the same manner as other things, but *by the Flower of the Mind*, that is, the Supream and singular Part of our Understanding.

*For the Father perfected all things and delivered them over to the*
*Second Mind, which the Nations of Men call the First.*]

*The Father perfected all things, viz.* the Intelligible Species, (for they are absolute and perfect) *and delivered them over to the second God*, next him to rule and guide them: whence, if any thing be brought forth by this God, and formed after the likeness of Him, and the other Intelligible Substance, it proceeds from the Supream Father; This other God, *Men esteem the First*, that is, they who think him the Maker of the World, to whom there is none Superiour.

*Intelligent Fynges do themselves also understand from the Father;*
*By unspeakable Counsels being moved so as to understand.*]

He calls *Fynges* the Intellectual Species which are *conceived by the Father*; *they themselves also being conceptive*, and exciting Conceptions or Notions, *by unspeakable* or unutterable *Counsels*: by *Motion* here is understood Intellection not Transition, but simply the Habitude to Notions so as unspeakable Counsels is as much as unmoved, for speaking consists in Motion; the meaning is this, That these Species are immoveable and have a habitude to Notions not transiently as the Soul.

*Oh how the World hath intellectual Guides inflexible!*]

The most excellent of the Intelligible Species, and of those which are brought down by the Immortals in this Heaven, he calls *the Intellectual Guides of the World*; the Coryphæus whom he conceives to be a God, which is the second from the Father. The Oracle saying that *the World hath inflexible Guides*, means that it is incorruptible.

*The Father hath snatched away himself;*
*Neither hath he shut up his own Fire in his Intellectual Power.*]

*The Father hath made himself exempt from all others; not including* himself neither *in his own Intellectual Power*, nor in the second God who is next him; or limiting *his own Fire* his own Divinity; for it is absolutely ungenerate, and it self existing by it self; so that his Divinity is exempe from all others; neither is it communicable to any other, although it be loved of all: That he communicates not himself, is not out of envy, but only by reason of the inpossibility of the thing.

*The Father infuseth not Fear but Perswasion.*]

*The Father makes no impression of Fear, but infuseth perswasion* or love; for He being extreamly good, is not the cause of ill to any, so as to be dreadful; but is the cause of all good to all; whence he is loved of all.

*These Oracles of* Zoroaster *many Eminent Persons have confirmed by following the like Opinions; especially the* Pythagoreans *and* Platonists.

# PSELLUS HIS EXPOSITION of the ORACLES.

*There is a room for the Image alſo in the Circumlucid place.*]

IMages, εἴδωλα, with the Philoſophers, are thoſe things which are connatural to things more Excellent than themſelves, and are worſe than they; as the Mind is connatural to God, and the rational Soul to the Mind, and Nature to the rational Soul, and the Body to Nature, and Matter to the Body: The Image of God is the Mind; of the Mind, the rational Soul; of the rational Soul, the Irrational; of the Irrational, Nature; of Nature, the Body; of the Body, Matter. Here the *Chaldaick Oracle* calleth the irrational Soul the Image of the rational, for it is connatural to it in Man, and yet worſe than it. It ſaith, moreover, that there is a part aſſigned to the Image in the circumlucid Region, that is to ſay, the irrational Soul, which is the Image of the rational Soul, being purified by Vertues in this Life, after the Diſſolution of the humane Life, aſcends to the place above the Moon, and receives its Lot in the *Circumlucid place*, that is, which ſhineth on every ſide, and is ſplendid throughout; for the Place beneath the Moon is circumnebulous, that is, dark on every ſide: but the Lunary, partly Lucid, and partly Dark, that is, one half bright, the other half dark; but the place above the Moon is circumlucid or bright throughout. Now the Oracle ſaith, that the circumlucid Place, is not deſign'd only for the rational Soul, but for its Image alſo, or the irrational Soul is deſtin'd to the circumlucid place, when as it cometh out of the Body bright and pure, for the Græcian Doctrine aſſerting the irrational Soul to be immortal, alſo exalts it up to the Elements under the Moon: but the *Chaldaick Oracle*, it being pure and unanimous with the rational Soul, ſeats it in this circumlucid Region above the Moon. Theſe are the Doctrines of the *Chaldæans*.

*Leave not the Dregs of matter on a precipice.*]

By *the Dregs of Matter*, the Oracle underſtands the Body of Man conſiſting of the four Elements, it ſpeaks to the Diſciple by way of Inſtruction and Exhortation, thus; Not only raiſe up thy Soul to God, and procure that it may riſe above the Confuſion of Life; but, if it be poſſible, leave not the Body wherewith thou art cloathed, (and which is *dregs of Matter*, that is, a thing neglected and rejected, the ſport of Matter) in the inferior World: for this Place, the Oracle calls a *Precipice*. Our Soul being darted down hither from Heaven, as from a ſublime place. It exhorteth therefore, that we refine the Body (which he underſtands by the dregs of Matter) by Divine fire, or that, being ſtripped, we raiſe it up to the Æther; or that we be Exalted by God to a place Immaterial and Incorporeal, or Corporeal but Ætherial or Celeſtial, which *Elias* the *Thisbite* attained; and, before him, *Enoch*, being tranſlated from this Life into a more Divine Condition, not leaving the dregs of Matter, or their Body, in a precipice; the Precipice is, as we ſaid, the Terreſtrial Region.

*Bring not forth, leaſt going forth ſhe have ſomething.*]

This Oracle is recited by *Plotinus* in his Book of the Eduction of the irrational Soul; it is an excellent and tranſcendent Exhortation. It adviſeth, that a Man buſie not himſelf about the *going forth of the Soul*, nor take care how it ſhall go out of the Body; but remit the Buſineſs of its diſſolution to the Courſe of Nature; for, Anxiety and Sollicitude about the Solution of the Body, and the Eduction of the Soul out of it, draws away the Soul from better Cogitations, and buſieth it in ſuch cares that the Soul cannot be perfectly purified; for if Death come upon us at ſuch time as we are buſied about this Diſſolution, the Soul goeth forth not quite free, but retaining ſomething of a paſſionate Life. Paſſion the Chaldæan defines, a Man's ſollicitous thinking of Death; for we ought not to think of any thing, but of the more excellent Illuminations; neither concerning theſe ought we to be ſollicitous: but reſigning our ſelves to the Angelical and Diviner Powers, which raiſe us up and ſhutting up all the Organs of Sence in the Body and in the Soul alſo without diſtractive Cares and Sollicitudes, we muſt follow God, who calls us.

Some interpret this Oracle more ſimply; *Bring it not out leaſt it go forth, having ſomething:* that is, Anticipate not thy natural Death, although thou be wholly given up to Philoſophy; for as yet thou haſt not a compleat Expiation; So that if the Soul paſs out of the Body by the way of Educting, it will go forth retaining ſomething of mortal Life: for if we Men are in the Body, as in a Priſon, (as *Plato* ſaith) certainly no Man can kill himſelf, but muſt expect till God ſhall ſend a Neceſſity.

*Subject not to thy Mind the vaſt Meaſures of the Earth;*
*For the Plant of Truth is not upon the Earth.*
*Nor meaſure the Meaſures of the Sun, gathering together Canons:*
*He is moved by the Eternal Will of the Father, not for thy ſake.*
*Let alone the ſwift courſe of the Moon: ſhe runs ever by the impulſe of Neceſſity.*
*The Progreſſion of the Stars was not brought forth for thy ſake.*
*The Ætherial broad-footed Flight of Birds is not veracious:*
*And the Diſſections of Entrails and Victims, all theſe are Toys,*
*The ſupports of gainful Cheats. Fly thou thoſe,*
*If thou intend to open the ſacred Paradiſe of Piety,*

*Where*

*Where Virtue, Wiſdom, and Equity are aſſembled.*]

The *Chaldæan* withdraws the Diſciple from all Græcian Wiſdom, and teacheth him to adhere only to God, *Subject not* (ſaith he) *to thy Mind the vaſt Meaſures of the Earth; for the Plant of Truth is not upon Earth*; that is, Enquire not ſollicitouſly the vaſt Meaſures of the Earth, as *Geographers* uſe to do, meaſuring the Earth; for the Seed of Truth is not in the Earth. *Nor meaſure the Meaſures of the Sun, gathering together Canons; He is moved by the Æternal Will of the Father, not for thy ſake*: That is, Buſie not thy ſelf about the Motion and Doctrine of the Stars, for they move not for thy ſake, but are perpetually moved according to the Will of God; *Let alone the ſwift courſe of the Moon, ſhe runs ever by the impulſe of Neceſſity*: That is, enquire not anxiouſly the rolling motion of the Moon, for ſhe runs not for thy ſake, but is impelled by a greater Neceſſity. *The Progreſſion of the Stars was not brought forth for thy ſake*; that is, the Leaders of the fixed Stars, and the Planets received not their Eſſence for thy ſake. *The Ætherial broad-footed Flight of Birds is not veracious*; that is, the Art concerning Birds flying in the Air, called Augury, obſerving their Flight, Notes, and Pearching, is not true. By *broad feet*, he means the walking or pace of the Foot, in reſpect of the Extenſion of the Toes in the skin. *And the Diſſections of Entrails and Victims, all theſe are Toys*: that is, the Art of Sacrificing, which enquireth after future Events, as well by Victims, as by inſpection into the Entrails of ſacrificed Beaſts, are meerly Toys. *The ſupports of gainful Cheats*: *fly thou thoſe*, that is, fraudulent Acquiſitions of gain. *If thou intend to open the ſacred Paradiſe of Piety, where Virtue, Wiſdom, and Equity are aſſembled.* Thou (ſaith he) who art under my Diſcipline, enquire not curiouſly after theſe things, if thou wouldeſt that the ſacred Paradiſe of Piety be open to thee. The ſacred Paradiſe of Piety, according to the *Chaldæans*, is not that which the Book of *Moſes* deſcribes, but the Meadow of ſublimeſt Contemplations, in which there are ſeveral Trees of Vertues; and the Wood, (or Trunk) of knowledge, of Good and Evil, that is, Dijudicative Prudence which diſtinguiſheth Good from Evil; likewiſe, the Tree of life, that is, the Plant of Divine Illumination, which bringeth forth to the ſoul the Fruit of a more holy and better Life; in this Paradiſe, therefore, grow Vertue, Wiſdom, and Equity; Vertue is one in General, but hath many Species; Wiſdom comprehendeth within it ſelf all the Vertues, which the Divine Mind pronounceth, as only unſpeakable.

*Seek thou the way of the Soul, whence or by what Order*
*Having ſerved the Body, to the ſame order from which thou didſt flow,*
*Thou maiſt riſe up again; joyning Action to ſacred Speech.*]

That is, *ſeek the Origin of the Soul*, from whence it was produced and ſerved the Body, and how Men cheriſhing and raiſing it up by the Exerciſe of Divine Rites, may reduce it to the place whence it came. *Uniting Action to ſacred Reaſon*, is to be underſtood thus. *Sacred Reaſon* (or Diſcourſe) in us is the Intellectual Life, or rather the ſupream faculty of the Soul, which the Oracle elſewhere ſtyles the *Flower of the Mind*; but this ſacred Reaſon cannot by its own guidance aſpire to the more ſublime Inſtitution, and to the comprehenſion of Divinity; the Work of Piety leads it by the hand to God, by aſſiſtance of Illuminations from thence: but the *Chaldæan*, by the Teleſtick Science, perfects (or initiates) the Soul by the power of Materials here on Earth. To this Sacred Reaſon, ſaith he, when thou haſt united Action, that is joyned the Work of Initiation to the Sacred Reaſon, or better faculty of the Soul.

Our Theologiſt *Gregory* raiſeth the Soul to the more Divine Things by reaſon and Contemplation: by reaſon which is in us the beſt and moſt intellectual faculty; by Contemplation, which is an Illumination comming from above: But *Plato* affirms, that we may comprehend the ungenerate Eſſence by Reaſon and Intellect. But the *Chaldæan* ſaith, that there is no other Means for us to arrive at God, but by ſtrengthning the Vehiculum of the Soul by material Rites; for it ſuppoſeth that the Soul is purified by Stones and Herbs, and Charms, and is rendred expedit for Aſſent.

*Stoop not down; for a Precipice lies below on the Earth.*
*Drawing through the Ladder which hath ſeven ſteps, beneath which*
*Is the Throne of Neceſſity.*]

The Oracle adviſeth the Soul which is next to God, that ſhe adhere only to him with her whole Mind, and bend not downwards; for there is a great *Precipice* betwixt God and the Earth which draweth Souls down the *Ladder* which hath *ſeven Seps*: The *Ladder of ſeven Steps* ſignifies the Orbs of the ſeven Planets; if therefore the Soul decline, ſhe is carried to the Earth through the ſeven Orbs: but that paſſage through the ſeven Circles leads her as by ſo many Steps to the Throne of Neceſſity, whither, when the Soul arriveth, ſhe is neceſſitated to ſuffer the terreſtrial World.

*Never change barbarous Names.*]

That is, there are certain *Names* amongſt all Nations delivered to them by God, which have an unſpeakable Power in Divine Rites: change not theſe into the Greek Dialect; as *Seraphim* and *Cherubin*, and *Michael* and *Gabriel*: Theſe in the Hebrew Dialect have an unſpeakable Efficacy in Divine Rites; but changed into Greek Names, are ineffectual.

*The World hath intellectual Guides inflexible.*]

The *Chaldæans* aſſert Powers in the World, and call them (*Coſmogogi*) *Guides of the World*, for that they guide the World by provident Motions: Theſe Powers the Oracles call ἀνοχὰς, *Suſtainers*, as ſuſtaining the whole World. Un-

moveable implies their ſetled Power; ſuſtentive, their Guardianſhip; theſe Powers they deſign only by the Cauſe and Immobility of the Worlds: There are alſo other Powers (*amilicti*) unplacable, as being firm and not to be converted towards theſe inferiour things, and cauſe that Souls be never allured with Affections.

*Labour about the Hecatine Strophalus.*]

The *Hecatine Strophalus* is a Golden Ball, in the midſt whereof is a Sapphire; they fold about it a leather Thong; it is beſet all over with Characters: thus whipping it about, they made their Invocations: theſe they uſe to call *Jynges*, whether it be round or triangular, or any other Figure; and whilſt they are doing thus they make inſignificant or brutiſh Cries, and laſh the Air with their Whips. The Oracle adviſeth to the performance of theſe Rites or ſuch a Motion of the *Strophalus*, as having an expreſſible Power. It is called *Hecatine*, as being dedicated to *Hecate*: *Hecate* is a Goddeſs amongſt the *Chaldæans*, having at her right ſide the Fountain of Virtues.

*If thou ſpeak often to me, thou ſhalt ſee abſolutely that which is ſpoken.*
*For then neither appears the Cœleſtial concave bulk,*
*Nor do the Stars ſhine; the light of the Moon is covered,*
*The Earth ſtands not ſtill, but all things appear Thunder.*]

The Lion is one of the twelve Signs of the Zodiack, and is called the Houſe of the Sun, whoſe Fountain or the cauſe of his Lion-formed Conſtellation the *Chaldæans* calls λεόντοχον: now he ſaith, that amidſt the Sacred Rites thou call this Fountain by its Name, thou ſhalt ſee nothing elſe in Heaven but the apparition of a Lion, neither will the *Concave Bulk*, or the Circumference of Heaven, appear to thee, neither ſhall the Stars ſhine, even the Moon herſelf ſhall be covered, and all things ſhall be ſhaken; but this Lion-having Fountain takes not away the Eſſence of thoſe, but their own predominating Exiſtence hides their view.

*Every way to the unfaſhioned Soul, extend the Reins of Fire.*]

The Oracle calls the Soul ἄπλαστον, that is, *without Form and Figure*, or moſt ſimple, and moſt pure. Reins of Fire of ſuch a Soul are the expeditious activity of the Theurgick Life, which raiſeth up the fiery Mind to the Divine Light: therefore by ſtretching the Reins of Fire to the inform Soul, he means, endeavour that all the Faculties conſiſting both in the Intellect, Cogitation, and Opinion, may receive Divine Illuminations ſuitable to themſelves. This is the meaning of *ſtretch the Reins of Fire*; but Nature uſeth to fail, and buſie it ſelf in the ſecond or worſe Life.

*Oh Man, the Machine of boldeſt Nature.*]

Man is called a *Machine* as being framed by God with unſpeakable Art: the Oracle likewiſe calleth him *audacious Nature*, as being buſied about excellent things, ſometimes meaſuring the Courſe of the Stars, ſometimes enquiring into the Orders of the ſupernatural Powers; contemplating alſo the things which are far above the Celeſtial Orb, and extending to diſcourſe ſomething of God. For theſe endeavours of the Mind in Diſquiſition proceed from an audacious Nature: he calls it boldneſs, not by way of Reproach, but to expreſs the forwardneſs of Nature.

*In the ſide of the ſiniſter* Hecate *is a Fountain of much Virtue; which remains intire within, not emitting her Virginity.*]

The *Chaldæans* eſteem *Hecate* a Goddeſs, ſeated in the middle rank, and poſſeſſing as it were the Center of all the Powers; in her right parts they place the Fountain of Souls, in her left, the *Fountain* of Goods or of *Vertues*; and they ſay, that the Fountain of Souls is prompt to Propagations, but the Fountain of Vertues continues within the bounds of its own Eſſence, and is as a Virgin uncorrupted: this Settledneſs and Immobility it receives from the power of the *Amilicti*, the Implacables, is girt with a Virgin-Zone.

*When thou ſeeſt a ſacred Fire without Form*
*Shining flaſhingly through the depths of the Whole World,*
*Hear the Voice of Fire.*]

The Oracle ſpeaks of a *Divine Light*, ſeen by many Men, and adviſeth, That if any one ſee ſuch a Light in ſome Figure and Form, he apply not his Mind to it, nor eſteem the Voice proceeding from thence to be true; but if he ſee this without any Figure or Form he ſhall not be deceived: and whatſoever Queſtion he ſhall propoſe, the Anſwer will be moſt true, he calls this εὐειδὲς *Sacroſanct*, for that it is ſeen with a beauty by Sacred Perſons, and glides up and down pleaſantly and graciouſly through the Depths of the World.

*Invoke not the ſelf-conſpicuous Image of Nature.*]

Αὐτοψία, *Self-inſpection*, is, when the initiated Perſon (or he who performs Divine Rites) ſeeth the Divine Lights: but if he who orders the Rites ſeeth an Apparition, this in reſpect of the initiated Perſon is ἐποψία, *ſuperinſpection*. The Image which is evocated at ſacred Rites, muſt be intelligible and wholly ſeparate from Bodies: but the Form or Image of Nature is not every way intelligible: for Nature is for the moſt part an Adminiſtrative Faculty. *Call not*, ſaith he, in the Rites *the ſelf-conſpicuous Image of Nature*; for it will bring thee nothing along with it but only a crowd of the four Natural Elements.

*Nature perſwades that Dæmons are pure.*
*The bourgeons even of ill matter are profitable and good.*

Not that Nature her ſelf perſwades this, but that being called before her preſence there floweth in a great Company of *Dæmons* and many Dæmonious

Dæmonious forms of ſeveral ſhapes appear raiſed up out of all the Elements, compounded and ſhaped from all the parts of the Lunar Courſe, and many times appearing pleaſant and gracious they make ſhew of an apparition of ſome good to the initiated perſon.

*The Soul of man will in a manner claſp God to her ſelf.*
*Having nothing mortal ſhe is wholly inebriated from God.*
*For ſhe boaſts harmony, in which the mortal body exiſts.*]

He ſaith that the Soul *forceth*, for that is the meaning of ἄγχει, the divine fire into her ſelf through immortality and purity, for then ſhe is *wholly inebriated*, that is, ſhe is repleniſhed with the more excellent Life and Illumination, and exiſts as it were out of her ſelf: then the Oracle ſaith to her, *boaſt of Harmony*; that is, glory in the obſcure and intelligible Harmony by which thou art tied together in Arithmetical and Muſical Proportions: for under this intelligible Harmony even the mortal and compounded Body is compoſed, having its compoſitions derived from thence.

*Let the immortal depth of the Soul be predominant, but all thy Eyes*
*Extend upward.*]

The *depth of the Soul* is her threefold powers; the intellectual, the intelligent, the opinionative. Her *Eyes* are the threefold cognoſcitive operations of theſe; for the Eye is the Symbol of Knowledge, as Life is of Appetite. Open therefore, ſaith he, the immortal Depth of the Soul, and extend thy cognoſcitive Powers upwards, and even thy own ſelf (to uſe our own Expreſſion) *transfer to the Lord.*

*Defile not the Spirit, nor deep not a Superficies.*

The *Chaldæans* cloath the Soul with two Garments: one they call ſpiritual, woven for it by the ſenſible World; the other Luci-form, tenuious and intangible, which is here termed *Superficies*: *Defile not*, ſaith he, the ſpiritual Garment of thy Soul with impurity; neither cauſe its Superficies to grow *deep* by certain material Additions: but preſerve both in their own Natures, one pure, the other undipt.

*Seek Paradiſe.*]

The Chaldaick *Paradiſe* is the whole Chorus of Divine powers about the Father, and the fiery Beauties of the creative fountains: The opening thereof by piety is the Participation of the Goods; the flaming Sword is the implacable power which withſtands thoſe that approach it unworthily; to ſuch perſons it is ſhut, for they are not capable of its felicity. To the Pious it is open: to this place tend all the Theurgick Vertues.

*This Veſſel the Beaſts of the Earth ſhall inhabit.*]

The *Veſſel* is the compounded mixture of the Soul, the Beaſts of the Earth are the Dæmons which rove about the Earth: our life therefore being full of paſſions ſhall be inhabited by ſuch Beaſts: for ſuch kinds are eſſentiated in paſſions, and have a material Seat and Order. Wherefore ſuch as are addicted to paſſions are glued to them by aſſimulation, for they attract what is like them, having a motive-faculty from the paſſions.

*If thou extend the fiery mind to the work of Piety,*
*Thou ſhalt preſerve the flaxible Body.*

That is, *If thou extend thy illuminated Mind* upwards, and the Work of fire *to the Works of Piety*, (the Works of Piety, with the *Chaldæans*, are the Methods of Rites), thou ſhalt not only render the Soul unvanquiſhable by Paſſions, but ſhalt alſo preſerve thy Body the more healthful; for this ordinarily is the effect of Divine Illuminations, *viz.* to conſume the matter of the Body, and to eſtabliſh health, that it be not ſeized either by paſſion or diſeaſes.

*Certainly out of the cavities of the Earth ſpring terreſtrial Dogs,*
*Which ſhew no true ſign to mortal Man.*]

The ſpeech is of material Dæmons: Theſe he calls *Dogs*, for that they are Executioners of Souls; *Terreſtrial*, for that they fall from Heaven, and are rolled about the Earth. Theſe, ſaith he, being removed far from the Beatitude of Divine Life, and deſtitute of Intellectual Contemplation, cannot preſignifie Futures; whence all that they ſay or ſhow is falſe, and not ſolid: for they know Beings μορφοτικῶς, by their Out-ſides; but, that which knoweth figures μερικᾶς, particularly, uſeth Notions indiviſible and not figured.

*For the Father perfected all things, and delivered them over to the ſecond*
*Mind, which all Nations of men call the firſt.*]

The firſt *Father of the Triad*, having made the Univerſal Frame, deliver'd it over to the *Mind*; which Mind the whole Race of Mankind (being Ignorant of the Paternal Excellency) call the *firſt God*: but our Doctrine holds the contrary, *viz.* that the firſt Mind, the Son of the Great Father, made and perfected every Creature; for the Father, in the Book of *Moſes*, declareth to the Son the Idæa of the Production of Creatures, but the Son himſelf is the Maker of the Work.

*The furies are Stranglers of Men.*]

(Ἀναγωγοὶ ἄγγελοι) The reductive Angels reduce Souls to them, drawing them from general things; but the *Furies* (ποιναὶ) being the Tormentors of the Natures which are diſperſed, and envious of humane Souls, entangle them in material Paſſions; and as it were ſtrangle them; and not only torture ſuch as are full of paſſions, but even thoſe that are converted towards the immaterial Eſſence, for theſe alſo coming into matter and into generation, ſtand in need of ſuch purification: for we ſee many Perſons even of thoſe who live holily and purely, fall into unexpected Miſeries.

*The Paternal mind hath implanted Symbols in Souls.*]

As the *Moſaick* Book ſaith, that Man was formed after the Image of God; ſo the *Chaldæan* ſaith, that the Maker and Father of the World *ſowed Symbols* of his Eſſence in the Souls thereof. For out of the paternal Seed, not only Souls, but all ſuperior Orders ſprung. But in Incorporeal ſubſtances, there is one kind of ſigns, *viz.* Incorporeal, and Individual; In the World, there are other ſigns and Symbols, the unſpeakable properties of God, which are far moſt Excellent than the Vertues themſelves.

*The Souls of thoſe who quit the Body violently are moſt pure.*]

Whoſoever ſhall take this ſaying rightly, will find that it contradicts not our Doctrine; for the Crowned Martyrs who in time of perſecution leave their Bodies by a violent End, purifie and perfect their Souls: but this is not that which the *Chaldæan* means. He praiſeth all violent Death, becauſe the Soul, which leaveth the Body with trouble, abhors this Life, and hateth converſation with the Body, and, rejoycing, flyeth up to the things above: but thoſe Souls which forſake this Life, their Bodies being naturally diſſolved by ſickneſs, do regret its propenſion and inclination to the Body.

*Becauſe the Soul being a bright fire by the power of the Father*
*Remains immortal, and is Miſtreſs of Life,*
*And poſſeſſeth many Complections of the cavities of the World.*]

The Soul being an immaterial and incorporeal *fire*, exempt from all compounds, and from the material Body, is immortal: for nothing material or dark is commixed with her, neither is ſhe compounded, ſo as that ſhe may be reſolved into thoſe things of which ſhe conſiſts; but ſhe is the Miſtreſs of Life, enlightning the Dead with Life, ſhe hath the Complements of many Receſſes, that is, ſuſceptive of the Government of Matter, for ſhe is enabled according to her different Vertues to dwell in different Zones of the World.

*The Father infuſeth not fear, but inſtead of perſwaſion.*]

That is, the Divine Nature is not ſtern and full of indignation, but ſweet and calm; whence it doth not cauſe *fear* in the Natures ſubjected to it, but attracts all things by *perſwaſion* and graciouſneſs; for if it were formidable and minacious, every Order of Beings would have been diſſolved; None of them being able to endure his Power. And this Doctrine, is in part eſteemed true amongſt us, for God is a Light, and a fire conſuming the Wicked: The Menaces and affrightings of God are the intermiſſion of the Divine Goodneſs towards us, by reaſon of our ill management of our Affairs.

*The Father hath ſnatched away himſelf:*
*Neither hath he ſhut up his own fire in his Intellectual fire.*]

The meaning of which Oracle, is this, The God of all things, who is alſo termed Father, hath made himſelf incomprehenſible, not only to the firſt and ſecond Natures, and to our Souls, but even to his own Power; for the Father, ſaith he, hath ſnatch'd himſelf away from every Nature: But this Doctrine is not Orthodox; for with us the Father is known in the Son, as the Son in the Father, and the Son is the Definition of the Father, and the Divine ſupernatural World.

*For the Intelligible is ſomething, which it behooves thee to comprehend with the flower of the Mind.*]

The Soul hath a power correſpondent to every thing that is conceivable by the Mind; As to ſenſibles, Senſe; to cogitables, Cogitation; to intelligibles, Mind. Now the *Chaldæan* ſaith, that although God is an Intelligible, yet he is not Comprehenſible by the Mind, but only by the *flower of the Mind*. The flower of the Mind is the (ἑνίαια) ſingular power of the Soul; Since, therefore, God is properly One, endeavour not to comprehend him by the Mind, but by the ſingular power: for that which is firſt One, can only be apprehended by that which is one in us, and not either by cogitation or Mind.

*The ungirders of the Soul which give her breathing are eaſie to be looſed.*]

Leſt any One ſhould ſay, I would free my Soul from my Body, but I cannot; the Oracle tells us, that the powers, which *thruſt the Soul* out of the natural Body, and give her breathing, as it were, from the toyl and trouble of the Body, are eaſily *looſed*; that is, theſe faculties are free, and not reſtrained by any Nature, and able to ſet the Body at Liberty, generouſly from corporeal Bonds.

*It behooves thee to haſten to the Light, and to the Beams of the Father,*
*From whence was ſent to thee a Soul cloathed with much Mind.*]

Seeing that the Soul hath not its Being from Seed, neither conſiſts of corporeal mixtures, but had its Eſſence from God above; therefore ſhe ought to turn towards Him, and to make her return to the *Divine Light*: for ſhe came down *cloathed with much Mind*; that is, ſhe was furniſhed by the Maker and Father with many Remembrances of the Divine ſayings, when ſhe came hither, whence ſhe ſhould endeavour to return by the ſame Remembrances.

*All things are produced out of one Fire.*]

This is a true Doctrine, conformable to our Religion; for all Beings, as well intelligible, as ſenſible, received their Eſſence from God above, and are converted to God alone; thoſe which have being only, Eſſentially; thoſe which have being

being and Life, Essentially and vitally; those which have being and Life and Mind, Essentially and Vitally and Intellectually. From *One* therefore *all things came*, and to One is their return: This Oracle is not to be condemned, but is full of our Doctrine.

*What the Mind speaks, it speaks by Intellection.*]

When (saith he) thou shalt hear an articulate Voice, Thundering from above out of Heaven, think not that the Angel or God who sends forth that Voice, did articulate it after our manner enunciatively; but that He, according to his own Nature, conceived it only inarticulately: but thou, according to thy own Impotence, hearest the Notion syllabically and enuntiatively. For as God heareth our Voice not vocally, so Man receiveth the Notions of God vocally, every one according to the operation of his Nature.

*These the Earth bewails even to their Children.*]

It is meant of *Atheists*, that God extends his Vengeance even to their *Posterity*: for the Oracle, to expres the torments which they shall receive under the Earth, saith *It howls beneath for them*: that is, the Place under the Earth bellows to them, and roareth like a Lion. Whence *Proclus* also saith, The Composition of Souls that are of Affinity with one another, is of like Nature; and those which are not yet loosed from the Bands of Nature, are entangled and detained by like passions. These therefore must fulfil all punishments, and since by natural Affinity they are infected with Pollutions, must again be cleansed from them.

*Enlarge not thy Destiny.*]

The wisest of the Greeks call Nature or rather the Completion of the Illuminations which the Nature of Beings receiveth (ἑιμαρμένην) *Fate*. Providence is an Immediate Beneficence from God. But Fate is that which governs all our Affairs, by the concatenation of Beings. We are subjects to Providence, when we act Intellectually; to Fate, when corporeally. Encrease not therefore, saith he, thy Fate, nor endeavour to surmount it, but commit thy self wholly to the Government of God.

*For nothing proceeds from the paternal principle imperfect.*]

The Father (saith he) produceth all things perfect and self-sufficient according to their Order, but the Imbecillity and Remission of the things produced sometimes causeth a Defect and Imperfection, but the Father calleth back again that Defect to Perfection, and converts it to it Self-sufficience. Like this, is that which *James* the Brother of our Lord pronounceth in the beginning of his Epistle, *Every perfect gift cometh down from above from the Father of Lights*. For nothing proceeds Imperfect from the Perfect, and especially when we chance to be ready to receive that which is primarily distilled from him.

*But the Paternal Mind accepts her not until she come forth.*

The Paternal Mind doth not admit the Impulsions of the desires of the Soul, before she hath excluded the forgetfulness of the riches which she received from the most bountiful Father, and called back to her Memory the sacred Watch-words which she received from him, and pronounce the good speech imprinting in her remembrance the Symbols of the Father who begot her. For the Soul consists of sacred Words and divine Symbols, of which those proceed from the sacred Species, these from the divine Monads; and We are (εἴκονες Images of the sacred Essences, but (ἀγάλματα) Statues of the unknown Symbols. Moreover we must know that every Soul differs from another Soul specifically, and that there are as several species of Souls as there are Souls.

*When thou seest the terrestrial Dæmon approach, sacrifice the stone Mnizuris, using invocation.*]

The Dæmons that are near the Earth are by nature lying, as being far off from the Divine knowledge, and filled with dark matter. Now if you would have any true discourse from these, prepare an Altar, and *sacrifice the stone Mnisuris*: this stone hath the power of evocating the other greater Dæmon, who, invisibly approaching to the material Dæmon, will pronounce the true solution of demands, which he transmits to the demandant. The Oracle joyneth the evocative Name with the sacrificing of the stone. The Chaldæan asserts some Dæmons good, others ill; but our Religion defines them to be all ill, as having by a premeditated defection exchanged good for ill.

*Learn the Intelligible, forasmuch as it exists beyond the Mind.*]

For though all things are comprehended by the Mind, yet God the first intelligible exists *without* or *beyond the Mind*. This *without* you must not understand distantially, nor according to intellectual alternity, but according to the intelligible Excess alone, and the propriety of the existence, it being without or beyond all Mind, whereby the superessential is manifested. For the first intelligible Mind is Essence; beyond which is the self-intelligible. Besides these is God, who is beyond the intelligible, and self-intelligible: for We assert the Divinity to be neither intelligible nor self-intelligible, it being more excellent than all Speech and Notion, so as that it is wholly unintelligible, and unexpressible, and more to be honoured by Silence, than reverenc'd by wonderful Expressions. For it is more sublime than to be reverenced, spoken, and conceived.

*Intelligent Iynges do themselves also understand from the Father,*
*By unspeakable Counsels being moved so as to understand.*]

*Iynges* are certain (Vertues or) Powers, next the

the Paternal Depth, consisting of three Triads. These understand according to the Paternal Mind, which containeth their Cause solely in himself. Now the Counsels of the Father in regard of their intelligible sublimity, are not vocal; but the intellectual Marks of abstract things, though understood by Secondaries (or Inferiours) are understood as without speaking, and as it were abstracted from intelligible Prolations. For as the Conceptions of Souls, they understand intellectual Orders, yet understand them as immutable: So the Acts of the Intellectuals understanding the intellectual Signs, understand them as not a vocal subsisting in unknown Existences.

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## CONJECTURES upon the Greek Text of the ORACLES.

WHO it was that rendred these Oracles in Greek is (as we said) uncertain; much more certain is it that they were all composed in Hexametre Verse: though they are sometimes cited indistinctly and abruptly by *Patricius*, seeming wholly irreconcileable with Poetick Numbers; yet that the greater part of them are Hexametres, none can deny; and whosoever shall look more cautiously upon the rest, will find Prints enough, by which they may be traced and demonstrated to have been of the same kind, though confounded in the manner of Citations, sometimes by the Authors out of which *Patricius* took them, sometimes by *Patricius* himself, who was far more diligent to collect and digest, than curious to distinguish them, or to regard their Numbers: which defect we shall endeavour, in some measure, to supply.

### ΜΟΝΑΣ, ΔΥΑΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΡΙΑΣ.

Ὅπῃ παλεγκὴ μονάς ἔζτι.]

The latter part of the Hexametre, ——Ὅπῃ παλεγκὴ μονάς ἔζτι. as is that also which immediately follows,

—— Ταναὴ [ἔζι] μονὰς, ἢ δύο γίγνᾶ.

and the next,

—— Δυὰς [γὰρ] ἥδε τῶνδε κάθηται. That which follows is cited again by it self afterward.

Καὶ τὸ κυβερνᾶν]

This seems to be a loose Citation of two several Hemistichs, with reference to the Phrase (infinitively) not to the Verse.

Ἀρχὴ πάσης τμήσεως ἡ ἓν ἡ πάξις]

Read, perhaps,

Ἀρχὴ τοι πάσης τ' τμήσεως, ἥδε ἓν πάξις.

Οὐ τὸ θέλειν κατέδυσε, καὶ ἥδη πάντα ἐτέτμητο.]

The Verse requires —— πάντ' ἐτέτμητο.

Εἰς τέλα γὰρ εἶπε νῶς παλεγὸς.]

Before,

Εἰς τέλα γὰρ νῶς εἶπε παλεγὸς.

Καὶ ἐφάνησαν ὲν αὐτῇ ἡ τ' ἀρετή.]

Perhaps [καὶ]

——ἐφάνησαν ὲν αὐτῇ

Ἥ τ' ἀρετὴ σοφίη τε, καὶ ἡ πολύφρων ἀτρεκίη.

Ἱερὸς πρῶτος ὁ νόμος, ἐν δ' ἄρα μέζῳ]

Read μέσῳ.

Καὶ πηγὴ πηγῶν.]

Perhaps,

Καὶ πηγὴ πηγῶν, μήτηρ συνέχουσα τὰ πάντα: the rest being a Gloss.

Ἐν δεν ἄρρλω]

It should be Ἐν δ' ἄρρλω.

Ἐν δεν συνόμῳ πρησὶν ἀμυδρὸν πρὸς ἄνθος.]

*Proclus* reads ἀμυδρῷ in Theolog.

### ΠΑΤΗΡ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΥΣ.

Ἑαυτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ἤρπασεν, ὅλ' ὲν ἓῇ.]

*Pletho* reads,

Οὐλ' ὲν ἓῇ δυνάμει νοερᾶ κλείζας ἴδιον πῦρ·

Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσε.]

*Pletho*,

Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσε πατὴρ, καὶ νῶ παρέδωκε

Δεύτερῳ, ὃν πρῶτον κλητίζεται (perhaps κλητίζετο) πρὶν γόνος ἀνδρῶν.

Πολὺ γὰρ μόνος.]

Distinguish,

——πολὺ γὰρ μόνος ὢν παλεγὸς ἀλκῆς]

Δρεπτάμενος νόος ἄνθος.

Πᾶσιν ἐνέσπερε] ἐνέσπερε· and afterwards,

ἔσπερεν καὶ κόζμον.

Μήτε πᾶσα τὰ παλεγὸς νοερᾶς ὑφασμένα φέυγει.]

Perhaps,

Μήδεα πᾶσι παλεγὸς, &c.

Ἔχει τῷ νοεῖν παλεγκὸν νῶν ἐνδιδόναι.]

Perhaps, ——ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν παλεγκὸν νῶν

Ἐνδιδόναι πάζαιαν (ὁμῶς) πηγαῖς τε καὶ ἀρχαῖς:

Οὐ γὰρ εἰς ὕλλω, πῦρ ἐπέκεινα τὸ πρῶτον]

Distinguish,

——ὃ γὰρ εἰς ὕλλω

Πῦρ ἐπέκεινα τὸ πρῶτον ἐλὼ δύναμιν καταυλεῖ

Ἔργοις, ἀλλὰ νόῳ——

Νῷ μὲν κατέχει.]

Distinguish,

——νῷ μὲν κατέχει τὰ νοητὰ,

Αἰῶνσιν δ' ἐπάγει κόζμοις——

### ΝΟΥΣ, ΝΟΗΤΑ, ΚΑΙ ΝΟΕΡΑ.

Οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ νόος ἔζτι νοητῶν ὃ χωρὶς ὑπάρχει.]

Afterwards cited thus,

Οὗ γὰρ ἄνευ νόος ἔζτι νοητῶν, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν

Οὐ νῶ χωρὶς ὑπάρχει.

Μάνθανε τὸ νοητόν.]

Afterwards,

Ὄφρα μάθῃς τὸ νοητὸν——

Νῶ γὰρ νῶς ἔζτιν ὁ κόζμος τεχνίτης πυρίος.]

Distinguish,

——νῶ γὰρ νῶς ἔζτιν ὁ κόζμος

Τεχνίτης πυρίος——

Ἔζι γὰρ τὰ νοητὰ] Ἔζιν.

Ἡ γὰρ ἐπεγκλίνῃ, ὡς ἂν νῶν.]

Read and distinguish,

Ἡ γὰρ ἐπεγκλίνῃ σὺν νῶν, καὶκεῖνο νοήζῃ,

Ὡς τὸ νοῶν, ὃ κεῖνο νοήζεις· ἔζι γὰρ ἀλκῆς

Ἀμφιφανὲς δύναμις νοερᾶς ἑρμηνεύσασα τομαῖα.

Οὐ δὲ χρὴ σφοδρότητι νοεῖν τὸ νοητὸν ἐκεῖνο,

Ἀλλὰ νόῳ ταναῷ ταναῇ φλογὶ, πάντα μετρῶσαν

Πλὴν

Πλὴν τὸ νοητὸν σαεῖνο· χρεὼ δὲ τῆτο νοῆσαι.
Ἡ γὰρ ἐπιγκλίνης σὸν νῷ, κἀκεῖνο νοήσεις
Οὐκ ἀτενῶς, ἀλλ' ἀγνὸν ὑπεσφρον ὄμμα, φέροντα
Τῆς ψυχῆς τεῖναι πειθὸν νόον εἰς τὸ νοητόν.
Ὅφρα μάθῃς τὸ νοητὸν, ἐπεὶ νόος ἔξω ὑπολέχει.

And presently after,

——ὁ γὰρ ἀνὴρ νόος ἔστι νοητὸς, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν
Οὐ νῷ χωρὶς ὑπολέχει——

## ΙΥΝΓΕΣ, ΙΔΕΑΙ, ΑΡΧΑΙ.

Πολλαὶ μέν.]

Distinguish,

πολλαὶ αἵδε ἐπιμελέσθαι φαεινὸς
Κόσμοις, ἐνθρώσκουσαι, ἐν ὧν ἀνεφάνησαν ἴασι
Τρεῖς.
Νοῦς πατρὸς ἐρρόησε.]

cited elsewhere by *Patricius* clearly, without [αἱ ἂν συνάπτωσι καὶ παλιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλα τόπους, ἀπὸ μεταλαμβανόντων ὀχετῶν.] which belong to some other place.

[Ἐξ ἁπλοΐσεως.]

Distinguish,

——μεμερισμέναι ἄλλαι,
Ἄλλαι μέν τε νόμοι κόσμου φρὶ σώματι· αἱ φρὶ πόλησι
Σμερδαλέως, σμικρὸν ἐστὶν ἐοικυῖαι, φορέονται.
Πολὺ δ' ἐφαπτόμεναι πυρὸς ἄνθος.]

Distinguish,

——πολὺ
Ἐφαπτόμεναι πυρὸς ἄνθος ἀκοιμήτοις χρόνοις.

Ἀρχεγόνοι ἰδέαι πρώτη παλιγγενὲς ἔβλυσε· τὰς δ'
Αὐτοπατὴς πατὴρ.

## ΕΚΑΤΗ, ΣΥΝΟΧΕΙΣ, ΤΕΛΕΤΑΡΧΑΙ.

Ἐξ ὧν τὰς δὲ πάντας ἐνθρώσκουσι.]

Distinguish,

——ἀμείλικτοι τε κεραυνοὶ,
Καὶ πρηστῆρες ὀδοὶ καὶ πολύπτοι παμφεγγέος ἁλικῆς
Παλιγοκλυδὲς ἑκάτης· καὶ ὑπερζωκὰς πυρὸς ἀνθος,

Ἡ δὲ κραταιὸν πνεῦμα πόλων, πυρὸς ἐπέφρα.
Ὅτι καὶ τὸ ζωογόνον.]

Distinguish,

Τῆς ἑκάτης κόλπον. καὶ ὑπερέχει τοῖς Συνοχεῦσιν
Ἀλκὴ ζείδωρον πυρὸς μέγα δυναμένοιο.
Ἀλλὰ καὶ φρουρεῖ.]

Distinguish,

Ἔργων εἰσὶ πατρὸς. ἀφορμοὶ γὰρ ἑαυτῶν,
Κἀνεργὸν ἐπιγόμενον.
Παντοίας σὺν δημα βάλλῃ.]

Distinguish,

Παντοίας σὺν δημα βαλλεῖν φρενὶ, μηδ'
ὑπερβολαῖς
Ἐμπυρίοις σπερχθῇς ὀχετοῖς, ἀλλὰ φρονίμως.

## ΨΥΧΗ, ΦΥΣΙΣ.

Ὅτι ψυχή.]

*Pletho*, Ὅτι.

Μετὰ δὲ πατρικὰς διανοίας.]

Distinguish,

——μετὰ δὲ πατρικὰς διανοίας,
Ψυχὴ, ἐγὼ, ναίω, θερμοψυχέσα τὰ πάντα.
Μὴ φύσεως ἐμβλέψῃς.]

*Proclus* in Theolog.

Μὴ φύσιν ἐμβλέψῃς, εἰμαρμένου ὄνομα τῆσδε.

What follows under the Title of ΟΥΡΑΝΟΣ is very confused, the same Fragments being often repeated.

## ΨΥΧΗ, ΣΩΜΑ, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ.

Most of these are perfect, being put forth by *Pletho* and *Psellus*.

Δίζεο σὺ ψυχῆς ὀχετὸν, ὅθεν, ἢ τίνι τάξει
Σώματι δηλήσεις (so *Pletho*) ὅτι τάξιν ἀφ' ἧς
ἐρρύης
(read ἐρρύσθης.)
Αὖθις, &c.

The rest may be corrected by the Edition of *Pletho* and *Psellus*.

FINIS.

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